


Joint Publication 3-33



Joint Task Force Headquarters



30 July 2012



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters to command and control joint operations. It provides guidance on the JTF headquarters' role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing JTF operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during operations and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of stylized, overlapping letters that appear to be 'W', 'E', and 'G'.

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY
VADM, USN
Director, Joint Staff

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JP 3-33 DATED 16 FEBRUARY 2007

- **Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between joint publication (JP) 3-33, *Joint Taskforce Headquarters*, and JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.**
- **Reorganizes chapters into a logical flow for ease of reading and understanding the organization and development of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ).**
- **Expands on the discussion of individual augmentation and the joint manning document when developing the JTF HQ.**
- **Adds detailed discussion on different types of JTF HQ to provide an in-depth understanding on how and why JTFs are stood up and organized.**
- **Eliminates discussions on subordinate component commands in Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands,” to reduce redundancy with other JPs and bring this publication in-line with current approved and emerging joint doctrine.**
- **Adds major discussion and an appendix on joint task force-state to provide guidance on command and control relationships and responsibility differences between federal and state troops in a domestic response situation.**
- **Incorporates appropriate changes with the disestablishment of US Joint Forces Command and the reorganization of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command under United States Transportation Command.**
- **Adds an appendix on JTF-Capable HQ that provides a framework and considerations for forming and sustaining the readiness of a JTF HQ within the Department of Defense.**
- **Removes the appendix for contract support and contractor management planning since JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, provides this information more extensively.**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Presents an Overview of a Joint Task Force (JTF)
 - Describes Forming and Organizing a JTF Headquarters
 - Covers JTF Subordinate Commands
 - Explains Command and Control of a JTF
 - Provides Descriptions of the JTF Directorates: Manpower and Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans and Policy, and Communications
-

Introduction to the Joint Task Force

A combatant commander (CCDR) will be the joint task force (JTF) establishing authority in most situations, but Secretary of Defense, a subunified command commander, and a commander, joint task force, also may establish subordinate JTFs.

A joint task force (JTF) is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC). The JTF establishing authority designates the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assigns the mission, designates forces, delegates command authorities and relationships, and provides other command and control (C2) guidance necessary for the CJTF to form the joint force and begin operations. The appropriate authority may establish a JTF on a geographic or functional basis or a combination of the two. In either case, the establishing authority typically assigns a joint operations area (JOA) to the JTF. The size, composition, capabilities, and other attributes will vary significantly among JTFs based on the mission and various factors of the operational environment, such as the adversary, the geography of the JOA, the nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to accomplish the mission.

Joint Functions and Joint Staff Directorates

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help the JFC and component commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups: C2, intelligence, fires, movement and

maneuver, protection, and sustainment. **The Basic Element of the JTF Staff is the Directorate.** Typically, these are the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1), intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4), plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5), and communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6).

Interorganizational Considerations

The CJTF, joint force staff, and components may operate with many interorganizational partners throughout the course of a single operation. The nature of interaction and considerations (type, authorities, protocols, etc.) vary with each potential partner.

Joint Task Force-State

When a state governor responds to support requests from civil authorities by activating Air National Guard and National Guard forces, a joint task force-state (JTF-State) may be formed; however, it is not a Title 10, United States Code, JTF as described in Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. The JTF-State establishing authority is the governor of a state and is based on state law.

Forming and Organizing a Joint Task Force Headquarters

Forming the JTF Headquarters (HQ)

The preferred approach to forming a JTF headquarters (HQ) is to do so around an existing C2 structure. Typically this is a combatant command's (CCMD's) Service component HQ or a subordinate Service component HQ.

Augmenting the HQ

Augmentation of the JTF HQ is a function of both the CJTF's mission and the JTF's force composition. The CJTF's mission is the most important factor in determining the required type of core staff augmentation. Mission analysis should consider the JTF HQ required capabilities and other related functions. Several sources of augmentation available to the core staff are: Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, joint organizational augmentees, joint individual augmentees, Service and special operations augmentees, liaison officers

(LNOs), and interorganizational partners.

Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities

Commander, Joint Task Force. The CJTF is ultimately responsible to the establishing authority for JTF actions.

The **chief of staff** is the key JTF staff integrator. This is accomplished through the establishment and management of staff processes and procedures that support the command's decision-making process.

Personal and special staffs perform duties as prescribed by CJTF and handle special matters over which the CJTF wishes to exercise close personal control. These staff groups may include (but are not limited to) public affairs officer, staff judge advocate, joint force chaplain, surgeon, inspector general, provost marshal, comptroller, HQ commandant, historian, and others (e.g., safety officer, political advisor) as directed.

Joint Task Force Staff Directorates. The basic element of the JTF staff is the directorate. Typically, these are the J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-6. These primary staff directorates provide staff supervision of related processes, activities, and capabilities associated with the basic joint functions described in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

Staff Organization

Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this **cross-functional collaboration** is the formation of an appropriate organizational structure to manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment.

Liaison Personnel

Exchanging LNOs is the most commonly employed technique for establishing close, continuous, physical communications among organizations. Liaison personnel enhance information sharing and contribute significantly to mission success.

Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands

Task Organization and Common Responsibilities

The subordinate Service components' HQ and their forces provide the basic building blocks for the JTF's component structure.

The CJTF can organize the JTF with Service components, functional components, or a combination based on the nature of the mission and the operational environment. In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, following are typical general responsibilities common to both Service and functional component commanders. Plan and execute operations to accomplish missions or tasks assigned by the higher commander's plans or orders. Advise the higher commander regarding employment possibilities of and consequences to achieving the subordinate commander mission objectives, cooperation with appropriate government and nongovernmental agencies, and other matters of common concern.

Service Component Commands

A JTF-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all Service forces that have been assigned or attached to the JTF.

Service component commanders have responsibilities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services support function. The CJTF also may conduct operations through the Service component commander or, at lower echelons, other Service force commanders. A JFC can only delegate that control over forces for which the JFC has been given.

Functional Component Commands

CJTFs may normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command typically consists of forces of two or more Military Departments established to perform designated missions. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the functional component commander.

Subordinate JTFs

A CJTF is authorized to establish subordinate JTFs as circumstances require. It is more common to form special-purpose JTFs that focus on specific functional aspects of the CJTF's operations. Because of the nature and visibility of civil-military operations and military information support operations, the CJTF may establish separate task forces for these activities.

Joint Task Force Command and Control

JTF HQ Command and Control Factors

The eight C2 factors are: the role of the commander in the JTF C2; command relationships; understanding the operational environment; operational area management; operational limitations; interorganizational considerations; multinational considerations; and civil-support organization considerations. The CJTF has the authority and responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions. The CJTF normally exercises operational control (OPCON) over assigned forces and OPCON or tactical control over attached forces through designated component, major subordinate command, or subordinate task force commanders. A critical function of the JTF is to organize the operational area to assist in the integration, coordination, and deconfliction of joint actions. The CJTF can employ areas of operations, joint special operations area, amphibious objective areas, and joint security areas to support the organization of the operational area within the assigned JOA.

JTF HQ Management Process

The CJTF and staff use a number of processes, such as the joint operation planning process (JOPP) that support the JTF's requirements, activities, and products. Three of these processes—JTF information management, the commander's decision cycle, and the HQ battle rhythm—are especially important for the efficient management of day-to-day HQ operations. The **information management process** facilitates the commander's decision making by improving the speed and accuracy of information flow as well as supporting execution through reliable communications. The **commander's decision cycle** is a process that depicts how command and staff elements determine required actions, codify them in directives, execute them, and monitor their results. A **battle rhythm** is a routine cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.

Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel

JTF manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) is principal staff assistant to the CJTF on manpower management, personnel management, personnel readiness, and personnel services.

The J-1 maintains the joint manning document, is the focal point for personnel support actions, and responsible for managing, optimizing, and synchronizing the level of personnel support provided to the task force during all phases of an operation. Although the Services have the primary responsibility for providing personnel services support to their Service members, the joint force J-1 tracks the efforts of Service components to stay abreast of personnel activities that could impact the joint force.

J-1 Responsibilities

Some responsibilities and functions executed by the J-1 are: personnel management, manpower management, joint manning document development process, joint individual augmentation, sourcing joint manning document requirements, joint manning document activation and maintenance, establishing a joint personnel reception center, and personnel accountability and strength reporting.

Personnel Planning

The JTF J-1 must be fully involved in planning efforts and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander's estimate and plan development. The JTF J-1 also coordinates related personnel planning issues with the supported CCMD J-1.

Joint Task Force Intelligence

Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-2)

The intelligence directorate's primary function is to provide information and analysis to facilitate accomplishment of the mission. This is accomplished through an intelligence process, which involves the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of information important to decision makers. The JTF J-2 conducts all-source, multi-discipline intelligence operations and ensures full access to an uninhibited flow of information from all sources in accordance with Department of Defense and Director of National Intelligence approved procedures.

J-2 Organization

Each JTF J-2 organizational structure is situation dependent. At a minimum, a core element of analytical and administrative capabilities is required.

Intelligence Disciplines and Sources

Intelligence disciplines are well-defined areas of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. Intelligence sources are grouped according to one of the seven intelligence disciplines: geospatial intelligence; human intelligence; signals intelligence; measurement and signature intelligence; open-source intelligence; technical intelligence; and counterintelligence.

Supported CCDR's Joint Intelligence Operations Center

The CCMD joint intelligence operations center fuses national-level, operational-level, and tactical-level intelligence, and acts as the combatant commander's (CCDR's) intelligence support mechanism to deployed JTFs, as required.

Joint Intelligence Support Element

The joint intelligence support element (JISE) integrates intelligence operations with operational and planning functions and performs common intelligence functions. By design, the JISE is scalable to meet the needs of the JTF, and it is tailored to fit the operational environment based on identified CJTF requirements.

Joint Task Force Operations

Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3)

The J-3 assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the **direction and control of operations**, beginning with planning and through completion of specific operations. In this capacity, the J-3 **plans, coordinates, and integrates** operations.

J-3 Organization

The CJTF should establish a joint operations center (JOC) to serve as a focal point for all operational matters and, in the absence of a JISE, intelligence

The actual J-3 composition will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted. The J-3 (and deputy) serve as principal advisor to the CJTF on operational matters. Current operations functions, to include the air, land, maritime, space, and special operations aspects, normally are performed by the joint operations center. The future operations staff is the core set of

matters. The JOC is led by the chief of operations.

J-3 planners that forms the nucleus of the planning teams focused on the near-term planning requirements. The joint fires element is an integrating staff element that synchronizes and coordinates fires and effects planning and coordination on behalf of the CJTF. JTF information operations (IO) staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplish CJTF objectives. Uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate, negate, or harm other JTF military operations, as well as other US Government information activities. The force protection (FP) element is responsible for providing analysis and recommendations to the staff concerning risks to the mission, FP measures, vulnerability assessments, resource allocation as well as any other products required by the CJTF and staff.

Joint Task Force Logistics

Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-4)

Successfully integrating or synchronizing logistics resources within the joint force and with partners is paramount in achieving sustained joint logistics readiness that enables operational adaptability and freedom of action for the JFC.

The J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans and with the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, engineering, health service support, operational contract support, and logistic services to include food service and related logistic activities. Given the functional role of this directorate and the Service responsibilities for support to their respective JTF components, consideration should be given to the established policies and procedures of the various Military Departments.

J-4 Organization

JTF J-4 organization should be tailored to respond to the anticipated operation. To accomplish this, it should include specialists from the various logistic functional areas: supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, engineering, health service support, operational contract support, and logistic services (e.g., food service, billeting, textile repair and clothing exchange, and laundry and shower).

J-4 Responsibilities

The JTF J-4 responsibilities may include the following: coordinate the overall JTF logistic functions and requirements; coordinate common item supply and services support in accordance with

tasking assigned in the operation plan or operation order; coordinate common-user logistics Service responsibilities as designated; arrange for and monitor transportation movement requirements; coordinate the operation of transportation nodes within the JOA including airports, seaports, and beaches; identify and coordinate host-nation support and local resource requirements with the civil-military operations center or primary agency; identify theater requirements for contract support against existing contracting assets; coordinate agreements, transactions, and implementing instructions with the appropriate component and multinational points of contact for US and multinational mutual support logistic exchange issues.

Logistics Staff Organizations

Joint logistic operations center serves as the JTF J-4 operations center for all logistic functions and staff organizations and can provide the JTF with logistic oversight, coordination, and control of logistic functions. The **joint movement center** implements the CJTF's taskings and priorities for movement. The JTF **contracting office**, working with the geographic CCDR logistic procurement support board or joint contracting center, is established (with warranted contracting officers) to coordinate contracting requirements for and assisting in the acquisition of local facilities, supplies, services, and support. In most cases, the CJTF will direct the JTF J-4 to establish and operate a **joint mortuary affairs office**.

Joint Task Force Plans and Policy

Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-5)

The J-5 assists the commander in planning and preparation of joint plans, orders, and associated estimates of the situation.

Policy Directorate

At the discretion of the CJTF, and based on factors such as size and expected duration of the CJTF, a policy division may be established within the JTF J-5.

J-5 Organization

A notional JTF J-5 organization consists of the following sections: the plans directorate, administration, plans, policy, deployment support, joint planning group, and strategy.

J-5 Responsibilities

The JTF J-5 provides political-military oversight for all aspects of JTF operations. JTF J-5 responsibilities include: develop, revise, and coordinate required plans and orders in support of assigned CJTF missions; lead the JTF deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP); and determine the forces required and available, and coordinate deployment planning in support of the selected course of action.

JTF Planning

The CJTF and staff develop plans and orders through the application of operational art, operational design, and the JOPP.

Adaptive Planning and Execution System

Joint operation planning is accomplished through the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system. The joint planning and execution community uses APEX to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations.

Joint Operation Planning Process

Key to **JOPP** is the interaction of CJTF, JTF staff, and the commanders and staffs of the next higher, lower, and supporting commands. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

Joint Planning Group

The joint planning group is a planning group charged with writing deliberate plans and orders for the JTF as well as for the execution of CAP and writing and developing future plans.

Joint Task Force Communications

Communications Systems Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-6)

The JTF J-6 assists the commander in all responsibilities for communications infrastructure, communications-computer networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability. This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the command's operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for

implementation and integration of interoperable communications to exercise command in the execution of the mission.

J-6 Organization

The actual composition of the J-6 will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted. Several of the J-6's functions may be placed under the joint network operations control center.

J-6 Responsibilities

Provide the communications system to support reliable, timely information flow in support of joint operations. This includes the development of communications system architectures and plans, as well as policy, guidance, and instructions for the integration and installation of operational communications system.

J-6 Requirements

JTF HQ and each assigned component must be prepared to provide its own communications support. JTF HQ communications support may be provided by the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)-controlled assets when requested by the supported CCDR and approved by the CJCS. However, if the JCSE is already committed, the supported CCDR may direct that this support be provided by a Service component or a consolidation of assets from the CCDR's components.

Information Systems Support

The J-6 ensures information systems support complements the overall information management plan. United States Strategic Command or Service network operations components control the communications system with input from the CJTF to ensure data and information get to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a JTF HQ to C2 joint operations. It provides guidance on the role of the JTF HQ in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing JTF operations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT TASK FORCE

“Organizing for joint operations involves many considerations. Most can be associated in three primary groups related to organizing the joint force, organizing the joint force headquarters, and organizing operational areas to help control operations.”

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011

1. General

a. A joint force is composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC). There are three types of joint forces: combatant command (CCMD), subordinate unified command (also called subunified command), and joint task force (JTF). A CCMD is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). A commander of a unified command may establish subunified commands to conduct operations on a continuing geographic or functional basis. **A combatant commander (CCDR) will be the JTF establishing authority in most situations, but SecDef, a subunified command commander, and a commander, joint task force (CJTF), also may establish subordinate JTFs.**

b. A JTF is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single JFC. The JTF establishing authority designates the CJTF, assigns the mission, designates forces, delegates command authorities and relationships, and provides other command and control (C2) guidance necessary for the CJTF to form the joint force and begin operations. The appropriate authority may establish a JTF on a geographic or functional basis or a combination of the two. In either case, the establishing authority typically assigns a joint operations area (JOA) to the JTF. There may also be situations in which a CJTF has a logistics-focused mission. In these situations, the CCDR should delegate directive authority for common support capabilities over specific logistic forces, facilities, and supplies to the CJTF. Figure I-1 outlines key JTF establishing authority responsibilities.

c. A CJTF has authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and require coordination among subordinate commanders. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Generally, a CJTF should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function as they were designed. The intent is to meet the CJTF's mission requirements while maintaining the functional integrity of Service components. A CJTF may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. A CJTF typically organizes the joint force with a combination of Service and functional components and additional attachments as required. The CJTF and component

Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibility

- Appoint the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assign the mission and forces, and exercise command and control of the joint task force (JTF).
 - In coordination with the CJTF, determine the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission.
 - Allocate or request forces required.
- Provide the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for the directed military operations.
- Define the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified.)
 - Provide or coordinate communications, personnel recovery, and security for forces moving into or positioned outside the JOA thus facilitating the commander's freedom of action.
- Develop, modify as required, and promulgate to all concerned rules of engagement and rules for the use of force tailored to the situation.
- Monitor the operational situation and keep superiors informed through periodic reports.
- Provide guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execute orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).
- Promulgate changes in plans and modify mission and forces as necessary.
- Provide or coordinate administrative and sustainment support.
- Recommend to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.
- Establish or assist in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation.
- Determine supporting force requirements.
 - Prepare a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).
- Approve CJTF plans.
- Delegate directive authority for common support capabilities (if required).

NOTE:

Directive authority for logistics is only exercised by combatant commanders.

Figure I-1. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibility

commanders will typically augment their headquarters (HQ) with additional enabling capabilities from sources such as the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). A CJTF can also form a subordinate JTF when necessary. Figure I-2 shows basic JTF organizational options.




Figure I-2. Joint Task Force Organizational Options

See Chapter II, “Forming and Organization the Joint Task Force Headquarters,” for information on JECC capabilities. Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands,” provides details on JTF component commands.

d. The CJTF and staff have a fundamental role in *unified action*—the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. The JTF may often operate in conjunction with multinational military forces. Even as a US unilateral force a JTF usually will operate with a variety of nonmilitary interorganizational partners. These partners can include any combination of United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and members of the private sector. JTF commanders will be challenged to achieve and maintain operational coherence given the requirement to operate in conjunction with interorganizational partners (USG departments and agencies, state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations [IGOs]; NGOs; and the private sector).

e. JTFs can be organized, staffed, and equipped for operations across the full range of military operations. The size, composition, capabilities, and other attributes will vary significantly among JTFs based on the mission and various factors of the operational environment, such as the adversary, the geography of the JOA, the nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to accomplish the mission. CJTFs typically function at the operational level and employ their capabilities in all physical dimensions of their JOA and in the information environment. The CJTF and CDR usually collaborate on framing theater-strategic objectives as well as tasks that the CDR eventually will assign to

the JTF. JTF commanders and their staffs collaborate with the JTF's Service and functional components through operational design and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) to plan and execute operations that achieve operational-level and theater-strategic objectives.

f. The establishing authority typically establishes a JTF for a focused and temporary purpose and disestablishes it when the JTF achieves its purpose and is not required for other operations. Occasionally the temporary circumstances that originally required joint operations may become more long-lasting, and the establishing authority must determine the best option to accomplish a continuing requirement. The establishing authority should re-evaluate the task and operational environment to determine if there is still justification for a JTF or if another option is more suitable. Options include:

(1) Continuing the existing JTF's mission indefinitely. An example of a "permanent JTF" is JTF NORTH in the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). This JTF supports federal law enforcement agencies on a continuing basis in the identification and interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the continental US.

(2) Transition the mission to a replacement JTF.

(3) Assign the mission to a Service component HQ when joint operations are not required.

(4) Transition to control of operations by a CCMD staff directorate if the focus is more on management of a long-term program rather than C2 of forces in operations (characteristic of military engagement and security cooperation activities).

(5) Transition to a multinational HQ.

Refer to Annex A, "Checklist for Transition to Permanent Operations," to Appendix A, "Checklists."

For specific guidance for organizing and staffing a JTF and for information and guidance concerning the various components and subordinate task forces that may comprise a JTF, refer to Chapter II, "Forming and Organizing the Joint Task Force Headquarters," and Chapter III, "Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands," respectively.

For additional guidance concerning JTF C2, refer to Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control."

2. Joint Functions and Joint Staff Directorates

a. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help the JFC and component commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups: C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as C2, intelligence, and sustainment apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the JFC's mission requires. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related

capabilities help define each function, and some could apply to more than one joint function. The joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the functions is essential to mission accomplishment.

See Chapter III, “Joint Functions,” of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, for a comprehensive discussion of joint functions.

b. **The Basic Element of the JTF Staff is the Directorate.** Typically, these are the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1), intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4), plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5), and communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6). The primary staff directorates provide staff supervision of related processes, activities, and capabilities associated with the basic joint functions. Some directorates, such as the J-2 and J-4, focus on specific functions (intelligence and logistics respectively), but all directorates have responsibilities that ensure the integration of the joint force’s capabilities and operations across the functions. Subsequent paragraphs briefly summarize the primary staff directorates:

(1) **Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff.** The planning for JTF manpower and personnel support requirements must begin early in the planning process and continue through the execution of operations and redeployment. To ensure optimal JTF personnel support, the JTF J-1 will be required to synchronize and coordinate personnel support efforts with Service components and functional components and to establish and publish policies, procedures, and standards to accomplish personnel visibility in the JOA.

For background information and guidance on JTF personnel and administration matters, refer to Chapter V, “Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel,” and JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

(2) **Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff**

(a) The JTF J-2’s intelligence priorities and efforts are driven by the CJTF’s need for a holistic understanding of the operational environment. Both Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD intelligence agencies and organizations provide assistance to the J-2 in support of activities and operations within the JOA.

(b) The CJTF may establish a JTF-level intelligence element such as a joint intelligence support element (JISE) or a joint intelligence operations center (JIOC), under the direction of the JTF J-2, to manage the intelligence collection, production, and dissemination. The decision as to the type of intelligence element required will be based on the scope and breadth of the mission assigned to the JTF. If the CJTF requires a JIOC, the decision to establish a fully manned JIOC at the JTF-level may require augmentation and should be approved by the CCCR. Note: JISE will be used throughout this publication when discussing the JTF-level intelligence element.

For specific guidance concerning JTF intelligence support, refer to Chapter VI, “Joint Task Force Intelligence,” and the JP 2-0 Series of publications.

(3) Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff

(a) The JTF J-3 assists the commander in directing and controlling operations. In this capacity the J-3, typically in concert with the higher HQ and JTF components' operations directorates, plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. Within the JTF staff, this is accomplished, in part, by working closely with the rest of the staff to recommend material for inclusion in the commander's intent so it is captured in planning, informs the commander's decision-making process, and contributes to the execution and assessment of operations. JTF planning and execution typically consider supported or supporting activities and the integration of interagency, multinational participants, and NGOs and IGOs.

(b) The CJTF should establish a joint operations center (JOC), under the direction of the JTF J-3, to manage all matters related to planning and executing current operations.

For more details concerning organization and procedures of the JTF J-3 directorate, refer to Chapter VII, "Joint Task Force Operations."

(4) Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff

(a) The J-4 helps the JFC manage the provision of logistics to the joint force. The ultimate goal is for logistics planners to develop a feasible, supportable, and efficient concept of logistic support and to be able to identify risks to the execution of the concept of operations (CONOPS).

(b) The JTF J-4's concept of logistic support often involves coordination with the host nation (HN), private contractors, and interorganizational partners. The quality and quantity of potential host-nation support (HNS) and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) can significantly affect the logistics concept and the JFC's CONOPS.

(c) The JTF J-4 should consider establishing a joint movement center (JMC). If the J-4 determines that there is a requirement to form a joint logistics operations center (JLOC) or a joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC), approval must be given by the CJTF or geographic combatant commander (GCC) respectively. Because logistic limitations affect all planning and execution, it is essential that logistic planners are integral members of the joint planning group (JPG) and appropriately integrated throughout the staff.

For more details concerning JTF logistic support, including information on forming a JLOC, refer to Chapter VIII, "Joint Task Force Logistics," and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(5) Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff

(a) Before execution, the JTF J-5 develops, updates, reviews, and coordinates joint plans required for successful accomplishment of JTF mission(s). During execution of current operations, the J-5 focuses on future plans, which are typically for the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. The J-5 also supports the future operations planning effort, which normally occurs in the J-3.

(b) The J-5 typically establishes a JPG to facilitate integrated planning across the staff. A JPG should include representation from all JTF principal and special staff sections, components and interorganizational partners as required. For homeland defense (HD) or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations, the J-5 will typically include National Guard Bureau (NGB) and/or National Guard (NG) joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State) elements in the JPG.

For more details concerning JTF planning and policy procedures, refer to Chapter IX, “Joint Task Force Plans and Policy.”

(6) Communications System Directorate of a Joint Staff

(a) The JTF J-6 assists the CJTF in all responsibilities for communications infrastructure, communications-computer networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability. This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the commands operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications system support to exercise command in the execution of the mission. The JTF J-6 may need to use reachback to the J-6 at the CCMD level to accomplish accreditation of communication systems.

(b) The JTF communications system should support an overall JTF operational requirement and an organizational design that encourages timely, effective, and accurate flow of information and guidance within the joint force and with interorganizational partners. The system must effectively link all higher, supporting, and subordinate organizations. It should also provide a rapid, reliable, secure flow of data to ensure continuous information exchange throughout the JTF from the earliest stages of planning through redeployment. Communication limitations influence all planning efforts. Therefore, it is imperative that communication planners are integral members of the JPG and appropriately integrated throughout the staff.

For more details concerning designated approving authority, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and DOD 8570.01-M, Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program.

Specific guidance for JTF communications support is located in Chapter X, “Joint Task Force Communications.”

3. Interorganizational Considerations

a. DOD coordinates with a wide variety of organizations across the range of military operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interest and structures. The term interorganizational coordination refers to the interaction that occurs among elements of DOD; engaged USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government departments and agencies; IGOs; NGOs; and the private sector. This interaction is especially pronounced for operations that are governed by different authorities and have considerably different USG governing structures and stakeholders.

b. The CJTF, joint force staff, and components may operate with many interorganizational partners throughout the course of a single operation. The wide variety of these potential partners can be grouped in three general categories: interagency partners, multinational partners, and all other potential partners. The nature of interaction and considerations (type, authorities, protocols, etc.) vary with each potential partner.

c. **Interagency Considerations.** This area of interaction pertains to USG departments and agencies, including DOD. These departments and agencies represent the US diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power and other supporting USG capabilities. Effective and efficient interaction and collaboration among these agencies is essential with respect to the necessity for unified action to achieve USG unity of effort. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) and the Interagency Management System (IMS) are two initiatives that can help the CJTF and staff coordinate effectively with other USG departments and agencies.

(1) The JIACG, an element of a CCDR's staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts assigned to CCDRs and tailored to meet the CCDRs' specific needs, the JIACG provides the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG departments and agencies. JIACG members participate in development of theater campaign plans, contingency plans, and operation orders (OPORDs). They provide a collaborative conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of nonmilitary organizations.

(2) The IMS is a whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization that integrates the collaborative efforts of USG departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. The system is intended to facilitate and support integrated planning processes for unified USG strategic and implementation plans, including funding requests; joint interagency field deployments at all levels of planning and execution of USG policy (e.g., national, subnational, GCC); and a joint civilian operations capability including shared communications and information management (IM). Specific guidance for interorganizational coordination is located in various chapters throughout this publication and in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

d. **Multinational Considerations**

(1) US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). These operations, which could occur in a formal multinational alliance or a less formal coalition, could span the range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of other interorganizational partners. Much of joint doctrine's information and guidance on unified action and joint operations applies to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs must account for differences in partners' laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language. Multinational considerations also include international law, agreements, and arrangements in place or required to protect the sovereign interests of national territories that JTF forces must cross, particularly if affected nations do not participate in JTF operations.

There is no standard template, and each alliance or coalition normally develops its own protocols and operation plans (OPLANs). Multinational operations may complicate traditional US unilateral planning and decision making and require additional procedures to properly address a host of issues such as information sharing, communication systems, intelligence, and personnel matters.

(2) **Strategic Context.** Through dual involvement in national and multinational security processes, US national leaders integrate national and theater strategic planning with that of the alliance or coalition. Within the multinational structure, US participants, including the CJTF, ensure that objectives and strategy complement US interests and are compatible with US capabilities. Within the US national structure, US participants ensure that international commitments are reflected in the National Military Strategy and are adequately addressed in strategic direction for joint operation planning.

(3) **Command Relationships.** Within the US chain of command, JTF commanders command joint US forces and prepare joint plans and orders in response to taskings from their chain of command. Since nations that participate in multinational operations rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces US joint forces in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. The MNF commander's command authority is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. This authority typically is limited to operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), designated support relationships, or coordinating authority. Important considerations for making this decision include mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE). Regardless of the command relationships, the US commander coordinates joint operation planning with multinational planning in the interest of unified action.

See Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control," and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for more information on multinational command relationships.

(4) Transition of a JTF into an MNF or transition to a follow-on MNF. At the direction of higher authority, a US JTF HQ may be required to transition to a MNF HQ. This transition and subsequent operations present a variety of considerations and challenges for the CJTF, staff, and components. Such transitions must be thoroughly coordinated among the US forces and all affected interorganizational partners to ensure the resulting MNF becomes a fully integrated multinational command and that there is appropriate consideration and respect for all participating nations' national guidance, planning input, capabilities, and limitations. When the obligation to function as the MNF HQ is complete, the US and multinational commanders must also plan the smooth transition to a follow-on MNF HQ under a different lead nation if multinational operations will continue.

To further assist the JTF staff in planning for transition, refer to Annex M, "Checklist for Transition of a Joint Task Force into a Multinational Force or Transition to a Follow-On Multinational Force," to Appendix A, "Checklists."

Additional multinational guidance is available in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.

e. Considerations Related to Other Potential Partners

(1) Integration and coordination among the military force and interorganizational counterparts are much less rigid than military C2. Unlike the military and other USG departments and agencies to a certain extent, most interorganizational partners are not staffed, equipped, or organized to plan and operate in a wide variety of situations across the military's range of operations. The lack of a prescribed or uniform interorganizational coordination process will require the CJTF and staff to be aware of their partners' various and somewhat unique structures, processes, procedures, and organizational cultures in order to accommodate their participation with the military. Some organizations may have policies that conflict with those of the USG, particularly those of the US military. Depending on the type of operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interorganizational involvement, the focal point for coordination may occur at the JTF HQ, the civil-military operations center (CMOC), or the humanitarian operations center.

(2) Unlike many USG departments and agencies and multinational military partners, most other interorganizational partners will not have the capability and appropriate authorization to handle or have access to classified information. An important consideration is how to balance and control information in a way that involves relevant partners' capabilities and contributions while preserving operations security (OPSEC). Information sharing with NGOs and the private sector may be more restrictive, but options such as the JIACG and CMOC are available to the JFC to facilitate interorganizational coordination and information sharing.

4. Joint Task Force-State

When a state governor responds to support requests from civil authorities by activating Air National Guard and NG forces, a joint task force-state (JTF-State) may be formed; however, it is not a Title 10, United States Code (USC), JTF as described in JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. The JTF-State establishing authority is the governor of a state and is based on state law.

For more details concerning JTF-State, refer to Appendix E, "Joint Task Force-State." For more information on civil support operations, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

CHAPTER II

FORMING AND ORGANIZING THE JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

“The synergy that results from the synchronization of Service components capabilities under a single joint force commander maximizes the capability of the force.”

**Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations
11 August 2011**

1. General

This chapter addresses options for forming the JTF HQ and organizing the staff. It reflects the significance of a well-balanced HQ staff that is representative of the whole force. CJTFs organize staffs and forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and CONOPS. An efficient and effective JTF HQ organization helps the CJTF set conditions that enable the joint force’s mission accomplishment.

SECTION A. FORMING THE JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

2. The Preferred Approach to Forming the Joint Task Force Headquarters

a. The preferred approach to forming a JTF HQ is to do so around an existing C2 structure. Typically this is a CCMD’s Service component HQ or a subordinate Service component HQ. The establishing authority (typically the CCCR) determines the appropriate level based on the scope and scale of the operation and nature of the mission. In some cases, the CCCR may request a deployable team from USTRANSCOM’s JECC to help the designated Service HQ transition to the JTF HQ, which the CCCR and CJTF would then augment with additional Service functional experts.

b. **Building Upon an Existing Service HQ.** DOD relies primarily on Service component HQ to adapt with little or no notice into a JTF HQ, often under crisis action planning (CAP) conditions. However, the newly designated JTF HQ typically will require additional resources that are not organic to the core Service HQ. Examples include joint C2 equipment and training, regional language and cultural experts, and augmentation from the JTF’s Service components. The CJTF and staff should plan for the time required to integrate new personnel and capabilities and accommodate other interorganizational partners expected to be involved in the operation. Once the JTF HQ is established, it takes time to receive, train, and integrate new members and then to begin functioning as a cohesive HQ with common processes, standards, and procedures. Furthermore, mission requirements may limit the time available for a Service HQ to reorganize into a fully functioning and proficient JTF HQ prior to deployment. To mitigate these challenges, CCRs may designate one or more Service HQ from their assigned forces to become “JTF-capable” HQ and integrate them into CCMD planning efforts and joint exercise programs. Appendix B, “Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters,” provides a framework and considerations for designating and sustaining the readiness of CCCR-designated Service HQ to be a “JTF-capable HQ.”

c. **Tasking an Existing JTF HQ.** In some situations, the establishing authority could task an existing JTF with the mission rather than establish a new joint force. Many of the organizational factors mentioned before will apply to this option if it is executed. For example, the new mission and operational environment could require a different mix of Service component capabilities and relationships with interorganizational partners. Supporting commands and sustainment requirements might change. The CJTF might have to adjust the composition of the JTF HQ accordingly. The existing CJTF and staff must carefully consider and plan for the associated complexities if faced with this new mission.

3. Options for Augmenting the Headquarters

a. Augmentation of the JTF HQ is a function of both the CJTF's mission and the JTF's force composition. The CJTF's mission is the most important factor in determining the required type of core staff augmentation. Mission analysis should consider the JTF HQ required capabilities and other related functions. The following factors are among many that the new CJTF and staff must consider as they determine augmentation requirements and sources.

(1) Current staffing level of the designated HQ. Fill key vacancies and replace non-deployable personnel.

(2) **Linguist and Interpreter Support.** Requirements for interpreters and translators (I/Ts) will vary according to the geographic operational area and must be considered during peacetime planning and early in the augmentation process. The identification, acquisition, training, security classification processing, verification of the skills, and debriefing of I/Ts represents a significant undertaking for a newly forming JTF. Some I/Ts may be non-native speakers academically trained in the language. The most effective I/Ts are typically native speakers from the region or dialect desired.

(3) **Interagency Requirements.** Does the mission require other USG department or agency experts with the JTF HQ, or is working through the CCDR's JIACG sufficient?

(4) **Multinational Involvement.** Consider command relationships, language expertise, etc. See JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, for detailed discussion.

(5) **Sustainment.** Logistic and personnel support requirements beyond normal organizational capabilities (contracting capability for HNS, legal expertise, etc.).

(6) **Liaison Requirements.** The CJTF and staff generally must manage significant liaison requirements both to and from the JTF HQ. These requirements may include (but are not limited to) the following: higher HQ and JTF components; supporting commands; the US Embassy; multinational military forces; interagency partners; and HN organizations.

b. The JTF composition is a key factor that affects the type of augmentation the core staff should receive. Generally, the JTF staff should be representative of the force composition as to numbers, experience, and influence of position and rank of members among the JTF's Service and functional components. The CJTF should also consider whether and how to incorporate the representation of supporting commands and MNFs in the

HQ. However, the best HQ composition is more an issue of having relevant expertise in the right positions to ensure the most effective employment of the JTF's capabilities in the context of the mission than of having equal component representation.

(1) For example, a JTF may be formed around an Army corps HQ if ground combat dominates the mission requirements. Consequently, many key positions may be filled by members of that Army corps HQ and other Army organizations. That same JTF, however, may have significant mission requirements to integrate airpower and special operations forces (SOF) and operate in close conjunction with multinational partners. The CJTF will likely augment the Army corps staff with expertise from the Air Force, SOF, and perhaps multiple multinational partners. The multinational augmentation might be even greater if the JTF has a subordinate multinational component or is operating as a subordinate element of a multinational HQ.

(2) Figure II-1 depicts several sources of augmentation available to the core staff. The following subparagraphs and others in this publication discuss these sources.

c. **Joint Enabling Capabilities Command.** JECC is a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM responsible for providing mission-tailored, ready joint capability packages to CCDRs in order to facilitate the rapid establishment of a joint force HQ. JECC provides the CJTF with short-duration support to rapidly establish, organize, and operate a JTF HQ. The JECC consists of three alert-postured subordinate commands: Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE), and Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE). USTRANSCOM deploys JECC forces in the form of a joint




Figure II-1. Building Upon the Core Staff

enabling capability package. By design, this package is modular, scalable, and tailored to the mission. It consists of Active Component and Reserve Component (RC) forces and includes elements from one or more of the JECC's subordinate commands.

(1) **Joint Communications Support Element.** JCSE provides rapid, reliable, and interoperable communications that link the CJTF and staff to the President and SecDef, GCCs, their component HQ, and multinational partners. JCSE tactical communication packages vary in capability from small initial-entry and early-entry teams to a significantly larger deployable joint C2 system. Packages can support operations worldwide as well as in HD and DSCA missions.

(2) **Joint Public Affairs Support Element.** JPASE provides trained, equipped, scalable, and expeditionary joint public affairs (PA) capability supporting worldwide operational requirements. JPASE is an early-entry capability that enables the CJTF to gain and maintain the initiative in the information environment. JPASE also provides joint PA training to better enable JFCs and their staffs to successfully meet continuously evolving information environment challenges in their respective operational areas.

(3) **Joint Planning Support Element.** The JPSE is composed of personnel who are experienced in planning and executing joint operations. JPSE provides expertise in operations, planning, logistics, intelligence, and knowledge sharing. Operations and plans personnel can integrate into a joint force J-3 or J-5 staff or help form the core of a newly forming operations or plans battle staff. Logistics personnel can integrate into the J-4 staff and help integrate, coordinate, and implement joint logistics planning and operations in various logistics and personnel areas. Intelligence specialists can integrate into the J-2 staff and assist with various aspects of intelligence support to help the joint force effectively neutralize enemy forces. Knowledge sharing specialists can integrate into the J-3 staff to collect, process, and share information and create an environment of shared understanding.

d. **Joint Individual Augmentation (JIA).** Individual augmentation is an important mechanism for providing personnel to a JTF HQ. JIA requirements are identified by the HQ designated to be the JTF or the establishing authority (usually a CCDR) and documented in a joint manning document (JMD). JIA requirements are then sourced in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1301.01, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*, and the Global Force Management process. The JMD is validated by the establishing authority and submitted to the Joint Staff J-1 for individual augmentation sourcing solution development. In multinational operations, partner nations also may provide JTF HQ individual augmentation beyond liaison requirements. The designated HQ should identify individual augmentation requirements as early as possible when forming the JTF HQ due to the extended time that may be required to source, process, and deploy individual augmentees, especially those with special technical or language skills.

For more details concerning JIAs, refer to CJCSI 1301.01, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures, JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3120, Global Force Management Allocation Planning, Policies, and Procedures.

e. **Joint Organization Augmentation.** Following is a list of joint organizations other than the JECC that may provide JTF augmentation. This list is not all-inclusive, but it should provide insight into the type of augmentation a JTF can receive and the purpose behind that augmentation.

(1) **National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).** The NIST is a nationally sourced team of intelligence and communications experts from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and other agencies. The NIST's purpose is to provide a national-level, deployable, all-source intelligence team to meet CCMD or JTF requirements.

(2) **Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).** DTRA's mission is to safeguard America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear [CBRN]) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects.

(3) **Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC).** The JIOWC is a CJCS-controlled activity and the principal field agency for joint information operations (IO) support of CCMDs.

(4) **Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity (JCSMA).** JCSMA can provide information security monitoring and analysis support to JTFs.

(5) **Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRC).** JPRC is the principal DOD agency for coordinating and advancing personnel recovery (PR).

(6) **Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC).** JWAC assists in preparation and analysis of joint OPLANs and Service chiefs' analysis of weapons effectiveness. JWAC normally provides this support to JTFs through the supported CCMD.

(7) **Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).** DLA supports the JTF using a variety of capabilities. DLA has robust logistic planning experience, logistic surge and sustainment expertise, forward deployed and expeditionary organizations and personnel imbedded physically and virtually with the warfighting and support organizations. In addition to executing its responsibilities as the executive agent for Classes I (Subsistence), III (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants [POL]), IV (Construction Materiel), and VIII (Medical Materiel), DLA exercises item manager duties for supply support across the other classes of supply. DLA can access and use a variety of IM tools to monitor the availability of supplies and equipment. GCCs can request DLA's Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office to augment the CCMD or a JTF to synchronize and integrate operational contract support.

(8) **United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).** USCYBERCOM is a subunified command under United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified DOD information networks and prepares to, when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable

actions in the operational environment, and facilitates US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace while denying the same to our adversaries.

f. **Integration and Sustainment of the JTF Staff.** Integration and sustainment of the JTF staff is a routine but important function. The headquarters commandant (HQCOMDT) is normally the primary planner and executor of these integration and sustainment functions for the JTF HQ. Refer to Annex H, “Special Staff: Headquarters Commandant,” of Appendix C, “Commander, Joint Task Force Personal and Special Staffs,” for a more detailed discussion of the HQCOMDT responsibilities.

g. **Additional Information.** There are a number of products and resources that will assist CJTFs and staffs in expediting the process of forming the JTF HQ and organizing the staff. These products and resources include notional JTF HQ templates that contain JMDs and C2 architectures, systems, software, telecommunications and video requirements, *Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures*, and learning resources for JTF staff positions. These resources and products can be found at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/sop_index.htm and at the following SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) links: Templates http://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/sop_index/htm.

SECTION B. COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities

a. **Commander, Joint Task Force.** The CJTF is ultimately responsible to the establishing authority for JTF actions. The CJTF duties may include (but are not limited to) the following:

(1) Determining the C2 and support relationships for the proper employment of assigned and attached forces for accomplishing assigned missions and keeping the established authority informed.

(2) Supervising all aspects of the JTF’s planning efforts to include development of OPODs, OPLANs, concept plans (CONPLANs), and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).

(3) Establishing requisite policies and guidelines. This includes providing guidance to the chief of staff concerning the establishment of the appropriate organization structure.

(4) Applying operational risk management to all levels of war, across the range of military operations, and all phases of an operation to include any branches or sequels of an operation.

(5) Exercising or delegating as appropriate, OPCON over assigned and normally over attached forces. The CJTF also may exercise TACON, have coordinating authority, or be in a support relationship as either a supported or supporting commander.

(6) Providing guidance to subordinate and supporting forces for planning and conducting operations.

(7) Ensuring ongoing operations are properly monitored to include maneuver, fires, communications, IO, PA, and other supporting activities.

(8) Keeping the JTF establishing authority informed on the progress of ongoing operations and the progress towards overall mission accomplishment.

(9) Ensuring the JTF staff conducts proper coordination with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, NGOs, or IGOs.

(10) Establishing, if necessary, coordinating procedures for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

(11) Establishing the succession of command.

(12) Exercising directive authority for those common support capabilities deemed essential to the accomplishment of the mission by the CJTF that may be delegated by the CCDR. If the CCDR has not delegated this authority to the CJTF by way of warning order, OPORD, or other formal directive, then the CJTF should initiate a request for this authority.

(13) Ensuring that cross-servicing support is provided and that forces operate as effective, mutually supporting teams.

(14) Identifying any requirement for additional forces or personnel to the establishing authority.

(15) Appointing the space coordinating authority (SCA). A CJTF normally designates an SCA to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the CJTF can either retain SCA or designate a component commander as the SCA. The CJTF considers the mission, nature, and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities made available and resident C2 capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the appropriate option. The SCA responsibilities are detailed in JP 3-14, *Space Operations*.

(16) Determining whether to retain control of joint security operations, normally coordinated through the JTF J-3, or to designate the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) as an area commander with joint security responsibilities. To facilitate joint security operations, **commanders should establish a joint security element, led by the joint security coordinator, to coordinate these operations.**

(17) Serving concurrently as a Service component commander. When one individual is assigned as both a CJTF and a CCDR level Service component commander, that individual retains all responsibilities associated with both command positions. This command organization is not optimal as it may detract from the CJTF's primary duties.

- (18) Establishing personnel visibility policies and standards.

b. **Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force (DCJTF).** The selection of the DCJTF usually is based on mission requirements and the composition of the JTF as a whole. Typically, the DCJTF is not from the same Service as the CJTF. The DCJTF should be of equal or senior rank to the component commanders. Based on the situation, there can be more than one DCJTF. The duties of the DCJTF may include (but are not limited to) the following:

- (1) If required, serving concurrently as JTF chief of staff.
- (2) Serving as the principal assistant to the CJTF.
- (3) Performing special duties as directed by the CJTF. Examples include:
 - (a) Representing the CJTF when authorized.
 - (b) Assuming command if the commander becomes a casualty or is otherwise incapacitated or unavailable to exercise command.
 - (c) Chairing designated boards in support of JTF decision-making processes.
 - (d) Supervising designated aspects of JTF planning.
 - (e) Supervising designated subordinate units.
 - (f) Supervising designated subordinate unit activities or functions.

c. **Chief of Staff. The chief of staff is the key JTF staff integrator.** This is accomplished through the establishment and management of staff processes and procedures that support the command's decision-making process. The chief of staff duties may include (but are not limited to) the following:

- (1) Coordinating and directing the staff directorates' work.
- (2) Supervising the preparation of staff estimates, plans, and orders.
- (3) If directed by the CJTF, coordinating and maintaining the battle rhythm becomes one of the chief of staff's primary responsibilities. This includes establishing and monitoring the JTF battle rhythm to ensure that it effectively supports JTF planning, decision making, and other critical functions.

For more details concerning battle rhythm, refer to Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control."

- (4) Managing the JTF process for creating a shared learning environment through the combination of IM, knowledge sharing, and collaboration.
- (5) Representing the CJTF when authorized.

(6) Implementing JTF policies as directed by the CJTF.

(7) Formulating and disseminating staff policies.

(8) Ensuring effective liaison is established with the JTF's higher and subordinate HQ, adjacent HQ, and with other critical agencies and organizations in the assigned operational area.

(9) Supervising sustainment of the JTF staff and its HQ and facilities.

(10) Supervising staff training and integration programs.

(11) Supervising the development and implementation of the JMD. Works with superior HQ and Service components to provide required personnel and identify and requisition critical shortfalls.

d. **Command Senior Enlisted Leader (CSEL).** The CSEL is a key advisor to the commander, often serving as a sounding board for the commander. The CSEL also can serve as a trusted observer of activities within the operational area in the commander's absence. The CSEL's duties may include (but are not limited to) the following:

(1) Serve as the primary advisor to the commander on issues related to JTF enlisted personnel.

(2) Perform special duties as directed by the CJTF. Examples include:

(a) Monitor or observe critical subordinate unit actions.

(b) Monitor the discipline, morale, and mission readiness of JTF elements.

(c) Be a command spokesperson.

(d) Review documents that impact the command's performance, operations, and related activities.

(3) Develop the command's noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

(4) Act as a liaison to multinational contingents that may not place the same responsibilities on their enlisted personnel, emphasizing the important roles and responsibilities US military NCOs perform in military operations to multinational contingents that may not place the same responsibilities on their enlisted personnel.

e. **Personal and Special Staff Groups.** Personal and special staffs perform duties as prescribed by CJTF and handle special matters over which the CJTF wishes to exercise close personal control. These staff groups may include (but are not limited to) public affairs officer (PAO), staff judge advocate (SJA), joint force chaplain (JFCH), surgeon, inspector general (IG), provost marshal (PM), comptroller, HQCOMDT, historian, and others (e.g., safety officer, political advisor) as directed. Refer to Appendix C, "Commander, Joint Task

Force Personal and Special Staffs,” for a more detailed discussion of the roles and responsibilities of these staff groups.

f. **Joint Task Force Staff Directorates.** The basic element of the JTF staff is the directorate. Typically, these are the J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-6.

(1) These primary staff directorates provide staff supervision of related processes, activities, and capabilities associated with the basic **joint functions** described in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*. For example, the J-2 focuses on the intelligence function, the J-1 and J-4 focus on their parts of the sustainment function (personnel services and logistics respectively), the J-3 focuses on movement and maneuver, fires, and many aspects of protection. See Chapter III, “Joint Functions,” of JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, for a comprehensive discussion of joint functions.

(2) These staff directorates provide expertise and experience for the planning, decision-making, execution, and assessment processes within the JTF staff. The assessment determines the progress being made to achieve the objective. The directorates also manage systems and processes internal to their staff directorate. Chapter V, “Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel,” to Chapter X, “Joint Task Force Communications,” describe in detail the internal organizations and systems of these directorates.

(3) Based on mission requirements and the nature of the operational environment, CJTFs commonly establish additional staff directorates. Examples of these are engineer, resource management, and civil-military. The addition of directorates does not fundamentally change any of the staff processes described in this publication.

5. Staff Organization

a. **A Cross-Functional Approach to Staff Organization.** Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing **across** the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this **cross-functional collaboration** is the formation of an appropriate organizational structure to manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. These appropriate organization structures facilitate planning by the staff, decision making by the commander, and execution by the HQ (see Figure II-2). Although cross-functional in their membership, most of these organizations fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates or their functional chiefs (see Figure II-3). This arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JTF and its commander in mission execution.




Figure II-2. Cross-Functional Staff

b. Cross-Functional Organizations that Support the JTF Staff

(1) **Center.** A **center** is an enduring functional organization, with supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within JFC's HQ. Often, these organizations have designated locations or facilities. Examples of centers include the JOC and the CMOC.

(2) **Group.** A **group** is an enduring functional organization formed to support a broad HQ function within a JFC's HQ. Normally, groups within a JTF HQ include a JPG that manages JTF HQ planning. JPG functions include leading designated planning efforts, resourcing and managing subordinate planning teams, and coordinating planning activities with other staff directorates.

(3) **Cell.** A **cell** is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a JFC's HQ. A cell usually is part of both a functional and traditional staff structures. An example of a cell within the traditional staff structure could be an IO cell subordinate to the operations branch within the J-3. An example of a cell within a functional staff structure could be a current operations cell within the JOC.

(4) **Office.** An **office** is an enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a JFC's HQ to coordinate and manage support requirements. An example of an office is the joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO).




Figure II-3. Basic Working Group Model

(5) **Element.** An **element** is an organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a JFC's HQ. The subordinate components of an element usually are functional cells. An example of an element is the joint fires element (JFE).

(6) **Boards.** A **board** is an organized group of individuals within a JFC's HQ, appointed by the commander (or other authority) that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision. Its responsibilities and authority are governed by the authority that established the board. Boards are chaired by a senior leader with members representing major staff elements, subordinate commands, liaison officers (LNOs), and other organizations as required. There are two different types of boards:

(a) **Command Board.** A command board is chaired by the commander, and its purpose is to gain guidance or decision from the commander.

(b) **Functional Board.** A functional board's purpose is to gain functionally specific guidance and decisions from the commander (or designated representative) based on a staff recommendation. These boards often focus on:

1. Synchronizing a particular function (e.g., IO, targeting, collection, and distribution) across multiple planning initiatives.

2. Allocation of resources between ongoing or future operations.

3. Maintaining continuity of purpose across ongoing operations.

(7) **Working Group (WG).** A WG (see Figure II-3) is an enduring or ad hoc organization within a JFC's HQ formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The WG consists of a core functional group and other staff and component representatives.

(8) **Planning Team.** A **planning team** is a functional element formed within the JFC's HQ to solve problems related to a specific task or requirement. Planning teams and WGs are complementary. WGs enhance planning through their provision of functional staff estimates to multiple planning teams. In contrast, planning teams integrate the functional concepts of multiple functional WGs into plans and orders. The planning team is not enduring and dissolves upon completion of the assigned task (see Figure II-4).




Figure II-4. Basic Planning Team Model

c. Employment of Cross-Functional Organizations to Support Planning and Decision Making.

(1) As a practical matter, the CJTF **and staff establish and maintain only those cross-functional organizations that enhance planning and decision making within the HQ.** They establish, modify, and dissolve these entities as the needs of the HQ evolve. Figure II-5 depicts an example of a JTF's employment of **cross-functional organizations.** (NOTE: this diagram is not meant to be either all inclusive or directive). The figure additionally depicts the most common proponent (by staff directorate or special staff group) for each **cross-functional organization** (Refer to Chapters V, "Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel," to Chapter X, "Joint Task Force Communications.")

(2) The cross-functional organization of the staff must facilitate the planning and decision-making processes that are crucial to the JTF's success. Figure II-6 is a notional depiction of the basic relationships within the cross-functional staff structure.

(a) Based on the complexity of the planning problem and time available, future plans and future operations planning teams interact primarily through the JOPP with elements both internal (e.g., WGs, cells) and external (other HQ, agencies, and organizations) to the HQ. As the planning teams move through JOPP, they ultimately gain guidance, intent, and decisions via designated decision boards.

(b) In contrast to the future operations and future plans planning teams, the *current operations* planning teams normally complete their assigned planning tasks without significant interaction with other staff elements (e.g., WGs). Generally, these teams are established and execute planning in the JOC under the supervision of the chief of operations. The commander is kept advised of ongoing, near-term planning initiatives through appropriate mechanisms (e.g., commander's critical information requirements [CCIRs], serious incident reports, or battle update assessments).

6. Liaison Personnel

"During [Operation] JUST CAUSE, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to also convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general, and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit's capabilities, and make recommendations."

**Lieutenant General C. W. Stiner, United States Army
Commander, Joint Task Force South
Operation JUST CAUSE**

a. **General.** Exchanging LNOs is the most commonly employed technique for establishing close, continuous, physical communications among organizations. Liaison personnel enhance information sharing and contribute significantly to mission success.




Figure II-5. Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization




Figure II-6. Staff Interaction Supporting Decision Making

(1) **The CJTF must identify the requirement for liaison personnel based on command relationships and mission support requirements.** LNOs must be requested at the earliest opportunity. Per this request, any specific qualifications and functions for these personnel should be noted by the CJTF. LNOs to the JTF HQ should be of sufficient rank (**recommend equal rank to JTF primary staff officers**) to influence the decision-making process. Ideally, LNOs should possess the requisite skill sets (technical training or language) to liaise and communicate effectively with receiving organizations.

(a) The CJTF should establish a familiarization program for all liaison personnel. A joint personnel reception center could perform this requirement.

(b) The CJTF must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall cognizance of all liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ for duty (e.g., DCJTF, chief of staff, or J-3).

(2) Liaison should be established between the JTF HQ and higher commands, between adjacent units, and between supporting, attached, and assigned forces and the JTF HQ. Additionally, the JTF also may exchange LNOs with MNFs, HN, and interorganizational entities.

(a) Normally, liaison personnel perform their duties within the JTF staff directorate that is responsible for functions related to the liaison personnel's assigned duties.

(b) They are representatives of their commanders and normally will attend briefings and maintain close contact with the JTF JOC. LNOs should have access to the CJTF.

(c) Although the liaison team may have workspace in the operations center to facilitate the exchange of information, the LNO is not a duty officer, but a representative of one commander to another.

b. LNOs, whether individually or in teams, perform several critical functions that are consistent across the range of military operations. The extent to which these functions are performed depends on the mission and the direction established by the commander they represent. A successful LNO performs four basic functions.

(1) **Monitor.** LNOs monitor JTF operations, the gaining organization, and the sending organization and must understand how each influences the other. LNOs must know the current situation and planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues, and understand their commanders' intent. The JTF battle rhythm, in part, drives the LNOs' daily schedule and allows them to maintain the current situation and better advise their commanders.

(2) **Coordinate.** LNOs help synchronize current operations and future planning between the sending organizations, gaining organizations, or the JTF. They also accomplish this by coordinating with other LNOs and other organizations.

(a) Successful coordination requires a collaborative process that enhances communications between the LNOs' organizations.

(b) This process may range from understanding how various organizations function to collaborative systems that improve communications between organizations.

(3) **Advise.** LNOs are the experts on the sending organizations' capabilities and limitations. They advise the CJTF, JTF staff, and the gaining organizations concerning capabilities of their organizations. They must be proactive in providing the supported staff with relevant information on their organization's capabilities. **They are not decision makers and cannot commit their parent organizations to actions without coordination and approval.**

(4) **Assist.** LNOs provide assistance to various organizations by providing their expertise and facilitating coordination between their organizations. They must not accept formal tasking by the JTF or any other organization. Formal taskings should be accomplished through normal C2 channels or as agreed to by the respective organizations.

c. LNOs provide an essential C2 bridge between the JTF HQ, its parent organizations, and its subordinate organizations.

d. To help ensure LNOs are properly employed and not misused, the JTF should follow certain basic guidelines. See Figure II-7 for details.

To further assist the JTF staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex B, “Checklist for Liaison Personnel,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

Liaison Officer Guidelines

- Liaison officers (LNOs) are personal and official representatives of the sending organizations and should be treated accordingly.
- LNOs support the gaining organizations and serve as critical conduits between organizations.
- LNOs remain in their parent organizations' chain of command.
- LNOs perform four basic functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist.
- LNOs are not full-time planners.
- LNOs are not watch officers.
- LNOs are not substitutes for delivering critical information through normal command and control channels or a conduit for general information sharing.
- LNOs are not replacements for proper staff-to-staff coordination.
- LNOs are not replacements for augmentees or representatives.
- LNOs do not have the authority to make decisions for their commander without coordination and approval.

Figure II-7. Liaison Officer Guidelines

CHAPTER III

JOINT TASK FORCE SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

"In any joint operation, the JFC [joint force commander] can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission."

**Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations,
11 August 2011**

1. Task Organization and Common Responsibilities

a. **Task Organization.** A JTF is composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single CJTF. The subordinate Service components' HQ and their forces provide the basic building blocks for the JTF's component structure. The CJTF can organize the JTF with Service components, functional components, or a combination based on the nature of the mission and the operational environment. All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces is provided through Service component commands. Typical JTFs have a combination of Service and functional components. A CJTF also can establish one or more subordinate JTFs if necessary. Figure III-1 shows the possible JTF components and subordinate commands. This chapter discusses Service and functional component commander responsibilities and provides examples of functional component commands and special purpose JTFs.

b. **Common Responsibilities.** In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, following are typical general responsibilities common to both Service and functional component commanders.

(1) Plan and execute operations to accomplish missions or tasks assigned by the higher commander's plans or orders.

(2) Advise the higher commander regarding employment possibilities of and consequences to achieving the subordinate commander mission objectives, cooperation with appropriate government and nongovernmental agencies, and other matters of common concern.

(3) Assess the progress of operations, integrate, manage, and share data and provide timely information to the higher commander relating to the subordinate commanders situation and progress.




Figure III-1. Possible Joint Task Force Components

(4) Coordinate with other JTF component commanders to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. In addition, coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized and as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.

(5) Provide liaison personnel to other commands and organizations as appropriate.

Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control," discusses C2 as it relates to subordinate commands.

2. Service Component Commands

a. A JTF-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all Service forces that have been assigned or attached to the JTF. In general, a Service component commander is responsible for all aspects of planning and executing operations as tasked by the next higher commander.

b. Service component commanders have responsibilities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services support function. The CJTF also may conduct operations through the

Service component commander or, at lower echelons, other Service force commanders. A JFC can only delegate that control over forces for which the JFC has been given. In the event that a Service component commander exercises OPCON of forces and that OPCON or TACON over those forces is delegated by the JFC to another component commander or other subordinate JFC, the Service component commander retains the following responsibilities for certain Service-specific functions:

(1) Make recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment, task organization, and command relationship of the forces of the Service component.

(2) Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned.

(3) Select and nominate specific units of the parent Service component for attachment to other subordinate commands. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the Service component commanders control when such subordinate commands are dissolved.

(4) Conduct joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the Service component commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the Service components facilities and capabilities are suitable.

(5) Inform their JFC, other component or supporting commanders, and the CCCR, if affected, of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation.

c. Service component commanders or other Service force commanders assigned to a CCCR are responsible through the chain of command, extending to the Service Chief, for the following:

(1) Internal administration and discipline.

(2) Training in joint doctrine and their own Service doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(3) Logistic functions normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority. The operating details of any Service logistic support system will be retained and exercised by the Service component commanders in accordance with instructions of their Military Departments, subject to the directive authority of the CCCR.

3. Functional Component Commands

a. CJTFs may normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command typically consists of forces of two or more Military Departments established to perform designated missions.

b. Functional component commanders exercise command authority (e.g., OPCON, TACON) as delegated, over forces or military capabilities made available to them consistent

with JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States Armed Forces*. The CJTF designates the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander as well as that commander's authority and responsibilities. Establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the CJTF.

c. The CJTF establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the functional component commander. However, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander. A Service component commander who is also the functional component commander retains the responsibilities associated with Service component command for assigned Service forces.

d. The commander of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the CJTF on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities and for meeting the reporting criteria for entities and events in the JOA as outlined in the CCDR's directives and CJTF's amplifying instructions.

e. Since a functional component commander will employ forces from more than one Service, the component commander's staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command to provide the JFC with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available. Staff billets for the needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified and used when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without loss in coordination or capability. The commander must also be aware of the constraints imposed by logistic factors on the capability of the assigned and attached forces and the responsibilities retained by the Services.

For more details on functional components, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, and JP 3-05, Special Operations.

f. Examples of Functional Component Commanders

(1) **Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).** The CJTF usually designates a JFACC to establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air operations. A CJTF typically will assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air; however, the JFC always will consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander.

(2) **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** When required, the CJTF designates a JFLCC and establishes the commander's authority and responsibilities to exercise C2 over land operations. The designation of a JFLCC typically occurs when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation, and the CJTF determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.

(3) **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The CJTF may designate a JFMCC to C2 joint maritime operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces or assets made available for tasking to perform operational missions. Generally, maritime assets may include navies, marines, expeditionary security forces, SOF, coast guards and similar border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary shipping managed by the government, civil merchant marines, army/ground forces (normally when embarked), and air and air defense forces operating in the maritime environment.

For further details concerning the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFMCC, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations; JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations; and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.

(4) **Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).** The CJTF may designate a JFSOCC or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander to accomplish a specific mission or control SOF in the JOA. The JFSOCC generally will be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2. The commander of the theater special operations (SO) command may function as the JSOTF commander or JFSOCC. In certain situations, the JSOTF commander may be appointed by Commander, US Special Operations Command. Normally, the JFSOCC exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached forces. C2 of SOF usually is executed within the SOF chain of command. The JFSOCC allocates forces as a supported or supporting commander based on guidance from the CJTF. When multiple JTFs are established, the theater SO command commander functioning as a JFSOCC may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs and/or a joint SO air component to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTFs SO requirements. The GCC, as the common superior, normally will establish supporting or TACON command relationships between JSOTF commanders and CJTFs.

For further details concerning joint SO, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

4. Subordinate Joint Task Forces

a. A CJTF is authorized to establish subordinate JTFs as circumstances require. For example, a CJTF assigned a large JOA, characterized by difficult terrain that restricts movement and maneuver, might determine that C2 could be more effective with a subordinate JTF responsible for operations in a remote portion of the JOA. The decision to do so requires careful consideration because of the many factors that will complicate forming a new JTF during ongoing operations.

b. However, it is more common to form special-purpose JTFs that focus on specific functional aspects of the CJTF's operations. Because of the nature and visibility of civil-military operations (CMO) and military information support operations (MISO), the CJTF may establish separate task forces for these activities. As a general rule, CMO and military information support (MIS) task force commanders work directly for the CJTF. However, in certain circumstances (e.g., crisis response and limited contingency operations) civil affairs (CA) and MIS task forces may be attached to the JSOTF.

(1) **Commander, Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF).** A CJTF may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond that which a CA representative on the staff could accomplish. The JCMOTF must be resourced to meet specific CMO requirements.

For further information on CMO and CA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(2) **Commander, Joint Military Information Support Task Force (JMISTF).** A CJTF may establish a JMISTF when the scope of MISO requires coordination and activities exceed the capability of MISO support element to advise and assist. The JMISTF is responsible for providing MISO support to joint or multinational operations at the tactical and operational levels. The JMISTF also is responsible for deconflicting all MISO that occur under the JTF and other commands as designated by the establishing authority.

For further details concerning MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

CHAPTER IV

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

"If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well."

**Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Winchester, VA,
November 1861**

1. General

This chapter describes C2 factors and three management processes that influence JTF C2. The eight C2 factors are: the role of the commander in the JTF C2; command relationships; understanding the operational environment; operational area management; operational limitations; interorganizational considerations; multinational considerations; and civil-support organization considerations. The three management processes are: JTF IM, the commanders decision cycle, and the HQ battle rhythm.

2. Joint Task Force Headquarters Command and Control Factors

a. **Role of the Commander, Joint Task Force, in Command and Control.** The CJTF has the authority and responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions. The CJTF's actions associated with these responsibilities are central to JTF C2. The CJTF leverages the full range of skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to guide the command through the fog and friction of operations towards mission accomplishment.

(1) **Commander's Role in Planning Operations.** The commander provides guidance that drives JOPP and supervises execution of the products. Early in JOPP, the CJTF's vision of an operation is translated into a broad **operational approach** that guides subsequent detailed planning and produces plans and orders for execution. The CJTF communicates the operational approach through three important mechanisms: **commander's intent, commander's planning guidance, and CCIRs**. These mechanisms assist the commander and JTF staff in establishing an effective dialogue to enable efficient planning. Later, during preparation activities and operations, these mechanisms assist the entire JTF in remaining focused on the commander's original vision and desired outcome of the operation.

(2) **Commander's Intent.** The commander's intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state. The CJTF uses the intent statement to help communicate the operational approach to both the JTF staff and subordinate and supporting commands during planning and execution. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the commander will accept risk during the operation.

(3) **Commander's Guidance.** The commander's guidance communicates the commander's initial thoughts for a given operation to the staff, which enhances effective planning. This guidance may be as broad or detailed as circumstances require. Although commanders provide guidance to their staffs throughout the planning process, there are two opportunities to provide early guidance to the staff to focus their efforts:

(a) **Commander's Initial Guidance.** Upon receipt of mission, the commander and staff conduct an analysis of the initiating directive to determine time available to mission execution, the current status of intelligence products and staff estimates and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The commander will provide **initial guidance** to the staff, which could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key capabilities within the CJTF's authority, and direct other actions as necessary.

(b) **Commander's Planning Guidance.** Planning guidance is an important input to subsequent mission analysis, but the completion of mission analysis is another point at which the CJTF may provide updated planning guidance that affects course of action (COA) development. The CJTF may have been able to apply operational design to think through the operation before the staff begins JOPP. In this case, the CJTF provides initial planning guidance to help focus the staff in mission analysis. Otherwise, the CJTF and staff will develop their understanding of the operational environment and problem to be solved during mission analysis. Then the commander will issue planning guidance, as he sees appropriate, to help focus the staff's efforts. At a minimum, the CJTF issues planning guidance, either initial or refined, at the conclusion of mission analysis and provides planning guidance as the operational approach matures. The format for the commanders planning guidance varies based on the personality of the commander and the level of command, but should adequately describe the logic to the commanders understanding of the operational environment and of the problem and the description of the operational approach. It may include the following elements:

1. A description of the operational environment.
2. A statement of the problem that military operations must solve.
3. A description of the operational approach.
4. The CJTF's initial intent.
5. Operational limitations.
6. Other factors as desired.

For more information on the JFC's guidance, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

(4) **Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** CCIRs are elements of information that the commander requires to directly affect decision making. CCIRs are a key IM tool for the CJTF and help the commander identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations. The CJTF determines what information is critical based on personal

experience, the mission, the higher commander's intent, and input from the staff. **CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.**

(a) There are two broad categories of information sought in the CCIRs: priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), which focus on the adversary and the operational environment; and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs), which focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the friendly force and supporting capabilities. Not all proposed PIRs and FFIRs are selected as CCIRs. Those PIRs not selected are downgraded to information requirements. PIRs address the enemy (adversary) and environmental factors and drive intelligence collection and production requirements. FFIRs address friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities—they drive reporting and requests for information (RFIs).

(b) CCIRs change as the decisions the commander must make change. The initial CCIRs often address information needed to make decisions during planning. These information requirements often relate to selecting a COA. During preparation and execution, CCIRs address information required in making anticipated operational decisions or plan adjustments.

(c) CCIRs often seek information the commander requires to decide whether to execute a branch or sequel. **The number of CCIRs in effect at one time must be limited.** This practice sets priorities the staff uses to allocate resources and manage information. CCIRs normally focus on near-term decisions, not every anticipated decision. As decisions are made, the CCIRs change to support other anticipated decisions. CCIRs spare the commander from receiving irrelevant information. They also protect subordinate HQ and supporting agencies from receiving excessive RFIs.

(d) CCIRs set IM and resource allocation priorities for the staff. They set IM priorities by establishing the information most important to the commander. CCIRs also establish priorities for allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources.

(e) To assist in managing CCIRs, CJTFs should implement a process to guide the staff. This process should include specific responsibilities for development, validation, dissemination, monitoring, reporting, and maintenance (i.e., modifying and deleting) of CCIRs.

For more details concerning CCIRs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(5) **Commander's Role in Preparing for Operations.** As the JTF prepares for an upcoming operation, it conducts a series of activities to improve its ability to conduct the actual operation. The CJTF closely supervises the JTF HQ and component commanders during this critical period. These activities include (but are not limited to) the following:

- (a) Continued analysis of the situation.
- (b) Reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
- (c) Refinement of the plan.

- (d) Coordination and liaison.
- (e) Rehearsals.
- (f) Training.
- (g) Inspections.
- (h) Movements.

(6) **The Commander's Role in Directing Operations.** Directing converts the commander's decisions into effective action by subordinate forces. The commander generates effective action by directing forces, synchronizing joint functions, and, within authority and capability, integrating other instruments of national power. The CJTF directs operations by:

- (a) Guiding the command toward mission accomplishment.
- (b) Assigning missions.
- (c) Prioritizing and allocating resources.
- (d) Assessing and taking risks.

(e) Assessing the situation and tasks deciding when and how to make adjustments. Task assessment must be part of the assessment to understand what adjustment in resources to make.

b. Command Relationships

(1) **C2 Functions of the JTF Establishing Authority.** The JTF establishing authority exercises either combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) or OPCON of the JTF. The JTF establishing authority transfers forces from subordinate commands and attaches them to the JTF as appropriate. The JTF establishing authority also establishes the command relationships between the CJTF and other subordinate commanders to ensure the success of the JTF.

(2) **C2 Functions of the CJTF.** The CJTF normally exercises OPCON over assigned forces and OPCON or TACON over attached forces through designated component, major subordinate command, or subordinate task force commanders. The CJTF also may be a supported or supporting commander. Further, the CJTF may delegate OPCON or TACON of, or establish support relationships for, specific JTF forces or military capabilities to or between subordinate commanders to accomplish specified tasks or missions. The CJTF is responsible for assigning responsibilities, delegating authorities, and establishing command relationships. Establishing command relationships and delineating coordinating instructions also are particularly important when JTF component and other subordinate commanders are assigned missions that bring their forces into common or contiguous areas.

For more details concerning command relationships, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

c. Understanding the Operational Environment

(1) The JFC's operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the operational environment helps commanders understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how these affect the JTF mission accomplishment.

(2) The CJTF and staff can benefit by a comprehensive perspective of the systems in the operational environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand. The joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is one process that can assist the CJTF in gaining a greater understanding of the operational environment. Developing a systems view can promote a commonly shared understanding of the operational environment among members of the interorganizational team, thereby facilitating unified action. A systems perspective of the operational environment strives to provide an understanding of interrelated systems (e.g., political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and others) relevant to a specific joint operation without regard to geographic boundaries. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this perspective. Understanding these systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC's knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. A commonly shared dynamic visual representation and associated Global Command and Control System (GCCS) data management tools can be used to integrate and manage relevant data sources. This will help the commander and staff analyze centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, decisive points, develop line of operations, refine objectives and desired and undesired effects, and focus limited resources.

(3) The CJTF is faced with an increasingly complex environment. This environment is characterized by a wide variety of potential interorganizational partners; adversaries using combinations of traditional and irregular warfare; and an exponential increase in information and information flow and global interconnected relationships. The JIPOE products for an operational area will assist the commander in understanding and navigating the complex environment. This broader, more inclusive approach to understanding the environment will assist in determining CCIRs and discussing assessments.

For further information on the operational environment and systems perspective, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

d. Operational Area Management

(1) **Organization of the Operational Area.** A critical function of the JTF is to organize the operational area to assist in the integration, coordination, and deconfliction of joint actions. The CJTF can employ areas of operations (AOs), joint special operations area (JSOA), amphibious objective areas (AOAs), and joint security areas (JSAs) to support the organization of the operational area within the assigned JOA. Figure IV-1 depicts typical JTF operational areas.

(a) **Boundaries** are lines that delineate surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.

1. JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or maritime force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.

2. Theater-wide air operations must take into account surface boundaries of the land and naval forces and the trajectory of their surface to surface fires as they may impact sorties flown during JTF air operations. Because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, the airspace control authority, on behalf of the JFC, promulgates airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this




Figure IV-1. Typical Joint Task Force Operational Areas

space. In addition, delivery of air weapons inside surface boundaries requires coordination with the surface force commanders.

For additional airspace control guidance, refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

3. Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment.

(b) **Area of Operations.** An AO is an operational area defined by the CJTF for land and maritime forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing within their AOs.

(c) **Joint Special Operations Area.** The CJTF may establish a JSOA to execute operations. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct SO activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. The scope and duration of the SOF mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous use of conventional forces and SOF in the same general operational area. When a JSOA is designated, the SOF commander is the supported commander within the designated JSOA.

(d) **Amphibious Objective Area.** The AOA is a geographical area (delineated for C2 purposes in the initiating directive) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious forces mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations.

For more details concerning AOs, JSOAs, and AOAs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, and JP 3-05, Special Operations.

(e) **Joint Security Area.** A JSA is a specific surface area, designated by the CJTF as critical to facilitate protection of joint bases and supports force protection (FP), movement control, sustainment, C2, airbases/airfields, seaports, and other activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JSAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements.

For more details concerning JSAs, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(2) **Control Measures.** The CJTF establishes additional control measures to further integrate joint actions within the JOA and subordinate operational areas in

coordination with their subordinate commanders. Control measures are directives to subordinate commanders to assign responsibilities, coordinate joint actions, and control operations. Commanders tailor their use of control measures to conform to the higher commander's intent, their own mission, and amount of authority delegated to subordinates. The CJTF employs control measures to achieve the following types of joint actions (NOTE: this list is not meant to be either all inclusive or restrictive):

- (a) Control of designated air, land, or maritime areas.
- (b) Control movements.
- (c) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
- (d) Conduct security operations.
- (e) Provide or coordinate fires.
- (f) Conduct air defense.
- (g) Designate lines of communications.
- (h) Identify critical logistic nodes or facilities.
- (i) Identify critical communications nodes or facilities.
- (j) Control C2 architecture.
- (k) Control data management operations.

e. Authorities, in the form of international and domestic law, national policy, and higher HQ guidance and intent, determine the commanders freedom of action. Authorities can be both permissive and restrictive, at times permitting a wide range of options available to the commander, while at other times restricting the actions that may be taken. An operational constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that directs an action, thus restricting freedom of action. An operational restraint is a requirement placed on the command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. Authorities approved for an operation play an integral role in planning, while operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must identify the approved authorities and operational limitations, understand their impacts, and develop options that maximize approved authorities. This must be done while minimizing the impact of operational limitations in order to promote maximum freedom of action during execution. Integrating the legal staff into the planning process assists the commander in identifying and understanding these authorities and limitations and helps the commander frame requests for authorities necessary to accomplish the mission.

(1) A common area of concern for every commander with regard to authorities and limitations is the use of force in mission accomplishment and self-defense. Use of force is framed by the commander's guidance and intent and approved ROE and rules for the use of

force (RUF). ROE and RUF are specific authorizations and limitations by which the President, SecDef, and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy and domestic and international law. When read in conjunction with the commanders guidance and intent, ROE and RUF are rules that govern when, where, against whom, and how force can be used. RUF are distinguished from ROE in that RUF are typically used for armed forces performing security or law enforcement functions. In addition, non-DOD entities such as state and local law enforcement or NG forces may also have established RUF that need to be considered in domestic operations where DOD forces operate in close proximity.

(2) ROE and RUF generally provide authority for or impose limitations on the use of force by commanders and individuals based on three types of considerations:

(a) **Military.** Properly developed ROE and RUF clarify the inherent right and obligation of unit self-defense.

(b) **Diplomatic and Political.** ROE and RUF are a reflection of USG and partner nations diplomatic and political will.

(c) **Legal.** ROE and RUF also are a reflection of international and domestic law and existing multilateral and bilateral agreements and arrangements.

(3) **ROE and RUF will change as the mission evolves.** Commanders should develop use of force measures that provide subordinate commanders with sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing conditions to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. Those measures may be influenced by the commander's judgment, the intent of higher authorities, the requirements of subordinates, the training of the force, and the concerns of multinational partners. Nothing in the ROE or RUF limit the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in unit self-defense consistent with the law of armed conflict.

(4) **ROE and RUF issues emerge during the planning process as the staff begins to develop COAs.** Required ROE should be identified during COA development. The supported CDR may provide ROE and RUF guidance to the CJTF via initial planning documents, which may precede COA development. The CJTF's proposed mission-specific ROE and RUF should be developed, exercised, and modified as necessary to support mission planning during the COA development, war gaming, analysis, and selection process. Mission objectives must drive the ROE and RUF formulation process and not vice versa.

(5) **ROE and RUF development, distribution, training, and modification must be timely and responsive to changing mission and threat parameters.**

(6) **Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE).** The President and SecDef have provided the SROE as standalone guidance for US forces worldwide that are equally applicable to all the CCMDs and can be easily amended or clarified to meet mission-specific requirements. SROE apply in addition to specific guidance, if any, from higher authority in the form of supplemental measures. SROE also provide lists of numbered supplemental

measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular situation.

(a) SROE generally do not apply to MNFs; DSCA operations; US Coast Guard units (and other units under their OPCON) conducting law enforcement operations; and US forces in support of operations not under OPCON or TACON of a CCDR, or performing missions under the direct control of the President or SecDef, Military Departments, or other interorganizational entities.

(b) GCCs also may augment the SROE to properly respond to the mission and threat in their AORs.

(c) The commander and staff must understand the military, diplomatic, political, and legal considerations that influence ROE and be able to distill the SROE and any CCDR-specific ROE into baseline ROE for the unit commander, weapon system operator, and individual Service member to apply in the field.

(d) The CJTF and staff can lessen confusion and contribute to the readiness and effective use of force by providing timely, clear, and concise ROE guidance and by assisting the components in training at every level.

(e) Subject to specific restrictions, commanders at all levels are authorized to use all lawful weapons and tactics available to accomplish assigned missions. ROE should strive, to the extent possible, to preserve this flexibility.

(f) Nonlethal capabilities offer a wider range of response to an increase or decrease of force consideration, and their employment should be clearly addressed in ROE and RUF.

(7) **Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF).** SRUF provide operational guidance and establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions taken by DOD forces performing DSCA missions (e.g., military assistance to civil authorities and military support for civilian law enforcement agencies) and routine Service functions (including FP duties) within US territory (including US territorial waters). The SRUF also apply to HD missions occurring within US territory and to DOD forces, civilians and contractors performing law enforcement and security duties at all DOD installations (and off-installation, while conducting official DOD security functions), within or outside US territory, unless otherwise directed by SecDef. HN laws and international agreements may limit US forces means of accomplishing their law enforcement or security duties. Additional examples of these missions, within the US, include protection of critical infrastructure both on and off DOD installations; military assistance and support to civil authorities; DOD support during civil disturbances; and DOD cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities, including counterdrug and border enforcement support.

(a) Unit commanders at all levels must teach and train their personnel how and when to use both nonlethal and lethal force in self-defense.

(b) Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unit self-defense includes the defense of other DOD forces in the vicinity.

(c) JTF SJAs should coordinate with NG counterparts when operating in a domestic support environment to confirm the RUF approved for use by the NG. There may be a difference between the ROE or RUF approved for DOD forces and the RUF for each state's NG forces operating in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status. Depending on the state, because NG RUF are based on the criminal law of the state in which an NG unit is performing the mission, the RUF may be more or less restrictive than the approved DOD RUF.

For more details concerning ROE and RUF, refer to the CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SECRET).

f. Interorganizational (Less Multinational) Considerations

(1) Relationships between the JTF and USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. During combat operations such as Operation DESERT STORM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other USG departments and agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide DSCA, its forces perform in a supporting role. Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency coordination. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination enables the JTF to build support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals through unity of effort.

(2) NGOs do not operate within a military, governmental, United Nations (UN), or other IGO hierarchies. As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the military. However, an associate or partnership relationship may develop during some missions. For example, if the UN has provided a grant to an NGO to implement a project, the NGO would be considered its "implementing partner." If formed, the CMOC is the focal point where US military forces coordinate any support to NGOs.

(a) As mentioned above, a coordinated effort between the JTF and USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and IGOs is essential to achieve our national objectives but should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. Military operations depend upon a command structure that often is very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various USG departments' and agencies' different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make achieving unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military.

(b) The military, on the other hand, tends to rely on structured decision-making processes, detailed planning, the use of standardized techniques and procedures, and sophisticated C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian agencies similarly employ standardized, methodical decision-making principles but likely will not have the same degree of C2 capabilities as does the US military. Across agency lines, IGOs and NGOs tend to coordinate because there is a perceived mutually supportive interest, not because of any formalized arrangement. Close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation are necessary for many reasons and may include: ensuring that a clear understanding of each organization's objectives; addressing inadequate structure and limited available commercial facilities and logistic support; developing coordination/mutual support procedures; and overcoming bureaucratic and personal limitations. This understanding could help harmonize agencies' responses in conjunction with joint operations, thus promoting unified action.

For further details concerning interorganizational coordination during joint operations, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

g. Multinational Considerations

(1) **Command Authority.** The President retains and does not relinquish command authority over US forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a competent UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or multinational commander for specific operations authorized by the UN Security Council, or approved by the North Atlantic Council, or other authorized regional organization.

(a) US forces under the OPCON of a multinational force commander (MNFC) will follow the MNF ROE for mission accomplishment when directed by SecDef. Regardless, US forces retain the right of self-defense per the SROE. After assignment to a MNF, US forces will report any changes to MNF ROE to higher authority for review and approval.

(b) US forces will remain under the OPCON of an MNFC only if the CCDR and higher authority determine that the MNF ROE are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense and the rules for individual self-defense contained in the current version of CJCSI 3121.01, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for Use of Force for US Forces (SECRET)*.

(2) **Organizational Structure.** The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated, lead nation, or parallel command.

(a) **Integrated Command Structure.** Multinational commands organized under an integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example of this command structure is found in NATO where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational make up.

(b) **Lead Nation Command Structure.** A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure is International Security Assistance Force and US Forces—Afghanistan, wherein a US-led HQ provides the overall military C2 over the main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces and the other predominately Afghan forces.

(c) **Parallel Command Structures.** Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible.

(d) Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component, often called a national command element, to ensure effective administration of its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. In an administrative role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the national support element.

(3) **Use of Special Operations Forces.** SOF have an inherent capability that can provide the multinational JTF commander with an accurate assessment of the capabilities, location, and activities of MNFs. SOF teams have played an integral role in assisting and integrating partner nation units into multinational operations. Multinational support includes assisting with a communication interface to integrate multinational partners into the command and intelligence structure, establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and combat service support, and training multinational partners on tactics and techniques. When authorized, SOF may be tasked to provide direct assistance to partners during combat operations.

(4) Additionally, JTFs must consider relationships and arrangements with HNs that do not directly participate in the operation but are required to grant overflight, access, and transit to their sovereign territories. This coordination most often will occur through US embassy representatives.

(5) Other multinational considerations include international law, agreements, and arrangements in place or required to protect the sovereign interests of national territories that JTF forces must cross, particularly if affected nations do not participate in JTF operations. The DOD 4500.54-M, *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide Manual*, (<https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil>) lists HN peacetime restrictions to determine if additional bilateral agreements/arrangements should be coordinated through US embassies. In addition,

an electronic version of the Foreign Clearance Guide can be found at: <https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil>.

For additional guidance concerning multinational C2, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

h. Considerations for DSCA Operations

(1) The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over federal (Title 10, USC) military forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider placing appropriate Title 10, USC, forces under the OPCON or TACON of a dual-status (Title 10/Title 32, USC) commander in support of the governor of a US state or territory. Title 10, USC, forces under the command (assigned or attached OPCON or TACON) of a dual-status commander will follow the Title 10, USC, RUF unless directed otherwise by the President or SecDef.

For more details concerning JTF-State, refer to Appendix E, “Joint Task Force-State.”

For more details concerning DSCA, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

3. Joint Task Force Headquarters Management Process

a. **General.** The CJTF and staff use a number of processes, such as JOPP that support the JTF’s requirements, activities, and products. Three of these processes—JTF IM, the commander’s decision cycle, and the HQ battle rhythm—are especially important for the efficient management of day-to-day HQ operations.

(1) **Information Management.** The complexity of JTF operations requires a process to assist the commander in exercising C2. The IM process facilitates the commander’s decision making by improving the speed and accuracy of information flow as well as supporting execution through reliable communications. **The goal of common understanding of information and appropriate sharing of the same is achieved through the proper management of personnel, equipment and facilities, and procedures.** This management is conducted by a viable IM organization, the result of which is a common tactical picture (CTP) that is shared with the GCC as an input to the theater common operational picture (COP), and with all the JTF’s component commanders.

(a) The IM organization is operationally focused to facilitate the command’s information flow processes (internally, externally, vertically, and horizontally). These are formalized in a command information management plan (IMP) or standard operating procedures. IM refers to the processes of managing an organization’s information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that information.

(b) **The commander sets the tone for the entire command by establishing priorities for information requirements and dissemination.** The commander defines

what information is needed and how it should be delivered. Additionally, the commander focuses the staff by designating certain information as critical. These CCIRs will change over time as the situation continues to evolve.

(c) The chief of staff understands the HQ information requirements and dissemination needs and directs and synchronizes the staff in these efforts. The chief of staff normally implements the IMP and ensures that the staff adheres to the processes that have been developed.

(d) The information management officer (IMO) generally is responsible for developing and capturing the command's IM processes and publishing them in the IMP. The IMO additionally coordinates IM training for the staff and components to ensure familiarization with the IMP and coordinates the joint information management board (JIMB) activities.

(e) Joint Information Management Board. The JIMB acts as the center point for oversight and coordinating IM within the JTF. It is comprised of operational or function information managers and information managers from all the primary staff sections, JTF components, and stakeholder information managers. It is co-chaired by the IMO and JTF J-6 who enables decisions made by the chief of staff or CJTF. The JIMB convenes initially to capture and identify both the existing and evolving processes that are needed to ensure effective flow of information throughout the command and to develop the IMP. Once a plan is approved, the JIMB provides oversight of processes and resolves IM cross-functional issues.

For further details concerning IM at the JTF level, refer to Chapter X, "Joint Task Force Communications," Appendix D, "Information Management," JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

To further assist the JTF IMO in the preparation of an IMP and coordinating IM with other USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs, refer to Annex L, "Checklist for Information Management," to Appendix A, "Checklists."

(2) Commander's Decision Cycle. The commander's decision cycle is a process that depicts how command and staff elements determine required actions, codify them in directives, execute them, and monitor their results. The commander's decision cycle has four phases (refer to Figure IV-2).

(a) Monitor. Monitoring involves measuring ongoing activities that may impact the JTF's operational area or impact the JTF's ongoing or future operations. The baseline for this measurement of the situation is the current plan or plans. This baseline allows the staff to measure the current situation against the one envisioned in the plan. This allows the commander and staff to identify where the current situation deviates from the one envisioned in the plan. Although staff sections monitor their individual staff functions to maintain current staff estimates, the preponderance of the JTF's monitoring function is conducted by the JTF's centers (e.g., the JOC, the JLOC), and is depicted visually through the CTP display.




Figure IV-2. Commander's Decision Cycle

(b) **Assess.** Within the commander's decision cycle, assessment is the determination of the impact of events as they relate to overall mission accomplishment. Fundamental to assessment are judgments about JTF progress in designated mission areas as measured against the expected progress in those same mission areas. These judgments allow the commander and the staff to determine where adjustments must be made to operations and serve as a catalyst for planning. Ultimately, assessment allows the commander and staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment.

(c) **Plan.** In the planning portion of the commander's decision cycle, the commander and staff make adjustments to the current plan or develop new plans, branches, or sequels with the purpose of successful completion of the broader mission.

(d) **Direct.** JTF HQ directs actions to ensure that current orders and directives are completed as intended. This direction is done with the broader purpose of achieving the overall mission. Tools like the commander's intent and CCIRs assist the JTF HQ in this role. The preponderance of the JTF's directing function is conducted by the JOC.

(3) **Battle Rhythm.** Battle rhythm is described as the sequencing and execution of actions and events within a joint force HQ that are regulated by the flow and sharing of information that support all decision cycles.

(a) **General.** A battle rhythm is a routine cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. As a practical matter, the HQ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other

activities (see Figure IV-3). These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly requirements. Typically, **the JTF HQ's battle rhythm is managed by the JTF chief of staff**. There are several critical functions for a battle rhythm; these include (but are not limited to) the following:

Sample Joint Task Force Headquarters Battle Rhythm

Time	Event	Location	Participants
Note: Event Time is Situational Dependent	Shift Change	JOC	Battle Staff/others as required
	Targeting Meeting	Briefing Room	As Required
	Situation Update to CJTF	Briefing Room	CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's Personal and Special Staffs, Component Liaison, others as required
	Plans Update to CJTF	Briefing Room	CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's Personal and Special Staffs, Component Liaison, others as required
	CJTF's VTC Call to Components	CJTF Conference Room	CJTF, Component Commanders
	JPG	J-5 Plans Conference Room	J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, Core Planners, Component Liaison, others as required
	JTCB Meeting	Briefing Room	DCJTF, J-2, J-3, JFACC, Component Liaison, others as required
	Joint Information Management Board	Briefing Room	COS, J-3, J-6, Staff Information Management Representatives, Component Liaison, others as required
	IO Working Group	Briefing Room	IO Staff, CA, PA, DSPD, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, Component Liaison, JMISTF, others as required
	Battle Update Assessment	Briefing Room	CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's Personal and Special Staffs, Component Liaison, others as required
	Protection Working Group	JOC	FP Officer, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, Component Liaison, others as required
	Shift Change	JOC	Battle Staff/others as required
	ROE/RUF Working Group	Briefing Room	J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, SJA Component Liaison, others as required
	Combat Assessment Board	Briefing Room	CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's Personal and Special Staffs, Component Liaison, others as required

Legend

CA	civil affairs	J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
CJTF	commander, joint task force	JFACC	joint force air component commander
COS	chief of staff	JMISTF	joint military information support task force
DCJTF	deputy commander, joint task force	JOC	joint operations center
DSPD	defense support to public diplomacy	JPG	joint planning group
FP	force protection	JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
IO	information operations	PA	public affairs
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff	ROE	rules of engagement
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff	RUF	rules for the use of force
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff	SJA	staff judge advocate
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff	VTC	video teleconferencing
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff		

Figure IV-3. Sample Joint Task Force Headquarters Battle Rhythm

1. Providing a routine for staff interaction and coordination within the HQ.
2. Providing a routine for commander and staff interaction (in so much as it can be).
3. Synchronizing staff organizations' activities.
4. Facilitating planning by the staff and decision making by the commander. This includes requiring the JTF proponent for a cross-functional staff element (e.g., joint targeting coordination board [JTCB]) to provide criteria and supporting rationale for establishing it (i.e., purpose and authority) and its proposed membership. A seven minute drill process may prove beneficial to proponents of cross-functional staff elements in briefing the chief of staff. The name "seven minute drill" refers to the fact that the staff officer briefing has 7 minutes, using the example in Figure IV-4, to explain to the chief of staff "why" that particular cross-functional staff element is necessary and how it supports the overall commander's decision cycle. Proponents of other cross-functional staff elements can use the Figure IV-4 template to develop their briefs.

(b) **Factors that Shape a Battle Rhythm.** Many factors influence the establishment of a battle rhythm. Subordinate commanders are responsible for linking the planning, decision, and operating cycles of their command to those of the higher HQ and must synchronize their unit battle rhythm with that of the higher HQ.

1. The higher HQ battle rhythm and reporting requirements.
2. Battle rhythm must support the commander's decision cycle.
3. The planning requirements within the HQ (e.g., future plans, future operations, and current operations).
4. Other factors (e.g., battlefield circulation).

b. **Information Systems and Information Sharing.** Information systems are the equipment that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers—hardware and software—and communications as well as policies and procedures for their use. Information systems assist commanders and staffs to gain situational awareness and support the CJTF's decision-making process.

(1) **Physical Information Sharing.** Physical information sharing is done primarily in cross-functional staff elements and other forums, and also shared via LNOs and through documents.

(2) **Virtual Information Sharing.** Virtual information sharing allows organizations and elements within or external to an HQ, whether collocated or geographically separate, to have access to the same information. This occurs both horizontally within an HQ and adjacent units and staffs, and vertically with components and higher HQ. A virtual network approach can provide an easily accessible point for information sharing through employment of Web pages and directories for authorized uses.

Seven Minute Drill Example: Civil-Military Operations Working Group

Purpose:

Coordinate with stakeholders, to include intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and host nation services, to deconflict and establish priorities for civil-military operations and planning in support of joint task force and humanitarian assistance requirements based on capabilities.

Inputs:

- Situation reports, component operational reporting
- Battle damage assessment
- Humanitarian assistance and host nation expectations and requests
- Information operations themes and messages (from information operations working group)
- Higher headquarters civil affairs situation reports
- Subordinate civil affairs battalion reports or updates
- Current and future operations updates (from commander's update brief)
- Prioritized logistics resource allocation (from logistics coordination working group/logistics coordination board)

Outputs:

- Construction priorities (to logistics coordination working group/logistics coordination board)
- Project validation
- Guidance to civil-military operations center and attached civil affairs units (fragmentary order and civil-military operations estimate)
- Feedback from subordinate civil affairs units on impact of information operations themes and messages (to information operations working group)

Key Tasks:

Address civil-military issues (should address issues as delineated by key tasks, but should not include issues at the tactical civil-military operations level). Provide subordinate civil-military operations and subordinate civil affairs unit commanders with guidance. Ensure synchronization of civil-military operations and civil affairs forces.

Chair:

Civil-Military Operations

Facilitator:

Deputy Civil-Military Operations

Frequency/and Location:

As required

Membership:

J-1, staff judge advocate, J-2, J-3, J-4, surgeon, J-5, assessments, chaplain, J-8, as required

Legend

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff	J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff	J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff	J-8 force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff

Figure IV-4. Seven Minute Drill Example: Civil-Military Operations Working Group

Information also can be disseminated via e-mail, message traffic, and one of the

collaborative tools, such as Defense Connect Online, HARMONIEWeb, or shared via video teleconferencing (VTC). Members of the JTF staff, LNOs, JTF components, and higher and adjacent commands can all collect or disseminate information in accordance with defined access permissions.

(3) **Joint Visibility Information.** Personnel visibility is having reliable information that provides visibility of US Service members, DOD civilian employees, and DOD-funded contractors physically present in a GCC's AOR. Additionally, personnel visibility may be expanded to include multinational partners, security forces, and local national and third country employees as appropriate. The goal of personnel visibility is to provide accurate, timely, readily available personnel information to senior leadership. The GCC will plan for and cause the establishment of a process, using existing Service systems, to account for all personnel in their AOR to achieve personnel visibility. The GCC has the authority to accomplish personnel service support functions through a single-service manager.

(a) Both a JTF and a Service component command are responsible for providing accurate personnel visibility data to the GCC for their JOAs or their AOs. A Service has the responsibility of operating an aerial port of debarkation (APOD)/seaport of debarkation (SPOD) or aerial port of embarkation (APOE)/seaport of embarkation (SPOE) in a GCC's AOR to process their personnel. Various categories of personnel from other Services and organizations may arrive in theater through the APOD/SPOD or depart through their APOE/SPOE.

(b) The GCC has the authority to accomplish personnel service support functions through the single-service manager concept. Service components may be tasked to collect personal data, using their Service system, for personnel from other Services and organizations who arrive in theater through their APOD/SPOD or depart the theater through their APOE/SPOE. Service components organizations tasked as a single-service manager will receive guidance and direction from and be under the operational oversight of the GCC's J-1.

CHAPTER V

JOINT TASK FORCE MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

“People are the most important asset in any military operation. Thorough planning and comprehensive personnel management directly impact mission readiness.”

**Joint Publication 1-0, Joint Personnel Support
24 October 2011**

1. General

a. The JTF J-1 is principal staff assistant to the CJTF on manpower management, personnel management, personnel readiness, and personnel services. The J-1 maintains the JMD, is the focal point for personnel support actions, and responsible for managing, optimizing, and synchronizing the level of personnel support provided to the task force during all phases of an operation. Although the Services have the primary responsibility for providing personnel services support to their Service members, the joint force J-1 tracks the efforts of Service components to stay abreast of personnel activities that could impact the joint force.

b. **Manpower and Personnel Directorate.** The J-1 has primary responsibility for personnel management; manpower management; personnel augmentation; joint personnel reception center; personnel accountability and strength reporting; rotation policy; pay and entitlements policy; postal operations, morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR); casualty reporting; personnel performance evaluations; awards and decorations; and civilian personnel. In order to manage personnel, J-1 establishes personnel visibility policies and procedures based on CJTF guidance.

(1) The JTF J-1 will co-chair the JMD WG with the JTF J-3.

(2) In addition, the J-1 provides support and assistance to the office of primary responsibility with regard to RC call-up, stop-loss, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and noncombatant repatriation, PR, and detainee operations. The JTF J-1 is responsible for the development of the JTF personnel estimate during JOPP. The J-1 must be fully involved in all phases of deliberate planning and CAP to support effective planning for personnel support to joint operations and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander’s estimate and plan development. The J-1 also must coordinate with the supported CCMD J-1 for personnel planning issues.

For further details, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

2. Organization

a. Figure V-1 depicts a notional J-1 organization. However, the actual composition of the J-1 will be dictated by the overall organization of the JTF and operations to be conducted.

Notional Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel Directorate Organization Chart




Figure V-1. Notional Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel Directorate Organization Chart

b. **Joint manpower division** provides policy oversight on joint manpower and management of joint forces and US contributions to multinational military organizations.

c. **Personnel readiness division** provides plans, policy, and guidance on joint personnel issues, to include oversight of joint personnel operations. Personnel readiness plans include development of the manpower requirements for inclusion in plans and orders. Personnel readiness issues normally are addressed in the plans and operations division of a joint force J-1.

d. **Personnel services division** accomplishes actions for the internal staff, DOD civilians, and military members of the JTF. It also includes limited administrative requirements related to DOD contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF).

e. Directors action group reviews policies pertaining to the separation/retirement of military personnel, concurrent receipt, survivor benefits, veteran issues, assignment policy, force realignment and transformation, quality of life issues, compensation, and recruiting and retention. All Services should have representation to the director's action group to provide guidance on Service specific personnel issues.

3. Responsibilities

Some responsibilities and functions executed by the J-1 are:

a. **Personnel Management.** A JTF J-1 is responsible for overseeing personnel management activities.

b. Manpower Management

(1) Manpower management consists of providing plans, policy, and oversight on joint manpower issues. The J-1 plays a key role in facilitating the consolidation and

management of manpower requirements and sourcing personnel for the JTF HQ. Through the conduct of joint personnel planning, as described in Chapter III, “Joint Personnel Planning,” of JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*, the J-1 facilitates the identification and consolidation of the JTF HQ manpower and personnel requirements into a JMD, which identifies all manpower requirements essential to the C2 of an HQ organization.

See CJCSI 1301.01, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures, for additional guidance.

(2) Effective manpower management entails the timely development and accurate maintenance of the JMD to ensure the right people are available at the right time throughout the joint operation in support of the CJTF’s mission requirements. The JTF can improve its chances of getting the right qualified individuals by including any specialized training for the billets or ensuring security clearances are not beyond the scope of duties. High demand/low density military occupational specialties are a challenge to effective manpower management as the individuals/capabilities are often not available.

c. Joint Manning Document Development Process

(1) JMDs are manning documents that identify all manpower requirements essential to the C2 of a JTF HQ organization. JMDs are created in the electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System (eJMAPS) in accordance with established business rules for the use of eJMAPS. See JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*, for detailed information. The specific JTF HQ JMD development process is as follows:

(a) As part of the CCDR JTF certification process, the CCMD J-1 in conjunction with the Service and JTF J-1s, will develop and maintain a JMD to support potential JTF operations. It is essential that the CJTF has an initial JMD on the shelf to facilitate the establishment of the JTF.

(b) A formalized, structured JMD WG should be established at the JTF levels to confirm and validate the JMD positions by skill, grade, and component; track by-name arrivals and departures for each position; determine or refine current and future manning requirements; and submit requests to higher HQ to change the JMD based on approved additions, deletions, and modifications identified by the JMD WG. JMD WG, chaired by J-1 with a co-chair from J-3, meets on a recurring basis with a set agenda with all staff sections participating.

(c) There is a requirement for supported CCMDs, force providers, and applicable DOD agencies to track personnel filling JMD positions and report status utilizing eJMAPS.

Refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, for specific requirements.

(2) Mission requirements should drive the development of JTF HQ organization and manpower requirements, as documented in its JMD. JMD development should occur in conjunction with and be based upon a thorough mission analysis and on the required capabilities and tasks reflected in development of the CJTF-approved joint mission-essential task list (JMETL). At this phase in the planning process, the J-1 and other JTF staff elements work in support of the J-3-led mission analysis effort to identify JTF HQ capability

requirements, joint mission-essential tasks (JMETs), and the corresponding manpower requirements. Clearly delineating roles and responsibilities is critical to the organization of an effective staff. The commander or the chief of staff should direct each staff element to participate in the JMD WG, which refines the manpower requirements to perform JMETs and subsequently builds and maintains the JMD. The JMD WG may seek to identify previous-like mission JMDs, such as JTF HQ C2 baseline templates and architectures, which may be used as a guide in determining JTF HQ manpower requirements. Such templates must be tailored, based on mission analysis and the CJTF's guidance, to the specific mission.

(3) The J-1 normally takes the lead in the JMD WG for drafting the JMD. The J-1 consolidates the capability requirements, to include position descriptions and proposed organizational structure submitted by all JTF HQ staff elements. The resulting JMD is approved by the CJTF and, subsequently, submitted to the supported CCMD for review and validation. Following validation, the CCMD loads the JMD into the eJMAPS. The eJMAPS is the primary management information system used to manage and document Joint Staff, CCMDs, CJCS-controlled activities, associated joint activities, and NATO manpower authorizations.

(4) The JTF J-1 should work with the supported CCMD J-1 to prepare specific reporting instructions. The supported CCMD forwards the JMD, along with position descriptions, specific reporting instructions, and desired report date for each position to its Service component commands and the combat support agencies (CSAs) to fill. The Service components and CSAs will then request individuals per their respective Service policies and report back to the supported CCMD what personnel from their commands will fill positions on the JMD. The supported CDR will then send the JMD to the Joint Staff J-1 for prioritization and sourcing of any unfilled positions.

(5) The organizational structure and size of a JTF HQ, as reflected in the JMD, should be based on mission requirements, a CONOPS, the CJTF decision-making process, both the supported CDR's and CJTF's guidance, and other factors external to the JTF HQ control, such as an imposed maximum footprint ceiling or multinational participation. A well-balanced JTF HQ staff should be representative of its subordinate forces and possess a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. Furthermore, the organization of the staff should be established and modified as the needs of the HQ evolve over time.

(6) When drafting the JMD, JTF HQ also should anticipate the need for liaison, interpreter and communications personnel requirements, especially as these relate to effective coordination and integration with multinational partners, the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs. Close cooperation and coordination is required with all mission partners because each have potentially different organizational processes and cultures. Manning, communications, and other technological interoperability commonly associated with mission partners can have an impact on the organizational structure of the JTF HQ. When possible, advance coordination and exercises with these partners can lead to the development of common procedures prior to the execution of an integrated operation and can contribute to the development of a comprehensive JMD and the readiness of the JTF HQ.

d. **Joint Individual Augmentation.** JIA enables CCMDs to augment JTFs with allocated temporary personnel resources to enable them to effectively perform assigned joint missions. Using the JIA process to fill permanent manning shortfalls or for joint training or exercise positions is not authorized. Filling **permanent manpower** and training (including scheduled exercises) billets is covered by CJCSI 1600.01, *Charter for United States European Command NATO Manning Division*, and other CJCS publications.

e. **Sourcing Joint Manning Document Requirements**

(1) After documenting its manpower requirements in a JMD, the JTF HQ, in coordination with its supported CCMD, should build a joint manning plan to source the JTF HQ manpower requirements. A joint manning plan can provide a methodical approach to transitioning the existing organic staff of a single-Service organization into a joint staff HQ, and it should consider the full range of available personnel sources.

- (a) The designated Service HQ own organic staff.
- (b) Augmentees from within the CCMD, such as the Service components.
- (c) Other temporary duty/temporary additional duty augmentation requirements.
- (d) Interagency and multinational partners.

1. Proper consideration of these personnel sources will enhance the JTF HQ ability to acquire the requisite joint expertise to plan and execute the assigned mission(s). This is particularly important if the manning requirements are initially beyond the ability of the supported CCMD to source.

2. A well thought out joint manning plan that provides for the immediate fill of key billets from all available sources can reduce the time it takes to get a JTF established and organized, so as to turn inevitable chaos into order. Getting the C2 right will facilitate the execution of operations.

(2) During JMD development, organic Service billets may be identified as the “core billets” on the contingency JTF HQ JMD. Many of these “core billets” may be further identified as key billets, for which the presence of the individual filling the billet is determined to be absolutely essential to the readiness of a JTF HQ to act on a planning order and to execute the directed JTF HQ mission(s) within the timeframes required by the applicable CJCS warning or execute order. The CJTF should, however, ensure that the JTF HQ avoids over reliance on a single Service to fill its JMD, as this limits the scope of joint advice that will ultimately be available to the CJTF.

f. **Joint Manning Document Activation and Maintenance**

(1) When ordered to conduct operations as a JTF HQ, the JTF HQ commander should commence operations based on a CDR-validated JMD. If a JMD has been pre-positioned in eJMAPS, it can be activated to expedite sourcing from the Services. In a crisis

situation, a pre-positioned JMD serves the purpose of providing the joint force provider with an initial indication of the JTF HQ manpower requirements and their likely sources.

(2) Any new requirements or changes to the JMD are provided as an emergent or change request submission, which is sent by the CJTF to the CCCR for validation and initial sourcing. Subsequent modifications to the CCCR-validated JMD are based on the specific requirements of the assigned mission and may need to be sourced internally by the supported CCMD because of the length of time required to source JIAs.

(3) The JMD should be reviewed and evaluated in conjunction with all readiness training events. To this end, the JTF HQ staff and especially the J-1 must maintain proficiency in developing, sourcing, and maintaining JMDs for contingency operations.

g. Joint Personnel Reception Center

(1) Establishing a joint personnel reception center facilitates the reception, accountability, training, processing, and onward movement or integration of individual replacements, augmentees, DOD civilian employees, CAAF, and units into the JTF.

(2) The establishment of a joint personnel reception center within the JOA will be at the direction of the CJTF.

(3) For JOAs with multiple entry and exit points, the CJTF should consider establishment of satellite joint personnel reception centers.

(4) A joint personnel reception center should be staffed with representation from all JTF Service components to facilitate reception of JTF component personnel and provide Service specific administrative support.

(5) Normally, the JTF J-1 would have overall responsibility for managing the joint personnel reception center. The J-1 will coordinate with the J-4 for billeting, transportation, food service, and other required logistic support.

(6) The joint personnel reception center can provide such things as orientation, briefings (e.g., ROE and RUF, cultural concerns, safety, OPSEC, and familiarization with JTF HQ, dining areas, and other facilities), religious support (RS), initial billeting, joint training, onward movement of units or personnel, and accountability of all personnel joining the JTF.

(7) The joint personnel reception center should be planned for, and established, when the JMD is developed and distributed to the Service components and the Joint Staff.

Refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, Appendix G, “Joint Personnel Reception Center and Joint Personnel Training and Tracking Activities,” for additional guidance.

h. Personnel Accountability and Strength Reporting

(1) The CJTF is responsible to provide an accurate personnel strength report to the supported CCDR.

(2) J-1 prepares the report by combining Service component reports into the joint personnel status and casualty report (JPERSTAT).

(3) The J-1 monitors unit strength, both current and projected, by means of daily personnel status reports from Service component commands.

(4) A JPERSTAT is submitted daily by the supported CCDR to the CJCS.

For more guidance on JPERSTAT format, refer to CJCSM 3150.13B, Joint Reporting Structure—Personnel Manual.

i. Rotation Policy

(1) The supported CCDR coordinates tour-length policies with the Service components, the Joint Staff, and the Services.

(2) The decision to establish a specific rotation policy depends on the mission, anticipated length of the operation, operational environment, personnel tempo, unique training requirements, and the availability of required skills.

(3) The nature of any operation necessitates a rotation policy that addresses both mission and individual needs. Morale and job performance often improves when individuals know when they will rotate. This is true for both individuals assigned to the joint force and those who are identified for future rotations.

(4) Tour lengths for personnel usually are 179 to 365 days based on battle rhythm and demand.

j. Pay and Entitlements

(1) The CJTF should determine, or recommend to the supported CCDR, policy concerning pay and entitlements. The JTF J-1 must be involved in this policy decision and must be in consultation with the JTF financial management and the JTF support services officer.

(2) A consistent policy should be developed to prevent inequities among personnel from the various Services. Pay and entitlement requests normally take time to enact, so an early determination of a policy will facilitate personnel receiving proper and timely pay. The JTF J-1 should address the following during the planning process:

(a) Temporary duty allowances (per diem rates); use of field conditions.

(b) Imminent danger pay, if applicable. This pay is not placed in effect until authorized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy and is not retroactive.

(c) Hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay, if applicable.

(d) Combat zone tax exclusion benefits, if applicable.

(e) Government civilian employees.

1. Danger pay allowances.

2. Foreign post differential.

3. Overtime, compensatory time, shift differential, and Sunday/holiday premium pay.

k. Postal Operations

(1) The supported CCDR's J-1 coordinates the movement of mail to the JOA, normally via a designated single-service manager. The JTF J-1 implements postal operations in the JOA based on guidance from the supported CCDR's J-1 and single-service manager.

(2) The JTF J-1 develops postal policies. Below are topics for consideration.

(a) JTF postal staffing requirements.

(b) Postal restrictions and embargo procedures.

(c) Establishment of postal infrastructure in the JOA.

(d) Start date for mail service.

(e) Free mail.

(f) Any Service member mail.

(g) Holiday mail programs.

(h) JTF J-1 is the single manager of postal operations to accomplish the above functions.

l. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

(1) The JTF J-1 has the responsibility to organize component command support; to identify temporary and permanent obstacles to MWR activities; and identify external requirements to sustain and improve MWR operations in the JOA. The CJTF should establish equitable MWR support policies and may designate a lead agent(s) for execution.

(2) MWR programs are essential to combat readiness. Establishment of these programs should be predicated on the combat situation. MWR programs can be "stress relievers."

- (a) Morale calls.
- (b) VTC access.
- (c) Pass program.
- (3) These programs may include:
 - (a) Exchange services.
 - (b) Fitness and recreation facilities.
 - (c) Entertainment services.
 - (d) Food and beverage sales.
 - (e) Newspaper issue and sales.
 - (f) Commercial telephone access.
 - (g) Rest and recuperation programs.
 - (h) Internet cafés.

m. Casualty Reporting

(1) While casualty reporting is a Service responsibility, the JTF J-1 ensures casualty information is reported through the chain of command to make superiors aware of status-of-forces and events that may have significant DOD or media interest.

(2) JTF casualty reporting is accomplished via event or incident reports (Operational Report 3 Serious Incident Report, or JPERSTAT), depending upon the intensity of operations and numbers of casualties.

(3) The JMAO (under the cognizance of the J-4) must coordinate with the J-1 to effect casualty projections for each warfighting scenario.

n. Personnel Performance Evaluations. The JTF J-1 must ensure the timely preparation and submission of performance evaluations for assigned individuals in accordance with the established guidelines of the individual Services.

o. Awards and Decorations

(1) The JTF J-1 should develop and promulgate guidance concerning awards and decorations consistent with DOD and CCMD awards policies.

(2) The JTF J-1 also should ensure that timely recommendations and supporting information for individual, unit, and campaign awards are forwarded to the appropriate command.

For additional information, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

p. Civilian Employees and Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (provided for the JTF J-1 awareness)

(1) The J-1 is responsible for coordinating and integrating personnel plans and procedures for civilian support to joint operations. The GCC issues guidance on theater admission requirements for use of DOD emergency-essential civilians and CAAF to support OPLANs during contingencies. CCDRs coordinate with DOD components to ensure theater admission requirements and other terms and conditions affecting the integration of CAAF personnel into OPLANs and OPORDs are incorporated into applicable contracts. The J-1 identifies predeployment requirements to include proper identification cards, security clearances, training, clothing, equipping, and medical processing. For CAAF, the link to the deployment is established by a government contracting officer (or designee) issued letter of authorization (LOA). The LOA is required for CAAF to process through a deployment center; to travel to, from, and within the AOR; and to identify any additional authorizations, privileges, or government support that they are entitled to under the contract. The J-1 should coordinate with component personnel officers and the J-4 to ensure contract LOAs reflect CCDR requirements and that LOAs are required at all vetting points processing CAAF. The J-4 monitors contract issues, including administration, and coordinates with the J-1 for any special CAAF issues, including administration support. CAAF accountability is provided by the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT), operated by the JTF J-4. SPOT generates LOAs and provides authoritative information on the whereabouts of CAAF in the JOA. Total numbers of contractors by location will be provided from SPOT to the J-1 for inclusion in the JPERSTAT. Development and employment of SPOT is directed in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.

For further details concerning contractor accountability, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(2) Contractors are used increasingly by DOD in the US for response to CBRN incidents and DSCA operations.

(3) They provide important expertise in a variety of fields. Thus, there are contractor-specific support issues that need to be addressed.

(a) **Personnel Issues.** CAAF personnel issues for military operations within the US are coordinated between the contract program manager and the JTF J-1.

(b) **Medical Issues.** In military operations within the US, ill or injured CAAFs may be provided first responder or forward resuscitative care by DOD medical assets until such time that they are transferred to a civilian medical facility for further treatment. If civilian medical facilities are unavailable due to the disaster or CBRN incident, CAAFs may be treated by DOD medical assets with reimbursement based upon existing contractual arrangements or determined using other DOD criteria.

(c) **Logistic Issues.** For CBRN and natural disaster operations within the US, CAAFs are an integral part of the JTF and must be able to travel with the force at a moment's notice. Therefore, CAAFs' travel and lodging is covered through the use of letters of identification for contractor travel.

q. **Joint Personnel Training and Tracking Activities (JPTTAs).** JPTTAs may be established in a supporting GCC's AOR upon request of the supported CCDR. These centers facilitate accountability, training, processing, and onward movement of both military and DOD civilian individual augmentees preparing for overseas movement for assignment to joint or combined staff positions. When established, a JPTTA is managed by the Joint Staff. DOD civilians and CAAF also should be processed through a replacement center in conjunction with the JPTTA prior to deploying to the operational area. Policy and procedures governing CAAF, including predeployment requirements and processing at deployment centers and reception centers are covered in DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.

r. **Sexual Assault Prevention and Response.** As part of policies, personals, and procedures, JTF J-1 is responsible for implementing sexual assault prevention and response policies for the CJTF. The details for a sexual assault prevention and response program can be found in JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*.

s. **Additional JTF J-1 Responsibilities.**

(1) Develops annex E (Personnel) to the CJTF's plans and orders. See JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*, and CJCSM 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats*.

(2) Maintains a dialogue not only with the other staff sections, but with the components and outside interorganizational entities, as well.

(3) Processes requests from directorate or staff sections for nonmilitary personnel (e.g., political advisors, linguists, and interpreters).

(4) Ensures that subordinate commanders are kept informed of personnel actions that will affect their commands and their Service members.

(5) Coordinates and is responsible to the CJTF for liaison and repatriation planning for NEOs. The CJTF assigns staff personnel for planning and administration as required and submits total numbers of evacuees through CCMD J-1 to Joint Staff J-1. To coordinate effective support at a safe haven, the CJTF can use the automated NEO tracking system to manage individuals during NEOs.

For details concerning NEOs, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

(6) Determines procedures concerning the use of local civilian labor (coordinate with the JTF J-4, J-2, and SJA).

(7) Ensures that personnel-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities and support military deception initiatives.

(8) Determines and enforces strict procedures for maintaining records management program.

(9) Ensures equal opportunity and equal employment opportunity support is provided to all personnel in the JOA.

(10) Coordinates early identification of personnel requirements under an RC call-up, when appropriate.

Additional information on specific procedures and requirements concerning RC call-up can be found in JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning.

(11) Coordinates PR activities, from a personnel perspective, with the CCMD J-1. The JTF J-1's role in PR is systematic management for casualty assistance to isolated personnel and their families. It includes accountability and reporting (Department of Defense [DD] Form 2812, *Commander's Preliminary Assessment and Recommendation Regarding Missing Person*) to the CCMD J-1. As directed by the CJTF, the JTF J-1 establishes a PR procedure that coordinates the efforts of other JTF staff sections.

(12) Determines the joint and multinational publication requirements for the JTF.

(13) In coordination with other staff sections, estimates and reports casualty rates.

4. Personnel Planning

a. The JTF J-1 must be fully involved in planning efforts and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander's estimate and plan development. The following are JTF J-1 personnel planning responsibilities:

(1) Participate in the JTF decision-making and planning processes from the inception.

(2) Provide membership to appropriate staff organizations in support of planning and operations.

(3) Inform the CJTF and other staff sections of personnel issues that may impact the operation. The requirement for the possible early deployment of postal personnel, linguists, interpreters, and other personnel support specialists to the JOA should not be overlooked.

(4) **Develop and Maintain the Personnel Estimate.** For an example of a personnel estimate, refer to CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, Planning Policy and Procedures*.

(5) **Casualty Estimates.** The personnel estimate should contain a casualty estimate. Casualty estimates support the following functions: commander's evaluation of COAs, by analysis of force strength for missions within the CONOPS and scheme of maneuver; personnel replacements and flow planning and allocation among forces; health service support (HSS) planning, for both force structure and logistic support; transportation planning, including both inter- and intratheater requirements, to deliver medical force structure and to evacuate and replace personnel; and evacuation policy options to sustain the force by balancing minimal support force footprint, maximum in-theater returns-to-duty, and stable personnel rotation. Service components in a joint force command provide their casualty estimates to the JTF J-1 who then makes the information available to the J-3, J-4, J-5, and the joint force surgeon.

b. The JTF J-1 also coordinates related personnel planning issues with the supported CCMD J-1.

To further assist the JTF J-1 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex C, "Checklist for Joint Task Force J-1," to Appendix A, "Checklists."

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CHAPTER VI

JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE

“Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.”

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* ca. 500 BC

1. General

Intelligence Directorate. The intelligence directorate’s primary function is to provide information and analysis to facilitate accomplishment of the mission. This is accomplished through an intelligence process, which involves the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of information important to decision makers. The JTF J-2 conducts all-source, multi-discipline intelligence operations and ensures full access to an uninhibited flow of information from all sources in accordance with DOD and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) approved procedures. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the J-2 participates in joint staff planning and in coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling intelligence efforts. The J-2 advises the JFC on what the adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, their probable intent, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. The J-2 has the lead for JIPOE and is responsible for managing the analysis and development of products that provide a systems understanding of the operational environment. A full understanding of the operational environment typically will require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, other interagency organizations, NGOs, IGOs, and centers of excellence. Note: All requests for imagery or other intelligence support for areas within the US are subject to US Government Intelligence Oversight Regulations and Department of Defense 5240.1R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons*. DOD intelligence component capabilities, resources, and personnel as a rule may not be used for activities other than foreign intelligence or CI, unless that use is specifically approved by SecDef. In addition, due to potential violations of the Posse Comitatus Act through direct DOD support to civilian law enforcement agencies, requests for military support to civilian law enforcement agencies are closely reviewed and processed separately for approval.

2. Organization

a. **J-2 Organization.** Figure VI-1 depicts a notional JTF J-2 organization. The J-2’s actual size and composition will vary based on the mission, campaign scope, and unit that forms the core of the JTF. (A number of the J-2 functions may be placed under the JISE, as shown in Figure VI-3, based on the CJTF’s preference.)




Figure VI-1. Notional Joint Task Force Intelligence Directorate Organization

b. **Joint Intelligence Support Element.** The JISE is the hub of intelligence activity in the JOA and is responsible for providing CJTF, JTF staff, and JTF components and subordinate task forces with the adversary air, space, ground, and maritime situation. Paragraph 8, “Joint Intelligence Support Element,” provides additional information on the JISE.

c. The JISE implements processes to integrate all intelligence functions and disciplines that enable more agile and responsive intelligence operations across the JTF in support of the CJTF’s intelligence requirements. The JISE’s approach stresses persistent awareness and local precision and is characterized by net-centric and fused operations, capabilities, planning, and organizations that together yield timely, assured, survivable, and actionable intelligence.

d. Joint intelligence should be provided at all command levels once the objectives, nature, and scope of military operations have been determined by the JTF.

e. At the JTF level, production focuses on the fusion of intelligence from all sources to support the JTF mission and operations. CCMD JIOCs possess organizational processes to integrate and synchronize military, national, operational, and tactical intelligence capabilities to increase intelligence fidelity and timeliness of dissemination to warfighters, and to decrease duplication of effort by intelligence centers.

f. The CCMD JIOC is the primary intelligence organization providing intelligence to joint warfighting at all levels. The JISE is the JTF J-2’s focal point for multi-disciplined, all-source analysis, fusion, collection management, and dissemination. The JISE utilizes

reachback capabilities to the CCMD JIOC and service as well as national intelligence organizations and centers as specified in the appropriate establishing base order or intelligence annex. See paragraph 7, “Supported Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center,” for more details concerning a CCMD JIOC.

g. The joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS) is a transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a CCMD JIOC to a JTF J-2. JDISS is the principal means by which intelligence flows throughout the JTF. Local area networks or Service-specific systems are merely supporting assets.

h. In a “federated approach,” a JTF receives its principal intelligence support from the CCMD’s JIOC, which receives information from all echelons and performs all-source analysis and production.

i. Joint intelligence has rapidly evolved from exclusively a “push” system (from the national level down) to an appropriately balanced “share” system, where the lower echelons request tailored intelligence support; while the higher echelons make vital intelligence available to lower echelons in a net-centric information environment. A JTF can acquire timely, relevant intelligence to thoroughly evaluate the operational environment and the adversary’s situation based on its mission and specific phase of the ongoing operation. With the “share” system information, such as indications of imminent or actual threats, significant military or political events, and force movement, is available to the JTF in a timely manner. The operational environment requires a “share” process at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical.

j. Figure VI-2 highlights some of the critical intelligence responsibilities of the CJTF. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, provides a more complete list.

Commander, Joint Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities

- Understand intelligence doctrine, capabilities, and limitations.
- Provide mission guidance and commander’s intent.
- Define area of interest.
- Provide priority intelligence requirements to the chief of staff.
- Identify commander’s critical information requirements to include priority intelligence requirements.
- Ensure intelligence is fully integrated in plans and operations.
- Engage intelligence personnel in discussions of the adversary, force protection, and future operations.
- Demand high quality, accurate, timely, and predictive intelligence.

Figure VI-2. Commander, Joint Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities

k. The JTF intelligence staff must understand the intelligence requirements of superior, subordinate, and Service and functional component commanders; be able to identify organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls; and access theater and national systems to ensure appropriate intelligence is provided or available to the JTF.

l. All intelligence requirements must be identified, documented, and prioritized. The prioritized requirements will be passed to the supported CCDR's JIOC.

m. The intelligence effort must be integrated throughout the JTF structure. This staff structure process also allows the J-2 to gain a broader understanding of the operational environment through the efforts of other staff sections that the J-2 requires, but would not normally collect with traditional intelligence methods.

n. Counterintelligence (CI) activities provide key support to both the CJTF FP mission and compartmented deliberate planning. The joint force staff CI and human intelligence (HUMINT) staff element (J-2X) must be included in all FP planning, including IO. Subparagraph 9b (1), "Joint CI/HUMINT Staff Element," provides additional information on this CI/HUMINT element.

For more details concerning CI, refer to JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (SECRET).

For more details concerning the intelligence organization and processes, refer to the JP 2-0 Series.

3. Responsibilities

Each JTF J-2 organizational structure is situation dependent. At a minimum, a core element of analytical and administrative capabilities is required. J-2 responsibilities may include, but are not limited to the following:

a. Determining personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. These requirements must be forwarded to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

b. Providing the intelligence staff, all watch teams, and supporting intelligence organizations with a clear understanding of friendly objectives, intent, plans, and the unfolding conduct of joint operations.

c. Prioritizing the intelligence requirements. This should include review of CJTF CCIRs to ensure that intelligence requirements identified by the CJTF are being processed.

d. Requesting additional intelligence capabilities through established command channels.

e. Ensuring intelligence support to and representation on all appropriate staff organizations. The JTF J-2 directs the overall CJTF intelligence staff, including the joint collection management board (if established at the JTF level), to incorporate the following:

(1) Synchronizing intelligence support with CJTF planning, operations, and execution.

(2) Determining organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls.

(3) Developing a JTF collection plan.

(4) Providing fused, tailored, and timely all-source intelligence to the JTF.

(5) Keeping the CCMD's JIOC director and senior subordinate commanders informed of the current intelligence situation, priorities, and requirements.

(6) Providing, as required, intelligence information and support to JTF subordinate command's intelligence staffs.

f. Monitoring movement, status, and activities of national, theater, and organic intelligence and intelligence-related assets.

g. Apprising the CJTF and JTF staff of intelligence capabilities and limitations, as well as the potential effects on operations.

h. Developing and refining the intelligence estimate.

i. Manage the JTF's JIPOE process and products.

j. Manage development of a systems perspective of the operational environment and identify adversary centers of gravity and decisive points to support JTF planning.

k. Assisting the CJTF to:

(1) Develop and refine the estimate of the situation.

(2) Identify relevant and attainable objectives.

(3) Identify IO objectives.

(4) Draft and prepare PIRs from the JTF's mission, commander's estimate, operation phases' requirements, and objectives for the CJTF's approval.

l. Provide intelligence support to targeting, i.e., analyzing the enemy and the situation and identifying and nominating to the CJTF those critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the use of weapons systems to generate specific lethal and nonlethal effects to attain the commander's intent and objectives.

m. Providing appropriate targeting intelligence support, including target intelligence packages, to the CJTF, JTCCB, and component commanders.

n. Identify liaison, coordination, and communications requirements with higher, adjacent, and subordinate intelligence organizations.

- o. Validating intelligence information requirements of subordinate and supporting commands.
- p. Determining security requirements for intelligence information.
- q. Planning for CI, to include:
 - (1) Providing multidisciplinary CI threat assessments.
 - (2) Coordinating CI plans and operations.
 - (3) Ensuring tailored CI or counterterrorism support to JTF FP programs.
- r. Developing the JTF intelligence concept of the operation to include the following:
 - (1) Identifying intelligence systems and personnel.
 - (2) Identifying tasking authorities and reporting responsibilities.
 - (3) Documenting procedures for:
 - (a) Developing intelligence for subordinate commands and forces.
 - (b) Obtaining intelligence from CCMD JIOC and other supporting entities, as appropriate.
 - (c) Obtaining geospatial information support and services, including digital products and services.
 - (d) Obtaining intelligence-related communications support.
 - (e) Identifying and maintaining continuity of minimum-essential support if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost.
 - (f) Identifying JTF requirements for intelligence-related staff organizations. See paragraph 6, “National Intelligence Support Team,” for more details concerning a NIST.
- s. Developing annex B (Intelligence) and annex M (Geospatial Information and Services), and provide input to appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) to the OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.
- t. Appointing an RFI manager to accomplish RFI responsibilities.
- u. Develop and recommend foreign disclosure policies and procedures with superior HQ foreign disclosure office for CJTF approval.
- v. Provide a Red Team. A red team is an organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in

plans and operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others.

Additional JTF J-2 responsibilities can be found in JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

4. Intelligence Disciplines and Sources

Intelligence disciplines are well-defined areas of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. Intelligence sources are the means or systems that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. Intelligence sources can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors. Intelligence sources are grouped according to one of the seven intelligence disciplines: geospatial intelligence (GEOINT); HUMINT; signals intelligence (SIGINT); measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT); open-source intelligence; technical intelligence; and CI.

For more details concerning intelligence doctrine, refer to the JP 2-0 Series, which also provides detailed implementing methodology for joint intelligence support and operations.

5. Collection Management

a. Intelligence is developed from information that is processed from data collected through human or technical means associated with the seven major intelligence disciplines.

b. The JTF J-2 may establish elements to:

(1) Coordinate and deconflict source operational interests between intelligence disciplines, i.e., CI and HUMINT.

(2) Use the “federated approach” to intelligence operations, which decreases duplication of effort by divergent intelligence centers; increases timeliness of dissemination and fidelity of intelligence products; and speeds resolution of PIRs for the commander.

(3) Minimize duplication of efforts between intelligence disciplines.

(4) Coordinate the reallocation of collection tasks among intelligence disciplines.

(5) Ensure proper resource application.

(6) Provide coordination and integration of intelligence and reporting efforts for the JTF.

6. National Intelligence Support Team

The CCMD JIOC will facilitate national-theater dialogue with the DIA forward element (DFE) to identify and provide NIST capabilities that leverage national-level, all-source intelligence support from throughout the intelligence community (IC) to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. The NIST utilizes liaison teams from NSA, NGA, DIA, and CIA, and incorporates other IC participants as required based on the needs of the CCCR and CJTF. It supports intelligence operations at the JTF HQ and is traditionally collocated with the JTF J-2. In direct support of the JTF, the NIST will perform functions as designated by the JTF J-2.

For more details concerning a NIST, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

7. Supported Combatant Commander's Joint Intelligence Operations Center

a. The CCMD JIOC fuses national-level, operational-level, and tactical-level intelligence, and acts as the CCCR's intelligence support mechanism to deployed JTFs, as required.

b. It is the focal point for in-theater intelligence analysis, production, dissemination, support to operation planning, and RFI processing and validation.

c. The CCMD JIOC support to JTF operations includes, but is not limited to, providing a complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation by integrating all intelligence information.

d. While in reality, a particular CCMD JIOC may not be able to satisfy every JTF RFI, it will coordinate support from external intelligence organizations for those it is unable to fulfill.

8. Joint Intelligence Support Element

a. The JISE integrates intelligence operations with operational and planning functions and performs common intelligence functions. Figure VI-3 shows a notional JISE. As shown, the JISE is the principal J-2 organization integrating with joint operations and plans.

b. By design, the JISE is scalable to meet the needs of the JTF, and it is tailored to fit the operational environment based on identified CJTF requirements.

c. The JISE is composed of analytical experts and analysis teams that provide services and products required by the CJTF, JTF staff, and components. These all-discipline and all-warfare specialty analysis teams should be focused on substantive operational intelligence problems. Analysis teams should take into account pertinent information from all sources; a JISE capability for all-source analysis is the key to operational intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete.




Figure VI-3. Notional Joint Intelligence Support Element

d. Analytical efforts of the JISE must be integrated with operations and planning elements, with responsibility for helping the CJTF to better understand how the adversary thinks (e.g., how an adversary will conceptualize the situation, what options an adversary will consider, and how an adversary will react to the JTF actions).

(1) When the JTF staff is engaged in planning operations, the JISE will integrate its efforts with the JTF J-2 planning and operations elements by:

(a) Developing and maintaining current JIPOE products in support of joint operation planning and assessment as directed by the JTF J-2.

(b) Performing the intelligence function of targeting, i.e., analyzing the enemy and the situation, and identifying and nominating to the CJTF those critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited by direct military operations to attain the commander's intent and objectives.

(2) When the CJTF and subordinate commanders are engaged in conducting operations, the JISE will integrate its efforts with plans and operations by:

(a) Coordinating with JTF J-3 watch teams and collection managers, managing all forms of reconnaissance and surveillance of the adversary that are necessary for understanding the situation, identifying objectives and opportune targets, and providing warning to forces.

(b) Maintaining up to date JIPOE products.

(c) In coordination with the JTF J-2, maintain and update JIPOE products to support assessing the effectiveness of operations (to delay, disrupt, debilitate, destroy, dissuade, or coerce) on adversary capabilities and intentions.

e. In addition, the JISE also may be used to manage intelligence resources and efforts and to coordinate application of senior, subordinate, and supporting commands' intelligence activities.

9. Intelligence Centers and Other Support

a. While not all of the organizations listed below may be required, each should be evaluated based on projected operations.

b. The following may be established or requested by the CJTF in addition to the JISE.

(1) Joint CI/HUMINT Support Element

(a) During joint operations, CI and HUMINT capabilities complement each other and work in partnership under the J-2X to provide JTF intelligence and FP. In concert with the mission, a J-2X may be established in joint force structures at every level across the range of military operations. In addition, individual Service or tactical components often may establish their own "2Xs" to manage internal CI and HUMINT functions, which interact with the J-2X. The J-2X reports to the JTF J-2.

(b) Planning and coordination for early engagement of CI and HUMINT collection and CI operations are essential to military operations, and respective capabilities may take months or years to develop. It is important to initiate these operations, to the maximum extent possible, before the outbreak of a crisis. As soon as a JTF is established, a J-2X should be appointed by the CJTF, and immediately begin to integrate CI and HUMINT support into planning and operations efforts in the JOA.

(c) The basic J-2X structure includes the following four elements: a J-2X, a task force counterintelligence coordinating authority (TFCICA), a human intelligence operations cell (HOC), and an operations support element.

(d) Service components could be tasked to provide LNOs to augment the J-2X, HOC, and other joint HUMINT centers to facilitate the flow of their Service collection requirements and responses to the customer.

For more details concerning J-2X, refer to JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (SECRET).

(2) Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC)

(a) A JCMEC is formed from elements of the DIA Foreign Material Program and the Services' technical intelligence organizations and explosive ordnance disposal personnel.

(b) It is activated during periods of hostilities and assists in management of recovery, exploitation, and disposal of captured enemy equipment. This type of equipment can provide critical information on adversary strengths and weaknesses that may favorably influence operational planning.

(c) A scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) LNO should be included in the JISE. An S&TI LNO evaluates the need for a JCMEC, or coordinates with an existing one. Since the JCMEC is formed and operated by DIA, it may operate with little JTF support. S&TI LNOs bridge the communication gaps that might arise.

(d) The JISE should notify the CJTF for JCMEC support and inform the CCMD JIOC. The CCMD JIOC will then source and allocate any support as required.

(3) Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC)

(a) A JIDC conducts follow-on exploitation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or detainees. EPWs or detainees are screened, and those of further intelligence potential are identified and forwarded to the JIDC for follow-on interrogation and debriefing in support of JTF and higher requirements. Besides EPWs or detainees, the JIDC also may debrief civilian detainees or internees, refugees, displaced persons, legal travelers, and other non-prisoner sources.

(b) The J-2X HOC manages JIDC activities. The HOC coordinates with the TFCICA for CI augmentation for exploitation of those personnel of CI interest, such as civil or military leaders, intelligence and political officers, and terrorists. Appendix 5 (Human-Resource Intelligence) to annex B (Intelligence) to an OPLAN or OPOD contains JIDC planning considerations.

(4) Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC)

(a) A JDEC collects and exploits captured material (to include documents, electronic media—computer files, video) to obtain intelligence. Material exploitation can obtain information on a great range of topics, such as information on adversary intentions and planning (including deception), locations, dispositions, tactics, communications, logistics, and morale as well as a wealth of information for long-term exploitation. The JDEC integrates the DOD documentation and media exploitation capabilities into strategic and operational plans as applicable.

(b) Coupled with other intelligence sources, document exploitation provides the CJTF (through the J-2) with a more complete picture of an unfolding operation and enemy capabilities.

(c) The JDEC is activated during periods of hostilities, deployed to the CCMD JIOC, or assigned to the JTF to manage the recovery, exploitation, automated processing, and disposal of captured adversary documents. The JDEC may be collocated with the JIDC or the JCMEC to capitalize on the common use of translators and linguists.

(d) The JTF J-2 should notify the CJTF that the JTF requires JDEC support and inform the CCMD JIOC director. The CCMD JIOC director will then source and allocate any support as required.

c. National Intelligence Support

NOTE

The JCMEC and JDEC conduct exploitation in the JOA, but their functions are not limited solely to combat operations. Both peace operations and refugee relief, for example, could require confiscating weapons and contraband; refugee relief could also require screening refugees for critical information. Cosmetic name changes of these centers in such scenarios may be required.

(1) CCMD JIOCs leverage national intelligence assets and determine requirements through DNI, DFE, and IC representatives detailed to CCMDs. JIOCs coordinate issues affecting DOD and national intelligence with the senior DNI representative, the appropriate defense intelligence CSA representative, and senior IC representatives. The DFE and other combat support agencies representatives are given—and provide—broad access to information affecting JIOC intelligence operational planning and execution, consistent with applicable security policies. The DNI has authorized DNI representatives detailed to the CCMD JIOC to levy requirements against national collection assets when national security and urgency dictate. DNI representatives to the JIOC also recommend advisory tasking consistent with national priorities.

(2) Combat support and defense agency (DIA, NGA, NSA, National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Security Service) personnel or resources are assigned or attached to the CCMD JIOC.

(3) All detailed supporting agency, non law-enforcement CI, security countermeasure, and defense HUMINT elements are in a direct support role for mission accomplishment. All supporting elements not specifically assigned (to include attached forces) are in general support and accept and respond to CCMD JIOC requirements, consistent with national intelligence priorities.

To further assist the JTF J-2 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex D, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-2,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

CHAPTER VII

JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

"In conventional warfare, Service members could get by on surveillance of the enemy, Odierno [Army General Raymond T. Odierno] said, But today's Service members, he said, need to understand the culture, politics, and economics of the regions in which they are fighting in. You have to understand the 'why,' the general said. You have both lethal and nonlethal tools available to you, and you have to know how and when to use them. It's a new way of thinking."

American Forces Press Service
July 21, 2010

1. General

Operations Directorate. The J-3 assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the **direction and control of operations**, beginning with planning and through completion of specific operations. In this capacity, the J-3 **plans, coordinates, and integrates** operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unified action.

2. Organization

a. Figure VII-1 depicts a notional JTF J-3 organization to support the accomplishment of the above responsibilities. It reflects both the traditional staff structure and the functional staff elements and organizations, as required, associated with the execution of operations. The actual J-3 composition will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted.

b. **The J-3 (and Deputy).** Serve as principal advisor to the CJTF on operational matters.

c. **Administrative Section.** Supports the J-3 section by maintaining J-3 correspondence, providing file maintenance, and general administrative support.

d. **Current operations** functions, to include the air, land, maritime, space, and SO aspects, normally are performed by the JOC.

e. Joint Operations Center

(1) The CJTF should establish a JOC to serve as a focal point for all operational matters and, in the absence of a JISE, intelligence matters. The JOC is led by the chief of operations.

(2) The JOC relies on the joint data network operations cell (JDNC) to manage friendly and adversary information and maintain and share a CTP. The JOC should be staffed to maintain status-of-forces; make recommendations; and promulgate CJTF orders in the




Figure VII-1. Notional Joint Task Force Operations Directorate Organization

execution of current operations. The JOC monitors, analyzes, and plans ongoing operations to allow effective modifications to exploit success or to avoid failure. The JOC also tracks CCIRs and makes recommendations to the CJTF on decisions required.

(3) Early JOC establishment may assist in the flow of information, since it provides a centralized point for the handling, tracking, and recording of information. The JOC (or current operations cell) establishes a formal process to communicate and gain guidance from the CJTF through the battle update assessment brief.

(4) The JOC should be organized to perform and interface with each of the basic JTF HQ functions to support the commander's decision cycle (see Figure IV-1) described in Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control." The related functions are described below:

(a) **Monitor**

1. Monitors the current status of assigned or attached forces and resources and provides information to aid in allocating and moving forces and materiel.

2. Monitors the ongoing situation of JTF forces and continuously reviews their progress in relationship to the current plan being executed.

(b) **Assess**

1. Monitors the execution of OPORDs to measure progress in meeting CJTF's objectives and end states. Mechanisms must be established, and personnel must be dedicated to development of assessments. Based on this, the JOC leadership determines whether the plan needs to be adjusted (resources applied or adjusted) within the JOC's planning horizon. If the window is beyond this horizon or it is a complex planning problem, it is referred to future operations for action.

2. Evaluates actions to identify operational deficiencies and develops methods to improve joint effectiveness.

(c) **Plan.** The JOC assists in the preparation of current OPLANs and orders. The JOC also must have the capability to conduct planning within its event horizon; this requires staff expertise to quickly develop plans that integrate all of the JTF staff.

(d) **Direct.** Facilitates CJTF direction to JTF component commanders and takes other necessary actions within the authority delegated to the JOC by the CJTF. During current operations this requires the drafting, gaining approval for, and issuing of fragmentary orders.

(5) The JOC executes these functions with a current operations element and an IM element.

(a) The **current operations** element is staffed by J-3 air, land, maritime, and SO watch officers. This group is responsible for monitoring situational awareness of the operational environment, maintaining operational status, assessing the impact of current operations on future plans and operations, and preparing and transmitting orders and reports. Assisting the J-3 watch officers are a cadre of watch officers from other JTF staff sections and various cells and centers within the JTF staff as well as JTF component LNOs. In

addition, functional LNOs provide information and expertise to the current operations section and in the case of component LNOs represent their respective commander's interests at the JTF level.

(b) The **JOC IM element** support includes:

1. Request for forces (RFF) and RFI management and processing.
2. Display of JOC information to include CCIRs, execution and synchronization matrixes, and significant events displays.
3. CTP display management.
4. Compilation and presentation of briefings.
5. Transmission, receipt, and tracking of message traffic.

(6) **Joint Data Network Operations Cell.** The JDNC is staffed to manage friendly and adversary information, plus maintain and share a CTP. The JDNC is a task-organized team of experienced personnel that supports the joint data network (JDN) operations. The term JDNC is presumed to be the CJTF's JDNC, unless specifically identified otherwise (i.e., JDNC equivalent). The JDNC should be trained and equipped to support continuous operations and should consist of personnel knowledgeable in the operations of participating components to optimize multi-Service experience and overcome C2 system interoperability challenges.

(a) The JDNCs task is to plan the C2 architecture, maintain configuration control, manage and integrate selected data provided by the various networks, execute the cell's operations, and develop a CTP that meets the JTF commander's situational awareness and decision-making requirements.

(b) The JDNC, as an element of the JTF J-3, manages the CTP to provide a reliable, complete, and timely status of entities and events in the operational area to the JOC. The JDNC continuously monitors the JDN and specifically supports the CJTF through oversight of both horizontal and vertical integration of data.

For further information on the JDNC, refer to CJCSM 3150.01B, Joint Data Network Operations.

f. **Future Operations.** The future operations staff is the core set of J-3 planners that forms the nucleus of the planning teams focused on the near-term planning requirements. Based on the complexity of the planning problem and the time available, future operations planning teams interact with elements both internal to the staff (e.g., WGs, cells) and external to the staff (other HQ and agencies). **As the planning teams move through the JOPP, they ultimately gain guidance, intent, or decision through designated decision boards.**

g. **Joint Fires Element.** The JFE is an optional staff element comprised of representatives from the JTF J-3, the components (for example, the Army fires cell or the Marine Corps force fires coordination center), and other JTF staff elements, to include the J-2 targeting staff, the J-5, and others. The JFE is an integrating staff element that synchronizes and coordinates fires and effects planning and coordination on behalf of the CJTF. The JFE also assists the J-3 in accomplishing responsibilities and tasks as a staff advisor to the J-3 and may include any and all of the J-3 tasks with the CJTF's approval.

For further details concerning the JFE and related matters, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

h. **Joint Targeting Coordination Board**

(1) The CJTF should establish a JTCB to provide a review and approval mechanism for targeting. The JTCB ensures that targeting efforts are consistent with the CJTF's CONOPS and the law of armed conflict.

(a) The CJTF defines the role of the JTCB and appoints its director. The DCJTF generally chairs the JTCB.

(b) The CJTF may delegate responsibility for running the JTCB to a subordinate component.

(2) The JTCB is composed of representatives from the staff, components (Service and functional), and others as required. The JTCB provides a forum in which all components can articulate strategies and priorities for future operations to ensure that they are synchronized and integrated.

(3) JTCB products may include approval of recommended modifications to targeting strategy, guidance and priorities, summaries of effectiveness assessments, and approval of the joint integrated prioritized target list, joint target list, restricted target list, and no-strike list.

(4) The JTCB is conducted daily or as required.

For further details concerning the JTCB and related subject matter, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

i. **Information Operations.** IO are described as the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. JTF IO staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplish CJTF objectives. Uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate, negate, or harm other JTF military operations, as well as other USG information activities. CJTFs must ensure IO planners are fully integrated into the planning and targeting process, assigning them to the JTCB to ensure full integration with all other planning and execution efforts. Successful execution of an information strategy also requires early detailed JTF IO

staff planning, coordination, and deconfliction with USG interagency efforts to effectively synergize and integrate IO capabilities.

(1) **IO Staff.** The J-3 normally designates an IO cell chief to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities. The primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure that IO are integrated and synchronized in all planning processes of the JTF staff and IO aspects of such processes are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and multinational staffs. The IO cell chief is normally responsible for functions depicted in JP 3-13, *Information Operations*. During the execution of an operation, IO planners should be available to the JOC or its equivalent to assist in integration, deconfliction, support, or adjustment of IO activities as necessary.

(2) **IO Cell.** The IO cell integrates and synchronizes information-related capabilities and may be integrated as part of the staff's JPG or equivalent organization. The organizational relationships between the joint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are per CJTF guidance. These supporting organizations provide guidance on the employment of their respective capabilities and activities. The specific duties and responsibilities of representatives from these supporting organizations should be established between the IO cell chief and the senior representative of each supporting organization. The CJTF should tailor the composition of the cell as necessary to accomplish the mission. Capability, staff function, and organizational representation on the IO cell also may include personnel identified in the information operations working group (IOWG).

(a) **Information Operations Working Group.** The IOWG provides the support to planning and assessment of information related capabilities. The assessment analyzes the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. As such, the representation within this group includes not only the core IO staff, but other staff directorates and special staff to include PA, CMO/CA, engineers, SJA, intelligence, assessment, and planning.

(b) The IOWG meeting agendas should address both functional updates by of information related IO capabilities and support to the ongoing planning efforts. The output of this discussion is a coordinated staff estimate for the JPG and operational planning teams as appropriate. Additionally, the group provides input to the assessment process by synthesizing representative data for the task and assessment data for the assessment cell. In some cases, the IOWG is given the broader tasking of coordinating all staff informational capabilities listed above (IO, PA, CMO/CA, [defense support to public diplomacy] DSPD) and this group is renamed a communications strategy WG. See JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, for details concerning DSPD.

For further details concerning IO, refer to CJCSI 3210.01, Joint Information Operations Policy (SECRET), and JP 3-13, Information Operations.

j. **FP Element.** The FP element is responsible for providing analysis and recommendations to the staff concerning risks to the mission, FP measures, vulnerability assessments, resource allocation as well as any other products required by the CJTF and staff. The FP section consists of the JTF FP officer and should contain personnel that have

backgrounds in operations, planning, security and counterterrorism operations, and any other expertise required depending on the mission of the JTF. The FP element forms the nucleus of the protection WG.

k. **CBRN Staff Function.** The CBRN staff provides CBRN operational and cross-functional expertise for all combating WMD mission areas. The CBRN function should be integrated into the existing staff. Augmentation, by Service CBRN staff, will be required depending upon the mission or joint operational environment. A JTF HQ may also require additional CBRN staff augmentation based on geographic mission area, assigned Service components, or CBRN situation. The CBRN staff works closely with DTRA on-site specialists or through reachback capability. The CBRN staff provides specialized operational and functional expertise to the protection WG, JPG, JISE, JOC, JLOC, JTCB, and other staff elements as required.

1. The Protection Working Group

(1) This group is chaired by the JTF FP officer, and meets as required to review and discuss protection issues raised by the CJTF, staff, planning teams, and the JTF's major subordinate commands. Figure VII-2 depicts the members, purpose, inputs, and products of the protection WG. Each principal staff section should be represented and provides an accurate intelligence, operations, and logistic assessment. The staff sections in black represent the recommended standing membership of the protection WG. The personnel represented in red may attend this WG depending on the discussion issues.

(2) The purpose of the protection WG is to be the commander's primary body for handling protection issues. Some of the specific tasks the protection WG should accomplish are to:

(a) Provide detailed staff estimates to planning teams to assist with the development of plans and orders.

(b) Develop recommended risks to the mission.

(c) Recommend allocation of resources to mitigate risks.

(d) Monitor and disseminate protection information throughout the JTF (threat levels and threat warnings).

(e) Conduct protection vulnerability assessments to assist major subordinate commands with development of FP plans.

(3) Some of the products the protection WG should produce are:

(a) Detailed staff estimates and analysis to planning teams to allow planners the ability to produce OPORDs.

(b) Annexes and appendices to plans and orders.




Figure VII-2. Protection Working Group

(c) Protection matrixes to assist the staff with risk and threat management.

For more details concerning protection and FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

m. **Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Cell.** The JTF J-3 should appoint a joint meteorological and oceanographic officer (JMO) to oversee and coordinate joint force, functional component, and Service component METOC operations. During the planning and execution of joint operations, the JMOs' duties typically include, but are not limited to:

(1) Assembling the JTF's METOC staff and equipment.

(2) Advising the CJTF on the need for additional METOC capabilities and whether to request or establish a joint METOC coordination organization to provide or arrange for direct support.

(3) Assisting the CJTF in developing and executing METOC roles and responsibilities in operational plans and procedures.

(4) Establishing and publishing information requirements and formats and coordinating METOC operations for the joint force.

(5) Communicating with the senior meteorological and oceanographic officer (SMO) and Services for specific METOC capabilities required by deploying forces so they arrive equipped and ready for operational employment.

(6) Monitoring METOC operations within the JOA.

(7) Identifying support requirements for the JOAs forecast and other METOC products as required by the supported joint force and staffs.

(8) Preparing input to the CJTF's situation report to the CCDR.

(9) Requesting additional resources through the CJTF.

(10) Coordinating with the supported CCDR's SMO and joint staff on updates to the various annexes supporting the OPORD.

(11) Coordinating with the SMO to ensure all available METOC information and resources, as well as HN assets, are properly considered and made available for use by joint forces.

(12) Ensuring all METOC personnel and equipment are included in the TPFDD and coordinating with the SMO to ensure that METOC TPFDD requirements are validated.

(13) Developing, updating, and implementing a METOC collection plan to identify all sources of METOC data across the JOA.

(14) Providing direction to the joint METOC coordination cell supporting the JOA.

(15) Actively monitoring and evaluating the planning and execution of METOC operations and working METOC issues that arise.

See CJCSI 3810.01B, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, and JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, for further details concerning joint METOC operations.

n. Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

(1) Based on CJTF direction, the J-3 may have responsibility for the planning and execution of CMO and civil affairs operations (CAO). However, the CMO staff element may be organized under a separate staff element (usually the CMO directorate) as designated by the CJTF.

(2) The organization of the civil-military section consists of a civil-military officer and personnel who evaluate and advise the CJTF and staff on the CMO that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in an operational area. Depending on the significance of CMO or CAO, a CMO WG may be formed to coordinate CMO throughout the JTF staff. The CMO or CAO tasks also may be delegated to a JTF component.

For further details concerning CMO and CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

o. Joint Personnel Recovery Center

(1) The CJTF should establish a joint personnel recovery center (JPRC) or its functional equivalent in the earliest stages of establishing a JTF. A JPRC may be established by the CJTF under the cognizance of the JTF staff (usually the J-3), or the CJTF may assign the responsibility to one of the component commanders. The JPRC coordinates with and assists, as necessary, the separately-organized component PR coordination cells during an isolating event.

(2) The JPRC should be augmented with appropriate representatives from the other JTF components.

(3) The JPRC coordinates with the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell through the joint force SO component command or the JSOTF operations center for SOF nonconventional assisted recovery and unconventional assisted recovery operations.

(4) Multiple JPRCs may be necessary when there are multiple JTFs in an operational area or when the geographic size of an operational area requires additional nodes.

(5) Specific JTF guidance for PR will be in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery Operations) to annex C (Operations) of the OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

For further details concerning PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

p. Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force Working Group. The JTF J-3 or J-5 is responsible for the development of ROE or RUF in the planning process. The ROE/RUF WG provides a formal planning structure that can effectively perform this responsibility. The ROE/RUF planning process requires timely and extensive intra-staff coordination and planning (usually between the J-2, J-3, J-5, and SJA). The starting point for mission-specific ROE/RUF is the SROE/SRUF, which may be modified with approved supplemental ROE/RUF. For details on ROE and RUF, refer to Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command and Control.” ROE and RUF are not static. They are tailored to the individual mission and threat environment and must remain responsive to changes in either. The ROE/RUF planning process does not end when the plan or order is approved. The ROE WG should track and review the ROE or RUF and respond according to threat or mission changes. It also is the responsibility of the WG to ensure that core SROE or SRUF training concepts from the Service and functional component forces are integrated into the ROE or RUF development process and that subsequent training on the approved mission specific

ROE or RUF build upon that core training base. The WG ensures early ROE or RUF development. Key points are as follows:

(1) At a minimum, J-2, J-3, J-5, and SJA representatives attend (other participation may vary according to the mission).

(2) The initial focus of effort is in support of the overall planning effort by the J-5 or JPG.

(3) Develop ROE or RUF early in the planning process (before or during COA development).

(4) Consideration of ROE or RUF issues is critical to the COA analysis process. Prepare for war gaming of COAs in the same manner as an opposition force cell by predicting probable ROE or RUF impact on operation planning and by discussing political and military aspects of the mission statement and forecasting probable ROE or RUF restrictions and allowances for use of force. Proposed ROE or RUF must be modified as necessary to support the mission objectives accomplishment.

(5) Gather threat indicators and decision points during COA development that will become the basis for drafting, requesting, or issuing mission-specific ROE or RUF.

(6) Draft mission-specific ROE or RUF in the OPORD, appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to annex C (Operations).

(7) Develop or review for uniformity and compliance with the ROE or RUF the tools for tracking, interpreting, and training these rules.

(a) Use ROE or RUF pocket cards (unclassified, if possible) at the unit level for training.

(b) Post the current ROE or RUF in force to secure Web pages or portals as appropriate.

(c) Develop ROE or RUF situation vignettes for use in training.

(8) Oversee ROE or RUF dissemination and training.

(9) React to component requests for mission-specific ROE or RUF.

(10) Generate mission-specific ROE or RUF requests based on the changing threat or mission.

(11) Participate in other cross-functional staff elements where ROE or RUF expertise is required. An example is the FP WG.

(12) Coordinate with multinational legal advisors to address differences in legal guidance and various national caveats to facilitate maximum multinational participation in the mission

q. **Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC).** An EHCC may be established to predict, track, distribute information about, and mitigate explosive hazards within the JOA. The EHCC should establish and maintain an explosive hazards database, conduct pattern analysis, investigate mine and improvised explosive device strikes, and track unexploded explosive ordnance hazard areas. The cell provides technical advice on the mitigation of explosive hazards, including the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, and provides training updates to field units. The EHCC coordinates explosive hazard teams.

For more information about the EHCC, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

r. **Joint Security Coordination Center (JSCC).** A CJTF may establish a JSCC using the designated joint security coordinator and representatives from the components in the operational area. Component and staff representation will vary based on the mission, forces, and threat and should support the planning, coordination, and execution of all joint security related operations especially those conducted in the designated JSA.

For more details concerning joint security operations, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

s. **Key Leader Engagement (KLE) Cell.** A KLE cell may be established to map, track, and distribute information about the key nodes within the human environment in the JOA. The KLE cell should establish and maintain a human environment database, recommend KLE responsibility assignment, deconflict engagement activities, conduct pattern analysis, develop a detailed background briefing on each key leader, suggest specific approaches for encouraging support for JTF activities/objectives, ensure debriefs are conducted following engagements, and update the human environment map with current intelligence and debrief information. The cell provides to field units and staffs an updated human environment map, background information, and desired effects for engagement of key leaders across the JOA. The KLE cell coordinates subordinate command KLE activities to ensure a coherent effort across the JOA, gathering of debriefing information, and updating of the data base.

3. Responsibilities

The J-3 (and deputy) responsibilities normally include but are not limited to the following:

a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification. Co-chair the JMD WG with the JTF J-1.

b. Serve as principal advisor to the CJTF on operational matters for assigned, attached, and supporting forces within the JOA.

- c. Assist the CJTF in the direction and control of operations.
- d. Plan, coordinate, and integrate military operations.
- e. Monitor current operational status of friendly, adversary, and neutral forces.
- f. Conduct current operations planning.
- g. Recommend JTF organizations.
- h. Recommend and publish plans and orders.
- i. Operationally control combat camera teams and ensure support throughout an operation. It is essential the CJTF make certain that PA and IO imagery requirements be identified and prioritized throughout the planning cycle.
- j. Assess operations for CJTF.
- k. Request modification of assigned JOA.
- l. Develop guidance and tasks as requirements for components.
- m. Identify the requirement for additional combat forces.
- n. Plan and execute CMO and CAO, as required. Associated with these types of operations, the J-3 also may be responsible for the planning, integrating, and conducting stability operations.
- o. Formulate requests to higher HQ for the use of lethal and nonlethal weapons not under the JTF control.
- p. Manage the JTF's assessment process.
- q. Disseminate the results of operational planning, assessment, and coordination.
- r. Train joint forces.
- s. Supervise METOC support.
- t. Recommend a joint or MNF organization.
- u. Establish interface with the interorganizational, interagency, multinational agencies, NGOs, and IGOs to synchronize JTF efforts with these organizations.
- v. Initiate requests for operations to be conducted outside the assigned JOA.
- w. Plan, coordinate, monitor, and integrate joint air operations and coordinate and integrate the use of airspace and joint air defense in the JOA, when the CJTF does not designate a JFACC, airspace control authority, or area air defense commander.

x. Establish a JPRC within the JOC to plan for, execute, and monitor PR within the JOA, unless the CJTF designates a subordinate component commander as the supported commander for PR.

y. Prepare the operations estimate and other planning products, and prepare annex C (Operations) of plans and orders. This also may include preparing the CMO estimate and annex G (Civil Affairs) if there is not a separate CMO directorate.

z. Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations during the execution phase.

aa. Serve as the single point of contact for the operations aspects of IO.

bb. Develop the protection estimate in support of planning activities.

cc. Organize the functional aspects of the JTF HQ to include establishing and directing the JOC.

dd. Establish and organize functional-related staff organizations as required.

ee. Develop, maintain, and share a COP in accordance with CCCR reporting instructions.

ff. Provide for CBRN defense.

gg. Mitigate the effects of CBRN threats and hazards through WMD consequence management.

To further assist the JTF J-3 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex E, "Checklist for Joint Task Force J-3," to Appendix A, "Checklists."

CHAPTER VIII

JOINT TASK FORCE LOGISTICS

“Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.”

Antoine Henri Jomini,
Précis de l’ Art de la Guerre, 1838

1. General

a. **Logistics Directorate.** The J-4 is charged with the **formulation** of **logistic plans** and with the **coordination** and **supervision** of supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, engineering, HSS, operational contract support, and logistic services to include food service and related logistic activities. Given the functional role of this directorate and the Service responsibilities for support to their respective JTF components, consideration should be given to the established policies and procedures of the various Military Departments. The J-4 is responsible for **advising the CJTF** of the **logistic support** that can be provided for proposed COAs and approved CONOPS. In general, the J-4 formulates policies for the CJTF’s approval to ensure **effective logistic support** for all forces in the command and **coordinates execution** of the CJTF’s logistic policies and guidance.

b. Logistics should be based on requirements and established priorities.

c. **Logistics provide the foundation of combat power.** Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments’ logistic resources to support the joint force. From a national perspective, it can be thought of as the ability to project and sustain a logistic ready joint force through the sharing of DOD, interagency, and industrial resources.

d. Joint logistics should use existing individual Service policies and procedures whenever possible. If this is not possible, the differences should be identified to the supported CCDR as early as possible for resolution.

e. Successfully integrating or synchronizing logistics resources within the joint force and with partners is paramount in achieving sustained joint logistics readiness that enables operational adaptability and freedom of action for the JFC. Political, legal, and fiscal concerns should be identified and addressed prior to providing support.

2. Organization

a. JTF J-4 organization should be tailored to respond to the anticipated operation. To accomplish this, it should include specialists from the various logistic functional areas: supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, engineering, HSS, operational

contract support, and logistic services (e.g., food service, billeting, textile repair and clothing exchange, and laundry and shower).

b. Figure VIII-1 shows a notional JTF J-4 organization. The actual composition of the J-4 will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted. See paragraph 12, “Logistics Staff Organizations,” for an explanation of various staff organizations.

c. Logistic responsibilities follow single-Service command channels; therefore, it is recommended that the JTF J-4 staff have representatives or liaison personnel from each Service involved in the JTF. Since SOF relies on conventional Service counterparts for support, it also is recommended that the SO components or JSOTF, if activated, have representatives involved as well.

d. It is recommended that the CJTF establish a JLOC to provide the following joint logistic control and coordination functions in support of ongoing operations.

- (1) Monitor current and evolving JTF logistic capabilities.
- (2) Coordinate logistic support and maintain asset visibility.
- (3) Advise the CJTF on supportability of proposed operations or COA.
- (4) Determine logistic requirements for planning and execution.
- (5) Coordinate with the supported CCMD’s J-4, JDDOC, or JLOC, and act as the JTF agent and advocate for logistic support.
- (6) Provide a central point for logistic-related functions and cross-functional staff elements.
- (7) The JLOC integrates its efforts with the JTF J-3 current operations through the establishment of a logistic cell within the JOC.
- (8) The JLOC should be responsible for the time horizons assigned to J-3 current and future operations while the remaining J-4 functional divisions focus on long-term planning by integrating with the J-5 and JPG.

e. HNS specialists, HN liaison representatives, an international agreements liaison, linguists and interpreters, and domestic interagency liaisons on the JTF J-4 staff are essential when dealing with the HN, MNFs, civilian populace, and contractors. CA can provide invaluable assistance in obtaining these personnel.

f. GCCs may establish a JDDOC to synchronize and optimize national and theater multimodal resources for deployment, distribution, and sustainment. The JTF J-4 section (e.g., JMC) may be required to coordinate some of its deployment and distribution activities with the CCMD JDDOC to better support JTF operations, or the CJTF may choose to stand up a JDDOC under the J-4 if approved by the GCC.




Figure VIII-1. Notional Joint Task Force Logistics Directorate Organization

For detailed discussion of the JDDOC and its functions, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

3. Responsibilities

The JTF J-4 responsibilities may include the following:

a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

b. Coordinate the overall JTF logistic functions and requirements.

c. Advise the CJTF concerning JTF logistic matters that affect mission accomplishment.

d. Formulate JTF logistic policies.

e. Develop annex D (Logistics) to OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans. Develop appropriate sections of paragraph 4 of the basic plan and CCDR's strategic concept. Participate in JIPOE process.

f. Coordinate common item supply and services support in accordance with tasking assigned in the OPLAN or OPORD, annex D (Logistics).

g. Coordinate common-user logistics (CUL) Service responsibilities as designated by the GCC, agreements for inter-Service supply and support, local procurement and controls, and allocate indigenous facilities and logistic resources available at staging bases in the JOA.

h. Monitor critical classes of supply support capabilities for the purpose of mission tasking and economy of resources and allocating critical resources.

i. Arrange for and monitor transportation movement requirements; also evaluate capabilities and limitations of assigned and attached forces, supporting commands, agencies, and in-country assets.

j. Coordinate the operation of transportation nodes within the JOA including airports, seaports, and beaches.

k. Identify and coordinate HNS and local resource requirements with the CMOC or primary agency. During foreign disaster relief, or FHA operations, DSCA, or support to USG response activities, the J-4 can play an important supporting role to the CMOC in meeting NGOs or IGOs requests for assistance and aiding them in coordinating all aspects of providing assistance with limited resources.

l. Arrange HNS with the appropriate agency in the JOA.

m. Identify theater requirements for contract support against existing contracting assets. If warranted, take necessary actions, in coordination with the GCC, to stand up requirements and contracting related boards and a joint contracting organization (either lead Service for contracting or joint contracting center [JCC]) necessary to maintain JOA-wide visibility of JTF requirements and component contracting efforts, and effectively support JTF requirements. Ensure contracting officers with appropriate warrants are requested. Additionally, identify resource requirements to support the contracting function, including protection, financial management, linguist, and legal support. Refer to JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, for further details concerning contracting. Coordinate and manage

contracting support within the JOA. This support will be coordinated with the lead Service for contracting (if appointed by the GCC).

n. Exercise staff supervision or cognizance over applicable military engineering matters (e.g., construction, maintenance, and site development).

o. Coordinate maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations to ensure economy of inter-Service and HN resources, even though these are primarily a Service versus J-4 responsibility.

p. Assist the JTF surgeon in developing the logistic aspects of the JTF's HSS system. Assist the surgeon in the development of annex Q (Medical Services) to CJTF's plans and orders, if required.

For more details on the JTF surgeon's responsibilities, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

q. Coordinate joint mortuary affairs, including the return of remains. Mortuary affairs include the responsibilities for coordinating search and recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within the theater. The responsibility extends not only to US forces, but also to multinational, civilian, third country, and adversary dead. Mortuary affairs in a DSCA scenario (i.e., JTF operations within the US) requires close coordination with civil authorities to ensure compliance with applicable statutes and established procedures.

For further details concerning mortuary affairs, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

r. With the PM, coordinate support for returning EPWs or detainees, civilian internees, displaced civilians, and other detained or retained persons.

s. Refine logistic planning guidance, ensure logistic-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities, and support military deception initiatives.

t. Maintain liaison with the other JTF staff agencies, subordinate task forces, and component commands.

u. Coordinate agreements, transactions, and implementing instructions with the appropriate component and multinational points of contact for US and multinational mutual support logistic exchange issues.

v. Provide reporting guidance and ensure Service components use published procedures for positive control of personnel and assets during deployment, sustainment, and redeployment operations.

w. Coordinate with the JTF J-1 to establish personnel accountability operations in the JOA.

4. Authority

a. Title 10, USC, empowers the CCCR to exercise COCOM, over assigned forces. Inherent in COCOM is directive authority for logistics (DAFL), which is the CCCR's authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved OPLANs. DAFL will only be executed by CCCRs.

b. Although DAFL is a logistic authority of COCOM, and thus only applies to assigned forces, under crisis or wartime conditions, the CCCR may use the facilities and supplies of all forces, assigned or attached, necessary to accomplish the missions.

(1) Transfer of OPCON does not include DAFL.

(2) When forces are transferred or attached OPCON from one CCCR to another, DAFL does not transfer unless specifically authorized by SecDef. Granting of such authority usually is addressed in the execute order or other directives that transfer forces.

c. DAFL cannot be delegated to a subordinate commander.

d. A GCC always retains DAFL but may delegate directive authority for a common support capability to the CJTF within the JOA. The GCC may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the subordinate CJTF's assigned mission.

e. It is critical that the JTF J-4 determine what, if any, logistic directive authority for common support capabilities the GCC has delegated to the CJTF and if the scope of the authority meets the JTF requirements. The joint theater logistic concepts, described in JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, should be used to optimize resources by synchronizing materiel support efforts in-theater to provide the assets required for joint force mission accomplishment in a timely manner.

For a more detailed discussion of DAFL, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

5. Planning Considerations

a. **Employment planning considerations directly impact the projection or deployment of forces.** From employment planning decisions, the CJTF identifies force requirements/capabilities; intent for the deployment operation; the time-phased arrival of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in-theater; sustainment requirements; and the closure of forces required to execute operations. Equally important to the successful conclusion of joint operations will be effective reconstitution and redeployment planning performed to either return a unit to home station or deploy it to another operational area. Transition planning must begin early, and include the following:

(1) Planning for what logistic infrastructure, materiel, and equipment that will remain in country (if any).

(2) Determining what is required for redeployment of forces, materiel, and equipment.

(3) Determining the proper legal transfer authority before turning over US assets to HN or MNFs.

b. **Synergy.** Effective logistics is derived from the synergy of information and logistic resources required to provide rapid, continuous, and responsive support to the commander. This includes delivery, tracking, and shifting of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies (even while en route) to optimize support to the warfighter. A JDDOC may be forward deployed from the supported CCMD to the JTF HQ to facilitate distribution and deployment. The decision to deploy this organization forward is operationally dependent and determined by the CCCR in coordination with the CJTF.

c. **Logistic Command and Control.** Unity of command requires coordination not only between Services, but also among USG departments and agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and MNFs.

d. **Apportionment and Allocation.** Apportionment is, in a general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning. Allocation is, in a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, forces, and others. Failure to maintain a system of apportionment and allocation can cause inflation of priorities, ultimate breakdown of the priority system, and loss of control over the logistic system.

e. **Accommodation for Requirements.** An effective J-4 organization should be able to meet all the anticipated JTF logistic requirements. If the scope or mission of the JTF should change, it is imperative that the staff and structure of the J-4 organization adapt.

f. **Economy.** As one of the principles of logistics, true economy of supply requires the careful planning and buildup of levels to provide those resources and combat facilities (based on threat distribution and phase duration) that are essential to initiate and sustain operations. At the same time, planners should avoid building too large a stockpile. Excess stocks waste resources, decrease flexibility, drain transportation resources from other priorities, and deny logistic support to other areas. Availability of strategic and intratheater transportation capability (e.g., people, materials handling equipment, lift assets) is critical to successful supply planning.

g. **Movement Control and In-Transit Visibility.** Accurate, up-to-date information is vital to effective operations. A JTF needs the capability to track and account for forces, equipment, and supplies coming into and within the JOA. Appropriate automated information system support, augmented by automated identification technology, is essential for this requirement.

(1) **Transportation by air, land, and sea, is the “linchpin” of the JTF operation.** The JTF J-4 not only must understand the roles and functions of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the JTF but also the impact of

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations on operational movement.

(a) Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations. The JTF J-4 requires the capability to monitor and track movement of forces, equipment, and supplies in and out of the JOA.

(b) Success of Service logistic streamlining initiatives is heavily reliant on intratheater distribution support. The JTF J-4 must coordinate with the theater J-4 to ensure the theater distribution network is focused to meet the JTF's deployment and initial logistic requirements.

(c) Coordination of movement and access to JOPES via GCCS is critical to deploying and supporting JTF forces.

(d) Logistic flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and continually updated as operations progress. Materiel arriving before cargo handling equipment is on hand or personnel deploying well in advance of their equipment can cause major problems.

(e) The JTF J-4 should integrate theater movement requirements with strategic movement to ensure continued support of ongoing operations. Inadequate control of movement reduces efficiency and could cause bottlenecks (especially seaports and airports).

(2) The JTF J-4 and J-3 must coordinate requirements to create feasible force flow that best achieves the CJTF's CONOPS within the constraints of time, available lift, and JOA infrastructure. Prioritized requirements are then passed by the JTF J-3 to the supported CCMD for validation to USTRANSCOM. If surface delivery is possible and meets required delivery timelines, it should be used. The JTF should define its movement requirements, specifically movement timeline and allow the Defense Transportation System to effectively move its requirements.

h. **Deployment Information.** The coordination and sharing of accurate, up-to-date information is vital to effective logistic planning, coordinating unit movements, and conducting sustainment operations. Knowing where units and supplies are located is critical to successful equipment and materiel support.

i. **Logistic Reserves.** Logistics can affect timing and tempo at the operational level of war when it determines how quickly a campaign can proceed. It is necessary to establish the requirement for logistic reserves with the supported CCDR.

j. **Industrial Base Requirements.** To ensure appropriate industrial surge planning for troop support items and spares, critical items must be identified and communicated through the appropriate inventory control point and through either DLA or Service materiel command to the industrial base.

k. **Additional Planning Considerations**

- (1) Logistic plans should be written to anticipate changes.
- (2) Early involvement of the JTF J-4 logistic staff is critical to the success of the operation and ensures logistic requirements are balanced with capabilities.
- (3) **Logistic Planners.** Key logistic representatives and their responsibilities are listed below.
 - (a) Review lessons learned (LL) databases for unique requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas.
 - (b) Determine JTF resupply requirements and understand Services resupply abilities and restraints.
 - (c) Identify requirements and pass them to the supported CCDR. The supported CCDR validates the requirements and passes them to the appropriate Service component, DLA, or outside agency for sourcing. Working with the Service components, the JTF J-4 can determine whether the JTF support should be provided from the military (Services), civilian sources, HN, UN, or other nations.
- (4) Transportation infrastructure analysts from USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands (TCCs) evaluate airports, seaports, and inland transportation systems capabilities against requirements.
- (5) Contracting and supply specialists evaluate HN capabilities to provide support services, storage, and materiel.
- (6) Engineers determine the capabilities of existing infrastructure and develop plans and requirements to upgrade existing or provide new infrastructure to support the JTF. The provisions of JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*, detail engineer capabilities.
- (7) A JTF logistic plan should be integrated with component commands and other organizations and agencies, as well as HN and MNFs, to ensure success.

For further details concerning planning guidance and areas to consider when developing the logistic plan, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System, and CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats.

6. Multinational Logistic Considerations

- a. In the absence of appropriate international agreements, no authority exists for the MNFC to provide for, or accept logistic support from, multinational partners. Once multinational support is established, the JTF J-4 should ensure that it is clearly understood what assistance can be rendered to MNFs and what reports higher authorities require—detailed accounting is a must.

b. The JTF J-4 staff should be aware of cultural differences (language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks), which may have an impact on logistic support to MNFs.

c. In conjunction with the JTF SJA, the JTF J-4 staff should develop a list of current agreements with other participating nations that provide for logistic support and should establish quality control and monitoring compliance for all multinational-provided services and supplies such as POL; water; and food.

Additional multinational logistic information, considerations, and issues can be found in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.

7. United Nations Logistics

a. UN logistic systems depend on member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level for a given length of time, normally 60 to 120 days. This period allows the UN to organize a logistic structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and memorandums of understanding, which will provide logistic support for the forces involved.

b. A UN survey and assessment team will evaluate the mission requirements and develop planning data for logistic support. When participating in a UN mission, the JTF should, if possible, send a US logistic representative with the UN mission survey team to assist in preparing the UN assessment. JTF efforts to participate and coordinate with UN forces will further unified action and reduce potential conflicts for use of facilities or resources.

c. Once established, the UN logistic support structure normally will provide a measure of continuing support through a system of a lead nation(s) (one or more nations providing the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement), civilian contractual arrangements, a UN force logistic support group, or a combination of the above.

d. The UN normally coordinates such logistic areas as bulk supplies (water, fuel, and rations of common-user items, for example, UN clothing, domestic consumables, batteries, and some vehicle spares) and services such as waste disposal, laundry, and bath.

e. For UN operations, the JTF J-4 should determine what standards are to be followed regarding support.

(1) US standards tend to exceed UN standards (e.g., consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels). US military equipment and system sophistication and the expectations of US forces may be different than the quality of support the UN is providing.

(2) UN standards must be clearly understood regarding the level and quality of UN support provided and funded. Logistic support that is significantly more extensive than what is outlined in the UN agreement may not be reimbursable.

(3) The JTF must be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support may not meet US requirements, especially in critical areas such as HSS.

8. Other Interorganizational Support Requirement Considerations

a. USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and IGOs provide for their own logistic support. However, JTF logistic capabilities often are requested and provided to these organizations. The JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations after arrival. This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, airfield control groups, and port and railhead operations groups.

b. The JTF must establish movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of other USG departments and agencies, MNFs, UN forces, NGOs, and IGOs that may be established. A JMC, JDDOC, or like organization is the primary organization for coordinating movements, including those provided by HNs or MNFs, to support joint operations in the operational area. Close communications should be established with all elements to ensure that their movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and security for materiel movement.

c. Although the JTF Service components or participating nations are responsible for their own logistics, these components and nations may use the common distribution system and other JTF-directed common-user logistic support to execute the overall logistic mission. Interagency support requirements will fall within this process, and a single Service executing all CUL functions directed by higher authority, contractual agreements, or a lead agency may provide this support. The JTF J-4 has overall responsibility to coordinate this effort.

9. Operational Contract Support Considerations

a. Recent operations have changed the way to view and employ contractors. The military has become increasingly dependent on contractor support for combat essential capabilities. **The key for a CJTF is to make a decision early on as to what capabilities the JTF will need to fill the gaps caused by fast moving, crisis action situations.** Effective contractor management within the operational environment also is essential to ensure that contractor-provided support is orchestrated and synchronized with the overall plan or order, and that contractor employees are properly accounted for, protected, and supported.

b. **The CJTF and components must abide by applicable laws, regulations, and international agreements,** while implementing appropriate contractor planning, deployment, and redeployment requirements, and adhere to theater management procedures as they relate to the management of contractor personnel during contingency operations. In addition, they must ensure that the contract, as the legal basis for the relationship between the government and contractor, carefully specifies the terms and conditions under which the contractor is to perform, and procedures to process contractor personnel prior to deployment. They also must ensure the specific support relationship between the contractor and the

government contains standardized clauses to ensure efficient deployment, employment, and redeployment of contractor personnel.

c. Contractor accountability should be established through the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker.

For further details concerning contracting, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

10. Host-Nation Support Considerations

a. HNS can be a significant force multiplier. Whenever possible, available, and suitable HNS should be considered as an alternative to deploying logistic support from other locations outside of the JOA. HNS may increase dramatically the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce the strategic airlift and sea lift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the JOA.

b. Countries without a government infrastructure may not be able to provide logistic assistance; however, limited support may be obtained through local contractors.

c. To maximize the JTF logistic effort, HNS functions (e.g., identification of requirements and procurement) should be centralized and coordinated within the J-4.

d. CA personnel assigned to the JTF are trained to identify and coordinate HNS resources and can provide valuable assistance to the J-4 staff.

e. The HNS agreement should include the authority for the CJTF to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate.

f. Every effort should be made to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The most effective negotiations occur when military members show competence in local language and customs. The J-2 may assist in obtaining personnel for use in negotiations.

g. A JTF legal advisor should be involved in the development process for HNS agreements.

h. It is critical to determine a lead agency (UN, Service, component, or other agency) for contracting and negotiating for support.

i. Areas of potential HNS are shown in Figure VIII-2.

j. Authority for negotiations must be obtained through the supported CCDR, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Department of State (DOS) channels. Negotiations for HNS fall under two basic categories.

(1) No HNS Agreement Exists

Host Nation Areas of Support

Can include but are not limited to:

- Transportation
- Supplies
- Security area protection
- Petroleum, oils, and lubricants
- Telecommunications
- Facilities
- Acquisition of equipment
- Civilian labor
- Health services support
- Services

Figure VIII-2. Host Nation Areas of Support

(a) The JTF J-4 determines potential HNS areas of logistic support required by the JTF and develops a concept of requirements for HNS.

(b) The JTF concept of requirements for HNS is passed to the supported CCDR for approval and action.

(c) The supported CCDR reviews and approves the JTF's HNS requirements and forwards them to the DOS via the OSD with a request that a general agreement be established between the HN and the US. The general agreement provides the framework, procedures, and the authority for the supported CCDR to conduct military-to-military negotiations. (If possible, the agreement should provide for direct negotiations between the JTF or component commanders and the HN.)

(d) A JTF legal officer should be directly involved in drafting new HNS agreements, to ensure adherence to both HN and US laws.

(e) Once the general HNS agreement is established, the JTF J-4 provides a detailed statement of requirements to the HN and begins the negotiations for detailed JTF logistic support.

(2) A Current HNS Agreement Exists

(a) The JTF J-4 reviews the current HNS agreement, identifying the logistic support items in the HNS agreement that the JTF would like the HN to "activate." The JTF then requests, in accordance with procedures established in the general agreement, that these logistic support items be implemented.

(b) The JTF J-4 identifies additional HNS logistic support that the JTF requires and begins negotiations (within the framework of the general agreement) to obtain it.

(c) The JTF J-4 ensures the components use existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN.

(d) Component commanders inform the JTF J-4 if an ACSA exists with the HN. If an ACSA does not exist, the JTF, via the supported CCDR, and the DOS, should take steps to initiate an ACSA with the HN.

11. Logistic Supporting Agencies and Organizations

a. The supported CCDR, through the JLOC (if established), provides the link to interface with the Joint Staff, Services, DLA, USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies. The supported CCDR's JLOC normally performs the following:

(1) Provides guidance concerning the CCDR's DAFL and coordinates the resolution of logistic issues and problems.

(2) Acts as the JTF agent for requesting additional resources, deconflicting demands on common use resources (when demand exceeds capabilities), and coordinates logistics with other MNFs at the DOS and Joint Staff levels.

b. USTRANSCOM, as the Distribution Process Owner, is responsible for the following:

(1) Providing global mobility, from origin to destination, to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy military forces.

(2) Procuring commercial transportation services through component commands.

(3) Activating, with SecDef approval, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, Sealift Readiness Program, and the Voluntary Intermodal Shipping Agreement (Stages I and II). Stage III requires the Secretary of Transportation's approval.

(4) Providing representatives to the JTF survey team to help evaluate seaports, airports, and inland transportation system requirements. Through its TCCs, USTRANSCOM performs the functions of the single port manager for both APODs and SPODs.

(5) Monitoring movement data.

(6) Nominating a director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR), upon request.

(7) Assisting in the development and validation of the TPFDD; also may provide training to TPFDD development personnel on the JTF staff.

(8) Coordinating movement and transportation information in JOPES. This data is critical to deploying and supporting forces.

(9) Coordinating airlift and refueling aircraft diplomatic clearances through US embassies with HNs for en route and overflight and access.

For further details concerning logistics, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. For a more detailed discussion of DIRMOBFOR, see JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.

12. Logistics Staff Organizations

a. Separate logistics staff organizations may be required; the need for each should be evaluated based on the projected operations.

b. The following may be established by the CJTF to coordinate logistic efforts.

(1) **Joint Logistic Operations Center.** This center serves as the JTF J-4 operations center for all logistic functions and staff organizations and can provide the JTF with logistic oversight, coordination, and control of logistic functions. It also provides the link to interface with the CCMD J-4 staff, Services, DLA, USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies.

(2) **Joint Movement Center.** The JMC implements the CJTF's taskings and priorities for movement. It tracks strategic movements to ensure that they meet the CJTF expected flow of force capabilities into the operational area, maximizing the use of available in-transit visibility automation tools. Additionally, the JTF's JMC coordinates the employment of all (including multinational and HN) transportation assets within the JOA.

(3) **Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center.** The mission of the JDDOC is to support the CCCR's and, if approved, the CJTF's operational objectives by synchronizing and optimizing strategic and multimodal resources to maximize distribution, force deployment, and sustainment. Its ultimate goal is to maximize the commander's combat effectiveness through improved end-to-end distribution and asset visibility.

For detailed discussion on a JDDOC, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(4) **Subarea Petroleum Office.** When tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk POL in theater, the subarea petroleum office is established by the joint petroleum office to coordinate, plan, and execute common bulk petroleum products for the JTF.

(5) **Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB).** The JFUB evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, inter-Service support, and construction at the JTF level. The provisions of JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*, will guide JFUB actions.

(6) **Contracting Office.** The JTF contracting office, working with the GCC logistic procurement support board or JCC, is established (with warranted contracting officers) to coordinate contracting requirements for and assisting in the acquisition of local facilities, supplies, services, and support. The contracting office coordinates contracting support requirements among Services to preclude inter-Service competition for supplies or services to obtain effective utilization and advantageous prices through consolidation of JTF requirements.

For more information, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(7) **Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.** In most cases, the CJTF will direct the JTF J-4 to establish and operate a JMAO. Once established (see the checklist in Annex F, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4,” to Appendix A, “Checklists”) the JMAO:

(a) Provides guidance to facilitate the conduct of mortuary affairs for the CJTF.

(b) Maintains data pertaining to the recovery, identification, and disposition of all US dead and missing in the JOA.

(c) Serves as a mortuary affairs liaison between the JTF and the JMAOs of the supported CCMD and Services.

(d) Serves as the central clearing point for mortuary affairs related information.

(e) Monitors the deceased and missing personal effects program.

(f) Performs planning, execution, technical, and management functions.

(g) Develops/disseminates standards/procedures and collects/presents mortuary affairs management statistical data.

For further details concerning mortuary affairs and the JMAO, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

(8) **Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB).** The JARB is an acquisition review board, not a contracting board. The JARB is utilized to coordinate and control the requirements generation and prioritization of joint CUL supplies and services that are needed in support of the operational mission and is normally chaired by the subordinate JFC (either subunified command or JTF-level) or deputy commander or J-4.

(a) The JARB’s main role is to make specific approval and prioritization recommendations for all GCC directed, subordinate JFC controlled, high-value or high-visibility CUL requirements and to include recommendations on the proper source of support for these requirements.

(b) The normal priority of CUL source of support include: lead Service organic military sources, multinational support, HNS, multinational military support, theater support contracts along with external support contracts such as the Military Department civil augmentation programs and DLA prime vendor contracts. The JARB is normally made up of representatives of the Service component logistic staffs, SOF component staff, DLA, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), joint force engineer, J-6, joint force comptroller, SJA, and other staff members as directed.

(c) It also should include representatives from designated theater support and external support contracting organizations. The theater support and external support contracting members’ main role in the JARB process is to inform the other JARB members which contracting mechanisms are readily available for their particular acquisition to include

limits of the local vendor base for each type of support. This would facilitate the decision to use either external support contracts or theater support contracting assets.

(9) **Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB).** The JCSB reviews contract support requirement forwarded by the JARB and makes recommendations on which specific contracting organizations/contract venues are best suited to fulfill the requirements. The goal of the JCSB is to maximize the contracting capabilities of the JOA while minimizing the competition for limited vendor capabilities.

(a) The JCSB is normally chaired by the subordinate J-4 acquisition officer or senior contracting official. It is made up of representatives from the Service theater and external support contracting organizations (to include facility/engineering contracting), DCMA along with DLA, and SOF component contracting representatives.

(b) This process requires adequate visibility of CUL related contracting capabilities within the operational area, which can be a significant challenge. It is through this JCSB that the J-4 ensures a coordinated contracting support effort across the entire operational area.

(c) The goal of the JCSB is to maximize the contracting capabilities of the JOA while minimizing the competition for limited vendor capabilities. It also establishes specific theater and external support contracting procedures and reporting requirements.

To further assist the JTF J-4 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex F, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

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CHAPTER IX

JOINT TASK FORCE PLANS AND POLICY

“We will continue to rely on adaptive planning, on integration and use of all government assets, and on flexibility and speed. Yet we must not only have a full spectrum of capabilities at our disposal, but also employ and tailor any or all of them to a complex environment. These developments will require an expanded understanding of “jointness,” one that seamlessly combines civil and military capabilities and options.”

National Defense Strategy
2008

SECTION A. PLANS AND POLICY DIVISION

1. General

a. **Plans Directorate.** The J-5 assists the commander in **planning and preparation of joint plans, orders, and associated estimates of the situation.** The J-5 also may contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section.

b. **Policy Directorate.** At the discretion of the CJTF, and based on factors such as size and expected duration of the CJTF, a policy division may be established within the JTF J-5. A policy directorate is typically responsible for the following:

(1) Analyze, interpret, disseminate, and provide recommendations on national/strategic policy documents in order to ensure compliance with USG, DOD, and CJCS plans, directives, and instructions.

(2) Serve as the lead office for advising, coordinating, tracking, and maintaining copies of the CJTF’s executive agreements.

c. The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the J-5 organization and responsibilities. Details of the planning process are addressed in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, and the CJCSM 3122 Series of Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) publications.

2. Organization

Figure IX-1 depicts a notional JTF J-5 organization. The overall JTF organization and mission dictates the actual J-5 composition.

3. Responsibilities

The JTF J-5 provides political-military oversight for all aspects of JTF operations. The following is a list, not all inclusive, of JTF J-5 responsibilities:




Figure IX-1. Notional Joint Task Force Plans Directorate Organization

a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

b. Develop, revise, and coordinate required plans and orders in support of assigned CJTF missions.

(1) These plans or orders may exist as a coordinated part of a CDR's plans or orders or as a supporting OPLAN or OPORD based on the planning guidance provided by the Guidance for Employment of the Force and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(2) Plans may be prepared in response to a CDR's planning directive or a CJTF directive.

(3) During execution, the J-5 will prepare plans branches and sequels as directed in support of future operations.

(4) Prepare the J-5 staff estimate.

c. Lead the JTF deliberate planning and CAP.

d. Plan and coordinate future operational phases during current execution phase.

e. Coordinate planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, multinational HQ, and the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs as required.

(1) Review subordinate supporting plans for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine.

(2) Advise the CJTF on any supported CCDR's plans and orders that relate to and may impact the JTF's mission.

(3) Keep the supported CCMD's J-5 or operational planning team aware of the JTF's status of operational planning especially during the initial planning efforts.

f. Determine the forces required and available, and coordinate deployment planning in support of the selected COA.

g. Ensure that the force requirements are entered in the GCCS JOPES application for phasing and movement and also entered in the Joint Capability Requirements Manager requirements module for joint force provider sourcing and SecDef allocation. Ensure force movement requirements assigned to the JTF HQ are built into the TPFDD or RFF and submitted to the supported CCDR.

h. Coordinate and review TPFDD input to ensure the force flow requirements are accurately entered and support the CONOPS.

i. Provide planning recommendations for HNS. This includes assisting other JTF staff sections during the coordination of HNS for JTF operations or training when conducting operations in countries that do not have an existing status-of-forces agreement (SOFA). Coordinate with DOS for SOFAs, status of mission agreement, overflight and access agreements with nations en route and within the operational area, or some other type of HN agreement.

j. Provide assistance to the JTF J-3 in the preparation of orders.

k. Coordinate with the JTF J-3 to ensure that politico-military activities such as NEOs and CMO or CAO are properly addressed with the appropriate US embassies and HN governments (including en route countries) from a strategy and policy viewpoint.

l. Participate with the JTF J-3 and SJA in development of operational limitations.

m. Recommend, as part of the planning process, measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Ensure these measures are consistent with those established by the higher HQ plan or order. Coordinate with the JTF J-3 on the adjustment of these measures during execution.

n. Provide J-5 personnel to the JTF HQ advanced echelon (ADVON).

o. Coordinate and incorporate planning with representatives of other nations, the interagency, NGOs, IGOs, and other interested non-US parties concerning the overall JTF mission, as directed. Take into account that a number of these representatives and organizations may have limited accessibility to information and facilities.

p. Provide the CJTF with an expanded perspective of theater strategic or operational joint warfighting concepts.

q. Form and supervise future plans, through the JPG.

(1) Manage JPG planning requirements.

(2) Establish and resource planning teams coordinating with other staff directorates to ensure these teams are adequately staffed with functional expertise.

(3) Manage planning processes conducted by JPG planning teams to include planning timelines and receipt of planning guidance, intent, and decisions from the command group.

(4) In coordination with the chief of staff, integrate events required for planning into the JTF HQ battle rhythm or calendar.

To further assist the JTF J-5 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex G, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-5,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

SECTION B. JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING

4. General

a. The CJTF and staff develop plans and orders through the application of operational art, operational design, and the JOPP. They combine art and science to develop products that describe how (the ways) the joint force will employ its capabilities (means) to achieve military end state (ends).

b. **Planning Horizons.** Like most complex organizations, JTFs have long-, mid-, and near-term goals. **JTFs organize to conduct future planning, future operations planning, and current operations planning.** The division of labor between these planning efforts is linked to time or events; and is situation as well as the level of command dependent. Using time horizons to delineate responsibilities, a JTF HQ may focus current operations on activities inside of 24 hours, focus future operations on activities between 24 and 96 hours, and focus future plans on activities beyond 96 hours, and up to 6 months. Using these event horizons to delineate responsibilities, **a JTF HQ may focus current operations on activities associated with ongoing operations, focus future operations on branch planning, and focus future plans on sequel planning.**

(1) **Future Plans Planning.** The focus of the JTF’s future planning is development of OPLANs and OPORDs. Future planning processes and products generally require significant coordination with entities both internal and external to the JTF staff. They also generally require adequate time to integrate the work of this broader planning audience. During operations, the focus of the J-5 and JPG is on the development of sequel planning. Depending on the situation the JPG may also be tasked by CJTF to conduct branch planning. The future planning function usually takes place in the J-5 or JPG. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there.

(2) **Future Operations Planning.** The focus of the JTF's future operations is the development of orders and fragmentary orders that are beneath the threshold of the long-term efforts of the future plans, but are not directly related to the management of current operations. Future planning processes and products generally require significant coordination with elements internal to the JTF. They also may require coordination with entities external to the JTF staff. The future operations function typically takes place in the JOC. Future operations planning also develop the branch plans in support of current and ongoing operations. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there. The planning for future operations often is accomplished under the cognizance of the J-3 (future operations cell).

(3) **Current Operations Planning.** The focus of the JTF's current operations planning is the management of the current operation or operations. This activity often includes the development of fragmentary orders to adjust or sustain these ongoing operations. The current operations planning function normally takes place within the JOC or J-3. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there.

5. Adaptive Planning and Execution System

a. Joint operation planning is accomplished through the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system. The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) uses APEX to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. APEX's focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of feasible, embedded options for the President and SecDef to leverage as they seek to shape the situation and respond to contingencies. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in plans that are continually updated. APEX also promotes earlier, robust, and frequent discourse between DOD planners and their interagency/multinational counterparts throughout the planning process.

b. CCMDs participate routinely in both deliberate planning and CAP. Due to the nature of the organization, a JTF HQ typically participates primarily in CAP. However, Service component HQ designated in peacetime as prospective JTF HQ for specific plans usually participate in the CCMD's deliberate planning effort.

6. Operational Art and Operational Design

a. Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ forces. It is based on commanders' and staffs' knowledge, training, education, experience, skill, and other factors. These factors help them apply intangible elements such as imagination, wisdom, and judgment to understand complex problems, visualize solutions, and make decisions that guide operational design, planning, and execution. Operational design supports commanders and staff in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct operations and campaigns. Operational design assists commanders in developing the operational approach, which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to

achieve their end state. Finally, JOPP is an orderly, analytical process through which the JFC and staff translate the broad operational approach into detailed plans and orders.

b. Operational art provides the vision that links tactical actions to strategic objectives. More specifically, the interaction of operational art and operational design provides a bridge between strategy and tactics, linking national political aims to tactical combat and noncombat operations that must be executed to accomplish these aims. Likewise, operational art promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives.

c. Elements of operational design support operational art with a general methodology that helps the JFC and staff reduce the uncertainty of a complex operational environment, understand the nature of the problem, and construct an operational approach to achieve the desired end state. The design elements (see Figure IX-2) are individual tools that help the JFC and staff visualize and describe the broad operational approach. Some design elements, such as military end state and lines of operation, are important to the operational design effort early in mission analysis, while other design elements are more useful later in JOPP.

For a detailed discussion of operational art, operational design, and the elements of operational design, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

7. Joint Operation Planning Process

a. Joint operation planning occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, which requires dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan development, and collaboration across multiple planning levels. Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promote early understanding of, and agreement on, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. The focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of viable, embedded options for the commander to consider as the situation develops. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in plans that are continually updated. Joint operation planning, through APEX, also promotes earlier, robust, and frequent discourse between DOD planners and their interagency and multinational counterparts throughout the planning process. Key to

Elements of Operational Design

- Termination
- Military end state
- Objectives
- Effects
- Center of gravity
- Decisive points
- Lines of operation/lines of effort
- Direct and indirect approaches
- Anticipation
- Operational reach
- Culmination
- Arranging operations
- Forces and functions

Figure IX-2. Elements of Operational Design

JOPP is the interaction of CJTF, JTF staff, and the commanders and staffs of the next higher, lower, and supporting commands. Although an ultimate product is the OPLAN or OPORD for a specific mission, JOPP is continuous throughout an operation. Even during execution, it produces plans and orders for future operations as well as fragmentary orders that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation.

b. **JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military operations.** It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate HQ throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

c. This planning process applies to deliberate planning and CAP. JOPP also is used by joint organizations that have no specific APEX responsibilities. Furthermore, JOPP supports planning throughout the course of an operation after the execute order is issued. In common application, JOPP proceeds according to planning milestones and other requirements established by the commanders at various levels. Figure IX-3 shows the primary JOPP steps. Refer to JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, for a detailed discussion.

8. Joint Planning Group

a. The JPG is a planning group charged with writing deliberate plans and orders for the JTF as well as for the execution of CAP and writing and developing future plans. To execute either mission, the JPG follows JOPP.




Figure IX-3. The Joint Operation Planning Process

b. The primary purposes for forming a JPG are to conduct CAP, assist in OPLAN and OPORD development, and perform future planning. As a JPG works through the CAP process towards development of an OPORD, it is important that the head of a JPG devise a system that analyzes COAs. There has to be a synchronization process to ensure that “all parts” of the JTF will work in unison from planning through operations. Early designation of a JTF will facilitate the forming of the JPG and commencement of the planning process. It may be possible to form a JPG without the JTF being fully organized and staffed. The CJTF should clearly articulate the JPG’s function, tasks, and interaction with the JTF staff to prevent misunderstandings and disputes.

(1) The JPG often is the focal point for OPORD development. The JTF OPORD typically will be based on the establishing authority’s OPORD (if available).

(a) The JPG chief must ensure that staff sections and individuals responsible for developing various sections of the OPORD are aware of their responsibilities.

(b) The format for an OPORD is provided in CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures*. Information that can be referenced in the supported OPORD need not be repeated in the supporting OPORD unless directed.

(2) Upon completion of the OPORD or OPLAN and based on CJTF guidance, designated planning team or teams focus on execution phase planning. Figure IX-4 represents **one organizational strategy** to synchronize long- and short-term planning, assessment, and guidance for commanders.

(3) A core JPG should be expanded for select planning functions. Typically, these “on-call” representatives will be needed when specific subject matter expertise and staff or component planning input is required. Many of these representatives are LNOs and JTF staff action officers with specific duties and responsibilities to the CJTF.

(4) JPG members provide analysis to the planning teams to which they are assigned based on their functional expertise. The JPG members maintain staff estimates that are informed through their participation in WGs and through the continued coordination with their parent staff directorate center or cell.

c. Composition of a JPG varies depending on the planning activities being conducted. Normally, all supporting components will have permanent representation in the JPG.

(1) There are no mandatory rules to determine the precise number of personnel to staff the JPG.

(2) Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure.




Figure IX-4. Joint Task Force Plans and Operations Synchronization

(3) These representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, directorates, components, or organizations.

(4) Often representatives from the supported and supporting CCMDs and multinational representatives or LNOs will augment the JPG.

(5) Composition of the JPG from the JTF staff may vary depending on the planning activities being conducted. A task specific organization may work best.

(6) The JTF HQ battle rhythm should be deconflicted to facilitate staff representative and LNO participation in the JPG.

(7) Often IGOs and NGOs who have extensive experience in the region/JOA, to include language and cultural knowledge, have a better understanding of the operational environment than the JTF planners themselves. The JPG should ensure that a system is in place that provides IGOs and NGOs input into the planning process, while taking into account OPSEC and the sensitivities of cooperation and coordination with IGOs and NGOs.

d. The JPG chief forms planning teams to address specific planning requirements. The JPG chief organizes each planning team with the appropriate functional expertise and administrative support. Planning teams normally are organized with a lead planner, requisite functional planners, component or major subordinate command representatives, and other stakeholders (as required). Planning teams complete planning on assigned tasks and usually are dissolved upon completion of those tasks. Figure IX-5 depicts a notional JPG composition.

(1) Other planning teams may plan for termination of the joint operation and transition of the JTF to another military force, UN, regional organization, or civilian organization. The JPG chief also supervises these teams to ensure they provide the type of analysis and planning that meets the needs of the command group and ensures that the command group in turn provides the required guidance, intent, and decisions to allow them to complete their tasks.

(2) To ensure that the planning teams remain focused, the JPG chief:

(a) Supervises their conduct of JOPP.

(b) Ensures they meet command group requirements.

(c) Synchronizes their activities to ensure they do not compete for the same resources or functional experts.


(d) Ensures that the JPG's planning teams are effectively linked to other staff agencies (e.g., WGs, centers, and staff directorates). This link is solidified through the staff estimate process in which planning team members inform the planning process through their staff estimates while continuing to keep their functional chief of staff director informed of ongoing planning efforts.

(e) Determines procedures for coordination with higher authority to include message traffic and distribution.

(f) The JPG chief arranges for briefings to appropriate individuals (e.g., CJTF, supported CCDR, and others as required) as JPG milestones are reached.

(3) One planning team formed by the JPG chief provides initial evaluation of a crisis situation, develops the organization of the JTF, and conducts CAP. This planning team is familiar with the CAP process and APEX products. A focused effort is critical during the initial phases of CAP. USTRANSCOM's JECC could augment this core group to provide continuity to the JTF planning process. See Figure IX-6 that illustrates the forming and informing of the planning group and teams.

Joint Planning Group Composition



Legend

AFFOR	Air Force forces	JPG	joint planning group
ARFOR	Army forces	JSOTF	joint special operations task force
COA	course of action	JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
IO	information operations	JTF	joint task force
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff	LNO	liaison officer
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff	MARFOR	Marine Corps forces
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff	NAVFOR	Navy forces
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff	NG	National Guard
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff	OPOD	operation order
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff	PAO	public affairs officer
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force	POLAD	political advisor
JFACC	joint force air component commander	RFI	request for information
JFLCC	joint force land component commander	SJA	staff judge advocate
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander	TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
JMISTF	joint military information support task force	USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
JOC	joint operations center	USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System	WARNORD	warning order

Figure IX-5. Joint Planning Group Composition




Figure IX-6. Forming and Informing the Planning Groups and Teams

CHAPTER X

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS

“During [Operation] PROVIDE COMFORT, we probably brought in 1300 short tons of communications equipment over and above the TO&E [table of organization and equipment] equipment to gain the necessary interoperability between all national forces”

**Major General A. C. Zinni, United States Marine Corps
Deputy Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (1992–1994)**

1. General

a. **Communications Systems Directorate.** The JTF J-6 assists the commander in all responsibilities for communications infrastructure, communications-computer networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability. This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the command’s operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications to exercise command in the execution of the mission. The communications system supports a collaborative information environment that assists commanders in conducting detailed, concurrent, and parallel planning.

b. The objective of the joint communications system is to facilitate the proper integration and employment of joint force operational capabilities through effective C2. A role of the communications system is to ensure connectivity throughout the operational environment, thus providing CJTFs with the capability to effectively plan, conduct, and sustain joint operations. A second role is to provide CJTFs the principal tool to collect, transport, process, protect, and disseminate data and information.

(1) All military forces, interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, HN agencies, and other organizations involved in an operation (e.g., peace operations, stability operations, or DSCA) must be able to effectively and efficiently communicate with one another, when appropriate.

(2) The communications system normally focuses on JTF operations; however, it also must support intelligence, logistics, and SO. Detailed communications system techniques and procedures necessary to deploy and sustain a JTF are contained in the CJCSM 6231.01, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications*, and annex K (Communications Systems) of the OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

c. The communications system gives the CJTF the means to exercise authority and direct assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The CJTF uses information to support decision making and coordinate actions that will influence friendly and adversary forces to the CJTF’s advantage.

d. Component tactical communications systems must be responsive to the CJTF. Because of their inherent capabilities, all communications are considered for joint use. Commercial communications systems may offer a cost-effective alternative means to satisfy the commander's needs and may effectively augment constrained DOD resources.

e. The complexity of joint operations and the finite amount of communications system resources may require the CJTF to adjudicate or assign subordinate commands responsibilities for providing this support. This normally is done in annex K (Communications System) to the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

f. The design of a communications system should be based on the continuous need for quality information to support JTF operations. Figure X-1 provides information quality criteria to be used by the JTF staff. USSTRATCOM or Service network operations (NETOPS) components control the communications system with input from the CJTF to ensure data and information get to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients.

Information Quality Criteria	
Accuracy	Information that conveys the true situation.
Relevance	Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation ahead.
Timeliness	Information that is available in time to make decisions.
Usability	Information that is in common, easily understood format and displays.
Completeness	All necessary information required by the decision maker.
Brevity	Information that has only the level of detail required.
Security	Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required.

Figure X-1. Information Quality Criteria

g. The JTF establishing authority ensures communications system requirements are supported, coordinates these activities, prepares policy and guidance, and ensures JTF systems compatibility.

h. Communications systems must be interoperable, flexible, responsive, agile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable.

2. Organization

J-6 Organization. Figure X-2 depicts a notional JTF J-6 organization. The actual composition of the J-6 will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted. Several of the J-6's functions may be placed under the joint network operations control center (JNCC).




Figure X-2. Notional Joint Task Force Communications System Directorate Organization with Joint Network Operations Control Center

3. Responsibilities

a. Responsibilities of the Joint Task Force Establishing Authority

(1) Ensure that communications system personnel, communications security (COMSEC), and equipment requirements are supported.

(2) Coordinate communications system activities with the Joint Staff, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Services, CCMDs, component forces, and others, as appropriate.

(3) Prepare communications system policy and guidance to enable subordinate forces to operate within the CCMD structure.

(4) Ensure or facilitate compatibility of subordinate communications systems.

(5) Share information within the joint force and mission partners, which could include MNFs and interorganizational to the maximum extent practical given strategic, operational, and tactical considerations.

b. Commander, Joint Task Force Communications System Support Responsibilities

(1) Provide overall management and protection of all communications systems not within joint or Service-provided NETOPS supporting the JTF.

(2) Ensure a compatible, adequate, and effective communications system that allow reliable, near-continuous access to enterprise information and services are available to support JTF C2 infrastructure.

(3) Publish communications system plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission and coordinate these plans prepared by subordinate commands.

(4) Adjudicate or assign subordinate commands the responsibility to provide communications systems support based on the situation or available resources.

(5) Use the RFF message process to gain additional capability or assets beyond what is assigned to the JTF, to include the JCSE. See subparagraph 3e(1) for a discussion of JCSE.

(6) Coordinate and provide CCCR/Service/CJTF directives to joint/Service NETOPS functions to ensure the proper level of service to JTF operations and units.

c. Joint Task Force J-6 Responsibilities

(1) Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate and forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

(2) Provide the communications system to support reliable, timely information flow in support of joint operations. This includes the development of communications system architectures and plans, as well as policy, guidance, and instructions for the integration and installation of operational communications system. The JTF J-6 exercises staff supervision of all communications system assets. This also includes CJCS-controlled transportable

assets, automated information systems, COMSEC, and networks necessary to accomplish the overall JTF mission.

(3) Ensure that subordinate Service or component HQ establish NETOPS centers. The JTF J-6 establishes clear lines of communications and reporting obligations between control centers. Each element of the JTF must have clearly defined missions and responsible areas within the network.

(4) Establish a JNCC to manage the communications system deployed during operations and exercises.

(5) Review all communications system plans prepared by subordinate component commanders. The JTF J-6 facilitates the execution of all communications system actions to maximize support to the CJTF and adjudicates any conflicts.

(6) Provide J-6 planning support to the JTF.

(7) Direct NETOPS and retain situational awareness. The JNCC requires timely support from a subordinate command's communications control center, commonly referred to as systems control. Subordinate command and agency network operations and security center are responsible for assimilating and integrating NETOPS situational awareness of their respective operational areas.

(8) Coordinate cross-servicing agreements between the JTF HQ, component planners, and the JNCC.

(9) JTF information systems support responsibilities include:

(a) Co-chair the JIMB with the IMO.

(b) In consultation with the CDR's J-6, JTF staff elements, JTF components, and other supporting organizations, develop the JTF communications plan (Annex K) to include the establishment of C2 systems architecture, including preplanned responses for system restoration, bandwidth reallocation, prevention of network intrusions, and recovery from data exchange bottlenecks.

(c) Establish a JNCC.

(d) Establish a technical help desk for network and systems administration issues for information systems (e.g., virtual collaboration software and COP systems).

(e) Assist the IMO in developing documented processes and procedures for standardizing and effectively using information systems and technology.

(f) Process security accreditation packages for CJTF approval.

(g) Establish network and e-mail accounts, JTF telephone directories, and e-mail global address lists.

(h) In consultation with the CDR's J-6, JTF staff elements, JTF components, and other supporting organizations consolidate and validate a list of communications system requirements based on validated information exchange requirements. Ensure compliance with the joint technical architecture and submit a validated list to the JTF chief of staff.

(i) Oversee the process of providing network status and architecture to the JOC in coordination with the JNCC.

(j) Establish information assurance procedures in accordance with the IMP.

(k) Plans for, and ensures, network and communications or computer system training and familiarization for JTF staff and augmentees is accomplished.

(l) Plan and ensure that deployed nonmilitary information systems are open and nonproprietary with commonly accepted standards and protocols that interoperate with military information systems. This should be coordinated by the supported CCMD prior to establishment of a JTF.

(m) Manage network drive storage, and backs up and restores network drive data.

(n) Appoint the JTF web administrator.

(o) Appoint the JTF records manager who determines and enforces strict procedures for maintaining a records management program.

(p) Assign appropriately trained and certified personnel to privileged user and information assurance management positions.

d. Joint Network Operations Control Center

(1) Exercises control and technical management over communications control centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands.

(2) Serves as the senior control agency for management and operational direction of the joint communications networks and infrastructure.

(3) Performs planning, execution, technical, and management functions.

(4) Develops and disseminates standards and procedures; collects and presents communications system management statistical data. The JNCC manages all tactical communications systems and communication connectivity as defined by the joint operational architecture.

e. Associated Communications Elements

(1) Joint Communications Support Element

(a) The JCSE is a unique communications systems organization that consists of an active duty element of about 500 personnel and two Air National Guard joint communications support squadrons. JCSE's primary mission is to provide tactical communications support for two simultaneously deployed JTFs and two JSOTFs. The JCSE possesses a wide range of tactical communications systems capabilities tailored to meet a variety of contingency missions. The unit is staffed with personnel from all the Services and is equipped with a wide array of tactical and commercial communications equipment.

(b) Use the process discussed in subparagraph 3b (5) to request JCSE support.

(c) JCSE personnel are allocated to support communications system requirements during predeployment, ADVON deployment, main-force deployment, and employment phases.

(d) JCSE has a variety of transmission equipment available to meet the requirements of a JTF or JSOTF HQ to include the following: military (ultrahigh frequency [UHF], super-high frequency [SHF], extremely high frequency), commercial satellite systems, tropospheric scatter, and line of sight microwave.

(e) JCSE can provide a full range of C2 support capability including voice, classified or unclassified data, and VTC.

(f) JCSE can provide communications packages to subordinate and component HQ that include: SHF satellite terminals, multiplexing equipment, and UHF single channel satellite systems. These packages are tailored to the requirement. Subordinate HQ include JSOTF HQ, special forces operations bases, naval special warfare task groups, and the joint SO air component.

(2) Defense Information System Agency or United States Cyber Command Liaison Officer. This LNO serves as the principal interface between the JTF J-6 and DISA HQ and assists the JTF J-6 in coordinating, planning, executing, and evaluating the defense information infrastructure (DII) of the DOD Information networks. DISA manages the employment of communications resources at designated gateways and extends the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) services to tactical networks. DISA contingency and support plans provide guidance for the request and termination of DISN services in the tactical environment. The appropriate DISA theater NETOPS center supervises the allocation, routing, and restoration of channels and circuits to provide positive DISN support of deployed forces.

(3) Regional Space Support Center Liaison Officer (RSSC-LO). The RSSC-LO serves as the primary point of contact in coordinating all ground mobile forces satellite requirements for JTF support. The CJTF requests deployment of the RSSC-LO when needed.

(4) Frequency Management Detachment. A frequency management detachment, known as a joint spectrum management element, normally deploys with the JTF. The detachment coordinates, manages, and deconflicts joint force frequency allocation and assignments with the area-supported CDR's J-6 and HN communications authorities.

(5) CJCSM 6231.01, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications*, provides a detailed description of each tactical communication element, its responsibilities, and reporting requirements.

(6) **Joint Communications Security Management Office (JCMO).** The JCMO provides joint COMSEC support to meet the operational needs of the JPEC, traditional and nontraditional allies, and non-DOD agencies. JCMO is the controlling authority for all joint intertheater COMSEC packages material and all global Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) COMSEC programs. Deploying forces require JCMO controlled keying material to communicate. JCMO controls worldwide joint COMSEC access, including multinational circuits in support of shared early warning systems.

4. Requirements

a. JTF HQ and each assigned component must be prepared to provide its own communications support. JTF HQ communications support may be provided by the JCSE or other CJCS-controlled assets when requested by the supported CCDR and approved by the CJCS. However, if the JCSE is already committed, the supported CCDR may direct that this support be provided by a Service component or a consolidation of assets from the CCDR's components. In either case, communications support to the JTF HQ and connectivity to the components routinely will be coordinated by the JTF J-6.

b. Extension of the DISN services into the assigned JOA initially is accomplished through teleport, standardized tactical entry point (STEP) sites, Defense Satellite Communications System entry points, and high frequency entry stations. As forces build in the JOA, requirements will surge past the capability of STEP sites to support. Other means to connect the JTF with the DISN will be introduced into the JOA to include commercial satellite and leased communications services. These systems will assume the primary support role from the STEP sites due to their greater bandwidth and ability to put the tactical entry point within the JOA. DISA will direct the employment of communications resources at designated gateways to extend DISN services to tactical networks. DISA contingency and support plans provide guidance on the requesting and termination of DISN services in the tactical environment. The DISA Global NETOPS Support Center or theater NETOPS centers will supervise the allocation, routing, and restoration of channels and circuits of the DII to provide DISN services for positive communications support of deployed forces.

c. Component commanders may be tasked with providing personnel and equipment required to install, operate, and maintain communications for their HQ support and for communications circuits from the component HQ to subordinate commanders. Additionally, component commanders may be tasked to provide communications from their component HQ to the CJTF.

d. When two or more commanders are collocated, communications system requirements will be coordinated and consolidated to the maximum degree possible. The JTF J-6 will initiate and coordinate any cross-servicing agreements with the JNCC (if formed) and the

component planners. Additionally, component commanders may be tasked to provide communications (i.e., a deployable joint C2 capability) from their component HQ to the JTF.

5. Information Systems Support

a. **The JTF J-6 has overall responsibility for JTF information systems support.**

b. The J-6 ensures information systems support complements the overall IMP. Quality information supports JTF operations. Figure X-1 provides information quality criteria to be used by the JTF staff. USSTRATCOM or Service NETOPS components control the communications system with input from the CJTF to ensure data and information get to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients. See Appendix D, “Information Management,” for additional information.

6. Global Command and Control System

GCCS is a suite of software applications and hardware designed for planning, execution, C2 of forces, data, information, and multi-discipline intelligence processing. The system receives multiple sensor feeds and reports that assist in the development of the COP. Planning and execution applications (JOPES and Status of Resources and Training System) also support supply, maintenance, transportation, acquisition, finance, personnel, engineering, and force health protection (FHP) needs. JOPES also supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs through deliberate planning and CAP; GCCS operations are addressed in CJCSI 3151.01, *Global Command and Control Operational Picture Reporting Requirements*, CJCSM 3115.01, *Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations*, and CCDR’s directives.

To further assist the JTF J-6 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex H, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-6,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

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APPENDIX A CHECKLISTS

Annex	A	Checklist for Transition to Permanent Operations
	B	Checklist for Liaison Personnel
	C	Checklist for Joint Task Force J-1
	D	Checklist for Joint Task Force J-2
	E	Checklist for Joint Task Force J-3
	F	Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4
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	J	Checklist for Health Service Support
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	L	Checklist for Information Management
	M	Checklist for Transition of a Joint Task Force Into a Multinational Force or Transition to a Follow-On Multinational Force

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A

CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION TO PERMANENT OPERATIONS

1. An establishing authority typically forms a JTF for a temporary purpose and disbands the JTF when the purpose is fulfilled, i.e., when the JTF accomplishes the task or mission. In some cases, however, the circumstances may require that operations continue on a more permanent basis. Therefore, the establishing authority or higher authority must determine whether to continue operations more permanently with the existing JTF or transition to a different C2 option. This checklist is intended to help the establishing authority and the existing CJTF and staff determine the best C2 option.

2. The primary HQ options for C2 of permanent operations include the following (there may be variations of these options depending on the specific circumstances):

- a. Task the existing JTF.
- b. Transition to a replacement JTF.
- c. Transition to a Service component HQ if joint operations are not required.

d. Transition to control of operations by a CCMD staff directorate if the focus is more on management of a long-term program (characteristic of military engagement and security cooperation activities) rather than C2 of forces in operations.

- e. Transition to a multinational HQ.

3. At a minimum, the determination of an appropriate option requires mission analysis based on future requirements and updates of the CJTF's and staff's understanding of the operational environment. The current CJTF and staff should accomplish this in collaboration with the JTF establishing authority, subordinate commanders, and other experts as required. Following are key questions related to making the initial determination on an appropriate C2 option for permanent operations:

- a. What strategic guidance exists on the new mission or tasks?
- b. What is the new desired end state?
- c. What is the fundamental problem that must be solved to achieve the end state (the factors that must be addressed to move the current system to the desired system)?
- d. What is the new mission or set of tasks associated with the desired end state?
- e. Do mission analysis and a revised understanding of the operational environment and problem confirm that military presence and operations are required for the foreseeable future?
- f. Does the mission require joint operations?

g. If the mission requires joint operations, what level of joint HQ is required current JTF level, a higher joint HQ, or a subordinate JTF?

h. If a current-level JTF is most appropriate, should the existing JTF continue operations with a revised mission or should it be replaced by a new JTF?

i. If the mission does not require joint operations, what Service component is most suited to assume the mission (i.e., will future operations be primarily land, air, or maritime in nature)?

j. Do circumstances and analysis indicate that a CCMD staff directorate can manage a long-term program to achieve the desired end state rather than committing a separate joint or Service HQ?

k. Do circumstances and analysis indicate that a multinational HQ could be the best option?

4. Once the establishing authority has approved a C2 HQ option, the existing CJTF and staff should continue planning accordingly.

a. If the existing JTF will continue long-term operations, then planning and other joint processes will continue as they would for any other operation. Examples of the many potential areas where changes may need to occur quickly include the following:

- (1) Joint force task organization.
- (2) JOA and other operational area boundaries.
- (3) Relationships with supporting commands.
- (4) Relationships with interorganizational partners.
- (5) JTF HQ augmentation.
- (6) JTF training requirements.
- (7) LNOs to and from other organizations.
- (8) Basing requirements.
- (9) HN support.
- (10) Operational limitations (constraints and restraints).

b. If the decision is to transition to another C2 HQ option for permanent operations, the specific nature of transition actions will vary based on the nature of future operations and what type of C2 HQ will assume responsibilities. For example, transitioning to a long-term security cooperation program managed by the CCMD should be much complicated than

transitioning to a multinational HQ charged with conducting peace operations. The existing JTF HQ should focus in three primary areas:

(1) Maintain the stability of the current situation pending transition to another HQ. JTF operations during transition will depend on tasks and other guidance from higher HQ.

(2) Continue planning for future operations in collaboration with the newly designated HQ and higher HQ until the new C2 organization is ready to assume full planning responsibilities.

(3) Continue planning for transition between the existing and new C2 organizations to ensure the smooth transfer of responsibilities (assumption of operations by the new HQ and its forces, turnover of equipment and facilities, redeployment of organizations and personnel, etc.).

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A CHECKLIST FOR LIAISON PERSONNEL

Before departure to the gaining HQ, liaison personnel should:

1. Be thoroughly briefed on:
 - a. The current situation of their parent unit.
 - b. Their commander's intent, including details of the CONOPS (e.g., unit locations and combat readiness factors such as personnel strength and logistic considerations).
 - c. The current status and missions of the unit to which they are being sent.
 - d. OPSEC applicable to the mission.
2. Obtain specific information or liaison requirements from each staff section.
3. What staff organizations require liaison representation?
4. Understand clearly their mission and responsibilities.
5. Ensure that arrangements for **communications, computer systems, and logistic support** will meet mission requirements (e.g., check radios, joint communications-electronics operating instructions, challenge and passwords, rations).
 - a. Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances.
 - b. If conducting liaison with a multinational unit, check language and interpreter requirements.
 - c. Become familiar with the potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, and operational procedures of their unit and, to the extent possible, those of the unit to which they are being sent.
 - d. Determine reporting requirements (method, means, and times) for both the superior HQ as well as the HQ attached to for the current operation.
 - e. Become familiar with command relationships among all major commands participating in the operation.
6. On arrival at the HQ to which sent, the liaison personnel should:
 - a. Report to the supported commander or their representative (e.g., deputy CJTF, chief of staff, or J-3), state their mission and exhibit their directive or credentials (if in writing), offer assistance, and be prepared to brief them on their unit's situation.

b. Visit each staff section, provide information as required, and obtain all necessary information to be transmitted to their unit.

c. Inform JPG lead of presence and provide local contact information.

d. Establish communications with their unit and exchange updated information, as required.

7. During the liaison tour, liaison personnel should:

a. Keep informed of the situation of their own unit and make that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which they are sent. (Such action is of special importance to liaison personnel of attached or supporting units.)

b. Find out how their parent command will be employed (e.g., mission, unit location, future locations, future operations, commander's intent).

c. Accomplish their mission without interfering with the operations of the HQ to which they are sent.

d. Report promptly to their own HQ if they are unable to accomplish their liaison mission.

e. Report to their parent command on those matters within the scope of their mission.

f. As permitted by official orders, inform the visited unit commander of the content of reports dispatched to the liaison personnel's parent HQ.

8. Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or commander about:

a. Significant problems being experienced by the liaison personnel's parent unit that could affect operations of other commands and vice versa.

b. Liaison personnel suggestions to enhance the effective employment of their parent command.

c. Liaison personnel recommendations concerning improved procedures for maximizing the effectiveness of their parent commands.

9. Ensure the liaison location at the HQ is known at all times (e.g., inform the JOC's duty officer or chief of staff of daily activities).

10. Advise parent unit (if possible) of departure from the liaison location.

11. Attend the CJTF's daily situation update briefing and other meetings, as required.

12. Keep an appropriate record of their actions and reports.

13. Report their departure to the visited unit commander at the completion of their mission.

14. Upon return to their own HQ, liaison personnel should:

a. Brief the commander or designated representative on all pertinent information received during their visit (e.g., detailed information concerning the mission of the higher HQ unit locations, future locations, and commander's intent).

b. Transmit promptly any request of the visited commander.

c. From the visited HQ, transmit mission requirements and requests for information.

d. Transmit information required by higher HQ in each staff area.

e. Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison requirements.

f. Prepare and conduct after action review (AAR) and compile LL to assist new or replacement LNOs for the operation just conducted or future operation.

g. Update JTF standard operating procedures to reflect the AAR comments, LL, and best practices for future LNOs/teams and future operations.

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-1

1. Does a personnel IM system exist that allows summation of separate Service personnel status reports, including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical personnel shortages; casualty accounting; and personnel requisitions?
2. Do plans include a current summary of JTF manpower requirements?
 - a. Are minimum grade, security clearances, and occupational skill requirements specified?
 - b. Are critical positions (billets) identified?
 - c. Are special experience requirements consistent with pay grade level and military occupational designations?
 - d. Have procedures been established to identify JTF augmentation requirements and functional component augmentation requirements? Have shortfalls been identified to the appropriate authority?
3. What staff organizations require J-1 representation?
4. Have procedures been established to capture personnel information on all in-bound JTF personnel immediately upon their arrival?
5. Have reporting instructions been issued addressing, as a minimum: reporting date, passports, visas, immunizations, uniform and equipment requirements, and travel restrictions? If appropriate, billeting arrangements also should be addressed in reporting instructions.
6. Has guidance been issued in applicable OPLAN/CONPLAN/OPORD annex E (Personnel) for component commanders to accomplish Service-specific preparation for movement actions prior to deployment?
 - a. Giving deploying members the opportunity to update wills and powers of attorney.
 - b. Allowing deploying members the opportunity to adjust pay allotments and establish direct deposit.
 - c. Making provisions to pay members while deployed.
 - d. Providing passports and visas if required.
7. Have other personnel actions been accomplished, by component commanders, such as medical screening, (e.g., immunizations, dental readiness, human immunodeficiency virus screening), identification cards and tags, Service record updates, including records of emergency data?

8. Consideration must be given as to how personnel will be deployed (temporary duty, field conditions) to ensure that adequate compensation is provided and to prevent unnecessary loss of pay and allowances.

9. Have the following support programs been established, if applicable?

- a. Special leave.
- b. Hostile fire or imminent danger pay.
- c. Federal income tax combat-zone exclusion.
- d. Free mail.
- e. Sole surviving son or daughter.
- f. Absentee voting.

10. Have MWR activities for JTF personnel been coordinated?

- a. Are MWR fitness facilities available?

(1) Has coordination been made with exchange services for immediate and short-term support?

(2) Has a point of contact information been provided to the responsible agent for receiving newspapers?

- b. Has a morale call policy been established and all personnel informed?

c. Has the CJTF identified a location for a local rest and recreation program? Has it been coordinated and approved by the supported CDR?

d. Has a location for MWR computer support for e-mailing and video teleconference access been identified and the information provided to the supported CCMD?

11. Do JTF and component commands' plans adequately and equitably address military postal support? If the operation will be dependent on mail for supplies and equipment, consider increasing postal support.

12. Is there adequate J-1 staff to support operations?

- a. 24-hour operations.
- b. Distributed locations of HQ or joint personnel reception center.

13. Has the JTF J-1 coordinated with the HQCOMDT to ensure personnel services to the JTF HQ are uniformly provided?

14. Has coordination been made with other staff sections to ensure unambiguous reporting of personnel information within the HQ?
15. Have reporting procedures been established for subordinates that account for operational phases and all C2 relationships throughout the operations? Do they meet the commander's decision cycle?
16. Are all JTF J-1 personnel proficient with the command's software standards?
17. Has liaison been established with the International Red Cross?
18. Has coordination with the JPRC been accomplished to address PR, especially reintegration responsibilities and missing personnel reports?
19. Have procedures been developed to process personnel returning to duty from medical channels?
20. Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified materials?
21. Consistent with operational requirements, is maximum practical use being made of local national civilian labor?
22. Have JTF J-1 supporting plans been developed for the evacuation of noncombatant and civilian personnel?
23. Have internal standing operating procedures been developed and coordinated to streamline the execution of recurring activities and reports?
24. Have all JTF components been provided reporting formats and requirements?
25. Have requirements for Service, joint, and multinational publications been identified?
26. Has a rating scheme been developed for JTF HQ personnel?
27. Has a point of contact list been developed and published?
28. Has a rotation policy been established and published?
29. Has CJTF guidance been issued regarding the Sexual Assault Response Program; personnel visibility standards; award submissions; and proficiency reports preparation?
30. Employ OPSEC.

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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-2

1. General

Note: All requests for imagery or other intelligence support for areas within the US are subject to US Government Intelligence Oversight Regulations and DOD 5240.1R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons*. DOD intelligence component capabilities, resources, and personnel as a rule may not be used for activities other than foreign intelligence or CI, unless that use is specifically approved by SecDef. In addition, due to potential violations of the Posse Comitatus Act through direct DOD support to civilian law enforcement agencies, requests for military support to civilian law enforcement agencies are closely reviewed and processed separately for approval.

a. With inputs from the JTF J-3, have the JTF J-2's missions, tasks, and requirements been clarified, prioritized, and confirmed with the CJTF?

b. Employ OPSEC.

c. Have intelligence support requirements to PR (manpower and collection requirements) been identified for the JPRC?

d. Has JIPOE been conducted?

(1) Have the current intelligence and indications and warning situations in the JOA been identified?

(2) Have current regional and threat assessments been accomplished?

(3) Are situation assessments periodically updated?

(4) Has an intelligence situation assessment been completed and submitted to the CJTF and up the chain of command?

e. Are the CJTF intelligence tasking and guidance completely understood, and have they been analyzed and applied to regional or theater assessments?

f. What staff organizations require J-2 representation?

g. Have intelligence priorities been regularly updated and passed throughout the entire chain of command, including components and supported commands?

h. Has the status (such as number, type, and readiness condition) of JTF's and CDR's organic intelligence collection and production assets been determined?

i. Has the JTF J-2 designated a J-2X to coordinate and deconflict CI and HUMINT collection activities?

- j. Has NIST support been requested?
- k. Have the JTF J-2 requirements for personnel augmentation, to include regional or functional experts, linguists, or reservists, been identified?
- l. Have the deployable elements to support the JTF's efforts in collection management, Service expertise, communications, and tactical in-depth analysis been identified?
- m. Have the JTF JOPES managers been kept up-to-date on intelligence personnel, equipment, and related movement requirements?
- n. Have the personnel, subject matter expert, and functional requirements for a JISE to support the JTF been determined?
- o. Has the JTF J-2, in coordination with the JTF J-6, developed a JTF intelligence communications architecture that allows interoperability laterally, vertically, and with MNFs? (JTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and local area network to carry intelligence information.)
- p. Has the intelligence architecture for flow of responsibilities for PIRs and RIF been determined?
- q. Have intelligence responsibilities been clearly delineated between JTF, supported CCDR, and national levels?
- r. Have any JTF subordinate units, such as SOF, been receiving intelligence support from the supported CCDR or national levels?
- s. Has the JTF coordinated with the supported CCDR's JIOC to determine whether PIRs already have been established for the current situation? (PIRs should be built around the CJTF CCIRs.)
- t. In concert with the JTF J-3 and the supported CCDR's JIOC, have PIRs been tailored for the current situation?
- u. Have PIRs been kept current, and are they updated periodically?
- v. Have the CJTF and component commanders been fully apprised of all relevant current events?
- w. Do any current events require closer examination or reporting to higher authority?
- x. Have the JTF J-2's information and data management systems requirements been identified, and are they compatible with the supported CCDR's and subordinate's systems (to include compatibility for multinational JTF operations when required)?
- y. In concert with the supported CCDR's J-2 and the JTF J-3, have all the JTF intelligence collection requirements been identified, developed, and published?

z. Have JTF intelligence shortfalls in collection capabilities and collection management been identified?

aa. Have collection requirements to cover shortfalls been developed and forwarded to the supported CCDR's JIOC for collection by theater resources?

bb. Have requirements for all GEOINT and geospatial information and related services support been identified?

cc. Have JTF geospatial information and services shortfalls been identified?

dd. Has information to support the joint intelligence estimate for planning been passed to the JS J-25?

ee. Has the annex B (Intelligence) been prepared for the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan?

ff. Can the JTF J-2 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?

gg. Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

hh. Have deliberate targeting plans been reviewed, and are target materials up-to-date?

ii. Have the JTF's requirements for HUMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, and MASINT collection been identified?

jj. Have the requirements for a HUMINT operations cell and supporting HUMINT collection forces, to include facility locations and personnel requirements, been established?

kk. Has the requirement for establishment of a JCMEC or JDEC and supporting technical intelligence collection forces been analyzed?

ll. Is a S&TI LNO determining or coordinating foreign materiel acquisition and recovery requirements?

mm. Have elements been requested for a JCMEC or JDEC as required?

(1) If the full center capability is not necessary, have adequate smaller elements (teams or cells) been requested?

(2) Have the requirements for interrogation and debriefing capabilities been identified?

nn. Have HUMINT management, liaison, and exchange program requirements been identified?

oo. Has foreign disclosure procedures for various intelligence sources and emergency disclosure authority for GEOINT been obtained?

pp. Has tailored GEOINT (i.e., mission specific data) been requested (once target has been identified)? Has all imagery been forwarded to the requesting command?

qq. Has the requirement for SIGINT operational tasking authority been identified? If not, work with cryptologic support group and command national cryptologic representative to obtain.

rr. Have MASINT management liaison and exchange programs been identified?

ss. Has a sensitive compartmented information facility been established and accredited?

2. Counterintelligence

a. Have JTF CI, counterterrorism, and FP related intelligence requirements been identified?

b. Has the CJTF appointed a TFCICA?

c. Has CI been incorporated into the planning as a FP measure?

d. Has CI been included in collection management planning?

e. Have component CI organizations been advised of possible TFCICA staff augmentation requirements?

f. Have intelligence security guidelines been developed and disseminated?

3. Multinational Interaction

a. Has liaison been established between joint and combined force intelligence structures?

b. Have procedures been established and reviewed to expedite sharing US-generated intelligence products with MNF (for example, sanitize products)?

c. Have friendly objectives, intentions, and plans been fully communicated to appropriate intelligence organizations?

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-3

1. Is the directorate implementing OPSEC procedures?
2. Is there a necessity to establish a JOC or portions thereof during CAP?
3. CAP process?
 - a. Is the JOC staff trained or experienced?
 - b. Has a split JOC operation been considered for infrastructure or reachback concerns?
4. If established during the CAP process, what role does the JOC play?
5. What staff organizations require J-3 representation?
6. Has the JTF been registered and assigned a joint unit identification code by the supported CDR?
7. Has the superior commanders tasking and guidance been analyzed?
8. Has the JTF reported its readiness in the Defense Readiness Reporting System?
9. Have current plans been evaluated?
10. Has the CJTF issued his initial guidance, intent, vision, and end state for the operation?
11. Have the disposition and location of assigned and attached forces been reviewed, and, if needed, has an increased force posture and force readiness been directed within established authority? (Respond as necessary within existing ROE or RUF, requesting modification if necessary.)
12. Execution System (JOPES) for each COA?
 - a. Have movement requirements for each COA been created and tested?
 - b. Has plan information been entered in JOPES?
 - c. Have in-place or in-theater forces been identified in JOPES?
 - d. Have units that are moving by organic lift been identified?
13. Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?
14. What is the extent of multinational participation and resolve?
 - a. How will multinational involvement affect remaining aspects of the checklist?

15. Have completed COAs, including validated forces and sustainment, been developed?

16. Have PR capabilities and limitations been addressed in COA development?

a. Have components, MNFs, and other government agencies PR capabilities been assessed for PR support to operations?

17. Have pre-hostility SO (e.g., counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, foreign internal defense) been considered during COA development?

18. Have COAs been evaluated and prioritized? (Wargaming is one method.)

a. Has USTRANSCOM been requested to provide COA transportation evaluation?

(1) Have deployment estimates been developed for each COA?

(2) Does the closure profile meet COA requirements?

(3) Can identified transportation shortfalls be resolved organically, or do they need to be elevated to the superior commander?

(4) Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the superior commander for resolution?

(5) What is the deployment status of reserve units?

(6) Have medical evacuation and retrograde cargo movement requirements been developed?

19. What is the effect of identified shortfalls on the COA?

20. Can the shortfalls be resolved using organic resources, or do they require elevation to the superior commander?

21. How will the COA likely be perceived by the indigenous, US, and partner nation publics?

22. Have supported command execution planning instructions been developed?

23. Has the COA been adjusted based on the superior commander's guidance?

24. Has the JPEC been notified that the selected COA is ready for evaluation?

25. Based on COAs selected, has risk been identified? What actions must be taken to mitigate this risk, or will the commander accept risk?

26. Has the commander's estimate, containing an appropriate risk assessment, been developed and submitted to the superior commander?

27. Have objectives been developed and forwarded to the superior commander?
28. Have regional options been developed, prioritized, and passed to the superior commander?
 - a. Has the process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights been initiated?
29. Has the JTF legal officer been consulted concerning applicable international agreements or other operational constraints unique to the operation?
30. Has guidance been developed for components?
 - a. Have components been tasked to analyze the situation and begin tentative planning to support proposed COAs?
31. Is the C2 architecture sufficient to meet JTF CCIRs, PIRs, and information exchange requirements?
 - a. Have the GCCS suites or deployable joint C2 suite achieved full operational status connectivity and reporting requirements been met?
 - b. Has a joint operation task COP/CTP been promulgated?
32. Upon COA selection or approval by superior HQ, has the CJTF issued any refinements to his refined guidance, intent, vision, and end state for the operation?
33. Is the plan, OPORD, or campaign plan complete and in the proper format?
34. Has the plan, OPORD, or campaign plan been submitted to the superior commander for approval?
35. Has the TPFDD been validated by the supported CCDR and sent to USTRANSCOM for a feasibility analysis?
36. Have appropriate JPEC organizations been tasked to develop information for support annexes?
37. Have NEO requirements been developed in support of the OPORD?
 - a. Has the status of noncombatants in the JOA been evaluated to determine the requirement for a NEO plan?
38. Has the superior commanders CMO plan provided guidance on CMO priorities and are the priorities supporting on-going operations?
 - a. Have CMO priorities been coordinated with the JTF component staffs?

b. Have US and friendly government departments and agencies and in-country relief organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component CMO?

39. Have all support annexes been incorporated in the CONPLAN, OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan?

40. Has an execute order been received?

41. Has the OPORD or campaign plan been adjusted for the superior commanders execute order before issuing the CJTF execute order?

42. Can the JTF J-3 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?

43. Are plan objectives being met?

44. Is a reassessment of objectives required?

45. Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?

46. Has replanning guidance been issued to the JPEC (if necessary)?

47. Are situations developing that require additional force and sustainment resources, or redirection of allocated force and sustainment resources?

a. Have deployment requirements been verified?

b. Has transportation lift allocation been verified?

c. Has each daily deployment increment been validated?

d. Have intratheater movement plans been developed?

e. Is the first increment deployment flow being monitored?

f. Has the next deployment increment been confirmed once the first increment is underway?

g. Is organic lift being monitored to ensure that arrival times meet OPORD requirements?

h. Have reception and onward movement capabilities been evaluated?

i. Are use rates, requirements, and all transportation modes being monitored?

j. Is the reprioritization of lift requirements (if required) being coordinated with the supported CDR and USTRANSCOM?

k. Is actual arrival data, if different than scheduled, being entered into the JOPES? (Continue to update deployment information on the JOPES deployment database.)

l. Is unit status being reported after arrival?

48. Does the situation call for termination of operations?

49. Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

50. If directed by the CJTF (based on J-3 recommendation):

a. Has a JPRC been established?

b. Has a JTCB been established?

c. Has a JFE been established?

d. Has a ROE planning cell been formed?

e. Has a weather cell been formed?

f. Has an IO cell been formed?

g. Is the J-3 properly staffed to plan, monitor, and direct execution of joint air operations?

h. Is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate the use of airspace in the JOA?

i. Is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate joint air defense operations within the JOA?

j. Has the CJTF (or designee) provided initial guidance concerning the functions and responsibilities of the above organizations?

(1) Have these organizations been properly staffed?

(2) Have these organizations analyzed all phases of the operation (deployment through redeployment)?

k. Is there a requirement to establish a CMOC?

51. Have recommendations been provided to the J-3 pertaining to the organization, use, and integration of attached CA forces?

a. Have civil-military plans, programs, and policies been coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with strategic objectives and the interagency efforts?

b. Have military units and assets that can perform CMO missions been identified and integrated with the CMO plan?

c. Have specific plans, policies, and programs been developed to further the relationship between the JTF and the civil component in the JOA?

d. Has the CJTF been advised on the effect of civilian populations on JTF operations?

e. Do CMO plans, policies, procedures, and programs deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the JOA? (This may include dislocated civilian operations, curfews, and movement restrictions.)

f. In coordination with the SJA, has the CJTF been advised of legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of JTF operations on civilian populations?

g. Have systems been emplaced prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated overseas, humanitarian, disaster and civic assistance aid, Commanders Emergency Response Program, payroll, and other funds dedicated to CMO?

h. Have procedures to facilitate movement, provide security, and control funds to subordinate units been identified?

i. Has coordination been established with CMO funds controlling authority/financial managers to meet the CJTF objectives?

j. Have the requirements for CMO and CAO area assessments and area studies been coordinated and integrated in support of the CMO plan?

k. Have culturally significant sites been identified and coordinated with the JTICB as no-fire or restrictive fire areas?

l. Has coordination been established for the integration of civil inputs to the CJTF COP?

51. Have combat identification measures been established?

52. Have all mission areas of space operations been considered during planning and COA development (i.e., space control, force enhancement, and force application)?

53. Has USSTRATCOMs' joint space operations center been contacted to provide space operations support to the JTF?

54. Have the effects of WMD been evaluated and the appropriate technical operations components been notified?

55. Has the CBRN threat environment been integrated into the operational considerations, mission-oriented protective posture levels established, and CBRN warning and reporting system established?

56. Have these systems been integrated with civilian civil defense systems as appropriate?

57. Have military units that can perform detainee/EPW missions been identified and a qualified chief of detainee operations appointed?
58. Have JSAs been identified to protect high-value facilities and a joint security coordinator appointed?
59. Has the JMETL and mission statement been approved and distributed?
60. If DSCA support/domestic operation is required, has coordination been established with the NGB Joint Operations Coordination Center?
61. If this a DSCA support/domestic operation, will there be one or several state- based (NG) JTF J-3 elements?
62. How will NG involvement affect this check list?
63. What is the deployment status of NG units?
64. Has the legal element been consulted regarding the impact of varying state RUF for impact on JTF domestic operations?
65. Will there be a requirement for a dual status command for the JTF, and what will be the affect on JTF J-3?
66. What is the impact of emergency management assistance compacts (EMACs) on JTF-CS operations?
67. What is the role of the Department of Homeland Security's Integrated Planning System?
68. If response is in the National Response Framework (NRF) which of the ESFs is the JTF J-3 responding to?
69. Have security or FP requirements for contractor personnel been analyzed and recommended?
70. Has a Defense Connect Online collaborative session or teleconference been established, or does one need to be established to support planning?

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ANNEX F TO APPENDIX A CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-4

1. General

- a. Has a thorough review of the OPLAN or OPORD been made?
- b. Employ OPSEC.
- c. Has the establishing authority's (CCDR's) logistic guidance been reviewed?
- d. What, if any, logistic directive authority for common support capabilities has the CCDR delegated to the CJTF?
- e. Has the JFC designated a lead Service to develop the contract support integration plan?
- f. Are annex D (Logistics) and the logistic estimates prepared?
- g. Is initial distribution of supplies included?
- h. Have logistic plans been coordinated with component commanders and other involved/interested partners?
- i. Are movements of personnel, equipment, and supplies included? Have adequate provisions been made for security during movements?
- j. Do force deployment plans include early movement of port openers and cargo handlers?
- k. Are construction and other engineering requirements included?
- l. What major logistic tasks need to be performed, including support relationships by phase and component? What tasks will be requested of supporting agencies? Have potential intermediate staging bases (ISBs), forward operating bases, or domestic base support installations been identified?
- m. What staff organizations require J-4 representation?
- n. Has a joint contracting office been established?
- o. Has a JMC or JDDOC been established?
- p. Which CCMD staff organizations impact the JTF?
- q. What logistic support currently is in place from contractor support and from HNS? What authority and responsibilities does the JTF have for this support? What additional support is required from either contractor or HNS?

r. Are support organizations, such as an Army theater sustainment command, in place? What coordination authority does the JTF have to request support?

s. Has the JFC promulgated guidance concerning a lead Service for designated logistic area?

t. Has the JFC promulgated guidance concerning ACSAs?

u. What major CUL has the CCDR chosen for theater support? What related organization and management options (single-Service logistic support or lead Service or agency support with or without OPCON or TACON) have the CCDR chosen for theater support?

v. Which common items/CUL are designed for support of the JTF, multinational partners, and other organizations? What control/authority does the commander, JTF have over these items? What Service or agency is responsible for the support?

w. For multinational operations, what support is provided and received from MNF? What authority does the JTF have over multinational support?

x. What process (e.g., joint theater logistics management) does the CCDR use to manage joint theater logistics? How does the JTF interface with this process?

y. Has the establishing authority promulgated guidance concerning common support capabilities?

z. Has the CJTF promulgated guidance concerning HN logistic support?

aa. Are mission-essential services provided by contractors and civilians incorporated into contingency plans? Are predeployment standards established for training and equipping civilians? What are the requirements to provide life support and security for contractors or other US civilians supporting the operation? What is the backup plan if a contractor cannot produce to standard? Have identified manpower and materiel been incorporated into planning and deployment databases?

bb. How many days can assigned forces sustain operations with organic supplies? Are sustainment supplies phased to provide uninterrupted operations? What is the supply safety level?

cc. What is the potential impact on logistic capabilities from competing government and nongovernmental agencies or organizations?

2. Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants

a. Should a subarea petroleum office for resupply of POL be established?

b. What is the CONOPS for petroleum support?

c. What HNS is available?

d. What are component responsibilities for petroleum support? Have components provided estimates of POL requirements? Who is compiling volatile strategic airlift requirements? Have requirements been provided to the defense energy support region?

e. Have arrangements been made with either the supported joint petroleum office or the defense energy support region to contract for HN sources?

f. Has a quality control program for POL or liquid oxygen been established?

g. Have POL storage methods and sites been selected? Have security arrangements for the sites been established?

h. Have arrangements been made for transportation of POL within the assigned JOA?

3. Munitions

a. What are the critical munitions required for this operation as determined by the warfighter? Are there suitable substitutions available?

b. Are sufficient stocks of these preferred munitions available?

c. Have munitions been properly relocated or positioned to support the operations?

d. Can any preferred munitions shortfalls be remedied through transfer between component commands or from foreign forces? (This question presumes transfer agreements have been approved and are in place to allow this consideration.)

e. Have components provided estimates of ammunition resupply requirements and common-user support?

f. Have ammunition storage sites been selected, and what are the explosive safety concerns, i.e., fire protection, explosive route, site for munitions storage building/build-up pad, etc.?

g. Have security arrangements for the ammunition sites been established?

h. Have arrangements been made for transportation of ammunition within the JOA?

4. Joint Mortuary Affairs

a. Has a JMAO been established to:

(1) Provide oversight of mortuary affairs support within the AOR of the CCMD?

(2) Maintain two-way coordination with the central JMAO?

b. Have mortuary affairs guidelines been established in accordance with JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs*?

c. Does the plan provide for establishment, staffing, and support of the mortuary affairs collection point? Does this site plan include:

- (1) Procedures for contamination mitigation of remains?
- (2) Theater mortuary evacuation point?
- (3) Personal effects depot?
- (4) Current death, concurrent return, and graves registration programs?

5. Sustainability

a. Are procedures established for maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations? Is there a requirement to provide disposal support within the theater where there is no DLA Disposition Service office? Is a useable DLA Disposition Service office located in the vicinity of the theater?

b. Have HNS availability and requirements been determined?

c. Has it been determined if any HNS agreements exist? Have required steps been taken to start the process for requesting authorization to begin negotiations?

d. Have arrangements been made to obtain maintenance support not organic to the JTF?

e. Have the Services established procedures for the return of retrograde to the repair source? Does the capability exist to track movement of retrograde?

f. Have laundry and bath support requirements been generated in coordination with the medical authority, with consideration for environmental factors?

g. Does the JTF require contracting personnel in country? Is a JTF contracting office required?

h. Have procedures been established to coordinate with US embassies and HNs for acquisition of supplies and services?

i. Are paying agents/field ordering offices required, and has coordination been made with contracting and financial management operations?

j. Has a joint logistic communications plan been developed to support J-4 C2 requirements?

k. Are adequate security procedures established for classified logistics data transmission?

l. Have the requirements for logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP), Air Force contract augmentation program, and Navy global contingency construction contract program assistance been evaluated?

m. Do the Services have procedures established for equipment accountability during deployment and redeployment operations?

n. Is a DLA support team required to augment the JTF J-4 staff?

6. Deployment and Distribution

a. Have joint-use transportation requirements been established?

b. Has a JMC or JDDOC been established (if needed) to ensure transportation requests are validated and theater common-user transportation resources are employed with maximum effectiveness?

c. Are common-user transportation requirements, capabilities, and performance monitored?

d. Are transportation shortfalls and conflicts in priorities deconflicted?

e. What HN transportation facilities and equipment are available?

f. Has the JMC or JDDOC evaluated and disseminated information about HN transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and personnel?

g. Has the JMC or JDDOC established the necessary communications (GCCS) to monitor and effect changes to the deployment of forces and supplies?

h. Has the JTF J-4 coordinated with USTRANSCOM throughout planning, deployment, execution, and redeployment phases?

i. Has the JTF J-4 coordinated with the JTF J-1 to ensure customs and duty issues do not hinder the expeditious movement of DOD cargo?

7. Engineer

a. Has a JTF engineer been assigned or identified?

b. Have engineer policy and guidance been established?

c. Have a joint civil-military engineering board and JFUB been established? Are board procedures in place?

d. Have traffic regulations, dictated by physical conditions of routes and communications, been established?

- e. Has engineer support in the collection and processing of information for preparation and revision of maps and related geospatial databases been identified?
- f. Have future engineering requirements been anticipated and planned for?
- g. Have component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction been evaluated and prioritized? Are procedures in place for this to occur?
- h. Have provisions been made for battle damage repair (e.g., airfield damage repair)?
- i. Has the JTF engineer established, issued, and executed the JTF environmental management support plan?
- j. What HN engineer support is available?
- k. What Class IV (construction and protection material) is available?
- l. What are the component responsibilities for engineering support?
- m. Will contract construction (to include LOGCAP) be utilized?

ANNEX G TO APPENDIX A

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-5

1. Has the problem been framed and a commander's statement or intent been developed?
2. What is the current politico-military situation?
3. Have current interorganizational plans been evaluated?
4. Employ OPSEC.
5. What staff organizations require J-5 representation?
6. Have all appropriate warning, planning, and implementing directives been thoroughly reviewed and mission analysis completed?
7. Have regional military objectives been developed and forwarded to the CCDR?
8. Has USSTRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center been contacted to provide space planning support? (Coordinate with JTF J-3 who has same question.)
9. Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?
10. Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the JTF establishing authority for resolution?
11. Has the supported CCDR's tasking and guidance been analyzed?
12. Has guidance been developed for components?
13. Have OPORD or OPLAN shortfalls and limitations been identified and resolved?
14. Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPLAN or OPORD?
15. Is the OPLAN or OPORD complete and in the proper format?
16. Has the composition of the JPG been determined?
17. Have the J-5 and appropriate JPG/operational planning team battle rhythms been established?
18. Does the JOPES database accurately reflect all force requirements needed to accomplish the assigned mission? Are these requirements properly routed, phased, prioritized, and sourced?
19. Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?

20. Do current conditions indicate the need and suitability for planning for operations during prehostilities, such as SO, MISO, PA, and CMO?
21. Does the situation call for redeployment planning?
22. Has a military end state been identified?
23. Are there any requirements for DSCA or support of foreign consequence management?
24. Is planning for stability operations or peace operations required?
25. Has a strategic theater estimate been developed?
26. Have protection issues been identified?
27. Have special technical operations requirements been considered?
28. Has military deception planning been conducted and included in the overall plan?
29. Is plan in response to a DSCA mission within the NRF?
30. What key scenario set(s) and national planning scenario(s) are JTF J-5 planning efforts in response to?
31. Have the JTF J-5 personnel requirements and shortfalls been passed to the JTF J-1, and are they being monitored through appropriate J-1-led battle rhythm events?
32. If JTF is formed in response to a domestic situation what is the relationship between Active Component JPG and NGB and state JTF (NG) JPG?
33. Have J-5/plans-related LNO requirements been appropriately identified and coordinated for both LNOs required within the JTF J-5 and LNOs that the JTF needs to establish external to the JTF?

ANNEX H TO APPENDIX A CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-6

1. General

- a. Is the communications system planner brought into the planning process early?
- b. Is a joint communications system planning meeting scheduled? Is a communications system planner from each organization attending the communications system planning meeting?
- c. Employ OPSEC.
- d. What cross-functional staff elements require J-6 representation?
- e. Are the command relationship decisions made in sufficient time to allow supporting communications to be adequately planned and communications system decisions to be promulgated in a timely manner?
- f. Are the communications system planners familiar with the command relationships for this operation and are these relationships adequately covered in communications system planning documents?
- g. Are the operational impacts of potential communications problems brought to the attention of the operational planners and superior commanders?
- h. Has IM been identified?
- i. What information is critical to the JTF HQ battle rhythm?
- j. Who produces that information?
- k. Who updates the information?
- l. Which countries or partners are not allowed access to particular information?
- m. Is there a network diagram or description showing connectivity to all commands and organizations included in the OPLAN or implementing instructions?
- n. Consider SO liaison and system requirements?
- o. Can communications system support each COA being addressed?
- p. Are close-hold and limited access procedures understood by all planners?
- q. Is planning adequate to ensure that all communications nets have interoperable COMSEC devices and keying material? Is secure equipment availability and installation adequate for this operation (e.g., encrypted UHF satellite communications [SATCOM] narrowband secure voice terminals)?

- r. Has an information assurance manager been assigned?
- s. Has the JTF J-2, in coordination with the JTF J-6, developed a JTF intelligence communications architecture that allows interoperability laterally, vertically, and with MNFs? (JTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and local area network to carry intelligence information.)
- t. Has a memorandum of agreement been established between the designated approving authorities responsible for each interconnected system?
- u. Is the use of the intertheater COMSEC package (ICP) being considered to ensure interoperable keying materiel? Do all forces hold all necessary components of the ICP? Has NATO COMSEC been considered?
- v. Have considerations been made or plans formulated to accommodate multinational personnel and communications and information equipment into the JTF deployment?
- w. Has interoperability been considered? Are sufficient numbers of CENTRIXS terminals available to US and multinational partners?
- x. Are provisions being made to ensure that all participating organizations are notified as to which frequencies, call signs, and COMSEC procedures are to be used for the operation?
- y. Has a joint spectrum management element been tasked and stood-up?
- z. Is there adequate planning to ensure joint communications-electronics operating instructions (JCEOI) are prepared in a timely manner? Are frequency management decisions made in a timely manner to enable JCEOI dissemination to participating units when needed? Is the Joint Revised Battlefield Electronic JCEOI System being employed for generating JCEOI or signal operating instructions?
- aa. Are operations codes available at all commands?
- bb. Is planning for SOF and conventional forces interoperability adequate for this operation?
- cc. Are procedures in place to adequately plan communications system for SO under both SO and mission-imposed close-hold restrictions?
- dd. Are theater and tactical communications system interfaces (DISN entry points) adequate to provide timely and accurate situation reporting for crisis management reporting to superior commanders, the Joint Staff, and SecDef?
- ee. Does communications system planning for deployment include command relationships, force OPCON procedures, force communications for underway sea or airlift and for Air Mobility Command communications system?
- ff. Are deployable GCCS terminals needed and planned for?

gg. Does the JTF have qualified GCCS operators?

hh. Is planning adequate to have communications into the objective area in the proper sequence and in sufficient amount and type to support the tactical operation?

ii. Have the functions of the JNCC been developed and published?

(1) Has the J-2, in coordination with the J-3 and J-6, prioritized the intelligence requirements within the overall communications requirements?

(2) Are all intelligence systems requirements identified? Which intelligence systems have organic communications, and which ones require communications provided by the J-6?

(3) Are the intelligence systems communications integrated into the overall communications planning? Are there provisions for frequency deconfliction to protect friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum?

(4) Are adequate communications systems available to get near-real-time imagery, signals data, and an accurate picture of the local situation to the tactical commanders?

(5) Are communications with all engaged civilian organizations adequately addressed in planning to include those only with unclassified commercial capabilities?

(6) Does communications planning include means for electronic conferencing/virtual collaborating with multiple disparate organizations (military and civilian)? Do branch plans include adding additional organizations as missions expand?

(7) Is the CJTF aware of various Global Positioning System (GPS) user equipment employed in theater to include commercial sets?

(8) Are the GPS frequencies L1 (1575.42 megahertz [MHz]) and L2 (1227.60 MHz) incorporated into unit and HQ frequency plans to preclude inadvertent GPS interference from tactical communications equipment?

jj. Has a GPS CONOPS been disseminated?

kk. Has the JTF standard datum been disseminated for GPS user equipment?

ll. Have PR personnel coordinated PR communications early?

(1) Are PR communications adequately covered in planning?

(2) Are plans for PR adequately promulgated to the operating forces?

mm. Are medical evacuation and casualty evacuation communications adequately covered in planning?

nn. Are plans for medical evacuation and casualty evacuation communications adequately promulgated to the operating forces?

oo. Have planners provided for dedicated and secure communications for PA to provide quality public information products to internal and external audiences both within and outside the JOA?

pp. Is there a heavy dependence on any one means of communications during the operation (e.g., UHF SATCOM)?

qq. Have SATCOM requirements been evaluated to ensure proper use of limited assets?

rr. Have user requirements and use patterns been evaluated to determine the feasibility of time sharing or combining SATCOM nets to reduce total nets required and loading of satellite networks?

ss. Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

tt. Have provisions been made to plan for replacement of tactical communications (tactical satellite and ground mobile facility terminals) at the earliest opportunity (if applicable) with commercial or other appropriate longer-term communications?

2. Predeployment

a. Do the JTF HQ and identified component HQ have systems to provide secure voice, record, and data communications (including GCCS) for:

- (1) Issuing command instructions?
- (2) Updating the force database?
- (3) Coordinating COAs?
- (4) Managing force status and generation?
- (5) Multinational partners?

b. Do marshalling and loading sites possess interoperable communications and compatible cryptographic keys?

c. Have authenticating memorandums been written and signed by the CJTF within 24 hours of JTF activation, authorizing JTF directors or their designated representatives to pick up message traffic up to and including special category?

d. Have the threats to the communications system been clearly defined and actions taken to eliminate or minimize the impact to these systems?

3. Advanced Echelon Deployment

a. During ADVON deployment, are secure communications available to communicate with JTF HQ, the supported and supporting CCDRs, and the appropriate US embassy? If ADVON deploys aboard a ship, are communications capabilities adequate?

b. Once in the assigned JOA, does the ADVON have secure voice, common-user telephone circuits, and secure record and facsimile capabilities for effective exchange of current intelligence, graphics, planning, and adjustments to operational assessments and orders?

4. Main Force Deployment

a. Are arrangements required for airborne or maritime communications system capabilities (e.g., joint airborne communications center or command post, Airborne Warning and Control System, Joint Strategic Targeting and Reconnaissance System, or amphibious command ship)?

b. Have radio nets for en route communications been developed and coordinated with supported CCDR and components?

c. If an ISB is used:

(1) Have ISB communications requirements been developed and coordinated?

(2) Has a responsible element been identified to make installation?

5. Joint Task Force Requirements

a. As forces deploy into the area and the JTF HQ joins the ADVON (if used), has a ground- or sea-based communications package (capable of providing secure voice, record, and automated data processing data transmission capabilities) been made available to satisfy requirements for communications links with:

(1) Supported CCDR?

(2) SecDef?

(3) Component HQ?

(4) Multinational HQ?

(5) UN?

(6) US embassies?

(7) DISN?

(8) Civilian organizations, including other interagency and multinational partners, IGOs, NGOs, and media? (May have only unclassified commercial capabilities—including teleconferencing and virtual collaboration.)

(9) Commercial access—single channel?

(10) Commercial access—multichannel?

b. If requirements exist, are there adequate capabilities to:

(1) Link deployed forces with the DISN, the Defense Special Security Communications System, and GCCS?

(2) Duplicate communications capabilities at the alternate JTF HQ?

c. Have procedures been established for reporting meaoning, interference, jamming, and intrusion to the appropriate JOC?

d. Are sufficient frequencies available to support the COA?

e. If the deployment is to foreign soil, has the HN approved frequencies for the operation?

f. Are the J-2, J-3, and J-6 working together to develop a joint restricted frequency list to protect friendly operations and exploit adversary operations? Did the J-3 approve the list?

g. Has a procedure been developed to standardize operating systems, their client computer workstations, and associated group policies throughout the JTF HQ and subordinate commands?

h. Has interoperability of communications systems been ensured?

ANNEX J TO APPENDIX A

CHECKLIST FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

1. Are the medical tasks, functions, and responsibilities delineated and assigned?
2. Is a comprehensive medical surveillance plan developed? Predeployment (threat assessment conducted and preventive medicine countermeasures integrated into the plan); deployment (environmental monitoring and disease and nonbattle injury statistics collected); and post-deployment (health assessments) actions?
3. Are there any specific plans, policies, agreements, or treaties to consider?
4. What staff organizations require HSS representation?
5. Are provisions made to provide emergency medical assistance to US nationals in the JOA and to enemy POW, civilian internees, displaced civilians, and other detained persons?
6. Has the theater evacuation policy been established? If so, have requirements for hospitals and patient movement workload been identified?
7. Is sufficient medical support available for deploying forces to ensure a continuum of care for those ill, injured, or wounded? Are all units on the TPFDD scheduled for timely arrival?
8. Have estimates of medical sustainability and anticipated resupply requirements been established?
9. Have resupply channels been determined? If applicable, have provisions been made to establish a theater lead agent for medical material and/or single integrated medical logistics item manager for medical equipment and supplies?
10. Has a JTF joint patient movement requirements center been established to coordinate movement of patients within and out of the assigned JOA?
11. Has a blood program system been established?
12. Has an area joint blood program office been activated to plan and coordinate the handling, storage, and distribution of whole blood within the assigned JOA and consolidate and forward resupply requirements to the Armed Services Blood Program Office?
13. Has a joint medical operations center been established to provide a central location for medical planning and operations?
14. Have medical personnel augmentation packages been identified and requirements submitted? Do hospitals have enough personnel and equipment to support movement of critical patients? Are there sufficient litters, straps, blankets, and other supplies as required, to support anticipated workload?

15. Have the numbers, types, and locations of patient evacuation conveyances been identified? Are they sufficient to meet projected workload?
16. Has an evacuation plan for ground and air ambulances been prepared?
17. Are noncombatant evacuees a consideration for HSS?
18. Have primary and secondary aeromedical airfields been identified?
 - a. Are sufficient aeromedical staging assets planned or in place?
 - b. Are aeromedical evacuation liaison teams located at key locations within each component's medical system?
19. Have preventive medicine procedures been established and sufficient personnel identified to ensure protection of the health and well-being of personnel assigned to the JTF?
20. Have medical communications channels, frequencies to be used by medical personnel, and any dedicated or medical-unique communication nets, operating procedures, or requirements been identified?
21. Has coordination with the JPRC been accomplished for recovery and reintegration support?
22. What does medical intelligence indicate?
23. Has the supported CCDR requested that National Center for Medical Intelligence be tasked to provide an area medical threat assessment?
24. What military forces are involved? What are their organic medical capabilities? Have provision of care agreements and/or limitations been established?
25. If other nations are involved, what are their unique medical requirements? If other nations are contributing medical assets, what are their capabilities, limitations, and national caveats?
26. Are HN medical support systems in place? Are rules of eligibility established and published for providing care to HN military or civilians in a manner that does not supplant HN medical support systems?
27. What are the HSS reporting requirements?
28. Should civilian contracts for medical support be considered?
 - a. If so, how many contractors will be part of the deployment?
 - b. Do OPLANs appropriately address medical support to contractors?
29. Is pre-regulation of patients to specific hospitals required?

30. Are sufficient supplies and equipment in place; has a program for sustainability and resupply been established; is a single integrated medical logistics system required?
31. Has liaison or coordination with other agencies been established?
32. Have all other areas of joint HSS and FHP been addressed such as patient movement, dental, behavioral health, and veterinary support? For a complete listing of planning considerations refer to JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.
33. Reinforce the importance of the mission and staying abreast of the situation. Highlight the importance of working as a “team.”
34. Integrate PA in all phases of transition planning to ensure public awareness of policy and operational changes with respect to the JTF.
35. Reevaluate or establish MWR requirements—means to prevent or reduce complacency.

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ANNEX K TO APPENDIX A CHECKLIST FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. Is the IG prepared to accept and work an increased number of assistance cases? Typical requests for assistance include:
 - a. Early return of family members.
 - b. Emergency leave procedures.
 - c. Nonsupport of family members.
 - d. Family support issues (identification card, health care, exchange and commissary privileges).
 - e. Service member entitlements.
 - f. Shipment or storage of household goods.
 - g. Family care plans.
2. Have inspections been scheduled and announced? Inspections should verify the status of:
 - a. Personnel and equipment readiness.
 - b. JTF operational readiness or effectiveness.
 - c. Processing for overseas movement.
 - d. Ports of debarkation processing.
 - e. Casualty affairs and graves registration.
 - f. Deployment operations.
 - g. Pre-operational training.
 - h. Ammunition resupply operations.
 - i. Operational feeding.
 - j. Enemy prisoners of war or detainees processing.
 - k. Mail services.
 - l. Reconstitution.
 - m. Replacement system.

- n. War trophies or contraband.
 - o. Accountability and serviceability of returning equipment.
- 3. IM and IO.
- 4. OPSEC.
- 5. FP and safety.
- 6. Is the IG prepared to conduct investigations? Investigations are normally more difficult to complete because:
 - a. Of limited access to the CJTF.
 - b. Of time and distance factors.
 - c. Of a greater reliance upon technical channel support from other IGs.

ANNEX L TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

1. Does paragraph 1 of the IMP “Introduction” address the following?
 - a. Purpose.
 - b. Scope.
2. In paragraph 2 of the IMP “Joint Task Force Information Management Organization,” are the following discussed?
 - a. JTF.
 - (1) CJTF.
 - (2) Deputy CJTF.
 - (3) Chief of staff.
 - (4) IMO.
 - (5) Others, as required.
 - b. JTF IM roles and responsibilities.
 - (1) JTF IM organization.
 - (2) JIMB.
 - (3) Joint IM cell.
 - (4) JTF components.
 - (5) Multinational partners.
 - c. Roles and responsibilities to higher HQ and other organizations.
 - (1) Higher HQ.
 - (2) Other organizations (NGOs, IGOs, and the interagency).
3. Does paragraph 3 of the IMP “Commander’s Dissemination Policy” address the following?
 - a. Critical information elements.
 - b. Information flow guidelines, structure, and priorities.

- c. Information exchange, policies, and procedures.
 - d. Information systems and networks architecture.
 - e. Communications network architecture.
 - f. IO policies and procedures.
 - g. Identification of operational information products.
 - h. Storing, access, and handling guidelines to specific information based on content, source, type, location, and classification.
 - i. Procedures for releasability of information based on security level and classification.
 - j. CCIRs.
 - k. Communication network architecture.
 - l. IO goals and objectives.
 - m. User's level of access to information by:
 - (1) User.
 - (2) Organization.
 - (3) Mission.
 - n. Information type (survival information, administration information, operational information, intelligence information).
 - o. Information release policies:
 - (1) PA guidance.
 - (2) Release of real-time operational information to subordinate units and multinational partners.
 - (3) Release of real-time intelligence information to subordinate units and multinational partners.
 - p. Limit access to specific information by content, source, type, or location.
 - q. Releasability of information transfer due to security or classification policy.
4. Are the below topics addressed in paragraph 4 of the IMP "Information Requirements and General Procedures?"

- a. CCIRs.
 - (1) FFIRs.
 - (2) PIRs.
 - b. RFI.
 - c. RFFs.
 - d. Requests for assistance.
 - e. Information services management.
 - (1) COP management.
 - (2) Collection management.
 - (3) Records management.
 - (4) Records manager's responsibilities.
 - (5) Records custodian's responsibilities.
 - (6) Action officers' responsibilities.
 - (7) Information technology services branch responsibilities.
 - (8) Files and records maintenance and disposition plans and policies.
 - (9) Records collection.
 - f. Other required reports.
5. Does paragraph 5 of the IMP "Digital Rules of Engagement" discuss the following?
- a. Minimization of bandwidth protocols.
 - b. Virtual meeting rooms facilitator.
 - c. Audio practices—standard military radio/telephone procedures should be employed.
 - d. Text chat practices.
 - e. Session/meeting closure.
 - f. Collaboration tools file cabinets.
 - g. Whiteboard.

- h. Virtual conference center/auditorium collaboration.
- i. Ad hoc meetings via chat.
- j. Document file naming convention.
- k. Briefing slide show file production and management.
- l. File management.
- m. Calendar operations.

6. Does paragraph 6 of the IMP “Battle Rhythm” discuss the impact of the battle rhythm of higher HQ and subordinate commands? (Applicable to each organization pursuant to their procedures.)

7. Does paragraph 7 of the IMP “Information Assurance or Computer Network Defense” address the following?

- a. Information priority matrix of critical mission systems.
- b. Information confidence convention (ICC):
 - (1) Information source assurance and reliability.
 - (2) Information currency.
 - (3) Information content and completeness.
 - (4) Use of the ICC.
- c. Computer network defense:
 - (1) Joint intrusion detection and monitoring plan.
 - (2) Information assurance vulnerabilities assessment.
 - (3) IO condition actions.
 - (4) Operational impact assessment.
 - (5) Continuity of OPLAN.
- e. OPSEC procedures (to include use of social networking).
- f. IO condition procedures.

8. Are the below issues discussed in paragraph 8 of the IMP “Information System Tools and Procedures”?

- a. Tactical data systems.
- b. Collaborative tools.
- c. Voice communications.
- d. Local area network or wide area network management.
- e. Data management.
- f. Electronic messaging:
 - (1) Organizational messaging.
 - (2) E-mail.
 - (3) Chat.

g. Publish instructions for user access to the collaborative information environment (how to get a user account, password, etc.).

9. Does paragraph 9 of the IMP “System Recovery Procedures” provide sufficient information concerning system recovery procedures? (Applicable to each organization pursuant to their operating system.)

NON-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT INTEGRATION GUIDELINES OR CHECKLIST

1. General

a. The mission assigned a joint task force (JTF) will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more Military Departments but increasingly, the support of all types of US Government—i.e., the interagency and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and multinational partners. The commander, joint task force (CJTF), has at least two responsibilities usually associated with those of combatant commanders—the requirement for unified action in the CJTF’s joint operations area and the necessity to interface with the interagency, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), IGOs, and host nation (HN) agencies. The JTF headquarters serves as the operational focal point for interagency coordination.

b. Non-Department of Defense (DOD) agency operations can be grouped into two general categories—domestic and foreign operations.

c. Identify and appoint a liaison officer for each non-DOD organization.

d. Identify policy or framework for information exchange requirements between interagency, NGOs, IGOs, multinational partners, and HN agencies (need to know; access).

e. Identify technical communications link parameters.

f. Identify information security exchange parameters.

g. Battle rhythms should be synchronized, as much as possible, with higher, lower, and adjacent commands, interagency, IGOs, NGOs, and multinational partners.

(1) Incorporate non-DOD information requirements into information management plan and the commander’s critical information requirements.

(2) Incorporate non-DOD annexes into overall JTF plans and orders.

(3) Define relationships with the interagency, NGOs, and IGOs.

(4) Conduct mission analysis in coordination with JTF staff.

(5) Identify and define end state of planned and ongoing operations.

h. Develop and recommend appropriate courses of actions to support the JTF.

2. Liaison Checklist

The following checklist can be used as a guide to aid in the flow of information between the JTF and external organizations:

a. Identify telecommunications systems compatibilities and requirements. Radio channels, call signs, and frequencies—see the JTF frequency manager.

- (1) Network connectivity and bandwidth requirements.**
- (2) Video teleconferencing interfaces and bridges.**
- (3) Media feed.**
- (4) Phone links.**
- (5) Phone books.**
- (6) Data transmission protocols.**

b. Establish information systems compatibility.

- (1) Information assurance tools.**
- (2) Desktop operating systems.**
- (3) E-mail bridges and gateways.**
- (4) Office application.**
- (5) Network operating system.**
- (6) Firewall.**
- (7) Router protocols and policies.**
- (8) Digital rules of protocols—file interface standards.**
- (9) Web site adjustments.**
- (10) Main frame.**
- (11) Operational requirements.**
- (12) Synchronize daily rhythms and operation times.**
- (13) Organization structure and chain of command.**
- (14) Action officers or liaison officers.**
- (15) Reporting procedures.**
- (16) Utility requirements.**

(17) Power.

(18) Air conditioning.

(19) Infrastructure.

(20) Classified access requirements.

ANNEX M TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION OF A JOINT TASK FORCE INTO A
MULTINATIONAL FORCE OR TRANSITION TO A FOLLOW-ON
MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. Begin the transition plan well in advance of MNF arrival. Establish milestones and measures of success.
2. Establish transition JPG with planners from the existing and incoming HQ.
3. Establish senior national representative planning review group.
4. Determine objectives of the transition process: timely and rapid activation of the MNF and component HQ and participating nations integrated into the MNF organization.
5. Conduct transition risk assessment. The level of violence can “rise” during or after a transition occurs; develop counter-contingency plans to avoid serious escalations and ensure operational security.
6. Establish senior-level MNF transition board to coordinate participating nation’s reconnaissance/survey teams, liaison teams, support and force levels, ROE, negotiate memorandums of understanding, SOFAs, transfer of responsibility, and funding.
7. Establish MNF HQ location, real estate, and resource requirements. Identify MNF logistics, medical, and other required areas if different from existing JTF facilities.
8. Receive and integrate MNF HQ forward command element and LNOs.
9. Coordinate/implement agreed information sharing arrangements with MNF HQ and force elements.
10. Establish communications with UN and the new strategic level command if required.
11. Determine requirements for JTF communications detachments during transition period.
12. Coordinate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and relief in place between JTF and MNF HQ and force elements. Recommend a staging base and points of entry (APODs and SPODs). Coordinate force preparation program and recommend an acclimatization period.
13. Establish multinational movement coordination center.
14. Establish multinational PA office.
15. Recommend MNF deployment priority and sequence into theater.
16. Develop relief in place schedule, procedures, and timeline. Include the force lay down plan. Develop transition synchronization matrix including major events and timing.

17. Identify MNF capability shortfalls, means to address shortfalls including consideration of leaving key JTF assets in place with appropriate logistic support. Determine equipment and resource to gift to MNF. Identify key areas of MNF interoperability.
18. Determine MNF funding and national implementing arrangements. Ensure local contacting arrangements have been considered by incoming MNF. Confirm existing arrangements that will transfer to incoming force with HN government, IGOs, and NGOs.
19. Recommend tactical AORs within an AO/JOA.
20. Develop FP plan for incoming and outgoing forces during transition period.
21. Ensure transition addresses PR capability assessment and MNF requirements.
22. Transfer LL.
23. Develop handover package and acceptable level of achievement on existing civil and military projects to the MNF.
24. Transition addresses coordination with IGOs and NGOs. The MNF/follow-on force understands cultures of key players and respect the roles and missions of local authorities and these organizations; determine how to leverage their contributions.
25. Establish mutually agreed criteria to set the preconditions before transition of command may occur.
26. Identify the timing and prepare for formal transfer of command.
27. When the MNF or follow-on force is prepared to assume command, clear and distinct change of responsibilities and authority must occur.

APPENDIX B

JOINT TASK FORCE-CAPABLE HEADQUARTERS

1. Overview

This appendix provides a framework and considerations for forming and sustaining the readiness of JTF-capable HQ within DOD. A designated Service HQ that has achieved and can sustain a level of readiness to establish, organize, and operate as a JTF HQ, which is acceptable to the supported/assigned CCDR, can be considered a JTF-capable HQ. For more details concerning the JTF-capable HQ, refer to Chapter II “Forming and Organizing the Joint Task Force Headquarters.” The essential elements of a JTF-capable HQ framework include:

- a. Figure B-1 indicates a typical JTF-capable HQ readiness model that guides the designation, organization, staffing, C2 equipping, training, and readiness of designated Service HQ.
- b. A list of core tasks recommended for inclusion in the JTF-capable HQ JMETL (Figure B-2).
- c. Baseline criteria (Figure B-3) for JTF-capable HQ readiness programs.




Figure B-1. Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters Readiness

Core Tasks for Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters	
Task Number	Task Title
OP 1	Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver • OP 1.1 Conduct Operational Movement • OP 1.2 Conduct Operational Maneuver and Force Positioning
OP 2	Conduct Joint Intelligence Operations
OP 3	Employ Operational Firepower
OP 4	Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel Support • OP 4.4 Coordinate Support for Forces in the Joint Operations Area • OP 4.5 Manage Logistics Support in the Joint Operational Area
OP 5	Provide Operational Command and Control • OP 5.2 Assess Operational Situation • OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders • OP 5.4 Command Subordinate Operational Forces • OP 5.5 Establish, Organize, and Operate a Joint Force Headquarters • OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support
OP 6.5	Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means

Figure B-2. Core Tasks for Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters

2. Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters Readiness Model

a. The generic force readiness model in the Figure B-1 can be used to portray the anticipated status of any designated Service HQ within a CCMD. Figure B-1 depicts the performance typically associated with forming a JTF HQ in an ad hoc manner, compared to the projected readiness levels and performance of a Service HQ that is designated to become a JTF-capable HQ and initiates pre-crisis readiness preparations. The model should be tailored for each designated Service HQ based on various factors, such as the AOR in which the JTF-capable HQ is formed and existing Service force generation cycles and materiel fielding schedules.

b. **Designation.** The Unified Command Plan assigns CCDRs with responsibility for “designating, and establishing the readiness requirements of, assigned Service HQ to be JTF-capable HQ.” CCDRs may select any number of Service HQ to effectively meet the JTF-capable HQ requirements in their AOR, with all risks considered. Given sufficient resources, any Service HQ may be designated to be a JTF-capable HQ by the CCDR to whom it is assigned. The number of Service HQ in the JTF-capable HQ formation phase at any one time will be constrained by resources, globally prioritized Service fielding schedules, and overall CCMD demand. As a result, CCDRs should coordinate their C2

Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters Readiness Criteria

1. Meets expectations of the supported combatant commander (CCDR) in mission-essential tasks.
2. Prepared a joint task force (JTF)-capable headquarters (HQ) joint manning document that the supported CCDR has approved as the baseline document that can be modified, as necessary, and sourced should the JTF-capable HQ be activated as a JTF HQ.
3. Prepared a JTF-capable HQ joint mission-essential equipment list that can be resourced to meet the supported CCDR's command and control system requirements for that HQ.
4. Implemented a JTF-capable HQ joint training plan that supports the CCDR's readiness requirements for the JTF HQ, to include interagency and multinational participation.
5. Possesses acceptable mission readiness posture and reports readiness as a JTF-capable HQ, in accordance with the CCDR's published readiness reporting protocols.

Figure B-3. Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters Readiness Criteria

operational requirements with the Joint Staff and Military Departments in conjunction with designating a Service HQ to form and sustain itself as a JTF-capable HQ. If CCDR force requirements for JTF-capable HQ cannot be met with assigned forces, then requests for additional forces will be resolved through the Global Force Management process.

c. **Organization.** A JTF HQ structure, size, and command relationships will be based on mission requirements, a CONOPS, both the supported CCDR's and designated Service HQ commander's guidance, and other factors external to the designated Service HQ control, such as an imposed maximum footprint ceiling or multinational participation. Based on its JMETL and required capabilities, a designated Service HQ, in conjunction with the Service component and supported CCMD, develops a draft JMD to reflect the proposed organizational structure and personnel requirements of the JTF HQ. Designated Service HQ should submit their draft JMD, in accordance with JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*, to the supported CCDR for review and approval. Following approval, the CCMD should load the document into electronic-Joint Manpower and Personnel System as a contingency JMD. The contingency JMD should be used and evaluated by the designated Service HQ throughout the JTF-capable HQ formation phase and subsequent training and readiness sustainment events. The designated Service HQ may request that contingency JMD positions be identified on Service manning documents to reflect dual-hatted positions and JTF-capable HQ training requirements.

For more details concerning the electronic-Joint Manpower and Personnel System, refer to CJCSI 1001.01, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program.

d. **Manning.** In conjunction with preparing a JMD, the designated Service HQ should prepare a joint manning plan to source identified personnel requirements in coordination with its supported CCMD. The plan should ensure that the right personnel are available at the right time for a JTF-capable HQ to transition into a JTF HQ and successfully plan and execute joint operations. To this end, the joint manning plan should be based on JMD requirements resulting from a complete and comprehensive mission analysis and on the approved JMETL, which will help identify the capabilities required to accomplish the joint mission.

e. **C2 Equipping.** Joint force communications system operations planning and management (see JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, Chapter III, “Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning and Management”) are critical to the JTF-capable HQ readiness posture and ensuring full connectivity with higher and lower HQ. Designated Service HQ commanders should emphasize the development of a joint mission-essential equipment list (JMEEL) of C2 systems, applications, communication systems, and support equipment for the JTF-capable HQ. Equally important is the preparation of a C2 equipping plan that includes the JMEEL, identifies required manning and system-specific training for C2 systems and applications, and addresses how C2 capability shortfalls or gaps will be sourced. Such pre-crisis C2 equipment planning will help JTF-capable HQ have a joint C2 systems, applications, and communications capability that is interoperable with the supported CCMD’s C2 architecture, functional component commands, subordinate Service and multinational tactical forces, and potential mission partners.

f. **Training.** Once selected to become a JTF-capable HQ, designated Service HQ commanders, in coordination with the supported CCDR, should develop a JMETL and a comprehensive joint training plan (JTP) in accordance with CJCSM 3500.03, *Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of United States*. The designated Service HQ should conduct joint training in addition to Service training and mission requirements. The JTP should identify individual and collective training, to include training to sustain the readiness of the HQ through the duration of its mission as a JTF-capable HQ. The JTP also should address the requirements and means by which both the designated Service HQ and mission partners can better prepare to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate their activities to achieve unity of effort in planning and operations.

g. **Readiness**

(1) **Readiness Standard (Core Tasks).** The acceptable readiness standard for JTF-capable HQ is established by the CCDR. It typically includes the ability to C2 integrated joint operations employing assigned and attached forces, including MNFs, and to coordinate and integrate mission partners’ support to accomplish assigned missions. Figure B-2 lists the core tasks associated with the basic joint functions—C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment—in which JTF-capable HQ should be proficient. Based upon mission analysis, the JTF-capable HQ commander may adjust this list when a related Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) task better describes the required capability. The commander may also add additional mission-related JMETs to the core tasks to comprise the JMETL that will help prioritize the capabilities and actions needed to increase and sustain readiness. If any required JMETL tasks are not listed in the UJTL, a

new task can be created using the UJTL Task Development Tool and associated process. JTF-capable HQ will then develop the necessary conditions and standards for their JMETs using a variety of sources: the sample standards from the associated UJTL tasks, mission guidance, and other relevant information. Regardless of the source, the commander approving the JMETL establishes the associated standards.

(2) **Readiness Criteria.** CCDRs should promulgate JTF HQ readiness guidance that identifies the criteria and process by which the supported CCDR, Service component and designated Service HQ commanders prepare, mature, and verify the Designated Service HQ's readiness to perform the missions envisioned by the supported CCDR. Because readiness is a holistic concept that the CCDR uses to assess JTF-capable HQ ability to establish, organize and operate as a JTF HQ, the readiness criteria presented in Figure B-3 are recommended for inclusion in CCDR readiness guidance for JTF-capable HQ. A JTF-capable HQ should be proficient in its approved JMETs, have the proposed organizational structure and personnel requirements of the JTF HQ documented in a contingency JMD, have required C2 systems and other key equipment readily on hand to the maximum extent possible, continue individual and collective training to sustain staff proficiency, and accurately report readiness to perform as a JTF HQ.

(3) **Readiness Reporting.** CJCSI 3401.02, *Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)* (Limited Distribution), and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 7730.65, *Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)*, with subsequent serial guidance, designate readiness reporting requirements for DOD, including Service HQ and JTF HQ. Designated Service HQ and JTF-capable HQ are considered "measured units" and should report readiness against CCDR-approved JTF HQ missions in accordance with DOD, CJCS, and CCDR promulgated readiness protocols. See Interim Change 1 to CJCSM 3150.02, *Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)* (Limited Distribution), for additional information concerning "measured units." CCDRs should review the periodic readiness reporting of designated Service HQ and JTF-capable HQ and take action, if necessary, to correct or mitigate readiness shortfalls. When ordered to conduct actual operations as a JTF HQ, the JTF-capable HQ commander will revalidate the JMETL, JMD, JMEEL, and training status for the assigned mission(s) and commence reporting readiness, per the governing instructions, every 30 days or when the JTF HQ readiness status changes, whichever is sooner.

3. Resources

The Services are responsible for providing designated Service HQ with the capabilities and resources necessary to operate as a JTF-capable HQ. CCDRs normally rely on established programs to identify and address JTF HQ capability gaps and associated resource constraints (specifically manpower and funding). The Capability Portfolio Management procedures, as well as the JTF or functional component HQ Certification program element of the CCDR's Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program, may be used to gain senior leadership visibility on JTF HQ readiness issues.

For more details concerning the Capability Portfolio Management and the CCDR Exercise and Training Transformation program, refer to DODD 7045.20, Capability Portfolio

Management; *CJCSI 3265.01*, Command and Control Governance and Management; *and CJCSM 3500.03B*, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, *respectively*.

APPENDIX C

COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFFS

Annex	A	Personal Staff: Public Affairs
	B	Personal Staff: Staff Judge Advocate
	C	Personal Staff: Chaplain
	D	Personal Staff: Surgeon
	E	Personal Staff: Inspector General
	F	Personal Staff: Provost Marshal
	G	Personal Staff: Comptroller
	H	Special Staff: Headquarters Commandant
	J	Special Staff: Historian
	K	Special Staff: Safety Officer

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C

PERSONAL STAFF: PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. Overview

a. Information relating to the military and its operations is available to the public from countless sources including official information from DOD as well as unofficial information disseminated by Service members, distributed by the media or by our adversaries. This information shapes the perceptions that the public forms about the military and its activities and operations. Regardless of the source, intention or method of distribution, information in the public domain either contributes to or undermines the achievement of communication and operational objectives. Official information released in a timely manner can help create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies, and help mitigate unofficial information. The ultimate goal is unity of effort among USG communication activities through the use of coordinated themes, plans, programs, and products integrated with the actions of all instruments of national power.

b. Mass information dissemination is no longer solely the purview of journalists and the media. The people formerly considered the audience now play an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing, and disseminating news and information; anyone with access to the Internet has the power to influence perceptions.

For more details concerning the DOD principles of information, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

c. PA operations contribute to the achievement of strategic, theater, and operational objectives through the dissemination of factual information and imagery concerning JTF operations and capabilities. The CJTF may share JTF preparations and results to international and domestic audiences to put operational actions in context, facilitate the development of informed perceptions about military operations, undermine adversarial propaganda efforts, and gain and maintain public support for military operations. The CJTF must be prepared for a surge of local, regional, and international interest prior to and upon arrival in the JOA. If the press is not already in the JOA to cover military activities, the CJTF may be asked to take the media to the appropriate locations to ensure coverage.

2. Plans

PAOs must be engaged throughout JOPP, have access to open source reports and relevant intelligence, understand common adversary propaganda techniques, and be very aggressive by anticipating and countering adversary propaganda—putting accurate information out first so that friendly forces gain the initiative and remain the preferred source of information. PAOs must advise the CJTF on potential implications of operational decisions on public perception and prepare the CJTF and applicable personnel to work with the media prior to arrival in the JOA.

a. PA planners establish and maintain a routine, ongoing relationship with other planners within the CCMD, JTF, and interagency. PA representatives participate in JTF

cross-functional staff elements as appropriate. The PA plan supports the commander's strategy, includes goals to assess success, and is coordinated with key staff agencies. Synchronization across the staff ensures services and support required by PA is provided and available to execute the PA plan. Every phase of PA planning should match the plan or order it supports and include coordination with the HN, the country team, other government departments and agencies, and NGOs as appropriate.

b. PA planners must ensure that PA plans support the commander's operational objectives, as well as the strategic guidance objectives and are developed in conjunction with other public communications efforts (e.g., MISO, CA). The use of coordinated communication plans and efforts throughout operations allows for the delivery of consistent messages to key audiences and serves to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests and policies.

c. The level of effort required to support the media consistent with CJTF objectives must be developed as soon as planning begins. Once the media learn that forces are preparing for a deployment, the information likely will be reported in a manner accessible by adversary forces. The information environment needs to be shaped with the timely release of information consistent with security concerns. PA plans should facilitate media access to meet CJTF objectives including countering or neutralizing adversary disinformation efforts. PA demands often are highest at the outset of operations as they inform the media and the public about military activities.

For more detailed discussion of PA planning, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

3. Execution

a. During execution PA personnel must ensure their efforts continue to be coordinated across the staff and interagency by participating in various coordination boards to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize information dissemination plans and activities derived from PA, MISO, and the interagency at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

b. PA and IO activities directly support military objectives; counter adversary propaganda, misinformation and disinformation, and deter adversary actions. Although both PA and IO plan and execute public information activities and conduct media analysis, they differ with respect to audience, scope, and intent and must remain separate.

4. Assessment

As with all operations, the success of PA activities should be assessed and modified accordingly. PA planners should determine objectives for PA activities that support achievement of the CJTF's strategy as well as relevant assessment measures and criteria to determine success. The PA staff collaborates with pertinent members of the joint force staff (CA, MISO, intelligence, etc.) on assessment development.

For further details, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations, and JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

5. Commander, Joint Task Force Responsibilities

- a. Provides overall direction and focus to PA activities in the operational area.
- b. Assesses PA personnel situation and request augmentation as necessary.
- c. Ensures that required PA support identified in annex F (Public Affairs) is available.
- d. Plans for the support of media representatives and military personnel supporting PA from the earliest predeployment stages of any operation.
- e. Ensures that the media receive access to military operations, access to command and staff personnel for briefings and interviews, and the logistic support necessary to accomplish their mission.
- f. Establishes media operations centers (MOCs), as appropriate, to provide timely public and command information products and services.
- g. Designates JTF PAO and a MOC director as required.
- h. Conducts media interviews when feasible.
- i. Designates an officer to accomplish a security review of combat camera imagery. All cleared imagery should immediately be provided to PA for potential release to the media.
- j. Ensure that all classified and unclassified imagery of joint operations is forwarded to Defense Imagery Management Operations Center, DOD's central reception and distribution point for joint interest imagery.

6. Media Operations Centers, American Forces Radio and Television Service, and Visual Information

a. **Media Operations Centers.** The CJTF should consider establishing a MOC to support media operations and facilitate media coverage within the JOA. A MOC is a single point of interface between the military and media representatives covering operations. It offers a venue for commanders and PA staffs to discuss their units and their roles in the joint operation, and helps journalists obtain information quickly and efficiently on a wide variety of complex activities. It should be staffed to support local and regional non-English speaking media. The MOC may also manage and use social media tools for information dissemination in accordance with approved policies as well as disseminate command information.

b. The MOC director is responsible for all activities conducted in support of the media relations mission. This includes close coordination with the joint force operations staff to ensure that releasable information is accurate, timely, and is issued with security sensitivities in mind. The MOC director also must ensure that HN sensitivities and media guidelines are considered. The deputy MOC director assists in the management of the tasks associated with support of the joint operation, including daily feedback summaries that include media support activities, analysis of media reporting, and theme or message development. The deputy MOC director also performs the functions of the MOC director in their absence.

Refer to Chapter III, “Public Affairs in Joint Operations,” of JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for a detailed listing of tasks associated with MOC operations.

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX C

PERSONAL STAFF: STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. Responsibilities

a. The JTF SJA is the principal legal advisor to the CJTF and is responsible for the training, equipping, and employment of legal personnel assigned or attached to the JTF. The SJA provides the full spectrum of legal services to the CJTF and staff and coordinates with the supported CCDR's SJA to optimize legal support. The SJA should have direct access to the CJTF. The advice should not be filtered through an intermediary. General responsibilities include:

(1) Task organize the SJA's office to meet the JTFs mission-specific requirements. The office must be joint and provide the appropriate mix of legal subject matter experts necessary to fully support the CJTF. The task organization will vary depending on the JTF mission.

(2) Provide legal advice and support to the CJTF and staff.

(a) International and operational law (including law of armed conflict, ROE, RUF, rule of law operations, law of the sea, airspace law, intelligence law, cyberspace operations, detention operations, international agreements, concepts and regional issues concerning national sovereignty, and general international law).

(b) Military justice (including uniform policies to maintain good order and discipline, disposition for misconduct, and supervision of military justice process).

(c) Claims (including Personnel Claims Act, Military Claims Act, Foreign Claims Act, SOFA claims, tort claims, admiralty, solatia payments, Article 139 claims, and affirmative claims).

(d) Legal assistance.

(e) Administrative law (including environmental law, federal employment law, investigations, Freedom of Information Act, and Privacy Act).

(f) Contract and fiscal law.

(3) Provide legal advice to the entire JTF staff.

(4) Serve as a single point of contact for component SJAs regarding legal matters affecting forces assigned or attached to the JTF.

(5) Serve as a CJTF point of contact with non-DOD agencies, IGOs, and NGOs in the execution of rule of law operations.

(6) Provide assistance with drafting command policies, orders, and international agreements.

(7) Ensure all plans, ROE, RUF, policies, and directives are consistent with DOD law of armed conflict (law of war) program and domestic and international law.

(a) Draft appendix 4 (Legal) to annex E (Personnel) of the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan (legal services support plan) and oversee execution of the legal services support plan at the JTF and component levels (component SJAs primarily are responsible for the execution of the legal services support plan, except as concerns JTF staff members).

(b) Assist in the development, review, and drafting of general and restrictive orders (e.g., General Order No. 1).

(c) Assist in the development, review, and drafting of appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to annex C (Operations), as well as requesting modification of ROE or RUF. The SJA or a representative is a member of the ROE WG or RUF WG. Refer to Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command and Control,” paragraph 2.e (6), “Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE),” and Chapter VII, “Joint Task Force Operations,” subparagraph 2o, “Rules of Engagement Working Group/Rules for the Use of Force Working Group,” for more details on the ROE or RUF WG as well as CJCSI 3121.01, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SECRET)*.

(d) Assist in the development, review, and drafting of appendix 1 (Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons) to annex E (Personnel).

(e) Review the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan for legal sufficiency.

(f) Review target and weapon plans for compliance with the law of armed conflict. In this regard the SJA or a representative should be a member of the JTCCB, if one is established (see Chapter VII, “Joint Task Force Operations,” for more details on the JTCCB).

(g) Assist in the development of appendix 8 (Contingency Contracting) to annex E (Personnel).

(8) Coordinate and oversee JTF and component ROE and RUF training.

(9) Assist in resolving claims for compensation by foreign personnel within the JOA. The SJA also must consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

(10) Assist in resolving cases where foreign authorities assert criminal jurisdiction over US forces within the JOA. The SJA also must consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

b. Capture and share joint legal LL, issues, and significant observations from training events and operations and provide input to the appropriate LL organization.

2. The Planning Process

a. The SJA must be involved throughout the planning process, including strategy and COA development, to ensure that plans comply with US and international laws, treaties, and agreements. SJA involvement in the planning process from the beginning is especially critical to the issues of EPWs, detainees, CMO, targeting, ROE, or RUF.

b. **Legal Estimate.** The SJA also develops the legal estimate during the planning process. The legal estimate is contained in appendix 4 (Legal) to annex E (Personnel) and should reflect the description of legal support required to support the CJTF and the assigned mission as developed during the planning process. It should include a review of laws that influence and govern the operations to include foreign and domestic statutes and regulations as well as international treaties and customs. The legal estimate should clearly identify all anticipated issues related to the law of armed conflict, human rights, claims, contracts, contractors and procurement, HNS, fiscal law, environmental law, SOFAs, and status of mission agreements. Depending on the mission, the legal estimate may include consideration of the following:

(1) Describe any legal considerations (authorities and limitations) that may affect implementation of the plan or order.

(2) Cite applicable references and inter-Service, HN, and reciprocal support agreements.

(3) Define key terms.

(4) Identify the legal section organization and staffing.

(5) Describe the provision of legal assistance and military justice support to the JTF including claims, military justice, legal assistance, trial defense, and trial judiciary services.

(6) Identify the requirements for submitting legal status reports.

(7) Identify the authority under US and international law, agreements, and arrangements for military operations and the use of force including freedom of navigation and overflight/access of international and sovereign national airspace in support of military operations for all en route and operational areas.

(8) Describe the exercise of disciplinary authority over members of other Services, including establishment of joint command convening authority if desired.

(9) Describe the process and procedures for responding to assertions of foreign criminal jurisdiction over US personnel. The SJA also must consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

- (10) Identify SOFA and status of mission agreement issues.
- (11) Describe the legal authorities and constraints associated with the negotiation and enforcement of international agreements.
- (12) Describe the process for reporting and investigating serious incidents (e.g., fratricide, violations of the law of armed conflict, ROE, or RUF noncompliance).
- (13) Describe the process and procedures for responding to requests for political asylum and temporary refuge.
- (14) As appropriate, describe the legal issues relative to migrant and refugee operations.
- (15) Address legal issues related to civilian employees and contractor employees who accompany US forces abroad.
- (16) Identify the legal issues associated with the acquisition of real property, goods, and services during combat or other military operations.
- (17) Develop the legal procedures associated with accounting for captured weapons, war trophies, documents, and equipment.
- (18) Identify any fiscal law issues that may affect operations, to include fiscal and accountability issues related to property transfer or disposal.
- (19) Describe the legal issues related to provision of logistic support to non-USG entities, including MNF, HN authorities, NGOs, and IGOs.
- (20) Describe the legal review of plans, orders, and target lists at every echelon.
- (21) Identify the legal issues related to the treatment of EPWs and other detainees.
- (22) Describe the legal support for intelligence oversight and IO.
- (23) Describe the process for review of ethics issues, such as giving and accepting gifts.
- (24) Identify the environmental aspects of the operation.

For further details concerning legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX C

PERSONAL STAFF: CHAPLAIN

1. General

a. The JFCH is the personal staff officer responsible to the commander for the execution of religious affairs. Religious affairs is comprised of RS and religious advisement.

(1) RS consists of chaplain facilitated free exercise of religion through worship, religious and pastoral counseling services, ceremonial honors for the dead, crisis intervention, and advice to the commander on matters pertaining to morals, ethics, and morale as affected by religion.

(2) Religious advisement consists of the practice of informing the commander on the impact of religion on joint operations to include, but not limited to: worship, rituals, customs and practices of US military personnel, international forces, and the indigenous population.

2. Functions

a. **Advise.** The JFCH advises the CJTF and staff on all matters of religion, morals, ethics, quality of life, and morale. The JFCH also advises the CJTF and staff on matters pertaining to the ethical/moral implications of plans, policies, operations, and strategies. The JFCH advises subordinate JTF religious support teams (RSTs) on the conduct of religious affairs.

b. **Supervise.** The JFCH supervises assigned staff in order to communicate command religious priorities, assess and direct religious affairs activities, answer specific religious inquiries, facilitate unity of effort, and enhance lines of communication and situational awareness. The JFCH also provides functional oversight and guidance to subordinate JTF RSTs.

c. **Plan.** The JFCH prepares RS portions of plans/annexes and participates in identifying religious affairs requirements during CAP. The JFCH ensures that required RS capabilities are identified and included in the command RFF and requests for individual augmentees.

d. **Resource**

(1) The JFCH identifies RS materiel, force structure, and facilities requirements.

(2) The JFCH plans chaplaincy force structure to meet force deployment requirements, special religious holidays, and sacramental duties and integrates these RS force requirements in the CCDR's RFFs and requests for individual augmentees.

(3) The JFCH coordinates with appropriate legal agencies to develop responsive methods to receive and acknowledge private donations, mailings, and unique religious

articles. The JFCH recommends command policy for the decommissioning of sensitive religious articles, clothing, chapels, and the return of such items to the sustainment base.

3. Religious Support Team Tasks

Religious affairs in joint military operations will require a variety of actions supporting different types and phases of operations.

a. Religious Support

(1) Planning and coordinating for the accommodation of the religious needs of the Service members.

(2) Offer institutional care, counseling, and coaching which attend to personal and relational needs based on the shared experience of service, professional wisdom, and pastoral understanding.

(3) Caring for the wounded and honoring the dead.

(4) Advising on RS of military operations.

(5) Coordinating for RST replacements.

b. Religious Liaison

(1) Chaplain liaison is any command-directed contact or interaction where the chaplain meets with a leader on matters of religion for the amelioration of human suffering and the benevolent expression of religion.

(2) Liaison and coordination activities in support of the commander's theater security cooperation program to include participation in humanitarian and civic assistance missions.

(3) When directed by the commander, establishing relationships with appropriate local religious leaders in consultation with the CCMD chaplain.

(4) As requested or directed by the commander and consistent with their noncombatant status, building and maintaining partnership capacity by assisting other militaries in establishing or improving their own military chaplaincies.

(5) Building relationships and collaborating with the USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and IGOs.

(6) Advising the JFC and staff on the constraints and restraints as defined by the noncombatant status of chaplains and Service policies.

(7) Information on specific lines of operations or functions can be found in the applicable JPs (e.g., JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*).

4. Chaplain Liaison in Support of Military Engagement

a. In many situations, clergy-to-clergy communication, as with military chaplains, is preferred by the indigenous religious leader.

(1) Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.

(2) Chaplain liaison in support of military engagement is any command-directed contact or interaction where the chaplain, as the command's religious representative, meets with a leader on matters of religion to ameliorate suffering and to promote peace and the benevolent expression of religion. These activities can take place during any phase of an operation and may have implications at all levels of operations.

b. Chaplains involved in chaplain liaison maintain dialogue with indigenous religious leaders, communities, NGOs, IGOs, and other actors as directed by the commander.

5. Enlisted Religious Support Personnel Roles and Responsibilities

The Army or Air Force chaplain's assistant or the Navy religious program specialist (RP) provides enlisted support to the chaplain. The RS senior enlisted leader is the principal enlisted advisor to the command chaplain. Services train their respective chaplain assistants or RP to work directly within their Service chaplaincy prerogatives. The skills vary by Service and mission set.

For more detailed responsibilities of the JTF chaplain, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.

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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C

PERSONAL STAFF: SURGEON

1. General

a. The JTF surgeon is a senior medical department officer from the Army, Navy, or Air Force who has ideally completed the joint planning orientation course and the JTF senior medical leader seminar. As the JTF senior medical leader the JTF surgeon serves as the CJTF's principal advisor for joint FHP and HSS and reports directly to the CJTF. The JTF surgeon is responsible for the coordination, integration, and implementation of FHP and HSS policies and programs designed to protect and sustain the health of forces assigned or attached to the JTF and directs personnel that comprise the JTF surgeon's office.

b. Working with the CCMD surgeon, the JTF surgeon assesses JTF FHP and HSS requirements and capabilities (both quantitatively and qualitatively) and provides recommendations to the CJTF. The responsibilities of the JTF surgeon are similar to those of the geographic CCMD surgeon. Specific details of the JTF surgeon responsibilities can be found in JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.

2. Organization

The JTF surgeon's office must be adequately staffed and task organized to support the mission of the JTF. Considerations for determining the duties and responsibilities by the staff are detailed in JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.

3. Responsibilities

a. The mission of the JTF surgeon's office functional areas and primary staff are detailed in JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.

b. **Checklist.** To assist the JTF surgeon and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex J, "Checklist for Health Service Support," to Appendix A, "Checklists."

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX C

PERSONAL STAFF: INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. General

a. The IG is an extension of the eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the CJTF. The CJTF should strive to have this function as part of the JTF. The IG provides the CJTF with a sounding board for sensitive issues and typically is a trusted agent in the command. The IG is a candid broker and an impartial fact finder. The rank of the IG should be commensurate with the overall JTF organization.

(1) Basic IG functions are inspecting, assisting, and investigating.

(2) IG responsibilities may include:

(a) Monitoring, evaluating, assessing, or inspecting operational and other areas essential to mission performance; and assessing the ability of all echelons of the JTF to accomplish assigned missions.

(b) Responding to operational matters; however, at the direction of the CJTF the IG may inspect any matter within the scope of the CJTF's authority.

(c) Providing assistance to all members of the JTF. The IG will refer cases to include those dealing with family members to the supported CCDRs' or component commanders' IGs as appropriate.

(d) Reviewing and assisting with JTF member morale and welfare, family, and other issues as appropriate.

(e) Conducting inquiries and investigations as necessary.

(f) Serving as the point of contact for coordination with the supported CCDR's IG to include coordination relevant to assessment of the JTF.

b. The JTF IG may provide support on site from "a normal working location" or through a combination of regular site visits and reachback based on the situation and the CJTF desires. The JTF IG will maintain points of contact with IGs of the supported CCDR and each of the JTF component commanders to facilitate referring cases that are Service-specific. The JTF IG will ensure that information on how to contact the supported CCDR's IG, component commanders' IGs, and the DOD IG Hotline is displayed at all times in a conspicuous JTF location.

c. Typical JTF IG actions include assessing and reporting to the CJTF on the following:

(1) Mission: orders, documents, and agreements; mission clarity; mission rules for termination or extraction; and "mission creep."

(2) Resources: equipment and personnel appropriate to mission(s) and sufficiency of administration, support, and logistics.

(3) Operational readiness: joint planning and conduct of operations, joint doctrine, readiness reporting, OPSEC, intelligence oversight, communications, and the discipline of assigned and attached personnel.

(4) Welfare and morale of assigned and attached personnel.

(5) Fraud, waste, and abuse.

(6) Other duties as specified by the CJTF.

2. Organization

a. **General.** The JTF HQ IG office should be tailored to suit the mission, size, scope, and expected duration of the JTF. Other factors that must be considered are the geographic location, dominant Service, and political environment. The following guidelines should be considered:

(1) The JTF IG should be a field grade officer (O-4 or above) with grade directly linked to the level of JTF employed, e.g., 2-star JTF = O-4/O-5 IG, 3-star JTF = O-5/O-6 IG, and for a 4-star JTF = O-6 officer.

(2) To be effective, the JTF IG must work for and have access to the CJTF and all elements and activities within the command.

(3) The JTF IG office will need to draw on augmentees to gain the functional expertise needed for inspection teams.

b. **JTF IG Minimum Personnel Requirements.** If the JTF maintains an IG function on-site, the minimum recommended staff would include the IG (O-4 or above) and an E7 assistant. A notional JTF IG organization is provided in Figure C-E-1.

c. JTF IG Minimum Equipment Requirements

(1) Means of transportation to visit all JTF locations.

(2) Unclassified phone and fax (with access to classified phone and fax).

(3) Computer system with software compatible with systems in use by the JTF.




Figure C-E-1. Notional Inspector General Organizational Structure

3. Tasks, Functions, and Procedures

a. The JTF IG is concerned with operational matters and compliance with policies and procedures at the JTF level. For cases that deal solely with a single-Service issue and do not affect the joint force, the JTF IG normally will refer the matter to the respective Service component.

b. The JTF IG will prepare an activity plan for approval by the CJTF. The activity plan will show inspections, assistance visits, and any IG-related activity directed by the CJTF.

c. The JTF IG will ensure that IGs of subordinate units establish contact upon assignment or arrival in the JOA. The JTF IG will provide technical guidance to subordinate IGs and coordinate common IG activities.

4. Considerations

a. Become involved, early on, in the CJTF's planning process to understand the commander's intent and CONOPS.

b. Focus on high-payoff issues that impact on the JTF's ability to rapidly deploy, sustain itself, conduct operations, redeploy, and prepare for the next mission or

reconstitution. These issues may include, but are not limited to, unit readiness for deployment, training, ammunition distribution, mail service, standards of discipline, and other Service member welfare issues.

c. IGs can expect an increasing frequency of RFIs and assistance. Historically, assistance cases account for the majority of the deployed IG's workload.

5. Planning Rhythm

The JTF IG battle rhythm is synchronized with and responsive to JTF operational requirements. It includes conducting scheduled inspections, providing assistance to members of the JTF as required, and conducting investigations as directed.

6. Reports

The IG will report directly to the CJTF on the results of each inspection or investigation.

To further assist the JTF IG and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex K, "Checklist for Inspector General," to Appendix A, "Checklists."

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX C

PERSONAL STAFF: PROVOST MARSHAL

1. General

The JTF PM develops and issues policies, programs, and guidance for the planning and conduct of military police operations.

2. Responsibilities

- a. Assist with the collection, processing, and reporting of EPWs or detainees.
- b. Advise the CJTF on technical and procedural aspects of physical security and FP.
- c. Provide the CJTF with a focal point on all matters of law enforcement planning, policy, and reporting; and provide a liaison for the CJTF with civilian law enforcement authorities.
- d. Recommend ways in which military police and security forces capabilities can best support the JTF's mission based on the CJTF's intent and CONOPS.
- e. Provide the CJTF with guidance and recommendations regarding detainee operations.

For further details concerning the CJTF PM, refer to JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, and the Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures.

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ANNEX G TO APPENDIX C PERSONAL STAFF: COMPTROLLER

1. General

Financial management support to the JTF includes resource management and finance support.

2. Responsibilities

- a. Serve as the principal financial management advisor to the CJTF.
- b. Represent the CJTF in identifying JTF financial management requirements to the supported CCDR, component commanders, and others as required.
- c. Establish financial management responsibilities and coordinate the designation of lead agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements.
- d. Provide estimates of resource requirements to the supported CCDR, component commanders, and others as required.
- e. Establish positive controls over the funding authority received.
- f. Coordinate with the JTF J-4 and IG to develop a system for prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.
- g. Prepare appendix 3 (Finance and Disbursing) to annex E (Personnel) of the OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.
- h. Coordinate with the JTF J-4 on logistic and contracting requirements to ensure they complement the financial management responsibilities.

For further details concerning the comptroller, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

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ANNEX H TO APPENDIX C

SPECIAL STAFF: HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

1. General

The HQCOMDT coordinates direct support to the JTF HQ at its employment location. Typically, the HQCOMDT has functional specialists who liaise with the host installation for this support. The HQCOMDT also has support elements that provide dedicated support to the JTF staff. Currently, there is no unit type code for the HQCOMDT, and the design of the HQCOMDT organization is notional and should be considered during planning. There may be a requirement for the JTF chief of staff to direct one of the staff directorates (e.g., J-4) to perform the HQCOMDT planning and other responsibilities until the establishment of this position or until the designated HQCOMDT joins the JTF.

2. Organization

Headquarters Commandant Organization Design and Development. Normally, the JTF HQ will be located at a host base and will have access to standard base support, making the HQCOMDT planning highly dependent on coordination with the host support and logistic groups. In some cases, the host installation may be a foreign military installation and may present difficulties in establishing reliable agreements quickly. In the instance of a non-US host installation, the HQCOMDT organization will need to be more self-sufficient. Additionally, split-based operations are becoming more common, in which case multiple HQCOMDTs may have to be utilized.

3. Identifying Support Requirements

a. The lead HQCOMDT planner should work with the JTF chief of staff to identify the HQCOMDT chief(s) at the earliest possible time. The lead HQCOMDT planner(s) should develop a WG consisting of functional specialists from the staff that can advise on the specific requirements needed to support the JTF HQ staff. Suggested WG members include the J-4 (logistic plans, supply, deployment/distribution, engineering, services), PM, J-1 (personnel), and J-6 (communications plans). Additionally, the lead HQCOMDT planner should coordinate with the JTF chief of staff and other staff principals in identifying detailed support requirements.

b. **Headquarters Commandant Development at a US Base.** Agreements need to be made early on with the host base with respect to specific support requirements. A support agreement should be established (time permitting) that will identify the specific support arrangements. In some cases, the HQCOMDT chief may require a small staff to coordinate with the base support element; in other cases the HQCOMDT chief may need an entire element to provide complete functional support to the JTF HQ staff, to include FP. After evaluating the level of base support expected, the lead HQCOMDT planner will develop a liaison staff to coordinate with host base supporting elements and identify augmentation elements to fill gaps that the host base is not able to support. The HQCOMDT planning WG should advise the lead HQCOMDT planner on all functional requirements and assist in designing the HQCOMDT composition.

c. **Headquarters Commandant Development at a Non-US Host Installation.** Past experience has shown that support made available by other Services or foreign militaries generally is very limited. The HQCOMDT planning WG should design the HQCOMDT organization with careful consideration of all augmentation requirements and consider identifying standard support unit type codes to support the deployed location when necessary.

d. **Obtaining Augmentees.** Once the support requirements are identified and the HQCOMDT organization is designed, the HQCOMDT lead planner must identify HQCOMDT positions and augmentees that need to be sourced. Position requirements, reporting instructions, and line remarks (special qualifications) must be submitted to the J-1 for sourcing by the relevant Service components.

ANNEX J TO APPENDIX C

SPECIAL STAFF: HISTORIAN

1. General

a. The JTF historian provides historical coverage for all JTF operations and ensures that proper documentation and historical reports will be available for future researchers.

b. Typically, the JTF historian will be a senior officer (O-4 to O-5 level) or appropriate level civilian with training as a military historian. Depending upon the circumstances of the JTF employment, the historian may have an assistant. The historian is considered part of the special staff with direct access to the chief of staff.

c. The JTF HQ historian receives staff guidance and support from the supported CCMD historian, not his/her Service history office. At the conclusion of the operation, the historian's records and materials are turned over to the CCMD historian. The JTF historian coordinates with the component historians and provides assistance and advice as necessary; but the component historians receive their guidance from their respective Service history offices.

d. The JTF historian's work centers upon recording the key decisions made at the operational level. Tactical level decisions are relevant only to the extent that they affect the course of the campaign or operation. To accomplish this end the historian collects key documents (including Focal Point material), conducts in-depth oral history interviews, and maintains a suitable chronology. The value of the field historians' work is measured by the insight provided into key decisions, not merely the quantity of material collected or the number of interviews.

e. A robust historical program will serve as the basis for factual, objective histories, both official and unofficial. The results of the history program will be most apparent during the years following the operation, as the need for an informed account grows.

f. Ensure that the JTF historian has an adequate security clearance to collect all documentation, collect classified photographs, and conduct classified oral histories. Supporting information technology must support storage of classified information.

2. Functions of the Joint Task Force Historical Office

a. Maintaining the command historical file, to include a chronology of significant JTF activities.

b. Maintaining a document reference collection in either electronic or paper copies. This duty is distinct from the formal records management requirements of a JTF.

c. Conducting an oral history program, to include interviews of the CJTF and key staff members.

d. All other duties as related to the command history program. To perform these duties the command historian must have access to key staff meetings, as well as access to key documents.

For further details concerning the joint historian, refer to CJCSI 5320.01, Guidance for the Joint History Program, and CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEs), Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.

ANNEX K TO APPENDIX C

SPECIAL STAFF: SAFETY OFFICER

1. General

Safety is a command responsibility. The JTF safety officer assists the CJTF and subordinate component commands in executing their responsibility to protect government personnel, property, and prevent unintended impact on civilians by ensuring safe operations in support of their mission. The safety officer supports the CJTF's safety programs to enhance mission success by developing proactive mishap/accident prevention programs; providing effective cross-flow of safety information between components; collecting and disseminating joint safety lessons identified; and tracking mishap/accident investigations. The safety officer tracks corrective actions applicable to JTF operations and reports the results to the commander.

2. Fundamental Principles

a. CJTFs are responsible for establishing command-level, joint safety programs for assigned and attached forces and should appoint a safety officer to assist in developing these programs. A safety officer may be a member of the CJTF's personal staff or special staff. In smaller JTFs, a safety officer may be a subordinate staff officer, collateral duty, or additional duty.

b. The scope of the safety program should be limited to those activities designed to ensure proper mishap/accident reporting and investigation, enhance mishap/accident prevention, and protect DOD personnel, resources, and the public without duplicating the efforts of Service safety programs.

c. Effective safety programs require leadership involvement in risk management at all levels, enforcement of discipline, and compliance with applicable standards. Subordinate commands should establish specific procedures (inspections and risk assessments) to ensure all personnel and activities comply with those standards. Commanders must ensure risk management is integrated at each functional level and is effectively applied throughout the command.

3. Joint Task Force Safety Officer Responsibilities

a. Provide commanders an unbiased perspective of the safety climate and preclude conflicts of interest with other staff sections. Subordinate unit safety officers, safety managers, and safety specialists provide mishap/accident data, trend analysis, process accident reports, and submit safety recommendations to the JTF safety officer.

b. Provide timely reports of Classes A through D mishaps/accidents and other potential high-interest safety incidents (near miss) to the CCMD safety office.

c. Provide timely summaries, trends, and analysis of Classes A through D mishaps/accidents for the commander and key staff review.

d. Notify CCMD safety office of all critical safety issues that might impact other components or operations. Disseminate safety information, issues, and recommendations to the JTF and all components.

4. Mishap/Accident Prevention

a. Safety is a function of risk assessment. To that end, commands should identify operations and activities that pose an increased risk for mishaps/accidents and develop procedures and programs to keep losses of manpower and equipment, injury to personnel, and prevent unintended impact on civilians. Mishap/accident prevention efforts should be implemented in such a manner as to have minimal adverse impact on operations. Whenever possible, safety measures taken should be applicable to combat as well as peacetime operations to reduce training artificialities and promote sound operational techniques.

b. Particular emphasis should be given to accident prevention efforts in the following areas: pre-mishap/accident plans; weapons and explosive safety; vehicle safety; and aviation safety. Depending on the organizational mission, other areas may pose greater hazards than those listed and must also be addressed. Based on assessment of mishap/accident potential and operational risk, commanders should place emphasis on a “worst hazard first” basis. Where joint or multinational operations are being conducted, safety personnel should ensure inter-Service/national coordination of elevated-risk operations to reduce the potential of accidents due to differences in equipment and procedures.

c. **Pre-Mishap/Accident Plans.** Commanders should ensure they have a current pre-mishap/accident plan established. This plan will be tailored to a specific location and situation during the operation or exercise. The plan should include, at a minimum, lifesaving and rescue information, notification procedures for contacting firefighting assets, medical evacuation and ambulance services, notification of key personnel in the chain of command, and notification of personnel responsible for mishap/accident investigation and safeguarding the mishap/accident scene. Standing mishap/accident investigation boards may be established.

d. **Risk Management.** Risk assessments should be completed for all training and operations. The assessment may be formal or informal in accordance with Service-specific directives. Risk assessments provide a means to systematically review potential hazards associated with specific operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and develop plans to mitigate those risks. Once identified, unnecessary risks should be eliminated, and operational risks reduced to a level that the commander determines acceptable. If a risk cannot be reduced to a level acceptable to the responsible commander, the decision to conduct the operation should be elevated to the appropriate level in the chain of command.

APPENDIX D

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

1. General

a. The role of IM is to provide a timely flow of relevant information that supports all aspects of planning, decision making, and execution; to include all activities involved in the identification, collection, filtering, fusing, processing, focusing, disseminating, and using information. IMOs assemble information that promotes understanding of the information environment and enable the CJTF to better formulate and analyze COAs, make decisions, execute those decisions, and understand results from previous decisions.

b. IM uses established procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, protect, display, disseminate, and dispose of information. A JTF requires a continuous flow of quality information to support operations. Information flow strategy is developed to ensure that this quality information gets to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients. To that end, the effective flow of information requires the information to be:

(1) **Positioned Properly.** The requirements for specific types of information often are predictable. Positioning the required information at its anticipated points of need speeds the flow and reduces demands on the communications system (e.g., using public folders to post required information).

(2) **Mobile.** The reliable and secure flow of information must be commensurate with the JTF's mobility and operating tempo. Information flow must support vertical and horizontal data sharing (e.g., collaborative [integrated] planning system).

(3) **Accessible.** All levels of command within the JTF must be able to pull the information they need to support concurrent or parallel planning and mission execution. If possible, channel information to the required user via automated means, reducing the need for manual exchange (e.g., graphic depiction of forces in a COP).

(4) **Fused.** Information is received from many sources, in many mediums, and in different formats. Fusion is the logical blending of information from multiple sources into an accurate, concise, and complete summary. A key objective of IM is to reduce information to its minimum essential elements and in a format that can be easily understood and acted on (for example, threat assessment disseminated in graphic form on an automated COP system).

c. The JTF's communications system provides the means for information dissemination. Users of information are ultimately responsible for its management. Principal, special, and supporting staff directors or chiefs must clearly identify their information requirements and work closely with the JTF IMO ensuring processes are automated in the most effective way possible.

2. Information Management Plan

a. **IM Plan.** An effective management plan provides guidance to ensure availability of decision-quality information. It is needed to articulate not just the processes that exist, but also the means by which the JTF will perform those processes. **This plan is the JTF IMP.**

b. The JTF IMP should cover the JTF IM requirements that cut across all elements of the organization. A construct that works well is that of the “4 Ps”: people, process, pipes, and protection. Examples include the duties, responsibilities, and skill requirements (people); IM processes and procedures (process); IM systems and requirements (pipes); and IM system protection (protection). Some of the key items are:

- (1) Commander’s dissemination policy.
- (2) Information requirements and general procedures (COP management, CCIRs).
- (3) Digital rules of protocol (also referred to as business rules). These rules provide correct use and promote proper etiquette when working with collaboration tools and other digital information systems within a JTF.
- (4) Battle rhythm or schedule of events.
- (5) Information assurance or computer network defense.
- (6) Information systems tools and procedures (to include collaborative planning tools).
- (7) RFI management procedures.
- (8) Network applications and architecture. This guidance may include using records management, web pages, or other applications.
- (9) Reports management.
- (10) Master suspense action log.
- (11) Significant events log.
- (12) Orders distribution.
- (13) System recovery procedures.

c. **Commander’s Dissemination Policy.** The commander’s dissemination policy serves as the commander’s guidance portion of the IMP on dissemination of information within and outside of the JTF. The commander’s dissemination policy is not a separate document, but a part of the IMP. It provides a foundation for developing the IMP and aids in prioritizing IM activities. It provides policy to guide JTF IM decisions in the absence of specific guidance or detailed instructions. Critical information needs must be predetermined

and prioritized to ensure support for critical missions, prevent overload of routine information, and provide guidance to apportion information assets.

(1) The commander's dissemination policy may incorporate policies pertaining to:

- (a) CCIRs.
- (b) PA guidance.
- (c) Communications network architecture.
- (d) Release of real time operational information.
- (e) Release of real time intelligence information.
- (f) IO goals and objectives.
- (g) Communications system status.

(2) Other areas a commander should consider for inclusion in the commander's dissemination policy are:

(a) Identifying the routine information products that must be sent to users based on their functional role(s) or mission(s).

(b) Weighing the main effort, allowing for dynamic adjustment to available bandwidth, and a reallocation of bandwidth to specific missions.

(c) Prioritizing information flow within an operational area.

(d) Prioritizing requests for information based on:

- 1. User.
- 2. Organization.
- 3. Mission.
- 4. Location.
- 5. Information type (i.e., STRIKEWARNING, contact report).

(e) Overriding automatic assignment of priorities.

(f) Interfacing with databases and other information sources associated with building the COP and providing for rapid tailoring of information required to create a new or updated COP.

(g) Limiting access to specific information by content, source, type, or location.

(h) Limiting file transfer sizes.

(i) Limiting information transfer due to security or classification policy and delivery tools.

For further details concerning IM at the JTF level, refer to Chapter X, “Joint Task Force Communications,” JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures.

3. Responsibilities (People)

To aid the commander in tracking, controlling, and fusing the vast amounts of information that a JTF can encounter, an effective IM organizational structure must be established. For a large JTF, a group of individuals will be required to accomplish effective IM. Regardless of its size, though, an IM organization provides the JTF with an information flow strategy designed to meet the commander’s needs for relevant and timely information while optimizing the use of information infrastructure resources. Depending on the JTF size, a CJTF may use some, all, or none of the elements listed below to create an IM organization. **In the organization discussed below, the IMO reports directly to the chief of staff.** An advantage of putting the IMO under the chief of staff is to provide leverage to manage IM policies effectively. In some situations, however, the JTF J-3 may be best positioned to manage the IMO. Ultimately, the CJTF decides where to place the IMO function.

a. Commander, Joint Task Force

(1) Establishes priorities for information gathering and reporting by identifying the type of information needed to attain a better understanding of the situation. This also includes establishing the CCIRs and commander’s dissemination policy.

(2) Approves the command IMP.

(3) Approves the command communications plan that supports the IMP.

b. Chief of Staff

(1) **Manages the JTF IM process**—a logical and effective approach to IM.

(2) Approves the HQ battle rhythm or operations cycle.

(3) Implements and enforces the IMP.

(4) Appoints the IMO.

(5) Appoints the RFI manager.

(6) Establishes the JIMB.

(7) Determines liaison requirements, establishes liaison information exchange requirements, and receives liaison teams.

c. **Information Management Officer.** The information manager's position is a primary duty assigned to a qualified individual with operational experience. The IMO is policy-focused, and as the senior JTF information manager, is responsible for developing and publishing the commander's IMP. The information manager may be a commissioned or staff NCO who best meets the command's requirements. The IMO should be intimately aware of the JTF's information needs and possess the authority to coordinate actions and processes accordingly. The IMO must be capable of working closely with JTF personnel of all ranks and specialties to coordinate procedures and capabilities that satisfy CJTF warfighting requirements and the JTF staff. Specifically, the IMO needs to understand how the command operates, and be able to articulate that understanding to communicators. The IMO:

(1) Ensures the JTF IM system accurately reflects the JTF IMP.

(2) Approves the format and structure of information posted and distributed from JTF briefings and reports using the JIMB.

(3) Coordinates additional training requirements by staff and component elements to support IM.

(4) Works to develop effective and efficient JTF COP management procedures.

d. **Joint Information Management Board**

(1) The JIMB is policy focused and responsible for building the JTF's IMP in conjunction with the staff directorates' information managers. Periodically, the board is required to make updates or changes to the IMP. JIMB composition should include:

(a) JTF IMO chairs the JIMB.

(b) Staff section IM coordinators.

(c) JNCC representative.

(d) JIMB representative.

(e) RFI manager.

(f) Information assurance representative.

(g) Web/database administrator/manager.

(h) External organization representatives, as required.

(i) Records manager.

(2) The JIMB:

- (a) Identifies and validates information exchange requirements.
- (b) Creates and maintains the IMP.
- (c) Acts as a focal point for coordinating JTF IM policy.
- (d) Operates under the supervision of the chief of staff (or designated staff directorate).
- (e) Resolves cross-functional and contentious IM issues.
- (f) Coordinates additional training required by staff and component elements to support production of quality information through effective IM procedures.

e. Joint Task Force Staff Directors

- (1) Implement internal staff directorate procedures to comply with the IMP.
- (2) Identify critical and relevant information to be placed on the HQ battle rhythm matrix. The JOC staff informs the IMO of any changes to information needs prompted by the HQ battle rhythm.
- (3) Appoint a staff directorate IM representative and RFI manager as points of contact for IM matters and RFIs. This can be the same individual, though it is not recommended to dual-hat in the JTF J-2 and J-3 directorates.
- (4) Ensure training is completed for basic IM, RFI management, and security procedures for all personnel in the staff directorates.
- (5) Assess IM to assure the flow of quality critical and relevant information.
- (6) Note: The JNCC, as an element of the JTF J-6, exercises control over the communications system and serves as the **single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network**. The JNCC performs planning, execution, technical direction, and management over the communications system. See Chapter X, “Joint Task Force Communications,” for further discussion of JTF J-6 IM responsibilities as they relate to IM systems management.

f. Joint Data Network Operations Cell

- (1) The JDNC is a task-organized team of experienced personnel that supports the JDN operations officer. The JDNC shall be staffed, trained, and equipped to support continuous operations and should consist of personnel knowledgeable in the operations of participating components to optimize multi-Service experience and overcome C2 system interoperability challenges. The JDNC’s mission is to plan the C2 architecture, maintain configuration control, manage and integrate selected data provided by the various networks,

execute JDN operations, and develop a COP/CTP that meets the commander's situational awareness and decision-making requirements.

(2) **Mission.** The JDNC, as an element of the JTF J-3, will manage the JDN to provide a reliable, complete, and timely CTP of entities and events in the operational environment to the JOC. The JDNC will continuously monitor the JDN and specifically support the CJTF through oversight of both horizontal and vertical integration of data, to include the following activities:

(a) Analyze the quality, timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of CTP information to ensure it meets the CJTF's data requirements and supports the JTF mission.

(b) Manage the CTP development processes and assess the connectivity and performance of C2 systems used to provide the required level of situational awareness needed to support decision making.

(c) Implement a coherent CTP management plan, incorporating hardware/software configuration control, filter settings, and permissions sets needed to meet tactical and operational information exchange requirements.

(d) Identify and assist in the resolution of interoperability issues.

(e) Perform multi-source data integration and track management, managing and integrating selected data provided by the various networks.

(f) Acts as the focal point for COP/CTP coordination within the JTF.

(g) Reviews and validates subordinate data inputs to provide an accurate JTF COP/CTP.

(h) Is actively involved in resolving all cross-functional COP/CTP issues.

(i) Advocates that the components establish their own COP/CTP point of contact to manage their portion of the JTF's COP/CTP.

For further information on the JDNC, refer to CJCSM 3150.01, Joint Data Network Operations, and Chapter VII, "Joint Task Force Operations," of this JP.

g. Joint Information Management Cell. Depending on the size of the JTF and scope of operations, the JTF chief of staff may establish a joint IM cell within the JOC. The joint IM cell reports to the JOC chief (or possibly the JTF J-3), and facilitates information flow throughout the JOA. In the absence of a standing joint IM cell, the responsibilities defined below must be assumed by other positions within the IM structure. The joint IM cell:

(1) Is responsible for ensuring the commander's dissemination policy is implemented as intended.

(2) Takes guidance published in the commander's dissemination policy and combines it with the latest operational and intelligence information obtained from the JOC or joint analysis center.

(3) Works closely with the JNCC to coordinate potential changes in communications infrastructure to satisfy changes in the commander's information dissemination requirements.

(4) Coordinates the accurate posting of all current, approved CCIRs.

h. Joint Task Force Staff Directorate IM Representatives

(1) May be commissioned or staff NCOs, regardless of rank or specialty.

(2) Oversee the internal and external information flow of their staff directorates.

(3) Provide the IMO with staff directorate information requirements for incorporation into the IMP.

(4) Provide the JNCC a list of their respective requirements for network support.

(5) Ensure compliance with the priorities, processes, and procedures in the IMP for web sites, message handling, e-mail, RFIs, and suspense control procedures.

(6) Coordinate and conduct IM training for internal staff directorate members.

i. Joint Task Force Request for Information Managers

(1) The JTF RFI manager is a non-table of organization billet, normally a secondary duty assigned to an individual in the JTF J-3 with operational experience. The JTF J-2 will designate an RFI manager for intelligence-related requirements, and these requirements will be tracked via community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers.

(2) JTF section or component RFI managers are responsible for receiving, validating, prioritizing, and submitting RFIs to the appropriate authority for resolution in a timely manner. RFIs should be focused upon validating planning assumptions.

(3) The JTF RFI manager develops and manages a tracking system to ensure RFIs are processed and the responses expeditiously disseminated to the requester. It is critical that the question, response, and identification of who responded is displayed—web-based RFI tools work best.

j. Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO). The JICO is the senior interface control officer in support of the joint multi-tactical data link network (MTN) operations within the JOA. The JICO is responsible for planning and managing the architecture and technical integration of joint data and communications systems for the MTN. The JICO controls and acts as the coordinating authority for the joint interface control cell and for any regional

interface control officer/sector interface control officer for planning and executing tactical data link (TDL) functions that cross regional or sector boundaries or impact the theater-wide MTN. When a JTF is formed, there will be only one JICO per JTF, and the JICO normally will be located in a C2 facility with connectivity to the primary TDLs (normally the joint air operations center, if established). There may be Service component interface control officers located at the joint information coordination center.

For a full discussion of the JICO, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, and CJCSM 3115.01, Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations, and CJCSM 6120.01, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link (TDL) Operating Procedures.

k. **Component Information Management Officers.** Each component commander appoints an IMO as a primary point of contact for IM matters. The JTF and component IMOs:

- (1) Component IMOs have similar duties and rank requirements as the JTF IMO.
- (2) Conduct liaison with the JTF IMO.
- (3) Coordinate and assist personnel with training required to produce quality information throughout the command.

l. **JTF Information System User Responsibilities.** Every user has inherent responsibilities to acquire, assess, reason, question, correlate, and disseminate quality information to other users. The JTF information and information system user responsibilities are to:

- (1) Handle all information as directed in the IMP.
- (2) Ensure accuracy and relevance of information before further dissemination. Clearly differentiate between original information and previously reported information to avoid duplicative reporting.
- (3) Properly control, classify, protect, and archive all information and information systems for which they are responsible. This requires a clear understanding of approved control measures for various classifications of information.
- (4) Validate the authority to dispose of JTF information before destruction.
- (5) Read and comply with the information requirements published in the JTF IMP.

4. Information Management Processes and Procedures (Process)

Central to the success of meeting the operational needs of the user is the JTF IMO, the JIMB, and the joint IM cell. The IMO supports the chief of staff in the horizontal and vertical integration of the command and its subordinates, primarily by integrating the command's key processes. It is not necessary or desired to document every single IMP process, but to describe those processes critical to how the command operates. As such, the

IMO must focus on the integration of the key processes. “Best practices” have shown that the following are critical processes for which procedures are required to properly integrate them.

a. **Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.** CCIRs are elements of information required by the commander that directly affect decision making. CCIRs are a key IM tool for the commander and help the commander assess the operational environment and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.

For more details concerning CCIRs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command and Control.”

b. Request for Information

(1) RFIs primarily are designed to validate planning assumptions. The CJTF establishes RFI procedures to provide a systematic method for requestors to obtain information. Providing visibility to the rest of the organization on the questions, answers, and identification of those providing answers to those questions is more important than merely allowing requestors to get information.

(2) An RFI can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the geographic CCMD’s procedures. RFIs are sent to higher, subordinate, and adjacent HQ or to other agencies requesting the information necessary to support the planning and decision-making processes.

(3) The JTF J-2 processes intelligence-related RFIs, and the JTF J-3 all other RFIs. They assign an RFI manager to receive and prioritize RFIs. A tracking system known as the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers is established to register, validate, track, and manage crisis and non-crisis intelligence information requirements.

(4) Effective RFI procedures provide requestors with an “information pull” mechanism for access to a variety of vital information. RFI procedures do not replace typical internal staff research available to JTF members (e.g., intelligence link via the SIPRNET and Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network [NIPRNET]). Instead, the RFI process provides a mechanism for a formal request to other echelons when the issue or question is beyond the resources of the staff. The process also provides visibility of those requests forwarded, their status, and responses to these requests.

(5) Component RFI managers submit RFIs to the JTF RFI manager that are beyond the components capability and staff resources to answer. Component RFI managers submit intelligence related RFIs, in accordance with established procedures.

(6) Normally, RFIs are not necessary among JTF directorates. However, if a JTF is not in a single location or the RFI is exceptionally complex, the JTF staff directorate RFI manager submits it to the JTF RFI manager by posting it to a JTF web page or other approved means. The JTF RFI manager processes the request and forwards it to the

appropriate agency for resolution. Each directorate RFI manager is responsible for monitoring their RFIs and closing the request.

c. **Battle Rhythm.** The “daily operations cycle” is synonymous with the HQ “battle rhythm.” This is the chief of staff’s tool to integrate the meetings and products in such a manner to provide the CJTF and staff with the products, information, and decisions that are required for decision making. To ensure information is available when and where required, the JTF daily operations cycle is essential. All JTF staff, components, and supporting agencies should participate in the development of the daily operations cycle. The JTF chief of staff must be the approval authority for changes. See Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command and Control,” for more details concerning the HQ battle rhythm.

d. **Reports.** Standardized reports help reduce the amount of staff work to meet recurring information requirements.

e. **Orders and Distribution.** Orders are the means for the JTF to direct the actions of other organizations. The CJTF issues guidance and direction in the form of warning orders, fragmentary orders, execute orders, OPORDs, and other directives. The JTF JOC is the focal point for disseminating orders. The JTF IMP must address procedures for the management of plans and orders throughout their life cycle to include, distribution, acknowledgment, and protection.

f. **Briefings and Meetings**

(1) Briefings and meetings can be the biggest time consumer for JTF members if they are not conducted properly. Meetings should occur to accomplish a specific purpose, on an as-needed basis. There are three roles that need to be specified for all meetings. The **meeting organizer** schedules the meeting and publishes the agenda. This agenda will specify the attendees, purpose of the meeting, and desired outcomes of the meeting. The **moderator** is the person who runs the meeting, gathers input, and assigns tasking during the meeting. The final role is that of the **recorder**, who acts as the scribe, and at the end of the meeting reads back all taskings to include who was tasked. The chief of staff determines which meetings occur via the published JTF HQ battle rhythm. The IMO is responsible for specifying procedures in the IMP to disseminate the products of the meeting, especially any decisions or direction given during the meeting.

(2) **CJTF Daily Update Brief.** This brief normally is conducted once daily to update the CJTF on current operations, future, and long range plans and provides the CJTF with analyzed information essential for decision making and synchronizing the JTF efforts. A secondary purpose is efficient cross leveling of information within the staff. Brevity, clarity, and a cross-functional analysis of the operational environment are goals of the CJTF update brief. The most common error occurring in the daily update brief is that the focus is purely on what happened, versus the future. CJTFs and staffs should ensure their update briefs remain focused on the future, rather than the past.

g. **Multinational Procedures and Systems.** The CJTF establishes procedures for information and data transfer between the JTF and multinational components. The CJTF

establishes a security CONOPS for the specific “how-to” for data transfer and develops information sharing/disclosure policies in accordance with DOD or approved multinational policy or procedures. Multinational procedures for transferring data addressing sensitive compartmented information are handled through special security office channels.

5. Information Systems (Pipes)

a. The goal of information systems and IM procedures is to produce an accurate picture of the operational environment and to support decision making. Information systems must provide effective and secure information exchange throughout the JTF. Users need to develop an understanding of the information systems available and IM procedures to match their information requirements.

b. Network Application Management

(1) Networking technologies are expanding the options available for managing the flow of information. The JTF can achieve a collaborative environment for sharing information using web pages, public folders, and e-mail. For example, networks provide the JTF access to information, allowing individuals to send and receive unclassified and classified information worldwide. The NIPRNET provides access to the Internet. SIPRNET and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System provide access to classified information.

(2) The intranet network infrastructure for a JTF HQ may differ from one JTF to another, but the concepts are generally the same. A JTF intranet is a communications network in which access to published information is restricted.

(3) The JTF IMO must work closely with the JTF web administrator and the component IMOs to develop and establish procedures for local area network management. The JTF IMP should identify how the JTF shares information. The JTF IMO must establish procedures enabling each staff section to access, post, and update information. Each staff section ensures the information posted is accurate, current, and relevant.

(4) Web Sites and Portals

(a) A well-organized web site assembles, organizes, and presents vital information in a timely manner. The JTF HQ, staff directorates, components, and supporting agencies should develop and maintain their own web pages for the site. Information on these web pages should include important updates, status reports, common staff products, and current activities.

(b) The JTF should organize the web site around a master “JTF home page.” The JTF home page or “front door” sits at the top of the JTF web site acting as a point of entry into the site. In a complex JTF web site, it is impractical to populate the JTF home page with dozens of links. Complicated or large home pages are long and will not load quickly in a bandwidth-constrained environment. Therefore, each major element or unit of the JTF should have their own home page with direct links back to the JTF home page. However, a JTF home page could list links for other applicable JTF home pages to advertise

their existence. Web pages or pages within a component should have a consistent design to facilitate navigation.

(5) **Electronic Mail**

(a) E-mail is a common tool that can be highly effective communicating time critical information within the JTF. However, the benefit of permitting rapid and asynchronous communications and eliminating “telephone tag” is tempered by the ever present potential for performance degradation, loss of situational awareness, and loss of referential information. The IMP should restrict and include processes to capture e-mail C2 and responses into more readily accessible common resources such as portals, network share spaces, or other similar capabilities. It permits a single user to communicate with one or several users simultaneously. However, e-mail can overload the network if used improperly. Unnecessary information and large message attachments overload the network. Use web sites, public access drives, or send a link (vice the actual attachment) on the local area network to disseminate information. Remove graphics, imagery, and text documents that do not add information content.

(b) At times, it is necessary to notify a large audience that a particular piece of information is available (e.g., warning orders). Users should use some discretion in selecting e-mail addresses. In most situations it is preferable to send a link to the information and notify intended recipients where it may be retrieved, versus attaching the item to multiple e-mail messages. This procedure reduces the bandwidth used when sending multiple copies of e-mails with attachments. Users should periodically review their e-mail group addresses for accuracy and ensure topic-related group members are still current. Remember, undeliverable e-mail may double the network load (once to attempt delivery and again to notify the sender of the delivery failure). Users should take prompt action to resolve the cause of undeliverable e-mail.

(6) **Shared disk drives and folders** are another means to allow common access to information. Organizations using shared drives should have an established policy for deleting obsolete and outdated information. Shared drive folder names may be topical or use the same titles as those shown in the file plan drive.

c. **Collaborative Tools.** Collaborative tools such as Defense Connect Online, Intelink, and HARMONIEWeb (for sharing unclassified information with the interagency and NGOs) can be used to bridge seams across an organization, such as between components separated by distance, or for elements within the JTF staff. These tools, however, will not improve information flow and decision making if procedures are not developed, documented in the IMP, trained to, and enforced to standardize their use. Collaborative tools fall into two categories: synchronous (real time) and asynchronous (non-real time). Examples of the former include VTC, collaboration suites on computers, and telephones. Examples of the latter are shared web spaces and web portals. The following are some examples of how to use such tools:

(1) Present an interactive visual projection enabling JTF members to see the collaborative effort both on their workstation screens and on a large “movie screen” display.

(2) Support the JTF planning process by permitting JTF planners to enter virtual meetings to share intent and build common planning documents across all echelons.

(3) Provide means that enable meetings and products to be shared throughout the JOA.

(4) Share and work on documents between the JTF HQ and subordinate organizations. These documents include force lists and availability, intelligence information, TPFDD, worldwide map system, unit capabilities, equipment, and organization for each US Service force and MNF as required.

(5) Using unclassified information sharing capabilities, such as HARMONIEWeb, bring into the JTF's collaborative information environment, persons, and organizations unable or unwilling to connect to DOD (dot.mil) systems due to location or cultural or political sensitivities.

d. Local Area Network or Wide Area Network Requirements. The JTF local area network can be set up with shared or private hard drive space. Private drive space is intended to limit access to stored data. Access generally is limited to specific functional areas as defined by user login names (i.e., specific joint-code staff sections). Since this capability is difficult to share across organizations, it is a good location for work that is not ready for publication. The IMP must specify the requirements for publication. Staff sections are responsible for the currency, accuracy, and maintenance of their shared drive information.

e. Video Teleconferencing Procedures. The purpose of the JTF VTC capability is support of the CJTF and JTF staff. VTCs are effective for sharing information and C2 between the CJTF and geographically dispersed subordinate commanders and staffs. While VTC is a key means of C2, the CJTF could use alternate methods of communication such as conference calls if a VTC system is not available. Since this is a high-bandwidth tool, the IMP should specify prioritization for its use (i.e., mainly focused on the command echelon).

f. Priority Communications. Information and the value of information based on the commander's requirements drive the installation and restoration of communications means. To assist in making this happen, the JTF J-6 establishes specific responsibilities for establishing connectivity between the JTF HQ and components. Normally, the higher HQ is responsible for establishing all connections to a lower HQ. The JTF should possess redundant means of voice communications, data transfer, and functional specific data systems.

6. Information and Information System Protection (Protection)

a. The increasing dependence of societies and military forces on advanced information networks creates new vulnerabilities, as well as opportunities. The J-6 primarily is responsible for information assurance; however, the IMO must include JTF J-6 approved information assurance procedures for the command. Potential adversaries could exploit these vulnerabilities through means such as computer network attack. Vulnerabilities caused by advancements in C2 systems must be mitigated. Mission accomplishment depends on

protecting and defending information and information systems from destruction, disruption, and corruption by safeguarding them from intrusion and exploitation. These are critical tenants for mission accomplishment and aid in accomplishing information superiority, an enabler to full spectrum dominance.

b. To ensure information integrity and assurance for the force, the CJTF must have an understanding of the various types of threats to JTF information systems and the consequences if these threats are not mitigated. Threats against friendly C2 vary by potential adversaries' technical capabilities and motivation. The IMP must anticipate internal and external threats across the range of military operations. Additionally, sound system configuration along with a proactive network monitoring plan aid in risk mitigation.

(1) **External Threats.** Attacks emanating from outside of the network continue to challenge security professionals due to the ethereal complexities of detection. Attack techniques, such as e-mail spoofing or internet protocol hopping, require a significant level of skill for the system administrator to detect and mitigate. Anti-virus software, information assurance vulnerability alerts, and DOD computer emergency response team advisories provide measures to protect against many external attack weapons.

(2) **Insider Threat.** Threats emanating from within the joint information infrastructure pose a significant risk to the overall information systems. Individuals with legitimate system access, whether recruited, self-motivated, or through carelessness have entry to information and information systems that are otherwise protected against outside attack. Within the system, a malicious insider may launch a series of computer attacks, which may create spill-over effects throughout the entire JTF network.

To further assist the JTF IMO in the preparation of an IMP and coordinating IM with other USG organizations, IGOs, and NGOs, refer to Annex L, "Checklist for Information Management," to Appendix A, "Checklists."

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APPENDIX E

JOINT TASK FORCE-STATE

1. Background

The NG normally will be on-scene, in their Title 32, USC, or state active duty status supporting a state-managed emergency response when DOD is directed to conduct a DSCA mission. Various command arrangements are available when military forces in different legal statuses and with separate chains of command support state civil authorities. A clear understanding of these arrangements is essential for effective coordination to ensure unity of effort. This appendix describes state authorities and operational relationships, simultaneous state and federal responses, and domestic considerations.

2. Authorities and Operational Relationships

a. **JTF-State Establishment.** Per DODD 5105.83, *National Guard Joint Force Headquarters – State (NG JFHQs-State)*, each state maintains an NG JFHQ-State under their respective state’s adjutant general that exercises administrative control (ADCON) of the Air and Army NG elements. These NG forces may be in a purely state active duty status, or in federally funded Title 32, USC, status, or a combination of either status. Regardless of status, these NG forces may be organized as a JTF-State under the OPCON of a pre-designated commander and staff. Just as the preferred option for organizing a Title 10, USC, JTF HQ is to form it around a CCMD’s Service component HQ or the Service component’s existing subordinate HQ, the JTF-State command element is nominally formed around an existing NG command within a state. DOD provides specialized training for pre-designated commanders and staffs via USNORTHCOM.

b. **JTF-State C2.** As the state’s senior military commander on scene, the JTF-State commander is responsible for the safe, efficient, and legal employment of all state military forces. The JTF-State commander and staff provide C2 and facilitate the flow of information between the governor or adjutant general and the activated units. The JTF-State commander must maintain situational awareness of local, state, and federal actions to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of response, support, and safety activities by working closely with the event or incident commander. The JTF-State commander also has the responsibility to know what capabilities the various NG units in the state possess and how they might be applied to the incident at hand so that they can be efficiently used to provide the most effective response possible. The JTF-State commander can request that the NG JFHQ-State activate and deploy additional units if additional capabilities are required. The JTF-State commander also may, with the approval of the governor and with the consent of the President of the United States, be called into federal service and continue service under state regulations so that they may command both regular, Title 10, USC, and NG forces (dual status command), thus facilitating unity of effort for all military forces at the incident site.

c. **Supporting States.** NG forces operating within the US and its territories remain under the command of their governor, exercised through the adjutant general and NG JFHQ-State. The exception is the Washington, DC NG where the adjutant general position does not exist. A general officer commands the DC NG. Other states may provide NG forces to

the affected state under an EMAC or other agreement between the respective governors. In cases where one state's NG forces support another state, OPCON is specified by the supporting state governor to the supported state's governor for a specified period (normally 30 days or less). ADCON remains with the supporting state's adjutant general and NG JFHQ-State. Other support responsibilities such as logistics may be modified within a memorandum of agreement between the respective governors.

d. State and Federal Coordination. In the event that active duty, Title 10, USC, forces are directed to respond to a domestic incident, state-controlled NG forces, and federally controlled DOD forces can operate independently in the operational area. Robust coordination is essential to unity of effort. State NG forces likely will be the first on the scene and may have better knowledge of the area and existing relationships with local civil authorities; therefore, DOD forces should leverage the state NG forces as a source of situational awareness and important information during all phases of the incident. There is a potential for NG forces to be federalized as part of a Title 10, USC, response. However, non-federalized NG forces from the supported state or from supporting states (by invitation), remain under the command of their respective state governor. Should a Title 10, USC, force be responding within a state, coordination between the federal and state military commands will be required. To facilitate this, the exchange of LNOs to coordinate and deconflict operations may be necessary.

e. State and CCMD Coordination. DODD 5105.77, *National Guard Bureau*, and DODD 5105.83, *National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State*, allow for direct communication between the Chief, NGB, and the commanders of USNORTHCOM, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), and other geographic and functional CCMDs (as required) relating to HD and DSCA. Direct coordination between a CCMD and the NG of a state should occur only when time does not permit communication via the NGB. In each such instance, the Chief, NGB will be informed of the direct coordination.

3. Simultaneous State and Federal Responses

a. Situation Overview. In most domestic incidents, Air Force and Army NG forces, under the state governor's control, will provide military support requested by civil authorities. However in a catastrophe, civil authorities may be so overwhelmed that they request large-scale federal assistance. Based upon the request of the primary federal agency, normally the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the President and SecDef may commit federal military forces. Designated federal military forces normally deploy as directed by the CCDR and operate under the command of a subordinate CJTF. This leads to a situation where federal and state military forces are operating within the same operational area, but supporting different civil authorities; i.e., NG forces are operating under state response efforts for the governor and the federal military forces are supporting the federal authority for the President and SecDef; both types of forces focus on the same response effort.

b. Command Structure Options

(1) A **parallel command structure** exists when state and federal authorities retain control of their employed forces through existing state and federal chains of command. For legal reasons, command of federal and state military forces usually remains separated, and forces normally operate in parallel chains of command (see Figure E-1). When a dual status commander is not appointed, unity of effort may be more difficult to achieve. In order to ensure unity of effort, both state and federal military forces coordinate continuously at every deployed echelon, and particularly at the JTF level. This coordination between commanders becomes a critical basis for situation updates and recommendations to the state emergency manager (who is the adjutant general in some states) and federal coordinating officer directing their respective efforts.




Figure E-1. Parallel Chains of Command

(2) A **dual-status command structure** exists when a commander operates within and subject to both federal and state chains of command to command both responses. The decision to have a dual-status command in a given state is a separate agreement between the President and the respective governor. Since JTF-State is a governor-controlled entity; it has no authority outside the state border. For the same reasons, trying to establish dual-status command across state lines is challenging at best. A multi-state response normally will involve at least a JTF-State in each state.

For a detailed discussion of dual status commander, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

4. Domestic Considerations

a. JTFs for domestic operations will normally involve supporting HD and DSCA operations. DOD may provide support to US civil authorities in all areas of this framework if authorized by the President or SecDef. This assistance to civil authorities is provided by US federal military forces to assist in domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, to include special events.

b. **Supported Combatant Commander.** For domestic operations, SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing CJTF may establish a JTF. USNORTHCOM is responsible for Title 10, USC, active duty HD missions and DSCA missions in the continental US, Alaska, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. (USNORTHCOM also commands a standing JTF Civil Support element). USPACOM is responsible for HD and DSCA missions for Hawaii, Guam, and the Pacific region. The Joint Director of Military Support publishes an execute order to further delineate support relationships, available forces, end state, purpose, and SecDef approved scope of actions.

(1) **Joint Task Force.** The supported CCDR designates a C2 HQ to execute DSCA operations. Based on the situation, the supported CCDR may deploy a JTF to the JOA for DSCA operations in support of a primary or coordinating agency.

(a) Deployment of a JTF is not contingent on a request from the primary or coordinating agency. Deployment of forces does require SecDef notification. Similarly, while a JTF may deploy without a request from the primary or coordinating agency, DSCA can only be provided pursuant to a Presidential declaration or request from another federal agency.

(b) A catastrophic event may dictate the establishment and deployment of multiple JTFs.

(c) The **National Response Framework.** The NRF states that if a JTF is established consistent with operational requirements, its C2 element will be co-located with the senior on-scene leadership at the joint field office (JFO) to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The co-location of the JTF C2 element does not replace the requirement for a defense coordination officer (DCO)/defense coordinating element as part of the JFO unified coordination staff. The DCO remains the DOD single point of contact in the JFO for requesting assistance from DOD. The DCO is normally one of the first military elements to

activate/deploy in response to a catastrophic event or in preparation for a potential catastrophic event, such as prior to landfall of a hurricane.

(d) Either a standing JTF or one configured for specific missions provides emergency assistance across all lines of support. The JTF may require greater proportions of support units and capabilities than required in a combat deployment.

(e) The JTF usually will exercise OPCON or TACON of DOD forces attached in support of the federal effort within the JOA.

(f) All classes of supply and all types of services may be required. Close coordination between the JTF and emergency support function coordinator is required. Interface for coordination is through the DCO.

For more details concerning DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

(2) **Joint Task Force-State.** When a governor or adjutant general deploys NG forces to support requests from civil authorities, they may create a JTF-State under the NG to maintain C2 of those forces. The JTF-State provides C2 for state NG resources deployed in support of civil authorities or a specific event or incident and facilitates the flow of information between the NG JFHQ-State and the deployed units.

(a) The JTF-State commander must maintain situational awareness of local, state, and federal actions to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of response, support, and safety activities by working closely with the event or incident commander. As the senior NG commander on scene, the JTF-State commander is responsible for the safe, efficient, and legal employment of all state military forces. The JTF-State commander also has the responsibility to know what capabilities the various NG units in the state possess and how they might be applied to the incident at hand so that they can be efficiently used to provide the most effective response possible.

(b) The JTF-State commander can request that the NG JFHQ-State activate and deploy additional units, if additional capabilities are required. The JTF-State commander also may, with the approval of the governor and with the consent of the President of the United States, be called into federal service and continue service under state regulations so that they may command both regular and NG forces (dual status command), thus facilitating a unity of effort for all military forces at the incident site.

c. The JTF-State commander, through the governor and/or the state adjutant general, may request forces and capabilities that are not resident in that state through the NGB to respond to a crisis.

5. Additional Considerations

a. The JTF-State commander and staff require a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and procedures that govern the status of state active duty, Title 32, USC, and Title 10, USC, forces. These duty statuses establish the actions and constraints for planning and employment of forces, RUF, and incident awareness and assessment. In addition, the

JTF-State operates in close coordination with local, state, tribal, and federal agencies that will have different statuses and RUF. Depending on the size of the operation, augmentation from the NG JFHQ-State staff and Army and Air NG may be needed. In some cases, active duty, Title 10, USC forces' augmentation might be needed.

b. NG JFHQ-State planners should also possess detailed understanding of JOPES, APEX, and the NRF. In addition, the NG JTF-State planning community should be cognizant of CONPLANS, such as USNORTHCOM 3501 DSCA/3400, *Homeland Defense*, and USPACOM 5001 DSCA/5002, *Homeland Defense*, as well as individual state plans and planning systems.

c. The JTF-State commander interacts with multiple outside elements in working to achieve unity of effort in support of domestic operations. Command always remains vested in the governor and the adjutant general of that state, unless the forces and HQ in question have been federalized under Title 10, USC.

APPENDIX F REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-33 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Department of Defense Publications

- a. DODD 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program*.
- b. DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*.
- c. DODD 3002.01E, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense*.
- d. DODD 5105.77, *National Guard Bureau*.
- e. DODD 5105.83, *National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State*.
- f. DODD 6495.01, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program*.
- g. DODD 7730.65, *Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)*.
- h. DODI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix*.
- i. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.
- j. DODI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*.
- k. DODI 5400.13, *Public Affairs (PA) Operations*.
- l. DODI 5400.14, *Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations*.
- m. DODI 6055.1, *DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program*.
- n. DODI 6495.02, *Sexual Assault Prevent and Response Program Procedures*.
- o. DOD O-2000.12-H, *DOD Antiterrorism Handbook*.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

- a. CJCSI 1001.01A, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*.
- b. CJCSI 1301.01D, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*.
- c. CJCSI 2700.01D, *International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States, Its Allies, and Other Friendly Nations*.

d. CJCSI 3110.10D, *Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Systems Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY 02 (SECRET)*.

e. CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SECRET)*.

f. CJCSI 3151.01B, *Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements*.

g. CJCSI 3210.01B, *Joint Information Operations Policy (SECRET)*.

h. CJCSI 3241.01, *Counterintelligence (CI) Support (SECRET)*.

i. CJCSI 3401.02B, *Force Readiness Reporting*.

j. CJCSI 5810.01D, *Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program*.

k. CJCSI 6211.02C, *Defense Information Systems Network (DISN): Policy and Responsibilities*.

l. CJCSI 6510.06B, *Communications Security Releases to Foreign Nations*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals

a. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures*.

b. CJCSM 3122.02D, *Joint Operation and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution*.

c. CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats*.

d. CJCSM 3150.01C, *Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions*.

e. CJCSM 3150.13C, *Joint Reporting Structures Personnel Manual*.

f. CJCSM 3500.04F, *Universal Joint Task Manual*.

g. CJCSM 6231 Series, *Manuals for Joint Tactical Communications*.

h. CJCSM 6510.01A, *Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network Defense (CND)*.

4. Joint Publications

a. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

b. JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*.

- c. JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*.
- d. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- e. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.
- f. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (SECRET)*.
- g. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.
- h. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.
- i. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
- j. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.
- k. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.
- l. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*.
- m. JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*.
- n. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
- o. JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*.
- p. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*.
- q. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- r. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.
- s. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- t. JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*.
- u. JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*.
- v. JP 3-32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*.
- w. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
- x. JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.
- y. JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.
- z. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- aa. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.

- bb. JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.
- cc. JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.
- dd. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- ee. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.
- ff. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs*.
- gg. JP 4-08, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations*.
- hh. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.
- ii. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.
- jj. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

5. Other Publications

- a. *Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure*.
- b. *United States Pacific Command Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures*.

APPENDIX G

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Doctrine Support Division, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, J-7, Joint Staff, Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-33, 16 February 2007, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.

4. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//DDJ7//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance with DOD Manual 5200.01, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS at <https://jdeis.js.mil> (NIPRNET) and <http://jdeis.js.smil.mil> (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR	after action review
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADCON	administrative control
ADVON	advanced echelon
AO	area of operations
AOA	amphibious objective area
AOR	area of responsibility
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAAF	contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAP	crisis action planning
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCMD	combatant command
CENTRIXS	Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	concept plan
COP	common operational picture
CSA	combat support agency
CSEL	command senior enlisted leader
CTP	common tactical picture
CUL	common-user logistics
DAFL	directive authority for logistics
DCJTF	deputy commander, joint task force

DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DCO	defense coordinating officer
DFE	Defense Intelligence Agency forward element
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DII	defense information infrastructure
DIRMOBFOR	director of mobility forces
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DISN	Defense Information Systems Network
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
DSPD	defense support to public diplomacy
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EHCC	explosive hazards coordination cell
eJMAPS	electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System
EMAC	emergency management assistance compact
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
FFIR	friendly force information requirement
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FP	force protection
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
GPS	Global Positioning System
HD	homeland defense
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HOC	human intelligence operations cell
HQ	headquarters
HQCOMDT	headquarters commandant
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IC	intelligence community
ICC	information confidence convention
ICP	intertheater communications security package
IG	inspector general

IGO	intergovernmental organization
IM	information management
IMO	information management officer
IMP	information management plan
IMS	interagency management system
IO	information operations
IOWG	information operations working group
ISB	intermediate staging base
I/T	interpreter and translator
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-2X	joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
JARB	joint acquisition review board
JCC	joint contracting center
JCEOI	joint communications-electronics operating instructions
JCMA	joint communications security monitoring activity
JCMEC	joint captured materiel exploitation center
JCMO	joint communications security management office
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JCSB	joint contracting support board
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element (USTRANSCOM)
JDDOC	joint deployment and distribution operations center
JDEC	joint document exploitation center
JDISS	joint deployable intelligence support system
JDN	joint data network
JDNC	joint data network operations cell
JECC	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (USTRANSCOM)
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFCH	joint force chaplain
JFE	joint fires element
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFO	joint field office
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JFUB	joint facilities utilization board
JIA	joint individual augmentation
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JICO	joint interface control officer
JIDC	joint interrogation and debriefing center

JIMB	joint information management board
JIOC	joint intelligence operations center
JIOWC	Joint Information Operations Warfare Center
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JLOC	joint logistics operations center
JMAO	joint mortuary affairs office
JMC	joint movement center
JMD	joint manning document
JMEEL	joint mission-essential equipment list
JMET	joint mission-essential task
JMETL	joint mission-essential task list
JMISTF	joint military information support task force
JMO	joint meteorological and oceanographic officer
JNCC	joint network operations control center
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	joint operations center
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	joint publication
JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element (USTRANSCOM)
JPEC	joint planning and execution community
JPERSTAT	joint personnel status and casualty report
JPG	joint planning group
JPRA	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
JPSE	Joint Planning Support Element (USTRANSCOM)
JPTTA	joint personnel training and tracking activity
JSA	joint security area
JSCC	joint security coordination center
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTF	joint task force
JTF-State	joint task force-state
JTP	joint training plan
JWAC	Joint Warfare Analysis Center
KLE	key leader engagement
LL	lessons learned
LNO	liaison officer
LOA	letter of authorization
LOGCAP	logistics civil augmentation program

MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MHz	megahertz
MIS	military information support
MISO	military information support operations
MNF	multinational force
MNFC	multinational force commander
MOC	media operations center
MTN	multi-tactical data link network
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NETOPS	network operations
NG	National Guard
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NG JFHQ-State	National Guard joint force headquarters-state
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIPRNET	Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
NIST	national intelligence support team
NRF	National Response Framework
NSA	National Security Agency
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PM	provost marshal
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PR	personnel recovery
RC	Reserve Component
RFF	request for forces
RFI	request for information
ROE	rules of engagement
RP	religious program specialist
RS	religious support
RSSC-LO	regional space support center liaison officer
RST	religious support team

RUF	rules for the use of force
S&TI	scientific and technical intelligence
SATCOM	satellite communications
SCA	space coordinating authority
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SHF	super-high frequency
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA	staff judge advocate
SMO	senior meteorological and oceanographic officer
SO	special operations
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SPOE	seaport of embarkation
SPOT	Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
SROE	standing rules of engagement
SRUF	standing rules for the use of force
STEP	standardized tactical entry point
TACON	tactical control
TCC	transportation component command
TDL	tactical data link
TFCICA	task force counterintelligence coordinating authority
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
UHF	ultrahigh frequency
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UN	United Nations
USC	United States Code
USCYBERCOM	United States Cyber Command
USG	United States Government
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VTC	video teleconferencing
WG	working group
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II-TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

air expeditionary force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

air expeditionary wing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

battle rhythm. None. (Approved for removal from JP1-02.)

board. None. (Approved for removal from JP1-02.)

bureau. None. (Approved for removal from JP1-02.)

cell. A subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a joint force commander's headquarters. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

center. An enduring functional organization, with a supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within a joint force commander's headquarters. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-33)

chief of staff. The senior or principal member or head of a staff who acts as the controlling member of a staff for purposes of the coordination of its work or to exercise command in another's name. Also called **COS**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

common-user network. A system of circuits or channels allocated to furnish communication paths between switching centers to provide communication service on a common basis to all connected stations or subscribers. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

communications security monitoring. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

echelon. None. (Approved for removal from JP1-02.)

element. An organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a joint force commander's headquarters. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

field training exercise. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

group. 1. A flexible administrative and tactical unit composed of either two or more battalions or two or more squadrons. 2. A number of ships and/or aircraft, normally a subdivision of a force, assigned for a specific purpose. 3. A long-standing functional organization that is formed to support a broad function within a joint force commander's headquarters. Also called **GP**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

hazard. A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-33)

information assurance. Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and

nonrepudiation, which includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called **IA**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

joint mission-essential task. A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the Universal Joint Task List in terms of task, condition, and standard. Also called **JMET**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

naval expeditionary warfare. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

office. An enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a joint force commander's headquarters to coordinate and manage support requirements. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-33)

personal staff. Aides and staff officers handling special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

planning team. A functional element within a joint force commander's headquarters established to solve problems related to a specific task or requirement, and which dissolves upon completion of the assigned task. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

section. 1. As applied to ships or naval aircraft, a tactical subdivision of a division. 2. A subdivision of an office, installation, territory, works, or organization; especially a major subdivision of a staff. 3. A tactical unit of the Army and Marine Corps smaller than a platoon and larger than a squad. 4. An area in a warehouse extending from one wall to the next; usually the largest subdivision of one floor. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

semipermanent joint task force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

tactical operations center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02)

task organization. An organization that assigns to responsible commanders the means with which to accomplish their assigned tasks in any planned action. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)


unit. 1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority. 2. An organization title of a subdivision of a group in a task force. 3. A standard or basic quantity into which an item of supply is divided, issued, or used. Also called **unit of issue**. 4. With regard to Reserve Component of the Armed Forces, a selected reserve unit organized, equipped, and trained for mobilization to serve on active duty as a unit or to augment or be augmented by another unit. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Universal Joint Task List. A menu of capabilities that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. Also called **UJTL**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

working group. An enduring or ad hoc organization within a joint force commander's headquarters consisting of a core functional group and other staff and component representatives whose purpose is to provide analysis on the specific function to users. Also called **WG**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-33** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

