U.S. Naval War College

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Historical Monographs | Special Collections

11-6-2023

HM 30: Reflections on Naval History: Collected Essays

John B. Hattendorf
The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs

Recommended Citation

Hattendorf, John B., "HM 30: Reflections on Naval History: Collected Essays" (2023). *Historical Monographs*. 34.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/34

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Historical Monographs by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

Reflections on Naval History

Collected Essays

John B. Hattendorf
Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus
of Maritime History
Naval War College

COVERS

Front cover: USS *Constitution* vs. HMS *Guerriere,* 19 August 1812, *by Charles Robert Patterson, oil on canvas, courtesy of the Naval War College Museum. Inset and title page:* Home from a Cruise, *by Norman Rockwell, oil on canvas, courtesy of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum. Back cover:* Boston Harbor from Constitution Wharf, *by Robert Salmon, oil on canvas, courtesy of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum. Further information about the art and its provenance appears in "A Word about the Cover Images" at the back of this volume.*

Reflections on Naval History

Naval War College Historical Monograph Series No. 30

The historical monographs in this series are book-length studies of the history of naval warfare, edited historical documents, conference proceedings, and bibliographies that are based wholly or in part on source materials in the Historical Collection of the U.S. Naval War College.

The editors of the Naval War College Press express their gratitude to all the members of the Naval War College Foundation, whose generous financial support for research projects, conferences, and printing has made possible the publication of this historical monograph.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in the Historical Monograph Series do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other agency, organization, or command of the U.S. government.

Correspondence concerning the Historical Monograph Series can be sent to the Director, Naval War College Press. For copy requests write to President, U.S. Naval War College, Code 32, or contact the Naval War College Press.

U.S. Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, Rhode Island 02841
https://usnwc.edu



Reflections on Naval History: Collected Essays

John B. Hattendorf
Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus of Maritime History
Naval War College

Naval War College Press

Naval War College Press
Newport 02841
Published 2023
Printed in the United States of America

ISBN 978-1-935352-81-5 (paperback)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Hattendorf, John B., author. | Naval War College (U.S.), issuing body.
Title: Reflections on naval history : collected essays / John B. Hattendorf.
Other titles: U.S. Naval War College historical monograph series ; no. 30.
Description: Newport, Rhode Island : Naval War College Press, 2023. | Series: Naval War College historical monograph series ; no. 30 | ". . . third in a series of volumes that bring together scholarly writings originally published in a variety of specialized journals and other publications . . . It includes papers originally appearing in the years 2010–20. The earlier volumes are Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays (2000), and Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays (2011)"—Foreword. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: "This volume contains 30 essays written between 2010 and 2020 that represent a broad historical perspective ranging across six centuries of maritime history"—Provided by publisher.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023019325 | ISBN 9781935352815 (paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: Naval history. | Naval art and science.
Classification: LCC D27 .H348 2023 | DDC 359.009—dc23/eng/20230501 | SUDOC D 208.210:30
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023019325

The logo of the U.S. Naval War College authenticates Historical Monograph Series No. 30, *Reflections on Naval History: Collected Essays,* by John B. Hattendorf, ISBN 978-1-935352-81-5, as the official U.S. Naval War College edition of this publication. Use of the U.S. Naval War College logo and ISBN 978-1-935352-81-5 is strictly prohibited without the express written permission of the Editor (or Editor's designee), Naval War College Press.

Reproduction and distribution are subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. Copies of all or any portion of this work must be clearly labeled as such, and are required to credit the author, series, full title, and the U.S. Naval War College. Contact the Naval War College Press regarding commercial use and copyrights.

Naval War College Press
Code 32
686 Cushing Road
Newport, Rhode Island 02841

401.856.5772 telephone
401.841.1071 fax
press@usnwc.edu

https://usnwc.edu/nwcpress

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword, by Carnes Lord ix
Introduction xi
Part 1: Maritime History and the Historical Perspective 1
I. *Ubi Sumus?* Twenty-Five Years Later 3
II. The Maritime Book in the English-Speaking World, 1528–1850 15
III. Changing American Perceptions of the Royal Navy since 1775 29
IV. Commonwealth Navies as Seen by the U.S. Navy, 1910–2010 45
V. "Those Far Distant, Storm-Beaten Ships, upon Which the Grand Army Never Looked": The Influence of Sea Power, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the U.S. Naval War College 59
Part 2: Early Modern Europe 73
VI. Navies and Naval Operations, 1400–1815 75
VII. Competing Navies: Anglo-Dutch Naval Rivalry, 1652–1688 99
VIII. North America as a Theater of Conflict and Imperial Competition during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701–1713 121
IX. The Peace of Utrecht in World History 137
X. British Policy toward Sweden, Charles XII, and the Great Northern War, 1697–1721 151
XI. Admiral of the Fleet James, First Baron Gambier, GCB 171
Part 3: The New Republic 203
XII. George Washington's Navy 205
XIII. Debating the Purpose of a Navy in a New Republic: The United States of America, 1775–1815 219
XIV. The Naval War of 1812 in International Perspective 235

XV. The Royal Navy and Economic Warfare on the United States during the War of 1812 253
Part 4: The World Wars 265
XVI. The Strategic Roles of Navies during World War I 267
XVII. Rear Admiral Henry B. Wilson and the U.S. Navy in France, 1917–1919 281
XVIII. The U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean during World War I and Its Immediate Aftermath, 1917–1923 295
XIX. Aircraft Carrier Naval Aviation and the Changing Character of Naval Battle during the War in the Pacific, 1941–1945 307
Part 5: Maritime History of, at, and near Newport, Rhode Island 325
XX. The Brenton Family of Newport 327
XXI. The Eighty-Gun Ship of the Line *Duc de Bourgogne* 359
XXII. A New Model of the Steam Frigate USS *Minnesota,* ca. 1877–1881 361
XXIII. Here's for a Coriolis Effect in Maritime History 365
XXIV. The Naval War College and Fleet Admiral Nimitz's "Graybook" 367
XXV. The Decision to Close Rhode Island Bases in 1973 373
Part 6: Naval Theory 379
XXVI. The Idea of a "Fleet in Being" in Historical Perspective 381
XXVII. The Quest to Understand Naval Leadership: Educating Admirals for High Command in the U.S. Navy 397
XXVIII. The Idea of Maritime and Coastal Space in U.S. Naval Thinking since 1970 . . . 415
XXIX. Statesmen and Sea Power: Reflections on Aspects of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond's Thinking 427
XXX. Naval Power and the Multidimensional Roles of the Armed Forces 441
Appendix: Bibliography of Books and Articles by John B. Hattendorf, 2015–2023 and Forthcoming 457
About the Author 465
A Word about the Cover Images 467
Index 471
Titles in the Series 503

FOREWORD

At a time when the study of history in the United States has become increasingly specialized and besieged with fashions and fads of various kinds, John B. Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus at the U.S. Naval War College, stands out as an exemplar of what a historian can and should be. John Hattendorf is recognized widely as the foremost practitioner in this country of the profoundly unfashionable field of naval and maritime history. More than that, on the international stage John has been a leading figure in and catalyst for the revival of the field in recent decades. His familiarity with virtually all the languages of the major maritime powers of modern Europe underscores this aspect of his work and distinguishes it from that of most American historians today. Most importantly, however, in spite of his mastery of the most arcane subspecialties of this discipline, John is always at pains to emphasize its holistic nature and its connection to the larger themes of politics and strategy, war and peace.

John B. Hattendorf was born in Hinsdale, Illinois, on 22 December 1941. He graduated from Kenyon College in 1964 and immediately joined the U.S. Navy, then saw action as a surface warfare officer during the Vietnam War. While still a lieutenant on active duty, he acquired a master's degree in history at Brown University and subsequently crossed paths at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, with Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, then President of the College. Recognizing John's extraordinary talents, Admiral Turner encouraged him to pursue his study of naval history at Oxford University, where, after resigning his commission, John enrolled as a DPhil student at Pembroke College. The subject of his dissertation was "England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study in the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1701–1713." An interest in and deep knowledge of the Royal Navy from its earliest days have been a mark of John's academic work throughout his career, and they are well represented in the volume presented here. In 1977, John returned to the Naval War College, where he remained for the next forty years, eventually assuming the chair named for Admiral Ernest J. King.

Reflections on Naval History: Collected Essays, by John B. Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus of Maritime History, Naval War College, is the third in a series of volumes that bring together scholarly writings originally published in a variety of specialized journals and other publications, many of which are obscure and difficult to access. It includes papers originally appearing in the years 2010–20. The earlier volumes are *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays* (2000), and *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (2011). The latter volume also appeared under the imprimatur of the Naval War College Press.

As director of the Naval War College Press, I am honored to have this opportunity to record, in however inadequate a fashion, my esteem for John Hattendorf as a scholar, an American patriot, and—not least—a human being.

Carnes Lord
Newport, Rhode Island

INTRODUCTION

Reflecting on history is a basic function for an academic historian. Such work involves not only examining primary sources with fresh eyes but also thinking in depth about historical topics in the light of what other scholars have written. It means analyzing and giving serious consideration to the historical situation under study in an effort to shed new light on historical events, to confirm or explain established understandings to new audiences. Reflecting on the broad field of maritime history, particularly on the subspecialty of naval history within it, is the particular function and responsibility of the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College.

Since its founding in 1884, the Naval War College has been one of the most important places in the United States for the advanced study of naval history. Historical work in Newport began with the College's pioneering founder, Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce. His contribution included his direction to Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan to begin the research for and writing of his Naval War College lectures that eventually became famous as Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power" series. A number of other naval officer–historians followed Mahan at Newport in the years that followed. Among them were Rear Adm. Caspar Goodrich (1847–1925), Rear Adm. French E. Chadwick (1844–1919), and Vice Adm. William L. Rodgers (1860–1944). These men all served as Presidents of the Naval War College, and several wrote or were inspired to write their principal works at the College.

Luce had explicitly appointed Mahan lecturer in history, and topics from naval history have always been part of the curriculum, primarily as case studies for a variety of professional naval purposes, and considered fundamental for higher levels of understanding within the naval profession. Nevertheless, there was no permanent academic position devoted to research or writing on naval history at the Naval War College during the first half century of its existence. That changed in the wake of the two world wars. The experience of those wars, with all their new features, brought for some of the U.S. Navy's top commanders a recognition of the importance of the

broader understanding of naval warfare that comes only with serious reflection on and study of history. In 1919, when Adm. William S. Sims returned to the College after having served as the wartime commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, he brought with him a sense of the professional value he had seen in the work of Sir Julian Corbett at the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence and in that of the Admiralty Historical Office. Among Sims's innovations were a new and increasing reliance on civilian academics to lecture on history and other topics at the College and employment of a professionally trained librarian and archivist.

As a faculty position at the Naval War College, the Ernest J. King academic chair had its immediate origins in May 1948, when the President of the Naval War College, Adm. Raymond Spruance, recommended a plan to establish a civilian professorship of maritime history. Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan approved the post on 29 December 1948, but it was not filled, "for lack of funds," until 1951, when Thomas C. Mendenhall of Yale University became the first scholar to occupy it. In 1953, Secretary of the Navy Robert Anderson named the chair in honor of Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, the U.S. Navy's great wartime Chief of Naval Operations. In so naming this position—with King's personal approval—Secretary Anderson honored not only the admiral's interest in maritime history but underscored the particular importance that he ascribed to an understanding of naval history for his own professional naval career in positions of high command.

The Ernest J. King chair, so named, was first filled by Professor Clarence H. Haring, a distinguished scholar of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spanish imperial and maritime history who had come to the Naval War College for a year immediately after retiring from Harvard, where he had been the Robert Woods Bliss Professor of Latin American History for three decades. At that point there was in the United States only one other named academic chair of maritime history, namely, that held by Robert G. Albion, the Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs, a chair established at Harvard University in 1948.

The Naval War College's first permanent, long-term civilian faculty member came in 1966, and its larger civilian faculty began to be assembled in 1972. Between 1951 and 1973 the E. J. King professors were one-year visiting appointments. The chair became a position for a permanent faculty appointment with the tenure of Philip A. Crowl, from 1974 to 1980. It was a particular honor for me to have the opportunity to be the E. J. King Professor of Maritime History for thirty-two years, from 1984 to 2016. Upon my retirement, the Naval War College graciously allowed me to continue my professional work as Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus with part-time employment as a senior advisor. Since 2016, the Ernest J. King chair has reverted to a visiting professorship for distinguished senior scholars. From 2017 to 2020, Professor Craig L. Symonds held the chair. Professor John T. Kuehn succeeded him in 2020.

During the years 1984 to 2016, one of the principal functions of the E. J. King Professor comprised representing the College at naval history conferences, contributing essays and chapters on naval history to collaborative works of naval history, and offering publishable papers for volumes of conference proceedings. Most of these pieces were published in specialist journals, in other languages, or in other countries and so may not have come to the attention of a broader American naval reading audience. From such writings I have over my tenure selected a number for republication (with necessary permission) in collected volumes, of which this is the third. The first, *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 2000), included a selection of sixteen essays from the years 1971 to 1999. The second volume, *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011), reprinted twenty essays originally published between 2001 and 2011.

This new volume, *Reflections on Naval History: A Collection of Essays,* contains thirty essays written between 2010 and 2020 that represent a broad historical perspective ranging across six centuries of maritime history. This collection is divided into six parts, each dealing with a major theme: (1) Maritime History and Historical Perspective; (2) Early Modern Europe; (3) The New Republic; (4) The World Wars; (5) Maritime History of, at, and near Newport, Rhode Island; and (6) Naval Theory.

The author is grateful to all the editors and publishers who graciously provided their permission to republish the pieces included in this volume. At the College, Pelham Boyer, similarly retired (but from the Naval War College Press), has volunteered to orchestrate these varied essays into a coherent single volume with a consistent typographical style and without what become in this format unnecessary repetitions. In addition, the author warmly thanks the Naval War College Press and its Publishing Services office for their work in creating this publication, with particular thanks to Albert Fassbender, Frank Chrupcala, Harold Ambler, Bill Miner, Brittney Penha, Danielle Smith, and Ken DeRouin.

John B. Hattendorf
Newport
June 2020

Part 1: Maritime History and the Historical Perspective

I Ubi Sumus?

Twenty-Five Years Later

The silver jubilee of the *Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* provides an opportunity to reflect once again on the state of our field and on where we are now in relation to where we were twenty-five years ago in 1991. At that point, scholars in the field were just beginning to mobilize and to react to the dire situation we maritime historians faced in North America. The establishment of the *Northern Mariner* and its subsequent growth and development have been significant steps toward remedying that situation.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, maritime history in the English-speaking world was a fractured subject, divided into small groups of scholars who tended not to talk to one another. At the time, there was much doubt as to what maritime history was about. For a time "maritime" meant everything that was not "naval." The English-language word-usage problem could be traced to Robert G. Albion's *Naval & Maritime History: An Annotated Bibliography,* which dated from 1951 and was continued through 1986.[1] This work was a major contribution to the field in its time, but the title inadvertently suggested to some that naval and maritime were two different and separate fields. This was not Albion's personal view: he had been working simultaneously in the opposite direction, to see mankind's relationships with the seas and oceans of the world as a single broad theme. In that regard, as the first occupant of an American academic chair in the field he had urged Harvard University to name his new post the Gardiner Chair of Oceanic History and Affairs when he became its first occupant in 1948. The donor of the endowed chair had specified that the endowment "was to be used for the study and teaching of the geography and history of the sea and of the ships that sail on or above it, 'particularly as they have affected or may affect the security and progress of the United States in view of the mid-oceanic and insular position of North America relative to other lands.'" This vision reflected the facts that the chair's namesake, William Howard Gardiner (1875–1952), had been president of the Navy League of the United States from 1928 to 1933 and that his interests lay with naval international affairs (as well as, perhaps, that he remained an airship enthusiast). Albion, however, clearly saw that naval affairs were but a subspecialty within a much wider field.

So, too, in 1973, the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH) was founded to try to develop that same idea. As Albion once explained, the publisher of the first edition of his bibliography had taken it upon himself to "improve" the title without consulting Albion, thereby creating the issue.[2] No doubt there were other factors involved, perhaps most notably the well-known tendency of some academics to carve out narrowly defined fields of specialty that they can operate within and defend from intrusion by others. In 1994–95, surveys of the state of the field showed very clearly that this was the case in Britain, Canada, and the United States but not in the Netherlands or elsewhere.[3]

Resolution of the lingering issue in English terminology took time. By the mid-1990s, the trends were favoring "maritime" over "oceanic" as the overarching term, but this was not fully in place until 2007 and 2008, and even now NASOH retains "oceanic" in its name as an historical curiosity. The process of resolution had begun in 1985, when a group of American academics felt that the study of maritime history was close to extinction and called for a national effort to revitalize and coordinate new efforts and new approaches to the field. The Council of American Maritime Museums was the first to answer that call, when it established a committee on higher education to examine the issue. In 1989, the committee reported that while museums such as Independence Seaport Museum in Philadelphia, the Mariners' Museum in Virginia, Mystic Seaport, the New Bedford Whaling Museum, the Peabody Essex Museum in Salem, the San Diego Maritime Museum, the San Francisco Maritime National Historical Park, and South Street Seaport, among many others, were actively supporting maritime history, public education in the field was disadvantaged and there was a general lack of awareness of it within the academic community. At that time, the museums had noted that there was no place in academia to send their staff members for education in either maritime or naval history. Except for an occasional course on a university campus, such as Gaddis Smith's lectures on maritime history at Yale University, the only alternative was the Frank C. Munson Institute of American Maritime Studies, which had been founded at Mystic Seaport by Albion and Edouard Stackpole in 1955 as a summer course with graduate-level credit. It has continued for more than sixty years to educate leaders in the maritime field in academia, museums, and archives.[4]

A further step was taken in 1993, when Professor Paul M. Kennedy's International Security Studies Program at Yale and the Naval War College sponsored a joint conference in New Haven to compare and contrast the states of naval and maritime history in different countries and in different languages. The proceedings of this conference were published by the Naval War College under the title *Ubi Sumus?*[5] This joint conference was followed over the next several years by two others on naval history: one looked at ways to improve approaches to that subspecialty

within maritime history;[6] another was a case study to consider naval issues over time in one specific ocean basin, here the Mediterranean.[7]

These initial efforts were complemented in 1995 by a volume of essays organized by the eminent Dutch-born Australian scholar Frank Broeze offering a critical assessment of recent historiography.[8] These efforts helped move the field past its perceived antiquarian pursuits. Since then, leaders in the field have been seeking to connect better with the broader academic historical profession in terms of approaches and arguments. Beyond the dichotomy that existed in the English-speaking world between "maritime" and "naval," there were additional subdivisions of subfields. Most notable on the naval side were the focus on some single national navy to the exclusion of others and a division between those who studied naval *operations* and those who looked at naval *administration*. On a personal note, when I first took up the E. J. King chair of maritime history at the Naval War College in 1984, one person told me that the word "maritime" in the title was intended only to extend the position's scope from the history of the U.S. Navy to that of the Marine Corps as well. Among others working in the field, Frank Broeze was certainly correct when as early as 1989 he had called for reconceptualization of the subject in a much broader way that would do away with such narrow dichotomies and bringing maritime history into the mainstream of general historical studies.[9] As Broeze wrote in his 1995 compilation, "The first step must be to agree that its purpose is the study of all aspects of the interaction between mankind and the sea. This specifically includes naval history, although that in itself remains a legitimate specialization, just as there are other such specializations, such as maritime economic history, maritime social and cultural history, and the history of maritime leisure and sporting pursuits."[10]

It is emblematic of the recentness of this transition that the American Historical Association recognized maritime history only in 2008 in its taxonomy of specializations that members may use to identify their interests. In choosing the word "maritime" to identify specialists in the field, the association explicitly recognized the term as the overarching description for a field that encompasses subspecialties that range from naval to economic, exploration and social history to nautical science, and technology to art and literature. Significantly, the twenty-second Congress of the Comité International des Sciences Historiques / International Committee of Historical Sciences included, for the first time, a section on maritime history in its main program, when it met in Jinan, China, in August 2015. In previous congresses, maritime history had been dealt with in special sessions sponsored by affiliated organizations. The congress at Jinan had a roundtable discussion entitled "Closing the Blue Hole" that discussed the challenges of international maritime historical research as a discipline, given observed disconnect between historical sciences at large and the small group of maritime historians interested in the marine realm.

The discussion was organized by Ingo Heidbrink, who gave the main paper; Lewis Fischer, Fei Sheng, Malcolm Tull, and Stig Tenold provided responses. The whole set of contributions will be published in a forthcoming issue [vol. 29, no. 2 (May 2017), pp. 333–64] of the *International Journal of Maritime History*.

The modern field of maritime history includes some areas of narrower specialization that have long histories of their own. The oldest subject area within the English-language scholarly tradition of maritime history is exploration at sea, a topic that looks back even before the works of Richard Hakluyt and the great compilations of early voyage accounts that he made during the Elizabethan age, particularly *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (1598–1600). The late-nineteenth-century Regius Professor of History at Oxford University James Anthony Froude called this work "The prose epic of the English nation."[11] The history of nautical science, navigation, and cartography grew out of efforts to elucidate the history of the early voyages of exploration and to chart the historical path toward modern approaches to navigation. The second-oldest is maritime economic history, which (in English) may be said to trace its interests to the establishment of the chartered trading companies, the rise of the first British empire, and fishing rivalries; the earliest investigations were such works as Hakluyt's manuscript "Discourse of Western Planting" (1584), Tobias Gentleman's *England's Way to Win Wealth, and to Employ Ships and Mariners* (1614), and Thomas Mun's *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade* (1664). The third-oldest subdiscipline in the English-language tradition is naval history, which originated in Great Britain with Josiah Burchett's *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea* (1720).[12]

Over time, the key traditional themes for maritime history developed along those three lines, as separate and isolated aspects: the history of maritime exploration, of naval warfare, and of economic affairs, the latter including shipbuilding, overseas trade, and commercial fishing. In these areas, North American scholars such as Albion, William Bell Clark, Gerald Graham, Clarence H. Haring, John G. B. Hutchins, John H. Kemble, Benjamin W. Labaree, Arthur Marder, Samuel Eliot Morison, J. H. Parry, Donald M. Schurman, and Lawrence C. Wroth published classic works in the field. Traditional maritime history had little to say about social and cultural matters, which appeared mainly in biographies of leading figures in industry, exploration, and naval affairs, predominantly naval commanders. The emphasis on a national perspective on naval warfare and on isolated aspects of economic history contributed to maritime history's marginalization in academia during the mid-twentieth century as the broader historical discipline turned during the 1960s and 1970s toward other broader approaches in social and cultural history. The subject remained popular in the public history sphere at museums and important in the context of professional education for the merchant marine, Navy,

and Coast Guard, but for decades maritime scholarship failed to follow these and other shifts in academia.[13]

MARITIME HISTORY TODAY

More recent initiatives have sought to move beyond these traditional approaches, particularly the limitations of national perspectives, and identify maritime history as a broad, interdisciplinary theme in global history. In the process "maritime history" has come to be recognized as an overarching term embracing a broad-ranging analytical understanding of mankind's multiple relationships with the oceans, seas, and waterways of the world. Put another way, maritime history is a multidimensional humanistic study of human activities, experiences, interactions, and reactions with the vast water-covered regions of our globe. A student who pursues maritime history may approach it from a variety of vantage points, including science and technology, industry, economics, trade and business, art, literature, military and naval affairs, and international relations, as well as comparative studies in imperial and colonial affairs, communications and transportation, intercultural relations and exchange, law, institutional and organizational development, and the exploitation and conservation of natural maritime resources. An additional set of issues includes social relations and labor, sports, and recreation.

In virtually all of these areas, one can investigate both relationships at sea and between sea and land as well. What unites the field across this range of interrelated vantage points is engagement with similar, complementary and comparative experiences, social relations, and the changing uses of science and technology. Under the overarching label of maritime history, each of these subspecialties is closely related to a specific range of academic approaches. The maritime economic historian has fundamental ties to the academic fields of economic and business history; the student of the history of maritime technology cannot work without ties to engineering and naval architecture; the historian of naval operations has connections to the diplomatic, military, and international history fields; the historian of navigation draws on the history of science and technology; the student of maritime art or maritime literature has connections to the wider fields of art history or literature; the historian of exploration has ties to the history of imperial expansion and global interaction; the maritime environmental historian depends on connections to the natural sciences. These connections to already established academic disciplines and specialized fields of interest help to define each particular subspecialty, but the subspecialties are also connected to one another, having the maritime element in common. It is this maritime element, with its cross connections and relations across the various subspecialties, that extends, revealingly and importantly, to broad aspects of national and international events ashore.

In the area of European naval history, two scholars in particular have produced important studies that provide models for future work in naval history: N. A. M.

Rodger of Oxford University has completed two of the three volumes in his magisterial naval history of Britain [the third, *The Price of Victory,* is projected], while the late Jan Glete of Stockholm University published several important comparative studies that examine the relationships of navies to the state-building process in early modern Europe. Much of the "new maritime history" has focused on social and cultural history. Work by Margaret Creighton, Cheryl Fury, Paul Gilje, Jesse Lemisch, Christopher Magra, Lisa Norling, Marcus Rediker, Billy G. Smith, and Daniel Vickers have all helped to energize the field. Among them, Vickers, Creighton, and Norling have specifically pointed out the differences between old and new approaches. The renewed emphasis on people, rather than ships or battles, has connected life at sea, with its interrelationships, to life on land.[14] The new Atlantic and global approaches to the past have also helped to reenergize maritime history, most particularly through the studies of the Atlantic world by Bernard Bailyn, David Armitage, and Jack P. Greene. The new Atlantic and global histories focus on transoceanic connections and comparisons that emerged over time as a result of the movement of peoples, goods, and ideas—movements, involving oceans, ships, and sailors, that are central to this integrative process across the globe. Scholars such as Magra, Rediker, Daniel Finamore, Michael J. Jarvis, and Peter Linebaugh have contributed to the further development of this approach. In 2010 and 2011, *The Mariner's Mirror,* Research in Maritime History, and the *International Journal of Maritime History* published the perspectives on developments in the field of such leading scholars as Lewis R. Fischer, Maria Fusario, Alan James, Roger Knight, Andrew Lambert, and Amélia Polónia.[15]

ORGANIZATIONS AND JOURNALS

Researchers and academics in many countries having strong maritime elements in their national experiences have the benefit of long-established scholarly societies that publish peer-reviewed journals in the field. The most widely known such societies are the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Zeegeschiedenis in the Netherlands, which publishes *Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis;*[16] the Sjöhistoriska Samfundet in Sweden, which issues *Forum Navale;*[17] and the Société Française d'Histoire Maritime in France, which publishes the *Chronique d'Histoire Maritime* three times a year and the *Revue d'histoire maritime* annually.[18] In addition, a number of national maritime museums that sponsor active research programs produce peer-reviewed academic yearbooks that contribute substantially to scholarly discussion. Particularly well known among these yearbooks are the *Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv,* published by the Deutsches Schifffahrtsmuseum, a German national museum and federal research center, and the *Årbok,* of the Norsk Maritimt Museum in Oslo;[19] also, there are numerous other yearbooks published by more specialized museums.

In the English-speaking world, the most prominent scholarly organizations are the century-old Society for Nautical Research in the United Kingdom, publisher of

The Mariner's Mirror, and the Australian Association for Maritime History, which issues *Great Circle*.[20] The *American Neptune,* published by the Peabody Essex Museum in Salem, Massachusetts, since 1941, was the premier journal for maritime history in North America until 2002, when its untimely demise suddenly left the field bereft of a scholarly journal. After a long period of negotiation aimed at reviving the *American Neptune* or moving it to another organization, the Canadian Nautical Research Society (CNRS) and the North American Society for Oceanic History agreed in 2006 to join forces and publish jointly *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord,* circulating it as a perquisite of membership within each organization.[21]

While most of the journals mentioned above have begun to widen their perspectives beyond their traditional national outlooks, some more recently established organizations and journals have taken global perspectives nearly from the outset. The lead here was taken by the International Maritime Economic History Association, with its *International Journal of Maritime History,* established in 1989, and its monograph series, Research in Maritime History.[22] Initially, the *International Journal of Maritime History* focused on the subfield of its sponsors, economic history, but over the span of a single generation of editors and readers it broadened to the entire range of maritime history; in 2016, the organization changed its name to International Maritime History Association. With this change of scope, the journal moved its base of operations at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, where the valuable Maritime History Archive is located, to the Blaydes Maritime Centre at the University of Hull, in England.[23]

More recently, e-journals have emerged founded on wider perspectives. These include the *Journal for Maritime Research,* published by the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, now also in hard-copy format;[24] *Coriolis: Interdisciplinary Journal of Maritime Studies,* produced online by Mystic Seaport Museum;[25] and another e-journal for one of the subspecialties, the *International Journal of Naval History: A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship*.[26] Among maritime history journals, the European Science Foundation's European Reference List for the Humanities has recognized both the *International Journal of Maritime History* and *The Mariner's Mirror* as "Class One" scholarly journals, its highest level.

While there is a relatively wide range of venues for article-length research, it is much harder to find publishers in the United States for book-length monographs. Until this year, the University Press of Florida was the leading publisher in the field, with its fine series "New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology," edited by James C. Bradford and Gene A. Smith; also, a series of NASOH handbooks that could be used for teaching maritime history was planned. However, the NASOH series did not materialize; worse, early in 2011 the University Press of Florida abruptly canceled its series, and no other publisher revived it. The Naval Institute Press has now taken its place for scholarly works on naval affairs in

the United States, while the Boydell Press has become the leading publisher in the United Kingdom for maritime history.[27]

BROAD PERSPECTIVES ON THE FIELD

The publication of *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History* in 2007 with four hundred contributors from fifty different countries marked the appearance of the first attempt to organize a global academic reference work for the field. As reviewers pointed out, its strengths and weaknesses reflected the state of the field at the time of publication.

A few years later, in the June 2010 issue of the *International Journal of Maritime History* appeared several important, reflective, wide-ranging articles. Chief among them were David M. Williams's "Humankind and the Sea: The Changing Relationship since the Mid-Eighteenth Century" and Lincoln Paine's "Beyond the Dead White Whales: Literature of the Sea and Maritime History." Both reflect the new beginnings of the growing number of perspectives on the subject, with Williams showing the gradual shift from an emphasis on economic issues to wider social issues as the relationship with the sea became a global one, and recently environmental and ecological issues, during the last half century. At the same time, Paine argued for the need to go beyond the usual list of anglophone writers. As he pointed out, the purpose of putting to sea is to establish wider connections; the parochial canon of Anglo-American literature has failed to do this across either space or time.

Lincoln Paine's magnificent and beautifully written overview of this complicated field, *The Sea and Civilization: A Maritime History of the World,* was the first attempt of a single author to range over the full history of global maritime history.[28] His survey extended from ancient times onward, using modern perspectives that include a wide range of insights from different historical disciplines including underwater archaeology.

In France, a major research project, which the Océanides Association has been working on since 2011, will produce in both French and English in early 2017 [issued by Boydell, 2017] its huge four-volume survey entitled *The Sea in History*.[29] Created under the leadership of its editor in chief, Christian Buchet of the Catholic University of Paris, it includes the work of some three hundred contributors from five continents, including North Americans, who present the topic chronologically and thematically. The volume *The Ancient World* is edited by Philip de Souza and Pascal Arnaud, *The Medieval World* by Michel Balard, *The Early Modern World* by Buchet and Gérard Le Bouëdec, and *The Modern World* by N. A. M. Rodger. In each volume, the contributors assess to what degree the sea has been important in history, taking up the topic in a total of some 250 essays that, attuned to their respective broad periods, examine economic development; warfare; the building of cities, empires, and nations; social aspects of sailors and maritime communities;

and nearly every other aspect conceivable. These volumes promise to be a huge contribution, of lasting quality, to the field.

THE STATE OF MARITIME HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES

In all subspecialties of maritime history, one would expect transnational and multidisciplinary approaches to understanding the past to open up avenues for research into the ways in which mankind's relationship with the sea has had an impact on human history, but this has not always been the case. The American maritime experience is a complex one, with its diversity of coastlines ranging from the Great Lakes, Atlantic, Pacific, Caribbean, to the Arctic. Some years ago at a NASOH conference Ingo Heidbrink, professor of maritime history at Old Dominion University and secretary-general of the International Commission for Maritime History (since 2016 amalgamated with the International Maritime Economic History Association into the International Maritime History Association), pointed out that the current state of maritime historical research in the United States shows a number of similarities with situations in other nations but also some important differences.

Most notable of the latter is the relatively low level of international perspective in the work of American scholars. While many of the more active national commissions of maritime history are regularly represented at the major international conferences on maritime history—for example, the conferences organized by the International Maritime Economic History Association (IMEHA), the North Atlantic Fisheries History Association (NAFHA), or the International Commission for Maritime History (ICMH)—only a very small number of United States–based maritime historians have been represented at these meetings during the last decade. In particular, younger maritime historians based in the United States have rarely participated in these international conferences. An explanation for this might simply be that maritime history in the United States deals with such a large array of domestic topics that many colleagues do not feel the need to take on the burden of international comparative historical analysis. Yet, as Heidbrink suggested, although there are more maritime historians in the United States than in any other country, they appear to other historians around the globe to have become more of an obstacle to than a catalyst for international cooperation. This difference between maritime history as practiced outside the United States and that within has also meant that many leading American maritime historians are, to a certain degree, strangers to their international counterparts.

In contrast, an important similarity between American and foreign maritime historians is their tendency to identify with their subspecialties rather than with the broader field of maritime history. While a significant number see themselves as maritime historians, many more scholars engaged in maritime history–related research do not yet use the term "maritime history" to describe their research areas. For example, colleagues dealing with the history of fisheries tend to avoid it,

in favor of such terms as "fisheries history" or "maritime environmental history." Some naval historians do the same, as do maritime economic historians and others. Of course, these terms are more precise than "maritime history" and are more compatible with the needs of the academic hierarchy, which by and large does not yet acknowledge the field of maritime history. While this predilection is understandable, at the same time it supports the tendency to compartmentalize an already small field into interest groups so narrow that the larger maritime picture is easily lost. Historians risk overlooking the broad interconnections and broader perceptions that other disciplines are bringing to the maritime field.

In the United States, while there has long been a widespread interest in maritime history in the museum and archival fields, the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) has been concerned about the lack of teachers for maritime historical studies in American universities, particularly so between 1982 and 2001, when the Gardiner Professorship in Oceanic History and Affairs at Harvard was in abeyance. Since 1992, the NEH has sponsored five summer institutes in maritime history for college and university teachers, to promote undergraduate teaching in this area. Over this quarter-century, two summer institutes on maritime history were held at the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University;[30] five more were offered at the Frank C. Munson Institute of American Maritime Studies at Mystic Seaport.[31] Continuing NEH support in this effort has been highly significant for the field of maritime history.

In another initiative, this one supported by the National Maritime Historical Society, Joshua M. Smith has produced a two-volume paperback set entitled *Voyages: Documents in American Maritime History,* which he designed for use in teaching undergraduate courses.[32] The subject is not yet widely taught, but thanks to the initiatives of the NEH individual scholars and teachers of it are appearing more frequently on campuses across the country. Complementing the NEH effort is, as already mentioned, the distinguished summer graduate-level program held annually at the Munson Institute. In addition, East Carolina University and Texas A&M have well-established programs in maritime history and underwater archaeology. The University of Connecticut–Avery Point, the Sea Education Association's Sea Semester program, the University of Washington, and other academic institutions are developing maritime environmental history programs. The Great Lakes Center for Maritime Studies, established in 1997, is located at Western Michigan University.

With the arrival at Old Dominion University of Ingo Heidbrink from Germany, there is strong hope for further development in archives, museums, and libraries throughout the Chesapeake Bay region. Significantly, Heidbrink also brought with him the secretariat of what has now become the International Maritime History Association. This, along with NASOH's role within the International Commission for Maritime History and its successor, should be of major assistance to American

scholars in connecting with the wider world of international scholarship in the field of maritime history.

Forthcoming conferences of NASOH and CNRS as well as others around the globe within the next few years will provide ideal opportunities for American maritime historians to set their research within broader analytical and international perspectives. Currently, the largest and most diverse of the events are the quadrennial International Maritime History Association conference, the next of which will take place in 2020 [2022] in Portugal; and the biennial McMullen Naval History Symposium at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, of which the most recent took place on 19–20 September 2019 [23–24 September 2021].

It takes time for new approaches to develop in any academic field, but a transition in approach and gradual intellectual broadening of maritime history are clearly in progress in the United States, Canada, and around the world. While North Americans, by and large, appear at the moment to be somewhat behind many of their international colleagues in these academic developments, there is clear evidence of improvement. The basic trends taking place plainly show that scholars within the various subspecialties of maritime history, as well as those who have previously confined themselves to a solely national approach to maritime history, are clearly beginning to widen their intellectual perspectives, use a wider range of languages and archives in their work, and consider the fuller implications of their research.

NOTES This article combines, updates, and extends two previous articles: "Maritime History Today," *Perspectives on History* 50, no. 2 (February 2012), pp. 34–36, and "Forum [on the first 25 years of the *International Journal of Maritime History*]: Naval History," *International Journal of Maritime History* 25, no. 1 (February 2014), pp. 104–109. It was originally published in the *Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 27 (January 2017), pp. 1–13, and appears by courtesy of its editor and the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

1 Robert G. Albion, *Naval & Maritime History: An Annotated Bibliography,* 4th ed., rev. and exp. (Mystic, CT, 1972); Benjamin W. Labaree, *A Supplement (1971–1986) to Robert G. Albion's* Naval & Maritime History: An Annotated Bibliography, Fourth Edition (Mystic, CT, 1988).

2 "In Memoriam: William Howard Gardiner, President of Navy League, 1928–1933," *Now Hear This: Newsletter of the Navy League of the United States* 3, no. 5 (June 1952), p. 1. For further information on Gardiner, see papers of William Howard Gardiner, MS Am 2199, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

3 Note, in particular, N. A. M. Rodger, "Britain," where the issue is directly addressed, and the essays that implicitly reflect it: Lewis R. Fischer and Gerald E. Panting, "Maritime History in Canada: The Social and Economic Dimensions"; Mark Milner,

"The Historiography of the Canadian Navy: The State of the Art"; Benjamin W. Labaree, "The State of American Maritime History in the 1990s"; and Kenneth J. Hagan and Mark R. Shulman, "Mahan plus One Hundred: The Current State of American Naval History"; all in Ubi Sumus? *The State of Naval and Maritime History,* ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1994), pp. 41–57, 59–77, 79–92, 363–78, 379–415. For the Netherlands, Jaap R. Bruijn, "The Netherlands," in Hattendorf, Ubi Sumus?, pp. 227–43. Generally, Frank Broeze, ed., *Maritime History at the Crossroads: A Critical Review of Recent Historiography,* Research in Maritime History, no. 9 (St. John's, NL: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1995).

4 Benjamin W. Labaree, "The Frank C. Munson Institute of American Maritime Studies," *American Neptune* 45 (1985), pp. 41–45.

5 Hattendorf, Ubi Sumus?

6 John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Doing Naval History: Essays toward Improvement* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995).

7 John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present, and Future* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

8 Broeze, *Maritime History at the Crossroads*.

9 Frank Broeze, "From the Periphery to the Mainstream: The Challenge of Australia's Maritime History," *Great Circle* 11 (1989), pp. 1–13.

10 Broeze, introduction to *Maritime History at the Crossroads,* p. xix.

11 J. A. Froude, "England's Forgotten Worthies," *Westminster Review* (July 1852), repr. *Short Studies on Great Subjects* (London, 1867), vol. 1.

12 This and the following paragraphs are a restatement and summation of the author's introduction as editor in chief to *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History* (Oxford, U.K., and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), pp. xvii–xix.

13 A forum on the current state of naval history appears in Andrew Lambert, John Beeler, Barry Strauss, and John B. Hattendorf, "The Neglected Field of Naval History? A Forum," *Historically Speaking* 11, no. 4 (September 2010), pp. 9–19.

14 Daniel Vickers, "Beyond Jack Tar," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd ser., 50, no. 2 (April 1993), pp. 418–24; Margaret Creighton and Lisa Norling, *Iron Men, Wooden Women: Gender and Seafaring in the Atlantic World, 1700–1920* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1996), pp. vi–xi.

15 See, in particular, Maria Fusario and Amélia Polónia, eds., *Maritime History as Global History,* Research in Maritime History, no. 43 (St. John's, NL, 2010); and Lewis R. Fischer, "Are We in Danger of Being Left with Our Journals and Not Much Else? The Future of Maritime History," *Mariner's Mirror* 97, no. 1 (2011), pp. 366–81. For naval history, see Alan James, "Raising the Profile of Naval History"; Andrew Lambert, "The Construction of Naval History, 1815–1914"; and Roger Knight, "Changing the Agenda: The New Naval History of the British Sailing Navy"; all *Mariner's Mirror* 97, no. 1 (2011), pp. 193–242.

16 See *Nederlandse Vereniging voor Zeegeschiedenis,* www.zeegeschiedenis.nl/.

17 See *Sjöhistoriska Samfundet,* www.sjohistoriska samfundet.se/.

18 See *Société Française d'Histoire Maritime,* www .sfhm.asso.fr/.

19 See *Norsk Maritimt Museum,* www.marmuseum .no/en. Also *Deutsches Schifffahrtsmuseum,* www.dsm .museum/.

20 See *The Society for Nautical Research,* www.snr.org .uk/, and *The Australian Association for Maritime History, Inc.,* www.aamh.asn.au/.

21 See *Canadian Nautical Research Society / Societé canadienne pour la recherche nautique* [*SCRN*], www.cnrs-scrn.org/, and "*The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord*," *SCRN,* www.cnrs-scrn.org/ northern_mariner/index.html.

22 See *International Maritime History Association,* imha.info.

23 See *Memorial University of Newfoundland,* www .mun.ca/, and *University of Hull Blaydes Maritime Centre,* www.hull.ac.uk/work-with-us/research/ groups/blaydes-maritime-centre.aspx.

24 The paper version appeared in May 2011. Both it and the electronic version are distributed or maintained by Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group, on whose website (taylorandfrancis.com/) *JMR* is now available. See also www.tandfonline .com.

25 See *Interdisciplinary Journal of Maritime Studies,* ijms.nmdl.org/, and chapter 23 of this collection.

26 See *International Journal of Naval History,* www .ijnhonline.org/.

27 See *U.S. Naval Institute: Books,* www.usni.org/press/ books, and Boydell & Brewer, boydellandbrewer .com/catalogsearch/result/index/?q=maritime &subject=1064.

28 Lincoln Paine, *The Sea and Civilization: A Maritime History of the World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013; paperback, New York: Vantage, 2015).

29 Christian Buchet, editor in chief, *The Sea in History,* 4 vols. (Woodbridge, Surrey, U.K., and Rochester, NY: Boydell, 2017).

30 These institutes produced two volumes on the period 1540–1815: John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Maritime History: The Age of Discovery* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1996) and *Maritime History: The Eighteenth Century and the Age of Sail* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1997).

31 The first of these produced an illustrated textbook for teaching: Benjamin Labaree et al., *America and the Sea: A Maritime History* (Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1998).

32 Joshua M. Smith, ed., *Voyages: Documents in American Maritime History,* vol. 1, *The Age of Sail, 1492–1865;* vol. 2, *The Age of Engines, 1865–Present* (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida for the National Maritime Historical Society, 2009).

II *The Maritime Book in the English-Speaking World* 1528–1850

Beyond the arena of professional seamen and dedicated specialists, the maritime book is often forgotten or simply regarded with indifference in the English-speaking world. But the printing press has played a vital role in history. This observation, banal and obvious for most aspects of European history, does not apply so easily to the maritime realm. Indeed, ships do not have, a priori, places in intellectual discourse; sailors were often relegated to so-called illiterate social classes, comprising all who were not very interested in reading. Thus arise the problems of definition of "the maritime book" and consequently of its readership. The answers to these questions are complex.[1]

To begin with, the English were not alone in advancing the maritime sciences. The French too contributed to the evolution of ideas and techniques despite the difficulties they encountered.[2] They competed strongly with the Royal Society of London, creating ambiguities for the Royal Navy and later the navy of the new American republic. In 1833, American officers tried, with the Naval Lyceum, to achieve objectives similar to those of the Académie de Marine; the result amounted to a few modest libraries in arsenals and a short-lived periodical. In fact, it is not in the English-speaking world that we will find the next "Académie" but in Scandinavia—in Sweden, which in 1771 founded the Kungliga Örlogsmannasällskapet, or Royal Society of Naval Sciences, for an identical purpose.[3]

Books by great scientists on mathematics and astronomy, geography, oceanography, and other physical sciences came to be applied on the world's oceans. Few practical mariners were equipped to use or even understand them, but these books were of great intellectual importance and often reflected the practical work that seamen were doing. Conversely, completing a circle, scientific work had direct or indirect consequences for practice at sea.

The classic works of Claudius Ptolemy from the second century AD are key sources for understanding geography and astronomy. The oldest work with an English connection attempting to bring Ptolemy to contemporary practitioners dates to the thirteenth century, when an Oxford-educated Englishman working at the University of Paris, John of Holywood (often referred to by the Latin form of

his name, Johannes de Sacro Bosco), summarized contemporary understanding of astronomy as formulated by Ptolemy. Using Gerard of Cremona's twelfth-century Latin translation of Ptolemy's *Almagest,* Holywood created an easily understandable and influential astronomy textbook that circulated in manuscript copies and in more than forty printed Latin editions between 1472 and 1647. Before the work of Copernicus became dominant, virtually all the navigation manuals of the sixteenth century used some version of Holywood's summary to explain the fundamentals of nautical astronomy to seamen.

The first relevant work written and published in England was one that attempted to collect the Renaissance understandings of the globe: William Cuningham's 1559 *The cosmographical glass, conteinyng the pleasant principles of cosmographie, geographie, hydrographie, or navigation*.[4] Designed to attract educated gentlemen, Cuningham's book is notable for its early use of italic type and for its illustrations. On the basis of such work in this broad field, a few scientists applied their efforts directly to the maritime world. A key example was Edward Wright, a Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, whose tiny 1599 book, *Certaine errors in navigation,* had enormous impact; it provided the mathematical tables by which Gerardus Mercator's earlier map projection could be applied to create practical and accurate sea charts.

Another Englishman who brought broad intellectual ideas into practice was William Borough; his *A discours of the variation of the cumpas* (1581) described the mathematical operations needed to correct a ship's compass course for the effect of the earth's magnetic field. Others contributed volumes on nautical instruments, among them John Blagrave, whose 1585 *The mathematical jewel* proposed an improved astrolabe, and later John Collins, author of *The description and uses of a general quadrant,* 1658.

The first important work that one can readily recognize as an English maritime book had been printed in 1528 in London "at ye costs & charges of R. Bankes" for Robert Copland. This was Copland's translation of Pierre Garcie's *The rutter of the sea . . . with the laws of the isle of Auleron,* a practical manual of sailing directions for traffic between England and Bordeaux. It was, however, designed for use by a literate seaman, one who needed a working knowledge of traditional maritime commercial law, the "laws of Oléron." Garcie's original, printed at Rouen in 1502, had been the first work of its kind to appear in northwestern Europe, though even it was not original. Called a "rutter"—a weak attempt to render into English the French *routier,* a route description—it drew on the first printed sailing directions, published in Venice in 1490. That work, in turn, had been a *portolano,* as a compilation of recommended courses and information on ports, tides, and currents was then known in the Mediterranean world (in classical times, a *periplus*).

No more practical navigation manual was published in English, however, until Richard Eden's 1561 translation of Martín Cortés's *The arte of navigation,* originally published in Spanish at Seville in 1551 under the title *Breve compendio de la sphera y de la arte de navegar.* John Davis's *The Seamans Secrets,* printed in 1595, was the first manual of navigational instruction by a practicing English seaman. A wide variety of instructional manuals appeared over the next century and a half, in numerous editions, the text changing little over many printings. Cheap and intended to be used and discarded, these have been largely ignored by librarians and book collectors; few examples have survived.

English books on building and outfitting ships begin to appear in 1602, first Richard More's *The carpenter's rule,* then Edward Hayward's *Sizes and lengths of riggings* (1656), Edmund Bushnell's *The Compleat Ship-wright* (1664), and William Sutherland's *Britain's glory, or shipbuilding unveiled* (1717). Typical were John Tapp's *The Seamans Kalendar,* which first appeared in 1602 and was still in print as late as 1696, after thirty-seven known printings. Similarly, Richard Norwood's *The seaman's practice,* printed thirty times between 1637 and 1732, was still being advertised for sale in 1776. Nathaniel Colson's *The Mariner's New Calendar* first appeared in 1676 and had eighty known impressions before it went out of print sometime after 1785.

These practical books of navigation reflected a change that had occurred among British mariners by the late seventeenth century and slowly changed the stereotype of sailors as illiterates. Three groups of professional seamen now emerged who received formal instruction and faced examinations in navigation to advance. The first comprised pupils at the Royal Mathematical School, associated with Christ's Hospital, who hoped to become certified as masters (warrant officers specializing in navigation) in the Royal Navy. Second were experienced masters who wanted to improve their pay by gaining qualification to handle larger vessels. Naval midshipmen who wanted to qualify for promotion to lieutenant made up the third group. Students in these categories balanced their learning with the handling of instruments, performance of geometric calculations, and use of numerical tables (such as ephemerides, mentioned below). Textbooks, practical hands-on training, and classroom instruction thus combined to bring mathematical techniques into the art of navigation.[5]

Other English marine works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries include dictionaries, reference works, repeatedly published practical manuals that showed little change in content over the years, and a host of others. The deeper one goes into maritime affairs, the clearer it becomes that the world at sea is but a transposed image of human life ashore in its many dimensions, ranging from law, administration, war, crime, punishment, and health to art and even prayer. English maritime books include the *Book of Common Prayer,* which since 1662 has included

supplemental "Forms of prayer to be used at sea," inspired by the Commonwealth's innovative 1645 volume *A Supply of Prayer for the Ships of This Kingdom*.

In the proliferation of maritime books printed at that time, there is a difference in quality between the English and French. Such a conclusion in comparative maritime studies is difficult to reach, let alone prove. Nevertheless, it seems inescapable that French maritime publishing by the middle of the eighteenth century was of remarkable quality and scientific worth, notably in broadcasting cutting-edge research. This is particularly evident in maritime cartography, shipbuilding, and naval tactics. Father Paul Hoste's well-known *L'Art des Armées Navales,* published at the end of the seventeenth century, was the first important modern book on naval tactics.[6] In English, we find nothing before *Naval Evolutions,* by Christopher O'Bryen (1762), and even that is in important part just a selection of translations from Hoste.[7] The second important English book too was of French origin, an anonymous translation (possibly attributable to a brother of O'Bryen) of a book published the year before by Sébastien-François Bigot, vicomte de Morogues.[8] The first original English book in the same field was the work of a Scot, John Clerk of Eldin.[9]

In the English-speaking world, sailing directions and sea atlases for use in practical navigation soon grew into one of the largest categories of maritime books. Shortly after Garcie's rutter appeared, Richard Eden began to translate accounts of the Spanish and Portuguese voyages. First, in 1553, came his extracts from Sebastian Münster's *Cosmographia,* issued by Eden as *A treatyse of the newe India;* it was followed in 1555 by Peter Martyr d'Anghiera's *Decades of the newe worlde.* When these books originally appeared they constituted the only reliable information in English, serviceable as practical sailing directions for seamen on the early voyages of exploration. Peter Martyr's work was taken to sea as the only available guide to the new Spanish and Portuguese lands.

Eventually, descriptive accounts of specific voyages formed a subgenre, one that was widely read throughout the English-speaking world. That was largely thanks to Richard Hakluyt's *Divers voyages* of 1582 and his two collections of *The principal navigations . . . of the English nation* (1589 and 1598–1600). On Hakluyt's death, the Rev. Samuel Purchas acquired Hakluyt's unpublished papers and issued them in his own series, culminating in 1625 with his four-volume *Purchas his pilgrimes.* Other multivolume compilations, such as *A collection of voyages,* first produced by the publishers Awnsham and John Churchill in 1704, and John Harris's *Navigantium atque itinerantium bibliotheca* in 1705, were brought out in expanded editions over the next half century. Such works met the growing interest among merchants, who sought practical information about overseas trading opportunities, and the reading public, which had developed a taste for exotic travel literature.

The voyage narrative remained popular through the first half of the eighteenth century. Accounts by captains William Dampier, Woodes Rogers, Edward Cooke, and George Shelvocke were widely read, but the tradition reached a height of popularity in 1748, with the publication by Adm. George Anson, first Baron Anson, of *A Voyage Round the World.* The book bore Lord Anson's name as the author, but in fact this famous seaman had employed assistants to bring his narrative of the voyage and his description of exotic lands up to the literary standards the audience now demanded.[10]

Other writers began to write such narrative and descriptive "accounts" to fictional voyages. The most famous such books were Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe,* first published in 1719, and Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels,* 1726. The term "maritime book" was acquiring yet another dimension as great novelists began to use nautical material. Tobias Smollett's *The adventures of Roderick Random* (1748) became the first of the subgenre of the "naval novel," in which social and physical descriptions of life and activity in the Royal Navy provide context.

In maritime cartography, the English maritime atlases were of neither the same quality nor importance as the *Neptune François* (1693). Revised in 1753 by Jacques Nicolas Bellin, it and Bellin's other works (*L'Hydrographie Françoise,* 1756, and *Le Petit Atlas Maritime,* 1764) had no competitors in English before 1777 and the publication of *The Atlantic Neptune.* The most popular English atlas of that time was *The English Pilot,* published in six volumes by John Seller. Unreflective of advanced research from the outset—it merely extended the Dutch trends of the seventeenth century—it was to be republished without substantial revision a hundred times over more than a century.[11]

The *English Pilot* case was typical; in the world of English shipping, the most influential books were the cheap ones with large sales. For example, William Sutherland's *Britain's glory, or shipbuilding unveiled,* a costly, large-format book on shipbuilding, managed several editions between 1717 and 1740, but his cheap and small *Ship-builder's assistant* of 1711 became one of the most popular maritime books in England, circulating in different editions until 1794.

The situation is analogous to the anonymous and entirely derivative *Marine Architecture* of 1739. Although it merely collected three mid-seventeenth-century pamphlets—*The Boat Swain's Art* by Henry Bond (1642), *The Compleat Ship-wright* by Edmund Bushnell, and *The Compleat Modellist* by Thomas Miller, the latter two dating back to 1664—it was published three times, and was still available during the American Revolutionary War in spite of its old and unoriginal designs.[12]

In the field of shipbuilding, the books of William Sutherland were the best in England until Mungo Murray published a work incorporating new conceptions of Henri Louis Duhamel du Monceau, advances taken into account also by William Falconer in his marine dictionary.[13] The same pattern can be seen in the

dissemination to England of the innovations of the Swedish shipbuilder Fredrik af Chapman published in Stockholm in 1768.[14] No English version of af Chapman appeared until after one did in French—in fact, not for another forty years. (The problem was not af Chapman's "art," or graphics, which were original creations that could be directly reproduced, but translating the Swedish text, which was complex and costly.)

By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, maritime publishing in England was concentrated in the main subject areas of shipbuilding, maneuvering, manning, and navigation, these four subdivided into twenty-four subdomains. For the period to 1800 we have precise results—a bibliography of 3,809 published books, most concerning navigation. Study of a second period, 1801–1850, is in its early stages; we are expecting a lot of research. In the middle and late eighteenth century, as before, French and English books were not of the same quality. In England, the publishers were concentrated in London and combined the activities of printing and bookselling, offering navigation manuals, sea charts, and even nautical instruction. Several competing publishing houses, such as Mount & Page, David Steel, and Imray, Laurie & Norie, dominated the market over several decades.

We now have historical and bibliographical studies on these businesses.[15] Originally, printing houses had been run by the families who created them, but over the decades, intermarriage among these families had produced an alignment of commercial and financial interests. For instance, in 1676 Richard Mount purchased from William Fisher the printing shop where he had been apprenticed, married Fisher's daughter, and inherited his authors, including Nathaniel Colson.[16] Seventy percent of the books his firm produced (as Mount & Page) went through more than three impressions (i.e., not revised editions but unaltered galleys, handed down from generation to generation) over an average life on the market of fifty-two years. The result was stable profits for the printers at, unfortunately, the expense of new ideas.

One exception, however, was *The Nautical Almanac,* which was aimed at both seagoing and scientific readers. Published annually from 1767, it was at once a practical tool and a survey of the contemporary research, contributed by a large number of collaborators. It played a role similar to that in France of *La Connaissance des temps*.

Also by that time, the middle of the eighteenth century, mapping was undergoing a revolution. Capt. James Cook and other English navigators achieved notable results with new hydrographical methods. Publishing soon caught up, most representatively with Murdoch McKenzie's *Treatise of maritime surveying* (1774), which proposed lines of research that would be pursued into the next century.[17] Shortly after, in 1795, Great Britain created its own hydrographic service; the appearance of a large number of charts and nautical ephemerides (tables of calculated projected positions of astronomical bodies useful in navigation) ensued.[18]

The exact number of sailors in the English-speaking world who might personally have used such works (deck officers, master's mates, etc.) is not easy to estimate; for the eighteenth century the number has been put at close to 16,700 in 1774 and 18,500 in 1788, in a total of 9,375 vessels—a small percentage of all the British merchant mariners serving under their own flag.[19] In 1700 there were fifty thousand British seamen in all, 150,000 in 1800, and two hundred thousand by 1850.[20] These numbers reflect the English predominance over the seas of the world between 1750 and 1850. Nevertheless, as British ships traveled the world and established new settlements in India, Australia, and the Pacific, London remained the center of the shipping-book industry.[21] The independence of the United States created a new market, but even that depended at first on London for technical books in all fields. After the first years of the new republic, however, Americans felt the need for a publishing capacity of their own and in the maritime-book trade were quick to develop and improve new techniques.

Even then, British examples served as models, especially for maritime cartography, where the absence of reliable charts and related materials generated a need of the highest urgency. The first high-quality atlas that the English produced on North American waters was *The Atlantic Neptune,* issued in 1777 by the Admiralty and covering the Atlantic coast from Nova Scotia to Florida.[22] Two Boston cartographers, John Norman and Osgood Carleton, compiled a corrected and less expensive revision, the first maritime atlas published in the United States—*The American Pilot* (1794).

Two years later, publisher and bookseller Edmund March Blunt printed in Newburyport, Massachusetts, north of Boston, the first American-made atlas of and sailing directions for the American coastline from the Canadian border to the Mississippi delta: Capt. Lawrence Furlong's *The American Coast Pilot*.[23] Nathaniel Bowditch, supercargo of a merchant ship bound for the Philippines from Salem, Massachusetts, examined for his own entertainment the astronomical tables in the thirteenth edition of a popular English manual, John Moore's *The New Practical Navigator*.[24] Shocked to find more than a thousand errors of calculation, he published in 1799 in Newburyport the first American edition of this book, with his own corrections.[25] On his ship's next voyage, in 1801, Bowditch wrote his own manual, which he would publish the following year in the United States and England as *The New American Practical Navigator*.[26]

These two books—*New American Practical Navigator* and *American Coast Pilot*—were soon recognized in the United States as essential maritime books. They were issued commercially by printing houses until the middle of the nineteenth century, since when the U.S. government has published them. The most recent edition of *American Practical Navigator,* long known to its users as simply "Bowditch," appeared in 2019.[27] The beginning of regular publication in the United States of

such works inspired the British hydrographic service in 1829 to reprint the first list of American lighthouses, received from the United States two years before. The hydrographic service that same year inaugurated its own, large series of world sailing directions with *The West India Directory*.[28]

Other important books that appeared in the United States during the first part of the nineteenth century were those of an American naval officer, Matthew Fontaine Maury, a descendant of French Huguenots. As chief of the U.S. Naval Observatory's Depot of Charts and Instruments, then director of the observatory itself, he conducted pioneering research on winds and currents. His work in the marine sciences that resulted constitutes the most valuable published contribution of an American scientist in the nineteenth century. Maury's first noteworthy book, a guide to the maritime routes that took best advantage of wind and current, first appeared in 1850, in French nine years later.[29] Maury drew on his practical research for scientific works, of which the most important was *The Physical Geography of the Sea,* the foundational book for modern oceanography in the English-speaking world.[30]

That English-speaking world had greatly expanded by this time, owing to the extension of the British Empire and the development of the American republic, and the maritime interests of both.[31] One consequence for that time was a growing global supremacy of English as a maritime and commercial language. Nevertheless, each maritime nation develops a specific vocabulary for use at sea. Sailors, who are proud of their nautical jargons, take no pains to make them even somewhat intelligible for those who stay on land—thus the first nautical dictionary in England, in the seventeenth century.[32] In the following century, the maritime labor market became increasingly international;[33] bilingual or even multilingual maritime lexicons appeared. A dictionary of English and French naval terms was published in France by Daniel Lescallier during the American Revolutionary War.[34] Twenty years later, the Hamburg-based tea trader Johann Röding wrote a combined dictionary and nautical encyclopedia in eight languages, among them English and French.[35]

Multilingual maritime lexicons were found as well in Holland, whose sailors spoke neither French nor English.[36] Dutch, however, was one of the main maritime languages, and it was taught during the seventeenth century to foreign sailors working for the East India Company. In the following century, the proportion of such sailors in the company climbed from 25 to 50 percent. Sailors felt the need to increase their knowledge of foreign maritime terms. During the last years of the Napoleonic Wars, two French–English dictionaries were printed in Holland.[37] The same publisher reprinted the same dictionaries in 1833 while the European powers struggled with the Belgian question. Two other dictionaries appeared in the following decade.[38] In the first half of the nineteenth century, Holland, which had been lagging the advanced industrial and maritime countries in the new steamship technology, had also to catch up with maritime lexicography; six polyglot dictionaries

were published, compiled from 1837 to 1865 by a translator and English teacher from Amsterdam, K. P. ter Reehorst.[39]

For most sailors, maritime books had always been practical and technical sources read or consulted for their work at sea. Between 1750 and 1850, however, the nature of that work was transformed. The design, propulsion, and construction of ships were in fundamental transition, challenging the technical backgrounds of sailors and forcing them to change their habits. Many maritime books of this time testify to these changes.

By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries there had emerged a new type of maritime book: literary evocations of the maritime world for nonspecialist readers. This highly varied type of book included both fiction (poetry, novels) and nonfiction (travelogues, accounts of shipwrecks, and history), the sea being the common denominator.

Travel stories generally are characteristic of the English-speaking world, but during the eighteenth century they formed a genre, alternating narratives of trips with descriptions of countries and peoples. The most popular example was Cdre. George Anson's *Voyage Round the World,* the first such book written at a level that appealed to literary circles.[40] Captain Cook (mentioned earlier) followed his example, helping Dr. John Hawkesworth produce what proved the most popular title of its kind.[41] Cook gave his own name to three more very successful books. The American naval officer Charles Wilkes, who had recently led an extensive exploration of the Pacific, produced a five-volume account in 1844.[42] These books had less popular success but contained valuable information and so joined the canon of works that later mariners in the same seas carried with them on board.[43]

Another genre, a modest and relatively new one in English, was naval history. The secretary to the Admiralty (and diarist) Samuel Pepys planned to write a naval history; he never did, but his erstwhile clerk and eventual successor, Josiah Burchett, undertook the project. In 1720 Burchett published the first national naval history in the English language, the fat volume *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea.*[44] In the middle of the century, John Entick issued an expanded edition, adding coverage of the merchant navy.[45]

But the predominant mode among historians from 1793 to 1815 was description of naval battles.[46] Two competing multivolume naval histories of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars appeared in the 1820s. One was a favorable insider's view by American-born Capt. Edward Brenton of the Royal Navy, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Year MDCCLXXXIII to MDCCCXXII.*[47] Brenton's book was notable for the period in providing some broad background to historical events at sea and making extensive use of information from participants. The other was by William James, a lawyer with experience in West Indian prize courts, who presented an opposing political view. His five-volume *The Naval History of Great*

Britain from the declaration of War with France in 1793 to the accession of George IV also drew on personal information from participants and was highly regarded for its detailed descriptions of battles and extensive use of documentary sources. James's *Naval History* was reprinted a number of times.[48]

The first important American contribution to naval historiography was from James Fenimore Cooper. His study of the first decades of the U.S. Navy and the documentation he amassed for it are still useful for researchers in the field.[49] English and American naval histories stressed the heroism of their respective navies and differed sharply as to fact and interpretation with regard to the War of American Independence and the War of 1812; all were occasions for rave reviews in their own "markets." In Britain, William James was the leading critic of hyperbolic American accounts of the War of 1812 in particular.[50]

Like James, Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas was a lawyer. The son and brother of naval officers, he briefly served in the Royal Navy himself, 1812–16. In the course of his legal studies after the Napoleonic Wars he became interested in documentary research in naval history. Nicolas's *Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson* has not yet been superseded.[51] At his death in 1848, he had completed only the first two volumes of his *History of the Royal Navy, from the Earliest Times to the Wars of the French Revolution,* from the Norman Conquest in 1066 to the reign of Henry V in the early fifteenth century. Nevertheless, it represents a pioneering attempt to exploit medieval archival evidence bearing on the early history of the Royal Navy.[52]

The eighteenth century gave new meaning to the term "maritime book."[53] William Falconer, well known for his naval dictionary, was also a popular poet, describing with great lyricism a shipwreck in the Mediterranean.[54] (Falconer's work became a basis for the Romantic movement of the next century, combining neoclassical form and maritime vocabulary.) On the other side of the Atlantic, the American poet Philip Freneau wrote a series of poems about his maritime experiences during the American War of Independence through which he hoped to create a distinctly American idiom.[55]

The American writer of the time who had the greatest share in the development of maritime literature, however, was James Fenimore Cooper, already mentioned as a historian. Novels like *The Pilot, Red Rover,* and *The Wing-and-Wing* established it in America on a solid basis.[56] In England, a former naval officer, Frederick Marryat, succeeded Tobias Smollett, warmly and humorously evoking the conditions of life in the Royal Navy in his popular novels *Peter Simple* and *Mr. Midshipman Easy*.[57] The most important American novelist of the period in general, Herman Melville, made his mark with maritime books: *White-Jacket, Moby Dick,* and *Billy Budd*.[58] An evolution in approach can be seen in this maritime literature from the adventure and romance of Marryat and Cooper (though they still find favor) to the realism of

Melville. This change was already evident in what proved a socially important story of the sea, the recollections of American seaman (and later lawyer) Richard Henry Dana. In his *Two Years before the Mast* he described the harsh realities of life at sea from the sailor's viewpoint.[59]

Maritime books that appeal to the reading public and to scholars have tended to overshadow those actually used by working seamen. Most of the latter fall under the general description of practical manuals, but many have had counterparts in advanced sciences, clearly related to the work of seamen but rarely if ever used by them. An example is the practical navigation manual, in which the elements of navigational sciences were summarized in a simplified way so that sailors could be taught their trade.

In the end, this review shows that the historical evolution of maritime science had two consequences. First, the development of maritime publishing proceeded apace with the need of decision makers and others in maritime life to adapt constantly to scientific advances. To do so they relied on a profusion of technical and practical books addressed to the intellectual elite or to practicing seamen, sometimes to both.

Second, the intrusion of maritime themes in the literature produced new literary genres. It can even be said to have regenerated the English language itself, through the use authors made of the sophisticated and specialized maritime vocabulary, as well as with picturesque slang. Here was a cultural enrichment that accompanied Britain's maritime supremacy in the world and was reflected closely in the United States.

NOTES This paper has not been previously published in this form. See notes 1, 4, and 7 below.

1 This section is based on John B. Hattendorf, *"The Boundless Deep . . .": The European Conquest of the Oceans, 1450 to 1840; Catalogue of an Exhibition of Rare Books, Maps, Charts, Prints, and Manuscripts Relating to Maritime History from the John Carter Brown Library* (Providence, RI: John Carter Brown Library, 2003).

2 Jean Mascart, *La vie et les travaux du chevalier Jean-Charles de Borda (1733–1799): Épisodes de la vie scientifique au XVIII*[e] *siècle* (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2000), pp. 188–211.

3 Ernst Holmberg, *Kungl. Örlogsmannasällskapet, 1771–1921* (Karlskrona: KÖMS, 1921); Fredrik Taube et al., redaktionskommitté, *Kungliga Örlogsmannasällskapet*, *1771–1971* (Östervåla: Tofters Trykeri, 1971).

4 The following draws on an essay that appeared under the title "The Englishmen Abroad: Professor John Hattendorf Charts the Emergence of the Maritime Book from Its Earliest Origins in the 15th Century," *Antiquarian Book Review* 30, no. 3, issue 337 (April 2003), pp. 24–28.

5 Margaret E. Schotte, *Sailing School: Navigating Science and Skill, 1550–1800* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2019), pp. 93–113. See also Andrew Adams and Richard Woodman, *Light upon the Water: The History of Trinity House, 1514–2014* (London: Corporation of Trinity House, 2013), p. 66; and C. S. Knighton, *Pepys and the Navy* (Stroud, U.K.: Sutton, 2003), pp. 115–17.

6 Brian Tunstall and Nicholas Tracy, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactics, 1650–1815* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 123; Michel Dupeyre, *Tactiques et stratégies navales de la France et du Royaume-Uni de 1690 à 1815* (Paris: Economica, 1998).

7 Christopher O'Bryan, *Naval Evolutions, or a System of Sea Discipline: Extracted from the Celebrated Treatise of P. L'Hoste . . .* (London, 1762). Generally, this discussion draws on Hattendorf's "Le livre maritime dans le monde anglophone, 1750–1850," in *Le livre maritime: Édition et diffusion des connaissances maritimes (1750–1850),* ed. Annie Charon, Thierry Claerr, and François Moureau (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2005), pp. 59–68.

8 *Naval Tactics, or a treatise of evolutions and signals with cuts, lately published in France . . . by Mons. Morogues* (London, 1763).

9 John Clerk of Eldin, *An Essay on Naval Tactics.* The first part of the book was first published in Edinburgh in 1782 as *An enquiry into naval tactics* and in 1790 republished in London with the new title *An Essay on Naval Tactics.* Clerk completed the book with parts II–IV for the edition of 1797.

10 See Glyn Williams, *The Prize of All the Oceans: The Dramatic True Story of Commodore Anson's Voyage round the World and How He Seized the Spanish Treasure Galleon* (New York: Viking, 2000), "A Literary Puzzle: The Authorship of Anson's *Voyage round the World,*" pp. 237–41.

11 D. W. Waters, "The Eva G. R. Taylor Lecture: The English Pilot—English Sailing Directions and

Charts and the Rise of English Shipping, 16th to 18th Centuries," *Journal of Navigation* 42 (September 1989), pp. 317–54.

12 See Brian Lavery's introduction to the facsimile edition of the 1739 *Marine Architecture* (Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints for the John Carter Brown Library, 1993).

13 William Falconer, *A Universal dictionary of the marine . . . to which is annexed a translation of the French sea terms and phrases, collected from the works of Mess. Du Hamel, Aubin, Saverien* (London: T. Cadell, 1769; repr. seven times up to 1789; revised and enlarged by Charles Burney, 1815); Mungo Murray, *A treatise on shipbuilding and navigation . . . to which is added an English abridgement of another treatise lately published at Paris by M. Duhamel* (London, 1754); William Sutherland, *Ship-builder's assistant* (London, 1711, 1726, 1755, 1766, 1784, 1794); *Britain's glory, or shipbuilding unveiled* (London, 1717, 1722, 1725, 1726, 1729, 1740).

14 Fredrik Henrik af Chapman, *Traité de la construction des vaisseaux. . . . Traduit du suédois* (Paris, 1779).

15 Mario M. Witt, *A Bibliography of the Works Written and Published by David Steel and His Successors* (Greenwich, U.K.: Greenwich Maritime Monographs, 1991); Thomas R. Adams, *Non-cartographical Maritime Works Published by Mount and Page,* Occasional Publications of the Bibliographical Society (London, 1985); Adams, "Mount and Page: Publishers of Eighteenth Century Maritime Books," in *A Potencie of Life: Books in Society—the Clark Lectures, 1986–1987,* ed. Nicholas Baker (London: British Library, 1993); Susanna Fisher, *The Makers of the Blueback Charts: A History of Imray Laurie Norie & Wilson Ltd* (St. Ives, U.K.: Imray Laurie Norie & Wilson, 2001).

16 Successively known as Richard Mount, Mount & Page, Page & Mount, and Mount & Davidson, the firm would become Smith & Ebbs in the nineteenth century.

17 Murdoch Mackenzie, *A treatise of maritime surveying, in two parts with a prefatory essay on draughts and surveys* (London: E. & C. Dilly, 1774).

18 See G. S. Ritchie, *The Admiralty Chart: British Naval Hydrography in the Nineteenth Century—a New Edition* (Durham, U.K.: Pentland, 1995), and Vice-Admiral Sir Archibald Ritchie, *The Admiralty Hydrographic Service, 1795–1919* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967).

19 Adams, "Mount and Page."

20 Ronald Hope, *A New History of British Shipping* (London: John Murray, 1990), p. 216, fig. 2, "The Number of Merchant Seamen Serving on British Ships (UK Registry), 1550–1987."

21 For a detailed study of this subject, see S. Max Edelson, *The New Map of Empire: How Britain Imagined America before Independence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2017).

22 Stephen J. Hornsby, *Surveyors of Empire: Samuel Holland, J. W. F. Des Barres, and the Making of* The Atlantic Neptune, Carleton Library Series, no. 221 (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 2011).

23 Lawrence Furlong, *The American coast pilot: containing the courses and distance from Boston to all the principal harbours, capes and headlands included between Passamaquady and the capes of Virginia* (Newburyport, MA: Blunt & March, 1796).

24 John Hamilton Moore, *The practical navigator: being an epitome of navigation. The Thirteenth edition constructed on a new plan* (London: W. Heather, 1798).

25 John Hamilton Moore, *The practical navigator: being an epitome of navigation. First American edition from the thirteenth English edition . . .* (Newburyport, MA: E. M. Blunt, 1799).

26 Nathaniel Bowditch, *The New American Practical Navigator* ([Newburyport, MA]: E. M. Blunt, 1802). For a study of Bowditch, see Tamara Plakins Thornton, *Nathaniel Bowditch and the Power of Numbers: How a Nineteenth-Century Man of Business, Science, and the Sea Changed American Life* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2016).

27 Not printed since 2002, it now appears only in electronic format. The revised 2019 edition is available online as a downloadable PDF in two volumes at msi.nga.mil/Publications/APN.

28 Great Britain, Hydrographic Office, *The West India Directory* (London, 1829).

29 Matthew Fontaine Maury, *Notice to Mariners: Explanations and Sailing Directions to Accompany the Wind and Current Charts* (Washington, DC: C. Alexander, 1850); eight editions appeared in English up to 1859. France, Service Hydrographique, *Instructions nautiques destinées à accompagner les cartes de vents et de courants. Par M. F. Maury. Traduit par Ed. Vaneechout, lieutenant de vaisseau* (Paris, 1859), was the first of three editions in French.

30 Matthew Fontaine Maury, *Physical Geography of the Sea and Its Meteorology* (New York: Harper and Brothers, [1855]; London: Sampson Low, Son, 1855); *Géographie Physique de la Mer. Traduit par P. A. Terquem* (Paris: J. Corréard, 1858 [revised and completed in a second edition, 1861]).

31 On this subject, see Benjamin W. Labaree, William M. Fowler Jr., Edward W. Sloan, John B. Hattendorf, Jeffrey J. Safford, and Andrew W. German, *America and the Sea: A Maritime History* (Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport, 1998).

32 The first maritime dictionary published in English was John Smith's *An Accidence or Pathway to Experience. Necessary for all Young Seamen* (London, 1626), which was revised, enlarged, rearranged, and the next year reissued as *A sea grammar* (London, 1627). Sir Henry Mainwaring had written a maritime dictionary several years before but was not to publish it for another seventeen years, as *Sea-man's dictionary* (London, 1644).

33 On this subject see Paul C. van Royen, Jaap R. Buijn, and Jan Lucassen, *"Those Emblems of Hell"? European Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market, 1570–1870,* Research in Maritime History, no. 13

(St. John's, NL: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1997).

34 Daniel Lescallier, *Vocabulaire des termes de marine anglois et françois* (Paris, 1777).

35 Johann Hinrich Röding, *Allgemeines Wörterbuch der Marine* (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1793–98).

36 Elizabeth A. Molt, comp., "No Double-Dutch at Sea: An Annotated Bibliography of English-Dutch Maritime Manuals and Dictionaries Printed in the Netherlands c. 1800–1940" (thesis in English language and culture, Univ. of Leiden, July 2002).

37 H. W. Lantsheer, *Woordenboek der Fransche Zeetermen, bijeenverzameld en in Hollandsche en gedeeltelijk in Englische Kunstwoorden overgebragt . . .* (Amsterdam: Pieter den Hengst en Zoon, 1811); A. C. Twent, *Zeemans Woordenboek. Of verzaamelng der meest gebruikelijke Hollandsche zee kuntswoorden en spreekwijzen, in het Fransche en Engelesch overgebragt . . .* (Amsterdam: Pieter den Hengst en Zoon, 1813).

38 H. W. Schokker, *Zak-Woordenboek van Engelsche Zee-termen . . .* ('s Gravenhage / Amsterdam: Gebroeders van Cleff, 1841); C. Roest, *Het Marine Stoomwerktuig in den vorm van een Woordenboek, in de Nederduitsche, Fransche en Engelsche Talen* (Amsterdam: het Algemeen Etablissement voor de Zeevaart, 1842).

39 K. P. ter Reehorst, *Nieuwe Handleiding in de Englelsche Taal hoofdzadelijk voor Nederlanders-bevattende eene beredeneerde Englische spraakkunst . . .* (Amsterdam, 1837); ter Reehorst, *New Dictionary of Technical Terms . . .* (Amsterdam, 1842); ter Reehorst, *Dictionary of Nautical, Steam- and Shipbuilding-Terms, in the English and Dutch* (Amsterdam: G. Hulst van Keulen, 1845); ter Reehorst, *The Mariner's Friend or Polyglot Indispensable . . .* (Amsterdam, 1849); ter Reehorst, *Gids of Handboek voor Kooplieden, Reizigers, Zeelieden, Landverhuizers, enz. In zes talen, Hollandsch, Engelesch, Duitsch, Italiaanisch en Spaansch . . .* (Meppel, Neth., 1849); ter Reehorst, *The Mariner's Friend or Ploylot Indispensable . . .* (1865).

40 Richard Walter, *A Voyage Round the World in the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III, IV by George Anson* (London, 1748). For a commentary on this book, see Glyn Williams, *The Prize of All the Oceans* (New York: Viking, 2000), and, on the entire genre, Williams, *The Great South Sea: English Voyages and Encounters, 1570–1750* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1997).

41 John Hawkesworth, *An Account of the Voyages Undertaken . . . for making discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere* (London, 1773).

42 Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838–1842* (Washington, DC, 1844).

43 See, for example, Kenneth Morgan, *Matthew Flinders, Maritime Explorer of Australia* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 11.

44 Josiah Burchett, *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea* (London, 1720).

45 John Entick, *A New Naval History, or, Compleat view of the British Marine* (London, 1757).

46 See, for example, Robert Beatson, *Naval and military memoirs of Great Britain from 1727 to 1783* (London, 1804); and Charles Ekins, *Naval Battles from 1744 to the Peace in 1814* (London, 1824).

47 Edward Pelham Brenton, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Year MDCCLXXXIII to MDCCCXXII,* 5 vols. (London: C. Rice, 1823–25). A revised edition (London: Charles Colburn, 1837) in two volumes with a nearly identical title extended the end date from 1822 to 1836.

48 William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the declaration of War with France . . . 1793 to the accession of George IV . . . 1820* (London: Richard Bentley, 1822–24). A second edition appeared in 1826; in 1837 the book was expanded to six volumes by Capt. Frederick Chamier. The extended work was reprinted in 1847, 1859, 1864, with corrections in 1877, with additions in 1886, 1902, and with commentary by Andrew Lambert in 2002.

49 James Fenimore Cooper, *A History of the Navy of the United States of America* (New York, 1839).

50 William James, *An Inquiry into the merits of the Principal Naval Actions between Great Britain and the United States, comprising an account of all British and American Ships of War, reciprocally captured and destroyed since the 11th June 1812 . . .* (Halifax, NS: Anthony H. Holland, 1816); James, *Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812: A Full and Correct Account of the Naval War between Great Britain and the United States of America* (London: Thomas Egerton, 1817).

51 Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, *Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson* (London: Henry Colburn, 1844–46). George P. B. Naish edited *Nelson's Letters to His Wife and Other Documents, 1785–1831,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 100 (London: Navy Records Society, 1958); Colin White edited a supplement, *Nelson: The New Letters* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2005).

52 Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, *A History of the Royal Navy, from the Earliest Times to the Wars of the French Revolution* (London: Richard Bentley, 1847).

53 See Peter Garside, James Raven, and Rainer Schöwerling, *The English Novel, 1770–1829: A Bibliographical Survey of Prose Fiction Published in the British Isles* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000).

54 William Falconer, *The shipwreck, a poem* (London, 1762).

55 Philip Morin Freneau, *The poems of Philip Freneau, written chiefly during the last war* (Philadelphia, 1786).

56 James Fenimore Cooper, *The Pilot* (1823), *The Red Rover* (1827), *The Water-Witch* (1830), *The Wing-and-Wing* (1842), *The Two Admirals* (1842), *Jack Tier* (1846–48), and *The Sea Lions* (1849).

57 Frederick Marryat, *The King's Own* (1830), *Peter Simple* (1834), *Mr. Midshipman Easy* (1836), and *Poor Jack* (1840).

58 Herman Melville, *Redburn* (1849), *White-Jacket* (1850), *Moby Dick* (1851), and *Billy Budd* (1924).

59 Richard Henry Dana, *Two Years before the Mast* (New York, 1840).

III *Changing American Perceptions of the Royal Navy since 1775*

There are many dimensions to a navy. At its most obvious, a navy is an expression of a nation's power, but at the same time it is a microcosm of a nation, representing its industrial and technological capacities as well as a reflection of the nature, character, and spirit of its people and its institutions. While a navy is a national creation that fully reflects its parentage, a navy also exists within the much broader and very different context of world affairs—the arena of competing powers and national interests, of deadly enemies as well as neutrals, friends, and allies. Outside Britain there is a wide spectrum of viewpoints from which to view the Royal Navy. The view from the United States of America is but one among many, but in itself it presents a changing kaleidoscope of viewpoints. Over two hundred forty years the American navy has viewed the Royal Navy first from the perspectives of rebellious colonies and then of a minor-power navy fighting a superpower navy, later seeing it as a role model, a peer competitor, and then as its closest ally as a great-power navy.

IN THE BEGINNING

In the absence of an established and well-organized state bureaucracy, the process of creating a navy in America was a slow and hesitant one.[1] In 1774 and 1775, as the political crisis between Britain and its American colonies grew into an open rebellion, the Royal Navy was superior to all other naval powers in the world, although at this point the French navy had potential superiority in its unmanned ships in reserve at Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort; Spanish ships of the line might also become available in a Franco-Spanish alliance.[2] Being on opposite sides of the Atlantic, both the British and the Americans were initially reluctant to engage in an all-out naval conflict. In 1775, American delegates gathered in the Continental Congress and began the fifteen-year-long process of examining and debating nearly every fundamental aspect of representative democracy. Some expressed the radical idea of complete independence, but others were reluctant to take any steps that would preclude an advantageous political solution for the American colonies within the British Empire.[3] One of those steps that might bring serious disadvantage, some believed, would be the creation of an American naval force.[4]

At the Second Continental Congress, in Philadelphia in 1775, the subject of a navy came up for debate. One of South Carolina's representatives, Christopher Gadsden, who had served years before in the Royal Navy as a purser, believed that the Royal Navy was not as formidable as many feared. He suggested that the Americans could easily start a navy by capturing some of the smaller British ships—cutters, sloops, and schooners. John Adams of New England made a similar argument.[5] Other members of Congress slowly came to see that there might be a role for American naval forces. First, they considered using small armed vessels adapted from merchant service to capture larger warships from the Royal Navy and thereby acquire purpose-built warships and trained sailors. Second, they saw an opportunity to force British forces to evacuate Boston by interrupting their supply lines stretching across the Atlantic. Third, American merchants believed that with armed ships they could effectively evade the British blockade of American ports.[6]

Also, the American patriots faced a number of practical military necessities in fighting British forces ashore that involved maritime support. Several American commanders developed ad hoc arrangements to meet these needs. These local initiatives were precursors of the eventual national navy, but they were far from the formal establishment of one to oppose the Royal Navy. In fact, in his *Autobiography* John Adams recalled that opposition to having a navy was "very loud and vehement."[7] The very idea of intercepting and attacking British forces at sea was "represented as the most wild, visionary, mad project that ever had been imagined. It was an infant, taking a mad bull by his horns; and what was more profound and remote, it was said it would ruin the character, and corrupt the morals of all our seamen. It would make them selfish, piratical, mercenary, bent wholly upon plunder, &c. &c."[8]

Adams's life experience on the Massachusetts seacoast had made him an ardent naval advocate, and his career as a lawyer in maritime cases placed him as a leader in this cause.[9] Eventually his arguments and those of others moved the Continental Congress to take on 13 October 1775 the first step toward establishing what came to be called the Continental Navy. As a member of the congressional Naval Committee, John Adams wrote the original draft of the organizational principles and rules for the newly established Continental Navy, adapting them directly from the Royal Navy's *Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea*.[10]

One of the greatest challenges for Congress was to find an effective administrative organization to support the fleet. The management of naval affairs became increasingly difficult. A number of approaches were tried, ostensibly based on British models that included the establishment of a Navy Board and even a Board of Admiralty. Seeking to know more about how the Royal Navy managed its affairs, William Ellery, a Rhode Island member of the Marine Committee (successor to the Naval Committee), wrote to a knowledgeable friend at home, William Vernon: "I

should be glad to know what is the Office of Commissioners of the Navy, and that you would point it out particularly; unless you can refer Me to some author who particularly describes. The Conduct of the Affairs of a Navy as well as those of an Army We are yet to learn. We are still unacquainted with the systematical management of them, although We have made considerable Progress in the latter."[11] Others similarly assumed that the British approach to naval management would be the best to emulate, but they too had no knowledge of naval administration or of how the Admiralty or the Navy Board functioned.[12]

During its ten-year existence, the Continental Navy played a very limited role. Its purpose was to contribute to what began as a civil war between American Englishmen and Englishmen at home in Britain and became the revolution that brought independence to the thirteen United States of America. The Continental Navy's role was one of several maritime equivalents of the people's and partisan irregulars ashore. The navy complemented the privateers, which more precisely fit this characterization, but it also undertook with some effectiveness vital tasks for the nascent revolutionary government that could not be given to privateers, such as showing the flag in foreign waters, carrying government funds, and transporting diplomats. These were vital functions in the development of the American state, yet the navy was no match for the Royal Navy, which largely eliminated it as a threat. The critical maritime role in the war fell to the new American republic's French allies. It was the French navy that created local maritime supremacy in the waters in and around Chesapeake Bay in 1781 and so contributed directly to the surrender of the British army at Yorktown.

THE EARLY REPUBLIC

With the recognition of American independence in 1783, the young United States saw no immediate need for a navy and had neither the financial capacity nor the central administrative structure to sustain one. The last ship of the Continental Navy was sold in 1785, and the young country was left with no armed force at sea. From the British point of view, this was ideal. Those in Britain and British North America knowledgeable about American affairs saw danger in even allowing Americans the right to fish on the Grand Banks. In 1783, as the peace negotiations were being completed, a British newspaper, the *Public Advertiser,* reported the views of "a Country Member of Parliament" who felt that allowing Americans to use the Atlantic fisheries would have "at one stroke annihilated our navy" and "put an end to our existence as a commercial nation."[13] He and others saw the fisheries as the traditional nursery of navies and predicted that in them the Americans, along with the French, could train up to eighty thousand seamen. They feared that the United States could create a navy that would leave Britain in a position where, as another writer in the *Public Advertiser* argued, "it will be in vain for us to defend any of our possessions."[14]

In fact, however, there was no immediate prospect of that. It would be seven years before the United States put any armed force to sea, and that was not a navy but, in 1790, the Revenue Marine's Cutter Service, the earliest predecessor of the U.S. Coast Guard. It was only in 1794, after American merchant vessels in the Mediterranean began to suffer from attacks by North African corsairs, that the new republic saw the need to establish a permanent naval service. Before that time, American merchant shipping had relied on Portugal's containment of North African corsairs around the entrance to the Mediterranean and in its western basin. When at British urging during the war against Revolutionary France Portugal made peace with the North African states, neutral Americans were left to fend for themselves.

Notwithstanding this important impetus, Americans were having a serious debate about the purpose and function of a navy. There were two factions. On one side was the group that has come to be called the "navalists," who saw the Royal Navy as their model. For them, the new navy should be an expression and symbol of the nation's power, honor, and prestige as well as a fighting force potent, capable, and effective enough to be an instrument of political influence in the world balance of power, to play the role of an arbiter in world politics. This navy with its potential capabilities could serve as a continual deterrent to aggression as well as show America's power while it protected American commerce and interests abroad.

In opposition to this view was another group, which has come to be called the "anti-navalists." They saw uses for a navy but argued that the navalists' vision was impractical and far too costly. Their own navy would be a smaller seagoing militia force, with only a very few vessels on distant stations, operating singly, most in home waters for coastal protection and the suppression of piracy.[15] For much of the first century of the new country's existence the anti-navalists held sway, but there remained a constant tension between the two viewpoints. By and large, the leaders of the young nation were content to accept the indirect benefits of the Royal Navy's global power while the United States focused on westward expansion across the North American continent. As Andrew Jackson told the American people in his inaugural address in 1829, the United States had "need of no more ships of war than are requisite to the protection of commerce."[16]

It was this type of thinking that had produced the large frigates that eventually made a mark in the Anglo-American war of 1812–15. Starting from the typical French and British frigates of the 1790s but adapting for the needs of a small navy, American shipbuilders sought to design frigates individually capable of defeating or escaping likely opponents. Thus, they applied hull timbers the size of a seventy-four-gun ship's to a frigate, producing one that "in blowing weather would be an overmatch for double-deck ships, and in light winds [would be able] to evade coming to action."[17]

A basic and recurring theme in the American naval view of the Royal Navy was the desire to be recognized as the naval service of a separate and independent

nation. It was this that caused such deep American resentment over the impressment of seamen. In 1805, Capt. John Shaw wrote the American consul at Gibraltar, "I wish the British Commanders to observe that our Service is very independent, and I hope our commanders will never let slip any insult which they offer to pass with Impunity."[18] During the Anglo-American war of 1812–15, American naval officers did not question British competence as fighters and seamen but were offended when their British counterparts seemed to question their honor. Secretary of the Navy William Jones lauded Capt. John Rodgers's voyage in USS *President* across the Atlantic to the Norwegian coast and into the Arctic as "another proof of the exaggerated power and fictitious omnipresence of the British Flag."[19] Yet an American naval rating saw his British opposite numbers as "hard fellows on salt water."[20] When James Durand, a Connecticut seaman, later recalled of being impressed into HMS *Narcissus* that "only lately I had quitted the service of the U. States after enduring everything. The thought of serving with the British fleet touched every nerve with distress and almost deprived me of reason."[21]

THE LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

The tales of victories of the American frigates over the smaller British frigates during the first part of the War of 1812 soon developed lives of their own and became in the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century historical writing collectively an important part of American patriotic culture. They helped develop public pride in American naval heritage and provided a new dimension to public support for current naval construction.[22]

As the new American steel navy began to take shape from the 1880s onward, when technological change was revolutionizing the physical characteristics of navies, a small group of American naval officers turned to history for the fundamental principles of naval warfare.[23] The most famous of these men was Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose series of four books on the "influence of sea power" between 1660 and 1815 detailed the strategic effectiveness of the Royal Navy. Mahan famously declared that "the world has never seen a more impressive demonstration of the influence of sea power upon its history. Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it [i.e., Napoleonic France] and the dominion of the world."[24] In his third *Sea Power* work Mahan wrote on the War of 1812. Unlike other American writers, he saw the story of that war as a cautionary tale for the United States and a negative influence in its national history. "Not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided, but by force massed, and handled in skillful combination," Mahan argued.[25] "It matters not that the particular force be small. The art of war is the same throughout; and may be illustrated as readily, though less conspicuously, by a flotilla as by an armada; by a corporal's guard, or the three units of the Horatii, as by a host of a hundred thousand." Mahan's final publication in the series was his *Life of Nelson,*

> a study . . . of the one man who in himself summed up and embodied the greatness of the possibilities which Sea Power comprehends,—the man for whom genius and opportunity worked together, to make him the personification of the navy of Great Britain. Thenceforward, the name of Nelson is enrolled among those few presented to us by History, the simple mention of which suggest, not merely a personality or a career, but a great force or a great era concrete in a single man, who is the standard-bearer before the nations.[26]

Mahan's historical works earned him great praise in Britain, bringing him honorary degrees from Oxford and Cambridge as well as an audience with Queen Victoria. They even earned him an offer of an honorary commission in the Royal Navy (which he politely but firmly declined).[27] This was understandable, in that Mahan had clearly expressed the world's admiration for the Royal Navy. In an interview published in early August 1914, Mahan suggested, "You people in England do not realize the immense admiration felt all over the world, yes, and in Germany also, for the British Navy. Speaking from my standpoint, as an American, I tell you that there is only one navy in the world, and that the others are mere striplings by comparison."[28] While not underrating his own or any other navy, he asserted that "by comparison with the British, every navy still has much to learn."[29]

Aside from holding up the Royal Navy as a model for others, Mahan was also interested in practical cooperation. In the first decade of the twentieth century American naval officers observed the establishment of the first Dominion naval forces and understood that such services would be extensions of the Royal Navy, as they were not entirely unaware of the debates and issues about these forces arising among the Cabinet in London, the Admiralty, the Colonial Office, and Dominion governments. One of the earliest American comments about Dominion naval forces came from Mahan, in the first years of the twentieth century, in the context of what was then termed "imperial federation."

In July 1904, Mahan was the guest of honor at a luncheon in London hosted by the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee. The well-known writer on imperial defense issues Sir John Colomb was in the chair. Introducing Mahan to the distinguished group that had gathered, Colomb declared,

> The object of the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom, in its truest aspect, is not to make wars, but to prevent them. And I take it that the Navy of which Captain Mahan has been a distinguished ornament, has, with ours, that common mission in the future. The great American Commonwealth of which Captain Mahan is a distinguished citizen, and the British Empire, of which we are all ourselves citizens, have a great common interest in the peace of the sea.[30]

Colomb went on to draw attention to the words of William B. Dalley, who had been attorney general, and briefly colonial secretary, in New South Wales during the 1880s. Dalley had suggested, "Let there be one Navy, under the rule of a single Admiralty—a Navy in which the colonies shall be as much integrated as the Mother country, which shall be theirs as well as hers, and on which they may all rely in time of danger."[31]

Mahan's response was revealing. Linking the United States to this issue, Mahan commented, "As the sympathies of the people who speak the same tongues widen, like those of the various communities under the British flag and our own are doing, . . . as they grow together[,] there will be an approximation of the period [of] which we have heard much—the federation of the world."[32]

Six years later, in 1910, Cdr. William S. Sims visited London in command of the battleship USS *Minnesota* and expressed similar sentiments. Sims, who would later become the U.S. Navy's most famous and successful commander in World War I, had been born in Port Hope, Ontario, in 1858 and had been raised there until the age of thirteen, when his American-born father and Canadian mother moved their family to the United States. On 3 December, during Sims's 1910 visit, the Lord Mayor of London ended a week of courtesy calls, parties, and festivities by hosting Sims and the officers and men of *Minnesota* at a luncheon at Guildhall. In a closing speech of thanks, Sims declared, "If the time ever comes when the British Empire is seriously menaced by an external enemy, it is my opinion that you may count upon every man, every dollar, every drop of blood, of your kindred across the sea."[33] His remarks were enthusiastically applauded by those present but earned Sims a public reprimand from President William Howard Taft. Half a dozen years later, in 1917, in the midst of the war with Germany, Taft observed, "The ways of history are strange. When I was President I reprimanded an officer for saying exactly what he is doing now. That officer was Commander, now Vice Admiral, Sims in command of the American Navy in Europe."[34]

Simultaneously, however, there was another, quite different current in American naval thinking. In the late nineteenth century, officers in both the U.S. Army and Navy had been influenced by the successes of the German General Staff in Prussia's wars and had begun to think about various contingency plans, in itself a concept entirely new in American practice. These strategists soon perceived that the Royal Navy, by which the U.S. Navy was vastly outnumbered, seemed the most dangerous possible enemy, even if not the most likely.[35]

Mahan himself drafted the first American naval war plan, in 1890, basing it on the assumption of a weak U.S. Navy operating with a defensive-offensive strategy. This plan, in concept appropriate to a small power, kept the American main battle fleet in port awaiting an opportune moment to attack its larger adversary and stationed minor squadrons in Puget Sound and on Lake Ontario.[36] "Any attempts against the British islands themselves, in the present relative strength of the two navies, is plainly impracticable. The belligerents will meet in the Western Hemisphere," Mahan predicted;[37] in fact, "Canada lies at our mercy, unless the British navy by action on our coasts can stay our hand."[38] To do this, he forecast, the Royal Navy would need twenty-four ships to maintain a constant blockade of New York, with a reserve at Halifax bringing the total to thirty.[39]

In 1911–12, a war game based on the evolved American contingency plan, by now named War Plan Red, for conflict with the United Kingdom was played by students at the Army War College. In contrast to earlier iterations, the current plan posited why war might occur between the two countries and looked at the situation from a global perspective. The game scenario was that Red (i.e., Britain) had caused Blue (the United States) to declare war by dispatching an army division and a mounted brigade, totaling twenty-two thousand men, in fast transports escorted by the First Cruiser Squadron from Southampton to Quebec to reinforce the Red army in Canada.[40]

THE GREAT WAR

The United States remained neutral in World War I until April 1917, when German attacks on shipping made that stance no longer acceptable. In 1917 and 1918, the U.S. Navy operated successfully in close cooperation with the Royal Navy under Admiral Sims, commander of U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters. An American squadron of battleships joined the Grand Fleet, while destroyers, naval aircraft, and transports carried out a wide range of cooperative operations.[41] Not all in the U.S. Navy were as happy as Sims was to be working with the Royal Navy. When Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels initially sent Sims to London in 1917, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. William S. Benson, cautioned Sims: "Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes, we would as soon fight them as the Germans."[42]

The experiences of American naval officers with the Royal Navy were both positive and negative. As in the War of 1812, they were proud of their service and of its new and advanced ships. Henry A. Wiley, who commanded the battleship USS *Wyoming* in the Sixth Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet, later recalled:

> I think we excelled the British in shooting. Of course, we were not put to the test in battle, and I don't know how we would have fared under fire. Our ships were not as rugged as the British ships, and our fire-control system probably would not have stood up as well as theirs under heavy, well-directed fire. [But our] system of turret firing was superior, I think, and we could have delivered a greater weight of metal in any given time under normal conditions.[43]

Nonetheless, Anglo-American naval cooperation was very effective and led to at least one conspicuous change in the U.S. Navy: a new officer uniform, one that fundamentally endures to this day. On 17 March 1919, the U.S. Navy adopted a double-breasted, navy-blue uniform jacket inspired directly by the Royal Navy's. The new style reflected contemporary taste in civilian clothing, but it was also a tribute to a close connection with the Royal Navy. The only major differences were that Americans used two vertical rows of six brass buttons, rather than the Royal Navy's eight, and (for line officers) a star rather than an "executive curl" on the sleeve above the rank insignia.[44]

At the same time, however, the peace negotiations at Paris were causing great tension between the United States and Britain. They agreed on the basic questions in dealing with the defeated Central Powers, but there was major disagreement over the U.S. demand for naval parity with Great Britain—that is, a navy "second to none." In March 1919 occurred the so-called Naval Battle of Paris, during which Americans showed their suspicions about British claims of continued naval supremacy and their fears that such supremacy and Britain's successful blockade against Germany might lead to a blockade of American ports in a future conflict. For this reason, American naval officers proposed that Germany retain a small fleet as a counterweight to the Royal Navy. For the same reason they also considered a League of Nations naval force.

American naval planners saw, on one hand, a number of reasons why war between the United States and Great Britain was unlikely, among them the economic dependence of Great Britain on the United States, the proximity of Canada to the United States, and the failure of colonial support if the Dominions did not consider a war against the United States as just.[45] On the other hand, there were reasons why a war might break out. The main issue was the disparity between British and American views of freedom of the seas, particularly in regard to belligerent rights. American naval officers were particularly sensitive to Britain's reluctance to codify maritime international law and its inclination to the most liberal interpretation of belligerent rights on the high seas; they saw here one of the several reasons for maintaining a navy equal to Britain's.

The U.S. Naval Advisory Staff in Paris used a Canadian contingency as an example of the type of crisis that could arise:

> If Canada should attempt to gain her independence from Great Britain by force, and if the United States remained neutral, it is the British contention that Great Britain could blockade every port of the United States and could so regulate our imports that we could spare none for exportation to Canada. This is not International Law, but an application of the law of force to neutrals. The only reply is the presence of a potential [U.S. naval] force that will secure the abandonment of the contention.[46]

The Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty of 1921–22 formally established the principles of nominal naval parity between Britain and the United States that the latter had been seeking during and immediately after World War I. The U.S. Navy did not immediately build up to treaty strength, allowing the Royal Navy to remain numerically and qualitatively superior through the 1920s.[47] Nevertheless, American naval officers remained distrustful of Britain. While they acknowledged war was unlikely, they still believed the Royal Navy might be used in its traditional role of protecting and furthering British trade at the expense of foreign—in this case, American—interests. The underlying cause for such a war would most likely be a British attempt to promote its weakening trade situation by attacking the United States, its principal economic competitor.[48]

In 1923, the *U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence Monthly Information Bulletin* reported that a former British prime minister, David Lloyd George, had said that the only country that gave his own any concern for a war in the near future was the United States. The points of friction between them, Lloyd George had said, were the Irish question, naval rivalry, and debt.[49]

WORLD WAR II

During the interwar period, the separate technical and professional development of the two navies created complementary bodies of professional experience and knowledge. Naval leaders in both countries were well aware that an exchange of information could be profitable, but the grounds upon which such an exchange could took place developed only slowly. At the outbreak of World War II in 1939 the United States again remained formally neutral but also began a range of activities to assist Britain even so.[50]

The very first steps were private initiatives, beginning in September 1939, only a few days after the conflict began. A small group of twenty-two Americans took up an opportunity to become officers in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, the first citizens of the United States to become sea officers in the Royal Navy. The first volunteer, William E. G. Taylor, received his RNVR commission on 14 September 1939, and the last of the twenty-two, Peter G. Morison (the only son of the famous American naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison), was commissioned on 10 November 1941, just barely a month before Germany declared war on the United States. Another was Draper Kauffman, who was to retire as a rear admiral in the U.S. Navy, famous for having organized the forerunner of the SEALs. He had graduated from the Naval Academy in 1933, but poor eyesight had prevented him from getting his commission. Upon volunteering instead for the RNVR, he received what he later recalled as very effective training to become a sublieutenant at HMS *King Alfred* at Hove. He found the ten-week "Y-scheme" course "excellent, very well run. . . . They did a superb job, for instance on indoctrination into the Royal Navy. Not stuffy. People might think that it might be, but it wasn't at all—the history of the Royal Navy, that you should be darned proud to wear the uniform and that sort of thing."[51]

In the formal relations between the two services, a firm working basis was established by the summer of 1940. The first liaison was between technical offices in the Admiralty and the U.S. naval attaché in London, but it soon proved inadequate. American naval officers with competence in specific areas were sent to London to examine activities within their specializations. The first to do this was Lt. Cdr. J. N. Opie III, who arrived in London in June 1940 to look into minesweeping arrangements and report back to the Bureau of Ships in Washington. He was followed by a number of others, most staying for just a few months, a few longer.

Lt. Cdr. Joseph H. Wellings was the first to be sent to study fleet operations and tactics, and he stayed from September 1940 to June 1941. He had the good fortune to return to America in HMS *Rodney,* bound for Boston, Massachusetts, for repairs; en route, the battleship was diverted to participate in the sinking of the German battleship *Bismarck*. Wellings's numerous letters, reports, and diary entries before he left reveal much about an American's reaction to the Royal Navy. As he wrote to his wife in October 1940, "I find that the English eat much more than we do, and in addition more often. I find their habits quite interesting. It is remarkable how they differ from ours when after all we have many things in common."[52] Wellings participated in a New Year's Eve celebration on board HMS *Hood*. As the ship's bell struck sixteen, he was amazed to see the wardroom tables cleared away, a bagpiper begin to play, and the admiral, captain, staff, wardroom, gunroom, and warrant officers dancing. "Such a comradeship one would never suspect from the English who are supposed to be so conservative. I was impressed very much. Such spirit is one of the British best assets. This spirit will go far to bring about victory in the end."[53]

The ABC (American-British-Canadian) staff talks that began in January 1941 established a framework for high-level cooperation between the two services in preparation for a time when the United States should enter the war. These were not easy negotiations and involved some serious differences of opinion. For some of the leading Americans, memories of experiences with the Royal Navy as junior officers during World War I now influenced in various ways their outlooks on Anglo-American naval relations.

For example, Adm. Harold Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations from 1939 to early 1942 and then Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, in London until 1945, had served on the staff of Admiral Sims in London in 1917–18. After the war, he had attended the Naval War College, anxious to replace the quickly extemporized arrangements of that period with well-planned and organized relationships that were firmly established beforehand. Thus, as Chief of Naval Operations, he was the organizer and mentor of the ABC-1 talks in early 1941.[54]

Stark's successor as Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Ernest J. King, had been during World War I flag lieutenant to Adm. Henry T. Mayo, the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. In this assignment, Commander King had traveled with Mayo and had the opportunity, rare for an American naval officer, to observe many of the senior British naval officers in command, including Beatty, Jellicoe, and Sturdee, as they interacted with Admiral Mayo during his visit to Britain and the Grand Fleet in 1918. King thought Sims "a show-off";[55] in particular, he did not like Sims's having allowed American ships to be taken under British overall command. He wanted the U.S. Navy to operate independently, under no other country's control.[56] King had a strongly nationalistic viewpoint that has often been misinterpreted as specifically anti-British. As a student at the Naval War College in 1933,

King had written in his thesis, "Our financial growth and strength have virtually reduced Great Britain to second place. . . . Great Britain must be considered a potential enemy and a powerful one, not so much as to questions of security but certainly as to matters involving the growth of our foreign trade, financial supremacy and our dominant position in world affairs."[57] King's attitude was long established by World War II, where it surfaced in a number of ways. In explaining his priority for the war in the Pacific over that in the Atlantic, King would recall:

> The British have been managing world affairs for well over three hundred years, ever since the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. I personally felt that the allies would lose the war against the Japanese unless we stopped them in a few weeks or months. . . . It seemed to me that the British "egged" the U.S. on to accept their ideas since they were already fighting the Nazis when the U.S. entered the war and also since the Nazis were close by and the Pacific was far away. . . . I can't get over the idea that the U.S. people had been sold a "pig in a poke" at that time and were in the well-known situation of having been worked into a concept (even a real obsession) of British origin rather than to look out for the basic interests of the U.S.A. throughout the entire world.[58]

In 1951, Admiral Lord Cunningham (from 1946 Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope) recalled in his published memoirs that Admiral King had been "at times rude and overbearing." The day after several American newspapers quoted this remark, King dictated a memorandum for the record in which he recalled an incident during the summer of 1942 that had prompted it.[59] Cunningham, as head of the British Admiralty delegation in Washington, had come to his office to ask if more destroyers could be made available for the North Atlantic convoy to Britain. At that time, King had been using every available vessel and was fully engaged in setting up Operation Torch in North Africa. "I therefore interpreted Cunningham's query as a 'needle' directed at me—and I was indeed very abrupt (rude) with him—and purposely so."[60]

In general, however, the professional relationship between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy was remarkably good and made for very effective collaboration. American naval men and women clearly respected the professionalism and expertise of their British counterparts. Nevertheless, friction arose in a number of areas from differing approaches to training, procedures, and operational planning as well as questions of which of the two navies should play the leading role for a particular function. There were a number of well-known instances: naval intelligence collaboration, planning for the D-Day operation, and the operations of the British fleet in the Pacific, for example.

THE COLD WAR AND AFTER

By 1946 it was apparent that the United States would need to take on a number of global responsibilities that the Royal Navy had previously exercised, beginning with the Middle East. The U.S. Navy itself was deeply influenced by Royal Navy operational patterns and approaches.[61] In addition, the World War II command

organization as it eventually evolved provided the fundamental model for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after 1949.[62] The gradual development, over the following forty years, of standardized procedures, equipment, supplies, and communications for multilateral operations removed many of the interservice problems that the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy had experienced during the war. For example, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic overcame what had once been insuperable practical obstacles to become an effective force and a model for other formal and ad hoc arrangements.[63] Through NATO, bilateral sharing of nuclear submarine technology, and other initiatives the two navies grew increasingly at ease with each other and worked together with less friction.[64] Some clear differences remained. Americans acknowledged, for instance, the quality of the Royal Navy's at-sea training as well as the depth of knowledge of its "executive" and engineer officers in their respective branches; the latter contrasted with the more generalist approach to officer knowledge and training in the U.S. Navy.

As the vicar of Kew the Rev. Charles Caleb Colton put it in the early nineteenth century, "Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery." A telling example of this might be found in an echo of the Royal Navy's long tradition of Trafalgar Night dinners. In the year 2000, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jay L. Johnson, announced that the U.S. Navy would mark with an annual "dining in" on the anniversary of the battle of Midway "one of the most decisive sea battles in world history . . . won, not by superior numbers or daunting technology, but by the courage and tenacity of sailors who fought a vicious air and sea battle against overwhelming odds."[65] Thus continues the long relationship and the evolution of viewpoints from which the American navy has perceived the Royal Navy: from an enemy to parent to peer competitor and finally close ally.

NOTES This paper was originally presented at "The Navy Is the Nation" conference, held at Portsmouth Historic Dockyard, Portsmouth, Hampshire, England, 18–19 April 2012, and appeared in *International Journal of Naval History* 11, no. 1 (July 2014). It is republished by courtesy of the editor.

1 For the first studies of early American naval administration, see Charles Oscar Paullin, "The Administration of the Continental Navy of the American Revolution," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (September 1905), reprinted in Paullin's *History of Naval Administration* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986); Paullin, *The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy, Its Achievements* (Cleveland, OH: Burrows Brothers, 1906); Gardner W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution* (1912, 1940; repr. New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), chap. 2, "Naval Administration and Organization," pp. 20–58.

2 Jonathan R. Dull, *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), p. 19.

3 Raymond G. O'Connor, *Origins of the American Navy: Sea Power in the Colonies and the New Nation* (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1994), pp. 16–17.

4 Richard Buel Jr., *In Irons: Britain's Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 79–80.

5 John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, [7] June 1775, in *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* [hereafter *NDAR*], vol. 1, ed. William Bell Clark (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Dept., 1964), pp. 628–29; Christopher Magra, *The Fisherman's Cause: Atlantic Commerce and the Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), pp. 182–83.

6 Magra, *Fisherman's Cause,* p. 186.

7 John Adams, *Autobiography,* in *The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States,* vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1851), extract quoted in *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 5 October 1775, in *NDAR,* ed. William Bell Clark, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Dept., 1966), p. 308 note 2.

8 Ibid.

9 As early as 1755, Adams had written, "We have (I may say) all the naval Stores of the Nation in our hands, it will be easy to obtain the mastery of the

seas, and then the united force of all Europe, will not be able to subdue us." John Adams to Nathan Webb, 12 October 1755, with Comments by the Writer Recorded in 1807, in *Papers of John Adams,* ed. Robert J. Taylor, Mary-Jo Kline, and Gregg L. Lint (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1977), vol. 1, available at "Adams Papers Digital Edition," *Massachusetts Historical Society,* www.masshist.org/adams-papers.

10 For the draft, *Autobiography of John Adams,* 28 November 1775, in Clark, *NDAR,* vol. 2, p. 1182. For the Continental Navy, *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 23 November 1775, in Clark, *NDAR,* vol. 2, p. 1109. The *Regulations and Instructions* were first published in 1731; it has not yet been determined which edition Adams used. The most recent edition was the eleventh, of 1772. For a list of the editions published between 1731 and 1790, see Thomas R. Adams and David W. Waters, comps., *English Maritime Books Printed before 1801* (Providence, RI: John Carter Brown Library, and Greenwich, U.K.: National Maritime Museum, 1995), items 1418–29.

11 William Ellery to William Vernon, Providence, 7 November 1776, in *NDAR,* ed. William James Morgan, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Dept., 1976), p. 79.

12 For a modern historical study of British practice at the time, see Daniel A. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), and Baugh, "The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution, 1690–1815," in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy,* ed. J. R. Hill (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 120–60. At least one source available to American officials outlined the British naval administration structure, but no evidence has yet been found that it was known to or used by them at the time; see Josiah Burchett, *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea* (1720), with an introduction by John B. Hattendorf (Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints for the John Carter Brown Library, 1995), which provides the outline in Burchett's preface.

13 "A Country Member of Parliament," *Public Advertiser,* 13 February 1783, quoted in P. J. Marshall, *Remaking the British Atlantic: The United States and the British Empire after American Independence* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), p. 51.

14 "Piscator," *Public Advertiser,* 12 February 1783, quoted in Marshall, *Remaking the British Atlantic,* p. 51.

15 Craig L. Symonds, *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785–1827* (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1980), pp. 11–25.

16 Quoted in ibid., p. 235.

17 Joshua Humphries in ca. 1794, quoted in Tyrone G. Martin, *A Most Fortunate Ship: A Narrative History of Old Ironsides* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 4.

18 John Shaw to John Gavino, 19 June 1805, in *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939–44), vol. 6, p. 126. I am grateful to Dr. Kevin McCranie for drawing my attention to this quotation and the two that follow.

19 William Jones to John Rodgers, 26 February 1814, microfilm M149, reel 11, 226, Record Group [hereafter RG] 45: Letters from the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, National Archives, Washington, DC.

20 Charles Denison, ed., *Old Ironsides and Old Adams: Stray Leaves from the Log-Book of a Man-of-War* (Boston: W. W. Page, 1846), p. 10.

21 James R. Durand, *The Life and Adventures of James R. Durand . . . written by himself* (1820; with commentary, New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1926; repr. Sandwich, MA: Chapman Billies, 1995), p. 49.

22 See Mark R. Shulman, *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

23 See John B. Hattendorf, "History and Technological Change: The Study of History in the U.S. Navy, 1873–1890," in *Naval History and Technological Change: Collected Essays,* ed. Hattendorf (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 2000), pp. 1–16.

24 A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1892), vol. 2, p. 118.

25 A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1905), vol. 1, p. v.

26 A. T. Mahan, *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1897), vol. 1, p. v.

27 William D. Puleston, *Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1939), p. 180; Mahan to J. B. Sterling, 31 May 1897, in *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* ed. Robert Seager II and Doris Maguire (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), vol. 2, p. 512.

28 A. T. Mahan, "The British Navy: Fragment of a Newspaper Interview," [n.d. but early August 1914], in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers,* vol. 3, p. 701.

29 Ibid.

30 *Captain A. T. Mahan on Imperial Federation. Speech Delivered at a Dinner of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee on July 6th, 1904. The Right Hon. Sir John Colomb, K.C.M.G., M.P. in the Chair* (London: Imperial Federation [Defence] Committee, 1904), pp. 1–2.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Quoted in Elting E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), p. 281.

34 Ibid., p. 284.

35 Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1890–1939* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 7.

36 "Contingency Plan in the Case of War with Great Britain, December 1890," in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers,* vol. 3, pp. 559–78.

37 Ibid., p. 559.

38 Ibid., p. 561.

39 Ibid., p. 564.

40 Ibid., p. 7. Also, see John B. Hattendorf, "Commonwealth Navies as Seen by the U.S. Navy, 1910–2010," reprinted, with abridgments, as chapter 4 of the present volume.

41 See Morison, *Admiral Sims;* Williams S. Sims, *The Victory at Sea* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1920; repr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984, with an introduction by David F. Trask); William N. Still Jr., *Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I* (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2006).

42 U.S. Senate, 66th Congress, 2nd Sess., *Naval Investigation: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Naval Affairs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1921), vol. 2, pp. 1883–93, 1917–19, 1992, 3139. Sims attributed this quote to Benson during the testimony, raising an issue about the authority of the CNO. I am grateful to David Kohnen for drawing my attention to this quotation.

43 Henry A. Wiley, *An Admiral from Texas* (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1934), p. 209.

44 James C. Tily, *The Uniforms of the United States Navy* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1964), p. 244.

45 Document 435: U.S. Planning Section, Early 1919, in *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1919,* ed. Michael Simpson, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 130 (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar for the Navy Records Society, 1991), p. 579.

46 Document 448: Memorandum of the U.S. Naval Advisory Staff, Paris, 7 April 1919, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations,* p. 603.

47 J. Kenneth McDonald, "The Washington Conference and the Balance of Power, 1921–22," in *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century,* ed. John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 189–210.

48 Christopher M. Bell, "Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918–1931," *International History Review* 19, no. 4 (November 1997), pp. 757–1008.

49 "British Dominions," *Office of Naval Intelligence. Monthly Information Bulletin,* no. 7 (1923), pp. 2–23. Lloyd George quoted at page 22. And see Bell, "Thinking the Unthinkable," pp. 799–800, 802; and Michael Vlahos, *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980), pp. 99–112.

50 See James R. Leutze, *Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937–1941* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1977); Malcolm H. Murfett, *Fool-Proof Relations: The Search for Anglo-American Naval Cooperation during the Chamberlain Years, 1937–1940* (Singapore Univ. Press, 1984); Patrick Abbazia, *Mr. Roosevelt's Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939–1942* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975).

51 *Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Draper L. Kauffman, U.S. Navy (Retired),* Oral History Series (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1982), quoted in Eric Dietrich-Berryman, Charlotte Hammond, and R. E. White, *Passport Not Required: U.S. Volunteers in the Royal Navy, 1939–1941* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 48.

52 Joseph Wellings to Mrs. Wellings, 20 October 1940, in *On His Majesty's Service: Observations of the British Home Fleet from the Diary, Reports, and Letters of Joseph H. Wellings, Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché, London, 1940–41,* ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1983), p. 44.

53 Diary, 31 December 1940, in Hattendorf, *On His Majesty's Service,* p. 85.

54 B. Mitchell Simpson III, *Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939–1945* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 125, 129–30, 136–37; Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p. 135.

55 Buell, *Master of Sea Power,* pp. 48–53.

56 Ibid., p. 278.

57 Capt. Ernest J. King, "The Influence of the National Policy on the Strategy of a War," RG 13: Student Theses, 1934, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI [hereafter NHC]. Also quoted in Vlahos, *Blue Sword,* p. 110. I am grateful to David Kohnen for drawing my attention to this and the following two quotations.

58 Walter Muir Whitehill, "Random Notes," ca. 1945, box 7, folder 7, Ms. Coll. 37: Thomas B. Buell and Walter Muir Whitehill Collection on Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, NHC.

59 An Associated Press story was carried by the *Sunday Evening Star* (Washington, DC) and the *Boston Globe,* among other U.S. papers, on 1 April 1951.

60 Memorandum for the Record, 2 April 1951, box 7, folder 7, Ms. Coll. 37, NHC.

61 Richard A. Best, *"Co-operation with Like-Minded Peoples": British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945–1949* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986), pp. 96ff.

62 Sean M. Maloney, *Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning, 1948–1954* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 5–46.

63 See John B. Hattendorf, "NATO's Policeman on the Beat: The First Twenty Years of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, 1968–1988," in *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays,* ed. Hattendorf (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 2000), pp. 187–200.

64 For submarine technology, see Peter Nailor, *The Nassau Connection: The Organisation and Management of the British POLARIS Project* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988).

65 Naval message, CNO NAVADMIN 164/99, R 041653Z JUN 99, subject: Naval Heritage, available at www.history.navy.mil/commemorations/midway/midway-1b.htm.

IV *Commonwealth Navies as Seen by the U.S. Navy*

Just thirty-three years ago, Professor Robin Winks of Yale University famously observed that "Americans cannot understand their own history without understanding Canadian history. Conversely, Canadians cannot understand their history without understanding American history."[1] However, Winks also pointed out the value of comparing and contrasting the histories of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States within the shared heritage of the English-speaking peoples, each developing its national identity and encountering other cultural influences under differing geographical and historical circumstances.[2]

The comparative development of their navies and the roles they undertook within those differing national trajectories is a broad subject, one that is easier to comprehend when limited to the Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand navies in the twentieth century. It would be problematic to link their experiences to those of the United States at comparative stages of naval development a hundred years earlier, in the different technological context of the nineteenth century.

A more modest alternative is to sample American perceptions of Commonwealth naval development in the twentieth century. Over the century between 1910 and 2010, various quarters and levels of the U.S. Navy have viewed Commonwealth navies in a variety of ways, sometimes contradictory but all reflecting a maturing appreciation as these naval forces grew from very small, nascent organizations into full-fledged navies. The naval forces of Canada had a special significance by virtue of their nation's geographical proximity to the United States and their shared home waters. Nevertheless, the naval forces of Australia and New Zealand were not overlooked, nor were those of India, as American naval officers assessed the world naval situation.

In the early twentieth century, American naval officers clearly understood that the Dominion naval forces were part of the larger capabilities of the Royal Navy, although they were not unaware of the debates among the Cabinet in London, the Admiralty, the Colonial Office, and Dominion governments about them.

One of the earliest American comments about Dominion naval forces in the first years of the twentieth century came in the context of what was then termed "imperial federation." In an article published in 1902, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan reflected on the success of the United States in merging thirteen previously separate English colonies into an effective federation.[3] Synthesizing the years since, Mahan commented, "The American Commonwealth and the British Empire have had many jars in the past, the memory of which has not wholly disappeared; but more and more clearly are coming into view the permanent conditions that from the first have existed. . . . In language, law, and political traditions there is fundamental identity; and in blood also."[4]

In 1887, Lt. Charles C. Rogers completed for the recently established Office of Naval Intelligence a large (375-page) study on Canada that described major ports and laid out early plans of naval operations in the event of a war with Britain.[5]

About this time, in fact, American officers of both the Army and Navy had begun to consider the possibility of, and draft plans for, a war against Britain. Mahan himself drafted a naval war plan in 1890, a landing by a fifteen-thousand-man expeditionary force at St. Margarets Bay, Nova Scotia, to attack Halifax and destroy the naval dockyard there.[6]

At a quite different level, war college students in the United States kept Dominion naval forces in mind as they worked on their academic exercises and war games. A war game concerning the American contingency plan for war between the United States and the United Kingdom, by now named War Plan Red, was the subject that students at the Army War College examined during the academic year 1911–12. In the Pacific, an expedition of 37,782 Australians and New Zealanders had on day 30 reached Suva in the Fiji Islands, from whence it would sail via Fanning Island to attack the Panama Canal as soon as Red had secured control of the Pacific.[7]

In this war game, Red completely overcame any resistance that Blue could offer. It was apparent in retrospect that Blue's best chance for defense had lain in a quick offensive against Cornwall and Ottawa (both Ontario) in the east and, in the west, Winnipeg, Manitoba, and Mission Junction, British Columbia, with the object of breaking up Canadian militia concentrations, destroying canals and railroads, and dividing Red's main expeditionary force. At the same, control of the Great Lakes would have been valuable for Blue. That appeared to be possible in Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron, and St. Clair but "difficult in Lake Erie and probably impossible at first in Lake Ontario."[8]

All these calculations involved a consideration of Dominion navies as part of Red's forces. A detailed chart provided the statistical information. In this scenario, the American naval officers saw the greatest use of Australian, Canadian, and Indian forces in supplying personnel to help man the Royal Navy's Australian station,

East Indian Squadron, and reserves in Canada, thereby releasing regularly trained officers and men for the war against the United States.[9]

Between 1917 and 1918, the U.S. Navy operated successfully with the Royal Navy in European waters under Adm. William S. Sims's command. An American squadron of battleships joined the Grand Fleet, while destroyers, naval aircraft, and transports carried out a wide range of cooperative operations.[10] However, during the peace negotiations at Paris in 1919, the subject of Canada arose. The U.S. Naval Advisory Staff in Paris used a Canadian contingency as an example of the type of crisis that could arise:

> If Canada should attempt to gain her independence from Great Britain by force, and if the United States remained neutral, it is the British contention that Great Britain could blockade every port of the United States and could so regulate our imports that we could spare none for exportation to Canada. This is not International Law, but an application of the law of force to neutrals. The only reply is the presence of a potential [U.S. naval] force that will secure the abandonment of the contention.[11]

British planners saw the eastern Atlantic, Canada, and the Far East as the most likely theaters for such a war to play out.[12] For their part, however, American naval planners looked at the same contingency solely in terms of the defense of the Western Hemisphere. By 1930, the American War Plan Red was still basically a defensive plan, in which Crimson (Canada) played a central role and the worst-case scenario was British forces invading the United States from Canada. But even as late as 1930, American officers could not easily imagine Canada remaining neutral and saw Canada as the most sensitive and productive target to attack in a war with Britain. Backed up by extensive analysis of war gaming, American naval plans envisioned the United States assuming the strategic defensive, attacking Halifax and other ports to prevent British forces from reaching Canada.[13]

Through the 1930s, a gradual shift in American naval attitudes toward Canada took place. Beginning in 1933, the Naval War College's Intelligence Department

[Red Naval] Personnel Available Immediately on Declaration of War

	Officers	Men
Fleet in commission	7,414	98,381
Coast Guard	310	2,790
Royal Marines	483	16,477
Training	805	5,199
Special Services	300	1,391
Royal Fleet Reserve*	—	19,749
Royal Naval Reserve†	415	4,225
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve	168	3,057
Officers retired list (shore duty only)	1,008	—
Australian Naval Forces	180	1,127
Canadian Naval Forces	60	810
Royal Indian Marine	215	—
Total	11,358	153,206
Available after 30 days	830	26,150
Available after 3 months	—	5,250
Grand Total	12,188	184,606

*90% of 21,943

†25% of 18,560

Source: Cdr. N. A. McCully, "War Plan, BLUE versus RED: Organization and Distribution of RED Naval Forces in Case of War with BLUE," pp. 7–8, box 49, file 1, RG 8: UNOpP. Army War College Work, 1911–1912, NHC. Also in box 4, file 3.

began to undertake a series of detailed studies on areas of strategic interest, which were paralleled by war games.[14] Revisions of these assessments in 1935–36 and again in 1940 reflect changing American naval perceptions. In the later versions the "worst-case" contingency above was not repeated. Even the 1935–36 assessment, however, had drifted away from the probability of actual war and had become something of an academic exercise: "We have, theoretically, a close approximation in parity, in the two navies, which are most interesting and convenient for use in demonstrating the principles of naval warfare."[15] Also, scenarios were no longer limited to "Red versus Blue" but widened to a range of others:

Crimson versus Blue

Crimson and Red versus Blue

Red versus Blue, with Crimson neutral

Crimson and Red plus others versus Blue[16]

The 1935–36 study explicitly described the Royal Canadian Navy for the first time, if only briefly, noting that it "consists of 550 of all ranks, 500 reserves, and 1,000 Naval Volunteer Reservists. It comprises one destroyer and two minesweepers based at Halifax: and a similar group based at Vancouver."[17]

By 1937, the Naval War College had extended its research on Canada and invited the American minister to Canada, Norman Armour, to give a detailed lecture and take away six in-depth questions to answer in writing after he returned to Ottawa. Armour explained fully for the students the history of Canada and its and the other Dominions' transitions to independent status. He dated that status from the 1917 Imperial War Council resolution recommending full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of the imperial Commonwealth. In Canada there were, the minister told his audience, three large opinion groups on defense issues. First there were the isolationists, who relied on Canada's geographical remoteness, the Royal Navy, and the Monroe Doctrine for protection. A second group, the collectivists, pinned their hopes on collective security and the League of Nations. Then there was a large group of middle-of-the-road people who would cooperate with the empire and the League but not involve Canada in any conflict not directly involving her national interests. "They [the last group] contend," the minister said, "that having reached the status of a sovereign nation, Canada should have a defense force sufficient to maintain the dignity of her position."[18]

Armour explained the debates in the Canadian Parliament on the 1937 defense estimate, amounting to $34 million (Canadian). In that connection he outlined the parliamentary history of the creation of the Canadian navy, going back to a 1909 debate as to whether to give dreadnoughts to Britain or to create a national navy. A recent speech by the leader of the opposition, former prime minister Richard Bedford Bennett, in support of the current plans of the W. L. Mackenzie King

government for naval expansion, had paid tribute to then–Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier's naval policy that had resulted in the 1910 Naval Service Act. Armour's point was that

> Canada had no intention of becoming involved in any conflict where her interests are not at stake, either in Europe or in the Pacific. . . . [W]hether she has at her command today a force adequate to maintain her neutrality or will have such a force in the near future, taking into account the heavily charged state of the British shipyards and the fact that Canadian shipyards and aviation factories are limited in size and output, is something that you can answer better than I.[19]

An update to the Naval War College's Canada study, apparently already in progress when war broke out in Europe in September 1939, was completed in mid-February 1940. Noting that the war "had already profoundly affected all phases of Canadian life," the report argued that "the Canadian Navy is almost negligible, in spite of the addition of the British flotilla leader *Assiniboine* and requisitioning of 40 commercial vessels for naval service. A fairly large number of small antisubmarine motor boats and aircraft salvage craft have also been added to the Navy."[20] Nevertheless, the Naval War College authors reached a quite new assessment of Canada, one that recognized for the first time in such American naval studies that nation's independent position: "This extremely brief review of Canada at war indicates that if the United States ever undertook her defense, the Canadians can be of major help. Conversely, a political upset would make her a rather dangerous enemy."[21]

Within a week after Britain's declaration of war against Germany in 1939, the Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa had all announced their support.[22] In the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was interested from the beginning of his administration in 1933 in closer U.S.-Canadian relations. With the approaching expiration, on 31 December 1936, of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, British and American officials engaged in a long series of preliminary diplomatic negotiations prior to the Second London Naval Conference scheduled for 1935. Britain faced an uneasy situation owing to America's neutral stance. It had few reliable allies in Europe, and in the light of the rise of Hitler and German rearmament, British leaders were seriously considering an accommodation with Japan. In November 1934 President Roosevelt told his negotiator in London, Norman H. Davis:

> I hope that you will keep two definite considerations always in mind. First that [Sir John] Simon [a National Liberal] and a few other Tories must be constantly impressed with the simple fact that if Great Britain is even suspected of preferring to play with Japan to playing with us, I shall be compelled, in the interests of American security[,] to approach public sentiment in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa in a definite effort to make these Dominions understand clearly that their future security is linked with the US.[23]

The construction of an Alaskan military highway was an early direct issue to arise between Canada and the United States. Thereafter, in January 1938, Commo. Percy Nelles (Canada's Chief of Naval Staff) and Maj. Gen. E. C. Ashton (the chief of the General Staff) briefly visited Washington for an initial, very tentative exploration of possible Canadian-U.S. defense cooperation with Adm. William D. Leahy (Chief of Naval Operations) and two American generals.[24] Over the following two years, political and practical pressure grew on both sides to develop some sort of formal security arrangement, despite America's neutrality. Separately, the United States had engaged in discussions in August 1940 with Britain to exchange fifty World War I destroyers for ninety-nine-year leases on six bases in the West Indies, Bermuda, and Newfoundland. While Canada was not a direct participant, the issue had relevance. On 17 August 1940, even before all the details had been agreed, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt met at Ogdensburg, New York, and established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) to study all aspects for the defense of the northwestern quarter of North America as a preliminary to a defensive alliance. Each side had its own expectations, but one of the first issues addressed in the PJBD was strengthening the Royal Canadian Navy.[25] With this beginning, the transition began from a belligerent Canada and neutral America to an active alliance on the practical basis of a shared understanding of the geopolitical situation and the ideological objectives in the war.[26]

The basic plan of the cooperation was worked out in the American-British Conference (ABC-1) held between 29 January and 28 March 1941, and thereafter a plan (known as ABC-22) for Canadian-American defense that assigned specific numbers of naval units to work with each other.[27] The experience of being an ally was entirely new to Americans in 1941. The United States had previously operated independently and had often taken a unilateral stance as a neutral power. Even in World War I the United States had not been one of the allies but rather an associated power.[28]

The fifty overage American destroyers that the Royal Navy acquired—some of them went to the Royal Canadian Navy—were symbolically renamed in honor of towns in Britain, Canada, and the United States that shared names, such as *St. Marys, Charleston, Chelsea, Georgetown, Broadway, Newark,* and *Newport*. During the war years, American officers and men typically felt that they had good and friendly relations with both their British and Canadian counterparts.[29] Americans thought that the rapid expansion of the Canadian navy from its small prewar size of some two thousand men and thirteen ships to the third-largest allied navy of a hundred thousand men and four hundred ships was likely to have resulted in lessening of the professional influence that a larger corps of long-serving professionals would have brought. Americans at the time believed that this showed to advantage in the Canadian navy's informality, its hard fighting, and its aggressive individualism but

less so as weaknesses in disciplined procedures, routine maintenance, and repair.[30] Its ships also had chronic difficulty in open-ocean underway refueling.[31]

In 1945, Adm. Sir James Somerville, RN, head of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington, wrote the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, Malcolm MacDonald, that an influential American officer had related to him his surprise as a destroyer flotilla commander at having repeatedly to reconcile differences between officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy, when he had expected the Canadians to be intermediaries with the British for the U.S. Navy: "He felt that in many cases friction which arose was due to hypersensitiveness on the part of Canadian Naval Officers, but at the same time he also felt that in certain circumstances British Naval Officers had failed to take due account of Canadians' sensitiveness or the fact that they were a young Navy lacking the experience of the British."[32]

Up to the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American naval officers had given relatively little attention to the other naval forces of the British Empire. Planning code names did exist for Australia (Scarlet), New Zealand (Garnet), and India (Ruby), and the *Monthly Information Bulletin* published one or two short factual reports on the Australian, New Zealand, South African, and Indian navies. There was little to be found, however, on the Straits Settlements Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve or the Malay navy.[33] In the 1930s, war planners did give thought to using Darwin in Australia as a refueling base. In contrast, on the strategic and diplomatic level the Far East had been an important theme in Anglo-American discussions. In 1937 and 1939, during Neville Chamberlain's government, inconclusive Anglo-American naval staff conversations were held on this subject; [34] however, it has been argued persuasively that the search for some means of informal Anglo-American strategic cooperation in the Far East between 1933 and 1939 was instrumental in eventual successful cooperation in the Atlantic and in the European theaters.[35]

In January 1938, the U.S. Navy sent Capt. Royal E. Ingersoll to London for conversations with the Admiralty. Ingersoll reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the British view that

> the UK cannot definitely commit the Dominions in any action in concert with the UK, as the Dominions like to maintain their independent Dominion status. They [the British] feel sure that Canada, Australia and New Zealand will cooperate with them against Japan and that there would be no question that Australia and New Zealand ports could be used by the US, such as the Admiralty Islands (south of the Carolines), which are an Australian mandate.[36]

During his meetings Ingersoll made a series of agreements with Capt. T. S. V. Phillips, head of the Admiralty's War Plans Division. One of the many points agreed on was that the U.S. Navy would be responsible for operations against Japanese trade on the entire west coast of North and South America, including the Panama Canal

and the passage around Cape Horn. It also assumed the general naval defense of the west coast of Canada.[37]

Immediately following the simultaneous, coordinated Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, Manila, Singapore, and Hong Kong on 7/8 December 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt met in Washington for the Arcadia Conference. There, from 24 December 1941 to 14 January 1942, British and American military and civilian leaders reformulated Allied strategy. The existing American RAINBOW FIVE war plan forbade major naval operations in the South Pacific west of 180° west longitude, thus eliminating Australian and New Zealand waters as operational areas. It allowed only minor naval forces to relieve Australian and New Zealand navies of escort and antiraider duties in order to free them to fight in Malayan waters.[38]

The Arcadia Conference changed the situation, creating a new strategic area for the Allies and a new multilateral force to operate in it: ABDA (American, British, Dutch, and Australian) Command, whose mission was to hold Burma, the Malay Barrier, and Australia from the Japanese and to counterattack, driving northward from the Dutch East Indies to recover the Philippines. The Japanese quickly eliminated ABDA in the battle of the Java Sea, but the model for multinational naval cooperation that it represented became a major influence in initiatives in the late 1950s and 1960s undertaken in the U.S. Navy and in NATO by an American naval officer who had served as a junior officer in ABDA Command, Richard G. Colbert.[39]

Details of the close and successful naval cooperation that followed throughout the remainder of World War II must be left aside in this overview.[40] However, it is useful to point out here that the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) essentially functioned as the center for Anglo-American worldwide planning during the war and that in it American naval forces found an effective framework for cooperation with Commonwealth navies.[41] In the immediate postwar years, from 1945 until the formation of NATO in 1949, there were repeated discussions about ways to continue and adapt the cooperative functions of the CCS.

By 1945, many American officials were coming around to the views of British military and naval leaders that the Soviet Union was a matter for future concern and that the continuation of combined Anglo-American policies would be important. In June 1945, Admiral Somerville, then with the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, reported to London that the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, had informally indicated that they were in favor of continuing the close U.S.-British relations. King's successor, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, went further in June 1946, advocating a "coordinated naval policy with appropriate members of the British Commonwealth of Nations" in dealing with the Soviets.[42]

While U.S.-British defense relations had become relatively informal by 1946–47, those between the United States and Canada remained institutionalized through

the Canadian-U.S. joint defense board that had been created in 1940. Canada and the other Commonwealth countries had been represented by the British in the CCS, but the United States now needed a more direct way of cooperating with them. To deal with this issue, the PJBD recommended a combined Canadian-U.S. chiefs of staff; while an attractive idea in itself, the U.S. Joint Chiefs felt that it would be unworkable to make similar arrangements with a wide range of other allies. Instead, therefore, a Joint Canadian-U.S. Military Coordination Committee was established. This group proceeded immediately to develop a command structure that avoided British intermediation.

At the same time, American naval commands were being reorganized on geographical terms to build on wartime experience and remedy issues that had arisen. This new system gave the U.S. Navy a worldwide operational command system that was similar to Britain's prewar and wartime plan, which now needed to be adapted to relationships with Commonwealth countries.[43] Perceptions of the rising Soviet threat in 1946–47 led to a number of possibilities for British-Canadian-U.S. defense relations. In 1948, the Brussels Treaty joined Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in the Western Union, with its Western Union Defence Organisation and Western Chiefs of Staff Committee. The creation of these organizations made clear to both Canada and the United States the need to think more broadly about their mutual and cooperative defense. In December 1948 the United States joined the group negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in 1949.

It took more than two years after the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to build an effective and fully accepted military and naval command structure.[44] That structure merged the naval dimension of national defense into a coordinated arrangement for the geographical, national, and functional assignment of forces. Through this arrangement the U.S. Navy worked with the Canadian navy, which was assigned roles built on its proven capability in antisubmarine warfare and given geographical responsibilities in the northwestern Atlantic (CANLANT). From an American point of view this relationship was a positive one. A commander of the U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet antisubmarine forces and NATO Commander, Western Atlantic and Atlantic (COMWESTLANT and COMOCEANLANT) told Naval War College students, "Fortunately for us we have extremely close cooperation and liaison with CANCOMARLANT in Halifax. We have U.S. officers on his staff, and I am fortunate to have some very fine Canadian Navy and Canadian Air Force officers on my staff and we do work extremely sympatical [*sic*]."[45]

Another important dimension of American perception of Commonwealth navies is that of educational exchanges of officers to staff and war colleges. For example, in 1950 Capt. John F. Davidson, USN, later a rear admiral, was an exchange student at the Canadian National Defence College, in Kingston, Ontario.

For him it was an eye-opening experience, a highlight of his career, and the basis of a much deeper understanding and appreciation of Canada. The United States, under the auspices of the United Nations, had just entered the Korean War. Canadian newspapers were full of criticism of the United States and its foreign and military policy. Against that background, Lester Pearson, then Canada's secretary of state for foreign affairs and later prime minister, visited the Defence College and gave an address, having just returned from Washington, where he had conferred with President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Pearson told his audience in Kingston:

> I want you to know, and I swear you to secrecy until hell freezes over. What you're reading in the paper is the result of my briefing with the press when I returned, but I want you to know what I really said to the President and to the Secretary of State. I said to them that the government of Canada was behind the United States 1,000% about going into Korea with the United Nations and so on. But if that should be known in Canada, the government of Canada would fall the next day. We don't have the benefit of the U.S. system where you've got four years. We would fall the next day if the people of Canada thought that we approved of intervention in Korea. I want you to know.[46]

Such candor was a revelation to Davidson. "That was the first time that I realized that what you read in the paper might not be representative: and that stood me in good stead when I was in political-military policy later."[47] As for Canada's general approach to professional military education, Davidson "liked the systems I saw going on up there," in which prospective officers for all three services attended one entry-level college and went to their respective services in the summer.[48] "I don't think there was too much wrong with that system, because then I think they understood each other better than we do."[49]

U.S. naval relationships with Canada were strengthened in other dimensions as well with Canada's eventual entry into the Korean War, the deployment there of Canadian warships, and at one point the Canadian command of a task element with Australian, Canadian, and American units. They were further developed through the Naval Tripartite Standardization Program of 1950, the establishment of the bilateral North American Air Defense Agreement (NORAD) in 1958, and from 1968, participation alongside other NATO navies in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic.[50]

The United States gave priority after World War II to its naval relationship with Canada as a matter of North American defense. The arrival of NATO gave it added emphasis and focus. However, the renewal of American naval relations with Australia and New Zealand were not long delayed. This came just in time for the first major Cold War crisis that occurred in the Pacific region.

In October 1950, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.K. Chiefs of Staff agreed that working relationships with the navies of Australia and New Zealand on operational matters would be mutually beneficial should they find themselves operating in that region against a common enemy. In due course responsibilities were

shared among the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for convoy routing, reconnaissance, local defense, antisubmarine warfare, and search and rescue within what became known as the ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand, Malaya) region. The scheme was implemented during talks at Pearl Harbor, attended by Adm. Arthur W. Radford (then commanding the Pacific Fleet) for the United States; Vice Adm. John A. Collins, Chief of Naval Staff, of Australia; and Commo. F. A. Balance, Chief of Naval Staff and First Naval Member, of New Zealand.[51] The relationship established through this agreement was strengthened in 1971 when the Royal Australian Navy joined Canada, Britain, and the United States in the NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) for communications and technical cooperation.[52]

Capt. Stephen Jurika, USN, who was the American naval air attaché in Australia during the Radford-Collins talks, later recalled the Australian navy of 1950–51:

> The navy has been assured that its needs will be met, regardless of costs. This is an indication to me that the Australian government recognizes that there is nothing like the Australian Navy in the defense of Australia. The Royal Australian Navy is a young and vigorous service, and its officer personnel do not have the stultified, parochial outlook on the world that so characterizes the average Australian. Cooperation with the U.S. and the Royal navies will keep the RAN abreast of developments both in weapons, equipment, and planning.[53]

For seventy of the past hundred years, Commonwealth navies have worked increasingly closely with the U.S. Navy and made major contributions to mutual national and alliance goals.[54] Relatively few American naval officers over the past century have had the opportunity to see Commonwealth navies up close, and even fewer have spent much time thinking about them; some rough edges remain, but the cooperation has been overwhelmingly successful. Those Americans who have had the opportunity to work with the officers of these navies uniformly praise their professionalism and high morale.

The U.S. Navy's longest and closest relationships among Commonwealth navies have been, aside from the Royal Australian Navy, quite naturally with the nation's neighbor to the north. As a recent U.S. naval attaché in Canada sees it, the roots of this good relationship lie

> in the day-to-day maritime operations in NATO, where we have a history of sailing together side by side for over 60 years with the NATO Standing Maritime Forces—interoperability between our navies is not a new idea. This has evolved into a relationship where Canadian warships regularly operate as an equal partner in a USN Battle Group—a compliment and honor we afford no other nation (not even the UK).[55]

Another former American naval attaché pointed to one of the rough edges: "simple arrogance [on the American part] since we're the guys with the aircraft carriers and big nuclear subs."[56] Yet a third relates the story of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, an American, who arrived in Ottawa in 1995 to tell senior Canadian defense and naval leaders, to the embarrassment of the embassy staff and

naval attaché, "I own 80% of the world's power," and gave the impression that he perceived Canada's forces as insignificant.[57] Of course, there are substantive policy differences and political sensitivities, as well as givens that may be best described in the old Canadian epigrams, that "Some nations have too much history; Canada has too much geography" and that "Being next to the USA is like sleeping with a fat lady; if she rolls over too fast, you are smothered."[58]

Several officers who served with Canadians during the Cold War point out the lack of funding for the naval service. Political leaders seemed to believe that Canada's geographical position between the United States and the Soviet Union would force the Americans to provide for its defense, freeing Canadian politicians to divert defense dollars to social programs.[59] In those decades, American observers often noted that it required many years to obtain approval for procurement of new equipment. Also, they believed, Canadian flexibility in ship procurement was limited by restriction to national shipyards.

Still, American naval officers who have worked closely on a daily basis with the Canadian and other Commonwealth navies tell of how those navies "treasure the special relationship with the U.S. and work very hard to maintain it."[60] These officers point out the closeness of the working relationships they developed and openness with which they were able to communicate and discuss issues with officials. They point also, with continuing appreciation, to the Canadian navy's effective initiative in preparing the ready alert naval squadron for deployment as a response to the 9/11 attack in 2001 and to its skillful procedures for boarding vessels in opposed and hostile situations during the Persian Gulf wars.

American officers have admired without qualification the professionalism of the officers and personnel of Commonwealth navies and their ability to maximize the usefulness of their forces and the seriousness with which they take training. The tradition of naval cooperation that began during World War II in both the Atlantic and the Pacific continued with both Canada and Australia in Korea, with Australia in Vietnam, and carried on to the recent Canadian and Australian naval participation in the Persian Gulf.

NOTES

This is a revised version of the paper presented at the centenary conference for the Royal Canadian Navy held at the Canadian War Museum, in Ottawa, on 4–5 May 2010. It was first published as part of the conference proceedings in the *Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 24, nos. 3–4 (July–October 2014), pp. 157–75, © 2014 Canadian Nautical Research Society. It is used by permission.

1 Robin W. Winks, *The Relevance of Canadian History: U.S. and Imperial Perspectives,* The 1977 Joanne Goodman Lectures (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979), p. 60.

2 Ibid., pp. 22–37.

3 A. T. Mahan "Motives to Imperial Federation," *National Review* and *International Monthly* (May 1902), repr. A. T. Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1902), pp. 89–135.

4 Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect,* p. 134.

5 Lt. Charles C. Rogers, Intelligence Officer, USS *Galena,* "Canada," August 1887, corrected to May 1891, box 5, folder 1, Record Group [hereafter RG] 8, Naval Historical Collection, Newport, RI [hereafter NHC].

6 "Contingency Plan in the Case of War with Great Britain, December 1890," in *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* ed. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977), vol. 3, pp. 559–78.

7 "War Plan, BLUE versus RED," box 49, file 1, RG 8: UNOpP. Army War College Work, 1911–1912, NHC. The U.S. naval officers who participated at the Army War College were Captain McLean and Cdr. N. A. McCully.

8 Ibid., summary, p. 3.

9 Ibid., p. 7.

10 See Elting E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942); William S. Sims, *The Victory at Sea* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1920; repr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984); and William N. Still Jr., *Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I* (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2006).

11 Document 448: Memorandum of the U.S. Naval Advisory Staff, Paris, 7 April 1919, in *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1919,* ed. Michael Simpson, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 130 (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1991), p. 603.

12 Christopher M. Bell, "Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918–1931," *International History Review* 19, no. 4 (1997), pp. 789–808.

13 Ibid., p. 802; Michael Vlahos, *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941,* Historical Monograph 4 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980), pp. 99–112.

14 "War Plan, BLUE versus RED."

15 Canada (1939–1940), pp. 24, 27, box 6, RG 8: D–Department of Intelligence, Studies of Strategic Areas, NHC.

16 Ibid., pt. 1, p. 28.

17 Ibid.

18 Norman Armour, "Canada," lecture, 26 April 1937, with written answers to six questions submitted later (quotation from main text of the lecture), p. 10, box 6, file 2, RG 8, NHC.

19 Ibid., pp. 22, 23.

20 Canada (1939–1940), pp. 24, 27.

21 Ibid.

22 Ritchie Ovendale, *"Appeasement" and the English Speaking World: Britain, the United States, the Dominions, and the Policy of "Appeasement," 1937–1939* (Cardiff, U.K.: Univ. of Wales Press, 1975), pp. 300–14.

23 Document 144: Roosevelt to Davis, 9 November 1934, in *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919–1939,* ed. Michael Simpson, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 155 [156] (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate for the Navy Records Society, 2010), p. 203.

24 Galen Roger Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933–1945: Necessary, but Not Necessary Enough* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 39–40. For the detailed history of the highway project, see Heath Twichell, *Northwest Epic: The Building of the Alaska Highway* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

25 Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance,* pp. 78–79.

26 John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies,* 3rd ed. (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 154.

27 Steven T. Ross, *U.S. War Plans, 1939–1945* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 2000), pp. 18–22.

28 Ibid., p. 24.

29 Patrick Abbazia, *Mr. Roosevelt's Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939–1942* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), p. 99.

30 Ibid., pp. 262–63, 318.

31 Kenneth P. Hansen, "Escort Oilers: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Atlantic," in *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy 10–11 September 2009,* ed. Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones, Historical Monograph 20 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2012), pp. 99–114.

32 Document 468: Somerville to Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald, 12 October [1945], in *The Somerville Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.S.O.,* ed. Michael Simpson, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 134 (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1995), p. 655.

33 For Australia: Office of Naval Intelligence, "Australia, Destroyers Of," *Monthly Information Bulletin,* no. 8 (August 1920), p. 41; and "Naval Policies–Command on Australian Station," *Monthly Information Bulletin,* no. 7 (July 1923), p. 22. For New Zealand: "British Dominions and Naval Defense [New Zealand]," *Monthly Information Bulletin,* no. 10 (October 1922), pp. 22–23; and "New Zealand Naval Defense," *Monthly Information Bulletin,* no. 1 (January 1924), pp. 48-50, no. 6 (June 1927), p. 55, and no. 7 (July 1927), p. 58. For South Africa: "South Africa," *Monthly Information Bulletin,* no. 7 (July 1923), p. 14. For India: "Indian Navy," *Monthly Information Bulletin,* no. 7 (July 1928), p. 29.

34 Malcolm H. Murfett, *Fool-Proof Relations: The Search for Anglo-American Naval Cooperation during the Chamberlain Years, 1937–1940* (Singapore: National Univ. of Singapore Press, 1984).

35 Greg Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933–1939* (London: Frank Cass, 2002).

36 Document 200: Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, January 1938, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919–1939,* p. 267.

37 Document 201: Record of Conversations: Agreed between Capt. T. S. V. Phillips, RN, and Capt. R. E. Ingersoll, USN, 11 January 1938, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919–1939,* p. 278.

38 Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 247.

39 See John B. Hattendorf, "International Naval Cooperation and Admiral Richard G. Colbert: The Intertwining of a Career with an Idea," in *The RCN in Transition, 1910–1985,* ed. W. A. B. Douglas (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1988; rev. and repr. in *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays,* ed. Hattendorf [Malabar, FL: Robert Krieger, 2000], pp. 161–85; further rev. and repr. as "Admiral Richard G. Colbert: Pioneer in Building Global Maritime Partnerships," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 3 [Summer 2008], pp. 109–30), chap. 12.

40 See James Leutze, *Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937–1941* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1977); W. A. B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, and Michael Whitby, *No Higher Purpose,* The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939–1943, vol. 1, pt. 1 (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell, 2002); and Douglas, Sarty, and Whitby, *A Blue Water Navy,* The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1943–1945, vol. 2, pt. 2 (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell, 2007).

41 Richard A. Best, Jr., *"Co-operation with Like-Minded Peoples": British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945–1949* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986), p. 36. On this subject, see Sean M. Maloney, *Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning, 1948–1954* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), chap. 1.

42 Nimitz to Forrestal, 23 July 1946, enclosed in Forrestal to Truman, 25 July 1946, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO; and quoted in Best, *"Co-operation with Like-Minded Peoples,"* p. 32.

43 Maloney, *Securing Command of the Sea,* pp. 51–54.

44 Ibid., p. 75ff; Robert S. Jordan, *Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension* (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 1–34.

45 Vice Adm. Edmund B. Taylor, USN, "Defense on the Atlantic," 10 January 1963, RG 15: Guest Lectures, NHC.

46 John F. Davidson, *Reminiscences of Rear Admiral John F. Davidson, U.S. Navy (Retired),* Oral History 101 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986), p. 257. Copy in NHC.

47 Ibid., p. 258.

48 Ibid., p. 260.

49 Ibid.

50 Thompson and Randall, *Canada and the United States,* pp. 194–96.

51 For a detailed study, see Thomas-Durell Young, *Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, 1951–1986* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), and Thomas-Durell Young, "ANZUS Naval Relations, 1951–85," in *Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy,* ed. T. R. Frame, J. V. P. Goldrick, and P. D. Jones (Kenthurst, NSW, Austral.: Kangaroo, 1991), pp. 296–315.

52 Thomas-Durell Young, *Supporting Future U.S. Alliance Strategy: The Anglo-Saxon or "ABCA" Clue* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1990), pp. 14–18.

53 Stephen Jurika Jr., *The Reminiscences of Captain Stephen Jurika, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired),* Oral History (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 755–57.

54 See Cdr. Barry L. Coombs, USN, *United States Naval Cooperation with Canada,* Strategic Research Department Research Report 2-95 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1995).

55 Capt. Stephen W. Jordan, USN, U.S. naval attaché, USDAO Ottawa, e-mail to John Hattendorf, 18 December 2009.

56 Capt. David G. Clark, USN (Ret.), former U.S. naval attaché, USDAO Ottawa, e-mail to John Hattendorf, 16 December 2009.

57 Capt. James "Randy" Stapleford, USN (Ret.), U.S. naval attaché, USDAO Ottawa, 1995, telephone conversation with John Hattendorf, March 2010.

58 Clark, e-mail to John Hattendorf, 15 December 2009.

59 Clark, e-mail, December 16, 2009; Capt. Duane J. Phillips, USN (Ret.), U.S. naval attaché, USDAO Ottawa, June 2000–May 2003, e-mail to John Hattendorf, 26 February 2010; Capt. John G. Colgan, USN (Ret.), U.S. naval attaché, USDAO Ottawa, August 1981–August 1985, telephone conversation with John Hattendorf, February 2010.

60 Phillips, e-mail, 26 February 2010.

V *"Those Far Distant, Storm-Beaten Ships, upon Which the Grand Army Never Looked"*

The Influence of Sea Power, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the U.S. Naval War College

The American naval officer Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) won worldwide fame in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for his pioneering naval strategic studies of British and French naval history in the period between 1660 and 1815, with particular attention to the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.[1] His most famous book was the 428-page *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783,* published in early May 1890. It has never been out of print since its first publication. Translated into French (1894–96), Russian (1895), German (1896), Japanese (1897), Swedish (1899–1900), Spanish (1900), and most recently Chinese (1997), the volume has had an enormous impact on naval strategic thinking around the world. It laid the foundation for the modern study of naval history and influenced the conduct of naval strategy in the First and Second World Wars.[2] While many of Mahan's ideas have been refined and superseded by later professional thought, it is useful to understand the historical context in which they arose.

The Influence of Sea Power upon History was the first of four volumes that Mahan devoted to the theme of "sea power," a term he coined to draw attention to his abstract concept of maritime power.[3] Little, Brown and Company in Boston, Massachusetts, published all his book-length works in the United States, while Sampson Low produced them in London. The three subsequent volumes in his sea-power series were *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812* (1892);[4] *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain* (1897);[5] and *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812* (1905).[6] An additional volume collected related essays: *Types of Naval Officers Drawn from the History of the British Navy with Some Account of the Conditions of Naval Warfare at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century and of Its Subsequent Development during the Sail Period* (1901).[7] These, along with Mahan's other writings—some fifteen books, 161 journal articles, 109 newspaper articles, and twenty-two contributions to other works—brought "sea power" into wide currency.

Mahan's work on naval strategy and naval command had its immediate origin in an invitation from Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy (1827–1917), to Mahan,

dated 22 July 1884, to take up the position of lecturer in naval history and tactics at the nascent U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island. The Navy would formally establish that institution, under Luce as its first president, several months later, on 6 October 1884. Luce had known Mahan at least since 1862–63, when Mahan had served as a lieutenant under Luce, then head of the Seamanship Department at the U.S. Naval Academy. At that point, the Naval Academy had been temporarily moved away from Annapolis, Maryland, to Newport, away from the fighting in the American Civil War (1861–65). Through this association Luce would have been aware that Mahan's father was Professor Dennis Hart Mahan, a highly influential professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, from 1824 to 1871 whose teaching had had a significant influence on the military leaders on both sides of the Civil War. However, Luce's first choice was not Mahan but rather Lt. Cdr. Caspar F. Goodrich (1847–1925), whom Luce also asked to serve on the formal board of officers convened by the Secretary of the Navy to conceptualize the first plan of study for the Naval War College. On 12 February 1884, Goodrich declined, having just settled in as inspector of ordnance at the Washington Navy Yard after duty in the flagship of the U.S. European Squadron, where he had been an observer of British military and naval operations in Egypt in 1882.[8] Mahan, meanwhile, had drawn Luce's attention with his publication in 1883 of *The Gulf and Inland Waters,* for a series on the history of the U.S. Navy in the Civil War. This work was a straightforward narrative account, with little indication of Mahan's later strategic interests.

When Luce's invitation arrived in September 1884, Mahan was commanding the steam sloop of war USS *Wachusett,* then at Callao, Peru, on the Pacific coast of South America, where the War of the Pacific, between Chile and Peru allied with Bolivia, had just ended. Mahan accepted, and to prepare for it he began a program of general reading in the library of the Phoenix Club in Lima, Peru.[9] On completion of his sea assignment, the Navy Department ordered Mahan to his home in New York City. Mahan reported to Luce in Newport on 20 October 1885, at which time Luce gave him a year's research leave at home, where he had easy access to such resources as the New York Public Library and the New York Yacht Club's library. Luce directed him to shape his researches toward consideration of the interrelationships of naval and military tactics, strategy, diplomacy, and national power.

Luce had in the 1870s, commanding a warship in European waters, met the British naval historian Sir John Knox Laughton (1830–1915) and had been influenced by his "Essay on Naval Tactics";[10] he had been influenced as well by Laughton's 1874 article "The Scientific Study of Naval History."[11] Luce's assignment to Mahan pointed him toward some of Laughton's ideas and led to something dramatically different from all previous major studies of naval history, which had focused on tactical engagements between ships. Later, Mahan "gratefully acknowledged his

indebtedness" to Luce, in print, "for guiding him into a path that he would not himself have found";[12] he assured his readers that whatever success he had achieved in drawing attention to the highest aspects of the naval profession, it "is due, wholly and exclusively, to the Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such studies."[13]

Mahan completed the research for his lecture series in the summer of 1886, in time to travel from New York to Newport in August for the beginning of the College's second course on 6 September. The Navy had acquired a building for the College and the small island in Narragansett Bay on which it stood in 1883, when Luce had succeeded in establishing there the U.S. Navy's first naval recruit training station. The stone building was already sixty-two years old, having been built in 1819–20 as the almshouse for Newport. No longer needing it, the town reluctantly gave the property to the state of Rhode Island, which in turn gave it to the federal government for the Navy's use. Mahan found himself the building's only occupant. "As I walked round the lonely halls and stairways, I might have parodied Louis XIV, and said, *'Le Collège, c'est moi.'*" There was a steward to make his bed and his meals, but "there was but one lamp available, which I had to carry with me when I went from room to room by night; and, indeed, except for the roof over my head, I might be said to be 'camping out.'"[14]

By the end of 1886, Mahan had warmed a bit to his isolated quarters:

> Our position entirely out of [i.e., just outside of] Newport, indeed in the very opposite direction from the fashionable quarter, has advantages of view and air over the latter. The island [Coasters Harbor Island, on which the College stands] which is connected by causeway with the main [island, i.e., Aquidneck Island, where Newport lies] is wind swept and almost treeless but the old house (formerly an almshouse) faces the sea-breeze and looks straight down the narrow entrance through which, over a hundred years ago [in 1778], D'Estaing sailed in with the French fleet under the fire of the English batteries.[15]

In 1886, the College course lasted only two and a half months. The second course, which further developed Luce's initial academic plan, put into effect in 1885, taught nineteen naval officers and two Marine Corps officers. Shortly before Mahan's arrival in Newport, Admiral Luce had been ordered to sea, to command the North Atlantic Squadron. Mahan was therefore Luce's successor as President of the Naval War College as well as (as had been the original intention) its lecturer in naval history and tactics. Luce brought his squadron to Newport in time for the opening of the session and remained for the first ten days, giving College students and faculty a practical connection to the fleet. The only faculty member other than Mahan was U.S. Army first lieutenant Tasker Bliss (1853–1930), who would make his mark as the first commandant of the U.S. Army War College in 1903; as Army Chief of Staff, 1917–18; and as American Permanent Military Representative on the Supreme War Council at Versailles in 1918–19. Soon joining Bliss was a medically retired Navy lieutenant, William McCarty Little (1845–1915), who served as a

volunteer faculty member and in 1886 began to develop a program of war gaming, which like Mahan's work would eventually become a hallmark of the College. Professor James R. Soley from the Naval Academy became the College's first civilian faculty member in 1885, lecturing on international law—thus completing the triad of academic and professional specialties of the new Naval War College: naval history, war gaming, and international law.[16]

Mahan remained at the College from 1886 through the end of the 1888 course, having given his Influence of Sea Power lectures in 1886, 1887, and 1888. He initially resisted the thought of publishing them, thinking that if he did officers would no longer feel a need to come to the College. At the same time, he had become aware of the mounting criticism of the College within the Navy. It was a question not just of enticing officers to request assignment at the College but also of holding off a growing and organized effort to close it. The chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, Congressman Hilary Herbert, did not seem to understand Admiral Luce's innovative idea of a place to study strategy and the highest aspects of warfare. Herbert thought the College was, or should be, a postgraduate school of a type that should be closely associated with the Naval Academy, with its laboratories and other resources for scientific investigation. Opposed to what he considered a redundancy, Herbert announced that he would stop further funding of the College.

Both Mahan and Luce saw immediately that given the natural predilections of naval officers of the day, insertion of technical subjects into the curriculum would quickly overwhelm the broader issues that the College was intended to study. As the College's president, Mahan moved rapidly to defend the intellectual goals of the fledgling institution, but his arguments failed to convince. Mahan later said of Congressman Herbert, "In vain did I try to divert his thoughts. . . . He stopped his ears, like Ulysses, and kept his eyes fixed on the necessity of strangling vipers in their cradle."[17] As a result, the College had no funding in 1887, leaving Mahan to sort through the debris from the conversion of the almshouse into the College and sell bits and pieces to purchase books for the library. Meanwhile, Mahan continued to develop the course, adding some contemporary matters. William McCarty Little moved ahead with his ideas for war gaming, and Mahan's own lectures were well received by the students. Admiral Luce brought the entire North Atlantic Squadron to Narragansett Bay once again to cooperate with the College in what constituted the U.S. Navy's first fleet exercises. By the end of the year, despite the lack of either funding or moral support from Washington, Mahan was pleased with the academic success of the College:

> Whatever the precise state of the case[,] their [the student officers'] ignorance and my success alike testify to the want of [i.e., need for] the College. If I had done as good work as it is generally said, it never would have been done had not the College called upon me, and what they [his students] received is likewise due to its existence. In truth the merit and raison

> d'être of the College is that it supplies an organization by which capable men will be called upon and stimulated to study the almost unknown region of naval war, to digest and systematize its methods and to impart them to others.[18]

Mahan continued to argue the value of the Naval War College as the world's only institution devoted to military and naval theory and not dominated by reference to technological development. Few in Congress understood or supported his point, but those few were concentrated in the House Naval Affairs Committee, where a large majority voted against its chairman in favor of funding the College in 1888. The bill passed in the House of Representatives, but when it got to the Senate for approval, Secretary of the Navy William C. Whitney unexpectedly appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee to ask that the bill be amended, "for reasons of economy and administration," so as to combine and colocate the College with the Naval Torpedo Station's school on nearby Goat Island. Additionally, Secretary Whitney ordered that the four-month-long College course be shortened by a month, as only two lectures were being given a day.

Both Luce and Mahan were livid; clearly the secretary failed to understand the educational approach: not passive learning through lectures but time set apart for students to engage the subject matter actively, by reading and writing. Mahan saw several respects in which the two naval schools might be joined, but, he argued, if "by consolidation is meant the merging of two lines of thought radically distinct and in temper of mind opposed, under a single directing intellect, the result will be the destruction of one or the other."[19]

The War College course for 1888 was in session while all this was going on. In the previous year, Admiral Luce had invited Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), a future president of the United States who had recently been a Republican candidate for mayor of New York City, to lecture at the Naval War College on his 1882 book, *The Naval War of 1812*. This lecture was delivered in September 1888 and created the first personal connection between Roosevelt and Mahan. Thus began what one historian has aptly called an "ambiguous relationship," one based on shared interest initially in naval history and later, in 1897 and 1898, in strategic planning.[20] The "ambiguity" lay in the fact that whereas Mahan thought of himself as a scholar and thinker, Roosevelt saw him as a valuable writer and polemicist. There were also differences in viewpoint between the two men. Nevertheless, they were both advocates of a large navy with modern battleships as something necessary to a major nation. Both also agreed, as arising from Social Darwinist ideas, on the need for overseas naval stations and on the annexation of Hawaii. In addition, both were concerned about the rising power of Germany and Japan.

Despite Mahan's success in Newport classrooms between 1886 and 1889 and the connections he had established there for the future, the Navy Department decided to order him to the Pacific Northwest as head of a commission to select a site for a navy yard. Thus rusticated, Mahan was no longer in a position to fight for the

College. There was some hope that the newly elected Republican administration of President Benjamin Harrison would be friendlier to the Naval War College than its predecessor. In the meantime, however, the class of 1889 was convened at the Torpedo School, where, as predicted, it was quickly overwhelmed by the technical instruction. In March 1889 Congress approved $100,000 for a new building at the Torpedo Station to house the combined Torpedo School and War College.

Admiral Luce, who had just (at the beginning of 1889) retired from active service, returned to his home in Newport and took up the fight. He urged the new Harrison administration to separate the two educational institutions and to have the proposed building constructed next to the old almshouse of Coasters Harbor Island. As it happened, the Naval Torpedo Station was at this point commanded by an ordnance specialist who was a friend of the Naval War College, Cdr. Caspar Goodrich, the man Luce had originally wanted as lecturer in naval history. Goodrich made it a point of honor to fight for the College and keep it alive while it was associated with the Torpedo Station. At the national level, Luce enlisted the help of Rhode Island senator Nelson Aldrich, who in turn interested the new Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin F. Tracy, a fellow Republican. Tracy took immediate action and recommended to Congress that it authorize the construction of the newly funded building on Coasters Harbor Island, on a site that Mahan had earlier selected for it, not on Goat Island with the Torpedo Station. Congress acted favorably on this recommendation on 30 June 1890. Because of the new construction and the move from one island to another, no classes were held in 1890 or 1891, and no students, faculty, or staff were assigned, with the exception of Lt. Cdr. Charles Stockton, who oversaw the work on the building.

Back in the Washington Territory, Mahan had completed his assignment, selecting the site of what eventually became the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. He had also changed his mind about publishing his lectures. With his report submitted, Mahan requested special assignment to his home in New York, there to revise his first series for publication and then produce a second volume carrying the subject through the battle of Trafalgar up to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Mahan was also beginning to give serious thought to continuing beyond his projected second volume to a sea-power series. Accordingly, he wanted to avoid sea duty. The Navy Department granted Mahan's request, to take effect from 30 September 1889.[21]

In the late summer of 1889, he made several approaches through friends and acquaintances to find a publisher, but to little avail. The process was one that "both distracts, vexes, and hinders me in my other work," Mahan wrote;[22] in the end, however, his friends succeeded in making the necessary connections. Lieutenant McCarty Little, who had wargamed the battle diagrams for the book, became Mahan's conduit to Little, Brown in Boston, which by mid-October had agreed. At that point, Mahan realized that the prospects for a follow-on volume depended

on the success of this first.[23] When *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* duly appeared, in May 1890, Luce, Laughton, and Roosevelt wrote the first reviews, all anonymously.[24] A fourth soon appeared in the *New York Times;* that reviewer has yet to be identified.[25]

Sending Admiral Luce a copy of his new book, Mahan wrote, "Whatever usefulness the book may [be] found to have, the merit is ultimately due to yourself, but for whose initiation it would never have been undertaken. But for the impulse you gave, I should still have been contented to drift on, smitten by the indifference to higher military considerations, which is too common in the service."[26] At the same time, Mahan admitted to Congressman (later Senator) Henry Cabot Lodge (1850–1924) that his work on the book had fundamentally changed his own views. "There is a very common impression that naval conditions are so changed, that they [i.e., historical lessons] are practically obsolete for present usefulness. I believe that this feeling, which I once shared, is very erroneous. My own opinions have undergone much modification through careful study of the past."[27]

While many admired his *Influence of Sea Power upon History,* critics noted that it was based on secondary sources. John Knox Laughton wrote privately to Luce, "I hope that I shall be able to do Capt Mahan justice [i.e., in his review, which would appear that October] on this side of the water. His chapters on strategy and policy are excellent; the details of his history he has, I think, taken too exclusively from French sources, and many are inaccurate."[28] In light of these criticisms Mahan determined to make better use of primary sources. His use of such materials led to a much better analysis but also meant he could not cover the range of 123 years in 428 pages as he had in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Using a more detailed approach, the new book would cover nineteen years and require two volumes with a total of 808 pages. Along with this, Mahan had to deal now with a very different strategic situation: no longer competing national naval strategies as between 1660 and 1783 but rather a major sea power attempting to defeat a major land power.[29]

From time to time between 1889 and 1892 Mahan was called on for his opinions about the Naval War College, but he had no direct responsibility for it. He began to capitalize on Admiral Luce's friendship with Laughton to locate source materials for his new lecture series and book.[30] Mahan had expected to be called on to lecture at Newport in 1890 and 1891; he was pleased, when no classes were convened, to have the additional time. As he later recalled, "The College slumbered and I worked."[31]

In February 1892 the Navy Department ordered Mahan to his second tour of duty as President of the Naval War College, with the personal encouragement and support of Secretary Tracy. Allowed to remain at his home long enough to complete his writing, Mahan left Commander Stockton to see the new building through to completion, which occurred in May 1892. About the same time, the Navy Department relieved the tense local situation by transferring the College from the

administrative oversight of the Torpedo Station and the Bureau of Ordnance to that of the Bureau of Navigation and specifically the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, James Soley, a former faculty member. During the spring and early summer of 1892 Mahan completed the draft of his new series of lectures, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, and in July returned to Newport to take direct responsibility for the College and prepare for a new class to convene in September.

His new series of lectures had, and his book based on it has, two principal arguments.[32] The first is his naval strategic argument, encapsulated in his famous description of the Royal Navy's blockading operations:

> They were dull, weary, eventless months, those months of watching and waiting of the big ships before the French arsenals. Purposeless they surely seemed to many, but they saved England. The world has never seen a more impressive demonstration of the influence of sea power upon its history. Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world. Holding the interior positions they did, before—and therefore between—the chief dockyards and detachments of the French navy, the latter could unite only by a concurrence of successful evasions, of which the failure of any one nullified the result.[33]

Mahan's second, equally important point was his economic argument, summarized in another passage:

> The strength of Great Britain could be said to lie in her commerce only as, and because, it was the external manifestation of the wisdom and strength of the British people, unhampered by any control beyond that of a government and institutions in essential sympathy with them. In the enjoyment of these blessings,—in their independence and untrammelled pursuit of wealth,—they were secured by their powerful navy; and so long as this breastplate was borne, unpierced, over the heart of the great organism, over the British islands themselves, Great Britain was—not invulnerable—but invincible. She could be hurt indeed, but she could not be slain.[34]

The 1892 course lasted only seven weeks, but on its completion Mahan's lectures were already in press at Little, Brown. In early December, Mahan informed Secretary Tracy that the publisher was sending him a copy of the new work: "It deals with the French Revolutionary period, and analyzes critically all the most celebrated naval operations, including the whole of Nelson's. . . . The work is the one upon which my own reputation must rest, as well as my claims upon the future consideration of the Department, in determining my employments. That I have been able to complete it is due wholly to your support—I may say even to your protection."[35] Secretary Tracy reciprocated the sentiments in his official report to Congress, noting that "the department is deeply impressed with the importance of the College to the Navy, as a means of insuring the development of the science of naval warfare as distinguished from the development of the naval material."[36]

The plaudits were short-lived. The chief of the Bureau of Navigation was the hostile Cdre. Francis M. Ramsay (1835–1914), who held that the proper higher education for officers would be a direct continuation of the Naval Academy's scientific curriculum. "The present War College system has very much the appearance

of a farce," he wrote.[37] In November 1892 a national general election returned the Democratic Party to power, bringing President Grover Cleveland back to the White House on 25 March 1893. Cleveland's new Secretary of the Navy was none other than Hilary Herbert, the former chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, whose opposition to the College was already well known. The new assistant secretary was William McAdoo, a former congressman and member of Herbert's committee, who charged that the supposed war college was "really a dancing school" for those who "find quite a romantic charm in sometimes strolling on the shining beach with the epauletted, embryonic admirals of our decaying and dilapidated Navy."[38]

Within two months the Navy Department ordered Mahan back to sea duty, despite his protests that he could better serve the Navy by continuing his contributions to professional naval literature.[39] On 11 May 1893, Mahan took command at New York of one of the largest ships in the U.S. Navy, the eight-year-old protected cruiser USS *Chicago*. Shortly thereafter, Rear Adm. Henry Erben was appointed commander in chief of the U.S. Navy's European station, flying his flag in *Chicago*. The Navy Department sent the ship on a largely ceremonial cruise, to return the naval courtesies of European countries in marking the four-hundredth anniversary in 1892 of Columbus's discovery of America.

Admiral Erben, sharing the new administration's views, had little sympathy for Mahan and no interest in his historical work. He, like Ramsay, believed that Mahan's writing signified his complete loss of interest in the naval profession. Nevertheless, and despite some tension between the admiral and his flag captain, the eighteen-month cruise proved a triumph for Mahan. His works were already widely known, and while Mahan was still crossing the Atlantic Professor Laughton was preparing his reception by lecturing at the Royal United Services Institution on "recent naval literature."[40] Mahan's already extensive knowledge of European history and current affairs was widened further by visits and conversations with senior military and civil officials in England, France, Germany, Belgium, Gibraltar, Spain, Italy, Malta, Syria, and Turkey.

In 1894, when *Chicago* anchored off the Isle of Wight during Cowes Week, Queen Victoria invited both Erben and Mahan to the annual state dinner at Osborne House. Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, who had brought the imperial yacht *Hohenzollern* to the occasion, was also present, as was the Duke of York, the future George V. During another week, in Southampton, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Spencer, gave a large formal dinner, where many praised Mahan's writings. In June, while *Chicago* was moored in Antwerp, Mahan returned briefly to England, where on the 18th he received an honorary degree at Cambridge. There he spent a few hours, then it was on to Oxford, where he spent the night of the 19th at Trinity College. The next day he received an honorary degree in the Sheldonian Theatre,

followed by lunch at the university's All Souls College and dinner at Christ Church. On both occasions Mahan wore his full-dress uniform, with gold lace and cocked hat—but without epaulettes, to avoid any chance of tearing his scarlet doctoral gown with crimson silk sleeves.[41]

There were other things on Mahan's mind aside from academic, social, and official functions. More than a year before, he had requested Commodore Ramsay at the Bureau of Navigation (which handled the assignment of naval officers) to allow him to devote himself to his historical studies and not be sent to sea: "The complicated administration of a large modern ship of war is a task too absorbing to admit of sustained mental effort in another direction."[42] Yet now, in command of *Chicago,* Mahan could not avoid thinking about the sequel to his *Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*. As early as June 1893, Mahan wrote to his publisher proposing a life of Lord Nelson, having already traced the outline of the admiral's campaigns in his most recent book. For Mahan, Nelson's biography would be not merely the story of an individual but rather a continuation of the themes of his two sea-power books, adding to them the idea of Nelson exercising sea power as an agent of the state. Mahan's study for *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire* had convinced him that the eventual British victory had not been predetermined:[43] "As in every contest where the opponents are closely matched, where power and discipline and leadership are nearly equal, there was a further question: which of the two would make the first and greatest mistakes, and how ready the other party was to profit by his errors. In so even a balance, the wisest prophet cannot foresee how the scale will turn."[44] Little, Brown was agreeable, but in his new work Mahan was to find once again that he needed to increase his research in primary sources; he turned for assistance to John Knox Laughton.

Mahan's study of Nelson was not to appear until 1897, after his retirement from forty years of active service. In it he would conclude that the key elements of effective naval leadership were personal intelligence, understanding of sound military principles, and resolution in action. "Reasoning of a very high order illuminates Nelson's mental processes," Mahan argued, "but it is not in the power of reason, when face to face with emergency, to bridge the chasm that separates perception, however clear, from the inward conviction which alone sustains the loftiest action."[45] Mahan underscored his point with Nelson's own words: "Yet do not imagine I am one of those hot brained people, who fight at an immense disadvantage, *without an adequate object.*"[46]

Mahan's sea duty in USS *Chicago* was arduous, but it also was a time for useful practical research, steaming through the same waters Nelson, his next subject, had. The cruise was also triumphal, and news reports of Mahan's reception in Europe gradually arrived in the United States and added to his growing reputation at home. However, the greatest victory that Mahan achieved in these months was one that

From the Preface, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*
(Volume 1, pages v–vi)

Thus, in its course, the author's former work, without abandoning its first simple motive, expanded into an attempt to analyze the strategic conduct of the naval campaigns, as well as the tactical features of the various battles—all too few—in which any clear tactical purpose was shown by the commanders engaged. The cordial reception given to the work by his professional brethren, in Great Britain as well as at home, has been to him not only most gratifying, but wholly unexpected. Its chief significance is, however, not personal. The somewhat surprised satisfaction testified is virtually an admission that, in the race for material and mechanical development, sea-officers as a class have allowed their attention to be unduly diverted from the systematic study of the Conduct of War, which is their peculiar and main concern. For, if the commendation bestowed be at all deserved, it is to be ascribed simply to the fact that the author has been led to give to the most important part of the profession an attention which it is in the power of any other officer to bestow, but which too few actually do.

That the author has done so is due, wholly and exclusively, to the Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such studies. If further success attend his present venture, it is his hope that this avowal may help to assure the long uncertain fortunes of the College, to which—and to its founder, Rear-Admiral Stephen B. Luce—he gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness for guiding him into a path he would not himself have found.

October 1892
A. T. MAHAN

occurred back in the United States. He was in England at the time and received the first reports while *Chicago* was moored at Southampton in August 1893. Earlier that month Secretary of the Navy Herbert had boarded the dispatch boat USS *Dolphin* at Washington to make the passage up the eastern seaboard to inspect the naval activities at Newport. Herbert left Washington with every intention of closing down the Naval War College. En route, however, the commanding officer of *Dolphin*, Lt. Benjamin Buckingham, suggested to Secretary Herbert that he might pass the time during their passage northward reading Mahan's recently published *Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*.

Buckingham lent the secretary his own copy; upon returning to Washington, Herbert called him into his office to return it. "This book alone is worth all the money that has been spent on the Naval War College," Herbert declared, having completely reversed his earlier opinions. "When I embarked on this cruise, I had fully intended to abolish the College; now I intend to do all in my power to sustain it."[47] And so it was that Alfred Thayer Mahan's books on sea power were both the products and the saviors of the Naval War College in the first decade of its existence.

Mahan's reach and influence went far beyond that, however. He had chosen to examine the naval wars between 1660 and 1815 not only because they were the most recent major naval wars but also because he found them suggestive of parallels with his own time. Mahan's arguments were deeply nuanced with regard to historical circumstances, but others used his name and work to promote much more rigid and doctrinaire views of decisive fleet battle. To American readers, Mahan's works complemented Frederick Jackson Turner's 1893 essay "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," as suggesting the path the country should follow

upon the closing of the frontier. Mahan's argument that, historically, navies have existed to protect colonies and maritime trade resonated with leading American politicians of his time, including Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, who saw in Mahan's work lessons for the nation's naval power and overseas expansion. For many British readers, Mahan's work explained and confirmed their faith in the Royal Navy as central to their dominant world power, while in Germany, Japan, and other countries Mahan's work was used to confirm a perceived need to build large battleship navies that could fight future climacteric fleet battles.

NOTES Originally published in *The Trafalgar Chronicle: Journal of The 1805 Club,* no. 25 (2015), pp. 11–28, reprinted by courtesy of the editor and The 1805 Club.

1 John B. Hattendorf, ed., *The Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahan's* The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991).

2 John B. Hattendorf and Lynn C. Hattendorf, comps., *A Bibliography of the Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1986). Entry A2 lists all editions and translations of the work up to 1986.

3 Mahan to Roy B. Marston, 19 February 1897, in *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* ed. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 493–94.

4 Hattendorf and Hattendorf, *Bibliography of the Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* Entry A4.

5 Ibid., Entry A6.

6 Ibid., Entry A12.

7 Ibid., Entry A10.

8 Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 1, p. 577 note 2. See also Caspar F. Goodrich [Lt. Cdr., USN], *Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1883, 1885).

9 Larrie D. Ferreiro, "Mahan and the 'English Club' of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History,*" *Journal of Military History* 72, no. 3 (2008), pp. 901–906.

10 John Knox Laughton, "Essay on Naval Tactics," in Gerard H. U. Noel [Cdr., RN], *The Gun, Rum, and Torpedo* (Portsmouth, U.K.: J. Griffin, 1874).

11 John Knox Laughton, "The Scientific Study of Naval History," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution* 18 (1874), pp. 508–27. On Laughton, see Andrew D. Lambert, *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession* (London: Chatham House, 1998), and Lambert, ed., *Letters and Papers of Professor Sir John Knox Laughton, 1830–1915,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 143 (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate for the Navy Records Society, 2002).

12 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1892), vol. 1, p. vi.

13 Ibid., pp. v–vi.

14 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life* (New York: Harper, 1907), p. 293.

15 Mahan to Samuel A. Ashe, 3 October 1886, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 1, p. 636.

16 John B. Hattendorf, B. M. Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars,* 2nd ed. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, forthcoming), chap. 2.

17 Mahan, *From Sail to Steam,* p. 297.

18 Mahan to Ashe, 14 November 1887, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 1, p. 646.

19 Mahan to Cdre. John G. Walker, 13 October 1888, in ibid., p. 661.

20 Richard W. Turk, *The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987).

21 Mahan to Walker, 19 August 1889, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 1, p. 701.

22 Mahan to Rear Admiral Luce, 21 September 1889, in ibid., p. 708.

23 Mahan to Luce, 16 October 1889, in ibid., p. 714.

24 [Stephen B. Luce], "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," review of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History,* by Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Critic* 17, no. 343 (22 July 1890), pp. 41–42; repr. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, eds., *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1975), pp. 101–103. [John Knox Laughton], "Captain Mahan on Maritime Power," review of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History,* by Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Edinburgh Review,* no. 352 (October 1890), pp. 420–53. [Theodore Roosevelt], "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," review of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History,* by Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Atlantic Monthly* 66, no. 396 (1890), pp. 563–67.

25 "Sea Power in History," review of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History,* by Alfred Thayer Mahan, *New York Times,* 19 April 1891, p. 19, cols. 2–4.

26 Mahan to Luce, 7 May 1890, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 2, p. 10.

27 Mahan to Henry Cabot Lodge, 19 May 1890, in ibid., p. 11.

28 John Knox Laughton to Luce, 12 August 1890, in Lambert, *Letters and Papers of Professor Sir John Knox Laughton.*

29 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press; Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), pp. 32–34.

30 Mahan to Luce, 31 December 1890, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 2, p. 11; Luce to Laughton, 10 November and 7 December 1890, in Lambert, *Letters and Papers of Professor Sir John Knox Laughton,* pp. 69–70.

31 Mahan, *From Sail to Steam,* p. 303.

32 Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy,* pp. 33–34.

33 Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,* vol. 2, p. 118.

34 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 327.

35 Mahan to Benjamin F. Tracy, 7 December 1892, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 2, p. 89.

36 U.S. Navy Dept., *Report of the Secretary of the Navy . . . 1892* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1892), p. 57.

37 F. M. Ramsay to H. C. Taylor, in Albert Gleaves [Rear Adm., USN], *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College* (New York: Putnam, 1925), p. 187.

38 Quoted in J. A. S. Grenville and G. B. Young, *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873–1917* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), p. 21.

39 Mahan to Ramsay, 17 March and 18 April 1893, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 2, pp. 98, 102.

40 Reprinted as Laughton, "Recent Naval Literature," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution* 37 (1893), pp. 1161–82.

41 Mahan to Ellen Evans Mahan, 20 June 1894, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 2, p. 290.

42 Mahan to Ramsay, 17 March 1893, in ibid., p. 98.

43 Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy,* pp. 35–39.

44 Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,* vol. 2, p. 201.

45 Mahan, *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), vol. 2, p. 324.

46 Ibid., p. 305. Emphasis original.

47 Doris Maguire, ed., *French Ensor Chadwick: Selected Letters and Papers* (Washington, DC: Univ. Press of America, 1981), pp. 178–79. See also Mahan to Ellen Mahan, 14 August 1893, in Seager and Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* vol. 2, p. 142; and Mahan to Luce, 14 August and 1 September 1893, in ibid., pp. 144–45.

Part 2: Early Modern Europe

VI *Navies and Naval Operations* 1400–1815

Typically, historians have described navies and naval operations as nation-state activities within a specific part of the spectrum of armed conflict and violence at sea. The traditional historiographical focus has been on naval activities at sea that a state directly controls and directs, with state-owned, state-hired, or purpose-built warships. In work based on these interpretations of naval operations, the primary historical focus was on battles at sea between fleets, squadrons, or individual ships of similar types; "naval operations" were distinct from the maritime activities that private business enterprises, chartered companies, political groups, individual leaders, or warlords might carry out. Such other forms of violence at sea included piracy, buccaneering, filibustering, and hijacking, activities that navies have, from time to time, worked to combat and control.[1] Throughout the early modern period, states purposefully encouraged privateering and corsairing as complementary to naval operations in economic warfare. Scholarship on related subjects has been marred by frequent failure to define terms, to look with care at the translation of foreign words, and to understand the pertinent legal systems.[2]

The traditional historiographical understanding of naval power and naval operations derives from several practices and influences. Until the late twentieth century, writers tended to examine navies and naval operations from the limited viewpoint of a specific nation's history or through the biography of national naval heroes. For example, in Dutch naval literature Gerard Brandt's 1687 biography of Adm. Michiel de Ruyter was an early model.[3] In the English language, the secretary of the Admiralty, Josiah Burchett, published in 1720 the first British national naval history.[4] Like the heroic biographies, Burchett's work focused on heroes, battles, and tactics and so exemplified the early approach to naval history. This approach dominated through the late nineteenth century, marking the work of such writers as William James, Johannes Cornelis de Jonge, William Hepworth Dixon, Charles de La Roncière, Georges Lacour-Gayet, and the many British authors who wrote biographical studies of Admiral Lord Nelson and his battles from as early as 1802.[5] Even today, biographical studies of naval heroes continue to represent a significant proportion of published naval history.

In an early attempt to change the emphasis on heroes and battles, Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas in his 1847 history of the Royal Navy divided naval history into two categories, civil and military, and made pioneering use of original manuscripts for the medieval and early modern periods.[6] Half a century later, Michael Oppenheim devoted an entire volume to English naval administration between 1509 and 1660, connecting it to merchant shipping.[7] Another major effort to shift the focus began in late-nineteenth-century Britain and the United States with the writings of Sir John Knox Laughton, Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett. These four highly influential figures were either naval officers or civilian scholars closely associated with navies. They studied early modern naval history as offering the most recent major naval wars before their own time. All were concerned to create a scientific approach, distilling principles of naval strategy and operations for contemporary and future naval application.[8] In the twentieth century, many naval historians continued to work generally along the lines that these Anglo-American historians had used: national history, the role of the navy in the rise of their respective nation-states, decisive naval battle, and exemplary, heroic national naval commanders. These writers were also typically professional naval men who combined nationalistic impulses with a desire to prove the historical importance of naval power in a way that reinforced naval development in the authors' own nations and times.[9] Others, in a more antiquarian vein, continued the tradition centered on naval heroes and detailed technical descriptions of battles, with lists of warships and with their dimensions and armaments.[10]

Two major historiographical issues arose out of all this in the naval historiography of the early modern period. First, naval historians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries limited themselves to the latter part of that era, drawing their conclusions and basing their understandings of navies and naval operations from the middle and late seventeenth century, the Anglo-Dutch and the Anglo-French naval wars between 1689 and 1815. They saw in these years the origin of modern navies and gave little attention to the earlier—but actually formative—two and a half centuries between ca. 1400 and ca. 1650.

Second, such writers as Mahan and the German political economist Max Weber asserted for individual nation-states a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Arguing from concepts of public law found in Jean Bodin's 1576 *Les Six Livres de la République* and Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* of 1651, Mahan and other naval writers held that by the end of the early modern period states had reserved permanently to themselves the rightful use of violence at sea, for purposes that included the eradication of buccaneering and piracy.[11] The 1856 Paris Declaration on Maritime Law, the first multinational attempt to codify in peacetime a set of rules for maritime warfare, underscored the role of the state. The signatories rejected privateering and otherwise contributed to the late-nineteenth-century liberal thinking

on international and maritime affairs that led to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Such developments influenced naval historians of the time who were looking for practical lessons in history for naval practitioners. Naval affairs during the early twenty-first century have begun to suggest to historians, however, that any national monopoly over violence at sea was not permanent. Moreover, scholars have begun to argue that this understanding has been overstated even for the early modern period.[12]

In the mid-twentieth century, a new interpretative factor appeared on the scene. Michael Roberts's 1956 inaugural lecture "The Military Revolution, 1560–1660" set off a widespread debate among military historians and naval professionals, some of whom sought to find a similar naval revolution.[13] The historiographical discussion first moved toward changes in technology as a reflection of a revolution in naval affairs. The pacifist scholar Carlo Cipolla, who thought revolutions an impolite and irrational way of settling issues, nevertheless led the way with his study of technological innovation and the early phases of European imperial expansion.[14] In another influential study, John Guilmartin pointed out how advancing technology brought about a fundamental change in sixteenth-century naval warfare in the Mediterranean.[15] Historians such as Guilmartin, Richard Barker, Geoffrey Parker, and Andrew Thrush all pointed to technological innovations that marked vital turning points in early modern naval history.[16] Parker went much farther, to argue that "a revolution in naval warfare occurred in early modern Europe which was no less important than that by land, for it opened the way to the exercise of European hegemony over most of the world's oceans for much of the modern period."[17] N. A. M. Rodger urged scholars to make a more careful evaluation, to achieve a better understanding of the links between naval developments and the nature of the national societies that supported navies, the character of their governments, and the types of naval operations involved.[18] More recently, Louis Sicking has argued, contrarily, that none of this amounted to a revolution in naval affairs. There were fundamental technological, organizational, operational, and tactical changes for navies, but they took place over three centuries and constituted an *evolution,* not a *revolution*.[19]

In the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, scholars have come to see the naval history of the period between the beginning of the fifteenth century and the early nineteenth century in two separate segments. The two centuries from 1450 to 1650 were the formative period when navies developed from their medieval character into a protomodern form, while in the 165-year span between 1650 and 1815 modern navies emerged. Where nineteenth-century historians focused singularly on battles and tactics, the latest scholarship has explored a range of categories, understanding navies as forming complex organizations.

Modern historians are careful to point out variations in these respects among navies in different parts of the world. To date, only one scholar, however, has been successful in analyzing this period in a national naval history in terms that bring the numerous strands together in a single work. N. A. M. Rodger's multivolume *Naval History of Britain* does this by interweaving—in alternating chapters or parts of chapters—descriptive analyses of what he identifies as the fundamental elements of the navy's role in broader national history: policy, strategy, and operations; finance, administration, and logistics, including technical and industrial support; social history; and the material elements of navies (ships and weapons).[20] At the time of writing, no other scholar has used this approach to deal with the multidimensional and complex character of another navy or in a comparison of navies.

The historical monographs employing the newer approaches to naval history sort themselves into seven broad areas, which will be discussed in turn in the remainder of this essay:

- The relationship of navies to state formation and to the rise of the fiscal-bureaucratic state for the support and administration of fleets
- The development of maritime strategic thinking
- Technology and the development of naval architecture for warships
- The development of naval tactics for battle
- The range of naval operations, including trade warfare and privateering
- The development of international law touching on war at sea
- The development of sea officers and sailors who specialized in naval affairs

NAVIES, STATE FORMATION, AND THE FISCAL-BUREAUCRATIC STATE

In the fifteenth century, navies were, in the medieval fashion, not entirely controlled by princes. A sovereign typically owned only a few vessels, if any. When a medieval king needed to arm a fleet for some specific purpose, such as an expedition to France, officials had to impress or hire vessels for particular periods. By the fourteenth century this system was extremely sophisticated. Edward III of England regularly assembled fleets of more than four hundred vessels; between 1345 and 1347, he probably managed to assemble over a thousand merchant ships for a variety of war fleets.[21] In the following century, King Henry V of England owned only eighteen vessels around the time of Agincourt in 1415. Modern historians estimate that there were in his expedition between 700 and 750 ships of various sizes, 36 percent of them hired abroad (chroniclers of the day reported between 1,500 and 1,600). Over his reign, Henry V's royal warships ranged in size from *Grace Dieu* (1,400 to 1,500 tons, completed in 1420) to two "great ships" (five to seven hundred tons displacement), to five-oared balingers (twenty-four to sixty tons).[22] Under Edward IV in the 1470s, there was, probably due to political instability, no "keeper of the king's ships" responsible for managing the Crown vessels. (By contrast with medieval ship sizes, in the eighteenth century the largest warships in Europe were

to reach three thousand tons. Where in the 1650s and 1660s warships of a thousand to 1,500 tons were regarded as giants, a century later such a ship would be too small to sail in the line of battle.)[23]

In the fifteenth century there was not yet a standing navy in England, as England and other countries would have by the seventeenth century, and as some already did. English kings in this period did not need a standing navy, thanks to how effectively they could requisition large fleets of merchant vessels, say, four hundred to 750, manned by over sixteen thousand men.[24] The English Crown could ship armies of ten thousand men and twice that number of horses to France during the Hundred Years' War. This was possible because ordinary merchant vessels, usually employed for trade, sufficed for naval purposes; few English ships were designed or built specifically as warships. There was one notable exception, Henry V's *Grace Dieu,* laid down in 1418 as a warship and never used in a commercial capacity. At 1,500 tons, she was the largest English warship built until the 1600s.[25] To maintain vessels of increasing size, England under Henry VII built at Portsmouth in 1495 the first recorded dry dock, where the carrack *Mary Rose* was constructed in 1509. Elsewhere in northern Europe, France had active royal shipyards and purpose-built bases dating from 1293–95, during the reign of Philip IV: the *clos des galées* at Rouen and its offshoot, Harfleur. Such works represented the initial infrastructure for naval development through the fiscal-military state.

The Habsburg Netherlands between 1488 and 1558 illustrates an intermediate situation. A series of "Ordinances on the Admiralty," the creation of the office of Admiral General of the Netherlands, and the establishment of a small royal fleet at Veere evidenced the Habsburg objective of gaining control over armed violence at sea. Conflicts of interest among seafarers, merchants, the admiral general, and the central government led to a failure to achieve centralized management, but these initiatives did foreshadow later developments in the Spanish Netherlands and the province of Holland.[26]

In southern Europe, Genoa, like England, relied on private armed vessels until 1559, when it began to create a state fleet.[27] In contrast, Venice had long maintained state shipbuilding facilities and in the late fifteenth century expanded them further, with the Arsenale Nuovissimo.[28] Practice varied widely in both northern and southern Europe as to the centralization of control and maintenance of naval forces until the sixteenth century, when change seems to have come with heavy guns in warships. These weapons could not be easily employed in ordinary merchantmen, which accordingly became less useful. In England's campaigns in 1512–14, King Henry VIII used most of the merchant ships taken up for war service only for carrying supplies; only the largest and best armed were useful in combat and offensive operations. Heavy ordnance also changed the balance between armament and manning, as the number of gunners needed for each weapon increased.[29]

The rise of the fiscal-bureaucratic state significantly changed European history, bringing with it a new sophisticated, innovative, and entrepreneurial form of organization that transformed the nation and the control of armed forces. The change came first in early modern Europe. As Jan Glete describes it, the fiscal-bureaucratic state was in essence a double contractual relationship: between rulers and society and between rulers and the armed forces. The rulers raised their financial resources by taxes on their subjects in exchange for the stability and security, both at home and abroad, their subjects needed to pursue their own interests. To deliver that stability and security, the rulers used the funds they raised to pay the armed forces.

Three stages in the rise of this new type of state organization can be discerned. First, the years 1480–1560 saw increased domestic peacefulness within states in parallel with rising cooperation, within countries, along with improved organizations for tax and fiscal matters. Gunpowder weapons came into use in this period, rendering obsolescent older forms of static defense (i.e., fortifications) and placing a premium on mobile armed forces, including permanent navies. Only wealthy states could afford such technological innovations, and this too enhanced the process of centralization within states.

The second phase of the transition period, from the 1560s to 1660s, was marked by domestic political crises that transformed the state, aggregating power into large and complex governmental administrative organizations. The third phase, during the latter half of the seventeenth century, saw a rapid rise of permanent naval forces. In the period up to 1570, the total displacement tonnage of all European state navies was about 200,000 tons. Growth was moderate for a century; in 1650 naval tonnage was slightly less than 300,000 tons. Twenty-five years later, in 1675, the total was suddenly 500,000 tons. By 1700 it had reached 800,000 tons.[30]

The warship of the Mediterranean states was the traditional galley. The Mediterranean was at the center of European trade, commerce, and culture; regional navies grew until the 1570s and were the largest in Europe. The Ottoman, Spanish, and Venetian navies were the principals, alongside such smaller and specialized forces as those of the Order of St. John at Malta and the Sacred Military Order of St. Stephen at Florence.[31]

The first sailing ship navies were small and existed on the periphery of the continent—in Portugal, England, Denmark-Norway, and Sweden. These navies grew out of their sovereigns' dynastic ambitions and selling of protection. Portugal was the first to develop a long-distance capability for its growing overseas trading empire.[32] States that controlled the most shipping—Spain, Venice, Genoa, the Netherlands, and the northern German states—only slowly turned to sailing ship navies.[33] Among these, however, emerged fiscal-military bureaucratic states, able to attempt to monopolize the use of armed force.[34] Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden represent three quite differing models for the development of a fiscal-military state.

In contradiction to some scholarly interpretations, Glete argues that Spain was the first fiscal-military state, by virtue of its initial successful combination of aggregating internal interests and building government organizations. Yet, in contrast to those of others, Spanish attempts at innovation in this area in the mid-seventeenth century failed. Spain's resources were not irretrievably exhausted, but, Glete argues, it failed because the basis of its efforts was not a central governmental organization but a network of private entrepreneurs, aristocrats, and city elites that came to control the nation's military and naval structure.[35]

The Dutch Republic provides an example of a bourgeois military-fiscal state. The Dutch political and economic systems were advantageous for the development of complex organizations. The government-chartered East India and West India Companies carried on trade and protected it—in both Asian and American waters. Dutch society had relatively little internal strife and encouraged cooperative entrepreneurial activity. (Later, Voltaire would note a comparable situation in England.)[36] The several Dutch admiralties' ability to tax trade funded a core standing naval force.[37]

Sweden, in contrast to the Dutch Republic, was a dynastic fiscal-military state. The development of robust organizational structure gave the Swedish state an advantage over others. Its abilities to mobilize resources, aggregate political interests, and maintain coherent armed units over the long term were supported by officers and bureaucrats who developed professional skills and who, along with aristocrats, identified their interests with the state and were therefore loyal to it. As long as these factors held, they radically transformed northern Europe and produced a naval force that dominated the Baltic.

In 1918, Joseph Schumpeter argued—in a precursor to Roberts's 1956 concept of "military revolution"—that the power of the state to tax stemmed from the need in early modern Europe to support standing armies. In 2004, Jürgen Backhaus, N. A. M. Rodger, and others examined the applicability of Schumpeter's thesis to navies, which were vastly more expensive.[38] The group found no evidence of a tax-financed early modern navy. Rather, its examination suggested, various and differing influences gave rise to navies in different states. These factors included the interrelationship of sea power with overseas trade, indirect taxation, royal patronage, and the increasing efficiency and adaptability of bureaucracies.[39] These scholars demonstrated that navies and naval power played a role in the consolidation of separate, autonomous cities and groups into a continent of territorial states. The process, however, may have been more complicated for northern European states than Glete suggested. British historians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries argue that France and England developed national identities and "states" in response to the Hundred Years' War, before either had a true navy.[40]

Another element of the emerging modern state, naval bureaucracy—and with it government-owned dockyards and burgeoning private enterprises for the support of navies—became a distinctive feature of this era.[41] Further studies have begun to examine the interrelationship between the state and commercial entrepreneurs in the form of nonstate networks of suppliers, human resources, construction, manufacturing, and food supplies.[42]

The idea of the fiscal-military state is not limited in its usefulness to the transitional period but has application to the protomodern and modern navies as well. For example, the early eighteenth century saw the rise of two important navies backed by fiscal-military bureaucracies and supporting infrastructures: the Russian navy from 1696 and the revived Spanish navy after 1714.[43] At the same time, the story of fiscal-military state navies is not exclusively one of success, as exemplified by the deterioration of the Spanish navy after its defeat in 1588 and the failure of the infant United States to maintain the Continental Navy that had helped win its independence in the early 1780s.[44] Fiscal matters are also manifest in deliberate downsizing and scaling back of strategy, as seen in France during the Nine Years' War of the 1690s.[45]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME STRATEGIC THINKING

The classical Greek word for an army general, *stratēgos*—with its cognate *stratēgia,* the art of a general—did not begin to acquire in European languages the modern meaning of "strategy" until between the 1770s and the 1830s. By that time, such writers as Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz had employed the word to denote the higher direction of military forces in war to achieve particular ends. There was in early modern Europe no explicit theoretical concept of strategy; nevertheless, some historians have found in documents of the period elements of strategic thinking. Writings on naval affairs in the early modern period initially tended to follow the model set by the fourth-century AD Roman writer Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus in his *Epitoma institutorum rei militaris,* commonly referred to as *De re militari.* Although largely devoted to land warfare, the work contained a short section on galley warfare and tactics. Vegetius's work had been influential in Western European warfare during the medieval period, first circulated in manuscript form and then printed in several editions in the 1470s and 1480s.[46] It continued to be influential as the basic practical manual on the art of war through the mid-eighteenth century. The early writers on naval matters in the early modern period—for example, Christine de Pizan (ca. 1364–1430) and Jean V de Bueil (ca. 1404–77), the latter of whom served in the post of "Admiral of France" from 1450 to 1453—placed their thoughts in the context of the practical issues of shipbuilding and navigation and followed closely the naval tactics that Vegetius described.

Of the classical texts, Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War* had the most to say about naval strategy, concerning the limits of the Athenian navy's

power during the Sicilian expedition, along with ideas of command of the sea and *thalassokratia* (maritime empire). Thucydides influenced English conceptions of strategic thinking from 1550, when an English translation from the French version appeared. His impact became a major one when his work came to influence Thomas Hobbes, who first translated the *History* from Greek in 1628, and Carl Andreas Duker, a German-born philologist at the University of Leiden, who published his translation at Amsterdam in 1731.

The earlier English views on the "sovereignty of the seas" had come from medieval feudal concepts that had nothing to do with strategy but rather arose from a medieval legal fiction that asserted the king's symbolic authority and right to maritime revenues. Early English mariners typically spoke, not of sovereignty, but of the "safeguard of the sea," the protection from attacks on England and its trade. In contrast, by the mid-1560s a Spanish naval commander could write that battles at sea vindicated Philip II's claims of Spanish dominion over the oceans.[47]

Scholars of the early modern period make a distinction between the actual practice of strategy in maritime wars and the early traces of maritime and naval strategic theory. There is clear, but highly scattered, documentary evidence that rulers, governments, and naval leaders thought strategically in sending out their naval forces to achieve broad objectives in international relations. They did so, however, neither consistently nor necessarily consciously, and the evidence that they did at all is found in dispersed documents that require deductive analysis.[48] Notwithstanding, if theorists have fully developed the ideas of grand, maritime, and naval strategy only in modern times, historians have found convincing traces of them in practice *avant la lettre*.[49]

While central governments had the means to develop broad strategic undertakings, the question arises of to what degree commanders at sea understood or were informed in such matters.[50] This issue points to another, the nature of the linkage between strategy and tactics. Before one can grasp fully that linkage with regard to early modern Europe, one must understand the character of the ships and weapons then available to translate concepts into actions.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL ARCHITECTURE FOR WARSHIPS

Navies in the first phase of the early modern period, using a range of technical innovations, were moving beyond the galley warfare that had characterized naval action in antiquity. One of these innovations was a fundamental change in naval architecture. Until about 1450, shipbuilders constructed ships by unwritten rules of thumb and empirical methods passed on through apprentices. In southern Europe there were two types of vessels, "long ships" (or galleys), with oars, and "round ships," with sails. In northwestern Europe there was a greater variety of specialized ship types; building techniques were accordingly more varied than in the

Mediterranean but less mature. Scandinavians began a Viking longboat not with its hull frames but with the outer hull, or shell, itself, clinker built (i.e., with overlapping strakes). Shipbuilders on the coast of northwestern Europe later adopted this approach for the construction of the cogs and hulks used up until the late sixteenth century.

Mediterranean shipwrights traditionally built a vessel's frame first and around it a smooth carvel-built hull (in which the edges of the strakes butted up against one another). Between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, the northern cog design began to influence the Mediterranean round vessel, whose hulls (although carvel built) were shaped first. The introduction of nearly vertical sternposts with attached "deadwood" at the bottom made possible the use of northern-style pintle and gudgeon rudders in place of steering oars. These innovations jointly increased maneuverability. Also, the number of masts increased, improving the sailing qualities of ships.

In the early fifteenth century, the Arsenale in Venice was the first to separate design and building processes, by generating a geometric design on paper, a *mezzaluna* ("half-moon"), by which to calculate the narrowing of successive hull frames. At first, the method was only a means to translate rule of thumb construction methods to paper, but eventually as it generated an archive of plans, it made standardization, quality control, and improvements in design possible. With the process of designing the shape of the hull in advance of construction, the frames could be built separately in a molding loft. Also, drawings gave shipowners and government officials a means to evaluate a design before construction.

Venice also was the first to employ ship models as a design tool and a means to pass on the classic galley designs of Theodoro Bazon (d. 1407). In France, Jean-Baptiste Colbert's 1673 regulation required the use of floating models (his innovation failed to take hold). Spanish shipwrights were using models by about the mid-eighteenth century. In contrast, the British Admiralty models of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were probably not built as a design tool but as a way to submit designs for royal approval.[51] By the end of the seventeenth century, shipyards had begun to use solid half models of the hull, especially private ones where shipwrights shaped the underwater body by eye. The Royal Navy occasionally used this method from 1716 onward.[52] By 1750, scientific understanding of shipbuilding had increased—the principles of vessel displacement in water, buoyancy, metacentric height, and stability, as well as the relationship of hull shape to speed.[53]

Shipbuilders in the early modern period did not widely employ Archimedes's principles of displacement and buoyancy, although some knew of them, before about 1600, when gun ports began to pierce hulls and thereby lower effective freeboard. In 1608, the Flemish mathematician Simon Stevin was the first to differentiate the center of gravity from the center of buoyancy and to develop a theory of

hydrostatics. In this period, such naval constructors as Anthony Deane in England and Olaus Judichær in Denmark calculated displacement by complicated geometric methods. In 1687, Isaac Newton's *Principia* replaced all earlier theories of hydrodynamics by using calculus to define a solid of least resistance. Père Paul Hoste was the first to create a synthesis of the theory of naval architecture, in his 1697 work *Théorie de la construction des vaisseaux*. Pierre Bouguer's 1746 *Traité du navire* and Henri-Louis Duhamel du Monceau's 1752 treatise *Elémens de l'architecture navale* signaled the beginning of mathematical predictions of a ship's performance and characteristics.

On the basis of these early works, the French minister of the navy, Étienne François, duc de Choiseul, created in 1765 a corps of naval engineer-constructors steeped in scientific theory.[54] In Sweden, Fredrik af Chapman employed scientific methods to calculate waterplane areas and displacement in his 1775 *Tractat om Skeppsbyggeriet*. In the last half of the eighteenth century, state-sponsored scientific academies, at the direction of naval ministries, supported this line of development. The Napoleonic Wars brought an end to such academies and with them the theoretical, scientific approach to warship design. (Ultimately, measuring instruments that quantified resistance, power, and energy replaced the abstract theories with engineering standards and criteria.)[55]

Some fundamental characteristics of warships, however, carried across the centuries from the late fourteenth to the mid-nineteenth. Ships designed for battle were usually built of oak, mahogany, or teak, with wood of other varieties added to the hull for increased buoyancy and protection of the crew in battle. A warship's framework was robust, its decks well supported with sturdy internal fittings as necessary to carry guns high up within the hull. As ships became larger and mounted more guns, the placement of the decks, the distribution of weight, and the lines of the hull became increasingly important. Stability—in technical terms, a moderate metacentric height and short rolling period—became essential. In a seaman's words, a "stiff" ship was preferable to a "tender" one, so that the gun ports on the lowest deck could be opened. Gun power increased with the number of guns; the heaviest guns had to be on the lowest tier for stability, lighter guns on the higher decks; and space limitations in the bow and stern meant that most guns lined the sides of the ship. A complicated system of masts, sails, and rigging controlled propulsion, and a single rudder at the stern provided maneuverability.

The result was a wooden sailing warship of the early modern era that was tactically defensive but capable of the strategic offensive by virtue of its ability to travel long distances on the open sea. In an innovative study, Carla Rahn Phillips traced the careers of six early-seventeenth-century Spanish galleons from their initial contracting through construction, fitting out, manning, and employment to encapsulate the entire range of issues involved.[56] Over the early modern period, warship

design was not static but continuously improved. Hull design and sail plans incrementally improved, joining many other factors to make ships more seaworthy and maneuverable, to give them better endurance, speed, and weatherliness (i.e., ability to steer generally upwind).

As warships became larger and more complicated, however, naval architects could no longer optimize a single warship design for all naval missions. As a result, specialized types, with increasingly standardized equipment within a type, emerged for separate and complementary tasks. The largest, ships of the line, were built with heavy armament and long endurance to be part of battle fleets, leaving smaller vessels to control sea-lanes. Medium-sized ships, such as frigates, could attack merchant shipping, conduct surveillance, and carry dispatches—a fleet's only means of "secure" communication with the shore. Other, smaller types, among them the bomb vessel and fireship, had special missions. From the mid-eighteenth century single-deck ships were commissioned in large numbers for patrol, escort, coast-guard, and reconnaissance work.[57]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL TACTICS IN BATTLE

Gunpowder weapons brought a major change in naval warfare, but their use and application developed only incrementally over several centuries. References to guns and projectiles launched by gunpowder—known in China by about 1128—became common in Europe by the beginning of the fourteenth century, when the Catalan forge began to produce high-quality wrought iron. A century later, these weapons were starting to show serious potential for military and naval use. Early shipboard employment reflected developments ashore as cannon balls became able to breach the walls of fortifications and gunpowder mills developed. By the last quarter of the fifteenth century, cast bronze cannon began to replace wrought-iron guns.[58]

The presence of gunpowder weapons on board ships did not immediately change naval tactics. In the 1460s and 1470s, small bombard-type guns were mounted to fire broadside or over the bulwarks. The traditional tactics continued. An attacking ship sought the weather gauge—that is, a position upwind of the opponent, from where it could choose the timing and "target angle" (i.e., with respect to the opponent's vulnerable zones) of its attack. When the moment came, the attacking ship bore down on the enemy. As the distance between the two closed, each discharged every type of missile available that could be aimed at the enemy—culverin (primitive cannon) shot, arrows, and other projectiles, holding the bombard to the last moment at close range—in order to kill or injure as many as possible of the other's crew, with a view to grappling the enemy ship, then sending a boarding party directly over the bulwarks. In this maneuver, the attacking ship often rammed the enemy ship: ships by this time were no longer fitted with rams, as ancient galleys had been, and the concussion could knock the enemy's seamen off their feet and damage

its hull and rigging. Once on the deck of an enemy vessel, a boarding party fought its crew hand to hand, with the object of capturing, rather than destroying, it.

The tactic of raining arrows and other deadly missiles on an enemy led to the construction of galleons, with high defensive superstructures forward and aft from which to counterattack. This change made the galleon far superior in combat to the low Mediterranean galley.[59] Meanwhile to counter galleys in combat northern European navies developed, by the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a new and distinctive type of warship with guns arranged in broadsides. This development pointed to the need for new naval tactics, but they came only slowly.[60] The distinctive semicircular battle formation of the Spanish Armada in 1588 is a prominent example of Spanish naval tactics employed against the Elizabethan English navy.[61]

Naval warfare continued to be marked by a variety of types of operations for particular purposes, ranging from transporting soldiers and landing them on distant shores to imposing blockades, patrolling for defensive purposes, and attacking merchant shipping, in a form of economic warfare. The quintessential exercise of naval power, however, was to defeat an enemy's assembled battle fleet with one's own. The fighting that resulted was between warships similarly armed with broadside guns, the increasing power of which presented a particular problem to be solved.

The first significant change came on 29 March / 8 April 1653, following the battle of Portland during the First Anglo-Dutch War. The three English "Generals at Sea"—Robert Blake, Richard Deane, and George Monck—jointly issued two documents: "Instructions for the better ordering of the Fleet in Fighting" and "Instructions for the better ordering of the Fleet in Sailing." While these instructions incorporated existing procedures, they also established a connection between cruising formations and battle formations, and they at least implied the need to train and exercise a permanent fleet in *standardized* practices. The instructions gave the flag officers commanding fleets at sea an improved ability to discipline and command them in the next battles. In the battle off the Gabbard Bank, both the Dutch and English noted that the English fleet had been better controlled than it had been off the Isle of Portland and that its broadside gunnery, when sailing in a line, had prevented the Dutch from grappling and boarding. Thus warfare between 1652 and 1654 led naval leaders in England and the Dutch Republic to think differently about tactics. During the years of peace that followed, the Dutch navy, then the largest in Europe, was the first to adopt what quickly became the new standard for European navies: a large, permanent, national fleet of purpose-built warships.

During the Second Anglo-Dutch War, additional tactical ideas developed. The Dutch institutionalized and expanded their thinking. Their admirals acknowledged the long-observed need for discipline and a well-ordered fleet in battle; specifically, they agreed that the fleet should fight as a unit, in a single line of battle. Ideally, the

three squadrons of ships in the line of battle would be close-hauled and windward of an enemy, supported by a reserve body of ships. In addition, the flag officers would be less exposed at the opening of an engagement. Naval officers debated and refined these issues for decades.

In June 1666, the Four Days' Battle off the Thames estuary, perhaps the longest and bloodiest battle of the age of sail, gave rise to further contemplation of naval tactics. The next month, James, Duke of York and Lord High Admiral, issued new instructions to the English fleet (which had been defeated in June) designed to ensure that hereafter it would maintain the weather gauge during a battle. They stressed the importance of staying in line formation and of dividing an enemy battle line by tacking through it to gain the windward position. These instructions established tactical practices that continued until the end of the eighteenth century.[62]

Between 1666 and 1815, fleet tactics generally developed. From the 1690s onward, French tacticians took a more intellectual, geometrical, and abstract approach than did the British and Dutch, who remained more pragmatic. In France, Hoste's *L'Art des armées navales* (1697) set the tone, followed by Sébastien-François Bigot de Morogues's *Tactique navale* in 1763, Jacques Bourdé de Villehuet's *Le Manœuvrier* of 1765, and the vicomte de Grenier's 1787 *L'Art de la guerre sur mer*. These theoretical treatises also had extensive influence in English translation. A counterpart from the British perspective came from a Scot, John Clerk of Eldin. His 1790 *An Essay on Naval Tactics, Systematical and Historical, with Explanatory Plates* reached a wide audience in translation into Dutch, Portuguese, and Russian.[63]

Much later, emphasis on theoretical literature and formal fighting instructions led to rigidity of tactics and stagnation of thought. By the late nineteenth century attempts would be made to induce "laws," analogous to the laws of natural science, first for military theory and then sea power.[64] Taken blindly and to its extreme, this approach would create inflexibility of thought rather than stimulating new ideas. More recent approaches to the history of early modern naval tactics address the abstract tactical concepts of the time in terms of their limitations for practical application and in experience at sea.[65] As one historian has stated, "In the absence of a consideration of such questions, the intricate three-dimensional business of fighting at sea has been reduced to a sterile one-dimensional narrative cleansed of its complexity."[66]

Naval practitioners and historians often cite, on one hand, the battle of Toulon in 1744 as an example of stagnation in naval tactics and, on the other, Admiral Lord Nelson's leadership and tactics at Trafalgar in 1805 as the apogee of tactical thinking in the age of sail. Hereafter, historians of naval tactics in the age of sail need to take into account a number of complex factors beyond the orders, instructions, and theoretical studies. A sailing warship in combat encountered rapidly changing situations and a wide range of correlations: relative advantages or weaknesses of

ships or weapons; the comparative leadership and tactical skills of commanders; the relative states of morale, health, training, group mentality, emotional state, and discipline of officers and men; the comparative physical conditions of ships and guns; and the relative impacts on them of weather, wind, speed, and sea state. To understand the employment of naval tactics it is necessary to consider the interaction of the human and physical elements in context of the chaotically unpredictable and lethal conditions of naval battle.[67]

THE SCOPE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

In general and in retrospect, one can see that nations used their sea power for a number of different strategic and functional purposes, listed here in modern terminology—an anachronism that in this case, used with care, assists understanding:

1. To destroy or blockade an enemy fleet to prevent it from interfering with one's own trade or other uses of the sea. An inferior force challenged the enemy's attempt to do so by keeping its fleet in condition to threaten the enemy's, obliging the stronger force thereby to divert resources.[68]
2. To control the sea by protecting one's own trade and trade routes. This was done typically by patrolling key geographic areas, such as where shipping routes converged, and accompanying convoys of merchant ships with armed escorts.[69]
3. To protect the coast of the nation or its overseas possessions, at the same time making it difficult for an enemy to operate in those waters.[70]
4. To deny the use of the sea to an enemy by using the navy or privateers to attack an enemy's merchant shipping and to damage the enemy's economy.[71]
5. To support military operations through amphibious landings.[72]
6. To represent, or serve as a symbol of, state or princely power and, relatedly, to demonstrate latent power and political interest through naval presence.[73]
7. To carry out policing functions: curbing piracy, maintaining order, regulating trade, collecting customs duties, etc.[74]
8. To carry out diplomatic functions, transporting important officials, diplomatic correspondence, specie, or other diplomatically important cargoes.[75]

All of these functions were exercised during the early modern period. In the transitional period from 1400 to 1650, these strategies were implemented on a much more limited and local scale than they would be in the protomodern period from 1650 to 1815, when navies developed global strategic reach.[76] A notable development of the protomodern period (though actually reaching back to the Hundred Years' War in the transitional period) was the increased ability of land and sea forces—mainly the British Army and Royal Navy—to conduct and control together amphibious landings of military forces from troop transports. Such an undertaking involved three essential elements: naval predominance to prevent disturbance of the operation from the sea; the availability for hire of commercial shipping to carry troops; and the ability—developed over time and after extensive experience—to

reconcile the differing opinions and approaches of military and naval commanders attempting to work jointly.[77]

THE BEGINNING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON WAR AT SEA

Maritime law derives from laws of merchant trading that extend back to ancient times and by the medieval period were known collectively as *lex maritima et mercatoria.* In the ancient and medieval periods, various codes of law developed in maritime regions. These regional codes provided the basis on which maritime law grew during the early modern period. One of the oldest was the Rhodian Sea Law, derived from the practice of the Aegean island of Rhodes in antiquity and later taken up and widely applied by Roman maritime law. When the Roman Empire receded, many of its legal practices remained in local traditions.

The most famous of the latter is the Rolls or Laws of Oléron, originating from the eponymous island at the mouth of the Charente River in the Bay of Biscay. It came to form the basis of English maritime law through the agency of Eleanor, Duchess of Aquitaine, whose personal property included Oléron. About 1346, King Edward III of England declared it the basis for all future legal decisions that the Admiral of England would make; as a result, it was to become the basis for maritime law in the English-speaking world. The Inquisition of Queenborough of 1375–1403 (a published set of detailed admiralty regulations) expanded on it.[78] As a compilation of legal judgments in French ports, the Laws of Oléron also became the basis of all subsequent Atlantic and Baltic maritime law. Louis XIV's 1681 *Ordonnance de la Marine* incorporated it. In the Mediterranean, a separate legal code, the *Consolato del Mare,* was printed as early as 1494, supplanting various local legal codes. While much of maritime law pertains to trade and merchant shipping, essential portions directly affect navies and naval operations. For instance, in England the admiralty court was controlled by the Lord High Admiral, but through a vacancy in that post in 1575, the judges of the High Court of Admiralty became independent in judgment and jurisdiction. The High Court of Admiralty and its subsidiaries, the Vice Admiralty Courts in various colonies, became highly relevant to the navy and privateers owing to their jurisdiction over prize cases.[79]

In a broader strategic sense, the legal debates of the seventeenth century over rival national claims to sovereignty over the seas established national objectives for naval operations. Several European states claimed portions of the open sea, in addition to England of the "British Seas." Spain and Portugal maintained the legal settlement in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas that divided the East and West Indies between them.[80] Denmark claimed the seas around Iceland, Greenland, and the Faeroe Islands. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden asserted power to tax merchant ships from outside the Baltic.[81] Genoa claimed sovereignty over the Ligurian Sea, Venice over the Adriatic.[82] Several states began to object to these claims and argue for freedom of the seas. In 1580, when Elizabeth I rejected Spanish legal objections to Sir

Francis Drake's circumnavigation of the world, Spain sent an armada to the Strait of Magellan to prevent a repetition.[83] France objected to Denmark's claims, and the Dutch Republic rejected those of Portugal.[84] It was in support of the Dutch position that Hugo Grotius published his *Mare Liberum* in 1609 (though he modified his viewpoint in his 1625 *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* to accept a state's control over and defense of its immediate coastal waters). John Selden's 1635 *Mare Clausum* was a contribution to a widespread doctrinal debate over freedom of the seas. Many naval powers initially opposed that concept, but it gradually gained broad support after David Hume in 1752 and Adam Smith in 1776 helped revive the idea in connection with free trade and free markets.

In 1702, the Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek laid the groundwork for a resolution by arguing that the decisive factor was the control of coastal waters from the shore, not by ships, which might or might not be present. Thus, the measure of control was the distance that a shore-based cannon could shoot. The Swiss philosopher Emer de Vattel accepted this device in an influential book in 1758, and soon treaties and national regulations reflected it. In 1782, the Neapolitan author Ferdinando Galiani defined the distance of a cannon shot as one league, or three miles. How this period dealt with these issues of maritime law became the basis of what developed in the early twentieth century as the law of naval warfare and later in that century as the international law of the sea.[85]

SEA OFFICERS AND SAILORS SPECIALIZED IN NAVAL AFFAIRS

For much of the early modern period, seamen moved freely and extensively between the various sectors of the seafaring world—fishing, whaling, coastal and regional merchant shipping, privateering, long-distance and colonial trade, chartered trading companies, and the navy. National and religious identity arose only slowly among seamen, and until it did, navies could recruit men of different nationalities and from any maritime sectors.[86] For lower-deck seamen, this situation continued up through the end of the age of the fighting sailing warship and into the mid-nineteenth century.

In England, the fishing industry was traditionally "the nursery of the navy," a pool of experienced mariners. Whenever in the Elizabethan era the Crown assembled a naval force, it depended on being able to draw from this pool both volunteers and impressed men. The absence of a permanent standing navy prevented seamen from specializing in naval affairs; service in the navy alternated with other maritime activities.[87] (The situation would not be much different for ordinary seamen at the end of the eighteenth century, when the Royal Navy was in desperate need of manpower to fight the Napoleonic Wars.)[88] When after the middle of the seventeenth century navies in Western Europe became permanent, standing forces it became possible for a seaman to specialize in naval service. This specialization became common among the three classes of officers: petty officer, warrant officer,

and commissioned sea officer. But even the commissioned officer—the highest of the hierarchy—was known to serve as late as the end of the eighteenth century in merchant ships when on half-pay.

There is clear evidence of a link between the natures of societies, of their governments, and of their military activities. Sea power was built most successfully in countries with open social systems, notably in Britain and the Dutch Republic. There the complex, highly technical, industrial nature of navies reflected contemporary society, as it did not in the rigid agrarian societies of the aristocratic military powers.[89] Within navies generally, internal social differences grew in this period, and as a result scholars have begun to look at specific groups of seamen.[90]

In many European navies, the professional development of both officers and men was initially a matter of on-the-job training. The historically minded sociologist Norbert Elias, writing in the 1950s, was among the first to compare major Western European navies of the seventeenth century in terms of professional genesis. Few noticed his work on this subject until his studies appeared posthumously in 2007.[91] Even then, among British naval historians, social history was in its infancy; the work of Michael Lewis and Christopher Lloyd from decades before had only very recently been expanded on.[92] N. A. M. Rodger's *Wooden World* was a pioneer, archivally based study in eighteenth-century naval social history; it was followed by David Davies's *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins* on the seventeenth century.[93] Since then, however, scholarship has explored a widening range of specific social issues, such as naval families, wives and mistresses, manpower, gender, order, discipline, crime, punishment, religion, shipboard life, naval medicine, and the health of seamen.

The Royal Navy was distinctive in establishing in 1677 a practical examination in seamanship to qualify for promotion to lieutenant. By the end of the eighteenth century, the prerequisite for taking the test was a minimum of six years of sea service, one of those years as a warranted, working midshipman. That requirement placed young aristocrats on the same level as middle- and even lower-class applicants in the competition for promotion.

In 1702, the Royal Navy created the seagoing position of schoolmaster, primarily to teach navigation. A Naval Academy was established at Portsmouth in 1729 but was neither widely attended nor highly regarded. The Admiralty eventually created another alternative by allowing potential officers to attend grammar or navigation schools ashore to reach the required standard in mathematics for navigational computations.[94]

The French navy's method of officer education was different. From the time of Cardinal Richelieu, Colbert, and the latter's son the Marquis of Seignelay, a prospective naval officer had to be of noble birth and heritage and have attended one of the three schools for the *gardes de la Marine,* at Toulon, Brest, or Rochefort. The service's initial focus was the creation of an officer corps of learned men, reflecting

the French approach to naval affairs generally, as seen in its extensive use of mathematics in warship design. French naval misfortunes during the Seven Years' War led to controversial reforms in the educational system, dividing its focus between teaching mathematics and inculcating zeal for combat.[95] Current scholars are just beginning to make comparative examinations of naval officer education and leadership styles in different navies.[96]

The research agenda of the academic investigation of navies and naval operations in the early modern period has expanded far beyond the battle narratives typical of earlier historiography. No longer confined to traditional and narrow nationalistic and institutional approaches of the past, naval history is now understood as a subdiscipline of the broader field of maritime history. Practitioners have accordingly widened and enriched its scope to cross recognized boundaries between academic disciplines and thereby take advantage of perspectives and insights their predecessors would have set aside. While the study of ships and seamen in battle continues to have its place, scholars now see combat in a much broader context and in relation to other functions and activities of navies as complex governmental organizations in themselves. The resulting multidimensional research agenda encompasses the relationships of navies to the nation and the state, comparative organizations, management, economics, industry, science, technology, international relations, and social relations, all of these across regions, cultures, and time.[97]

Most importantly, whole new areas of research are opening up, examining navies and naval affairs through such social and cultural lenses as nationhood, community, society, race, empire, gender, ideology, memory, and commemoration. As the situation stands at present, scholars have not yet applied these investigations evenly across the early modern period. Many have tended to favor the late protomodern years, 1793–1815, at the expense of earlier phases or the transitional period between 1400 and 1650. Of such work that has recently appeared, the largest body has been on British naval history, not on other European navies or on comparisons across different navies. This pattern suggests lacunae that future scholarship has the opportunity to fill.[98]

NOTES This essay appears in Claire Jowitt, Craig Lambert, and Steven Mentz, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 1400–1800* (London: Routledge, 2020), © Taylor & Francis. It is used by permission.

1 See David J. Starkey, "Voluntaries and Sea Robbers: A Review of the Academic Literature on Privateering, Corsairing, Buccaneering and Piracy," in *Naval History, 1680–1850,* ed. Richard Harding, International Library of Essays on Military History (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 519–42.

2 N. A. M. Rodger, "The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare," *Mariner's Mirror* 100, no. 1 (2014), pp. 5–16.

3 Gerard Brandt, *Het Leven en Bedryf van den heere Michiel de Ruiter, Hertog, Ridder, &c. L. Admiraal Generaal van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt* (Amsterdam, 1687); Ronald Prud'homme van Reine, "Michiel Adriaenszoon de Ruyter and His Biographer Gerard Brandt," in *De Ruyter: Dutch Admiral,* ed. Jaap R. Bruijn, Ronald Prud'homme van Reine, and Rolof van Hövell tot Westerflier (Rotterdam, Neth.: Karawansaray, 2011), pp. 37–55.

4 Josiah Burchett, *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea* (1720; facsimile reproduction, intro. by John B. Hattendorf, Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints for the John Carter Brown Library, 1995).

5 Leonard W. Cowie, *Lord Nelson, 1758–1805: A Bibliography* (Westport, CT: Meckler, 1990); Eugene L. Rasor, *The Seaforth Bibliography: A Guide to More than 4000 Works on British Naval History, 55 BC–1815* (Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2008), originally published as *English/British Naval History to 1815* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), available and updated at humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/rasor/; Georges Lacour-Gayet, *La marine militaire de la France . . . ,* 4 vols. (Paris: H. Champion, 1905–11); Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française,* 6 vols. (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit, 1899–1932); William Hepworth Dixon, *Robert Blake: Admiral and General at Sea,* with an introduction by Barry M. Gough (London, 1852; repr. Mount Kisco, NY: Regatta, 2000); J. C. de Jonge, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen,* 5 vols., 2nd ed. (Haarlem, Neth.: Kruseman, 1858–62); William M. James, *Naval History of Great Britain during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,* with a new introduction by Andrew Lambert, 6 vols. (London, 1822–24; repr. Bloomsbury, U.K.: Conway Maritime, 2001–2003).

6 Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, *A History of the Royal Navy from the Earliest Times to the Wars of the French Revolution* (London: Bentley, 1847; facsimile repr. as *A History of the Royal Navy: 1327–1422,* Charleston, SC: Nabu, 2011).

7 Michael Oppenheim, *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy from MDIX [1509] to MDCLX [1660] with an Introduction Treating of the Preceding Period* (London: John Lane, 1896).

8 Andrew Lambert, *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession* (London: Chatham, 1998); A. D. Lambert, "The Construction of Naval History, 1815–1914," *Mariner's Mirror* 97, no. 1 (2011).

9 See, for example, Curt Freiherr von Maltzahn, *Der Seekrieg* (Leipzig, Ger.: Teubner, 1906); Arnold Munthe, *Sjömaktens Inflytande på Sveriges Historia* [to 1699], 2 vols. (Stockholm: Marinlitteraturföreningen, 1921–22); and Ernst Wolgast, *Seemacht und Seegeltung: Entwickelt an Athen und England* (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1944).

10 See, for example, R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic, 1522–1850* (London, 1910; repr. London: Francis Edwards, 1969); and Saturnino Monteiro, *Portuguese Sea Battles 1139–1975,* 8 vols. (n.p.: Amazon Digital, 2014).

11 Max Weber, *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society,* trans. and ed. Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 138–47; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), pp. 1–3; Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860,* Stockholm Studies in History, no. 48 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 7–8.

12 Guy Chet, *The Ocean Is a Wilderness: Atlantic Piracy and the Limits of State Authority* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 2014).

13 Michael Roberts, "Military Revolution, 1560–1660," in *Essays in Swedish History* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1967), pp. 195–225; Clifford J. Rogers, ed., *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995).

14 Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns, Sails, and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400–1700* (New York: Pantheon, 1965).

15 John Francis Guilmartin Jr., *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974).

16 The principal articles are gathered in Jan Glete, ed., *Naval History, 1500–1680,* International Library of Essays on Military History (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 3–97.

17 Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 82–114, quotation p. 83.

18 N. A. M. Rodger, *Essays in Naval History, from Medieval to Modern,* Variorum Collected Studies Series (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2009), chap. 5; Rodger, introduction to *Navies and State Formation: The Schumpeter Hypothesis Revisited and Reflected,* ed. Jürgen G. Backhaus (Zurich, Switz.: LIT Verlag, 2012).

19 Louis Sicking, "Naval Warfare in Europe, c. 1330–c. 1680," in *European Warfare, 1350–1750,* ed. Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), pp. 236–63; Sicking, "European Naval Warfare," in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European History, 1350–1750,* ed. Hamish Scott (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015), vol. 2, pp. 591–611. See also Beatrice Heuser, *Strategy before Clausewitz: Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400–1830* (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 48–64.

20 N. A. M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649* (London: HarperCollins, 1997), pp. xxv–xxvi. See also Rodger, "Considerations on Writing a General Naval History," in *Doing Naval History: Essays toward Improvement,* ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995), pp. 117–28.

21 Craig L. Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century,* Warfare in History (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2011), pp. 207–209. See also Graham Cushway, *Edward III and the War at Sea: The English Navy, 1327–1377* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2011).

22 Ian Friel, *Henry V's Navy: The Sea-Road to Agincourt and Conquest, 1413–1422* (Stroud, U.K.: History, 2015), pp. 108, 189–90; Craig L. Lambert, "Henry V and the Crossing to France: Reconstructing Naval Operations for the Agincourt Campaign, 1415," *Journal of Medieval History* 43, no. 1 (2017), pp. 24–39.

23 Glete, *Navies and Nations,* vol. 2, pp. 402–403.

24 Lambert, "Henry V and the Crossing to France."

25 David Loades, *The Tudor Navy: An Administrative, Political, and Military History* (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar, 1992), pp. 11–35; Rodger, *Safeguard of the Sea,* pp. 141–63; Susan Rose, *England's Medieval Navy, 1066–1509: Ships, Men and Warfare* (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 43–63.

26 Louis Sicking, *Neptune and the Netherlands: State, Economy, and War at Sea in the Renaissance* (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2004), pp. 481–95.

27 Pierangelo Campodonico, "Les Génois: Une flotte militaire privée?," and Giovanna Petti-Balbi, "Flottes publiques et flottes privées à Gênes au XIV^{e} siècle," in *The Sea in History: The Medieval World / La mer dans l'histoire: Le Moyen Âge,* ed. Michel Balard (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2017), pp. 203–24; Balard, "Genoese Naval Forces in the Mediterranean during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," in *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,* ed. John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, Warfare in History (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2003), pp. 137–49.

28 Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, "L'arsenal de Venise," in Balard, *Medieval World,* pp. 128–37.

29 Loades, *Tudor Navy,* pp. 95–99.

30 Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 67–139.

31 Ayşe Devrim Atauz, *Eight Thousand Years of Maltese Maritime History: Trade, Piracy, and Naval Warfare in the Central Mediterranean,* New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2008), pp. 89–139; Marco Gemignani, "The Navies of the Medici: The Florentine Navy and Navy of the Sacred Military Order of St Stephen, 1547–1648," in Hattendorf and Unger, *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,* pp. 169–85.

32 Francisco Contente Domingues, "The State of Portuguese Naval Forces in the Sixteenth Century," in Hattendorf and Unger, *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,* pp. 187–97; "Portugal, 1500–1800," in "Navies, Great Powers," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History,* ed. John B. Hattendorf (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), vol. 3, pp. 1–3.

33 Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe,* pp. 1–41.

34 Ibid., pp. 174–212. See also Jan Glete, *Swedish Naval Administration, 1521–1721: Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities* (Leiden, Neth.: Brill,

2010); Alan James, *The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572–1661* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell for the Royal Historical Society, 2004); Jaap R. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,* 2nd English ed., Research in Maritime History, no. 45 (St. John's, NL: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2011).

35 Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe,* pp. 67–139.

36 Voltaire, "On Trade," in *Lettres philosophiques sur les Anglais* (1778).

37 Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe,* pp. 140–73; Jaap R. Bruijn, "The Raison d'Être and the Actual Employment of the Dutch Navy in Early Modern Times," in *Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf,* ed. N. A. M. Rodger et al. (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2016), pp. 76–87.

38 The proceedings of this conference is Backhaus, *Navies and State Formation.*

39 Ibid., pp. 9–20, 108–10, 158–62, 205–13, 271–72, 306–308, 350–51, 361.

40 Gerald Harriss, *Shaping the Nation: England 1360–1461,* New Oxford History of England (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 2005), pp. 85–92; John Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500,* Cambridge Medieval Textbooks (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), provides a more complex view.

41 Daniel A. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965); Baugh, "The Professionalisation of the English Navy and Its Administration, 1660–1750," in *The Sea in History: The Early Modern World / La mer dans l'histoire: La période moderne,* ed. Christian Buchet and Gérard Le Bouëdec (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2017), pp. 852–66; Martin Bellamy, *Christian IV and His Navy: A Political and Administrative History of the Danish Navy 1596–1648* (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2006); Jaap R. Bruijn, *De admiraliteit van Amsterdam in rustige jaren, 1713–1751* (Amsterdam: Scheltema & Holkema, 1970); Glete, *Swedish Naval Administration;* Olivier Chaline, *Les armées du roi: Le grand chantier, XVII^e–XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2016); James Pritchard, *Louis XV's Navy, 1748–1762: A Study in Organization and Administration* (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1987); Glete, "Policy and Administration," pt. 2 of *Naval History,* pp. 101–229; Harding, *Naval History,* pp. 393–518.

42 Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2010); David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 75–76, 80–87, 149, 290–93; Roger Morriss, *The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy: Resources, Logistics and the State, 1755–1815,* Cambridge Military Histories (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011).

43 Edward J. Phillips, *The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet, 1688–1714,* Contributions in Military Studies, no. 159 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995); P. A. Krotov, *Российский флот на Балтике при Петре Великом* (St. Petersburg, Russ.: Istoricheskaya Illustratsiya, 2017); Eduard Sozaev and John Tredrea, *Russian Warships in the Age of Sail, 1696–1860: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010); Agustín Guimerá and Olivier Chaline, eds., *La Real Armada: La marine des Bourbons d'Espagne au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2018).

44 David Goodman, *Spanish Naval Power, 1589–1665: Reconstruction and Defeat,* Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003); John B. Hattendorf, "The Formation and the Roles of the Continental Navy, 1775–1785," in *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011), pp. 185–203.

45 Benjamin Darnell, "Reconsidering the *Guerre de Course* under Louis XIV: Naval Policy and Strategic Downsizing in an Era of Fiscal Overextension," in Rodger et al., *Strategy and the Sea,* pp. 37–48.

46 Susan Rose, "Vegetius and Taccola: Was Medieval Writing on War at Sea of Any Practical Use?," *Mariner's Mirror* 104, no. 1 (2018), pp. 4–17.

47 Thomas Wemyss Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea* (Edinburgh, U.K.: William Blackwood, 1911); Heuser, *Strategy before Clausewitz,* pp. 117–32; Rodger, *Safeguard of the Sea,* pp. 78–79, 99, 114, 150–52, 380–83.

48 John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702–1712,* Modern European History (New York: Garland, 1987), pp. 53–54; Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 1–10.

49 See works in note 59 as well as Daniel A. Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War 1754–1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest,* Modern Wars in Perspective (London: Routledge, 2011), see index entries for "Strategy." Also Roger Knight, "British Defensive Strategy at Sea in the War against Napoleon"; Agustín Guimerá, "The Offensive Strategy of the Spanish Navy, 1763–1808"; and Paul Kennedy, "The Influence of Sea Power upon Three Great Global Wars, 1793–1815, 1914–1918, 1939–1945: A Comparative Analysis"; all in Rodger et al., *Strategy and the Sea,* pp. 88–113, 134–36.

50 Olivier Chaline, "Strategy Seen from the Quarterdeck in the Eighteenth-Century French Navy," in Rodger et al., *Strategy and the Sea,* pp. 19–27.

51 E.g., Grant Walker, *The Rogers Collection of Dockyard Models at the U.S. Naval Academy Museum,* 2 vols. to date (Florence, OR: SeaWatch Books, 2015–).

52 For technical details on the ships produced, see Rif Winfield, *British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1793–1817: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2008); James Bender, *Dutch Warships in the Age of Sail, 1600–1714: Design, Construction, Careers, and Fates* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014).

53 For an evaluation of the role of the Enlightenment in this, see Rodger, *Essays in Naval History,* chap. 14.

54 For technical details on the ships produced, see Rif Winfield and Stephen S. Roberts, *French Warships in the Age of Sail 1626–1786: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017).

55 Alan Lemmers and Larrie D. Ferreiro, "Naval Architecture," in Hattendorf, *Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History,* vol. 2, pp. 648–57.

56 Carla Rahn Phillips, *Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century,* Softshell Books (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1992).

57 Jan Glete, "Early Modern Warships," in Hattendorf, *Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History,* vol. 4, pp. 374–80; for more detail on this development, see also the cited volumes by Winfield and by Bender.

58 Robert Gardiner and Richard W. Unger, eds., *Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: The Sailing Ship 1000–1650* (London: Conway Maritime, 1994), pp. 139–50; Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys,* pp. 135–75.

59 Gardiner and Unger, *Cogs, Caravels and Galleons,* pp. 100–101; Friel, *Henry V's Navy,* pp. 92–95; N. A. M. Rodger, "The Development of Broadside Gunnery, 1450–1650," in Glete, *Naval History,* pp. 239–62.

60 Rodger, "Development of Broadside Gunnery," p. 255.

61 Peter Pierson, *Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 128–75; Julian S. Corbett, ed., *Fighting Instructions, 1530–1816,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 29 (London, 1905; repr. London: Conway Maritime, 1971), pp. 27–44; Loades, *Tudor Navy,* pp. 133, 208, 224, 246, 249–50, 252, 254; Rodger, *Safeguard of the Sea,* pp. 254–96.

62 John B. Hattendorf, "Navies, Strategy and Tactics in the Age of De Ruyter," in Bruijn, Prud'homme van Reine, and Van Hövell tot Westerflier, *De Ruyter,* pp. 97–118.

63 Michel Depeyre, *Tactiques et stratégies navales: De la France et du Royaume-Uni de 1690 à 1815* (Paris: Economica, 1998); R. E. J. Weber, *De seinboeken voor Nederlandse oorlogsvloten en konvooien tot 1690* (Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1982); Brian Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactics, 1650–1815* (London: Conway Maritime, and Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990).

64 E.g., Corbett, *Fighting Instructions;* Corbett, ed., *Signals & Instructions, 1776–1794,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 35 (London, 1909; repr. Conway Maritime, 1971); Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History,* pp. 265–69; John Creswell, *British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century: Tactics in Battle* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 253–56.

65 N. A. M. Rodger, "Image and Reality in Eighteenth-Century Naval Tactics," in Harding, *Naval History,* pp. 321–37.

66 Sam Willis, *Fighting at Sea in the Eighteenth Century: The Art of Sailing Warfare* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2008), pp. 5–6, 170–71, quotation at p. 4.

67 Ibid., p. 171.

68 E.g., John B. Hattendorf, "The Idea of a 'Fleet in Being' in Historical Perspective," *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 1 (Winter 2014), pp. 43–60.

69 E.g., A. N. Ryan, "The Defence of British Trade with the Baltic, 1808–1813," and Michael Duffy, "The Establishment of the Western Squadron as the Linchpin of British Naval Strategy," in Harding, *Naval History,* pp. 45–68, 95–116; Patrick Villiers, "Développement naval et développement commercial: Les leçons de l'Histoire," in Buchet and Le Bouëdec, *Early Modern World,* pp. 785–95; N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), pp. 159–60, 177–78, 559–60.

70 E.g., Glete, *Swedish Naval Administration,* p. 659.

71 E.g., Glete, *Naval History,* the articles of part 5, "Trade Warfare and Privateering," pp. 453–534. See David Morgan-Owen and Louis Halewood, eds., *Economic Warfare and the Sea: Grand Strategies for Maritime Powers, 1650–1945* (Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2020).

72 E.g., Piers Mackesy, "Problems of an Amphibious Power: Britain against France, 1793–1815"; Richard Harding, "Sailors and Gentlemen of Parade: Some Professional and Technical Problems concerning the Conduct of Combined Operations in the Eighteenth Century"; and David Syrett, "The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations during the Seven Years and American Wars"; all in Harding, *Naval History,* pp. 117–47, 309–20.

73 E.g., Friel, *Henry V's Navy,* pp. 152–54.

74 E.g., Robert C. Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1989); Chet, *Ocean Is a Wilderness*.

75 E.g., Hattendorf, "Formation and the Roles of the Continental Navy."

76 Jan Glete, "Naval Power, 1450–1660: The Formative Period," in *Early Modern Military History, 1450–1815,* ed. Geoff Mortimer (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 88ff. For a specialized force, see, for example, the naval functions of the Knights of Malta, in Atauz, *Eight Thousand Years of Maltese Maritime History,* pp. 140–65.

77 Richard Harding, "The Control of Landing Operations," in Buchet and Le Bouëdec, *Early Modern World,* pp. 891–903.

78 Robin Ward, *The World of the Medieval Shipmaster: Law, Business and the Sea, c. 1350–c. 1450* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2009), pp. 20–47, 183–208; Reginald G. Marsden, ed., *Documents Relating to Law and Custom of the Sea,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vols. 49–50 (London, 1915–16).

79 See, for example, Richard Hill, *The Prizes of War: The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars, 1793–1815* (Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton with the Royal Naval Museum, 1998), on the legal constraints on navies and privateers in prize cases at the end of the early modern period.

80 Tatiana Waisberg, "The Treaty of Tordesillas and the (Re)Invention of International Law in the Age of Discovery," *Meridiano 47: Journal of Global Studies* 18 (2017). For the English claim, see Fulton, *Sovereignty of the Sea*.

81 Johan Engström and Ole L. Frantzen, eds., *Øresunds strategiske rolle i et historisk perspektiv* (Stockholm: Riksarkivet, 1998); Jan Glete, "Naval Power and Control of the Sea in the Baltic in the Sixteenth Century," in Hattendorf and Unger, *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,* pp. 217–32.

82 Bernard Doumerc, "L'Adriatique du XIII^{e} au XVII^{e} siècle," and Olivier Chaline, "L'Adriatique, de la guerre de Candie à la fin des empires (1645–1918)," in *Histoire de l'Adriatique,* ed. Pierre Cabanes et al. (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001), pp. 240–310, 360–96.

83 Carla Rahn Phillips, ed., *The Struggle for the South Atlantic: The Armada of the Strait, 1581–1584,* Hakluyt Society, 3rd series, vol. 31 (London: Routledge, 2017).

84 Peter Borschberg, *Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and Free Trade in the East Indies* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011).

85 Fulton, *Sovereignty of the Sea;* Pieter Emmer, "*Mare Liberum, Mare Clausum:* Oceanic Shipping and Trade in the History of Economic Thought," in Buchet and Le Bouëdec, *Early Modern World,* pp. 671–76. Frank L. Wiswall Jr., "Classical and Medieval Law"; and David H. Anderson, "Early Modern through Nineteenth-Century Law," and "Twentieth-Century Law through 1945"; all in Hattendorf, *Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History,* vol. 2, pp. 326–34.

86 N. A. M. Rodger, "Social Structure and Naval Power: Britain and the Netherlands," in Buchet and Le Bouëdec, *Early Modern World,* pp. 679–85. For an early sociological approach, see Norbert Elias, *The Genesis of the Naval Profession* (Dublin: Univ. College Dublin Press, 2007), and compare to J. D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy,* Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1991).

87 Cheryl A. Fury, *Tides in the Affairs of Men: The Social History of Elizabethan Seamen, 1580–1603* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), pp. 26–32.

88 J. Ross Dancy, *The Myth of the Press Gang: Volunteers, Impressment and the Naval Manpower Problem in the Late Eighteenth Century* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2015), pp. 2–3; Starkey, "Voluntaries and Sea Robbers."

89 Rodger, "Social Structure and Naval Power," pp. 684–85.

90 See, for example, Goodman, *Spanish Naval Power,* pp. 161–253; Evan Wilson, "Particular Skills: Warrant Officers in the Royal Navy, 1775–1815," in *A New Naval History,* ed. Quintin Colville and James Davey, Cultural History of Modern War (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester Univ. Press, 2019). Also Carla Rahn Phillips, "Spanish Noblemen as Galley Captains: A Problematical Social History"; J. Ross Dancy, "British Naval Administration and the Lower Deck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century"; and Evan Wilson, "British Naval Administration and the Quarterdeck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century"; all in Rodger et al., *Strategy and the Sea,* pp. 9–18, 49–75. For a summary of Dancy and Wilson, see Samantha A. Cavell, J. Ross Dancy, and Evan Wilson, "British Naval Administration and the Manpower Problem in the Georgian Navy," in *New Interpretations of Naval History: Selected Papers from the Eighteenth McMullen Naval History Symposium Held at the U.S. Naval Academy 19–20 September 2013,* ed. Lori Lyn Bogle and James C. Rentfrow, Historical Monograph 25 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2017), available at digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/25/.

91 Elias, *Genesis of the Naval Profession*.

92 Michael Arthur Lewis, *England's Sea-Officers: The Story of the Naval Profession* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939); Lewis, *A Social History of the Navy, 1793–1815* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960; repr. London: Chatham, 2004); Christopher Lloyd, *The British Seaman 1200–1860: A Social Survey* (London: Collins, 1968).

93 N. A. M. Rodger, *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (1986; repr. New York: W. W. Norton, 1996); Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*.

94 Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* p. 123; Evan Wilson, *A Social History of British Naval Officers, 1775–1815* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2017), pp. 9–32.

95 Michel Vergé-Franceschi, *Marine et éducation sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1991).

96 Evan Wilson, Jakob Seerup, and AnnaSara Hammar, "The Education and Careers of Naval Officers in the Long Eighteenth Century: An International Perspective," *Journal for Maritime Research* 17, no. 1 (May 2015), pp. 17–33; Evan Wilson, AnnaSara Hammar, and Jakob Seerup, eds., *Eighteenth-Century Naval Officers: A Transnational Perspective* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Richard Harding and Agustín Guimerá, eds., *Naval Leadership in the Atlantic World: The Age of Reform and Revolution, 1700–1850* (London: Univ. of Westminster Press, 2017).

97 For a broad evaluation of the changing nature of naval history as a subdiscipline of maritime history, see Colville and Davey, *New Naval History,* pp. 1–25. See also Quintin Colville, Elin Jones, and Katherine Parker, "Gendering the Maritime World," *Journal for Maritime Research* 17, no. 2 (2015), pp. 97–101; Richard Harding, *Modern Naval History: Debates and Prospects* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); Hattendorf, *Doing Naval History;* and Roger Knight, "Changing the Agenda: The 'New' Naval History of the British Sailing Navy," *Mariner's Mirror* 97, no. 1 (2011), pp. 225–42.

98 See Timothy Jenks, *Naval Engagements: Patriotism, Cultural Politics, and the Royal Navy, 1793–1815* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006); J. D. Davies, Alan James, and Gijs Rommelse, eds., *Ideologies of Western Naval Power, c. 1500–1815,* Politics and Culture in Europe, 1650–1750 (London: Routledge, 2019). Also Katherine Parker, "Memorialising Anson, the Fighting Explorer: A Case Study in Eighteenth-Century Naval Commemoration and Material Culture"; and Cicely Robinson, "The Apotheosis of Nelson in the National Gallery of Naval Art"; both in Colville and Davey, *New Naval History*.

VII *Competing Navies*
Anglo-Dutch Naval Rivalry

1652–1688

Before the acute Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the seventeenth century ended with a transformation in international politics and mutual relations that turned those same rivals into the close allies that became known as "The Maritime Powers," it produced three maritime economic wars and wide-ranging peacetime competition at sea. The three naval wars—of 1652–54, 1665–67, and 1672–77—as well as the Dutch invasion of England in 1688, were separated by periods of maritime, economic, and colonial rivalry. The navies of both countries operated in this period primarily in European waters, but their activities in the wider Atlantic world gradually increased. Although their immediate causes and contexts differed, the conflicts were incremental stages in an Anglo-Dutch naval arms race that established navies as permanent standing forces broadly among the major European powers. At the same time, navies created new basic approaches to warship design, operations, and tactics that were to dominate European naval warfare into the early nineteenth century.

The gradual ending of both the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War between 1646 and 1648 transformed the international security and economic situations of Europe. For the Dutch Republic these changes heralded a new phase in the Dutch economy that brought its maritime trade and dominance at sea to new heights. Dutch shipping rates undercut the English in trade to the Baltic, the Caribbean, Flanders, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, Spain, and Portugal. England was not alone in feeling the effect of Dutch commercial success—merchants of Denmark, Genoa, the Hanseatic League, and Venice were also hurt—but the English losses were larger than theirs, and the English particularly resented it.[1] English ambassadors complained to the States General in The Hague in March 1651 that Dutch shipping companies had been keeping the "foundation to themselves for ingrossing the universal trade not only of Christendom, but indeed, of the greater part of the knowne world."[2] This widening gap in maritime trade is one of several factors that led to war between England and the Dutch Republic, but it was only indirectly reflected in the corresponding naval developments in each country.

NAVIES IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

A British historian of Sweden, Michael Roberts, set off a widespread debate among military historians with his 1956 inaugural lecture at the Queen's University of Belfast, "The Military Revolution, 1560–1660."[3] He argued that technical developments in tactics of those years revolutionized military affairs generally and did so in a way that "exercised a profound influence upon the future course of European history. It stands like a great divide separating medieval society from the modern world."[4] Some naval historians have sought to find a similar naval revolution. The historiographical discussion first moved toward changing technology as a reflection of such a revolution. The pacifist scholar Carlo Cipolla, who thought revolution an impolite and irrational way of settling issues, led the way with a study of technological innovation and the early phases of European imperial expansion.[5] Other historians too, such as John Guilmartin, Richard Barker, Geoffrey Parker, and Andrew Thrush, pointed to technological innovations that marked turning points in early modern naval history.[6] Parker went much further, to argue that "a revolution in naval warfare occurred in early modern Europe which was no less important than that by land, for it opened the way to the exercise of European hegemony over most of the world's oceans for much of the modern period."[7]

Another line of historiography linked the revolution in military affairs to navies through the concurrent development of bureaucracies and the fiscal-military state.[8] In a precursor to Roberts's 1956 military-revolution argument, the economist Joseph Schumpeter had argued that the power of the state to tax stemmed from the need in early modern Europe to support standing armies. Looking back to this argument in 2004, a group of scholars suggested that navies had found a variety of other sources of sustainment. These sources included the interrelationship of navies with overseas trade, indirect taxation, royal patronage, and more efficient and adaptable bureaucracies.[9] Additionally, there were critical links between naval developments and the nature of the national societies that supported navies, the character of governments, and the types of naval operations involved.[10] More recently, however, Louis Sicking has argued that none of this made for a "revolution in naval affairs," that the fundamental technological, organizational, operational, and tactical changes emerged over three centuries and effected a transformation, not a revolution.[11]

THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH NAVIES IN THE MID-SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

During the reign of King Charles I, from 1625 to 1649, the Royal Navy reflected within itself the social and political divisions of Britain's three kingdoms. Naval officers from the aristocracy—the "gentleman" officers—supported the king's navy as a symbol of the monarchical state and instrument of the king's power and royal purposes on the high seas. In contrast, naval officers from other social classes who

had risen solely on merit within the service—the "tarpaulin" officers—were concerned for the merchant trade that the king had shown little interest in protecting and the parliamentary politics that the king was stifling. On top of this, the king represented a "high church" Anglicanism that some thought a disguised form of Roman Catholicism. In opposition, the merchant shipping community strongly supported Presbyterianism and a range of puritanical Protestant views.[12] Against this background the king's navy became a point of national political contention over the constitutional issue of parliamentary funding.

When the political divisions within the British Isles devolved into civil war between the king and Parliament in 1642, the use of the sea for political and economic purposes became increasingly important. Early on, the Parliamentary forces took control over most of the navy, placing the Earl of Warwick as commander in chief, later Lord Admiral. The Parliamentarian John Pym began to strengthen the financial foundations of the navy and improve its administration through a series of interlocking parliamentary committees. As a result, the earlier constitutional tension over the navy disappeared.[13] Although events on land, rather than at sea, would determine the results of the Civil War, the uses to which sea power was put were an essential aspect of the conflict. The ability of Parliamentary naval forces to impose a degree of control in British coastal waters was crucial to the success of Parliamentary forces on land. The Civil War laid the groundwork for future global employment with the stationing of naval forces in the Mediterranean and West Indies and with the incremental expansion of dockyards, victualing facilities, and warship construction. However erratic and uncoordinated their execution in wartime, these developments contributed to the centralization of naval direction in England and the professionalization of naval officers and ratings.[14]

In Holland, since the beginning of the Eighty Years' War in 1568 and the establishment of the Dutch Republic in 1581, naval forces had been essential for the protection of local waters as well as of trade, which expanded rapidly from 1590 onward. From 1626 the Dutch navy had a permanent corps of naval captains. In contrast to the English navy, however, that of the Dutch Republic was a decentralized organization that utilized local networks, "admiralties," for mobilizing resources. That network gave the navy the benefit of the rapid advances in technology and rationalized shipbuilding that were to be the foundation of Dutch maritime supremacy in the seventeenth century. The five Dutch admiralties each enforced maritime law, authorized privateers, and (by virtue of the navy's major function of protecting shipping) sold licenses for convoying and foreign trade. Before the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the navy's principal source of financial support was the sale of licenses.[15]

The sizes of European navies between 1640 and 1650 reflect both peace in continental Europe and the growth of the English navy during the Civil War. In 1640, the Dutch navy was 118 percent the size of the English navy. Five years later the

The Major European Navies, 1640–1650, Compared in Total Displacement Tonnage

Year	England	Dutch Republic	France	Denmark-Norway	Sweden	Portugal (estimated)
1640	38,000	45,000	29,000	20,000	28,000	18,000
1645	39,000	—	20,000	16,000	35,000	18,000
1650	49,000	29,000	21,000	23,000	28,000	26,000
1655	90,000	64,000	18,000	21,000	23,000	17,000

Source: Glete, *Navies and Nations,* vol. 1, pp. 179, 186.

Swedish navy temporarily surpassed the Dutch. By the end of the decade, however, the Dutch navy had regained a slight edge over the Swedish navy but had dropped to only 59 percent of the size of the English fleet, which had rapidly grown in size during the Civil War. The Dutch navy meanwhile had divested itself of hired shipping and was no longer the largest in Europe.

In 1648, in fact, the Dutch navy settled into a peacetime routine. Its principal mission was now convoying merchant ships in dangerous waters and protecting Dutch maritime supremacy generally. The fleet was accordingly made up of smaller warships, under a thousand tons displacement. Approximately one-third were between five hundred and a thousand tons displacement, the remainder between a hundred and five hundred.[16] These ships lacked uniformity in design, creating marked differences in speed and maneuverability. To this point, the Dutch navy had given little thought to standardization in the design of warships as components of a fleet in battle.[17]

If the English navy had become the largest in Europe by 1650, with a notable superiority over the Dutch navy, in second place, Sweden's and Portugal's fleets, roughly equal in size, were close behind the Dutch. At the end of the decade, however, there was no indication that a significant naval armaments race might be brewing in continental Europe.

The large number of ships that Parliament had acquired through capture, purchase, and construction between 1645 and 1650 fundamentally changed the nature of the English fleet. Like the Dutch navy, it had been a combination of hired merchant ships and purpose-built warships. By the early 1650s, purpose-built warships dominated the English navy.[18]

There had been both external and internal reasons for Parliament to strengthen its navy.[19] The leaders of the new Commonwealth saw the need for a strong navy to complete the revolution and eliminate the Royalist forces that remained not only at home but abroad, harbored in the Dutch Republic, in colonies such as Barbados and Virginia, and elsewhere. Some also desired to export the English revolution. As the radical Puritan preacher Hugh Peter urged Parliament in December 1648, "This army must root up Monarchy, not only here, but in France and other

Kingdoms round about; this is to bring you out of Egypt: this army must dash the powers of the earth to pieces."[20] Finally, the Commonwealth having the active support of the merchant shipping community, there was renewed desire to rebalance trade, addressing the advantage that the Dutch had gained after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

Pressure from the Eastland (or North Sea) and Levant Companies, involved in European trade, along with the Hamburg Merchant Adventurers and some influential merchants involved in the West India trade led Parliament to pass the Navigation Act of 1651. This act challenged Dutch commercial interests, reviving the earlier idea of requiring goods imported into England to be carried directly from their points of origin in English ships. The assumptions and motivations behind the act were not purely commercial in nature. Merchant shipping and the fisheries were traditionally considered collectively "nursery for seamen," a source of trained manpower on which the navy depended. Additionally, the regulation of trade required naval means to enforce it. Furthermore, a strong navy gave the Commonwealth the armed strength to back diplomatic negotiations, as well as to challenge the Dutch at sea, if necessary. At the same time, the navy provided a means to protect colonial trade and export some degree of control to overseas colonies.[21]

The Commonwealth accordingly decided, in 1649, to expand its navy; that decision created a major governmental crisis. From a national management perspective, there was too much other work to be done and too few to do it with too small resources. Also, there were extensive logistical and financial implications in expanding the fleet that year and then maintaining it. Support would have to be provided to imminent operations in the Downs, Ireland, Scotland, and, in 1650–51, in Portugal, the western Mediterranean, Barbados, and Virginia. The Commonwealth began immediately, in 1649, to reorganize the administrative and fiscal management of the navy accordingly.[22]

THE FIRST ANGLO-DUTCH WAR, 1652–1654

When war finally erupted between the Dutch and the English in the spring of 1652, it happened suddenly.[23] War followed the breakdown of diplomatic negotiations over England's Navigation Act and the Dutch rejection of England's proposal for a union between the English Commonwealth and the Dutch Republic. England's immediate objective in going to war was to compel the Dutch Republic to withdraw its claim to immunity from a search at sea and stop harboring royalists. Dutch maritime trade and fisheries were the obvious vulnerabilities that England could strike. While negotiations were still in progress the Dutch mobilized a fleet of 150 ships under Lt. Adm. Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp to protect shipping between the Strait of Gibraltar and the Sound (Øresund). At the time, the five Dutch admiralties had collectively seventy-nine warships, most of them old and unready for battle. As had been standard practice, mobilization brought in a variety of leased

armed merchantmen. The English saw this mobilization as a threat, and it added a volatile element to the situation.

The geostrategic relationship between the Dutch Republic and the British Isles gave England an advantage. All Dutch Atlantic and Asiatic trade had to pass either south of the British Isles through the narrow waters of the Channel or "north about," around Scotland to the North Sea. Additionally, the prevailing southwesterly winds made it difficult for Dutch ships to approach England directly but easier for the English to gain the Dutch coast.

The circumstances did not present opportunities for any extensive thinking about strategy—that is to say, the comprehensive use of naval force to deal with an enemy force so as to achieve broader political objectives. The newly mobilized Dutch fleet was numerically superior to the English navy, but the latter was in a better condition to fight. In 1652, the Dutch preferred their well-tried technique of positioning a limited number of ships to windward, from which they could turn to sail suddenly downwind to grapple and board enemy ships and seize them by hand-to-hand combat. For large fleets with a wide variety of ship types, they had developed an organization of five squadrons, each approaching the enemy from windward in a line-ahead formation to approach the enemy, each ship then immediately attacking individual enemies, first with gunfire, then grappling and boarding.[24]

Initial English attacks on the Dutch fisheries north of Scotland and on returning Dutch East Indiamen in the Channel failed. English naval strategy then shifted to attacking Dutch warships, as a preliminary to destroying Dutch trade. Battles were typically the results of more or less chance encounters of opposing fleets. The English tactical preference was for gunnery duels in line of battle, the Dutch warships protecting convoys of merchant vessels. The Dutch responded to this challenge with a similar type of naval force, a kind of operational reasoning that led eventually to a strategic rationale for naval power.[25]

On 19/29 (Old Style / New Style) May 1652, the English General at Sea, Robert Blake, encountered the Dutch fleet off Dover and demanded a salute in recognition of Britain's sovereignty over those seas.[26] Cannon shots were exchanged, and a battle ensued in which two Dutch ships were lost and open conflict between the two states began. All this proceeded in a way little changed from the past. There is no indication that either side planned the encounter, either strategically or tactically. Neither, surviving accounts suggest, were new or distinctive tactics used in subsequent engagements—Adm. Michiel De Ruyter's minor victory over Sir George Ayscue in the Channel near Plymouth on 16/26 August 1652; the battle of the Kentish Knock in the Thames estuary, in which Blake and Vice Adm. Sir William Penn defeated Adm. Witte de With on 28 September / 8 October 1652; and the battle of Dungeness, in which Adm. Maarten Tromp defeated Blake on 30 November / 10 December 1652. At Dungeness, Tromp's numerical superiority won

the day for the Dutch, demonstrating to the Council of State in England that the naval administrative crisis that had begun in 1649 was not yet resolved. Parliament had voted no funds for the navy since the beginning of the war and was not meeting requests for more naval expenditures. Changes in parliamentary leadership and new Admiralty and navy commissions improved the administrative situation for a time. Cromwell's coup of April 1653 and his assumption of the Lord Protectorship in December 1653, however, produced an army-dominated government that failed to appreciate some critical naval needs.[27]

The following year, Blake and his fellow General at Sea Richard Deane were able to attack the Dutch convoy under Tromp's protection off Portland in a three-day battle that began on 18/28 February 1652/53. The English defeated the Dutch at the Gabbard off the North Foreland on 2–3/12–13 June 1653 and off Terheide south of Scheveningen on 10/20 August 1653, when Tromp died in action. The English had earlier suffered a severe loss when Cdre. Jan van Galen destroyed a five-ship English division under Cdre. Henry Appleton off Livorno (Leghorn) in the Mediterranean on 4/14 March 1652/53.[28] The Council of State had detached twenty ships from the main fleet and sent them to the Mediterranean, where English trade was now unprotected—a strategic error (it allowed Tromp's now-larger fleet to defeat Blake off Dungeness in December 1652) that taught the English not to divide the fleet in the future.

The first evidence, though minor, of change in tactical ideas came on 10/20 February 1652/53, just eight days before the battle of Portland. On that date Vice Adm. Sir William Penn issued instructions to his squadron directing the smaller ships to stand to windward to observe and to protect the larger fighting ships from attack by fireships.[29] A major change came on 29 March / 8 April 1653, at Portland, where the English were refitting after the three-day battle off that port. Preparing for the next encounter, all three Generals at Sea—Blake, Deane, and George Monck—joined in issuing two complementary documents, "Instructions for the better ordering of the Fleet in Fighting" and "Instructions for the better ordering of the Fleet in Sailing."[30] While to an extent compilations of standard and existing directives, they included some innovations. First, issued together as they were, they established a connection between cruising formations and tactical dispositions in battle. These documents were to be observed at sea in the context of preparation for battle, giving, despite their limitations, the English fleet a degree of discipline and its flag officers a level of control that had not previously been seen.

The documentary evidence is vague, but it appears that from this point forward the English fleet began to conduct itself differently. The next major battle was at the Gabbard. Deane died in that action, but as both English and Dutch sources report, the English ships were under better control. Also, their broadside gunnery while in line prevented the Dutch from closing to grapple and board.

If the Gabbard was suggestive of new tactical thinking, there is no evidence of it in the final major battle of the war, off Terheide. Nevertheless, these experiences now led naval leaders to think differently about, and to prepare for, future wars. For the Dutch, reverses at sea led to an immediate commitment to build a larger fleet of purpose-built warships and abandon the traditional dependence on leased armed merchantmen. In February 1653, the war still in progress, the States General authorized thirty warships carrying up to fifty-four guns; thirty more were ordered during the peace negotiations. All were soon declared public property, not to be demobilized and sold off at the end of a war.[31] The resulting costs forced the States General to subsidize the five admiralties beyond their traditional funding sources, convoy fees and sales of licenses. Even during the First Anglo-Dutch War, only 27 percent of the admiralties' funding came from convoys and licensing; 33 percent was from the provinces and another 23 percent from a new tax on shipping and trade. The key figure in making this shift of financial and political support for the navy permanent was the *raadpensionaris* ("grand pensionary," effectively the head of government), Johan de Witt.[32]

With this series of decisions, the most powerful navy in Europe adopted what would become the international standard, the permanent national navy. As other nations followed this lead, there arose, and was tacitly accepted, a strategic corollary: that one's own merchant trade and coasts could best be kept secure—two central functions of navies—by ships built "for the line of battle," fighting and defeating equivalent enemy naval forces. The existence of an undefeated enemy naval force represented the potential of that nation to oppose one's use of the seaways for either peaceful or military uses.

THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1654–1665

In the dozen years between the First and Second Dutch Wars, both the Dutch and English navies grew and developed, as did other navies. The displacement figures reflect the increase not only in numbers of major warships but in their individual sizes, as ships of the line carried more and more guns.

A new and significant development was the sudden emergence of France as a naval power. Cardinal Richelieu (first minister of state until his death in 1642) had established a firm basis for the French navy. With the end of the Fronde (1648–52) and of the Franco-Spanish War (1635–59) in the Mediterranean, France began to concentrate on future operations in the Atlantic and beyond. With the death of Richelieu's successor, Cardinal Mazarin, in 1661, Louis XIV and his new first minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, moved France to the front rank of European navies within a decade. The French navy quickly adopted and intellectualized the new approaches to warship design, purpose-built warships, and tactics.[33]

The peace that followed the First Anglo-Dutch War was uneasy. Cromwell was once again rebuffed in his desire to unite with the Dutch and other Protestant

The Major European Navies, 1660–1690, Compared in Total Displacement Tonnage

Year	England	Dutch Republic	France	Denmark-Norway	Sweden
1660	88,000	62,000	20,000	16,000	23,000
1665	102,000	81,000	36,000	26,000	31,000
1670	84,000	102,000	114,000	32,000	34,000
1675	95,000	89,000	138,000	29,000	35,000
1680	132,000	66,000	135,000	38,000	20,000
1685	128,000	76,000	123,000	38,000	33,000
1690	113,000	58,000	122,000	35,000	37,000

Source: Glete, *Navies and Nations,* vol. 1, pp. 192, 195, 220, 235.

Comparison in Numbers of Warships over 700 Tons Displacement

Year	England	Dutch Republic	France	Denmark-Norway	Sweden
1660	57	51	15	11	11
1665	69	70	25	16	18
1670	60	88	75	20	20
1675	68	73	87	19	21
1680	89	62	83	25	13

Source: Glete, *Navies and Nations,* vol. 1, p. 204.

powers. Maritime disputes continued over fisheries and inspection of shipping.[34] At the same time, Cromwell's navy represented a threat to European states and their Atlantic empires. Keeping England's navy in service, Cromwell in 1655 launched his "Great Design," an imperial campaign that, if failing to achieve the Lord Protector's broader imperial vision, did capture Jamaica from Spain.[35] Meanwhile, the Dutch were demonstrating their determination to fight for their trading interests and overseas possessions. The long-running Dutch war with Portugal and the deployment of the Dutch navy to Lusitanian waters precluded any direct attempt by the Dutch to regain Brazil (which they had attempted to wrest from the Portuguese earlier in that war, and from which they had been expelled in 1654).[36] At the very end of the interwar period, in 1664–65, De Ruyter led an expedition to West Africa, the Caribbean, and Newfoundland.[37]

When in 1660 the British throne was restored, the new King Charles II acquired a navy of 156 ships, of which seventy-five carried forty to sixty-four guns. The Protectorate navy had been moving to even larger vessels: master shipwright Peter Pett built the eighty-gun *Naseby* at Woolwich in 1655, his brother Christopher the seventy-gun *Richard* in 1658. Two years later, the *Royal Sovereign* emerged from

rebuilding at Chatham with a hundred guns.[38] As a war between the two maritime countries approached in the early 1660s, the Dutch too began to strengthen their fleet, in a three-year program that by 1664 brought into service sixty more warships of eighty guns and over.

In both countries, notable naval administrators came to the fore. In the Dutch Republic, Johan de Witt became the dominant political advocate of modernizing the Dutch navy, reflecting the commercial interests of the Amsterdam merchants.[39] The father-and-son team of David and Job de Wildt, whose successive tenures as secretary of the admiralty at Amsterdam stretched from the 1640s to 1704, markedly centralized the previously distributed administration of the navy. In England, the young Samuel Pepys began his notable career as a novice in 1660.[40] England's navy, now the Royal Navy, was under the command of the Lord High Admiral, the twenty-seven-year-old James, Duke of York, the king's brother. A firm leader who had seen many actions ashore but was initially inexperienced at sea, James had an able naval advisor in Adm. Sir William Penn and his secretary Sir William Coventry.

THE SECOND DUTCH WAR, 1665–1667

The second war between England and the Dutch had a complex set of complementary, but occasionally contradictory, causes involving commercial rivalry, national prestige, politics, and foreign and imperial policies.[41] England's broad strategic concept on entering the war was to isolate the Dutch from their vital trade sources. The way the English intended to do this was to threaten Dutch commerce to draw the Dutch navy out to fight, destroy its fighting capability in a decisive naval battle, and then establish an economic blockade of the Dutch coast.[42]

As war approached in late 1664, the Duke of York took direct command of the English fleet at Portsmouth on 9/19 November. Moving quickly, on 11/21 November he set a new tone for employing heavily armed ships by organizing the fleet into three squadrons. While the surviving documentation does not provide full details, this scheme seems to have been the source of English terminology that would last well past the age of sail. The senior squadron (stationed in the center) was designated "Red," the next senior (in the van) "White," and then (in the rear) "Blue." The ship bearing the commander of each squadron was to fly a flag of the corresponding color. In turn, each squadron had three divisions, each commanded by an admiral in the center (the Red division), by a vice admiral in the van (the White division), and a rear admiral in the rear (Blue). This arrangement made for three flag officers in each squadron and a total of nine in the fleet.

Over the next two weeks, the Duke of York issued separate sailing and fighting instructions that largely reflected those that the Commonwealth had issued. The fighting instructions, however, contained two very important new articles. One required the line-ahead formation, on either a starboard or larboard tack. The other required ships to hold their fire until close enough that their guns could have effect.

Further innovations also seem to have taken place between November 1664 and 1 February 1665. The duke signalled that ships were expected to take up preplanned positions in the line of battle, not simply at the discretion of captains, as previously done. These fighting instructions established a naval order of battle. In the coming months, several iterations appeared, along with new additional instructions.[43]

On the opening of the war, the English and Dutch fleets immediately took up positions from which they could act aggressively to protect and defend their respective merchant shipping. In April, the Duke of York moved to intercept Dutch homeward-bound convoys and to try, conformably to the English "operational concept," to force a battle by luring the Dutch to protect their commerce. The English had no margin of superiority, however, that would allow them to maintain a superior force in Dutch waters for any length of time, and they eventually withdrew for supplies and repairs, allowing the Dutch navy to put to sea.[44]

The desired effect of the improved English tactical dispositions did not materialize in the battle of Lowestoft on 3/13 June 1665, although in it the Duke of York defeated the Dutch. The Dutch flagship, *Eendracht,* while engaged with the English flagship *Royal Charles,* received a hit in the powder magazine, which exploded, killing the Dutch commander, Jacob van Wassenaer, heer van Obdam. It was this accident that led the Dutch to withdraw from the action—and, less fortunately for the English, cleared the way for Michiel De Ruyter to replace Wassenaer as lieutenant admiral of Holland and West Friesland.[45] In any case, the actual conduct of the English ships in combat was not in accordance with the instructions and plans. Some ships luffed up to windward, with the effect of putting them in three, four, even five ranks instead of a single line of battle, causing some casualties in English ships by "friendly fire."[46]

Several months after the battle, Adm. Edward Montagu, 1st Earl of Sandwich, reflected on the action and came up with detailed and practical recommendations for improvement.[47] The Dutch too reflected on Lowestoft. But their official investigation into the defeat continued to stress the importance of grappling and boarding. Even the Admiralty of Zeeland, which encouraged its officers to think innovatively about how to defeat the English tactics, had in mind only finding ways to avoid "the long and disadvantageous gun-battle with the English and to bring about the early laying aboard at the first opportunity."[48] However, the English close-ordered line and heavy broadside gunnery, as it was more rigorously observed, precluded closing in groups to grapple and board.

Nevertheless, new ideas about tactics were brewing in the minds of the Dutch admirals. After lengthy discussions with sea officers during August 1665, Johan de Witt broadcast the results in correspondence and directives from the States of Holland. The sea officers had drawn several vital conclusions from recent experience: first, as long acknowledged, a well-ordered fleet, disciplined in battle; second, as

also seen by the English, a single line of battle, close hauled, in three squadrons, windward of an enemy; third, less exposure of flag officers at the beginning of an action; and last, a reserve. A new order to the fleet embodying these ideas was issued to the Dutch fleet under Cornelis Tromp on 15 August 1665, with some variations. One of these had the center squadron slightly farther from the enemy than the other two.[49] This order produced the "snake-shaped line" that remained in the instructions for more than twenty years but was rarely, if ever, used. Further changes to the instructions were made by De Ruyter, appointed as commander in chief on 11 August 1665, on his return after more than a year in Africa and the West Indies. For the Dutch admirals, then, much remained to be resolved and clarified in their tactical ideas.

Meanwhile, the English victualing and shore-based naval infrastructure had broken down, just as the overall strategic situation was changed by the declaration in January 1666 by both France and Denmark of war against England. The situation placed even greater stress on English naval logistics when Denmark closed the Sound (Øresund), and with it access to the Baltic to English merchant vessels, depriving England of materials essential for shipbuilding and repair. Further, England (as did the Dutch Republic) faced a major shortfall in seamen to man warships. As for France, Louis XIV had only a peripheral interest in the war and was only fulfilling, with growing embarrassment, a 1662 treaty obligation with the Dutch. In the event, France secretly instructed its admirals to avoid battle if possible.[50]

In the Dutch navy, issues concerning tactics, numbers of squadrons, and the presence of a reserve squadron continued to be debated. Only after extensive discussions that involved De Ruyter, De Witt, and representatives of the States General and of the five provincial admiralties was De Ruyter given discretion to arrange the fleet for battle in three squadrons divided into divisions under vice admirals and rear admirals. Just one week after this decision was made, the Dutch and English fleets met off the Thames estuary in the Four Days' Battle (1–4/11–14 June 1666).[51]

This huge, prolonged action is remembered as the largest and bloodiest battle in the age of fighting sail. Dutch tactics, although they included boarding, grappling, and fireships, showed a marked improvement, as did the ability of the new seventy- and eighty-gun ships, sailing in line of battle, to damage the English with gunfire.

An equally interesting aspect of the battle was how the English estimated the strategic situation, leading them to divide their fleet. Earlier in the year, Admiral Lord Sandwich had sailed with thirty ships to protect English trade in the Mediterranean. Now, while De Ruyter was approaching with eighty-four ships, the English received intelligence—false, as it turned out—that the French Toulon squadron under the Duke of Beaufort was approaching the Channel to join the Dutch. Prince Rupert of the Rhine (the Duke of Cumberland) took command over twenty English ships of the line, leaving the Duke of Albemarle with only fifty-four, and spent

three of the four days of the battle guarding against the illusory possibility of the French landing ashore in Britain or attacking coastal trade. The situation encapsulated England's strategic dilemma: whether to concentrate the battle force or deal with the multiple smaller threats on other fronts.

After the action, the Four Days' Battle (on balance a Dutch victory) bought for the English some time to reflect on tactics while repairing their battle damage. On 16 July Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle issued "Additional Instructions for Fighting," which emphasized the need to "keep up with the admiral of the fleet and to endeavour the utmost that may be the destruction of the enemy, which is always to be made the chiefest care."[52] Moreover, they instructed, "all the best sailing ships [i.e., the fastest] are to make what way they can to engage the enemy, that so the rear of our fleet may the better come up."[53]

That same month, the Duke of York first issued one of the most important and influential English instructions of the era, intended to ensure that the English fleet maintained the weather gauge:

> In case we have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stands towards us and we towards them, then the van of our fleet shall keep the wind, and when they are come to a convenient distance of the enemy's rear shall stay until our whole line is come up within the same distance of the enemy's van, and then our whole line is to stand along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in the van, and in case the enemy tack in the rear first, then he that leads the van of our fleet is to tack first, and the whole line is to follow, standing all along with the same tacks on board as the enemy does.[54]

The thought expressed here was to stand for more than a century as the mandatory Article XVII of the eighteenth-century Royal Navy's permanent *Sailing and Fighting Instructions*. Additional points in this document expressed the importance of keeping the line intact and dividing that of an enemy by tacking through the enemy's battle line to gain the windward position.

Just a week after these additional instructions appeared, the English under the Duke of Albemarle and the Dutch under De Ruyter met again, in the two-day Battle of St. James's Day (i.e., the day it began) on 25–26 July / 4–5 August 1666. In this action, the two generally equal fleets exchanged heavy gunfire, but the English maintained the advantage, keeping a disciplined van and center. The engagement ended in defeat for the Dutch, and its aftermath provided them an opportunity to think again about fleet tactics. De Ruyter argued that it was necessary that ships keep in their assigned stations: "Otherwise the train of ships would be too extended, and the ships would be left unsupported."[55] In the weeks and months that followed, Johan de Witt played a crucial role in institutionalizing further changes. He incorporated into the general signal book De Ruyter's signal to form in line of battle line, confirmed the organization of the battle fleet into three squadrons of three divisions each, and even established a standard administrative "distribution list"

for the navy, to make sure that procedures and directives reached those who issued orders within the fleet.[56]

By late in 1666, for their part, the English were experiencing severe difficulty in finding the financial resources and supplies to keep their fleet at sea. Seamen were protesting and dockyard workers in mutiny as peace negotiations began. In early 1667, King Charles II decided not to attempt to put the fleet to sea, deploying only two small squadrons as coastal guard ships. Instead of keeping their full strength together against the Dutch, the English leaders, who were convinced that the Dutch were on the verge of surrender, sent to the Mediterranean a squadron of twenty ships—nearly all the ships that the English had then in commission. It was the same egregious strategic error that had led to Tromp's victory in 1653. It removed England's main naval defense and gave the Dutch navy an opportunity of a kind that made fleet tactics moot. It was at this point that De Ruyter made his famous raid on the English coast, up the Thames estuary and into the Medway River, capturing the decommissioned eighty-six-gun *Royal Charles* (originally *Naseby* but renamed for the king), and towing it back as a prize to Holland.[57]

The Second Dutch War left both countries exhausted. It had, however, firmly established the line-of-battle tactic in both navies and like the first war had spurred increases in the size of warships. Concomitantly, in ship design the importance of stability, to make ships firm platforms for gunnery, had come to outweigh that of speed, as did enough "stiffness" to prevent a ship from heeling so far that its lower gun ports could not be used. The seventy-gun third-rate ship of the line became as a type a recognized success in the Royal Navy, and the three-deck, hundred-gun "first rate" was returning to favor. Across the North Sea, shallow waters and sandbanks led the Dutch to eschew three-deck ships and prefer beamy (thus smaller-draft) vessels, but their large sixty-, seventy-, and eighty-gun warships were fully capable of dealing with the English. It was the Dutch to whom the French initially turned in the early 1660s for major warships. These two-deckers proved more substantial than their English counterparts, more stable and their lower tier of guns higher from the water.[58]

THE THIRD DUTCH WAR, 1672–1674

From a strategic perspective, the Third Dutch War was significantly different from the others.[59] Its origins lay in the personal enthusiasms of the young Louis XIV of France.[60] Against the more careful judgment of his ministers, France now executed a volte-face from the policy pursued during the Second Dutch War and decided to invade and overwhelm the Dutch Republic. It meant a volte-face as well for England, which had agreed in 1668 with Sweden and the Dutch Republic to prevent French occupation of the Spanish Netherlands.[61] France now actively sought to embroil England in its war to destroy the Dutch Republic. The English complied; King Charles II's motives for entering into the secret Treaty of Dover and thus the Third

Dutch War in alliance with France against the Dutch Republic lie fundamentally in internal English politics and the Crown's struggle for power with Parliament.[62]

The war broke out when the English sent two frigate squadrons, one under Sir Edward Spragge and Sir Robert Holmes, specifically to assert English "sovereignty of the sea," contrive an incident, and with it as justification, attack the homeward-bound Dutch convoy from Smyrna. Spragge and Holmes produced their "incident," and it (although they were repulsed by the Dutch, who defended themselves effectively) became a casus belli. Charles II declared war on the Dutch Republic on 18/28 March 1671/72, followed by Louis XIV on 6 April 1672 (NS).[63]

From a naval perspective, these circumstances of policy and strategy distinguished this war from the earlier two. In retrospect, it can be seen to have caused the English navy to begin to develop means to fight in a coalition and also to complement military operations ashore. While the English initially anticipated another naval war, the French quickly began aggressive land operations to invade the Republic. French soldiers, with troops from England, Cologne, and Münster, moved from the south and the east and occupied much Dutch territory, but the English were not directly part of these operations.

The naval actions were similar to those of the first two Dutch wars but showed that the tactical developments that had emerged from them had matured. Moreover, in every one of the four significant actions in this war a French squadron joined with two English squadrons in the line of battle. Anglo-French naval strategy focused on blockading the Dutch coasts so that an invasion from the sea could be launched. The Dutch responded by flooding the polders of Holland to prevent their occupation and creating a formidable naval defense to avoid any such attempt.

In this war, De Ruyter had the advantage of a fleet in an excellent state of readiness with the new warships from the 1664–66 building program. In addition, De Ruyter had trained his commanding officers in procedures for meeting a superior enemy in battle. These procedures finally did away with group tactics for grappling and boarding in favor of the single line ahead. He added, however, innovative ways to counter the Anglo-French use of this formation, which after all had been pioneered by the English. (In an early exercise of operational deception, these special tactics were disseminated by word of mouth and by example rather than in formal written instructions.)[64] In contrast, the Duke of York, who commanded the combined Anglo-French fleet, issued fighting instructions fundamentally the same as those of 1666.[65]

The first fleet engagement of the war occurred on 28 May / 7 June 1672, when De Ruyter with sixty-two ships attacked eighty-two allied ships in Solebay, off Southwold, Suffolk. Although the English and French had expected an attack, they were still at anchor when De Ruyter appeared. The French squadron, under the comte d'Estrées, and the English got under way separately, and two separate actions

ensued, in both of which the Dutch prevailed. De Ruyter's attack forced the English and French to postpone a landing in Holland and also created a feud between d'Estrées and his second in command, Abraham Duquesne, whom d'Estrées accused of failing to support him. Similarly, the English admirals traded recriminations.[66]

Late in 1672, the Amsterdam and Zeeland admiralties each sent a secret naval expedition to America, under Jacob Binckes and Cornelis Evertsen the Youngest, respectively. Meeting at Martinique in 1673, they joined forces to attack English and French shipping in the West Indies, then raiding Virginia and the shores of Chesapeake Bay, then reconquering New York, and finally attacking the Newfoundland fisheries. In the process they captured 650 ships.[67]

The focus of events now shifted ashore and to the defense of Holland from the invading French. Johan de Witt and his brother Cornelis, blamed for the critical situation, were lynched by rioters in The Hague. Prince William III, stadtholder of Holland and commanding on land, now commandeered guns and men from Dutch warships. In the meantime, De Ruyter planned an aggressive attack on England to sink ships and block the channels to Portsmouth and London.[68] Thwarting this plan in May 1673 just as De Ruyter appeared off the Thames, the new commander of the English fleet, Prince Rupert, forced him back into Dutch waters.[69]

Thrown on the defensive, De Ruyter took his fleet to the Schooneveld flats off Walcheren Island, an area of sandbanks where, outnumbered seventy-six ships to fifty-two, he made brilliant use of his local knowledge in two actions, the first on 28 May / 7 June 1673, and the second on 4/14 June. In the first, Prince Rupert planned to use his numerical superiority to deliver a decisive blow, but De Ruyter came out to windward of the shoals, where he was able to maneuver to avoid the allies' advance squadron and fireships. Instead of retreating as Rupert expected, the Dutch formed a line to defend their position. Rupert placed the French squadron in the middle of his line to prevent what had occurred at Solebay. Rupert in the van engaged Cornelis Tromp's squadron, while De Ruyter's and Adriaen Banckert's squadrons fought briefly with Spragge's and d'Estrées's, then rejoined Tromp against Rupert. No ships were lost in the general action, in the English or French fleet, but the English and French were unable to approach the Dutch ports.[70]

In the second action, a week later, the opposing fleets met again off Schooneveld, with similar results. Lack of communication between Rupert and d'Estrées confused the allied fleet, which withdrew to the Nore, at the mouth of the Thames. Its commanders concluded that they could not reach the coast by challenging De Ruyter at Schooneveld.[71]

Meanwhile, the allied fleet cruised off Kijkduin (Texel) to draw De Ruyter out into open water and clear an avenue for landing. The two fleets engaged on 11/21 August off Texel. The fleets were slightly larger this time, with the Dutch outnumbered eighty-six ships to sixty; their commanders were the same. The battle divided

into separate squadron actions. In the end, De Ruyter's maneuvers forced the allies back to the English coast and broke their blockade of the Dutch coast.[72] The misunderstandings that arose in the battle between d'Estrées and Rupert—the French took little part—became public in a dispute that showed the strains within the alliance. The recriminations contributed to the cessation of allied operations and the conclusion that the war had been a failure for France and England.[73]

The Anglo-French fleet had consistently attempted to break through the Dutch formations but always failed. De Ruyter's successful defense was the most significant naval achievement of the era, and the frustration of an enemy landing in Holland and Zeeland was critical for the Dutch. De Ruyter's actions in the Third Dutch War marked the unmistakable arrival of the range of new European naval developments.

THE PEACE OF 1674 TO THE DUTCH INVASION OF ENGLAND IN 1688

England made peace with the Dutch Republic the following year, but the Dutch war with France did not end for another four years, in 1678. The Dutch shifted their naval operations from the North Sea to the English Channel, the Mediterranean, and the Baltic. In the Channel, their enemies now included Dunkirk privateers, whom the French government encouraged to attack Dutch shipping. In the Mediterranean, the Republic joined with the Spanish to fight the French; De Ruyter died in combat against Vice Adm. Abraham Duquesne's fleet in 1676.[74] The war against France spread to the Baltic, where Sweden had made an alliance with France against Denmark. The Dutch Republic in each of the three years between 1675 and 1677 sent squadrons of ten to fifteen ships to assist the Danes. A combined Dutch and Danish fleet under Cornelis van Tromp (who was at the time the head of both navies) won a major victory off the southern tip of the island of Öland in 1676. The Dutch also fought the French in the Caribbean. Jacob Binckes's squadron attacked Cayenne in French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Tobago.

Following the 1678 Peace of Nijmegen, the Dutch navy settled into a peacetime role. The Republic reduced its active naval forces and limited their operations to the protection of trade in the Mediterranean.[75] The English navy had been on a similar footing since 1674, its operations also mainly in the Mediterranean. King Charles II died in 1685, and his brother, the Duke of York, came to the throne as King James II. The English navy developed an extensive system of trade protection, stationing regional squadrons to deter attacks, and combating the Barbary corsairs from bases at Lisbon, Gibraltar, Port Mahon, and also (though it did not mature as a naval base as had been hoped) at Tangier.[76]

James II's Roman Catholicism (he had converted during his brother's reign) aroused protests in England, but the memories of the Civil War and Cromwell's military dictatorship were too recent and vivid for any immediate desire for revolution. Across the North Sea, however, Prince William III was gravely concerned about the survival of the Dutch Republic against what appeared to be the

ever-expanding influence and power of Louis XIV's France. In this context, England, he foresaw, would become a further, severe threat to the Republic if James II were to ally himself with France. In early 1688, William III began to think seriously—and secretly—about asserting his claim to the English throne (he was a grandson of Charles I), as well as that of his wife, Mary, James's eldest daughter. If successful, he would become both the unrivaled leader in the Dutch Republic and king of England. William skillfully exploited the anti-Catholic sentiments of key Englishmen to intensify opposition to James.

Among those whom William brought to his side was Adm. Arthur Herbert, who had publicly opposed James's policies and had been passed over for command of the main English fleet. Between June and October 1688, the Dutch gathered ships at the Rotterdam admiralty, eventually forty-eight ships of the line and frigates, as well as twenty-eight smaller warships, manned by 9,500 seamen. The Dutch navy hired some three hundred merchantmen and sixty fishing boats to carry fifteen thousand armed troops, four thousand horses, and extensive supplies. Under the command of Admiral Herbert, the massive fleet of 463 ships left Hellevoetsluis on 20/30 October, but heavy westerly winds drove it back to port. Herbert tried again about noon on 1/11 November 1688, this time enjoying the benefit of an easterly gale that later (prevailing winds being southwesterly) became legendary as the "Protestant Wind." On a northwesterly course toward the open North Sea, the large force gradually assumed an ordered formation.

About midnight, William and Herbert, aware that the easterly wind would be holding James's fleet under Lord Dartmouth in the Gunfleet, north of the Thames estuary on the east coast of England, changed their apparent intention to land the expeditionary force on the northeast coast and instead sailed down the Channel, taking advantage of the easterly wind that kept Lord Dartmouth and James II's opposing fleet bottled up. On 3/13 November Dartmouth's flagship sighted William's fleet directly to windward. Later that day, the Dutch fleet passed through the Strait of Dover, by that night it was off Dungeness, and on 4/14 November it was off the Isle of Wight. Dartmouth, unable to get around sandbanks or overcome the tide, could not get to sea until 4/14 November, by which time the Dutch were far down the Channel. The next day the wind shifted back to the prevailing southwest, slowing Dartmouth but allowing William and Herbert to sail handily into the east-facing Tor Bay, on the coast of Devon. On the same day, William landed at Brixham, on the south side of the bay. Over the next two days—the seas were unseasonably calm, and there was no opposition—the fifteen thousand troops and four thousand horses with their supplies got ashore safely.[77]

CONCLUSION

Over the twenty-four-year period, between 1652 and 1676, of the three Anglo-Dutch naval wars, navies first employed aggressive, offensive tactics with large,

heavily gunned warships in line of battle. With the support of growing and increasingly complex administrative and governmental structures ashore, tactics, ships, and gunnery developed over the following century to a level of refinement that made them the hallmarks of the European sailing navies throughout the Napoleonic Wars. William III's invasion force in 1688 demonstrated a further transformation of fleets, in effectively and efficiently organizing and quickly landing an amphibious expeditionary force. The characteristics taken on in those years dominated naval history for the remainder of the age of sail and continued thereafter in spirit. Even so, these advances over the thirty-six years between 1652 and 1688 were but a part of the more substantial and continuing evolution of navies across the centuries both before and after.

NOTES This essay appears in David Ormrod and Gijs Rommelse, eds., *War, Trade and the State: Anglo-Dutch Conflict, 1652–89* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell & Brewer, 2020). Used by permission.

1 Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806,* Oxford History of Early Modern Europe (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 610–11; Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 197–207.

2 Quoted in Israel, *Dutch Primacy,* p. 207, from SG 5899/i: English Ambassadors to the States General, 30 March 1651, Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, Neth.

3 Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560–1660," in *Essays in Swedish History,* ed. Roberts (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1967), pp. 195–225. The following section is based on John B. Hattendorf, "Navies and Naval Operations, 1400–1815," in the present volume (chapter 6) and in *The Routledge Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 1400–1800,* ed. Claire Jowitt, Craig Lambert, and Steve Mentz (London: Routledge, 2020).

4 Roberts, "Military Revolution," p. 195.

5 Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns, Sails, and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400–1700* (New York: Pantheon, 1965).

6 John Francis Guilmartin Jr., *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974). The principal articles are gathered in Jan Glete, ed., *Naval History, 1500–1680,* International Library of Essays on Military History (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 3–97.

7 Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 82–114, quotation p. 83.

8 Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 140–73.

9 N. A. M. Rodger, "Military Revolution at Sea," introduction to *Navies and State Formation: The Schumpeter Hypothesis Revisited and Reflected,* ed. Jürgen G. Backhaus (Zurich, Switz.: LIT Verlag, 2012).

10 Backhaus, *Navies and State Formation,* pp. 9–20, 108–10, 158–62, 205–13, 271–72, 306–308, 350–51, 361.

11 Louis Sicking, "Naval Warfare in Europe, c. 1330–c. 1680," in *European Warfare, 1350–1750,* ed. Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), pp. 236–63; Sicking, "European Naval Warfare," in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European History, 1350–1750,* ed. Hamish Scott (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015), vol. 2, pp. 591–611. See also Beatrice Heuser, *Strategy before Clausewitz: Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400–1830* (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 48–64; and Gijs A. Rommelse, "An Early Modern Naval Revolution? The Relationship between 'Economic Reason of State' and Maritime Warfare," *Journal for Maritime Research* 13, no. 2 (2011), pp. 138–50.

12 N. A. M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649* (London: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 410.

13 Ibid., pp. 417, 421–22.

14 Richard J. Blakemore and Elaine Murphy, *The British Civil Wars at Sea, 1638–1653* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2018), pp. 173–78.

15 Glete, *War and the State,* pp. 165–67; Jaap R. Bruijn, "The Raison d'Être and the Actual Employment of the Dutch Navy in Early Modern Times," in *Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf,* ed. N. A. M. Rodger et al. (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2016), pp. 77–78; Karel Davids and Marjolein 't Hart, "The Navy and the Rise of the State: The Case of the Netherlands, c. 1570–1810," in Backhaus, *Navies and State Formation,* pp. 285–88.

16 Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860,* Stockholm Studies in History, no. 48 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), vol. 1, p. 201. For lists of ships, see James Bender, *Dutch Warships in the Age of Sail, 1600–1714: Design, Construction, Careers, and Fates* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), pp. 140–79.

17 Jaap R. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,* 2nd English ed., Research in Maritime History, no. 45 (St. John's, NL: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2011), pp. 60–61.

18 Hans-Christoph Junge, *Flottenpolitik und Revolution: Die Entstehung der englischen Seemacht während der Herrschaft Cromwells,* Publications of the German Historical Institute London, German Edition (Stuttgart, FRG: Klett-Cotta, 1980), p. 133. For details, see J. David Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men & Warfare, 1649–1689* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), and Rif Winfield, *British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1793–1817: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2008).

19 Glete, *Navies and Nations,* vol. 1, pp. 179–80.

20 Quoted in Junge, *Flottenpolitik und Revolution,* p. 121.

21 David Ormrod, *The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650–1770,* Cambridge Studies in Modern Economic History (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), p. 310; Charles Wilson, *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (Berlin: Springer, 1978), pp. 53–59; Michael J. Braddick, "The English Government, War, Trade, and Settlement, 1625–1688," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire,* ed. William Roger Louis, vol. 1, *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century,* ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 302, 306.

22 J. S. Wheeler, "Prelude to Power: The Crisis of 1649 and the Foundation of English Naval Power," *Mariner's Mirror* 81, no. 2 (1995), pp. 148–55; Wheeler, *The Making of a World Power* (Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton, 1999), pp. 43–46.

23 This section is a revision of the similar section in John B. Hattendorf, "Navies, Strategy, and Tactics in the Age of De Ruyter," in *De Ruyter: Dutch Admiral,* ed. Jaap R. Bruijn, Ronald Prud'homme van Reine, and Rolof van Hövell tot Westerflier (Rotterdam, Neth.: Karwansaray, 2011); repr. in Hattendorf, *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011).

24 Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* pp. 53–54; Bruijn, *Varend verleden: De Nederlandse oorlogsvloot in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans B.V., 1998), pp. 92–93. See also "The Resolution of Admiral [Maarten] Tromp on the Distribution of the Fleet in Case of Its Being Attacked," extracted in *Fighting Instructions, 1530–1816,* ed. Julian S. Corbett, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 29 (London, 1905; repr. London: Conway Maritime, 1971), p. 91.

25 Sir Herbert Richmond [Adm.], *Statesmen and Sea Power* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1946, 1947), pp. 39–41.

26 See Thomas Wemyss Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea* (Edinburgh, U.K.: William Blackwood, 1911).

27 N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), pp. 35–37; Wheeler, *Making of a World Power,* pp. 47–56.

28 R. C. Anderson, "The First Dutch War in the Mediterranean," *Mariner's Mirror* 49, no. 4 (1963), pp. 260–62; Ronald Prud'homme van Reine, *Schittering en schandaal: Biografie van Maerten en Cornelis Tromp* (Amsterdam and Antwerp: De Arbeiderspers, 2001), pp. 208–209.

29 Brian Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactics, 1650–1815* (London: Conway Maritime, and Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 18.

30 "Fighting": Corbett, *Fighting Instructions,* pp. 99–103; J. R. Powell, ed., *The Letters of Robert Blake, Together with Supplementary Documents,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 76 (Colchester, U.K., 1937), pp. 467–71. "Sailing": Powell, *Letters of Robert Blake,* pp. 471–76.

31 Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* pp. 53–54; Bruijn, *Varend verleden,* pp. 95–97.

32 Davids and 't Hart, "The Navy and the Rise of the State," pp. 291–93, 303. See also Johanna K. Oudendijk, *Johan de Witt en de zeemacht* (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1944), pp. 43–57; Herbert Harvey Rowen, *John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625–1672* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 79–82.

33 Alan James, *The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572–1661,* Royal Historical Society Studies in History, n.s. (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell for the Royal Historical Society, 2004), pp. 148–65. See also Daniel Dessert, *La Royale: Vaisseaux et marins du Roi-Soleil* (Paris: Fayard, 1996); and Rif Winfield and Stephen S. Roberts, *French Warships in the Age of Sail 1626–1786: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), pp. 13–14, 53.

34 Timothy Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), pp. 172–89.

35 Carla Gardina Pestana, *The English Conquest of Jamaica: Oliver Cromwell's Bid for Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard Univ. Press, 2017), pp. 248–56.

36 Wim Klooster, *The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2016), pp. 89, 93.

37 Henk den Heijer, "Michiel De Ruyter's Expedition to West Africa and America, 1664–1665," in Bruijn, Prud'homme van Reine, and Van Hövell tot Westerflier, *De Ruyter*.

38 Brian Lavery, *The Ship of the Line,* vol. 1, *The Development of the Battlefleet 1650–1850* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 30–32, 59–60.

39 Rowen, *John de Witt,* pp. 78–83; Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* pp. 75–82; Bruijn, *Varend verleden,* pp. 103–107.

40 For a study on this subject, see C. S. Knighton, *Pepys and the Navy* (Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton, 2003).

41 Gijs Rommelse, *The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667): Raison d'État, Mercantilism and Maritime Strife* (Hilversum, Neth.: Verloren, 2006), pp.

198–201. Generally, this section is a revision of the similar section in Hattendorf, "Navies, Strategy, and Tactics."

42 Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power,* p. 46.

43 Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail,* pp. 22–24; Corbett, *Fighting Instructions,* pp. 122–30.

44 Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power,* p. 47.

45 Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* p. 77; Bruijn, *Varend verleden,* pp. 100–101.

46 R. C. Anderson, ed., *The Journal of Edward Montagu, First Earl of Sandwich, Admiral and General at Sea, 1659–1665,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 64 (London, 1928), p. 224, for 3 June 1665.

47 Ibid., pp. 269–70, for 29 August 1665.

48 R. E. J. Weber, "The Introduction of the Single Line Ahead as a Battle Formation by the Dutch 1665–1666," *Mariner's Mirror* 73 (1987), pp. 5–19; repr. in Glete, *Naval History,* p. 317.

49 Ibid., pp. 320–21.

50 Pierre Renouvin, ed., *Histoire des relations internationales,* vols. 2–3, *Les temps modernes,* by Gaston Zeller, pt. 2, *De Louis XIV à 1789* (Paris: Hachette, 1963), p. 25.

51 See H. A. van Foreest and R. E. J. Weber, *De Vierdaagse Zeeslag, 11–14 juni 1666* (Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1984), and Frank L. Fox, *A Distant Storm: The Four Days' Battle of 1666* (Rotherfield, U.K.: Press of Sail, 1996).

52 Corbett, *Fighting Instructions,* pp. 129–30.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., pp. 148–49, misdated as 1672 but in fact 18 July 1666, as documented in Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail,* pp. 27–30.

55 Weber, "Introduction of the Single Line Ahead," p. 325.

56 These changes were reflected in De Ruyter's instructions of 6 August 1667, in R. E. J. Weber, *De seinboeken voor Nederlandse oorlogsvloten en konvooien tot 1690* (Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1984), doc. 21, pp. 102–14.

57 P. G. Rogers, *The Dutch in the Medway* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017).

58 Lavery, *Ship of the Line,* vol. 1, pp. 32–36.

59 This section is a revision of the similar section in Hattendorf, "Navies, Strategy, and Tactics."

60 Paul Sonnino, *Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War,* Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), p. 176.

61 For details of this negotiation and agreement, see Birger Fahlborg, *Sveriges yttre politik, 1664–1668* (Stockholm, Swed.: Wahlström och Widstrand, 1949), pp. 464–547.

62 J. R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 179–88.

63 Sonnino, *Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War,* p. 191.

64 Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* p. 88; Bruijn, *Varend verleden,* p. 115.

65 Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail,* p. 32; Corbett, *Fighting Instructions,* pp. 133–63.

66 R. C. Anderson, ed., *Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 86 ([London], 1946), pp. 13–22, 95–101, 156–57, 164–84; Michel Vergé-Franceschi, *Abraham Duquesne: Huguenot et marin du Roi-Soleil* (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1992), pp. 254–60; J. D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy,* Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1991), p. 171.

67 Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* p. 77; Donald G. Shomette and Robert D. Haslach, *Raid on America: The Dutch Naval Campaign of 1672–1674* (Berwyn Heights, MD: Heritage Books, 2010).

68 Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* p. 83; Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* p. 89; Bruijn, *Varend verleden,* p. 117.

69 Frank Kitson, *Prince Rupert: Admiral and General-at-Sea* (London: Constable & Robinson, 1998), pp. 246–89.

70 J. C. M. Warnsinck, *Admiraal De Ruyter: De Zeeslag op Schooneveld juni 1673* (The Hague, Neth.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1930); Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail,* p. 35; Jaap R. Bruijn, *De oorlogvoering ter zee in 1673 in journalen en andere stukken* (Groningen, Neth.: J. B. Wolters, 1966), pp. 55–56, 114–15; Anderson, *Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War,* pp. 32–36, 300–302, 319–20, 334, 377, 386–87.

71 Jones, *Anglo-Dutch Wars,* p. 206; Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail,* p. 36; Bruijn, *Oorlogvoering,* pp. 60, 118–20; Anderson, *Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War,* pp. 37–40, 303, 322, 336, 378–79, 389.

72 Bruijn, *Oorlogvoering,* pp. 89–90, 152–54, 184–85, 205–209; Anderson, *Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War,* pp. 46–53, 311, 355–62, 381, 386, 390–94.

73 Carl J. Ekberg, *The Failure of Louis XIV's Dutch War* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 161–70.

74 Vergé-Franceschi, *Abraham Duquesne,* pp. 268–78, and "De Ruyter versus Duquesne," in Bruijn, Prud'homme van Reine, and Van Hövell tot Westerflier, *De Ruyter,* pp. 183–98.

75 Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* pp. 77–79.

76 Sari Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power,* Studies in Naval History (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar, 1991).

77 Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* pp. 136–39; Bruijn, *Dutch Navy,* p. 80; A. W. H. Pearsall, "The Invasion Voyage: Some Nautical Thoughts," in *1688: The Seaborne Alliance and Diplomatic Revolution; Proceedings of an International Symposium Held at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 5–6 October 1988,* ed. Charles Wilson and David Procter (London: Trustees of the National Maritime Museum, 1989), pp. 165–74.

VIII *North America as a Theater of Conflict and Imperial Competition during the War of the Spanish Succession* 1701–1713

The War of the Spanish Succession was a conflict among the principal Western European powers over their relative positions in international power politics. Among the issues were participation in oceanic trade and the related economic roles of overseas colonies, notably those in the Americas. Although the Americas were involved in war aims, the war was not decided in the Americas but rather on the battlefields of Europe. The results relating to all issues, including the Americas, were negotiated among European diplomats at Utrecht. For most of the war, the colonists in North America—whether they were French, Spanish, or English—typically were left to their own devices, with the exception of one, isolated expedition in the latter part of the war.

The main theaters of action were the Low Countries, the Rhine-Danube valley, the Mediterranean, Portugal, and Spain. In terms of both geography and communication, North America was remote. Even the West Indies and South America have seemed more relevant to historians of the war than North America, where the conflict is given a different name, "Queen Anne's War." That name—like "King William's War" before it—suggests that the fighting there was isolated, removed from European power issues. Of course, it was not. While distant, it was not unconnected, although it had a number of special characteristics that made it different.

The North American theater has rarely been considered as a whole rather than in terms of one or another of its regions.[1] Examining them together, one can discern four themes. First, the fundamental rivalry among Britain, France, and Spain created the conflict. Second, each rival developed a separate relationship with the local Native American peoples, making them either allies or neutrals. Third, the war took place on the fringe of a largely unexplored and undeveloped continent. Fourth, the logistics, distance, and time involved in bringing forces from Europe shaped the character of the conflict in North America and left the colonists to act—or not act—on the basis of available resources.

Six separate regions were involved: Spanish territories in the trans-Mississippi West, stretching to the Pacific Ocean; French and Spanish territories in the Mississippi Valley and on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico in the south; English colonies

on the southeastern Atlantic coast; New England colonies and French Acadia; New France; and Newfoundland in the northeast. In all these, the conflict was set within the context of relations between Europeans and Native Americans. These relationships varied from region to region, the variables including the development of amicable relations, the manipulation of rivals to gain allies, or the securing of neutrality during conflict.

COMPARATIVE NAVAL POWER

In any examination of military operations in overseas theaters of warfare, the missions and capabilities of competing navies are fundamental. While France and Spain were competitors in the period leading up to the war, they ostensibly set their rivalry aside during the War of the Spanish Succession. The Spanish navy was very small in 1700, with only two eighty-gun ships and eight ships of from forty to sixty guns. At the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession two of these ships were in the Pacific, five in the southern Netherlands, and the remainder cruising in the West Indies or in home waters; there were also about thirty galleys in the Mediterranean. Spain was to lose most of its small fleet to wear and tear or enemy action during the war. Despite some replacements, there would be only six ships in the entire Spanish navy by the end of the war.[2] Thus it fell to Spain's ally, France, and the French navy, to protect the Spanish silver fleet as it crossed the North Atlantic.

The main thrust of French policy for the Americas during the war was to protect and use the resources of Spain's colonies, rather than build or protect its colonies themselves or to attack directly the British, Dutch, or Portuguese colonies in the Americas. During the War of the Spanish Succession, the French navy was the principal opponent of the allied navies of England and the Dutch Republic, known as the "Maritime Powers."[3] (See the table.)

Comparative Naval Strength, 1700–1715

	British		Dutch		Total		French		Anglo-Dutch Superiority	
	N	D	N	D	N	D	N	D	N%	D%
1700	127	174	83	97	210	271	108	176	94%	54%
1705	122	170	79	94	201	264	105	167	91%	58%
1710	123	171	86	101	209	272	94	158	122%	72%
1715	119	168	71	84	190	252	62	102	206%	147%

N = Total number of ships of the line; D = Total displacement in thousands of tons.

Source: Glete, *Navies and Nations,* vol. 1, p. 226.

At the same time, French naval power was in decline. At the outset of the war, the French navy was very close in size to the English navy. During the war, Britain gradually moved beyond numerical parity into superiority, in the latter third of the war, to all other European navies. Britain's alliance with the Dutch Republic added a greater dimension to this superiority. The combined Anglo-Dutch naval force at the outset of the war gave the Maritime Powers a superiority of more than 90 percent in numbers of major warships over the French and more than 50 percent in the total tonnage of those ships. By 1710, the Anglo-Dutch superiority had increased to 122 percent in the numbers of major warships over the French and 72 percent in total tonnage. The decline in French naval power is also reflected in naval funding, which, as the overall cost of the war rose between 1701 and 1710, fell to 11 to 14 percent of France's total defense expenditures. Simultaneously, French naval officials found themselves chronically unable to pay their bills.[4] The British navy, for its part, by the end of the war had reached a position of global naval supremacy in terms of numbers, equal to the combined naval forces of France, Spain, and the Dutch Republic.[5]

The great disparity in naval strength between the contending powers had direct implications for how navies were used during the war. Despite its inferior and worsening position, France attempted to maintain relative naval strength with a construction program. A total of sixty thousand tons was added between 1701 and 1708, but the allied attack on the naval dockyard at Toulon in 1707, although it failed to take that port, destroyed so many warships that the French navy was disabled for the remainder of the war.[6] France concentrated its declining naval resources on protecting the silver *flota* from America, encouraging privateers to make war on Anglo-Dutch trade in European waters.[7]

The British and Dutch, facing an enemy that did not attack overseas territories, were free to use the sea, protecting their own trade, transporting troops to the Continent, supporting and encouraging allies, making combined amphibious assaults, and maintaining a maritime superiority that discouraged French naval challenges. France did attempt such a challenge in the battle of Vélez-Málaga, off southern Spain in August 1704, but did not succeed and did not try again the remainder of the war. Instead, French naval forces concentrated on their missions and, to the frustration of British and Dutch officers, avoided battle when they could. The French sent small squadrons, sometimes privately fitted out, to the colonies to escort ships home; naval vessels began to be used by investors for private gain. By the latter part of the war, the French navy was unable to provide even a single warship for service in North America.[8]

NEW SPAIN AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI WEST

The Pacific Ocean had long been seen as a Spanish lake and its eastern shore entirely Spanish territory. By the time of the War of the Spanish Succession, it was well known that Spanish silver from Peru shipped along the Pacific coast and carried overland to the Caribbean port of Vera Cruz in Mexico was important for the French and Spanish war economies. Traditional Spanish policy of forbidding French commerce with Spanish colonies wavered during this war. In 1701, Philip V authorized French merchants into Spanish Pacific coast ports, though not for trading. The merchants ignored the ban and developed a thriving illegal trade, which Philip attempted to stop in 1705. A year later, Archduke Charles, a rival claimant to the Spanish throne, sought to develop that trade for his own supporters, and Philip requested French assistance to stop it. Despite policy vacillation over the claims of Spain and its own merchants' interests, France sent ninety-eight merchant ships to the Pacific between 1701 and 1713.[9] French merchants from Saint-Malo were remarkably successful in direct trade with Spain's colonies, bringing back to French ports between 1703 and 1715 as much as ninety-nine million pesos, enough to have doubled the French monetary supply in those years.[10] Most of this trade was in silver from the Viceroyalty of Peru; it affected the Viceroyalty of New Spain, in North America, in passing through Panama to Vera Cruz en route to Europe. The privateers of a little squadron under Capt. Woodes Rogers were among the very few English ships in the Pacific in this period. In November and December 1709, they captured the Spanish frigate *Encarnación* off the southern tip of Baja California near the end of a transpacific passage from Manila to Acapulco but failed to take the larger ship the frigate was escorting.[11]

While that incident on the Pacific coast took place late in the war, the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1702 was felt more quickly ashore in New Spain. On New Spain's northwestern border, "the rim of Christendom," the Jesuit Eusebio Kino had been laboring as a missionary and explorer since the 1680s. In early 1702, Father Eusebio, who had recently demonstrated that California was not an island, recommended that Upper or Alta California be named Novae Philipinae in honor of Spain's new king and Lower or Baja California Novae Carolinae in honor of Carlos II.[12] Returning to his missionary work in the Pimería Alta (present-day Arizona and Sonora), Kino saw an urgent need for missionary teachers for the local Native Americans and pleaded with his superiors for assistance. The local Pima tribe particularly wanted teachers, he reported; numerous and friendly, they were loyal defenders of Spain's imperial enterprise. Yet response to the missionary's call was slow; the war had made transatlantic travel unsafe. The missionaries that were approved to go could not travel, because the annual fleet from Cádiz to Vera Cruz could not sail. Further, the war's huge demands on the Spanish treasury left less and less for missionaries. By the time of Kino's death in 1711, the bishop of

Durango was calling for the suppression of the Jesuit missions in New Spain as too expensive to sustain.[13]

Farther to the east, the middle section of the Spanish northern frontier had reached its historical limit and served as an advanced outpost against the Plains Indians as well as against the French, who were reported to covet lands beyond their settlements in the Illinois Country and the Mississippi Valley.[14]

FRANCE AND SPAIN ON THE COAST OF THE GULF OF MEXICO

In Texas, Louisiana, and Florida there was direct competition among Europeans.[15] After the 1697 treaty of Rijswijk had solidified its positions in the West Indies, France took steps to expand along the Gulf Coast to check Spanish expansion as well as to guard against the threat from Carolina, then the southernmost of the English North American colonies.[16] Pierre Le Moyne, sieur d'Iberville, was sent to challenge directly Spanish hegemony and to claim the mouth of the Mississippi River for France. On arrival in the area, Iberville found that the Spanish had beaten him to Pensacola but had not yet located the river mouth. Iberville established Fort Maurepas on Biloxi Bay and serendipitously found an entrance to the Mississippi in 1699. The French established Fort Mississippi nearly a hundred miles upriver in 1700 and another fort at the eastern entrance to Lake Pontchartrain in 1701. In 1702, they established Fort Louis de la Mobile, near the mouth of the Mobile River, and Fort Louis de la Louisiane on Dauphin Island at the entrance to Mobile Bay.

In the process of attempting in the 1670s to approach the Gulf of Mexico from the Canadian north the French had established positions in the Illinois Country, but these were unconnected to the Gulf Coast. The tiny settlements—near present-day Peoria, Illinois, on the Illinois River (established 1680); at the Falls of Saint Anthony near present-day Minneapolis, Minnesota; at Cahokia, Illinois (established 1699); near Vincennes on the Wabash River in Indiana (1702); and at Kaskaskia, Illinois (established 1703), on the Mississippi River—were not developed and remained at subsistence levels during the war. The only other French initiative in the west during this period was Antoine de La Mothe, sieur de Cadillac's establishment of Detroit in 1701.

The Canadian historian W. J. Eccles argued that for France the War of the Spanish Succession in North America was fought on a new basis, one different from that of previous colonial wars. In 1700–1702 Louis XIV and his ministers discussed the value of linking the French settlements on the Gulf Coast with those in the Illinois Country and in Canada to form a barrier against the English.[17] The idea of strategic containment, keeping the English colonies from expanding west of the Appalachians, fed ambitions, fears, and conversations on both sides, but in fact no such policy was put into military or naval effect between 1702 and 1714. The total

French population in Louisiana and Illinois between 1701 and 1715 has been estimated as growing from a hundred to only three hundred individuals. For the most part, the French continued to be relatively few in number, travelers and traders in the interior. Their handful of minimally manned fortified positions were meant only to support possible future claims to southern and western territories, not to fight for them during the present conflict.[18]

THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER OF THE ENGLISH COLONIES

Carolina comprised two settlements established under a single set of proprietors forty years before the War of the Spanish Succession. During the war the two developed in distinctive ways. Two separate proprietary governments—one for the northern province and one for the southern province—were in place by 1712. After a rebellion in South Carolina in 1719, a royal governor was put in place, but the colony retained a proprietary government. A decade later, in 1729, the proprietors finally sold their interests to the Crown, making North Carolina and South Carolina royal colonies. When still a nominally unified, proprietary colony, Carolina was responsible for its own defense in the War of the Spanish Succession. In its early phase of settlement, Carolinians had been preoccupied by a profitable trade with Native Americans within their borders. Gradually, Carolinians had moved beyond them and reached even the Mississippi River. In the process, they encountered Spanish traders coming up the rivers from the south and French traders from the new settlements near Mobile and the lower Mississippi.

By 1701, the residents of Charles Town in South Carolina were beginning to fear an attack. At the same time, Carolinians made friendly advances toward the Yamasee and other tribes to the south, hoping to prevent them from supporting the French or Spanish. Governor James Moore decided in 1702 that notwithstanding these measures, the best defense for Carolina would be a preemptive attack on Spanish Saint Augustine, "before it be strengthened by french forces," in order to protect "the fronteere Colony of all her [Majesty's] Plantations on the Maine [i.e., Atlantic coast] in america."[19] Moore undertook this strategic initiative on his own, unable at first to secure the approval of the proprietors of the colony, who saw no reason to conduct a war at their own cost. Hearing informally that England had declared war on the Bourbon alliance of France and Spain, Moore urged the Commons House of Assembly of Carolina on 20 August 1702 to take action, but that body initially refused. The official report of the declaration of war reached Charles Town a few days later, on 26 August, and opinion changed. By early September the colonists were caught up by war fever, as the assembly proclaimed "the encouragement to free plunder and a share of all Slaves."[20] It then voted two thousand pounds from the colony's treasury to fund Moore's 213-mile amphibious expedition against the Spanish Castillo de San Marcos at Saint Augustine, Florida, and declared that "all persons who go on this expedition shall have an equal share of all plunder."[21]

In early November, the Carolinian force of five or six hundred militiamen and between three and six hundred Native Americans arrived in Spanish Florida by sea in fourteen vessels. About 1,200 townspeople of Saint Augustine, along with the governor and supreme military commander in Spanish Florida, José de Zúñiga y Zerda, took refuge behind the coquina-stone bastions of the Castillo, built between 1672 and 1695. Moore and the deputy governor, Robert Daniell, easily occupied the deserted town but failed entirely to take the fortification. In late December, Spanish reinforcements arrived from Havana, and Moore was forced to discontinue his ineffective eight-week-long siege. As Sir Francis Drake had done in 1586, Moore burned the town in early January 1703, along with its parochial church, the monastery of Saint Francis, six missions, and nearby farms.[22]

Governor Moore's failure quickly lost him his office, and the expedition cost the colony six thousand pounds more than the two thousand allotted, obliging the colony to issue paper currency and impose new customs duties to cover the deficit. Moore himself, however, lost neither his connections with the proprietors nor his appetite for preemptive attacks. In December 1704, he led an expedition against the Apalachee tribe of northern Florida in the largest of a series of raids on Spain's Native American supporters that became known collectively as the "Apalachee massacre." Moore's largest single action was the battle of Ayubale or Concepción, where his fifty Englishmen and a thousand Native American allies were opposed by Spanish troops and their own allies. These actions resulted in the disruption of Spain's mission trading network with its Native American allies in this region and temporarily removed the perceived threat to Carolina. They resulted also in the depopulation of large areas of northern Spanish Florida between the protected areas near Saint Augustine and Pensacola.[23]

In response, a Franco-Spanish force attacked and burned Charles Town in 1706. The surviving Apalachees, along with members of the Tawasa and Chatta tribes, sought the protection of the French at Mobile. An English-led group of Tallapoosas attacked Spanish-held Pensacola in 1707, destroying the town before French forces arrived and saved the fort. Having moved this far to the west, the Carolinians wanted to go farther and seize French Mobile, which they saw as the key to the northeastern coast of the Gulf of Mexico and the mouth of the Mississippi. The prerequisite of Carolina's expansion was success in the efforts of the colony's Indian agent, Thomas Nairne, to make peace with the Choctaws and the chief tribes along the rivers: the Arkansas, Tourimas, Taensas, Natchez, and Koroas. The French, however, led by Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, effectively checked these diplomatic initiatives, precluding an English attack and protecting Franco-Spanish trade with Native Americans from diversion to Carolina traders. Checked until 1711, Carolina in that year capitalized on a brewing dispute among the Native

Americans to fund an attack by Chickasaws and 1,300 Creeks on the Choctaws, who supported the French.

This surrogate-style warfare reached a high point in 1712, when several Carolina victories inspired further dreams of expansion toward the Mississippi. The aggressive and callous dealings of traders with the Native Americans led in 1715 to an uprising of the Yamasees, who, encouraged by both the French and Spanish, began a campaign of revenge on Carolina that set back the colony's development for years.[24]

PROBLEMS OF COLONIAL DEFENSE AND OVERSEAS CAMPAIGNS

Carolina's military actions raised a fundamental and unresolved issue in British colonial policy during the War of the Spanish Succession. On the one hand, the events on the southern frontier showed the importance of Carolina within the larger imperial competition among the British, French, and Spanish in North America. At the same time, in the description of the American historian Charles McLean Andrews, "it demonstrated the recklessness, if not the criminal absurdity, of a policy that left the care of such a colony in the hands of a group of private persons, unfit to carry out so important a responsibility and inadequately supplied with funds to meet the emergencies that inevitably would arise."[25] This conflict over the rationalization and funding of colonial and imperial defense versus the rights of colonies and colonists was to ferment over the next sixty years before boiling over in revolution in 1775.

Nevertheless, the principal problem in military and naval areas was the multiplicity of, on one hand, colonial governments—some proprietary, some royal—raising and controlling military forces, and on the other, agencies in London attempting to coordinate military, naval, and colonial policy. Attempts to deal with it had begun as early as 1643, when the New England Confederation was set up to exercise rudimentary coordination for defense. In 1686 King James II revoked the proprietary charters of several northern colonies and combined them under a single royal governor in the Dominion of New England. In 1689 the colonies reverted to their old charters, but with the basic defense issue still unsolved. In 1701 the Board of Trade recommended that proprietary charters be resumed to the Crown; Parliament debated the idea in 1701, 1702, and 1706 but passed nothing. Thus, the defense of the North American colonies during the War of the Spanish Succession was based on procedures that had been put in place under William III (r. 1689–1702).[26]

Command, control, support from London, communications, finance, and admiralty law all depended on a broader colonial system that was in this period decades from full development. The various Navigation Acts from 1651, though instruments of commercial policy, had indirect effects on defense issues. The Act of 1696 was particularly important, in that it established the system of vice-admiralty

courts in the North American colonies that were to deal with wartime maritime prize cases. Initially ten vice-admiralty court districts were created, pairing proprietary colonies with royal ones. By the opening of the War of the Spanish Succession, vice-admiralty courts had been established in Maryland (1694), New York (1696), South Carolina (1697), Pennsylvania (1698), Virginia (1698), and Massachusetts (1699). In 1704, shortly after the war began, another was established in New Hampshire (1704), the first of a proliferation that increased after 1715. One of the initial problems in the colonial vice-admiralty courts was misappropriation of prize goods and ships by colonial governors and their failure to remit the Crown's and the Lord High Admiral's shares. The system was further tightened in 1708 with the Act for Encouragement of Trade to America, with its provisions on the adjudication of prize cases in colonial courts.[27]

The efficiency of maritime communication between London and America was another issue. As early as 1701 the prospect of war with France led Britain to experiment twice with regularizing transatlantic mail, but only with the West Indies, and the effort was not sustained throughout the war.[28] Another difficulty was the failure of the War Office, Transport Commissioners, Treasury, and Exchequer in Whitehall to coordinate among themselves, particularly in regard to army transport ships, commodities, and supplies for overseas operations.[29]

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF THE ENGLISH COLONIES

In August 1696, just as the Nine Years' War (1688–97) was ending, the Privy Council in London asked the Board of Trade for a summary of how colonial defense had developed during the war. The board's report described the state of affairs as it would stand at the opening of the War of the Spanish Succession.[30] Its major recommendations were that the colonies be enabled to defend themselves and each other with minimal aid from the Crown and that regularized procedures for doing so be established. The need was more urgent for the northern colonies than for the southern, as the enemy was in striking distance of nearly all the northern colonies, not just of one, as in the south. New York, Massachusetts (which then included modern-day Maine), and New Hampshire lay directly on the border with New France, while Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island would be directly threatened if those neighbors were attacked. The board offered two proposals for the northern colonies: first, each colony would provide a quota of money and men for the common defense; second, a royal captain general would coordinate and command the unified forces of the northern colonies. These recommendations acknowledged the need for increased unity of action among the separate colonies if their collective self-sufficiency was to improve. A "united front" would be particularly vital in maintaining alliances with Native American tribes, which, the board underscored, was essential for frontier defense.[31]

This scheme was adopted, and quotas were duly established during the remainder of the Nine Years' War. To the new position of captain general was soon added another idea, the appointment of royal governors of multiple colonies, further pulling colonies together. In early March 1697, Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, was made royal governor of New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, with military responsibilities for not only these but also the proprietary colonies of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. However, with the end of the Nine Years' War and the death of Bellomont in 1701, the whole scheme collapsed. The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession found the organizational situation no better than it had been in 1692.[32] The colonies in the course of the war would suffer all the long-standing difficulties of dealings with and between local governments vested with different authorities and also the frustrations and constraints that followed for military undertakings.[33]

The war in the north was marked at the outset by two separate threats, one facing New York and the other Massachusetts. In New York the Five Nations of the Iroquois (the predominant grouping on the northern frontier) had declared their neutrality, a result both of their experiences in the last war and of French diplomacy thereafter. In the new war they would not attack the French if not attacked by them. That effectively denied to the New Yorkers the Native American support they required to attack New France or even, for that matter, defend their own long and poorly defined northern border. Iroquois neutrality also, however, protected New York from raids, and that suited its merchants, as it allowed them to continue their profitable trade to the interior. Massachusetts, in contrast, was left threatened by the increasing strength of Port Royal in French Acadia, just across the Gulf of Maine from Massachusetts's northern territory of Maine. The governor of Massachusetts, Joseph Dudley, recommended to London as early as December 1703:[34]

> If H.M. [His Majesty] shall please to make a descent upon Port Royall with some ships of warr directly from England, without first going to the West Indies, where they usually loose halfe theyr number and all their health [to yellow fever], before they come northward, it would in all probability be effectuall to remove that nest of pyrates so near us.[35]

The French and their Abenaki (non-Iroquoian) allies sought retribution for English raids during the earlier King Philip's War of the 1670s and after on French and Abenaki settlements and their Abenaki allies. While imperial strategy and trade rivalry motivated the French, quite different motives moved their Native Americans allies, who sought personal goals in a parallel war to win scalps and capture matériel and prisoners. Both saw vulnerable targets in the English settlements along the Connecticut River, which flowed directly southward from New Hampshire to Long Island Sound. The governor general of Quebec, the marquis de Vaudreuil, began a series of lightning raids against English settlements, against which Massachusetts forces could only very ineffectively defend themselves. In one of the best-known incidents of the war, a French force under Jean-Baptiste Hertel

de Rouville struck Deerfield, Massachusetts, at dawn on a cold February day in 1704. Burning the settlement, the French killed numerous settlers and took others as prisoners. They then attacked Northampton, farther south in the Connecticut River valley.[36]

Dudley and Vaudreuil exchanged views on a neutral zone similar to New York's, but Vaudreuil's terms were too high for the New Englanders, requiring them to stop fishing in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and the sea around Acadia. Meanwhile, Vaudreuil's raids were bringing a reciprocal response from Massachusetts against French outposts, creating a vicious war of vengeance that was to bring no advantage to either side. In response to the Deerfield raid, Massachusetts attacked French settlements at Castine, Grand Pré, Pigiquit, and Cobequid in Acadia's Minas Basin. The leaders of Massachusetts estimated that Port Royal, the main French defensive position in Acadia, was too strong to assault with their limited forces. The French waged a privateering campaign against English vessels on the North American coast. It was extremely successful: some 234 English vessels had fished the Grand Banks before the war, but by 1707 there were only forty-six.[37] The Massachusetts General Court (the colony's legislature) authorized Governor Dudley to make an attempt on Port Royal in June 1707 with support from nearby colonies. Dudley did so but found the position even stronger than had been anticipated. Unable to take the fort, the English withdrew.[38] In Boston, public criticism was so great that Governor Dudley decided to make a second attack in September, but this expedition was even less successful, as the French had obtained supplies from a privateer and support from another nation of non-Iroquoian allies, the Mi'kmaqs.[39]

In July 1708, in the wake of these events, Samuel Vetch delivered a memorial on behalf of the colony entitled "Canada Survey'd," to the Board of Trade: "It cannot but be wondered att, by all thinking men, who know the valuableness of the British Monarchy in America, both with regard to their Power and Trade, that a Nation so Powerful in Shipping, so numerous in subjects, and otherwise so wisely jealous of their trade, shou'd so tamely allow such a troublesome Neighbor as the French."[40] Arguing the importance of North America, Vetch continued, "There is no island the British possess in the West Indies that is capable of subsisting without the Assistance of [that] Continent."[41] Like Moore and Nairne in South Carolina, as well as a number of others in the previous half-century, Vetch looked beyond his own colony to a wider British Empire in North America.[42] In a second memorial to the board, in August 1708, Vetch remarked of the French that "their principal Place of Strength and Importance [is] Quebeck and Montreal, which being taken, all their other governments such as Port Royal, Trois Rivieres, Placentia & Mississippi wou'd fall a course into the hands of the Crown."[43]

Vetch duly proposed such a campaign, and by February 1709 government officials in London had approved it. They sent instructions to the various departments

and colonial governors, while Vetch returned to North America to help lead the expedition. A two-pronged attack on New France was envisaged. Colonial militiamen from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania would march overland from Albany, New York, to attack Montreal, while 1,200 men from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut would assemble in Boston to join four thousand troops being sent from Britain. From Boston they would sail to deliver an amphibious attack on Quebec. Despite squabbling among the colonies over their various quotas and other arrangements, the colonial portion of the expedition was in place by late June. That date was well behind the scheduled arrival of reinforcements from Britain, but the colonial troops found none there. The colonials waited and waited, but nothing happened. Finally, on 11 October, Governor Dudley received a letter written on 1 July informing him, without explanation, that the expedition had been "laid aside." In fact—the colonials had no idea of any of this—the force had been ready to sail in late May but the cabinet had canceled it. France, the British leaders thought, was likely to sign a preliminary peace and the troops planned for America should be diverted to occupy Spain.[44] The Geertruidenberg peace talks collapsed, leaving London to send a ship to advise the colonial governors to use their assembled forces to make their own attempt on Port Royal. This directive arrived in Boston too late in the season for the Americans to act, but they kept their forces together for an attack in 1710.

Meanwhile, the French had become aware of the threat and had improved their defenses.[45] The New England colonies—now angry, disappointed, and frustrated—continued to appeal to London. New York even sent four Iroquois sachems from the Mohawk River valley to impress London with the importance of Native Americans to the war as well as to be impressed themselves by the grandeur of London and Queen Anne's court.[46] But even before the Iroquois sachems arrived, the plans for a 1710 expedition were canceled. Instead, Col. Francis Nicholson (until 1705 the governor of Virginia and now in London) was ordered to take command of a colonial force and attack Port Royal. Massachusetts contributed nine hundred men with provisions for three months; Rhode Island added two hundred more, with transport ships; Connecticut contributed three hundred men; New Hampshire made a small contribution; and the Royal Navy released three station ships from New York and Boston. Port Royal was invested, and on 2 October 1710, after a weeklong siege with naval gunnery the governor of Acadia, Daniel d'Auger de Subercase, capitulated.[47] Other Acadian towns followed, and on 12 October Nicholson proclaimed the renaming of Port Royal, Acadia, as Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia.[48]

Nicholson returned to London to make the case for the major expedition against Quebec. The Iroquois sachems had created great interest there and had drawn attention to the previously overlooked course of the war in North America.[49] In December 1710, Secretary of State Henry St. John secretly began preparations

for a new expedition against New France.[50] The expedition, under the command of Adm. Sir Hovenden Walker, reached Boston in June 1711, and colonial soldiers joined it. The plan was that Francis Nicholson would march north with an army of militiamen to attack Quebec, while Walker's forces sailed up the Saint Lawrence River. It failed spectacularly.[51] On 23 August 1711, before Nicholson's forces could reach Canada by land, Walker's fleet ran aground in the Saint Lawrence and lost 884 men by drowning. As Walker gathered the survivors, he considered either continuing the expedition or attacking the French in Newfoundland. In the end, he rejected both options and returned to England.

The British attempt to seize New France had failed, but peace negotiations raised other opportunities. Secret negotiations in October and November 1711 between the French envoy Nicolas Mesnager and English secretaries of state Lord Dartmouth and Henry St. John revealed that France was willing to sacrifice colonies to preserve its gains in Europe, which it required as compensation for its military defeats and economic exhaustion. An agreement, also secret, ceded Hudson Bay and Placentia in Newfoundland to Britain. By June 1712 France was prepared to cede Acadia, as it eventually did at Utrecht, where the war was brought to an end.[52]

The cession of Newfoundland touched on a long-standing rivalry over fishing rights. Annually, the British had sent a small squadron of warships to protect the migratory fisheries of the region and to convoy their catch to market in Europe; the admiral in command would serve temporarily as governor of the English settlements.[53] During the War of the Spanish Succession, Newfoundland had experienced the brutal cross-raiding that had terrorized settlements on the frontier between New England, Acadia, and New France but no decisive military or naval action.[54]

CONCLUSIONS

The War of the Spanish Succession took different forms and had different outcomes in different areas of North America, but it was largely a matter of colonies making isolated raids with their own resources. Except for the 1711 British attempt to attack Quebec, there were no major interventions of military or naval forces from the European theater. The absence of a major naval rivalry in North American waters contributed to this pattern, which encouraged by its absence privateering and raiding. There was little military action in the middle British colonies or on the western frontier, but activity on both the southern and northern frontiers was considerable. Perhaps owing to the complexity of competing ambitions, the peace negotiators in distant Utrecht made no provision for the broad section of North America stretching from California to Louisiana and Florida, leaving it in the status quo ante of unresolved imperial competition. At the same time, the more confined British-French rivalry on the northeastern coast of North America received considerable and direct attention from the negotiators.[55] French acquiescence to

British gains in Hudson Bay, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland represented on both sides a consolidation of strategic, security, and trading interests, not a dramatic victory of one over the other. France traded its territorial interests in Newfoundland to keep its fishing rights and its possession of Cape Breton, which controlled entry into the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and so was the key to the security of New France. For Britain, the acquisition of Nova Scotia and Acadia provided security that had been lacking for the New England colonies. The frontier issues of New York, the Great Lakes, the Mississippi, and the western rivers remained, like those of the southern frontier, in Florida, Louisiana, and New Spain, unresolved in this war.

NOTES

Previously published in Matthias Pohlig and Michael Schaich, eds., *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives,* Studies of the German Historical Institute, London (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 445–64. Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press, global.oup.com/academic/rights/permissions/autperm/.

1 An exception is J. S. Bromley's broad overview in chapter 2, "Colonies at War," of his *Corsairs and Navies, 1660–1760* (London: Hambledon, 1987), pp. 21–28. See also Roland Dennis Hussey and J. S. Bromley, "The Spanish Empire under Foreign Pressures, 1688–1715," and Philip S. Haffenden, "France and England in North America, 1689–1713," in *The New Cambridge Modern History,* vol. 6, *The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688–1715/25,* ed. Bromley (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 372–33, 480–508; Bruce P. Lenman, "Colonial Wars and Imperial Instability, 1688–1793," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire,* vol. 2, *The Eighteenth Century,* ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 155–56; James Pritchard, "The War of the Spanish Succession in America, 1702–1713," chap. 8 in *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670–1730* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 358–402; and Carlos Martínez Shaw, "La Guerra de Sucesión en América," in *La Guerra de Sucesión en España y la Batalla de Almansa: Europa en la encrucijada,* ed. Francisco García González (Madrid: Sílex, D.L., 2009), pp. 71–93.

2 Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860,* Stockholm Studies in History, no. 48 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), vol. 1, p. 229; Henry Kamen, *Philip V of Spain: The King Who Reigned Twice* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2001).

3 On this topic see John B. Hattendorf, "'To Aid and Assist the Other': Anglo-Dutch Naval Cooperation in Coalition Warfare at Sea, 1689–1714," in *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688–1720: Politics, War, & Finance,* ed. Jan A. F. de Jongste and A. J. Veenendaal Jr. (The Hague, Neth.: Institute of Netherlands History, 2002), pp. 177–98; repr. Hattendorf, *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011), pp. 65–81.

4 Henri Legohérel, *Les trésoriers généraux de la marine, 1517–1788* (Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1965), p. 179. See also Guy Rowlands, "Keep Right On to the End of the Road: The Stamina of the French Army in the War of the Spanish Succession," in Pohlig and Schaich, *War of the Spanish Succession*.

5 Glete, *Navies and Nations,* vol. 1, p. 227.

6 J. H. Owen, *War at Sea under Queen Anne, 1702–1708* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1938), p. 191.

7 On this subject in general, see J. S. Bromley's collected essays on variously related topics in his *Corsairs and Navies.*

8 Pritchard, *In Search of Empire,* pp. 362, 391.

9 Paul W. Mapp, *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713–1763* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2011), p. 127.

10 Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2000), p. 113. See also Pritchard, *In Search of Empire,* pp. 362–66.

11 Glyndwr Williams, *The Great South Sea: English Voyages and Encounters, 1570–1750* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1997), p. 152; Woodes Rogers, *A Cruising Voyage Round the World: . . .* (London: Bell and Lintot, 1712; repr. London, 1928), pp. 204–205.

12 Herbert Eugene Bolton, *Rim of Christendom: A Biography of Eusebio Francisco Kino, Pacific Coast Pioneer* (New York, 1936; repr. Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1984), p. 477.

13 Ibid., pp. 491–92, 582–84.

14 John Francis Bannon, *The Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 1513–1821,* Histories of the American Frontier (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1974), pp. 91, 109.

15 David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1992), p. 149.

16 Ibid., pp. 155–58.

17 W. J. Eccles, *Canada under Louis XIV, 1663–1701* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 247–49; Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670–1732,* 2nd ed. (Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 2004), pp. 71–107.

18 Pritchard, *In Search of Empire,* pp. 40, 403–404, 423.

19 Quoted in Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1964), vol. 3, p. 237.

20 Charles W. Arnade, *The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702,* Univ. of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, no. 3 (St. Augustine, FL: St. Augustine Historical Society, 1959; repr. Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2011), p. 4.

21 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

22 Ibid., pp. 53–61.

23 Andrews, *Colonial Period,* vol. 3, pp. 238–39.

24 Verner W. Crane, "The Southern Frontier in Queen Anne's War," *American Historical Review* 24 (1919), pp. 379–95; Andrews, *Colonial Period,* vol. 3, pp. 239–40; Crane, *Southern Frontier,* pp. 71–107; Steven C. Hahn, *The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670–1763,* Indians of the Southeast (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2004).

25 Andrews, *Colonial Period,* vol. 3, p. 240.

26 See G. H. Guttridge, *The Colonial Policy of William III in America and the West Indies* (London, 1922; repr. London: Frank Cass, 1966); and I. K. Steele, *Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 1696–1720* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1968); Philip S. Haffenden, *New England in the English Nation, 1689–1713* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1974); Leonard Woods Labaree, ed., "Military and Maritime Affairs," in

Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670–1776 (New York: n.p., 1967), vol. 1, pp. 392–460; Labaree, "External Relations," in ibid., vol. 2, pp. 699–740.

27 David R. Owen and Michael C. Tolley, *Courts of Admiralty in Colonial America: The Maryland Experience, 1634–1776* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic for the Maryland Historical Society, 1995), pp. 32–35, 158. See also Andrews, "The Vice-Admiralty Courts," chap. 8 in *Colonial Period,* vol. 4, pp. 221–71 and, for 6 Ann. c. 37 (1707), sometimes called the "America Act," pp. 235–36.

28 Ian K. Steele, "The Packet Boats, 1702–1715," chap. 9 in *The English Atlantic, 1675–1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), esp. pp. 168–88, 204–206.

29 Andrews, *Colonial Period,* vol. 4, pp. 277–78.

30 "Report of the Lords of Trade on the Northern Colonies in America," 30 September 1696, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York,* ed. E. B. O'Callaghan, vol. 4 (Albany, NY, 1854), pp. 227–30.

31 Kurt William Nagel, "Empire and Interest: British Colonial Defense Policy, 1689–1748" (unpublished PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins Univ., 1992), pp. 19–20.

32 "Representation upon the state of defense of the several Plantations in America," 24 January 1702, pp. 19–32, CO 324/8, The National Archives, Kew, U.K. [hereafter TNA].

33 Nagel, "Empire and Interest," pp. 83–90.

34 On Dudley as governor of Massachusetts, see Everett Kimball, *The Public Life of Joseph Dudley: A Study of the Colonial Policy of the Stuarts in New England, 1660–1715* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1911), pp. 76–156, and a transcription of his full royal commission to be governor, dated 1 April 1702, pp. 211–18.

35 Governor Joseph Dudley to Board of Trade, 19 December 1703, in *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series* [hereafter *Calendar*], vol. 21, *America and West Indies: Dec. 1, 1702–1703,* ed. Cecil Headlam ([London]: [Public Record Office], 1913), doc. 1398, available at www.british-history.ac.uk/.

36 Haffenden, *New England in the English Nation,* pp. 214–15; Pritchard, *In Search of Empire,* p. 394; Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, *Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 2003), pp. 1–4.

37 John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), pp. 113–14.

38 Ibid., p. 115; Haffenden, *New England in the English Nation,* pp. 244–45; "An Account of the Expedition to Port Royal. May 13, 1707," in *Calendar,* vol. 23, *America and West Indies: 1706–1708, June,* ed. Cecil Headlam (1916), doc. 1592, item iii, pp. 777–80.

39 Pritchard, *In Search of Empire,* p. 398; Faragher, *Great and Noble Scheme,* p. 115.

40 "Canada Survey'd," 27 July 1708, p. 111, CO 324/9, TNA.

41 Ibid., p. 117.

42 G. M. Waller, *Samuel Vetch: Colonial Enterpriser* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1960), pp. 94–120; J. D. Alsop, "Samuel Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd': The Formation of a Colonial Strategy, 1706–1710," *Acadiensis* 12 (Autumn 1982), pp. 39–58.

43 "Memorial of Samuel Vetch," 15 August 1708, p. 244, CO 324/9, TNA.

44 Waller, *Samuel Vetch,* pp. 124–56; John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702–1712,* Modern European History (New York: Garland, 1987), pp. 189–90.

45 G. A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts–Nova Scotia Relations, 1630 to 1784* (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 108–19.

46 On this subject, see Richmond P. Bond, *Queen Anne's American Kings* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1952).

47 "Artacles [*sic*] of Capitulation agreed upon for the Surrender of the Fort of Port Royall etc.," 2 October 1710, in *Calendar,* vol. 25, *America and West Indies: 1710–June, 1711,* ed. Cecil Headlam (1924), doc. 412, p. 221; Waller, Samuel.

48 "Proclamation by General Nicholson," 12 October 1710, in *Calendar,* vol. 25, docs. 419–20, pp. 226–27.

49 Bond, *Queen Anne's American Kings,* pp. 1–16. A search in the British Newspaper Archive, www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk, returned no results for the word "America" between 1702 and 1710 but thirteen from 1711 to 1714.

50 Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession,* pp. 233–36.

51 Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America,* 2nd ed. (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1958), pp. 92–102; Sir Hovenden Walker, *The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 1711,* ed. Graham (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1953).

52 Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession,* pp. 245–46; Pritchard, *In Search of Empire,* p. 400.

53 See, for example, on the 1702 expedition, Stephen Martin-Leake, *The Life of Sir John Leake: Rear-Admiral of Great Britain,* ed. Geoffrey Callender, Publications of the Navy Record Society, vols. 52, 53 (London, 1920), vol. 1, pp. 95–104.

54 Peter E. Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2004), pp. 196, 201, 299, 315, 408–409.

55 Dale Miquelon, "Ambiguous Concession: What Diplomatic Archives Reveal about Article 15 of the Treaty of Utrecht and France's North American Policy," *William and Mary Quarterly* 67 (2010), pp. 459–86.

IX *The Peace of Utrecht in World History*

The Peace of Utrecht is one of the great treaties of world history.[1] Properly, it was a series of twenty-three separate bilateral treaties signed between January 1713 and November 1715. These included the treaties of Rastatt and Baden in March and September 1714, respectively, and to them must be added one signed a decade later, on 30 April 1725, between Austria and Spain. Collectively, these agreements ended the War of the Spanish Succession, a conflict that had raged across Western Europe from 1701 to 1713. The conflict was the last of Louis XIV's wars for the glory of France and the first of the wars between the great European powers that were to be fought about, and have major implications for, distant parts of the globe.

WHY DID EUROPEAN STATES GO TO WAR IN 1702, AND WHAT WERE THEIR OBJECTIVES?

States rather commonly go to war without accurately relating their means to acceptable ends. Warfare is so complex and difficult that the focus tends to be on the instruments of fighting rather than considerations of what can or cannot be achieved in terms of the risks, costs, manpower, or the enemy's capabilities. War objectives can be wishful and overoptimistic. Too often, leaders see only as far as the first act of the drama and not the later acts that lead to an ending.[2]

The fundamental causes of the War of the Spanish Succession can largely be found in the long-standing rivalry between the royal houses of Bourbon and Habsburg. Nearer-term causes revolve around the Bourbon France of Louis XIV, respectively the strongest single military power and the most powerful monarch in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Europe, and the reactions of other European states, including Habsburg Austria, to both. The collective term for the European conflicts of this era, "the Wars of Louis XIV," is not just a convenient label collecting the wars that happened during the Sun King's seventy-two-year reign, between 1643 and 1715. The five declared wars that followed Louis's assumption in 1661 of personal, absolute rule were very much his wars, reflections of his personal leadership and objectives.[3] The first four brought France growth in power and territory: the War of Devolution (1667–68), the Franco-Dutch War (1672–78,

overlapping the Third Anglo-Dutch War of 1672–74), the War of the Reunions (1683–84), and the Nine Years' War (1688–97). The fifth of Louis XIV's wars, however, proved to be one too many. From the French perspective, the War of the Spanish Succession was not only unwanted at the outset but in the end made demands on state finances that could not be met.

The immediate cause of the war was the collective reaction of the major states of Europe to the death of King Carlos II of Spain on 1 November 1700, at age thirty-eight, leaving no children.[4] Carlos, the only surviving legitimate son and heir of King Felipe IV, had been born in 1661 with congenital defects, probably arising from inbreeding within the Spanish Habsburg royal house. These conditions had produced mental and physical disabilities that were already obvious when Carlos succeeded to the throne as a four-year-old. European leaders had quickly foreseen the international implications—the risk of widespread conflict—and had long attempted by diplomacy and discussion to forestall them.

The issue of the Spanish succession became, in fact, the single most important issue in European international politics at the end of the seventeenth century. Spain was no longer a great military or naval power but still controlled vast territories and global trade networks that could be transformed by more energetic leadership into the underpinnings of overwhelming power. Spanish possessions stretched to the Philippine Islands in the East; Florida, Mexico, South and Central America in the West; the Spanish Netherlands (bordering the Dutch Republic, France, and Germany) in continental Europe; the Balearic Islands, Sicily, and Sardinia in the Mediterranean; and on the Italian coast, Naples, Milan, and the fortified Sienese ports known as the Stato dei Presidi.

For the Dutch and the English, the prospect of this bloc in the hands of a Bourbon prince under the influence of Austria evoked the memory of Emperor Charles V's domination of Europe in the sixteenth century. A new Bourbon king of Spain under the influence of Louis XIV presented the threat of a "universal monarchy" that could suppress the Protestant faith, in a renewal of the religious wars of the early seventeenth century. Certainly, that possibility meant in the early years of the eighteenth century something significantly different from what it had a century before. Geopolitically, religion was now important less for doctrinal reasons than for how it defined national culture and national identity. It provided a framework for friendships and alliances with, and assistance to, like-minded peoples across state borders. Europeans shared the conviction that Christianity was the foundation of Western European civilization—but Christianity, writ large, not any of its divisions. They were moving slowly and hesitantly toward a limited degree of toleration and toward the more modern notion that choice of denomination was an individual one, not that of a prince.[5]

In the final years of the seventeenth century, two great wars ended. The Nine Years' War was brought to a close by the Treaty of Turin in 1696 and the subsequent Peace of Rijswijk in 1697. Then, a long European conflict with the Ottoman Empire that had begun in 1684 was ended by the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699. These treaties created a situation that began to be termed an "equilibrium of power." This concept could be traced back several centuries, but only now did it come explicitly to the fore in formal declarations and documents. In the years leading up to the War of the Spanish Succession, it was used with specific reference to the growing power of France.[6]

The idea that international stability could be established through a system of potentially hostile powers—a system so arranged that each would see the risks of conflict as outweighing possible benefits—became widely shared in Europe during the last decade of the seventeenth century and the first decade of the eighteenth century.[7] In the period of the War of the Spanish Succession, the leader who worked most notably to create a balance of power against the growth of French power was the stadtholder William III, whose arrival from the Dutch Republic in 1688 to take the English throne, jointly with his wife, Queen Mary II, created a revolution in English foreign policy.[8]

An important aspect of the 1697 Peace of Rijswijk, ending the Nine Years' War, was Louis XIV's recognition of the legitimacy of William III's accession to the English throne. By this Louis XIV acknowledged the right of England to choose the Protestant William and Mary over the Catholic James II and his heirs, whose claims Louis had supported during the war. With this treaty, then, the right of national self-determination became important, yet nearly simultaneously the idea of collective security arose to mitigate the threat that anarchical self-determination posed.

In 1698, Louis XIV and William III (the latter acting for both England and, through the States General, the Dutch Republic) achieved a radical innovation in international relations, the Treaty of The Hague. It attempted to prevent a general European war over the Spanish succession by agreeing in advance on how, on the death of Carlos II, Spain's territories should be allocated among the three principal claimants to its throne. The agreement saw the electoral prince of Bavaria (that is, son of the prince-elector of Bavaria, so titled as a member of the body that chose successive Holy Roman emperors) ascending the Spanish throne; Louis XIV's son, the Dauphin of France, taking the principal Spanish-held territories in Italy; and a son of Emperor Leopold (effectively ruler of Austria as well as Holy Roman emperor), Archduke Charles, receiving the Spanish Netherlands. This treaty was innovative in that, first, it was an agreement among three major stakeholders (France, England, and the Dutch Republic) about what would ensure collective security in Europe (three others, Spain, Austria, and Bavaria, were not brought in). Second, it operationalized the balance of power, and thereby collective security, by means

of division of territory. Third, neither England nor the Dutch Republic gained any territory for itself.[9]

The First Partition Treaty (as this instrument is known) set a precedent and laid out concepts that would be used in the Utrecht agreements fourteen years later, but its immediate effects were short-lived. Within four months, the six-year-old electoral prince of Bavaria died. A Second Partition Treaty was signed in London in March 1700 that named Archduke Charles of Austria as the heir to the Spanish kingdom, the Spanish Netherlands, and Spanish overseas territories. As in the first treaty, the Dauphin of France would acquire Milan and the principal Spanish-held territories in Italy. Additionally, the various princes were to be allowed to take possession of their designated lands without interference; were any to be attacked and prevented from doing so, the signatories would jointly enforce the agreement.[10] But this agreement too was short-lived. The emperor rejected it, wanting Spain's Italian lands for himself.

Eight months later, in November 1700, Carlos II died leaving a will that rejected any partition, bequeathing the full inheritance of the Spanish crown to Louis XIV's grandson Philippe, duc d'Anjou. Contrary to his partition agreements with the English and Dutch, Louis XIV accepted the will, agreeing that his grandson would succeed to the Spanish throne, implying the eventual possibility—because Philippe was also an heir to the French throne—of the unification of Spain and France under a single Bourbon ruler.

The Spanish king's will did not in itself cause the war, but it led to a number of actions whose intentions were unclear and that cumulatively created tension and anxiety. In 1701, Austria made the first military move, sending an army under Prince Eugene of Savoy to occupy Milan; Eugene was opposed by and defeated French forces at Carpi and Chiari. About the same time, French troops moved into the Spanish Netherlands to claim the inheritance there of Philippe d'Anjou, now Felipe V, as king of Spain, and to put force behind a demand that the Dutch Republic recognize his right to the Spanish crown. In the process, they surrounded advanced outposts in the Spanish Netherlands established under earlier treaties to protect the Dutch from invasion. At the same time, France banned the importation of a number of English goods, placed a high tariff on others, and revived an internal tax historically used during wartime. France might have justified some of these actions but made little attempt to explain them; by early September 1701 they were enough to cause the Dutch Republic, England, and the emperor to reestablish the Grand Alliance, which had been in effect during the last war. This was not in itself a declaration of war but an agreement on common aims should diplomacy fail and war break out.[11]

Shortly thereafter the Catholic James II, the deposed English king, died in France. Louis XIV proceeded to recognize the son of the deposed James as King

James III—an empty courtesy apparently intended to induce Pope Clement XI to support Bourbon claims over those of the Habsburgs. To William III, however, it was a direct threat to English self-determination—specifically the 1701 Act of Settlement, restricting the throne to Protestants—one that required an addition to the terms of the Grand Alliance.[12] Tension rose further when Louis XIV agreed to a request of the prince-bishop of Cologne for French troops to help deal with internal unrest.

It would take time for the Dutch and English to find the domestic political and financial support necessary to go to war, but they increasingly doubted Louis XIV's sincerity and objectives, suspicion that would continue throughout the war and eventually hamper peace negotiations. The Dutch were ready for war before the English. In the interim, William III died following a riding accident; however, Queen Anne and her government, led by Lord Godolphin and the Earl of Marlborough, quickly committed themselves to William's treaties and plans. On 15 May 1702, England, the Dutch Republic, and the Holy Roman Empire declared war against France and Spain.

As in so many wars, the participants had various motivations for going to war, not all of them compatible or achievable. These may be summarized as follows:

- France wanted to sustain the Bourbon dynasty in Spain and France, gain indirect control over the Spanish Netherlands and Milan, and have freer access to trade in the Spanish overseas empire.
- Spain wanted to maintain its kingdom, royal house, and empire without changes.
- Austria wanted to prevent French hegemony, return Spain to Habsburg control, and control Spanish territories in Italy.
- The Dutch Republic wanted to prevent French hegemony, secure its own borders, and maintain the political and economic independence that gave it free access to world markets.
- England too wanted to prevent French hegemony, as well as to preserve the political settlement of the 1688 Glorious Revolution (with the Protestant succession that was central to it) and to guarantee its growing overseas trade.

In the eyes of English leaders, an alliance was the only way to wage war effectively against France, the greatest military power in Europe. That was a task far beyond the capacity of any single state; encircling and engaging France offensively on all sides would in fact require support from states beyond the alliance. Encircling France was a particular element of British grand strategy, to oblige Louis XIV to divide his superior forces to meet multiple threats in different geographic areas. The British goal was to force France into accepting a balance of power in Europe—a joint venture of sovereign states to create a peacetime situation of mutual benefit. A balance of power implies a recognition of national self-determination modified

by collective national-security requirements. It would allow both small and large states opportunities for individual economic growth and development.[13]

HOW DID WARTIME EVENTS ALTER THE ABILITY OF THE CONTENDERS TO ACHIEVE THEIR WAR AIMS?

War aims typically change in the course of the fighting. Once at war, states tend to be less cautious about taking risks and to lose their peacetime tolerance for unresolved issues. Their initial demands regarding what a peace settlement should achieve are sometimes extreme, but they soon find that they must back down to something more moderate. Some have even risked losing a current war in trying to position themselves for some future war that they may foresee—making the assumption that enemies now will be enemies then, not reckoning that future circumstances might make them allies instead. Fighting prolonged wars in a search for a more advantageous peace can raise costs ruinously. Countries can find themselves making sacrifices merely to justify past sacrifices. Warfare can become a way of life, and a profitable one for vendors of munitions, equipment, and supplies; political leaders who support or represent such sectors are often reluctant to discontinue these profits. In domestic politics, emotional attachments enter the picture and make war termination a less rational matter. Leaders rarely realize that their initial decisions to go to war might have been flawed and instead perpetuate their prewar assumptions. At the same time, there is an element of contingency, as success or failure on the battlefield (and the various reasons for it) can fundamentally affect, even change, the ability of a state to achieve its political objectives.[14] Finally, as noted, England and its cobelligerents were obliged to search actively for new allies, with additional troops and strategic geographic positions, and each new ally had its own reasons for joining and exacted a particular price for doing so.

Nevertheless, across the more than a decade of conflict on land and at sea in the War of the Spanish Succession, broad patterns are discernible, as well as events and trends that would directly impact the construction of the peace.

Brandenburg-Prussia

Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession there was the constant threat that the simultaneous (1700–21) Great Northern War that Sweden was fighting against Denmark-Norway, Russia, and Poland-Saxony would absorb the Grand Alliance and distract it from its focus on France. In the event, the two wars did not merge, but much diplomacy had to be exercised to prevent that. The Northern War was to be a chronic hindrance to allies attempting to hire or subsidize troops, especially from the north German states. In late 1700, when the elector of Brandenburg, Frederick III, crowned himself Frederick I, king in Prussia, the emperor elicited from him a promise to supply troops in case of war with France and Spain—as the price of recognition of the crown of Prussia, subsidies for his army, and the Orange inheritance as a first cousin of William III (that is, the scattered continental territories

of the king of England, who also was the prince of Orange and stadtholder of several provinces of the Dutch Republic).[15]

Bavaria

In the center of Europe, military movements from 1702 to 1704 were driven by the ambitions of the ruling house of Bavaria to obtain a crown for itself. Maximilian II Emanuel, the elector of Bavaria, regent of the Spanish Netherlands, and father of the boy who had been the prospective king of Spain in the 1698 First Partition Treaty, had been one of the first to recognize Felipe V as king of Spain in 1700 and had approved the entry of French troops in 1701.[16] Max Emanuel (as he is known) played both sides and offered alliances to both the emperor and Louis XIV, his choice depending on which would best meet his demands—among other things, a crown for himself in Bavaria and continuation of his regency in the Spanish Netherlands. The emperor finding his price too high, Max Emanuel made an active alliance with France. Both of his hopes, and also those of France, were thwarted by defeat in two major battles. First in 1704, at the instigation of Austria, Marlborough marched his Anglo-Dutch army to the Danube (a movement that became famous) to join Prince Eugene and Ludwig von Baden to defeat the Franco-Bavarians at Blenheim. This victory was critical in holding the Grand Alliance together;[17] at the same time, it deprived Max Emanuel of Bavaria. His regency lasted only until 1706, when an Anglo-Dutch-Danish force defeated the French at Ramillies and drove them out of the Spanish Netherlands. Max Emanuel's exertions for France were not to be forgotten, either by the French, who protected him for the remainder of the war, or by the victors thereafter at Utrecht.

Savoy

Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy, ruled the Savoyard state, strategically located on the Mediterranean coast at the southeastern frontier of France. In the Mediterranean, the promise of an allied fleet was largely what brought the duke of Savoy into the Grand Alliance in 1703. The allies needed Savoy's support for their strategic plan to threaten France with invasion on its southern coast, destroy the naval dockyard at Toulon, and relieve the Protestant Camisard rebels in the Cévennes area of Languedoc. The French response, an attempt to crush the duke of Savoy, was defeated at Turin in 1706; through the duke's diplomacy and contribution to the war, the Savoyard state won increased international standing that became a factor in international politics at the end of the war.[18]

The War Overseas

Some of the basic issues and results of the War of the Spanish Succession concerned overseas territories and overseas trade, yet there were few major battles in distant parts of the world. There are substantial reasons why, most importantly the missions and capabilities of the competing navies.

The Spanish navy was very small in 1700, only two eighty-gun ships and eight ships of between forty and sixty guns.[19] At the beginning of the war two ships were in the Pacific, and five were in the southern Netherlands, with three cruisers in the West Indies and in home waters, along with some thirty galleys in home waters. Spain was to lose most of this small fleet to wear and tear or enemy action during the war; despite some replacements, there were only six ships in the entire navy at the end of the war.[20] Thus, it fell to Spain's ally, France, and its navy to protect the Spanish silver fleet as it crossed the North Atlantic. The main thrust of French policy for the Americas during the war was indeed to protect and to use for itself the resources of Spain's colonies rather than to build or protect its own or attack directly those of the enemy in the Americas. (See the table "Comparative Naval Strength, 1700–1715," in chapter 8.)

During the War of the Spanish Succession, then, the French navy was the principal opponent of the allied Anglo-Dutch navies, whose nations were deservedly called the "Maritime Powers."[21] However, French naval power was itself in decline. At the outset of the war, the French navy was very close in size to the English navy. During the war Britain gradually moved beyond numerical parity until in the latter third of the conflict its fleet was superior to all other European navies. Britain's alliance with the Dutch Republic reinforced this superiority. Their combined naval force at the outset of the war gave the Maritime Powers a superiority over the French of more than 90 percent in numbers of major warships and more than 50 percent in their tonnage. By 1710, that Anglo-Dutch superiority had increased to 122 percent in numbers and 72 percent in total warship tonnage. The decline of the French navy is reflected in its funding: although the overall cost of the war rose, French naval expenditures fell in most areas in the years between 1701 and 1710 to 11–14 percent of France's total military expenditures. French naval officials found themselves chronically unable to pay their bills.[22]

By the end of the war, the British navy had in terms of numbers achieved global naval supremacy. It was equal in strength to the combined naval forces of France, Spain, and the Dutch Republic—testimony to the dramatic decline in French naval capacity over the previous twenty-five years.[23] The great disparity in naval strength had direct ramifications on how navies were used during the war and also on the peace settlement, which was tacitly to acknowledge British naval superiority. Moreover, the fundamental relationship of naval power to the growth and protection of national trade was also reflected in the peace arrangements.

During the conflict France attempted to remain competitive in naval strength with a construction program to replace losses.[24] Because France concentrated such naval resources as it had to protection of the silver *flota,* it increasingly encouraged privateers to make war on Anglo-Dutch trade in the Channel, the North Sea, and the North Atlantic.[25]

The British and Dutch, freed by their enemy's naval strategy from defending their overseas territories, could use the sea for their own purposes: protecting their own trade, transporting troops to the Continent, supporting and encouraging allies, delivering combined-force amphibious assaults, and generally maintaining a superiority that discouraged French naval challenges. In August 1704 France challenged the Maritime Powers in a major battle at sea (the battle of Vélez-Málaga, off the southern coast of Spain) and was unsuccessful. The engagement was a tactical draw but a strategic victory for the allies: the French did not try again. Instead, to the frustration of British and Dutch officers, they avoided battle when they could. Instead of mounting major fleet operations, the French navy sent small squadrons, sometimes privately fitted out, to the colonies to escort ships home. In the process, naval vessels began to be used by private investors for private gain. By the last years of the war the French navy was financially unable to provide even a single warship for service in North America;[26] the expedition under René Duguay-Trouin (himself formerly a privateer) that captured Rio de Janeiro in 1711 was privately funded.

Portugal

The most difficult of the demands on the Grand Alliance by potential allies proved to be those exacted by Portugal in the Methuen treaty of May 1703. They were, first, that Archduke Charles come to Portugal on his way to Spain before Portugal would take an active role in the war and, second, that no peace or truce would be made while a French prince (that is, King Felipe V) remained in Spain. These terms, which many interpreted as a substantive change for allied and British war aims, were eventually transformed to become the political cry in Britain of "No peace without Spain!" In fact, the English leaders at the time who made the treaty saw the treaty only as a means to achieve Britain's fundamental war aims, not a major change or addition to them. In addition to sharing its eastern border with Spain, Portugal was essential to the alliance from the naval perspective. An attempt to capture Cádiz having failed in 1702, the 1703 treaty with Portugal would be the first, essential step in getting allied naval forces into the Mediterranean. On Portugal's Tagus River lay Lisbon, an essential all-weather port, a supply point for the largest warships of the day, and a staging base for movements of major British and Dutch forces into the Mediterranean. The allied capture of Gibraltar in August 1704 was a further step, in that a naval presence there could keep the Strait of Gibraltar from being closed.[27] Allied naval power helped in 1704 and again in 1705 prevent Franco-Spanish forces from retaking "the Rock" to end its support of allied entry into the Mediterranean.

There began in 1704, with the capture of Gibraltar, a series of remarkable allied military successes in Spain in the name of Archduke Charles (as the hopeful King Carlos III of Spain). These were taking Barcelona, winning the support of Valencia and Catalonia for the Grand Alliance, and even gaining temporary control of

Madrid, as well as large parts of Castile, Aragon, and Murcia. That series ended when in early 1707 Carlos III and his advisors decided, overriding English advice, to divide the allied English, Portuguese, Dutch, and German forces to protect these gains. Shortly afterward, the duc d'Orléans (a nephew of Louis XIV) arrived from France with reinforcements for the Bourbon Franco-Spanish army under the Duke of Berwick. The Bourbon army, significantly larger than the portion of the divided allied army before it, won a complete victory at Almansa in April 1707. That critical victory won back Valencia for Felipe V and started a gradual recovery of other territories. In December 1710, after a brief recovery in allied fortunes, the duc de Vendôme decisively defeated the English at Brihuega (capturing their commander, future British prime minister Gen. James Stanhope, who would remain a prisoner of war for two years). With Bourbon forces triumphant, the allies retreated to the Catalan region, where British naval power directly supported them.[28]

Before a new campaigning season could begin in 1711, the strategic situation completely changed with the sudden death in April of that year of the thirty-three-year-old emperor Joseph I, who had succeeded Emperor Leopold only six years before. Next in line to the imperial throne was his younger brother, the twenty-six-year-old Archduke Charles. The man whom the allies had brought to Spain as their candidate for the Spanish throne as Carlos III now unexpectedly became Emperor Charles VI. Charles left to prepare for the presumed formality of election to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, leaving his wife at Barcelona as his regent to exercise his claims in Spain. He found the Electoral College divided, with the prince-electors of Bavaria and Cologne excluded, but after much maneuvering Charles won the election. The imperial coronation took place at Frankfurt am Main on 22 December 1711. Charles VI entered Vienna as emperor for the first time in January 1712, just as the peace negotiations were beginning at Utrecht.[29]

For the Maritime Powers, the Habsburg unification of Spain and Austria thus completed was no more palatable than a Bourbon unification of Spain and France would have been. Neither represented the balance of power that the Maritime Powers sought in Europe.

WHAT COMPROMISES WERE NECESSARY TO END THE WAR?

In most wars the course of actual combat—the success, failure, or stalemate of opposing military forces—at a given juncture determines what each belligerent could reasonably hope for at a peace conference. However, internal factors, political and otherwise, play complicating, and critical, roles. One of the most difficult things for political leaders to do is to "cut their losses," particularly in a war that has been prolonged, costly, unsuccessful, or stalemated. In each belligerent's internal debate, "hawks," who want to continue the war, tend to see anything less than total success as a demoralizing betrayal of national values. The "doves," who want to end the war,

argue that it is continuation of the conflict that will result in demoralization, even lead to the complete destruction of the state.[30]

If the belligerent states do attempt to negotiate a peace, their internal political struggles typically come to the fore, often with the effect of exposing the absence of well-thought-out plans for peace among leaders, whether military or civilian, doves or hawks. The hawks typically demand "peace with honor," while the doves want "negotiations" as such, not recognizing that this necessarily means compromise with enemies, who have their own objectives and ideas, as do secondary allies, who allowed themselves, for reasons of their own, to be recruited to the cause. Disagreements are very deeply held, sometimes surviving and operating in later history, as is certainly the case with the Utrecht settlement after three hundred years.[31] Finally, the belligerents are affected financially by the war, generally constrained in the settlement by severe wartime economic pressure but sometimes (as with the United States in 1945) energized. In the case of the War of the Spanish Succession, all sides had been weakened almost to the point of economic collapse.

Typically the first practical issue is whether to continue the fighting while peace is being negotiated. Numerous approaches to this problem have been taken. (During World War II, in fact, the Allies agreed early on to seek "unconditional surrender" specifically to avoid disputes of the kind that arose among the allies of 1712–13.) In 1712, the British government strictly ordered its generals to avoid any decisive military action while negotiations were under way. The Dutch and Austrian governments vehemently disagreed and attempted to maintain direct military pressure on France. One of the most significant attempts to force France to make a better peace was a siege by Prince Eugene of the fortresses at Landrecies and Le Quesnoy, the last major fortifications blocking the road from the Spanish Netherlands through the Oise River valley to Paris. Prince Eugene was confident that his combined Dutch-imperial force could succeed, having previously forced the Lines of *Ne Plus Ultra* ("no farther") and two other series of fortifications that had protected France's northern frontier. In the event, however, the absence of Britain's twelve thousand troops, withdrawn after an Anglo-French cease-fire agreement, left the defenders, under Marshal Claude-Louis-Hector de Villars, an opportunity. Villars skillfully took it and decisively defeated the Dutch-imperial force at Denain in July 1712, thereby reversing the political effect on the ongoing Utrecht negotiations for which Eugene had aimed.

In the event, the most important compromise was an agreement to allow Felipe V to retain the Spanish throne. This was nearly a foregone conclusion from a military and balance-of-power perspective, but to keep Spain, Felipe had to renounce his rights to succession in France. Spain's European territories were divided among several powers. Britain received Gibraltar and Minorca, which helped to ensure its commercial access and naval presence in the Mediterranean, but was forced to

withdraw support from its Catalan allies. That choice would lead to the suppression of the Catalans and later the rise of Catalan separatism. Savoy received Sicily and parts of Milan; Austria received the Spanish Netherlands, Naples, Sardinia, and the larger part of Milan.

Portuguese sovereignty over disputed lands in Brazil was recognized. The Dutch Republic received a promise to continue to work toward a more effective "barrier" (fortifications in the Spanish and Austrian Netherlands the Dutch wished to hold as a buffer against France), an issue that had been the subject of treaties since 1709 and was to continue for many years. France had to dismantle the privateering port at Dunkirk and to release the lands on the right bank of the Rhine that were part of Freiburg im Breisgau. France obtained, however, the main portion of the Orange inheritance in France. France abandoned its Italian allies, but Louis continued to support the electors of Cologne and Bavaria, whose territories were restored. Brandenburg-Prussia received general acknowledgment of the royal title of its former prince-elector. The British acquisition of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland was accompanied by a rationalization of French and English possessions around the Gulf of Saint Lawrence: England obtained the eastern and southern coasts of Newfoundland, but France held the islands of Cape Breton and Prince Edward, collectively the gateway to New France, and retained its fishing rights and use of the western and northern littorals.

TO WHAT EXTENT DID UTRECHT SHAPE THE FUTURE OF EUROPE?

The peace agreements of 1713–14 left a number of unresolved controversies and a certain amount of continuing dissatisfaction. The Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1713 was never ratified. The *asiento* (license) that gave England access to the slave trade to South America brought with it controversies over its implementation, no commercial gain, and eventually serious criticism on ethical grounds. The treaty's settlement for Italy was unstable and did not last, and the renunciations designed to prevent a union of the French and Spanish monarchies were contested for a century. Spain and Austria did not sign a peace, and the emperor did not relinquish his claim to the Spanish throne.

With the rise in influence of Cardinal Giulio Alberoni as the principal advisor to Felipe V's consort, Queen Isabel de Farnesio, Spain began to recuperate from its losses and develop a stronger navy. France and Britain saw this development, along with the rise of Russia in the north, as a threat to the Utrecht settlement and established in 1716 an alliance that endured until 1731. Spain began to put its new military capabilities to use in 1717, when it sent a fleet of warships and troop transports to capture Sardinia while Austria was distracted by a war with the Turks in the Balkans. The Anglo-French alliance became the basis for a Quadruple Alliance formed by Britain, France, Austria, and the Dutch Republic (later joined by Savoy

as a fifth partner) to preserve the Utrecht balance of power by thwarting Spanish ambitions.

In the War of the Quadruple Alliance, which lasted until 1720, the great powers forced Spain to relinquish Sardinia and Sicily. Thereafter the broader balance of power and thus peace in Europe was maintained until 1740, when a major war broke out over the rights of Emperor Charles VI's daughter Maria Theresa to succeed her father. This was in turn to merge with several colonial conflicts to create a larger, in fact global, conflict.

The Utrecht settlement ended a half-century of war, from 1665 to 1714, and the general peace it wrought remained in place for more than twenty-five years. The Utrecht settlement did not prevent future wars, but those that followed did not permanently change the broadly conceived territorial boundaries it established. We still have them today. At the same time, William III's innovative concept of a broad balance of power, realized by the Grand Alliance he brokered, replaced dynastic rivalry as the fundamental geopolitical dynamic in Europe. Serious new threats to the European order were to arise in 1793, 1914, and 1939, but cooperative alliances emerged to restore the broad Utrecht model, in 1815, 1919, and 1945. Historians have even traced modern joint ventures among sovereign states in World War II, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union back to William III and the ideas that led to the Peace of Utrecht.[32]

NOTES This previously unpublished essay was the opening, keynote address at the "Understanding Utrecht 1713–2013" symposium, held in the Gibraltar Garrison Library on 10–11 October 2013.

1 For a full, annotated bibliography on the subject, see Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, comps., "International Relations: Peace of Utrecht," *Oxford Bibliographies,* oxfordindex.oup.com/. More recent works include David Onnekink and Renger de Bruin, *De Vrede van Utrecht (1713)* (Hilversum, Neth.: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2013); Trevor J. Dadson and J. H. Elliott, eds., *Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713–2013* (London: Legenda, 2014); and two exhibition catalogs containing scholarly essays, Renger de Bruin and Maarten Brinkman, eds., *Peace Was Made Here: The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden, 1713–1714* (Petersberg, Ger.: Michael Imhof Verlag, 2014), and Bernardo J. García García, ed., *En nombre de la paz: La Guerra de Sucesión Española y los Tratados de Madrid, Utrecht, Rastatt y Baden 1713–1715* (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2013).

2 Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971), p. 8.

3 John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714* (London and New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 6, 17.

4 See John B. Hattendorf, "Die Ursprünge des Spanischen Erbfolgekrieges [The Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession]," in *Wie Kriege entstehen: Zum historischen Hintergrund von Staatenkonflikten,* ed. Bernd Wegner, Krieg in der Geschichte, vol. 4, 2nd ed. (Paderborn, Ger.: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2003), pp. 109–44.

5 Joke Spaans, "Beyond the Religious Wars," in De Bruin and Brinkman, *Peace Was Made Here,* pp. 18–24. See also Benjamin J. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard Univ. Press, 2007); Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Reformation: Europe's House Divided, 1490–1700* (London: Penguin, 2004); David Onnekink, ed., *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713* (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2009); and W. R. Ward, *Christianity under the Ancien Régime, 1648–1789* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999).

6 M. Sheehan, "The Development of British Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power before 1714," *History* 73, no. 237 (February 1988), pp. 24–37.

7 M. S. Anderson, "Eighteenth Century Theories of the Balance of Power," in *Studies in Diplomatic History: Essays in Memory of David Bayne Horn,* ed. Ragnhild Hatton and M. S. Anderson (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1970), pp. 183–98. Later in the eighteenth century, the concept would be extended to internal politics and to governmental structures, as in 1787 with the checks and balances of the Constitution of the United States. In the international sphere, the concept later lost some credibility—the likes of Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin were apparently not to be deterred by a balance of power—yet the alliances against them were formed very much in that spirit. On this see, for example, Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?," *World Politics* 5, no. 4 (July 1953), pp. 442–77; and Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," *Naval War College Review* 11, no. 5 (January 1959), pp. 1–20.

8 G. C. Gibbs, "The Revolution in Foreign Policy," in *Britain after the Glorious Revolution, 1689–1714,* ed. Geoffrey Holmes (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 59–79. See also David Onnekink and Esther Mijers, eds., *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context* (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2007).

9 Mark A. Thomson, "Self-determination and Collective Security as Factors in English and French Foreign Policy, 1689–1718," in *William III and Louis XIV: Essays 1680–1720 by and for Mark A. Thomson,* ed. Ragnhild M. Hatton and J. S. Bromley (Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 271–86.

10 The full text of the Second Partition Treaty may be found in Historical Manuscripts Commission, *The Manuscripts of the House of Lords* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965), n.s., vol. 4, pp. 251–73.

11 "The Grand Alliance, 1701," in *English Historical Documents,* vol. 8, *1660–1714,* ed. Andrew Browning (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), pp. 873–74.

12 Mark A. Thomson, "Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession," in Hatton and Bromley, *William III and Louis XIV,* pp. 140–61. And see Hattendorf, "Die Ursprünge des Spanischen Erbfolgekrieges."

13 See John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702–1712* (New York: Garland, 1987), pp. 63–75.

14 Iklé, *Every War Must End,* pp. 8–16.

15 Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, *Frederick I: The Man and His Times* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984).

16 For a detailed study see Ludwig Hüttl, *Max Emanuel: Der Blaue Kurfürst, 1679–1726: Eine politische Biographie* (Munich, FRG: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1976), pp. 281–371, and Reginald de Schryver, *Max II. Emanuel von Bayern und das spanische Erbe: Die europäischen Ambitionen des Hauses Wittelsbach 1665–1715* (Mainz, Ger.: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1996), pp. 115–49.

17 See John B. Hattendorf, "English Grand Strategy and the Blenheim Campaign of 1704," *International History Review* 5, no. 1 (February 1983), pp. 3–19.

18 See Christopher Storrs, *War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 122–70, 313–15.

19 The following paragraphs on naval power are a condensation of a discussion in the essay appearing as chapter 8 of this collection.

20 Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860,* Stockholm Studies in History, no. 48 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), vol. 1, p. 229.

21 On this topic see John B. Hattendorf, "'To Aid and Assist the Other': Anglo-Dutch Naval Cooperation in Coalition Warfare at Sea, 1689–1714," in *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688–1720: Politics, War, and Finance,* ed. Jan A. F. de Jongste and A. J. Veenendaal Jr. (The Hague, Neth.: Institute of Netherlands History, 2002), pp. 177–98; repr. Hattendorf, *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011), pp. 65–81.

22 Henri Legohérel, *Les trésoriers généraux de la marine, 1517–1788* (Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1965), p. 179.

23 Glete, *Navies and Nations,* vol. 1, p. 227.

24 J. H. Owen, *War at Sea under Queen Anne, 1702–1708* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1938), p. 191.

25 On this subject in general, see J. S. Bromley's collected essays on variously related topics in *Corsairs and Navies, 1660–1760* (London: Hambledon, 1987).

26 James Pritchard, "The War of the Spanish Succession in America, 1702–1713," chap. 8 in *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670–1730* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 362, 391.

27 "Report on Gibraltar, ca. Early 1704, from the Godolphin Papers," in *Select Documents for Queen Anne's Reign Down to the Union with Scotland, 1702–7,* ed. G. M. Trevelyan (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1929), p. 82.

28 Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700–15* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), pp. 11–23. See also David Francis, *The First Peninsular War, 1702–1713* (London: Ernest Benn, 1975), and J. A. C. Hugill, *No Peace without Spain* (Oxford, U.K.: Kensal, 1991).

29 Karl Otmar von Aretin, *Das Alte Reich, 1648–1806,* vol. 2, *Kaisertradition und österreichische Großmachtpolitik (1684–1745)* (Stuttgart, Ger.: Klett-Cotta, 1997), pp. 224–29.

30 Iklé, *Every War Must End,* p. 83.

31 Ibid., pp. 84–85.

32 B. Cox, *King William's European Joint Venture* (Assen, Neth.: Van Gorcum, 1995).

X *British Policy toward Sweden, Charles XII, and the Great Northern War* 1697–1721

Britain's vital interests in Northern Europe—specifically Sweden—were commercial and economic ones, not political. The most important commodities that Britain valued and needed to acquire from this region were iron, copper, timber, pitch, tar, hemp, and flax. Together these items constituted the category known as "naval stores," the industrial materials necessary to construct ships. Access to the Baltic Sea and protection of this trade were vital economic interests on which British merchant shipping and naval power depended; they were of continual concern from the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the sailing-ship period.[1]

International politics, the depredations of privateers, and wars created threats to these British interests that from time to time required diplomatic and naval responses. Oliver Cromwell took the first step, during the First Anglo-Dutch War in 1652–54, concluding with Sweden a treaty providing for reciprocal trading privileges and regular diplomatic exchanges.[2] In April 1661, following the restoration of the monarchy in England, this agreement was replaced with a new treaty that remains in effect over 350 years later.[3]

The rule of King Charles XII of Sweden, marked by nearly continuous warfare and spanning the reigns of three sovereigns in England and Great Britain, was a particularly tumultuous chapter in regard to British relations with Sweden. King William III, Queen Anne, and George I each faced distinctive international and internal issues in that arena, but for all of them, the basic, underlying British economic interests remained the consistent concern.

ENGLISH RELATIONS WITH SWEDEN UNDER WILLIAM III, 1697–1702

Charles XII's accession to the Swedish throne in 1697 occurred at a critical moment in European international affairs. On 20 September 1697, between the death of Charles XI on 15 April 1697, and the new fifteen-year-old king's declaration of self-rule in early 1698, the Peace of Rijswijk was signed, ending the Nine Years' War. During that war France and the Maritime Powers—England and the Dutch Republic—had actively vied for Swedish support. King Charles XI had played a careful hand, maintaining neutrality between the rival international blocs and the

internal factions supporting one side or the other. His effectiveness as a neutral led the belligerents to invite him to be the mediator at Rijswijk. Charles XI did not live to carry out this role; Swedish diplomats took his place, if without the panache and acclaim that the king's personal presence might have brought their nation.

This was the situation at the opening of Charles XII's reign, and it established key factors that carried through the subsequent war. First, Swedish mediation at Rijswijk reflected the Western European powers' tacit agreement that it was important for European stability to maintain Sweden's international reputation and position in such ways. Sweden, they saw, was no longer the potentially destabilizing military power it had been under the great wartime leader King Gustav II Adolf (r. 1611–32). Sweden aspired to remain such a force, but in fact it had become much weaker and more vulnerable in the half-century since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War. The fact that the role of mediator was a cosmetic one, that Louis XIV and William III had made the real decisions secretly, in advance, and between themselves, reflected this assessment. Second, the prevarications Charles XI had employed to maintain neutrality had left a legacy of mistrust of and corruption in his government: rival powers had expended significant sums of money to influence his senior officials.[4]

After Rijswijk, the first matter to emerge pertained to commercial maritime relations. One of the unresolved issues from the Nine Years' War was the Anglo-Dutch policy of interfering with maritime trade with France. The dispute involved differing definitions of neutral trade compounded by activity that was clearly illegal. When the prewar English chargé d'affaires, John Robinson, returned to Sweden in 1696, William III formally directed him to resolve the matter.[5] Robinson, however, found that "there is no probability any new measures can be taken with this Crown, before this difficulty about their ships [taken by the Maritime Powers en route to French ports] be one way or another remov'd, which will hardly be without the expense of a good sum of money."[6] The issue became the stumbling block that prevented English and Dutch diplomats in 1699 from framing an alliance with Sweden to maintain stability in the north and maintain the peace of Western Europe.

Another legacy of Swedish diplomacy in the north during the Nine Years' War led the Maritime Powers to become involved in the complicated dynastic rivalry between Sweden and Denmark over the Holstein-Gottorp lands in Schleswig. To align Sweden against France, the Maritime Powers and Hanover had in 1689 become guarantors of the Treaty of Altona, supporting the Swedish interpretation recognizing the independent sovereignty of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp.[7] A month after Charles XI's death in 1697, Denmark (properly the "Twin Kingdoms" of Denmark and Norway) announced plans to destroy the forts protecting Holstein-Gottorp that had been authorized under the 1689 agreement. The guarantors responded first by convening a conference at Pinneberg, near Hamburg. William

III's initiatives for peace proved fruitless; Denmark seized a large part of the Duchy of Holstein and demolished the forts.

William III now ordered a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet under the overall command of Adm. Sir George Rooke, the Dutch contingent under Lt. Adm. Philips van Almonde, to the Sound (or Øresund, between the Danish island of Zealand and Sweden) to enforce the Treaty of Altona. In early June 1700, the sixteen English and eighteen Dutch warships arrived off Gothenburg, Sweden, about 120 miles north of the Sound, while diplomats demanded that peace be restored and Danish troops be removed from Holstein-Gottorp. Denmark's refusal led Rooke to move the Anglo-Dutch fleet closer to Copenhagen (at the Sound's southern end) and to arrange cooperation with Adm. Gen. Hans Wachtmeister, commanding the Swedish fleet in the Baltic. With the Danish fleet blocking the main channels of the Sound, Wachtmeister left his largest ships behind when he joined up with the Anglo-Dutch squadron. Admirals Rooke and Almonde rejected the Swedish proposal that Wachtmeister take overall command of the three naval forces but agreed to cooperate with him. For this, the English diplomat John Robinson served as the principal messenger between the fleet, Charles XII, and Swedish commanders ashore and afloat.

The operation was intended as a demonstration to Denmark of allied armed solidarity, and Rooke had orders to prevent it from becoming a general conflict. Accordingly, he refrained from attacking the Danish fleet and allowed it to withdraw into protected harbors at Copenhagen. Rooke's forces then moved forward to bombard that city, on 19–20 and 25–26 July, but caused little damage. To put more pressure on Denmark, Rooke and Almonde agreed to a Swedish proposal that the Anglo-Dutch squadron support a Swedish amphibious landing at Humlebæk, on the east coast of Zealand north of Copenhagen. The operation began on 4 August with the landing of four thousand troops under Anglo-Dutch naval protection, while Swedish forces blockaded Copenhagen by sea. Swedish leaders began now to collect themselves, while their and their allies' naval forces controlled the waterway, the Sound toll—a substantial percentage of the value of cargoes of ships passing through it—as the Danes had historically done. Representing the English government, John Robinson opposed this as an unacceptable injustice, no better than what the Danes were doing to Holstein-Gottorp.[8]

By 12 August more than ten thousand Swedish troops were ashore and organizing to march on Copenhagen. Before they could start, information arrived that King Frederik IV of Denmark-Norway was willing to make peace. On 23 August, Rooke and Almonde were informed that a treaty had been signed at Travendal, in Schleswig. Celebrating the occasion, Rooke ordered his ships to display all their flags and pennants during the day and to fire guns in the evening.[9] Charles XII

requested that Rooke's forces assist in withdrawing the Swedish invasion force from Denmark. That task completed, Rooke's squadron sailed on 12 September 1700.[10]

After leaving Denmark, Charles XII moved quickly to reinforce Swedish forces in the Baltic Provinces and in Germany to counterattack the forces of Augustus II, king of Poland and elector of Saxony, who had invaded the Swedish territory of Livonia (in modern terms, southern Estonia and northern Latvia). The news that Tsar Peter I of Russia had made peace with the Ottoman Empire was not immediately understood as what it would prove to be, the harbinger of a Russian declaration of war against Sweden.[11] However, the gradual realignment of European states in relation to France over the Spanish succession had clear implications for Sweden.

The Maritime Powers, their attention turned to the imminent War of the Spanish Succession, were concerned that the French might be attracting Sweden to their cause. It was difficult to obtain reliable information on what Charles XII was doing, as Charles had banned foreign diplomats from accompanying the army. In October 1701, the Dutch had learned that French agents had obtained 600,000 crowns in Amsterdam to bribe Swedish officials. At this, the English ambassador to the States General, John Churchill, Earl of Marlborough (who was also captain general of English forces at home and abroad), moved swiftly to sign a treaty with Swedish representatives, not waiting for approval from London (which in due time concurred). He and Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius saw this as a temporary measure by which Sweden would agree not to ally itself with enemies of the Maritime Powers.[12] As King William's secretary at war, William Blathwayt, explained to Robinson, "This treaty, you see, is not intended to be final, but only introductive of a more solid and substantial alliance between the two Crowns and the States [General]."[13] The treaty, that is, gave some assurance that France would not use Sweden to disrupt the Grand Alliance led by the Maritime Powers and Austria over the Spanish succession. At this point, they intended to bring Sweden into their own alliance, not only for its troops and military skill but to tie Charles XII firmly to the allied cause.

ENGLISH RELATIONS WITH SWEDEN UNDER ANNE, 1702–1714

The year 1702 was a turning point for Anglo-Swedish relations. It saw the death of William III, the accession of Anne in her own right, and the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. From the English perspective, Marlborough's treaty notwithstanding, Sweden was now an active threat to the allied strategic position in the new war. In December, Queen Anne ordered John Robinson, now an envoy and plenipotentiary, to find and call on Charles to assure him of "that friendship that is already between us, and of Our resolution to maintain all treaties and guarantees We are engaged in to him," particularly that of Travendal.[14] England wanted "a peace in the North . . . and an accommodation" between Sweden and Poland and offered mediation to achieve it.[15] At the same time, the queen renewed invitations

for Sweden to join the Grand Alliance and furnish troops. Anne's ministers, wanting to be kept informed, ordered Robinson to get Charles's permission to stay with him after delivering his messages.

Leaving the English mission in Stockholm to the care of Robert Jackson, as commissary in charge of affairs, Robinson and his wife, with several secretaries and servants, sailed from Karlskrona in January 1703 for Stralsund, on Germany's Baltic coast. Among those with Robinson was his new private secretary, James Jefferyes, the son and namesake of an English army brigadier general and knight who was governor of Cork, Ireland. The young Jefferyes had been born about 1680 in Stockholm—his father was then serving in the Swedish army—and had spent the first ten years of his life in that country. In 1697 the boy was enrolled at Trinity College, Dublin, where he earned his bachelor of arts degree in 1701. Now the young Jefferyes, known to be fluent in Swedish, would become highly useful to Robinson, who was known for his own knowledge of Swedish as well. Years before, King Charles XI had called Robinson "a good Swede" in acknowledgment of his fluency.[16]

From Stralsund the party traveled overland via Danzig and Warsaw to Charles's headquarters near Lublin, in southeastern Poland, arriving on 9 March. Robinson immediately sent Jefferyes to Count Carl Piper to request an audience. Jefferyes was rebuffed, told that the army would march the next day. Robinson persisted and called on Piper personally, but the latter refused, saying that the king would not see any foreign diplomat. Robinson replied that he had not come as a diplomat but as a bearer of personal letters from Queen Anne and from the royal family in Stockholm. On this information, Piper arranged an audience.

On 12 March, along a snow-covered road outside Lublin on the way to his audience, Robinson met Charles XII on horseback coming in his direction. Alighting from his carriage, Robinson was accorded a four- or five-minute audience with the king, who remained mounted on his horse. As Robinson would recall, "On my part it was a very odd audience, for I had on a very large robe with furs turn'd outwards, a great fur cap in my hand, and a very sorry periwig on my head."[17] Although he made no progress in achieving English diplomatic objectives, Robinson established a connection; he and Jefferyes hereafter visited the Swedish army's camp and the king's field chancery several times and made useful contacts. One of them was Samuel Åkerhielm, whom Robinson arranged to send to Oxford for three years at English expense. Åkerhielm's father had been in charge of foreign relations in Charles's field chancery until his death the year before. One of his sisters had married Josias Cederhielm, another Olof Hermelin, both secretaries in the king's field chancery with whom Robinson did business.[18]

Robinson traveled on to Warsaw, where he joined allied ministers in advocating peace between Poland and Sweden. The king-elector of Poland, Augustus II,

granted Robinson an audience in June 1703 and assured him of his interest in peace but refused to relinquish the Polish throne as Charles XII required. Robinson moved on to Danzig. From this vantage point he was able to assist local officials in their dealings with the Swedish army as well as help frustrate French attempts to trade with Danzig. At the same time, Robinson made people aware of allied victories, sponsoring public celebrations to mark Blenheim in 1704 and Ramillies in 1706.[19]

In August 1703, Sweden and the Maritime Powers signed a "treaty of stricter alliance and for the tranquillity of Europe," by which Sweden obtained a guarantee from England and the Dutch Republic to enforce the Peace of Travendal, signed in 1700, to ensure that Denmark did not engage in any hostilities with Sweden or its allies. In return, Sweden vaguely agreed to enter into negotiations for admission into the Grand Alliance and promised to supply ten thousand troops when its war against Poland and Russia had ended. The issue of Anglo-Swedish trade relations, however, continued unresolved and nearly broke into open conflict. The War of the Spanish Succession was making naval stores critical to England, but Sweden required pitch or tar sold to England to be carried in Swedish ships, imposing no such limitation on its trade with France. In 1703, the Swedish Tar Company raised its prices exorbitantly. Parliament in 1704 relieved the situation by subsidizing naval stores from North America and moving to obtain them from Russia, forcing Swedish merchants to lower their prices to remain competitive.[20]

A variety of threats to Swedish merchant shipping brought Swedish warships from the Baltic into the North Sea while English and Dutch warships were engaged with the French. In late July 1704, a Royal Navy squadron of eight fifty-gun warships under Cdre. William Whetstone, on patrol off Orfordness, Suffolk, encountered a fleet of Swedish merchantmen being escorted by the fifty-gun Swedish warship *Öland,* commanded by Capt. Gustaf von Psilander. Although massively outnumbered, Psilander refused to give the customary salute in recognition of England's claim to sovereignty of the "British Seas." A four-hour battle followed in which Whetstone captured *Öland,* seized the merchant ships, killed or wounded a number of Swedish seamen, and sent Psilander ashore, where he was imprisoned.[21] The Swedish envoy in England, Christoffer Leijoncrona, quickly approached Secretary of State Robert Harley to defuse the situation. The secretary was sympathetic, writing Robinson, "If it is necessary to have a Breach, it may be upon a much better foot, and with much better grace than on this occasion; Althô You know very well the Sovereignty of the Seas is very popular in England, and the Swede's Conduct therein not very acceptable to our Nation."[22] Both sides took precautions to avoid a repetition of the incident.

Charles XII's activities continued indirectly to threaten the allies in the War of the Spanish Succession.[23] How they complicated that war can be seen in such

episodes as when, after the victory at Blenheim, the duke of Savoy asked Vienna for twelve thousand imperial troops for service in Italy. The Austrians knew that to accommodate him they would have to persuade some other ally, most likely Prussia, to supply eight thousand of the requested troops. At that time, however, Denmark-Norway and Saxony-Poland were working to draw Brandenburg-Prussia into their own war against Sweden. The king in Prussia, concerned about a Swedish attack, was unwilling to release troops to fight in Italy unless the Maritime Powers could guarantee him assistance in such a case.[24] In November 1704, accordingly, the renewal of a 1701–1702 troop-subsidy agreement between the Maritime Powers and Prussia contained a secret article by which Queen Anne promised her best efforts to prevent Prussian involvement in the Great Northern War and to encourage the States General to assist in making peace in that conflict.[25] Prussia sent the troops but on condition of recalling them if in danger of an attack from Sweden. That disturbing reservation gave new urgency to the Anglo-Dutch policy of keeping things quiet in the north so "that no part of the forces of the allies may be diverted from pursuing the interest of the common cause."[26] That involved reinforcing England's neutral stance: Secretary Harley, for instance, told the Swedish resident in London, "Her Majesty at the same time that she is ready to perform all acts of friendship to the King of Sweden can not but consider the Czar of Muscovy [Tsar Peter I] as a Prince in Amity with her Majesty and treat him accordingly."[27]

England's intention of not involving itself directly in the north was threatened when, in 1705, the bishop of Lübeck-Eutin died and Denmark displaced his Swedish-backed replacement and took possession of that territory. The matter was of direct concern to the allies: the cabinet in London saw that not only war between Sweden and Denmark might result but disruption of the allied grand strategy against France as well. Its diplomacy effort turned to "prevent[ing] the Swedes from engaging in this broil."[28] For their part, the Maritime Powers offered to recompense the Danish candidate if he would return the bishopric to the Holstein-Gottorp candidate, but the emperor in Austria, whose acquiescence as a member of the Grand Alliance was necessary, initially failed to confirm the arrangement.[29]

After the combined success against Denmark, the allies fully engaged in their successful war against France; Charles XII felt free to attack Denmark's former ally Saxony, now occupying Livonia. Meeting hardly any resistance, the Swedish army pressed beyond Leipzig, Saxony's largest city, and moved toward its capital, Dresden. On this news, the allies became extremely concerned that Denmark, Prussia, and Hesse would withdraw their troops in allied service to carry out their treaty obligations to Saxony.[30] To mollify the Grand Alliance, Charles XII assured all parties that he would not prejudice the allied war effort against France.[31]

On 24 September 1706, at Schloss Altranstädt, not far from the battlefield of Lützen, where the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf had been killed in 1632, Saxon

officials and their king agreed to Charles's demands in a secret agreement by which Augustus would be dethroned and Stanisław I Leszczyński, whom Charles had declared king of Poland in 1704, recognized. In October, Augustus defeated a Swedish army at Kalisz; in response, to stop this double-dealing, Charles announced the details of their secret agreement on 15 November.[32] Charles also demanded that other European powers recognize Stanisław as king of Poland, and Louis XIV quickly did so. From the allied perspective, the presence of the Swedish army in Saxony seemed to be advantageous to the French side in their war, as from there the Swedes might attack the new emperor, Joseph I. To avert that prospect the Maritime Powers began negotiations at The Hague to bring Saxon troops into allied service.

In the meantime, Robinson and his Dutch colleague, Johan van Haersolte, left Danzig together and traveled to Leipzig, where they arrived on 12 November.[33] By that time Charles had eased his ban on foreign diplomats and allowed them to maintain contact with his army in winter quarters. On 24 December 1706, Charles granted Robinson an audience at which the envoy extraordinary was finally able to present his credentials, issued four years earlier. Robinson thereafter continued his quiet diplomacy with Sweden, the value of which the king seemed to acknowledge when he conversed for half an hour in Swedish with Robinson's Yorkshire-born wife, Mary. As Robinson reported, "It is esteem'd a greater grace than ever His Majty show'd to any stranger [foreigner] before."[34] Meanwhile, a wider recognition by the allies of Stanisław as king of Poland had not been immediately forthcoming, a delay that gave French diplomats an opportunity to attempt to draw Sweden into their camp. The Hague and London were particularly concerned that if Charles's army did in fact cross into Austria, Sweden would in effect be supporting Louis XIV. That in turn would directly affect allied military plans for 1707, forcing allied armies in Flanders (which since their victory at Ramillies the year before had been attempting to force their way into France) onto the defensive.[35] In addition, a Protestant "Evangelical Pact" that Sweden, Prussia, and Hanover wanted to create would strengthen Sweden's position in northern Germany and weaken that of Austria in the Grand Alliance against France.

Giving him full diplomatic powers, Queen Anne ordered the Duke of Marlborough to discuss allied concerns with Charles XII personally at Altranstädt. Just before Marlborough left The Hague, Grand Pensionary Heinsius and Simon van Slingelandt, the secretary of the Council of State, advised him that the Dutch had intercepted French letters indicating that every official around Charles XII except Count Carl Piper, senior secretary of the king's field chancery, was in French pay.[36] Despite such evidence and the feeling that Charles was an unpredictable figure whose fate was uncertain, Queen Anne and her officials were secretly considering Charles XII as mediator between France and the allies to end the War of the Spanish Succession. Marlborough was told to judge the feasibility of giving Charles this

role—"but," as Lord Godolphin, the Lord Treasurer, warned, "the nicety of it seems to lie in this: that it may be too dangerous to give him a handle to press the peace and the mediation of it."[37]

Marlborough arrived at Altranstädt on 26 April 1707 and had long conversations with Charles XII the following day, with Robinson translating when Marlborough was not using French. Their meetings were fruitful. Charles declined the role of mediator in the War of the Spanish Succession, as he would be fully engaged against Russia. At the same time, Charles assured Marlborough that he would not act in any way that would harm the allies and that he would support the Maritime Powers when the time came to negotiate a peace with France. Marlborough confirmed England's support for Holstein-Gottorp and Austria, its recognition of Stanisław as king of Poland, and its guarantee of the 1706 Treaty of Altranstädt with Saxony, by which Augustus gave up his claim to the Polish crown. In addition, Marlborough quietly promised gifts to key Swedish officials. Count Piper was given a pension of £1,500 per year, while Hermelin and Cederhielm of the field chancery each got £500 per year. But Marlborough made no progress with either hiring Swedish troops or drawing Sweden into the alliance. Charles's promise of neutrality and secret, tacit support had to suffice.

Marlborough explored arranging for Robinson to accompany Charles in his coming campaigns but found that Robinson's diplomatic status made that impossible. Instead, Swedish officials allowed Robinson's secretary, Jefferyes, to accompany the army, ostensibly a volunteer but actually an English agent, paid and equipped by London. Jefferyes would keep London directly informed and should the Swedes defeat the Russians be on the spot to make the case that Swedish troops be sent to fight France.[38]

In the course of these arrangements King Stanisław arrived at Schloss Altranstädt and gave Marlborough an opportunity to talk with him personally. Further, Augustus II, who had just arrived at Leipzig, eleven kilometers away, invited Marlborough to confer with him on 28 April. In that meeting Marlborough was able to expedite the deployment of Saxon troops to Flanders and to encourage the Austrians to take other Saxon troops into their pay.[39] Marlborough returned to The Hague, meeting en route with King Friedrich I in Berlin and Elector Georg Ludwig in Hanover. Pleased by his meetings with four sovereigns, Marlborough remarked privately to his wife, "They seem to be all very different in their kindes. If I was obliged to make a choice it should be the youngest, which is the king of Sueden."[40]

Meanwhile in London, on 12 May 1707, the independent, sovereign kingdoms of Scotland and England, which since 1603 had been in a personal, dynastic union by virtue of having the same sovereign, agreed to the Act of Union that joined them to form Great Britain. From this point, what previously had been termed "English" policy and diplomacy became "British."

Marlborough left Robinson at Altranstädt to follow up. In late July Robinson and his Dutch colleague mediated an agreement between the Swedes and Austrians concerning Saxon troops and the religious rights of Protestants in Silesia.[41] In early July, the Swedish army began to move against Russia. Robinson remained accredited to Charles XII but moved to Hamburg to take up actively Britain's role as a guarantor of the 1700 Treaty of Travendal, as Charles had particularly requested of Marlborough.[42] The British fear of a war between Austria and Sweden was removed by a second Treaty of Altranstädt, by which the emperor agreed to the Gottorp (i.e., Swedish) candidate for the Lübeck-Eutin bishopric and Britain joined in compensating his now displaced Danish rival.[43] At this point, British relations with Sweden were cordial. Robinson remained in communication with Charles's field chancery; his communications to London enclosed reports from Jefferyes to the secretary of state and letters from Count Piper to Marlborough.[44] With these connections established, British worries over the situation in the north momentarily melted away.

They returned in 1709. On 8 July of that year, the Russian army defeated Charles XII's troops at Poltava (in modern Ukraine). Count Piper and Josias Cederhielm were captured, and Robinson's third contact, Olof Hermelin, disappeared. Jefferyes too was captured. Before he was taken to Moscow (where he would be a prisoner until the British envoy there, Charles Whitworth, was able to gain his release), Jefferyes reported that although Charles, wounded in the foot and unable to walk, and several thousand men had escaped, "this strange reverse of fortune has wholly chang'd the face of affairs in these parts."[45] The Russians were reportedly ready to march into Livonia, invade Poland, and restore Augustus to the throne. If Prussia and Denmark should join in this, Jefferyes predicted, "'tis more than probable that Sweden by this long and tedious war is exhausted of men and money will be forc'd to succumb. I need not mention to Y:r Hon:r the great projects the Muscovites have maid to extend their dominions in the East Sea, all along the Nieper [Dnieper River], over Crimm [Crimea] and the Black Sea to the Mare Caspium [Caspian Sea]."[46]

When Marlborough heard the news of Poltava, he sadly reflected on how such a battle could so quickly wreck the fortunes of a king and his country. "I am extremely touched with the misfortun of this young King," Marlborough wrote Godolphin. "His continued successes, and the contempt he had of his enemys, has been his ruin."[47] In late August, officials in London recalled Robinson to become bishop of Bristol and Lord Privy Seal. Soon thereafter, in 1710, Robert Jackson became minister resident at Stockholm. Jefferyes returned to London in early 1710 and a year later, with Robinson's encouragement, became minister resident to Charles XII, now at Bender (in present-day Moldova), an unexpected guest in Ottoman territory.[48] The broad strategic situation also changed: Augustus of Saxony reassumed the Polish crown and joined Denmark and Russia in a renewed league against Sweden. Denmark prepared to invade Sweden and to withdraw its troops from allied

service. The Maritime Powers assumed the payroll of the Danish troops and so retained them.[49]

Britain took its own steps to prevent further threats of troop withdrawals. In March 1710, representatives of the queen, the emperor, and the States General signed a declaration guaranteeing the neutrality of the Holy Roman Empire and Germany in the Northern War. Six months later this diplomatic language was given military backing, when the three allies, along with Prussia, the bishop of Münster, the elector of Mainz, the duke of Wolfenbüttel, the duke of Mecklenburg, and the landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, agreed to detailed plans for an "army of neutrality," twelve to fifteen thousand men on the Elbe or Oder Rivers as a deterrent to attack from the north.[50]

British policy makers were concerned about the impact Charles's presence in Ottoman-controlled territory might have on tension then current between Hungary and Austria. That situation was further complicated by the coming into power of an anti-Russian government in Constantinople, which declared war against Poland and Russia in November 1710. British diplomats feared that neutrality in the north might be imminently compromised;[51] nevertheless, they were ordered by their government, which had no desire to become directly involved, to concur in all judgments of the States General and Dutch diplomats, considering them "best and earliest informed" of such matters.[52]

At about this time, Bishop Gilbert Burnet, who was writing his *History of My Own Time* (published 1724, 1734), asked Robinson about Sweden. Robinson told Burnet that Charles XII "has all along wished well to the Allies, and not at all to France which he never intended to serve by any step he has made."[53] With the same understanding in mind, Queen Anne instructed Jefferyes in early 1711 to confirm British friendship with Sweden, in the face of captures of British ships trading to the Baltic by Swedish privateers. These depredations had become an irritant, but Baltic naval stores remained a vital need, and between 1710 and 1713, while the war with France was in progress, the allies could not spare warships to protect their Baltic trade.[54] Jefferyes could only argue, "Free ships make free goods in all cases but contraband."[55]

Britain was negotiating a fine line. Henry St. John, secretary of state for the Northern Department in the Earl of Oxford's new Tory government, explained to Jefferyes that it "wou'd not be for our advantage entirely to disoblige the northern confederates, or that the king of Sweden should be in a condition of hurting the common cause of the allies by the invasion of Saxony, so on the other hand it is very far from being the general interest to have the ballance of power in the north entirely destroy'd and the protestant religion in Germany deprived of so great a support as it must necessarily be by an absolute conquest of the Swedish provinces."[56]

St. John soon expressed doubts about recent British policy in the north and blamed the Dutch for a lack of resolution in their northern policies and their failure to recognize Stanisław. St. John considered the Treaty of Altranstädt a solemn promise to maintain Stanisław on the Polish throne.[57] The Danes, Poles, and Russians pressed to use the army of neutrality to crush the Swedes; British and Dutch leaders resisted these attempts.[58] Despite previous mishandling of the diplomatic situation, St. John believed that the best course for Britain was to temporize and keep the northern princes in as good humor as possible toward the allies.[59] Beyond that, during the remainder of Anne's reign Britain showed little direct concern for Sweden, leading Charles to protest from exile that Britain had "grown cold," but she reassured the king of her continuing friendship.[60]

As the Utrecht negotiations led to peace in the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, continual erosion of Sweden's strength led Britain to propose an international congress to promote its welfare and prevent the kingdom's complete collapse. Charles repeatedly rejected the proposals, stymieing all efforts for negotiation, peace, or mediation. Nevertheless, Jefferyes remained in close contact with the Swedish king, following him in his largely self-imposed exile from Bender to Adrianople (in present-day Turkey) and Constantinople in 1713, and then to Stralsund in 1714–15. In May 1714, with the War of the Spanish Succession over and Anne's reign in its last months, the queen protested to the tsar, "We cannot see the total ruin and overthrow of a nation with whom we have such alliances and in the preservation of which the interests of our people are so deeply concerned."[61]

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH SWEDEN UNDER GEORGE I, 1714–1723

At Stralsund on 30 November 1714, Jefferyes formally notified Charles of the accession of George I to the British throne. Charles XII greeted the news with compliments but understood the situation in which George was placed by his dual role of elector in Hanover and king of Great Britain. George needed to counter the Jacobite claims to the British throne and balance Hanoverian interests and ambitions in Germany, while at the same time dealing with the broad European and global issues that Utrecht had established. As in that of William III before him, George I's accession to the throne had created a type of composite state, but as an elector George had a much stronger role in Hanover than William had had in the Netherlands as a stadtholder. The affairs of Britain and Hanover were handled through separate governments and sets of ministers, whose politics and policies were sometimes complementary but sometimes competitive or mutually opaque. This complexity was reflected in divisive political forces within both Hanover and Britain.[62]

Hanover had been an ally of Sweden since the 1680s but shared the interest in territorial expansion awakened after 1709 by the weakening of Sweden's control over its German provinces. Additionally, Hanover was competing with Denmark and Prussia. When Denmark in 1712 took Stade, one of Sweden's four fortified

cities in Germany, and occupied the Duchy of Bremen, Hanover moved to occupy Swedish Verden as a preliminary to controlling Bremen.[63] These tensions were reduced following the accession of George's nephew and son-in-law, Friedrich Wilhelm I, as king in Prussia. A complex set of bilateral agreements among Denmark, Prussia, and Hanover resulted in the occupation by Hanover of Bremen and Verden in 1714–15 and the absorption by Denmark of Holstein-Gottorp's lands in Schleswig.[64] However, the price of Hanover's gain was for George (as elector, but not king) to join Denmark and Prussia in declaring war against Sweden.[65]

In 1715, the Utrecht peace having released navies from their commitments, an Anglo-Dutch expedition sailed to the Baltic under the overall command of Adm. Sir John Norris, with a Dutch contingent under Rear Adm. Lucas de Veth. The orders given the admirals by their respective governments were incompatible. The Dutch orders were strictly defensive, limited to protection of neutral trade. The British Admiralty's instructions were similar but allowed reprisals against Sweden for British losses. In addition, George I enclosed private orders to Norris authorizing him to join the Danish fleet as a means to protect trade. Yet, when Prussia in fact encouraged that, Norris refused to separate from the Dutch squadron. It was only when Denmark joined in the demand that George found ways for the Royal Navy to be used for Hanoverian objectives. Norris's presence was a political statement; it had no direct effect on the fall to the Danes of Stralsund and the nearby island of Rügen on 8 August. In September 1715, Norris sailed for England, leaving an eight-ship detachment under Capt. Edward Hopson in Danish waters. A number of diplomats had hoped that Charles would agree to a peace or a cease-fire to prevent the total loss of his lands. He did not, and Hanover openly declared war on Sweden on 15 October 1715. Returning finally to Sweden in December, during the failed 1715 insurrection in Scotland, Charles set about creating the impression that his country supported the Jacobites against George.[66]

Charles began to prepare for a campaign in Norway (a possession of his enemy Denmark) in 1716, apparently as a strategic threat toward Britain that might keep the Royal Navy in home waters and not in the Baltic assisting his enemies. When the Swedish move against Norway began, Denmark and Russia considered a pincer attack on northern and southern Sweden by forces convoyed across the Baltic by a British-Danish-Dutch-Russian fleet. However, Tsar Peter at this time concluded marriage alliances for his nieces with the duchies of Courland and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, both on the Baltic, and then rapidly sent troops into both, all creating indecision, delay, and suspicion. The Anglo-Dutch squadron could not join the Danes in the eastern Baltic until early August, by which time the tsar had abandoned the plan. George saw the tsar's decision as a betrayal and expanding Russian activity as potentially affecting British access to naval stores. The northern alliance against Sweden disintegrated in mutual suspicion.[67]

In Britain, these events played into internal politics and led to political changes that first split the Whig Party and then brought James Stanhope forward as George I's chief minister and the key figure for British foreign relations from July 1716 until his death in February 1721. Stanhope made an aggressive series of interconnected policy changes. First, to establish a wider European basis for foreign policy, he agreed with the French to create the Triple Alliance, which was long to be a foundation of British policy. While creating a basis for a broad pacification of Europe, the alliance barred French support for any threat from Jacobite elements in France. The Dutch Republic was the third part of the Triple Alliance; however, Stanhope de-emphasized that long-standing relationship, as Dutch priorities for neutrality began to clash with Britain's new policies.[68]

The British ministry now published correspondence of Jacobites in France with the Swedish ambassador in London, Count Carl Gyllenborg, and Baron Georg von Görtz, Sweden's minister-at-large on the Continent, making them appear part of a plot for a renewed Jacobite invasion of Scotland. The ministry imprisoned Gyllenborg in London and prevailed on the Dutch to imprison Görtz. This sequence of events was orchestrated to bring British public opinion into line with George's Hanoverian policies against Sweden. In retaliation, Charles XII broke diplomatic relations with Britain and briefly detained Robert Jackson (who returned to England in October).[69] With war possible, Britain sent no convoy that year to the Baltic for naval stores but depended on Dutch merchants for them.[70]

Britain's main focus soon turned to the international situation in southern Europe and the Quadruple Alliance to maintain the peace settlement of Utrecht in the Mediterranean against the rising issues with Spain. For London, the north was overshadowed, but not entirely: Swedish military operations in Norway raised the possibility of attacks on Scotland or on Hanover through Denmark. Also, the Jacobites had been energetically attempting to bring about a separate peace between Russia and Sweden, a threat to both Hanover and Britain. George I thought that prospect unlikely, however, and instead pursued peace initiatives, working through Hanover.[71] To that end, in 1717 Admiral Norris went on a diplomatic mission to Amsterdam to confer, along with the British diplomat Charles Whitworth, with Tsar Peter on a commercial treaty. In the end Peter demanded, and the British delegation rejected, that as a prerequisite fifteen British warships be placed annually under Russian command. Norris considered "the Czar by his situation, numerous army, and disposition towards the water, to be the most dangerous enemy our country can have."[72]

Britain's failure to agree with Russia required that its approach to Sweden change. In 1718 Norris sailed for the Baltic under orders that made no mention of Russia but directed him to join his Anglo-Dutch command with the Danes to annoy the Swedes, hinder them from leaving the Baltic, and yet encourage Sweden to

open commerce with British merchants. Shortly after Norris's arrival at the Sound, where the Dutch joined him, the Russians put to sea their largest naval force up to that time. Misinterpreting Russian intentions, the British, Danish, and Dutch thought that a Swedish-Russian peace was at hand and that the Russian force would join Sweden's. To prevent such a rendezvous, Norris joined the Danes to blockade the main Swedish naval base, Karlskrona, leaving the Dutch to convoy merchant trade. Norris departed for home in late October, relieving the pressure on Sweden and freeing Charles for his Norwegian campaign—which, had it succeeded, might have secured a strategic position eliciting more-acceptable peace terms from Russia and Hanover.[73]

Instead, Charles XII died in Norway, on 11 December 1718. A fundamental change created thereby became evident to Britain in early 1719. In the initial accounts from Stockholm, Robert Jackson reported that Charles's sister, now Queen Ulrika Eleonora, was to found a joint monarchy along the model of William and Mary's in England and that her prince consort was to be her husband, Friedrich, the hereditary prince of Hesse-Kassel. Soon Jackson predicted, correctly, that Ulrika Eleonora would abdicate in favor of her husband, who would rule as King Fredrik I of Sweden.[74]

Meanwhile, Spain's leading minister, Cardinal Giulio Alberoni, had been directing military, naval, and conspiratorial efforts to undo the Utrecht settlement in the Mediterranean, in part by working for a Jacobite restoration in Britain. A Spanish expedition duly set out in March 1719 under the Duke of Ormonde to invade Scotland, only to be scattered by a storm in the Bay of Biscay. Once that Jacobite threat had receded, George I ordered Lord Carteret to Sweden as ambassador. Britain's objectives with regard to Sweden were at this point to restore trading relations, renew the defensive alliance of 1700, and support Sweden against the Russians, while also encouraging Sweden to release territories in Germany.[75]

These goals were part of a larger British plan to create a balance of power and general peace in the north. The first step was a preliminary treaty between Hanover and Sweden, signed in Stockholm on 22 July 1719. Carteret promised British naval support against Russian raids on the Swedish coasts; Sweden, in return, agreed to sell Bremen and Verden to Hanover, whose forces had occupied them since 1712. A complex set of further treaties to which Sweden was not a party divided up its territories. Importantly, Prussia agreed to leave its alliance with Russia to obtain a portion of Pomerania. Through French diplomacy, Denmark agreed to relinquish claims to Swedish territory in Germany in order to retain the Holstein-Gottorp territories. To persuade Sweden to accept this dismemberment, Carteret falsified the dates of the agreements to cause Swedish leaders to think that they had been reached before news of the Swedish-Hanoverian pact reached the signatories.

Carteret accompanied this deception with a threat to deny naval assistance against Russia unless Sweden agreed to relinquish its territories.

Circumstances were to prevent Britain from completely implementing its plan. The financial turmoil surrounding the South Sea Bubble (the disastrous collapse of the speculative South Sea Company after inordinate and fraudulent inflation of its share prices) and a continuing need for naval forces in southern Europe combined to keep British forces available for the north insufficient to compel Russian concessions that would allow Sweden to recover Livonia and Estonia. Britain used further pressure and financial inducements to gain the Peace of Nystad in 1721 that ended the Great Northern War. A total of £20,000 went to Russian court officials and the same amount to the Swedish king. Another £100,000 would follow if George, as king and elector, were included as a participant in the peace; in the event, and to George's disappointment, neither Hanover nor Britain was.[76]

Peace allowed Britain to return to its fundamental commercial and economic interests in the Baltic region. Its solid support for Sweden in the years following Charles XII's death and the rise of Russia together brought substantial commercial gains to British merchants in the north. At the same time, the results of the War of the Spanish Succession and the Great Northern War had combined to make Great Britain and Russia the leading powers of Europe.

NOTES This is a revised version of "British Policy towards Sweden, Charles XII, and the Great Northern War, 1697–1723," chapter 9 (pp. 166–83) of *Charles XII: Warrior King,* ed. John B. Hattendorf et al. (Rotterdam, Neth.: Karwansaray, 2018). Copyright Karwansaray BV, Rotterdam, Netherlands; reprinted by permission.

1 See, for example, J. F. Chance, comp., *British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689–1789*, vol. 1, *Sweden, 1689–1727,* Camden Series, 3rd ser., no. 32 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1922), p. x; R. G. Albion, *Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652–1862* (1926; repr. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965); Sven-Erik Åström, *From Stockholm to St. Petersburg: Commercial Factors in the Political Relations between England and Sweden, 1675–1700,* Studia Historica, vol. 2 (Helsinki: n.p., 1962); J. J. Malone, "England and the Baltic Naval Stores Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *Mariner's Mirror* 58, no. 4 (1972), pp. 375–95; H. S. K. Kent, *War and Trade in Northern*

Seas: Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Relations in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), pp. 1–5; N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), pp. 191–92; and James Davey, *The Transformation of British Naval Strategy: Seapower and Supply in Northern Europe, 1808–1812* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2012), pp. 13–24.

2 Michael Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court, 1655–1656: The Missions of Julius Coyet and Christer Bonde,* Camden Series, 4th ser., no. 36 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1988). For a full list of English diplomatic representatives in Sweden from 1535 to 1789, see Gary M. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives, 1509–1688* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011), pp. 272–79, and David Bayne Horn, ed., *British Diplomatic Representatives, 1689–1789,* Camden Series, 3rd ser., no. 46 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1932), pp. 139–44. For reciprocal trading privileges, see Bulstrode Whitelocke, *A Journal of the Swedish Ambassy in the Years M.DC.LIII. and M.DC.LIV. . . .* (London: Becket and De Hondt, 1772).

3 6 Consol. T.S., pp. 469–94, SP 108/518, The National Archives, Kew, U.K. [hereafter TNA]. The treaty was supplemented by the Convention of 25 July 1803, renewed by Article II of the Treaty of Örebro, 18 July 1812, amended by the Declaration of 27 November 1911, and was still in effect in 2014.

4 Ragnhild M. Hatton, "Gratifications and Foreign Policy: Anglo-French Rivalry in Sweden during the Nine Years War," in *William III and Louis XIV: Essays 1680–1720 by and for Mark A. Thomson,* ed. Hatton and J. S. Bromley (Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 93–94; Werner Buchholz, "Zwischen Glanz und Ohnmacht: Schweden als Vermittler des Friedens von Rijswijk," in *Der Friede von Rijswijk 1697,* ed. Heinz Duchhardt (Mainz, Ger.: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1998); Anthony F. Upton, *Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism,* Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 211–12.

5 31 December 1696, in Chance, *Sweden, 1689–1727,* pp. 16–17.

6 Robinson to Vernon, 1 January 1698, fols. 133–34, Addit. Ms. 35,105, British Library, London [hereafter BL].

7 For the full text, Treaty of Accommodation, etc., Den.-Gottorp, 20/30 June [New Style (NS) / Old Style (OS)] 1689, 18 Consol. T.S., pp. 407–17.

8 Robinson to Blathwayt, 7 August 1700, Addit. Ms. 35,106, BL.

9 John B. Hattendorf, ed., *The Journal of Admiral Sir George Rooke, 1700–04* (London: Navy Records Society, forthcoming), entry for 12 August 1700 (OS).

10 Ibid., entry for 1 September 1700 (OS).

11 Ragnhild M. Hatton, *Charles XII,* General Series, no. 84 (London: Royal Historical Association, 1988), p. 140.

12 Marlborough to Godolphin, 23 September / 4 October 1701, and 26 September / 7 October 1701, in *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence,* ed. Henry L. Snyder (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 36–37.

13 Blathwayt to Robinson, 8 October 1701, fol. 162, Addit. Ms. 35,106, BL.

14 Instructions for Dr. John Robinson, 11 September 1702, in Chance, *Sweden, 1689–1727,* pp. 26–29.

15 Ibid.

16 Ragnhild M. Hatton, ed., *Captain James Jefferyes's Letters to the Secretary of State, Whitehall, from the Swedish Army, 1707–1709* (Stockholm: Kungliga samfundet för utgivande av handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia, 1954), pp. 6–11; Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives,* p. 140.

17 Robinson to Hedges, 14 March 1703, SP 95/15, TNA; transcribed in John B. Hattendorf, "John Robinson's Account of Sweden, 1688," special issue, *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok* (1996), p. xxxi.

18 Hatton, *Charles XII,* p. 235; A. E. Stamp, "The Meeting of the Duke of Marlborough and Charles XII. at Altranstadt, April 1707," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 12 (1898), p. 106. Åkerhielm's attendance at Oxford is attested in Robinson's correspondence; in Birger Sallnäs, *Samuel Åkerhielm d.y.: En statsmannabiografi* (Lund, Swed.: Gleerupska universitetsbokhandeln, 1947), pp. 11–12, 14–15; and in Carl Vilhelm Jacobowsky, "Svenska studenter i Oxford ca. 1620–1740," *Personhistorisk Tidskrift* (1927), pp. 105–33, on the basis of a 1704 letter from him dated at Oxford. However, the Oxford University Archives have no record of his matriculation in the university, nor has any record of him been found in the archives of Oriel, Robinson's college at Oxford, where Robinson might have made a connection for him. Possibly Åkerhielm was using some anglicized form of his surname, but none has been identified.

19 June Milne, "The Diplomacy of Dr. John Robinson at the Court of Charles XII of Sweden, 1697–1709," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 30 (1948), pp. 80–84.

20 R. D. Merriman, *Queen Anne's Navy: Documents concerning the Administration of the Navy of Queen Anne, 1702–1714* (London: Navy Records Society, 1961), pp. 141–44, 158–65; John J. Murray, "Robert Jackson's 'Memoir on the Swedish Tar Company,' December 29, 1709," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 10, no. 4 (1947), pp. 424–26.

21 Jakob Seerup, "Danish and Swedish Flag Disputes with the British in the Channel," in *Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf,* ed. N. A. M. Rodger et al. (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2016), pp. 31–32.

22 Harley to Robinson, 4/15 August 1704, fols. 5–6, Addit. Ms. 34,677, BL; Lars Ericson Wolke and Martin Hårdstedt, *Svenska sjöslag* (Stockholm: Medström, 2009), pp. 153–54.

23 See John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702–1712,* Outstanding Dissertations in Modern European History Series, ed. William H. McNeill and Peter Stansky (New York: Garland, 1987), p. 122.

24 Marlborough to Godolphin, 2/13 October, 6/17 October, and 9/20 October 1704, in Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence,* vol. 1, pp. 380, 381–83; Marlborough to Harley, 13 October 1704, in *The Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, from 1702 to 1712* (London: John Murray, 1845), vol. 1, p. 504.

25 Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession,* pp. 278–79, 286–87.

26 Hedges to Vernon, 17 October 1704, fol. 4, SP 104/4, TNA.

27 Harley to Swedish resident, 18 July 1704, Anglica 536, Riksarkivet, Stockholm.

28 Harley to Stanhope, 18 January 1706, fol. 121, SP 104/72, TNA.

29 Harley to Sunderland, 9 October 1705, fols. 95–96, SP 104/39; E. Howe to Harley, October 1705, fol. 16, SP 81/162; both TNA. Marlborough to Godolphin, 21 December 1705 / 1 January 1706, and 25 December 1705 / 5 January 1706, in Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence,* vol. 1, pp. 516–17. Stepney to Raby, 15 January 1706, SP 195/77; Harley to Vernon, 2 April 1706, fol. 19, SP 104/4; both TNA. Anne to Godolphin, 4 June 1706, in *The Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne,* ed. B. C. Brown (London: Cassell, [1935]), p. 188.

30 Heinsius to Marlborough, 4 and 6 September 1706, in *The Correspondence 1701–1711 of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough and Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland,* ed. Bert van 't Hoff (Utrecht, Neth.: Kemink, 1951), pp. 264–65; Marlborough to Heinsius, 11 and 15 September 1706, and Marlborough to the elector of Hanover, 11 September 1706, in Murray, *Letters and Dispatches,* vol. 3, pp. 129–30.

31 The elector of Hanover to Marlborough, 21 September 1706, in Murray, *Letters and Dispatches,* vol. 3, p. 130.

32 Hatton, *Charles XII,* pp. 212–15.

33 Van Haersolte to Heinsius, Frankfurt (Oder), 5 November 1706, in *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702–1720,* ed. A. J. Veenendaal (The Hague, Neth.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976–2001), vol. 5, p. 650; Van Haersolte to Heinsius, Leipzig, 14 November 1706, in ibid., vol. 5, pp. 668–69; Van Haersolte to Heinsius, Leipzig, 16 December 1706, in ibid., vol. 5, pp. 727–29.

34 Robinson to Harley, 15 February 1707, SP 88/17, TNA; also quoted in Milne, "Diplomacy of Dr. John Robinson," p. 85.

35 Marlborough to Godolphin, 16 November 1706, in Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence,* vol. 2, p. 729.

36 Marlborough to Godolphin, 9/20 April 1707, in ibid., p. 747.

37 Godolphin to Marlborough, 1 April 1707, in ibid., p. 743.

38 Hatton, *Charles XII,* pp. 224–27; Henry L. Snyder, "The Formulation of Foreign and Domestic Policy in the Reign of Queen Anne: Memoranda by Lord Chancellor Cowper of Conversations with Lord Treasurer Godolphin," *Historical Journal* 11, no. 1 (1968), pp. 155–56; Stamp, "Meeting of . . . Marlborough and Charles XII," pp. 113–16, with transcriptions of Robinson to Harley, 17/28 and 19/30 April 1707, SP 88/20, TNA; Marlborough to Godolphin, 16/27 April and 29 April / 10 May 1707, in Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence,* vol. 2, pp. 752, 757–62; Ragnhild M. Hatton, "Presents and Pensions: A Methodological Search and the Case Study of Count Nils Bielke's Prosecution for Treason in Connection with Gratifications from France," in *Politics and Culture in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honor of H. G. Koenigsberger,* ed. Phyllis Mack and Margaret C. Jacob (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), p. 104; Marlborough to Harley, 27 April 1707, in Murray, *Letters and Dispatches,* vol. 3, pp. 347–48; Karl-Gustaf Hildebrand, "England och Sverige, 1707: Några bidrag," *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok* (1937), pp. 176–201; Hatton, *Captain James Jefferyes's Letters,* pp. 14–19.

39 Marlborough to Godolphin, 9/20 April, 16/27 April, and 28 April / 9 May 1707, in Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence,* vol. 2, pp. 747, 753, 761; Marlborough to Harley, 27 April 1707, pp. 347–48; Van Haersolte to Heinsius, Leipzig, 12 January 1707, in Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling,* vol. 6, p. 22.

40 Marlborough to the duchess, 29 April / 10 May 1707, in Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence,* vol. 2, p. 762.

41 Robinson to Marlborough, 19/30 July 1707, enclosing "Minutes of Conferences with Swedish Ministers," fols. 102–10, Addit. Ms. 61,146, BL.

42 Marlborough to Godolphin, 28 April / 9 May 1707, pp. 759, 764; Marlborough to Harley, 10 May 1707, in Murray, *Letters and Dispatches,* vol. 3, p. 359.

43 Harley to Lord Treasurer, 22 September 1707, Ms. Loan 29/45N, BL.

44 Fols. 149–86b, Addit. Ms. 61,260, BL. Letters from Jefferyes to Marlborough in 1711 are in fols. 45–51, Addit. Ms. 61,368, BL. For Jefferyes to the secretary, Hatton, *Captain James Jefferyes's Letters;* and Ernst Carlson, ed., *Kapten Jefferyes bref till Engelska Regeringen: Från Bender och Adrianopel 1711–1714, från Stralsund 1714–15* (Stockholm: Kungliga boktryckeriet, 1897).

45 Jefferyes to Secretary of State, 13 July 1709, in Hatton, *Captain James Jefferyes's Letters,* p. 76.

46 Ibid.

47 Marlborough to Godolphin, 1/12 August with quote from 15/26 August 1709, in Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence,* vol. 3, pp. 1331, 1334.

48 See also Akdes Nimet Kurat, ed., *The Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople, 1710–1714* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1953).

49 Boyle to Pultney, 22 November 1709, fols. 112v–13, SP 104/4, TNA.

50 Declaration of 3 March 1710, fols. 39–47, SP 84/234, TNA.

51 St. John to Palmes, and to d'Alais, 29 December 1710, SP 104/48, TNA; Charles Whitworth's "Memorial of Affairs of North," 11 January 1711, fols. 143–44, Addit. Ms. 37,358, BL.

52 St. John to Raby, 23 March 1711, fol. 18, SP 84/241, TNA.

53 Robinson to Bishop Burnet, undated, fols. 67–68, Ms. Add. D.23, Bodleian Library, Oxford, U.K., printed in Hattendorf, "John Robinson's Account," pp. 103–104.

54 Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* p. 175.

55 Jefferyes to Queensbury, 18 May 1711, in Carlson, *Kapten Jefferyes bref,* pp. 1–4 at p. 4.

56 St. John to Jefferyes, 21 August 1711, in Chance, *Sweden, 1689–1727,* p. 55.

57 St. John to Whitworth, 8 May 1711, fols. 193–94, Addit. Ms. 37,358, BL.

58 St. John to Orrery, 24 July 1711, fol. 63, Ms. Eng. Let e.4, Bodleian Library, Oxford, U.K.; Orrery to Bolingbroke, 28 July 1711, Ms. Eng. 218.1F, Houghton Library, Cambridge, MA.

59 St. John to Whitworth, 7 August 1711, fol. 365v, Addit. Ms. 37,358, BL; St. John to Pultney, 10 August 1711 and 8 April 1712, SP 105/5, TNA.

60 Charles XII to Anne, 15 May 1713, and Anne to Charles XII, 1 October 1713, FO 90/72, TNA.

61 Instructions to G. Mackenzie, 20 May 1714, FO 90/72, TNA.

62 Derek McKay, "The Struggle for Control of George I's Northern Policy, 1718–19," *Journal of Modern History* 45, no. 3 (September 1973), p. 367; Jeremy Black, "Hanover and British Foreign Policy, 1714–60," *English Historical Review* 120, no. 486 (April 2005), pp. 303–309; G. C. Gibbs, "English Attitudes towards Hanover and the Hanoverian Succession in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century," and Heinz Duchhardt, "England-Hannover und der europäische Friede 1714–1748," both in *England und Hannover,* ed. Adolf Matthias Birke and Kurt Kluxen (Munich, FRG: K. G. Saur, 1986), pp. 35–36, 128–30; Jeremy Black, "Hanoverian Nexus: Walpole and the Electorate," in *The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714–1837,* ed. Brendan Simms and Torsten Riotte (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), pp. 12–13; Black, *British Politics and Foreign Policy, 1727–44* (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 74, 77–78, 80–81, 119.

63 Georg Schnath, *Geschichte Hannovers im Zeitalter der neunten Kur und der englischen Sukzession 1674–1714: Im Anschluss an Adolf Köcher's unvollendete "Geschichte von Hannover und Braunschweig 1648–1714"* (Hannover, Ger.: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1999), vol. 3, pp. 653–73.

64 Ibid., pp. 696–705; Erich Hoffmann, *Spätmittelalter und Reformationszeit,* vol. 4, pt. 2 of *Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins,* ed. Olaf Klose (Neumünster, Ger.: Verlag Wachholtz, 1990), p. 249.

65 Black, *Politics and Foreign Policy,* pp. 67–68.

66 Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* p. 229; Ragnhild M. Hatton, *Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, 1714–1721* (London, 1950), pp. 75–78; Hatton, *Charles XII,* pp. 403–406; John J. Murray, "Sweden and the Jacobites in 1716," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 8, no. 3 (May 1945), pp. 259–76; J. Murray, *Sjömakternas expedition till Östersjön 1715* ([Stockholm]: [Esselte Aktiebolag], [1953]); J. Murray, *George I, the Baltic and the Whig Split of 1717: A Study in Diplomacy and Propaganda* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1969), pp. 161–89; David D. Aldridge, *Admiral Sir John Norris and the British Naval Expeditions to the Baltic Sea 1715–1727* (Lund, Swed.: Nordic Academic, 2009), pp. 63–110.

67 Hatton, *Charles XII,* pp. 417–25; Ragnhild Hatton, *George I* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2001), p. 189; Walther Mediger, *Mecklenburg, Rußland und England-Hannover 1706–1721* (Hildesheim, FRG: Lax, 1967), vol. 1, pp. 270–366; John J. Murray, "Scania and the End of the Northern Alliance (1716)," *Journal of Modern History* 16, no. 2 (1944); Murray, *George I, the Baltic and the Whig Split,* pp. 216–84; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* pp. 229–30; Aldridge, *Admiral Sir John Norris,* pp. 111–61.

68 Hatton, *Diplomatic Relations,* pp. 136–44; Basil Williams, *Stanhope: A Study in Eighteenth-Century War and Diplomacy* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1932; repr. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1979), pp. 200–29; Walpole to Townshend, 14 October 1716, in *An Honest Diplomat at the Hague: The Private Letters of Horatio Walpole, 1715–1716,* ed. John J. Murray (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1955; repr. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries, 1971), pp. 352–56.

69 Jackson to Secretary of State, 6 March 1716 and 10 October 1717, SP 95/21, TNA; John J. Murray, "An Eighteenth-Century Whitebook," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (August 1950); J. Murray, *British Public Opinion and the Rupture of Anglo-Swedish Relations in 1717* (offprint from *Indiana Magazine of History* 44, no. 2 [June 1948], pp. 125–42); J. Murray, "Robert Jackson's Mission to Sweden (1709–1717)," *Journal of Modern History* 21, no. 1 (March 1949), pp. 1–16; Hatton, *Diplomatic Relations,* pp. 147–59; Guillaume de Lamberty, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du XVIII siècle: Contenant les négociations . . . ,* vol. 10 (The Hague, Neth.: Henri Scheurleer, 1731), pp. 18–88.

70 Hatton, *George I,* pp. 218, 235.

71 Ibid., pp. 222, 236–37.

72 Norris to Stanhope, 7 July 1717, SP 42/75, TNA, and quoted in Aldridge, *Admiral Sir John Norris,* p. 176.

73 Aldridge, *Admiral Sir John Norris,* pp. 199, 210; Hatton, *Charles XII,* p. 463ff.

74 Robert Jackson to Secretary of State, 20 February 1719, fol. 25; Robert Jackson to Secretary of State, 2 March 1719, fols. 29–30; both SP 95/23, TNA.

75 Stanhope to Carteret, 22 July 1719, in Chance, *Sweden, 1689–1727,* p. 116.

76 Townshend to Finch, 9 August 1721, in ibid., pp. 159–60; Townshend to Finch, 10 November 1721, in ibid., p. 163; Hatton, *George I,* pp. 483–84.

XI *Admiral of the Fleet James, First Baron Gambier, GCB*

Admiral Lord Gambier (1756–1833) is a controversial figure in British naval history. Many historians have tended to assume the worst about him, enjoying a verbal gibe at "Dismal Jimmy" without careful consideration.[1] Lord Cochrane's bumptious and vindictive criticism over the operations at Basque Roads in 1809 was the most effective and most widely known attack on his reputation.[2] There is also a tendency to ridicule Gambier as one of the most prominent of the "Blue Lights"—naval officers who promoted evangelical Anglicanism both for its own sake and as something of great professional value within the naval service. These one-sided assumptions and attacks by some of Gambier's contemporaries have been taken up by a number of historians and need to be corrected so that Gambier may be seen in a more balanced manner for what he was. As the historian Richard Blake wrote in 2008, "Nowadays we have come to be more critical of Cochrane's veracity at various points in his self-advertising and self-justifying autobiography, and are now less ready to accept his own evaluation. Gambier deserves his day in court—once again."[3] Reassessing him, however, is not an easy task, as Gambier left no collection of personal papers or diaries that record his thinking. Nevertheless, there was much more to Gambier's naval career than an affair that Cochrane instigated, and there is a positive side to his religious beliefs and philanthropy that should not be discounted in taking the measure of the man.

Historians have often overlooked the fact that Gambier fought successfully in North American waters during the American Revolution and was briefly a prisoner of war. Later, he served as commander in chief at and governor of Newfoundland, 1802–1804, and was one of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1795–1801, 1804–1806, and 1807–1808. Gambier led the attack on Copenhagen in 1807, during which the entire Danish navy was seized. Gambier was the senior British negotiator for the Treaty of Ghent that ended the War of 1812. After his retirement, Gambier became the first president of the Church Missionary Society. In his honor, Gambier was made a geographical place-name: the Gambier Islands at the entrance to Spencer Gulf in South Australia; Mount Gambier, a dormant volcano and a city on its slopes in South Australia; the Gambier Islands in modern-day French Polynesia;

Gambier Island in Howe Sound, near Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada; Point Gambier, Gambier Island, and Gambier Bay at the southeast tip of Admiralty Island in Alaska; and the village of Gambier, Ohio, in the United States, the seat of Kenyon College, in the founding of which Admiral Gambier played a key role.[4]

FAMILY BACKGROUND

There was in England a branch of the Gambier family from Normandy in the early seventeenth century, during the reign of James I.[5] In that period, some of the Gambier family were exiled for their religion. However, Admiral Lord Gambier's line traces back instead to Nicolas Gambier (1660–1724), a Huguenot refugee, who had left Caen, Normandy, at some point following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 and by 1690 had settled with his wife, Ester, in London. They had two sons, who married into rising families that soon developed naval connections.[6]



Genealogical chart of the Gambier family's naval connections

Nicolas and Ester's younger son, James Gambier (1692–ca. 1747), was a barrister, a member of the London Common Council, and warden of Fleet Prison. He married Mary Mead (d. after 1758), whose brother was Capt. Samuel Mead of the Royal Navy. Among their four sons and three daughters, Margaret (d. 1792) married Sir Charles Middleton, later Admiral Lord Barham, First Lord of the Admiralty. Another daughter, Susan, married Vice Adm. Sir Samuel Cornish, Bart., who had commanded the East Indies Squadron when it captured Manila in 1762. James and Mary Mead Gambier's second son, James Gambier (1725–89), had entered the navy under the patronage of his uncle Captain Mead and his brother-in-law, Vice Adm. Sir Samuel Cornish, eventually rising to become a vice admiral. He gained a reputation as a "penurious old reptile," adept at manipulating service interests and patronage to propel his career but unfit for the responsibilities of high command

and naval management. At New York, he had been second in command to Lord Howe, commander in chief on the North American Station in 1778–79, and was briefly in command between Howe's departure and the arrival of Vice Adm. John Byron. In 1783–84 he became commander in chief of the Jamaica Station through the patronage of the Earl of Carlisle.[7] In 1787, Admiral Gambier inherited one hundred thousand pounds from a brother who had been in the East India Company's service for thirty years.[8] As one recent historian has harshly judged, the elder James Gambier was "a supercilious man of little ability, who had been repeatedly thrust into circumstances well beyond his understanding and capabilities and who was, each time, unable to rise to the occasion."[9]

He had several children by his second wife, including naval lieutenant Samuel John Gambier (ca. 1767–89) and Sir James Gambier (1772–1843), an army officer who later served as British consul general at Lisbon in 1803, Rio de Janeiro in 1810, and in the Netherlands. One of Sir James Gambier's sons was Rear Adm. Robert Fitzgerald Gambier (1803–85), a founder of the Royal Sailors Home in Portsmouth. Sir James is believed to have had an illegitimate child, James Fitzjames (1813–48?), who trained in the navy under his second cousin, Robert Gambier (1791–1872). He eventually rose to become a captain himself, in command of HMS *Erebus,* and was lost with Sir John Franklin's expedition in the Arctic.[10]

James and Mary Mead Gambier's elder son was John Gambier (1723–82). Much of John's career was spent as lieutenant governor of the Bahamas, where he also served twice as the acting governor, first in 1758–60 and again in 1776–78, immediately after the two-week-long American occupation of the islands in March 1776. John Gambier had married Deborah Stiles (ca. 1732–66), with whom he had four sons and four daughters. Their eldest son, Sir Samuel Gambier (1752–1813), was secretary of the Navy Board, 1795–96, and commissioner of the board from 1796 to 1813.[11] Their second son died as a midshipman in 1781; their third was Adm. James, Lord Gambier (1756–1833), the most prominent naval figure in the family (and the present subject). A grandson, Samuel's third son, was Sir Edward John Gambier (1794–1879), a Cambridge graduate who served as recorder of Prince of Wales Island (Penang), 1834–36, and chief justice of Madras, 1842–49. One of James and Mary Mead Gambier's daughters, Mary, married Adm. Samuel Pitchford (1739–1816), who in 1771 had taken the surname of Cornish, as the heir of his uncle, Adm. Sir Samuel Cornish, Bart., who was also an uncle of his wife. Another of James and Mary Mead Gambier's daughters, Margaret, married William Morton Pitt, a member of Parliament for Poole, later for Dorset, and a second cousin of Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger.

The future Adm. of the Fleet James Gambier was born on 13 October 1756 on New Providence Island in the Bahamas, while his father, John Gambier, was lieutenant

governor of the colony. James Gambier's mother, Deborah, died in 1766 when the boy was ten years old. However, in his infancy John and Deborah had sent James home to England, along with his elder brother and two sisters, to be raised by his father's sister Margaret Gambier.[12] In 1761, Margaret had married Capt. Charles Middleton, with whom she had become acquainted through her uncle and his first commanding officer, Capt. Samuel Mead.

A Scot born in Midlothian, Charles Middleton had been brought up as a Presbyterian. According to one speculative account, the two first met as early as 1747, when Middleton was a lieutenant and just twenty years old. Margaret slowly began to interest Middleton in her own, growing evangelical beliefs. Very likely, the two heard one of the most famous preachers of the mid-eighteenth century, Rev. George Whitefield. A renowned open-air preacher and a founder of Methodism, he had led the way for the "First Great Awakening" of the 1730s and 1740s in colonial North America.[13] Margaret's father, the elder John Gambier, and his wife, Mary Mead Gambier, were said to have thought Middleton an inappropriate match, but Margaret broke with her parents over both religion and her choice of husband, at which she moved to Teston to live with a school friend of similar religious views, the wealthy Elizabeth Bouverie. Following the marriage of Charles and Margaret Middleton in 1761, Charles returned to sea duty in command of the frigate *Adventure,* returning in 1763. From that point, at the end of the Seven Years' War, until the beginning of the War for America in 1775 Middleton declined naval appointments; he was on peacetime half-pay for a dozen years. Living instead the life of a country gentleman, he managed the Teston farm owned by Elizabeth Bouverie, with whom they lived in her manor house, later to be known as Barham Court. Using accumulated prize money won during the war, Middleton invested in East India Company stock to supplement his half-pay and support his new lifestyle ashore.

That period was an important one for the Middletons—and by extension for James Gambier—as in it the Middletons strengthened their evangelical leanings and developed a social life among like-minded friends and acquaintances. Through Elizabeth Bouverie the Middletons made the close acquaintance of the evangelical philanthropist and writer Hannah More, one of the leading figures in the Bluestocking Society's group of intellectual women.[14] Margaret herself, who had talent as an artist, enjoyed entertaining the literary and cultural elite at the Middletons' townhouse in Mayfair. In addition to mingling with the cultural leaders of the day—Samuel Johnson, James Boswell, David Garrick, and Joshua Reynolds—they found kindred spirits in the philanthropist and politician William Wilberforce, interested in the abolition of the slave trade, whose colleagues included Granville Sharp and Thomas Clarkson, who often met at Barham Court. The couple also renewed a family connection to Charles's cousin the politician Henry Dundas, Lord

Melville, and Margaret's niece and James's sister Margaret, whom she had raised and had married into the Pitt family.

Tying all this together was a religious sentiment that led the Middletons to the Clapham Sect, an influential and wealthy group of evangelicals led by Rev. John Venn, rector of Clapham Parish Church and founder of the Church Missionary Society.[15] As the historian Richard Blake has explained, "Charles and Marg[a]ret shared a worldview where Christianity was central and its implications clear—evangelism, abolition of slavery, and the moral reformation of society—and where high office gave singular opportunities for these goals to be attempted."[16] It is not certain exactly how long young James Gambier lived with the Middletons as a child or precisely when he left their home for naval service, but the Middletons' religious life, values, principles of self-discipline, and connections certainly became vital elements of his life as an adult and were central in his naval career.

ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

Capt. James Gambier carried his nephew James on the muster books of the sixty-four-gun guard ship *Yarmouth* for three of the four years that he commanded it at Chatham, from 1766 to 1770. The boy is listed from 1767, when he was eleven, as successively a captain's servant, midshipman, and able seaman for a total of two years, eleven months, four weeks, and thirteen days.[17] James would have been about fourteen when his uncle left *Yarmouth* and took command of the North American Station for ten months in 1770–71; the boy accompanied him and was carried as a midshipman on board the fifty-gun *Salisbury,* Capt. Andrew Barkley, for one year, nine months, and three weeks. James Gambier flew his broad pennant from *Salisbury* for the first ten months of his command, moving the station's base from Halifax to Boston as a response to the increasing hostility of the New England colonists. Prematurely recalled in 1770, when Lord Grafton was succeeded by Lord North as prime minister, Captain Gambier was briefly to be, in 1773, commissioner of victualling accounts at the Navy Board (in charge of naval administration), then resident commissioner at Portsmouth Dockyard.[18]

The now sixteen-year-old James Gambier remained at sea, as able seaman and then midshipman in Capt. Charles Thompson's fifty-gun *Chatham,* the flagship of Rear Adm. William Parry, commanding the Leeward Islands Station. After some three months Gambier was appointed to the ten-gun sloop *Spy,* Master and Commander Thomas Dumaresq, in which he served for five months as master's mate and three and a half more as midshipman, in the West Indies. He returned to *Chatham* for two months as an able seaman, then was a midshipman for a year before sitting for his lieutenant's examination at the Navy Office, St. Mary-le-Strand, Westminster, on 28 September 1774. For that examination he produced journals that he had kept in *Chatham* and *Spy* as well as certificates from all his commanding officers, including his uncle.[19] Although one certificate declared that he was

"more than 20 years of age," he was actually two weeks short of his eighteenth birthday. He was passed but not promoted to lieutenant for two and a half years, on 12 February 1777, five months after his twentieth birthday.[20]

GAMBIER'S FIRST PHASE OF NAVAL SERVICE

Following his examination in 1774, Gambier was first assigned, as a passed midshipman, to the seventy-four-gun guard ship *Royal Oak,* Capt. Joseph Dean, at Spithead. Then he rejoined Thomas Dumaresq, now a post captain in command of the fifty-gun *Portland,* returning to the West Indies as the flagship of Rear Adm. James Young on the Leeward Islands Station. While in the West Indies Gambier was appointed an acting lieutenant in the sixteen-gun *Shark,* Cdr. John Chapman, and later in the twenty-four-gun *Hind*. Gambier was in *Hind* when his promotion to lieutenant took effect. He returned to England that August and served briefly in the seventy-four-gun *Sultan,* Capt. John Wheelock, before he was assigned to Capt. George Keppel's sixty-four-gun *Ardent,* his uncle's flagship as the second in command on the North American Station. On 9 March 1778, just thirteen months after he became a lieutenant, the twenty-one-year-old James Gambier was promoted to master and commander through his uncle's patronage and took command of the eight-gun bomb ketch *Thunder,* assigned to harbor defense at New York. Less than a week after his promotion, the French seventy-four-gun ship *Hector* and the sixty-four-gun *Vaillant* of the comte d'Estaing's fleet captured *Thunder* off Sandy Hook and took Gambier as a prisoner of war.[21]

Exchanged, Commander Gambier returned to New York, where his uncle Rear Adm. James Gambier promoted him on 9 October 1778, four days short of his twenty-second birthday, to post captain in command of the thirty-two-gun frigate *Raleigh*. He had served exactly seven months as a commander before his promotion to captain. Gambier's new command had been built by the Americans two years earlier in Kittery, Maine, as the Continental Ship *Raleigh*. On 27–28 September 1778 HMS *Experiment* and *Unicorn* had cornered *Raleigh* in Penobscot Bay. *Raleigh*'s captain, the famous John Barry, had run his ship ashore and tried unsuccessfully to scuttle and burn it. Most of the Americans had escaped capture, but their ship had not; *Raleigh* had been refloated and brought into the Royal Navy.[22] With Gambier in command, *Raleigh* remained in American waters for the winter and then sailed for England in the spring of 1779.

At the outbreak of the war in 1775, Charles Middleton had returned to naval duty and taken command of a guard ship at the Nore. In August 1778 Middleton was appointed to succeed Capt. Maurice Suckling, Horatio Nelson's uncle, as Comptroller of the Navy, the principal officer at the Navy Board. In the dozen years he held this post, from 1778 until 1790, Middleton was in a position to support his nephew's career, just as the other uncle, Rear Adm. James Gambier, was losing his once-broader influence.[23]

On 1 May 1779, French troopships escorted by five warships made an attempt to land a force on the island of Jersey. Rear Adm. Marriot Arbuthnot had just left St. Helens, on the Isle of Wight, with a convoy bound for North America; receiving the news at sea, Arbuthnot temporarily detached on his own initiative four frigates and the fifty-gun *Experiment,* under Capt. Sir James Wallace, to protect Jersey.[24] At Portsmouth, Adm. Sir Thomas Pye, at the same news, simultaneously ordered Capt. John Lewis Gidoin to take a squadron of five frigates to Jersey as well. Capt. James Gambier's *Raleigh* was among the latter group, having just arrived at Portsmouth on the 2nd.[25] The two forces joined, searched for several days, and on 11 May sighted French warships about twenty miles from Jersey. The two senior captains conferred and decided to divide their forces: Wallace took his squadron around the southwestern side of Guernsey, Gidoin taking his the other way around to where the French had reportedly anchored, off Coutances on the Normandy coast. Seeing Gidoin with *Raleigh* and the other frigates approaching, the French immediately sailed for St. Malo, with the British ships in chase. Facing a contrary tide and light winds, Gidoin's squadron had to anchor; when Wallace's group joined it was able to chase the French ships into St. Malo and then attack shore batteries on nearby Cancale Bay on 13 May.[26]

Returned to Portsmouth, *Raleigh* learned that the Navy Board had ordered the dockyard commissioner there, Sir Samuel Hood, to refit it for Channel service and sheath its hull with copper over a preparation of paper.[27] This work was done at Plymouth between 24 June and 12 September 1779. The ship's lines were taken in dry dock at Plymouth in July, after which it was coppered and converted from its American arrangement to a standard Royal Navy thirty-two-gun frigate.[28] On completion of *Raleigh*'s refit, Gambier took the ship to the North American Station.

In the spring of 1780, after British strategy had shifted from New England to the southern colonies, Admiral Arbuthnot commanded the naval forces in the siege of Charleston, South Carolina, supporting the British army under Generals Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis. By early February *Raleigh* was operating off the coast of the Carolinas.[29] The siege lasted from 29 March until 12 May 1780 and resulted in the capture of the city, a major British victory. Arbuthnot's squadron had left New York, escorted Clinton's troops to Savannah, Georgia, and then continued on to the North Edisto on the South Carolina coast, where Cornwallis's troops were disembarked. The squadron prepared to cross the bar at the entrance to Charleston Harbor but had to wait sixteen days in the open sea before conditions were right. Finally, on 20 March, the squadron crossed the bar, opposed by American and French warships and galleys, of which eight American ships and one French were captured. As the British land forces crossed the Ashley River and set up batteries against the city, Arbuthnot led eight ships, including *Raleigh,* through heavy gunfire to anchor under James Island, intending to advance into the Cooper River.

Finding its entrance blocked by sunken ships and gun emplacements on Sullivan's Island and Mount Pleasant, Arbuthnot ordered five hundred seamen and marines to capture the American positions on Mount Pleasant. On the morning of 29 April, Capts. Charles Hudson, John Orde, and James Gambier landed with this force and, learning that the Americans were abandoning their redoubt at Lempriere's Point, overlooking the Cooper River, seized it before the enemy could remove the guns, ammunition, and supplies.[30] In the next stage of the operation, Arbuthnot decided to attack the weak western and northwestern side of Fort Moultrie. During the night of 4 May, Hudson and Gambier, with Cdr. John Knowles of the Transport Service, took two hundred sailors and marines in boats and passed unobserved under the guns of Fort Moultrie to capture a redoubt on the east end of Sullivan's Island. As Captain Orde prepared to move two hundred men from Mount Pleasant and Arbuthnot's squadron waited only for the tide to come closer to begin the bombardment, Captain Hudson called on the fort to surrender, which it did on 6 May. The city surrendered four days later. In his dispatch to the Admiralty, Arbuthnot gave his highest praise to Sir Andrew Hamond, but the admiral further wrote, "Captains Hudson, Orde, Gambier, Elphinston[e], and Evans have distinguished themselves particularly on shore; and the officers and seamen with them on this occasion, have observed the most perfect discipline."[31]

On 23 October 1780, *Raleigh,* in company with sixty-four-gun *Intrepid,* captured the ten-gun Pennsylvania privateer *Greyhound,* Capt. John Kemp, three days out of Philadelphia on its first cruise.[32] In December 1781, *Raleigh* captured the twenty-gun American privateer *General Mifflin* with two prizes off Charleston. The prizes had been bound for Cork, Ireland. At the same time, *Raleigh* prevented *General Mifflin* from taking as a prize the ship *Roman Emperor* and convoyed the latter safely into Charleston.[33]

Gambier took *Raleigh* back to Portsmouth in May 1782, where the crew was paid off and the ship stripped. (The hull was to be placed on sale on 13 February 1783 and sold for £550 on 16 May.)[34] With the end of the war in sight, Gambier apparently made no effort to find a new assignment, although with his uncle Charles Middleton at the Navy Board, it would seem to have been quite possible for him to do so. Instead, he left active service in 1782 and went on half-pay, a captain only twenty-six years of age. He had shown himself to be a capable officer. In command of a frigate, he had been successful in combat both afloat and ashore. He had captured prizes and had earned a mention in dispatch for meritorious performance in combat.

Peacetime Interlude

Very little is known about Gambier's activities during the decade that elapsed before he took command of the seventy-four-gun *Defence* in April 1793. It is known that in July 1788 he married Louisa Matthew, the second daughter of Daniel Matthew

of Felix Hall, Kelvedon, Essex, who in 1770 had been High Sheriff of Essex.[35] Two years earlier, Daniel Matthew's eldest daughter, Jane, had married Sir Samuel Gambier, James's elder brother, who was secretary to, then a commissioner of, the Navy Board between 1795 and 1813.

When Margaret, Sir Charles Middleton's wife and James Gambier's aunt and surrogate mother, died in October 1792 Hannah More (a friend of the Middletons' in the Bluestocking Society) wrote immediately to Middleton with condolences. After a series of intervening letters she wrote Middleton in January 1793, "I have great respect for Captain Gambier. He must be a comfort to you in your affliction."[36] In the context of a letter about religious affairs, this consoling remark suggests that during this peacetime period Gambier may have moved in the same circles as she.

Return to Sea Duty

Soon after France declared war against Britain and the Netherlands in 1793, the Admiralty called the now thirty-seven-year-old Gambier to command the seventy-four-gun *Defence* in the Channel Fleet under Admiral Lord Howe. William Henry Dillon, who served as a midshipman under Gambier in 1793–94, was to include in his 1820 memoirs a detailed reminiscence of those years. On first reporting to Gambier in September 1793, Dillon remembered him as "rather tall, good looking, light limbed, and of a very genteel appearance."[37] William Wilberforce had recommended Dillon to Gambier, as had Dillon's previous commanding officer. In Dillon's first interview with Gambier he was told, revealingly, "Mind the prospects before you. I was a captain in nine years from my entering the Navy. Keep up your spirits, and, if you attend to your duty, you will find a friend in me."[38] This statement confirms that since Gambier became a post captain in October 1778, he must actually have first gone to sea in 1769, rather than in 1766 as the muster books had recorded. At the same time, the remark reveals Gambier's attitude that patronage needed to be matched by performance.

Dillon's memoir clearly reveals him to have been a conceited and very demanding young man, one prone to find his own (rigid) views correct and others' wrong. Inclined to hard discipline, he had little sympathy with Gambier's attempts to inculcate religion or introduce lighter and more innovative leadership. At one point he even ridiculed Gambier's views. At dawn on 18 November 1793, in rough seas and high winds, Howe's force sighted a French squadron; Howe ordered it to engage the enemy. *Defence,* in the van, was ready for action when suddenly its foretopmast carried away, taking the main topmast with it. Dillon related, "Here was a transition from a hope of glory to the keenest feelings of disappointment. Capt. Gambier, who had reckoned upon distinguishing himself that day, was so completely cast down that he could not refrain from saying 'D——n it all. We have lost the glory of the day!' Everyone who heard him could not help remarking that he had broken his own orders by swearing."[39]

On another occasion, when Gambier upbraided Dillon for not attending prayers: "You are a refractory young gentleman. I see how it is. You rely on your influential connections."[40] Annoyed and wishing to justify himself, Dillon blurted out, "Since you will not, Sir, do me the justice to give credit to the sincerity of intentions, I hope I may be allowed to say that I did not come to sea to learn my prayers."[41] Gambier never again required his presence at prayers, but Dillon was surprised and offended when Gambier unhesitatingly declined Dillon's offer to accompany him to his next command.[42] These anecdotes provide rare insight into Gambier's temperament and personality, but they do not warrant the historian Michael Lewis's inference from them of "that unique officer James Gambier—'Preaching Jemmy'—whose running of a capital ship in wartime is an almost unbelievable tragi-comedy."[43] Dillon himself was perceptive (and self-serving) enough to see that Gambier, "by his gallant conduct in [command of *Defence* during the battle of] the 1st of June[,] established a reputation that led one to expect that he would rise to a prominent station in the profession. It was therefore desirable to be on good terms with him."[44]

In the end, Dillon changed his attitude. Gambier forgave the midshipman his youthful indiscretions and not only allowed Dillon to follow him to his next command but provided him patronage for many years to come.

THE BATTLE OF THE GLORIOUS FIRST OF JUNE

As Dillon's memoir acknowledges, Gambier earned a reputation as an effective fighting officer, as well as the approval of Lord Howe, in a celebrated battle fought on 1 June 1794. It was the first of the major engagements of the war; its name actually comprises three major battles with a French fleet under Rear Admiral Villaret de Joyeuse over a five-day period beginning on 28 May and culminating on 1 June.[45] For the final meeting with the French fleet Lord Howe had an innovative tactical plan. The opposing fleets would at the outset, he presumed, sail in line ahead on nearly parallel courses, the British to windward, gradually closing the distance between them. Ordinarily each ship in the battle would continue to follow the ship ahead until the two lines were in contact; Howe, instead, meant for each ship, on his signal, to turn individually toward the French line and run downwind to and through it, fire (potentially with devastating effect) into the respective bow and stern of the French ships on either hand while passing between, then turn to engage one of them on the leeward side, thereby preventing its escape.

In the event, Howe in his flagship *Queen Charlotte* duly executed the plan and turned toward the French fleet—but only a few of his ships followed, either not seeing the signal or ignoring it. James Gambier's *Defence,* the seventh ship in the British van, was the first and, for a time, only ship to follow Howe's order. Passing through the French line between its sixth and seventh ships, he raked both of them and maneuvered into the planned position on the leeward side of one. *Marlborough* soon followed *Defence*'s example, but the failure of so many other commanding

officers to carry out Howe's plan left Gambier and his ship in a perilous situation. *Defence* was dismasted but continued to fire; by the end of the action, eighteen of the ship's company had been killed and thirty-nine wounded. The ship had to be towed back to England.[46] Midshipman Dillon was later told that Lord Howe had remarked, "If every ship of the Fleet had followed Captain Gambier's example, the result of this action would have been very different."[47] The battle was nevertheless a victory, the first British fleet victory in this war against France. The king came to Portsmouth to congratulate Howe personally and distribute honors and distinctions (producing considerable dissention and complaint among the officers not receiving them). Gambier received the Naval Gold Medal and was made a Colonel of Marines for his services; Dillon believed that Gambier had been offered a knighthood but had declined it.[48]

The action was certainly a highlight of Gambier's career, and his actions in it became widely known and admired. In 1803, James Stow engraved the first publicly circulated image of Gambier, in a print commemorating the battle.[49] As his own memento, Gambier commissioned the artist Nicholas Pocock to paint a different scene showing *Defence* dismasted and surrounded by enemy ships.[50] Gambier bequeathed the latter work, completed in 1811, in his will to the Greenwich Hospital Collection, where it has been much admired.[51]

In 1809, following Cochrane's charges against Gambier, a letter in his defense appeared in the *Naval Chronicle:*

> [As one] having been an eye witness to his persevering intrepidity in the hour of danger, and his modest unassuming deportment on many triumphant occasions, I feel called upon to acknowledge his meritorious example and national worth. . . . [H]is regulation, discipline, and strict conformity in every particular to the articles of war, were notorious in the Channel fleet; for with great attention and judgment his exertions were adapted to promote the comfort and happiness of every officer and seaman in the ship: he may with truth be styled the seaman's friend. I could relate many instances of his unwearied attention in forwarding the deserving and friendless sailor, not only in promotion, but to the hurt and wounded, pecuniary assistance, when he conceived the smart money [a lump-sum pension payment] or Greenwich pension inadequate. . . . This steady adherence to the instructions and laudable endeavour to improve the morals of the seamen, were the only complaints I ever heard alleged against him.[52]

Meanwhile, halfway around the world, Capt. George Vancouver was nearing the end of his long voyage. His sloop of war *Discovery* had in 1790 set sail to explore the North Pacific, accompanied by the armed tender *Chatham,* commanded by Lt. Joseph Whidbey. In Alaskan waters on 4 August 1794 Whidbey sighted and recorded the coordinates of a prominent cape; Vancouver named it Point Gambier, in honor of Capt. James Gambier.[53] Vancouver typically named geographical features he discovered after friends and naval colleagues. The two captains were contemporaries, Gambier just eight months the elder.[54]

AN ADMIRALTY COMMISSIONER

On 30 August 1794 Gambier received orders to leave *Defence* and take command of the ninety-eight-gun *Prince of Wales,* then fitting out at Chatham, taking some of his present officers and midshipmen with him. Gambier stayed only six months in this command; through Howe's influence, the thirty-eight-year-old captain became on 7 March 1795 one of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. Exactly one year after the battle, on 1 June, Gambier was promoted two steps at once, to Rear-Admiral of the Blue and the more senior Rear-Admiral of the White. He remained at the Admiralty Board until 19 February 1801, serving as Senior Naval Lord from 10 September 1798 to 1801. During this period he was promoted three more steps, to Rear-Admiral of the Red and Vice-Admiral of the Blue on 14 February 1799 and on 1 January 1801 to Vice-Admiral of the White.[55]

As an Admiralty commissioner, Gambier was fully immersed in managing the fleet, but in addition he undertook two major special tasks: designing an experimental frigate and revising the signal book. As an experiment, Gambier designed a fifth-rate (i.e., single-gundeck), thirty-two-gun frigate to be built of fir rather than oak.[56] The ship, *Triton,* was constructed at Deptford and later became famous as one of four frigates that captured two Spanish galleons laden with silver in the Bay of Biscay in 1799.[57] To mark the success of his project, Gambier commissioned Nicholas Pocock to paint a triple portrait of *Triton,* showing it from three aspects in a fresh breeze. The main, detailed view shows it hove to with backed foresails, while the other two show the ship in the distance.[58] In addition, Gambier heavily influenced Sir William Rule's design of the seventy-four-gun *Plantagenet*.[59]

Gambier's second undertaking, the revision of the fleet signal book, was a critical task that filled a long-standing need. Over the years numerous changes had been suggested and had been instituted by various fleet commanders, but they had not been consolidated into a single authoritative document. The battle of the First of June had demonstrated some of the signaling difficulties that the fleet faced. Admiral Lord Howe had been an innovator in this area and his ideas were widely accepted; with his retirement, Gambier, as one who fully understood Howe's thinking on signaling, was as Senior Naval Lord in a position to undertake the revision.[60] The new publication was approved and issued on 13 May 1799, incorporating many ideas that had been current in the fleet. Its organization was rationalized by division into two volumes, one for day and one for night, each containing, together for the first time, both signals and instructions for their use. In addition, the books provided an authoritative list of the seven hundred–some warships in the Royal Navy, each with a standard identifying number, with blank lines for the addition of new ships. It was to be Gambier's signal book that the fleet used at the battle of Trafalgar.[61]

Missionary Work

Among Gambier's private concerns during this period was the second evangelical "awakening" that occurred in Britain, between 1786 and 1799, which had a clear effect on him and his wife. As already noted, Gambier had from an early date been involved with the Clapham Sect. This group, inspired by the reports of maritime explorations undertaken during the reign of George III, most notably those of James Cook, Philip Carteret, and Samuel Wallis to the Pacific, had begun to discuss the idea of converting the heathen in distant lands. A number of organizations were established to promote such missionary work. The first of these was the Baptist Missionary Society, established in October 1791, followed shortly thereafter by the nondenominational Missionary Society in 1795. After similar societies with the same name were established in Glasgow and Edinburgh in 1796, the English group became known as the London Missionary Society. The London society initially attracted people from many denominations, including Anglicans like Gambier, although it was later more clearly identified with Congregationalists.[62]

The London Missionary Society's first major project was to send a ship with twenty-four missionaries to the South Pacific. This project quickly came to fruition; the ship *Duff* was fitted out at Blackwall in the Thames and, with Capt. James Wilson in command, sailed from Spithead in October 1796 with a large convoy. The ship, after leaving the convoy, reached Tahiti independently in early 1797 and sailed on to the Marquesas and the Tuamotus. In May 1797, *Duff* reached a previously undiscovered atoll, Temoe, which Wilson named Crescent Island for its shape. In the distance, the missionaries could see what they named the Duff Mountains. As they drew closer, they realized that they had found a previously unrecorded archipelago. Wilson recorded in his published report of the voyage, "The group was named Gambier's islands, in compliment to the worthy admiral of that name, who, in his department, countenanced our equipment."[63]

Meanwhile back in London, the member of the Clapham Sect and the similar Eclectic Society had been discussing missionary matters for over a decade. In 1796, a group headed by Rev. John Venn, Gambier's distant relation by marriage and rector of Clapham, began to consider seriously establishing an overseas missionary society within the Church of England. It was not until 12 April 1799 that the society was formed; Venn's son Henry was secretary and Vice Admiral Gambier was one of seven vice presidents, another being William Wilberforce, who had declined the presidency of the society. Until 1812, in the absence of a president, the society's vice presidents took complementary leadership roles. Gambier proved highly valuable in the society's liaison with the government concerning mission work overseas.

On leaving the Admiralty in February 1801, Gambier became third in command of the Channel Fleet, under Adm. William Cornwallis, and flew his flag in the ninety-eight-gun *Neptune*. Soon after, in March 1802, the Peace of Amiens was

signed and an uneasy fourteen-month period of quiet began. The Admiralty ordered Gambier to take up the position of commander in chief and governor of Newfoundland.

Iver Grove

Before leaving England on this assignment, Gambier accumulated the financial resources to purchase a country home, Iver Grove, some eighteen miles from London between Uxbridge and Windsor in Buckinghamshire at Shredding Green, near the village of Iver. The property had forty-five acres of land and a Palladian-style brick house built in 1722–24 by the Office of Works (responsible for royal residences) for Lady Mohun, daughter of the queen's physician and second wife of Charles, Baron Mohun, who had been killed in a duel in 1712.

Its architecture was characteristic of that office's style at the end of Sir Christopher Wren's tenure, when he had been assisted by architects Nicholas Hawksmoor, John Vanbrugh, and John James. The architectural historian Nikolaus Pevsner later commented that Iver Grove had an "air of dignity and grandeur unusual in such a small house." The residence was situated on twenty-four acres, surrounded by "highly dressed pleasure grounds with handsome and lofty timber." Another twenty-one acres comprised "rich, park-like meadows." Such a home would seem to have been well suited to Gambier's personality and position and practical for a couple with no children. The property remained Gambier's home until his death in 1833 and then his wife's until her death in 1844. When the next year the property was sold, it was described as "a substantial mansion on a moderate scale, with all the suitable offices, capital stabling, superior walled garden, with hot house." A close examination of the details reveals, among many other things, that the house had a brew house and an ale and wine cellar and that it brought ownership of a pew in the chancel of Iver church.[64] Under Gambier's guidance, the gardener at Iver Grove, William Thomson, made a contribution to horticulture by developing one of the earliest giant pansy gardens.[65]

Newfoundland

In the eyes of official London, Newfoundland was not a colonial settlement but rather an important cod fishery that needed the Royal Navy's protection. In the century between 1729 and 1825, naval officers served in the dual position of commander in chief of the warships on that station and governor of the colony. During this period, the officers were usually captains, but from the American war through the Napoleonic Wars vice admirals usually held the post. In wartime, their commander-in-chief role predominated; their primary concern was the protection of the fishery and their support bases. In peacetime, however, they had time to consider, as governor, more fully and carefully the civil issues of the inhabitants.

The first portion of Gambier's tenure in Newfoundland fell during the Peace of Amiens, which allowed him to assist schools, charitable institutions, and the clergy. Gambier found that in the past the needs of the residents had been overlooked by the government and that public works had been provided insufficient funds. He saw too that the character of the fishery had changed. The inshore fish stock had once been migratory; fishermen, many traveling from elsewhere in season, had followed shoals of cod, taking their catch to the nearest beach for drying. Accordingly, large stretches of the coast had been reserved for this temporary use. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the resident fishing population had sharply increased, and Gambier moved to change that policy and allow local residents to lease those lands. In December 1803, Gambier wrote to Lord Hobart, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies: "The present system of policy is insufficient for effecting the happiness and good order of the community which is the chief end of all government. This I attribute to the want of *a power in the Island for framing laws for its internal regulation,* and for raising sums necessary to promote any measure of public utility."[66] Gambier's perceptive view of civil affairs was far ahead of its time: Newfoundland was not organized as a colony until 1825 and did not become self-governing until 1855.

The peace collapsed in June 1803, toward the end of his term, and Gambier turned his attention to defense. At that point, the local military commander was authorized to raise a force of a thousand men, but with a garrison only numbering sixty-three, recruiting it proved a formidable task, let alone training and equipping it.

Return to England

On 23 April 1804 Gambier was promoted to Vice-Admiral of the Red, and with William Pitt's return to power as prime minister on 10 May 1804, he was recalled from Newfoundland to resume his seat as Senior Naval Lord among the Commissioners of the Admiralty. At the formation of the newly appointed Board of Admiralty commissioners, on 15 May, Henry Dundas, Lord Melville, who had been Secretary of State for War in Pitt's earlier government, became the First Lord of the Admiralty. He would remain in that post until May 1805, when Gambier's uncle Sir Charles Middleton succeeded him, as the first Baron Barham of Barham Court and Teston. Gambier was promoted to Admiral of the Blue on 9 November 1805. He would stay with Barham at the Admiralty until 10 February 1806, upon the formation (following Pitt's death on 23 January) of a wartime national-unity government known as the "Ministry of All the Talents" under William, Lord Grenville, who had been a political opponent of Pitt.

Gambier, Barham, and the other Admiralty commissioners managed successfully the complex series of strategic and operational situations that led up to and beyond the Trafalgar campaign.[67] Immediately on his arrival in 1804, during Lord Melville's tenure, Gambier had begun a project to revise the *Regulations and*

Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea. Revision was long overdue—the Admiralty had last issued the *Regulations and Instructions* in 1731.[68] In addition to updating (such as of references to types of ships no longer in service), conflicting and inconsistent practices that had come into use during the intervening seventy-five years needed regularization. In November 1804 the Admiralty sent a draft to the Navy Board and suggested further amendments in March 1805. Shortly after Lord Barham took office that May, he wrote the prime minister, "Our Naval Instructions will, I hope, be issued soon. It is an improvement of the first importance."[69]

In their earlier command experiences, Barham and Gambier had both emphasized the importance and necessity of following regulations, and now they agreed on the need for revision. The other Lords Commissioners too fully approved; the king in council formally established and issued them on 25 January 1806.[70] The new publication was to remain in effect until revised in 1869 and superseded in 1879;[71] it consolidated and regularized practices across the entire naval service and, in 440 pages, addressed much greater detail than had the superseded 186-page edition of 1731. One of its most notable aspects was an emphasis on cleanliness and health, as well as on the public expression of religion in the navy, in the framework of the Church of England—in line with both Gambier's and Barham's views. Through these regulations, Barham and Gambier gave new vitality in the navy to the liturgy of the Book of Common Prayer and to officer-led and clergy-taught instruction in Christian piety to the men of the lower decks.[72]

In another notable change, the new *Regulations and Instructions* quietly omitted the centuries-old English claim for foreign vessels to salute and strike their topsails to acknowledge British "sovereignty of the narrow seas."[73] When asked about it a decade later, Gambier replied that it was his initiative and that "it was omitted *solely* on the ground of the absurdity of the practice and the certainty, if insisted upon, of involving the nation in disputes with Foreign Powers."[74]

With the fall of the Ministry of All the Talents and the formation by William Cavendish-Bentinck, third Duke of Portland, of a new government on 24 March 1807, Henry Phipps, third Baron (from 1812, Earl) Mulgrave, was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. Gambier was recalled to his seat as Senior Naval Lord on the Admiralty Board. He served in that capacity for just over a year from 6 April 1807 to 9 May 1808, during which time he reputedly "had direction of all the patronage in the Navy."[75]

COPENHAGEN EXPEDITION

Gambier continued to hold his appointment at the Admiralty when the board entrusted him with command of a fleet being readied for Baltic operations. The contingency of war with Denmark had been foreseen for more than a year. The previous ministry had seen the strategic danger and had begun to refit sixty-four- and seventy-four-gun ships that could operate in the shallow waters of the Sound

and Belts (the waterways connecting the Baltic with the North Sea). By the time it left office in 1807, a dozen suitable ships had been collected at Great Yarmouth, on England's North Sea coast. The new ministry continued the preparations; by April, 16,500 soldiers destined for Germany were available, as well as eight thousand men of the King's German Legion on the Baltic island of Rügen, where they were involved in the defense of nearby Stralsund from the French.[76] The idea of occupying the Danish island of Zealand had been discussed in London, but that summer two intelligence reports provided the impetus needed to mount an operation: first, in June 1807, that the Danish fleet was readying itself for action, and second, in early July from Tilsit (then in Prussia, now in Russia), where the tsar and Napoleon were negotiating a treaty, that Russia and France were contemplating an anti-British league. By mid-July the Duke of Portland with his ministers concluded that the strategic situation seemed to be a replay of that in 1801, when the Royal Navy had forcibly reopened passage to the Baltic, and had decided to send both a fleet and an army to the scene. It was not until 17 July 1807, however, that the ministry began to conclude that this time Britain must demand—or, if need be, seize—possession of the Danish fleet for the remainder of the war, to prevent Napoleon from acquiring control of it and shutting down all British trade and commerce, including, critically, shipbuilding materials, in the Baltic.[77] With seventeen ships of the line and numerous smaller warships, Gambier sailed on 26 July to Denmark, with Vice Adm. Henry Stanhope and Cdres. Sir Samuel Hood and Richard Keats commanding divisions, and Sir Home Popham as fleet captain (in modern terms roughly equivalent to a chief of staff). The military force of twenty-five thousand men was commanded by General Lord Cathcart, with Maj. Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley in command of the reserve.

Gambier's mission was an extremely difficult and delicate one. A large joint amphibious force of this nature, assembled from several dispersed bases to be a latent force during diplomatic talks before taking any direct offensive action, needed firm command and superior leadership. Also critical was effective coordination between the government at home and diplomats abroad as well as among the military and naval commanders.[78] Gambier carried this off superbly, despite objections from Hood, Keats, and Capt. Robert Stopford, commanding the seventy-four-gun HMS *Spencer,* who resented Gambier's delegation of authority to Popham, who was experienced in Danish waters and joint expeditions but was junior to them.[79]

Gambier's first task was to surround Zealand, the largest of the Danish islands and on which Copenhagen is located, in a preemptive operation to prevent the Danish army from concentrating there to defend the capital. Denmark was then a neutral power; its authorities, entirely unprepared for an invasion, found themselves surrounded by warships and with only thirteen thousand troops to face the twenty-five thousand British. Gambier and Cathcart jointly repeated, as they had

several weeks earlier, the demands already made through diplomatic channels, this time adding, "It is yet not too late for the voice of reason and moderation to be heard."[80]

They summoned the Danish officer commanding the defenses of Copenhagen to surrender the Danish fleet, which "shall be held on deposit for His Danish Majesty and shall be restored with all its equipment" at a general peace.[81] Otherwise, "the captured property, public and private, must then belong to the captors, and the city, when taken, must share the fate of conquered places."[82] The Danes refused and declared war on Britain. Without hesitation, Gambier and Cathcart attacked the city. The bombardment of Copenhagen involved the second use in wartime of Sir William Congreve's rockets, which caused fires in thirty-eight places in the city and forced the evacuation of twenty thousand people. Between 8 and 9 percent of central Copenhagen was burned to the ground, and other parts of the city were heavily damaged.[83]

Eventually, Denmark surrendered its fleet; Gambier's ships towed it back to Britain on 21 October, along with a large quantity of naval stores. The secretary of war, Lord Castlereagh, congratulated Gambier for "carrying His Majesty's Orders and Execution for Preventing the Danish fleet and Naval Resources being placed in the hands of our enemies."[84] On 9 November 1807, in recognition of Gambier's highly effective performance, the king raised him to the peerage as Baron Gambier of Iver in Buckinghamshire.[85] Gambier was at the same time offered a pension of two thousand pounds a year, but he modestly declined it.[86] In January 1808 both houses of Parliament voted their thanks to the commanders. (Opposition members, however, condemned the entire operation as an unjustified attack on a neutral. Among others who condemned it, Thomas, Lord Erskine—recently Lord Chancellor—ranted, "If hell did not exist before, Providence would create it now to punish ministers for that damnable measure.")[87] Gambier now resumed his post at the Admiralty, serving there until 9 May, when he was appointed to the command of the Channel Fleet.

THE CHANNEL FLEET, 1808–1811

The primary strategic functions of the Channel Fleet were to control the Western Approaches to the English Channel and to maintain the blockade of the French squadron at Brest. This blockade prevented the French squadron from getting to sea and joining the major French Mediterranean squadron based at Toulon, thus creating a major concentration of the French fleet. To British naval leaders, neither invasion across the Channel nor a major fleet battle in the Channel or Bay of Biscay seemed likely. Nevertheless, it was prudent to guard against such contingencies, so the blockade continued. It was tedious and demanding work with little opportunity for personal gain or glory. Gambier saw in it an opportunity to introduce Christian piety to the fleet as a means of improving discipline and morale. Regular weekly

church services returned to the fleet, as the regulations now required, and church organizations provided Bibles, prayer books, and tracts to seamen. Gambier's innovations in this area met with some success but hardly eradicated the fleet's ingrained culture of licentiousness and drunkenness.[88]

Gambier had commanded in the Channel for nearly a year when a gale forced his blockading ships off their station, allowing French rear admiral Jean-Baptiste Willaumez to escape from Brest with eight ships of the line. Sailing south, Willaumez took refuge at Basque Roads, near the mouth of the Charente River, to pick up troops from the Rochefort naval dockyard for a planned attack on British possessions in the West Indies. Anchored in Basque Roads, the French ships were protected by reefs, shoals, coastal fortifications on Île d'Aix and Oléron, and a boom across the seaward approach to the estuary. Gambier soon had intelligence that Vice Adm. Zacharie Allemand had taken command and would soon attempt to escape.

British warships arrived on the scene on 17 March 1809, but there Gambier faced the difficult, if not insoluble, problem of whether to risk his deep-draft warships in an attack. Gambier and several others realized that both the French ships and their own were vulnerable to attack by fireships (that is, expendable vessels that could be set afire and sent drifting unmanned among stationary enemy ships, burning any they contacted and disordering the enemy ships in their attempts to evade). Gambier took defensive measures and began to plan an offensive operation. In London, Lord Mulgrave and the Admiralty Board saw the same opportunity and advised Gambier that they were preparing to send fireships from England for that purpose. At that juncture, Captain Lord Cochrane arrived home in the thirty-eight-gun frigate *Imperieuse* from the Mediterranean.[89] Thomas Cochrane, tenth Earl of Dundonald, had a patchy reputation. As an opposition member of Parliament while a serving naval officer, he had unwisely attacked both the government and the Admiralty in particular for their inefficiencies. In the Mediterranean, Admiral Lord Collingwood's attempt to use him at Corfu, guarding the entrance to the Adriatic, demonstrated his energy but also, in a venomous dispute he seems to have instigated with a fellow captain, his self-centered lack of diplomacy.[90] Nevertheless, Cochrane's return to England at this time was opportune, as he was deservedly well known to be an innovative tactician and an aggressive, even daredevil, commander. Lord Mulgrave thought him the ideal person to lead the fireship attack under Gambier's overall command. Characteristically, Cochrane suspected ulterior political motives and an attempt to ruin him. Eventually, Cochrane warily accepted the appointment, on the condition that his command also include "explosion vessels," a craft that he had designed for such operations.

Cochrane and Court-Martial

When Cochrane arrived at Basque Roads on 3 April, his presence was immediately resented by the other captains, who saw him as an interloper even though he was

there at the express direction of the First Lord. Earlier, one of Gambier's flag officers, Rear Adm. Eliab Harvey, had volunteered to command the fireship attack. Unaware of Lord Mulgrave's intervention and blaming Gambier for his not being selected, Harvey publicly denounced him with a string of epithets, calling him among other things a "Jesuit, Methodist, Psalm-singer." (In Harvey's anger, he told a captain to repeat his remarks to the commander in chief; the result was Harvey's court-martial and dismissal from the service. He was eventually reinstated, after expressing his regret to Gambier, but not employed.)[91]

With the Channel Fleet blockading the estuary of Basque Roads, Cochrane carried out his attack. It was a success but not as complete as Cochrane would have liked. In the midst of the action, Cochrane had signaled for Gambier to send in larger ships to finish off the French; Gambier had done so, but unfavorable wind and tide prevented him from getting close enough to attack. As it was, four French warships and an East Indiaman had been driven ashore or burned and all the remainder damaged and put out of action, several having thrown their guns overboard to seek shelter in the shallow Charente. Gambier ordered now–Rear Admiral Stopford to attack the French ships using Congreve rockets, but Stopford's flagship grounded in the shallows and, with a change in the wind, it became impracticable to continue the attack.

In his dispatch to the Admiralty, Gambier was particularly generous to Cochrane:

> I cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and applause, of the vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane on the French line-of-battle ships, which were on shore, as well as his judicious manner of approaching them, and placing his ship in the most advantageous position to annoy the enemy, and preserve his own ship; which could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy.[92]

Gambier's generosity to the young captain was not appreciated. Instead, Cochrane threatened to use his position as a member of Parliament for Westminster to oppose a planned vote of thanks to Gambier, accusing him of cowardice for not destroying all the French ships. Gambier in turn requested, on 30 May, the Admiralty to convene a court-martial to inquire into his conduct as commander in chief. To that court Gambier declared:

> Had I pursued any of the measures deemed practicable and proper in the judgment of Lord Cochrane, I am firmly persuaded the success attending this achievement would have proved more dearly bought than any yet recorded in our naval annals, and far from accomplishing the hopes of my country or the expectations of the Admiralty, must have disappointed both. If such, too, were the foundations of his Lordship's prospects, it is just they should vanish before superior considerations attending a service involving the naval character and most important interests of the nation.[93]

The court-martial honorably acquitted Lord Gambier. A motion of thanks to Gambier for his service at Basque Roads readily passed in the House of Lords.

Cochrane attempted to persuade the House of Commons not to follow suit but was defeated, and the Commons too voted thanks to Gambier. Gambier also received a medal, a reward for his skill and bravery at Copenhagen.[94] The portrait artist Sir William Beechey took the opportunity of Gambier's prominence in 1809 to exhibit his portrait of the admiral at the Royal Academy.[95] Several artists produced prints based on Beechey's portrait, which circulated widely during Gambier's lifetime.[96]

A Reflection of Broader Social Issues within the Navy

The squabble between Cochrane and Gambier was of a type that erupted between officers from time to time in the eighteenth-century Royal Navy. Some culminated in private duels, and others broke out into major, public, and highly politicized rows, as did one between Vice Adm. Thomas Mathews and his second in command, Rear Adm. Richard Lestock, over the battle of Toulon in 1744 and another between Adm. Augustus Keppel and Vice Adm. Sir Hugh Palliser in 1778–79. Something of the sort might well have occurred following the battle of Trafalgar, but Collingwood, who had succeeded to command of the combined fleet at the death of Admiral Lord Nelson, and others made sure that "all was hushed up."[97] Such disputes had their foundation in naval officers' concepts of personal honor and duty. The disputes that involved Gambier, however, added a twist of their own.

His critics, Eliab Harvey and others, employed toward him a distinctive, virulent rhetoric that focused on Gambier's religious beliefs and his central role, along with Barham, in bringing public Anglican worship back into the navy during the Napoleonic Wars. The acid attacks on the "Blue Lights," as such evangelical officers were known, arose from differences in social values: those of the Blue Lights were becoming serious threats to the social lives of naval officers given to gambling, womanizing, and drinking. Those who attacked the evangelicals tended to dismiss them as poor and ineffective naval officers, but some, as Gambier's career shows, were highly competent. Such attacks on individual officers were representative of larger social tensions within the naval officer corps. Between 1660 and 1815, naval officers tended generally to shift their emphasis from honor to duty—that is, away from personal honor to personal discipline in carrying out one's duty to God and country.[98] These values gave rise to the Christian reform movements of early-nineteenth-century Britain that eventually evolved into the social values of the Victorian era. The bitterness of the attacks on Gambier and others reflected a divide between two groups in the navy, each of which suspected—perhaps with good reason—that the other had built networks aiding the professional advancement of individuals of its own sort.

While such public disputes may have been fueled by personal honor, they were not good for the reputation or the honor of the service at large. Of the battle of

Basque Roads the contemporary naval historian Capt. Edward Brenton concluded that

> never had Britain more reason to be proud of her navy than on this occasion, when the fleet of her rival was pursued and destroyed under their own batteries, and in one of their best anchorages; never was more zeal displayed, from the highest to the lowest rank, and it is not too much to say that the just expectation of England was not disappointed—"every man did his duty."
>
> Unfortunately, though the king and the country were satisfied, the navy was at variance with itself.[99]

Collingwood wrote to his sister along the same lines: "On the subject of Adml Gambier's court martial, I am sorry it ever happened, it was very injurious to the service and is an instance that however zealous and correct an officer's conduct may be, it will yet be subject to the animadversion of wrong-headed people."[100]

LATER YEARS

After the court-martial, Gambier returned to the command of the Channel Fleet. Promoted on 31 July 1810 to Admiral of the White, he commanded the Channel Fleet until 1811, when the new First Lord of the Admiralty, Charles Philip Yorke, ruled that admirals should be relieved from their stations after three years. Gambier returned to Iver Grove and to work with the Church Missionary Society, which elected him its first president in 1812. Gambier retained the position for more than twenty years. In 1813, he joined, and thereby lent prestige to, the Naval and Military Bible Society, along with the distinguished Vice Adm. James Saumarez and eventually the Duke of Wellington and Robert Jenkinson, second Earl of Liverpool, prime minister 1812–27. Gambier also became a patron of the British and Foreign Bible Society. Gambier outdid all his contemporaries in supporting such charitable activities, becoming a member of thirty-nine, a patron of three, governor of three, committee member of two, vice president of eleven, and president of another three, in addition to the Church Missionary Society.[101]

Peace Commissioner

Gambier did not have to wait long after leaving the Channel Fleet for a return to public employment. On 4 June 1814 he was promoted to Admiral of the Red. Two months later, on 30 July, the prime minister, Lord Liverpool, appointed Gambier to head a commission to negotiate peace between Britain and the United States of America after two years of warfare. The first meeting of the peace commissioners took place at Ghent, in Belgium, on 8 August. The ministry in London expected the five American peace commissioners—John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, James A. Bayard Sr., Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin—to push very hard for recognition for American maritime rights, on which the ministry had no intention of yielding. For this reason, Liverpool was careful to choose men who could deal with this specific problem. In particular, he chose Gambier as a senior flag officer who knew Americans and American waters, as well as maritime issues generally.

Gambier was seconded by William Adams, a prominent Admiralty lawyer and expert on maritime rights, and Henry Goulburn, a thirty-year-old rising political star and protégé of Spencer Perceval, who had recently been prime minister. The close proximity of Ghent to London, with easy communications, meant that the British peace commissioners were under direct control and could not act independently. Though Gambier remained the senior figure, Goulburn was the key political link to the ministry. Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh and the ministry directly instructed the British delegation to treat the United States as a defeated nation and to demand territorial compensation for its attack against Canada. Gambier and his colleagues held to that position for the first three months, developing a plan to carve out some 250,000 square miles of present-day Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota—some 15 percent of the United States as it was then—to create an independent state for Native Americans. It would be both a barrier to American aggression against Canada and a hindrance to the development of the United States.

When news of the British demands reached America, President James Madison quickly rejected them. London was surprised that the United States, which faced bankruptcy, could reject its terms. The ministry soon changed its mind, however, about punitive demands, owing not to American opinion but to public opinion at home and the situation in Europe. By October 1814 Parliament had made clear that it would not fund a continuation of the war in America and diplomacy at the Congress of Vienna had become complicated, and the ministry and its negotiators began to soften their stance.

By December, there was a real possibility that Liverpool's government would fall if wartime taxation continued. For their part, negotiators at Ghent saw that the only quick and firm basis for peace was a return to the status quo ante bellum, both sides yielding nothing and agreeing to nothing that would in any way complicate or delay the peace. The negotiating teams signed the treaty on Christmas Eve 1814 at the British consular residence.

Sending the treaty off for formal ratification in London and Washington, the negotiators remained in Ghent to celebrate Christmas Day, at the request of the people of Ghent, and then a fortnight longer to attend the city's banquet in their honor.[102] While they were there, on 2 January 1815, the prince regent announced in London that he had reorganized the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath to commemorate the end of the war in Europe. He had created three classes to honor wartime military and naval commanders. The prince regent appointed Gambier to the second of these: Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath.[103] The United States ratified the treaty on 17 February 1815, and Gambier returned to Iver Grove and resumed the life of a retired flag officer in the style of a modest country gentleman, occupied with his leadership and patronage of many charitable

organizations. But on 12 April, in the Great Council Chamber at Carlton House, the prince regent invested Gambier as Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath.[104]

The Ohio Connection

In the autumn of 1823, having been retired from public service for nearly a decade, Gambier was surprised to receive a letter from the currently serving Speaker of the American House of Representatives, Henry Clay, then one of several candidates for president of the United States. At Ghent, Clay had certainly shown no affinity for or interest in religion—in contrast to the Bible-reading John Quincy Adams;[105] nevertheless, Clay was now writing to introduce to Gambier the Episcopal bishop of Ohio, Rt. Rev. Philander Chase.[106] Ohio, a thousand miles from saltwater, seemed an unlikely place in which to interest Gambier.

Consecrated as the first bishop of Ohio five years earlier, Chase was deeply frustrated that he could find few clergymen willing to come west. After trying every possibility within his reach, Chase determined that he must create his own college and seminary to supply the needs of the church on the frontier. There was no money to be found for such a project within his diocese, so Chase convinced the Ohio diocesan convention to fund a trip to England by which he might find support. Chase also sought the endorsement of his fellow American clergymen and other American bishops. Several sent him favorable letters, but the presiding bishop, William White of Pennsylvania, and Bishop John Henry Hobart of New York were strongly opposed. White objected to anyone from the American Episcopal Church soliciting funds from the mother Church of England. For his part, Hobart had already been instrumental in founding the General Theological Seminary in New York City in 1817 and another college in Geneva, New York, in 1822; he now took it on himself to resist actively every effort that Chase made. The Missionary Society of the church also publicly opposed Chase's plan. Despite all this, Chase persisted and sailed in the Black Ball packet *Orbit* from New York to Liverpool, where he arrived in early November.

There, Chase had few friends or supporters, but the provost of Oriel College, Oxford, then an influential place in English ecclesiastical affairs, invited Chase to visit. The experience inspired Chase further as he pursued his dream.[107] The high-church bishop Hobart, in his determination to frustrate Chase, had arrived in England ahead of him and visited Oriel too (cutting a figure that the young English theologian John Henry Newman would some months later describe to an acquaintance in unflattering terms).[108] Hobart set in motion a very effective and efficient effort to discredit Chase and undermine his plans. Rumors were spread in London that Chase should not be trusted with money, that he was little better than a Methodist.

Hobart had even written to Gambier hoping to put similar ideas in his mind; Gambier, however, was to be Chase's last, best hope. Chase's letter of November 1823 described a situation that Gambier might have seen as not unlike what he had endured himself from Cochrane. Gambier's reply was reserved but indicated willingness to hear him out. Gambier invited Chase to attend in London, nearly two weeks later, an anniversary meeting of the Auxiliary Bible Society over which he was to preside; afterward they would return in Gambier's coach to Iver Grove for several days of leisurely talk.[109]

Bishop Chase's visit to Iver Grove was a remarkable success. In the end, Gambier gave him a letter of support that he could show others to gain support.[110] In a separate letter, Gambier told him that he hoped the one letter written for circulation might help to "counteract . . . the effects of the opinions not only of Bishop Hobart but of other persons in this country that were unfavorable to your good cause."[111] Gambier proved to be the key to success for Chase's project. Gambier's influence fully overcame Hobart's mischief, bringing Chase the support of the Church Missionary Society and with it contacts and donations from many prominent figures, including Hannah More, the Countess of Rosse, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nicholas Vansittart (Baron Bexley). Gambier's connections with the low-church evangelicals were paralleled by the support of an influential member of the high-church group, George Wharton Marriott, a barrister and member of All Souls College, Oxford.[112] Marriott's connections produced strong backing among adherents of that element of the Anglican church—most notably the influential George Gaskin, former secretary of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and a prebendary of Ely Cathedral, and George, second Baron Kenyon, who was particularly generous.

As Bishop Chase prepared to return to America in the spring of 1824 after traveling all across England, both north and south, the list of subscribers grew and donations began to arrive. Lord Gambier, Lord Kenyon, Dr. Gaskin, and the banker Sir Henry Hoare became the trustees of the growing fund, Gambier the key figure among them. After Chase's return to America, Gambier wrote to Henry Clay thanking him for the introduction: "I found, as you truly described him, a learned, pious, and highly estimable clergyman. . . . It is a cause of great satisfaction to me that so much success has attended the good Bishop's visit to this country, for I greatly rejoice on every occasion that in any way promotes mutual friendship and good will between the people of our two countries."[113]

By 1826 the trustees had raised six thousand pounds, with which Bishop Chase eventually purchased six thousand acres of open land in central Ohio, which became the permanent site of the newly named Kenyon College in the village of Gambier, Ohio. Today streets and buildings of that town still bear the names of Admiral

Lord Gambier's friends and acquaintances: Rosse, Bexley, Gaskin, Marriott, and others.[114]

FINAL YEARS AND LEGACY

On 2 July 1830 the newly ascended King William IV promoted Gambier to Admiral of the Fleet.[115] In 1832, King William presented Gambier with one of the only four batons ever made for an Admiral of the Fleet.[116]

Gambier died at Iver Grove on 19 April 1833 at the age of seventy-six. He was buried in the churchyard of St. Peter's Church, Iver. He having had no children, his peerage became extinct on his death. His personal property at the time of his death was estimated at under thirty thousand pounds. Lady Gambier remained at Iver Grove until her death, when the property and the final proceeds of their estate were divided among eight nieces and nephews.

Long after Gambier's death, Capt. George Henry Richards, a hydrographer in HMS *Plumper* surveying the coast of British Columbia between 1857 and 1862, commemorated the battle of the Glorious First of June by naming Gambier Island, the Defence Islands (to commemorate Gambier's ship in that battle), and Howe Sound (to commemorate Gambier's commander).[117]

Gambier's contributions to the Royal Navy have long been overshadowed in history by the exploits of Lord Cochrane and by the objections of those who in the 1790s and early 1800s disliked the promotion within the service of religion and religious values. In the long view of naval history, however, Gambier appears as the important figure he was. He was a successful fighting captain, rose very quickly to positions of high command and responsibility, and exercised through them an enormous but unrecognized influence on the naval service. His contributions to operational signaling and to the navy's *Instructions and Regulations* were substantial and should not be dismissed as they have been. The attacks that Gambier endured in his later career largely disappeared over time as the ideas he and Barham pioneered became accepted for what they were and are, a normal activity for individuals to pursue, and widened to accommodate other denominations. The generations of naval officers who followed Gambier largely took for granted a role for religion in their service.

Gambier's qualms over the use of weapons—like Congreve's rocket—that caused terror would echo throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. Gambier's reactions were among the early expressions of views that would produce later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the modern law of naval warfare. Gambier's estimate of the situation at Basque Roads that led him not to risk his force unnecessarily, with a major strategic result already achieved, is an equally modern and responsible military viewpoint.

Admiral Lord Gambier's contributions to the Royal Navy deserve much more appreciation than they have yet received. It will be entirely worthwhile to undertake the extensive research in public and private records, Gambier having left no archive of his own papers, to plumb more deeply the nature of his thought, character, and prescience.

NOTES

This paper appears in Sean M. Heuvel and John A. Rodgaard, eds., *From across the Sea: North Americans in Nelson's Navy* (Warwick, U.K.: Helion, 2020),
© Helion and Company. It is used by permission.

1 See, for example, Sam Willis, *In the Hour of Victory: The Royal Navy at War in the Age of Nelson* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), p. 175.

2 Thomas [Cochrane], 10th Earl of Dundonald [Adm.], *The Autobiography of a Seaman* (London: Richard Bentley, 1860), vol. 2, passim, but esp. chaps. 26–28.

3 Richard Blake, *Evangelicals in the Royal Navy, 1775–1815: Blue Lights & Psalm-Singers* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2008), p. 221.

4 General biographical sketches on Gambier's life are, in chronological order, John Marshall, *Royal Naval Biography* (London: Longman, 1823–35), vol. 1, pp. 74–86; James Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain* (London: Whitmore & Fenn, 1828), vol. 2, pp. 82–90; John Knox Laughton, "Gambier, James, Baron Gambier," in *Dictionary of National Biography,* vol. 20, *Forrest–Garner,* ed. Leslie Stephen (London: Smith, Elder, 1889); Frederic F. Thompson, "Gambier, James, 1st Baron Gambier," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography,* vol. 6, *1821–1835* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1987), available at www.biographi.ca/en/bio/gambier_james_6E.html; T. A. Heathcote, *The British Admirals of the Fleet, 1734–1995: A Biographical Dictionary* (Barnsley, U.K.: Leo Cooper, 2002), pp. 94–96; Lee Bienkowsi, *Admirals in the Age of Nelson* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), pp. 152–69; Richard C. Blake, "Gambier, Baron James (1756–1833)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), available at oxforddnb.com/view/article/10321; Nicholas Tracy, *Who's Who in Nelson's Navy: 200 Naval Heroes* (London: Chatham, 2006), pp. 148–50; and the website *More than Nelson,* morethannelson.com/officer/lord-james-gambier/.

5 This general history of the family is based on Sir Egerton Brydges, ed., *Collins's Peerage of England: Genealogical, Biographical, and Historical, Greatly Augmented and Continued to the Present Time* (London: F. C. and J. Rivington, et al., 1812), vol. 9, pp. 387–91; David C. A. Agnew, *Protestant Exiles from France, Chiefly in the Reign of Louis XIV; or, The Huguenot Refugees and Their Descendants in Great Britain and Ireland,* vol. 2, *Refugees Naturalized in and after 1681,* 3rd ed. (privately published, 1886), p. 401; and Georgiana, Lady Chatterton, ed., *Memorials, Personal and Historical of Admiral Lord Gambier, G.C.B.,* 2nd ed. (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1861), vol. 1, pp. 1–15.

6 A genealogical chart of the Gambier, Middleton, Noel, Stephen, Venn, and Elliott families, showing church and patronage connections, may be found in Gareth Atkins, "Religion, Politics and Patronage in the Late Hanoverian Navy, c. 1780–c. 1820," *Historical Research* 88, no. 240 (May 2015), pp. 272–90.

7 "London, 8 July," *Stamford Mercury* (U.K.), 10 July 1783, p. 4.

8 "25. [May. Death at] Knightsbridge. Mr. Gambier, brother of the Admiral. He resided in the East Indies upwards of 30 years in the service of the Company. He has left the Admiral 100,000£ [*sic*] in stocks"; *Scots Magazine* 49 (1 June 1787), p. 312.

9 David Syrett, "'This Penurious Old Reptile': Rear-Admiral James Gambier and the American War," *Historical Research* 74, no. 183 (February 2001), pp. 63–76. See also Roger Knight, "Gambier, James (1723–1789)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* available at www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10320.

10 William Battersby, *James Fitzjames: The Mystery Man of the Franklin Expedition* (Stroud, U.K.: History Press; Toronto: Dundurn, 2010). See also William Battersby, "Sir James Gambier—Father to Captain James Fitzjames," *Franklin Expedition News and View,* www.thefranklinsite.com/how-we-know-that-sir-james-gambier-was-james-fitzjames-father/.

11 "Alphabetical List of Officials: A–J," in *Office-Holders in Modern Britain,* vol. 7, *Navy Board Officials 1660–1832,* ed. J. M. Collinge (London, 1978), pp. 81–116, available at www.british-history.ac.uk/office-holders/vol7/pp81–116.

12 Chatterton, *Memorials . . . of . . . Lord Gambier,* vol. 1, p. 2.

13 Blake, *Evangelicals in the Royal Navy,* pp. 38–39.

14 On Hannah More's connections and correspondence with the Middletons and her numerous visits to Teston, see Anne Stott, *Hannah More: The First Victorian* (Oxford: U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), pp. 68, 87, 89–90, 100, 122, 125, 149, 165, 170, 177, 214, 241, 267–68, 293, 298.

15 John Knox Laughton, ed., *Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham, Admiral of the Red Squadron, 1758–1813,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vols. 32, 38, 39 (London: Navy Records Society, 1907–11), vol. 1, pp. xxi–xxiv; Atkins, "Religion, Politics and Patronage," pp. 275–77; Roger Morriss, "Charles Middleton, Lord Barham, 1726–1813," in *Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century,* ed. Peter Le Fevre and Richard Harding (London: Chatham, 2000), pp. 301–23; John E. Talbott, *The Pen and Ink Sailor: Charles Middleton and the King's Navy, 1778–1813* (London: Frank Cass, 1998); Blake, *Evangelicals in the Royal Navy,* pp. 37–43.

16 Blake, *Evangelicals in the Royal Navy,* p. 41. Venn was also related to the Gambier family by marriage; his aunt, Mary Venn, had married William James Gambier, a first cousin to Lt. Gov. John Gambier and Vice Adm. James Gambier.

17 James Gambier's Passing Certificate as a lieutenant, 28 September 1774, ADM 107/6/314, The National Archives, Kew, U.K. [hereafter TNA].

18 Knight, "Gambier, James (1723–1789)."

19 Gambier's Passing Certificate as a lieutenant.

20 On the typical length of time between passing and being promoted, see Evan Wilson, *A Social History of British Naval Officers, 1775–1815* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2017), p. 35. While not among the 58 percent who were commissioned within a year of examination, Gambier was within the three-year period by the end of which 80 percent had been promoted. "Principal Officers and Commissioners," in Collinge, *Navy Board Officials,* pp. 18–25, available at www.british-history.ac.uk/office-holders/vol7/pp18-25.

21 *More than Nelson*.

22 Tim McGrath, *John Barry: An American Hero in the Age of Sail* (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2010), pp. 191–257; see also William Bell Clark, *Gallant John Barry, 1745–1803: The Story of a Naval Hero of Two Wars* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 164–71.

23 "Principal Officers and Commissioners."

24 Extracts of letters from Admiral Arbuthnot, in *London Gazette,* no. 11976, 4 May 1779, pp. 2–3.

25 Dockyard Commissioner Sir Samuel Hood to Admiralty, 2 May 1779 [from POR/H/11, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, U.K. (hereafter NMM)], in *Portsmouth Dockyard Papers, 1774–1783: The American War—A Calendar,* ed. R. J. B. Knight, Portsmouth Record Series 6 (Portsmouth, U.K.: City of Portsmouth, 1987), p. 20.

26 William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1897–1903), vol. 4, p. 24.

27 Hood to Navy Board, 2 May 1779, acknowledging the order [from POR/F/17, NMM], in ibid.

28 Ships Plans, ZAZ3127, Admiralty Collection, NMM, available at collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/82918.html; Rif Winfield, *British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1714–1792: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2007), p. 218.

29 John Knox Laughton, ed., "Journals of Henry Duncan, Captain, Royal Navy," in *The Naval Miscellany,* vol. 1, ed. Laughton, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 20 (London: Navy Records Society, 1902), pp. 177–79, 186.

30 Arbuthnot to Elphinstone, 18 April 1780, in *The Keith Papers: Selected from the Letters and Papers of Admiral Viscount Keith,* vol. 1, ed. W. G. Perrin, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 62 (London: Navy Records Society, 1927), p. 169.

31 Vice-Adm. M. Arbuthnot to Admiralty Secretary Philip Stephens, 14 May 1780, in *Bath Chronicle,* 22 June 1780, p. 1.

32 *London Gazette,* no. 12331, 14 September 1782, p. 2. See also "Pennsylvania Privateer Schooner *Greyhound,*" *American War of Independence at Sea,* www.awiatsea.com/Privateers/G/Greyhound%20Pennsylvania%20Schooner%20%5BKemp%5D.html.

33 "Postscript," *Northampton Mercury,* 29 January 1782, p. 3, reprinting from *(New York) Rivington's Royal Gazette,* 30 December 1781.

34 *London Gazette,* no. 12409, 26 January 1783, p. 2; Winfield, *British Warships,* p. 20.

35 Felix Hall was reduced in size in the 1930s and later gutted by fire. By 2017 there was only the partial shell of the burned-out structure. In a later tragedy, when the National Trust–owned Clandon Park in West Clandon, Guildford, Surrey, burned in April 2015, one of the most valuable objects destroyed, on indemnified loan to that property, was a group portrait by Johann Zoffany from the mid-1760s valued at four million pounds: *The Mathew Family at Felix Hall, Kelvedon, Essex.* The two young girls in the picture were undoubtedly Louisa and Jane Matthew, who would eventually marry the Gambier brothers, James and Samuel, respectively. See Patrick Sawer, "'Huge Payout' for Painting Destroyed in Clandon House Fire," *Telegraph,* 29 December 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/29/huge-payout-painting-destroyed-clandon-house-fire/.

36 Hannah More to Middleton, 8 January 1793, in Chatterton, *Memorials . . . of . . . Lord Gambier,* vol. 1, p. 212.

37 Sir William Henry Dillon [Vice Adm. of the Red], *A Narrative of My Professional Adventures (1790–1839),* ed. Michael A. Lewis, vol. 1, *1790–1802,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 93 (London: Navy Records Society, 1953), p. 95.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., p. 100.

40 Ibid., p. 110.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., pp. 163–64.

43 Ibid., p. xxxii.

44 Ibid., p. 164.

45 For a detailed description of the battle with transcriptions of the principal dispatches, see Willis, *In the Hour of Victory,* chap. 1. See also Michael Duffy and Roger Morriss, eds., *The Glorious First of June 1794: A Naval Battle and Its Aftermath* (Exeter, U.K.: Univ. of Exeter Press, 2001); and Willis, *The Glorious First of June: Fleet Battle in the Reign of Terror* (London: Quercus, 2011).

46 Willis, *In the Hour of Victory,* pp. 74–75.

47 Dillon, *Narrative,* vol. 1, p. 135.

48 Ibid., p. 153.

49 "*Commemoration of the Victory of June 1st MDCCXCIV,* lettered with the title, and the names of the admirals and captains [including Capt. James Gambier] around the individual medallions; lettered below the image 'R. Smirke, R. A. Delt. The Figures Engraved by R. Bartolozzi, R. A. Pub. by R. Bowyer, 1803 Historic Gallery, Pall Mall Landscape & Water Engd. by Landseer Portraits of the Admls. Engd. by Ryder. Portraits of the Capts. Engd. by Stow,'" 1875,0814.752, Print Collection, British Museum, London.

50 Nicholas Pocock, *The "Defence" at the Battle of the First of June 1794,* BHC0474, NMM.

51 Nicholas Pocock, *The Battle of the Glorious First of June 1794: The "Defence" under Tow by a Frigate,* PAD8701, NMM. Pocock was reputed to have been present in a frigate during the action and to have made sketches throughout. Pocock's painting characteristically "has a deadpan realism and a mastery of brilliant observed detail which brings that distant battle to life"; David Cordingly, *Nicholas Pocock, 1741–1821* (London: Conway Maritime, 1986), p. 75. Pocock's presence in the battle, however, is disputed by recent scholarship; see Eleanor Hughes, "Nicholas Pocock: Accuracy and Agency," in *Spreading Canvas: Eighteenth-Century British Marine Painting,* ed. Eleanor Hughes (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press for the Yale Center for British Art, 2016), pp. 82–84.

52 J. C., letter to the editor, *Naval Chronicle* 22 (1809), pp. 102–103; Nicholas Tracy, ed. *The* Naval Chronicle: *The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War* (London: Chatham, 1998–99), vol. 1, pp. 109–10. "J. C." might be John C. Carpenter, master's mate in *Defence* during the battle; see Kenneth Douglas-Morris, *The Naval General Service Medal Roll 1793–1840* (Uckfield, U.K.: Naval & Military, 2016), p. 4.

53 Dillon, *Narrative,* vol. 1, pp. 163–66, 178, 185. In W. Kaye Lamb's note on this discovery in his edited version of Vancouver's 1798 book (retitled *The Voyage of George Vancouver 1791–1795* [London, Hakluyt Society, 1984]), vol. 4, pp. 1372–73, he conflates Admiral Lord Gambier with his uncle, Vice Adm. James Gambier. Lamb also asserts that Vancouver had served in *Europa* when that ship had been Vice Admiral Gambier's flagship as commander in chief of the Jamaica Station in 1783–84. This, however, is not substantiated in Bern Anderson, *Surveyor of the Sea: The Life and Voyages of Captain George Vancouver* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1960). Anderson documents that Gambier had already left the ship when Vancouver arrived on board *Europa* in late 1784, as it was about to sail from London to Jamaica flying the flag of Rear Adm. Alexander Innes. Innes was followed in 1786 by Cdre. Sir Alan Gardner, who became Vancouver's patron.

54 George Vancouver, *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and round the World* (London: G. G. & J. Robinson & J. Edwards, 1798), vol. 3, pp. 273–74, 280; U.S. Geological Survey, *Geographical Names Phase 1 Data Compilation,* ID 1424379, geonames.usgs.gov/apex/f?p=138:2:0::NO:RP.

55 Patrick Marioné, *The Complete Navy List of the Napoleonic Wars* (Brussels: SEFF, 2003), CD-ROM; J. C. Sainty, *Admiralty Officials, 1660–1870* (London: Athlone for Univ. of London, Institute of Historical Research, 1975). With thanks to Roger Knight for the latter reference.

56 Winfield, *British Warships,* p. 203.

57 William M. James, *The Naval History of Great Britain: During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,* vol. 2, *1797–1799* (London, 1837; repr. with new introduction by Andrew Lambert, London: Conway Maritime, 2002), pp. 357–58; Edward Brenton, *The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Year MDCCLXXXIII. [1783] to MDCCCXXXVI. [1836]* (London: Henry Coburn, 1837), vol. 1, p. 439.

58 Nicholas Pocock, *The Frigate "Triton,"* 1796, BHC3675, Oil Paintings, NMM, available at collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/15148.html. The National Maritime Museum also holds a 1796 Admiralty model of *Triton* (SLR0589).

59 Winfield, *British Warships,* p. 65.

60 Rear Adm. Hugh Seymour to Rear Admiral Gambier, 15 July 1798, in Chatterton, *Memorials . . . of . . . Lord Gambier,* vol. 1, pp. 341–44.

61 Brian Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactics 1650–1815,* ed. Nicholas Tracy (London: Conway Maritime, 1990), pp. 227–29; Julian S. Corbett, ed., *Signals and Instructions, 1776–1794, with Addenda to Vol. XXIX,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 35 (London: Navy Records Society, 1908), pp. 78–79.

62 Eugene Stock, *The History of the Church Missionary Society: Its Environment, Its Men and Its Work* (London: Church Missionary Society, 1899), vol. 1, pp. 59–70, 108–109; Richard Lovett, *History of the London Missionary Society, 1795–1895* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1899), vol. 1, pp. 3–145.

63 London Missionary Society, *A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean: Performed in the Years 1796, 1797, 1798, in the Ship* Duff, *Commanded by Captain James Wilson* (London: T. Chapman, 1799), pp. 18–19, 117. Wilson calculated the position of the Gambier Islands as latitude 23° 12′ S, longitude 225° E. From 1844 to 1870 and 1871 to 1881, the islands were part of a French protectorate that was formally

annexed in 1881–82 under the collective name of Établissements français de l'Océanie. Becoming an overseas territory in 1946, the area (comprising the Gambiers and four other archipelagoes) was renamed French Polynesia in 1957; subsequently, in 2002–2003, it became a *collectivité d'outre-mer* (an "overseas country" or "collectivity") of France.

64 "Particulars of Iver Grove, between Windsor and Uxbridge. Many Years the Residence of Lady Gambier. . . . For Sale by Auction. 19 June 1845 . . . ," Buckinghamshire County Council, Property Sale Catalogue, D-TR/9/10–11, Centre for Buckinghamshire Studies, Aylesbury, Bucks, U.K.

65 W. H. Ward and K. S. Block, *A History of the Manor and Parish of Iver* (London: M. Secker, 1933), pp. 203, 217, 219, 244; John Cornforth, "Iver Grove: Home of Mr. and Mrs. James Howe Kitson," *Country Life,* 15 August 1963, pp. 372–75; "Property Market," *Country Life,* 29 November 2007, p. 114. Today the house survives with altered interiors and is listed by the government-funded body Historic England as Grade II* (i.e., in the "most significant" 8 percent of properties); see "Iver Grove," *Historic England,* www.historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1124384.

66 Quoted from CO 194/43, TNA, in Thompson, "Gambier, James, 1st Baron Gambier."

67 Roger Knight, *Britain against Napoleon: The Organization of Victory, 1793–1815* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), p. 227.

68 Great Britain, Admiralty, *Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea* (London, 1731), repr. in twelve subsequent editions, including the 2nd (1734), 3rd (1743), 5th (1746), 6th (1747), 9th (1757), 10th (1766), 11th (1772), 12th (1787), and 13th (1790) editions.

69 Laughton, *Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham,* vol. 3, pp. 8–82; Brian Lavery, ed., *Shipboard Life and Organisation, 1731–1815,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 138 (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate for the Navy Records Society, 1998), pp. 6–8.

70 Great Britain, Admiralty, *Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea, Established by His Majesty in Council,* 2nd ed. (1806; London: W. Winchester and Son, 1808).

71 Great Britain, Admiralty, *Queen's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions for the Government of the Naval Service* (London, 1869); *The Queen's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions for the Government of Her Majesty's Naval Service* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1879).

72 Richard C. Blake, *Religion in the British Navy, 1815–1879: Piety and Professionalism* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2014), pp. 3–8.

73 On this subject, see Thomas Wemyss Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea: An Historical Account of the Claims of England to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of the Evolution of the Territorial Waters; With Special Reference to the Rights of Fishing and the Naval Salute* (Edinburgh, U.K.: William Blackwood & Sons, 1911); and Jakob Seerup, "Danish and Swedish Flag Disputes with the British in the Channel," in *Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf,* ed. N. A. M. Rodger et al. (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2016), pp. 28–36.

74 As it had nearly done with Sweden in 1704; see chapter 10 of the present book. Gambier to Croker, 21 January 1815, in W. G. Perrin, "The Salute in the Narrow Seas and the Vienna Conference of 1815," in *The Naval Miscellany,* vol. 3, ed. Perrin, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 63 (London: Navy Records Society, 1928), p. 326.

75 Collingwood to his sister, 25 June 1808, in *The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood,* ed. Edward Hughes, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 98 (London: Navy Records Society, 1957), pp. 248–49.

76 Knight, *Britain against Napoleon,* p. 202.

77 Brenton, *Naval History of Great Britain,* vol. 2, pp. 169–80; William M. James, *The Naval History of Great Britain: During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,* vol. 4, *1805–1807* (London, 1837; repr. with new introduction by Andrew Lambert, London: Conway Maritime, 2002), pp. 284–93; A. N. Ryan, ed., "Documents Relating to the Copenhagen Operation, 1807," in *The Naval Miscellany,* vol. 5, ed. N. A. M. Rodger, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 125 (London: George Allen & Unwin for the Navy Records Society, 1984), pp. 297–329; Ryan, "The Causes of the British Attack upon Copenhagen in 1807," *English Historical Review* 68, no. 266 (January 1953), pp. 37–55.

78 Thomas Munch-Petersen, *Defying Napoleon: How Britain Bombarded Copenhagen and Seized the Danish Feet in 1807* (Stroud, U.K.: Sutton, 2007), pp. 97–116.

79 Hugh Popham, *A Damned Cunning Fellow: The Eventful Life of Rear-Admiral Sir Home Popham KCB, KCH, KM, FRS, 1762–1820* (Tywardreath, U.K.: Old Ferry, 1991).

80 Joint Proclamation by Gambier and Cathcart, 16 August 1807, quoted in Marshall, *Royal Naval Biography,* pp. 79–81. For a detailed study of the first phase of the operation, see Munch-Petersen, *Defying Napoleon,* pp. 169–92.

81 Gambier and Cathcart to Peymann, 1 September 1807, in Ryan, "Documents Relating to the Copenhagen Operation."

82 Ibid.

83 Munch-Petersen, *Defying Napoleon,* pp. 199–202. Congreve's rockets had been first used at Boulogne in 1806.

84 Quoted in James Davey, *The Transformation of British Naval Strategy: Seapower and Supply in Northern Europe, 1808–1812* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2012), p. 32.

85 Copy of royal warrant creating Adm. James Gambier a baron, 1807, D 81/50, Archives, Centre for Buckinghamshire Studies, Aylesbury, Bucks, U.K.

86 "Obituary," *Gentleman's Magazine,* June 1833, pp. 559–60.

87 Quoted in Davey, *Transformation of British Naval Strategy,* p. 32.

88 Blake, *Evangelicals in the Royal Navy,* pp. 202–203.

89 Cochrane has been a character in naval novels, as well as the subject of many historical studies. Of these the most recent are Brian Vale, *The Audacious Admiral Cochrane: The True Life of a Naval Legend* (London: Conway Maritime, 2004), and David Cordingly, *Cochrane the Dauntless: The Life and Adventures of Admiral Thomas Cochrane, 1775–1860* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007). These take a more balanced perspective than Christopher Lloyd, *Lord Cochrane: Seaman, Radical, Liberator—A Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, 10th Earl of Dundonald, 1775–1860* (London: Longmans, Green, 1947; repr. with new introduction by John B. Hattendorf, New York: Henry Holt, 1998). Cochrane himself produced the widely read, self-serving memoir cited in note 2, above: Dundonald, *The Autobiography of a Seaman*.

90 Cordingly, *Cochrane the Dauntless,* pp. 140–41.

91 Tracy, *Who's Who in Nelson's Navy,* pp. 174–75.

92 Gambier to the Admiralty, 14 April 1809, in *Naval Chronicle* 21 (1809), pp. 344–46, repr. in Tracy, *Naval Chronicle,* vol. 4, pp. 236–38.

93 Tracy, *Naval Chronicle,* vol. 4, p. 253. For detailed and contrasting historical examinations of the battle of Basque Roads, see William M. James, *The Naval History of Great Britain: During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,* vol. 5, *1808–1811* (London, 1837; repr. with new introduction by Andrew Lambert, London: Conway Maritime, 2002), pp. 98–130; Brenton, *Naval History of Great Britain,* vol. 2, pp. 277–82, and court-martial, 284, 331; and Peter Kirsch, *Fireship: The Terror Weapon of the Age of Sail* (Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2009), pp. 218–27. Frederick Marryat's *Frank Mildmay, or the Naval Officer* (London, 1829) describes in fictionalized form the author's personal experiences in 1809 at Basque Roads as a midshipman in the frigate *Imperieuse* under Lord Cochrane.

94 Admiral Gambier's medal, Bombardment of Copenhagen, 1807, MED0012, NMM. See collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/40473.html.

95 "Obituary," June 1833.

96 Mezzotint published 2 September 1808, by George Clint, after Sir William Beechey, NPG D34275; stipple and line engraving, published 12 February 1810 (probably 1808), by Gaetano Stefano Bartolozzi, published by T. Cadell & W. Davies, after William Evans, NPG D34274; both National Portrait Gallery, London. Another version in the British Museum's collection (1866,1013.778) was engraved by W. Holl and published by Fisher, Son & Co., London, 1834, as an illustration in volume 5 of William Jerdan's *National Portrait Gallery of Illustrious and Eminent Personages of the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1834). Yet another in the British Museum is a stipple, etching, and engraving by "G. Parker Sc. / from an original Picture by Sir Willm. Beechey, R. A. / Pubd. by W. K. Wakefield, 19, Wellclose Square," ca. 1828–40, 1913,0528.93.

97 Michael Duffy, ". . . 'All Was Hushed Up': The Hidden Trafalgar," *Mariner's Mirror* 91, no. 2 (May 2005), pp. 216–40.

98 N. A. M. Rodger, "Honour and Duty at Sea, 1660–1815," *Historical Research* 75, no. 190 (2002), pp. 425–47; Wilson, *Social History of British Naval Officers,* pp. 196–202.

99 Brenton, *Naval History of Great Britain,* vol. 2, p. 282.

100 Collingwood to his sister, 6 October 1809, in Hughes, *Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood,* p. 295.

101 Gareth Atkins, "Christian Heroes, Providence, and Patriotism in Wartime Britain, 1793–1815," *Historical Journal* 58, no. 2 (June 2015), pp. 407–408.

102 Troy Bickham, *The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the British Empire, and the War of 1812* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 235–57.

103 *Supplement to the London Gazette,* no. 16972, 4 January 1815, p. 19.

104 *London Gazette,* no. 17004, 18 April 1815, pp. 725–26.

105 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* p. 245.

106 Henry Clay to James Gambier, 20 August 1823, in *The Papers of Henry Clay,* ed. James T. Hopkins, vol. 3, *Presidential Candidate* (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1963), pp. 470–71.

107 Peter Nockles, "Oriel and Religion, 1800–1833," in *Oriel College: A History,* ed. Jeremy Catto (Oxford: U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), p. 291.

108 Ibid., note 1.

109 Gambier to Chase, 24 November 1823, KCL 231124b, Bishop Philander Chase Papers, Kenyon College Archives, Gambier, OH [hereafter Chase Papers].

110 Gambier to Chase, 11 December 1823, KCL 231211a, Chase Papers.

111 Gambier to Chase, 16 December 1823, KCL 231216a, Chase Papers.

112 "Obituary," *Gentleman's Magazine,* May 1833, p. 473.

113 Gambier to Clay, 29 June 1824, in Hopkins, *Papers of Henry Clay,* vol. 3, p. 789.

114 George Franklin Smythe, *Kenyon College: Its First Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press for Kenyon College, 1924), pp. 16–58; Smythe, *A History of the Diocese of Ohio until the Year 1918* (Cleveland: Diocese of Ohio, 1931), pp. 115–39.

115 *London Gazette,* no. 18709, 23 July 1830, p. 1539.

116 Placard on Admiral of the Fleet Lord St. Vincent's baton at NMM, available at collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/62081.html.

117 John T. Walbran, *British Columbia Coast Names, 1592–1906: To Which Are Added a Few Names in Adjacent United States Territory, Their Origin and History* (Ottawa, ON: Government Printing Bureau, 1909), pp. 134–35, 197–98, 253–56; Helen B. Akrigg, "Richards, Sir George Henry," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography,* vol. 12, *1891–1900* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1990), available at www.biographi.ca/en/bio/richards_george_henry_12E.html.

Part 3: The New Republic

XII *George Washington's Navy*

George Washington knew little about ships or the sea. Only once was he a passenger on a sea voyage, when he and his brother sailed to Barbados in 1751–52. He visited only two major warships: the French eighty-gun *Duc de Bourgogne* at Newport, Rhode Island, on 6 March 1780, and the 104-gun *Ville de Paris* off Cape Henry, Virginia, on 17 September 1781. Nevertheless, Washington instinctively grasped the strategic importance of a navy as an essential complement to the Continental Army's operations ashore; it became a consistent thread in Washington's thinking throughout the war. With the arrival of the French army in 1780, Washington emphasized that "in any operation, and under all circumstances a decisive Naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend."[1]

"George Washington's navy" and "Washington's fleet" are names that historians have given to a small force of Massachusetts fishing schooners. Before the Continental Navy was authorized, Washington hired these craft at Continental expense, by his authority as commander in chief, to support the Continental Army's operations in New England between 1775 and 1777. This local maritime force was one of several that Americans improvised to meet urgent practical necessities before the Continental Congress agreed to establish a national navy.

Washington's navy itself was preceded by small boats that attacked British positions on Buzzards Bay on the Massachusetts coast in May and June 1775; vessels under Gen. Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain from May 1775; craft used by the militiamen under Jeremiah O'Brien at Machias, Maine, on 12 June 1775; the Rhode Island State Navy, established on 15 June 1775; boats and galleys acquired by Pennsylvania to defend the Delaware River on 6 July 1775; and two vessels captured by O'Brien off Machias formally transferred to Massachusetts on 23 August 1775 to guard the coast. Washington began his naval initiatives in August and September 1775. Not until 13 October did the Continental Congress take the first step toward the establishment of a national navy, by resolving to acquire two ships. Washington's navy, based in Massachusetts, remained under Washington's direction until

late October 1777, when the Continental Navy took over management of its remnants.

ESTABLISHMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

In the early summer of 1775, when Britain's Royal Navy had twenty-nine warships active in North American waters, the Americans had no organized or centrally directed naval force at all. Only a very few Americans had naval experience, but many had wide experience at sea in merchant and fishing vessels, and many had served on board privateers, privately owned and armed vessels with "letters of marque and reprisal" authorizing them to attack enemy merchant ships;[2] such vessels retained a portion of the value of their prizes after legal adjudication.[3] Congress fiercely debated the wisdom and practicality of creating a national navy. Some thought it would so antagonize Britain, the world's leading naval power, that Americans would never be able to reconcile their differences with the Crown. Others argued that an American navy would serve only New England interests. Yet others were convinced that a navy would be too expensive, too difficult to organize, and impossible to maintain, leading only to wasted effort, bankruptcy, and frustration.

While this argument on the political, financial, and logistical aspects of a national navy continued, some in responsible positions between May and July 1775 saw an immediate, practical need for a variety of small, armed vessels to protect American shipping, cut off the enemy's supply lines, and capture enemy supplies and ships for American use.[4] On 20 June 1775, inspired by nearby Rhode Island's creation of a state navy five days before, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress considered arming no fewer than six vessels. It took no action; however, a month later, on 18 July 1775, the Continental Congress sanctioned Rhode Island's naval initiative. It directed, in fact, that in lieu of a national navy, each state establish through its legislature a "committee of safety" to manage its defense and, at its own expense, arm merchant vessels for the protection of its coast.[5]

When this news arrived, the Massachusetts Congress authorized John Glover, the colonel of the 21st Regiment of the Continental Army (formerly the 23rd Massachusetts Militia Regiment), who was from Marblehead, America's foremost fishing port, to lease suitable fishing schooners from Marblehead merchants for the direct support, and under the control, of General Washington. Glover did so and began to convert them into warships at Continental expense at nearby Beverly, manning them from the many experienced seamen and fishermen in his regiment. Colonel Glover was already well known to Washington, who in April had ordered him to prevent intelligence from reaching British ships at Marblehead. Also, when in June 1775 Glover's regiment joined the main army at Cambridge, Massachusetts, it provided the guard detail for Washington's headquarters.[6]

Glover's own vessel, *Hannah,* was the first to be acquired and fitted out for Washington's fleet. On 2 September 1775, Washington explicitly explained to its

captain, Nicholson Broughton, that he was being employed not to fight enemy armed vessels but rather to seize vessels "laden with Soldiers, Arms, ammunition or Provisions."[7] *Hannah* was lost after only a month, but other schooners were already being fitted out. On 4 October, Washington instructed Glover and Stephen Moylan, the army's muster master, to have the vessels appraised as well as manned, armed, and equipped.[8] At the same time, Washington sent Capt. Ephraim Bowen Jr. to Plymouth to fit out two additional vessels. Washington also appointed naval agents for administrative purposes: William Watson at Plymouth and Joshua Wentworth at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Glover appointed his brother Jonathan as the agent for Marblehead and William Bartlett for Beverly. All the agents were to report to Lt. Col. Joseph Reed, Washington's military secretary, or directly to General Washington.

Only on 5 October 1775, having already leased several schooners at Continental expense and sent one to sea, did Washington for the first time (briefly) mention his naval initiatives to the Continental Congress.[9] By that time, however, the Continental Congress had decided to send its newly established military-affairs committee to visit Washington at his Cambridge headquarters. As a result, it was only a day or so after sending his initial report that Washington received notice of this impending visit by three prominent members: Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania (the committee chairman), Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, and Thomas Lynch of South Carolina. Washington reacted immediately, sending to Congress on 12 October fuller details of his naval activities and a copy of the orders he had given Captain Broughton in September.[10]

The delegation arrived at Cambridge on 15 October and had, aside from two days of private talks, five days of discussion with Washington between 18 and 22 October. The congressmen discussed a wide range of military issues, but it was only in the final, private phase that the naval issues arose. The congressmen now heard about Washington's naval activities in detail and agreed to get wider congressional retroactive approval for them. In addition, they agreed on a plan of action to handle the difficult, specific legal procedures for dealing with vessels taken as prizes.[11] This satisfactory outcome was commemorated by the names given three schooners: *Franklin, Lynch,* and *Harrison*.[12]

While the congressional committee was still at Cambridge, Congress finally received Washington's orders to Broughton of six weeks before. From it the congressmen gained their first larger understanding of what Washington was doing in the naval sphere. By this time Congress was in a somewhat better mood than earlier to deal with naval affairs, having just authorized the first two warships of the Continental Navy, on the same day that Washington's letter of the 5th, with its first glimpse of his naval activities, had been read to Congress.[13] Yet it was not until

2 December that Congress sanctioned "the General's fitting out armed vessels to intercept the enemy's supplies."[14]

Meanwhile, on 29 October, Lieutenant Colonel Reed reported to Washington that all four vessels that Glover and Moylan had fitted out since the loss of *Hannah—Lynch, Franklin, Lee,* and *Warren*—were at sea and the two that Bowen had at Plymouth—*Washington* and *Harrison*—would sail within a few days.[15] At the time they had no flag, but on 20 October Reed had suggested the need for one and proposed the design used by the floating batteries, a white flag with a green pine tree and the motto "An Appeal to Heaven." Local seamstresses were now making them, and they were first used in November.[16]

In December 1775, Washington added a new naval agent, appointing Winthrop Sargent to Cape Ann and Gloucester. He and the other four naval agents provisioned the ships monthly, maintained all accounts, and appraised and documented all prizes captured. Their reimbursement was 2.5 percent of the proceeds of prize cargo at sale and 2.5 percent of the prize money disbursed to capturing vessels.[17] This reimbursement was theoretical at the outset, there being no admiralty court to adjudicate prizes so that their cargoes could be released for sale and prize money allocated. Washington repeatedly requested that Congress act on the matter; finally, on 25 November, Congress authorized each state to establish courts for this purpose and laid down standard shares for the division of prize money.[18] The Massachusetts Provincial Congress accordingly established three admiralty courts, and the Massachusetts Council (acting collectively, in the absence of a governor) appointed judges: Nathan Cushing for the Southern District (Plymouth, Barnstable, Bristol, Nantucket, and Dukes Counties); Timothy Pickering for the Middle District (Suffolk, Middlesex, and Essex Counties); and James Sullivan for the Eastern District (York, Cumberland, and Lincoln Counties). Under this arrangement, the Eastern District (in what is now southern Maine) had no business from Washington's schooners. The Southern District dealt with the prizes of the schooners based at Plymouth and the Middle District with those of the Beverly and Marblehead schooners.[19] These courts proved slow to act; the first cases were not heard for three months, after which legal backlogs only increased.

In mid-December 1775, Glover's 21st Regiment returned from Cambridge to Marblehead, as the enlistments for 1775 expired at the end of the year for both the soldiers serving ashore and those at sea in the schooners. With the New Year, a new army was formed and, in this process, the 21st Regiment became the 14th Continental Regiment. While the 14th Regiment continued to be known as the Marblehead Regiment and included many men who had reenlisted from the 21st Regiment, there were not enough men to complete its manning. As a result, Glover expanded his recruiting base for the infantry regiment and the schooners from his

hometown of Marblehead to nearby Lynn and Salem, with an entirely new company coming from Beverly.

When in April 1776 Washington prepared to shift his operations to New York, he delegated the military command of the New England area to Maj. Gen. Artemas Ward. This command included the schooners, for which Washington gave him explicit instructions as to employment and administration.[20] In May 1776 Congress appointed as prize agent for Massachusetts John Bradford of Boston, who in turn removed Glover, Watson, and Bartlett. Those dismissals and Bradford's political appointment caused a great deal of ill will and much confusion, but it reflected a gradual transition of Washington's navy to the control of other agencies. On 11 July, Washington ordered Glover's 14th Regiment to join the main army, then preparing the defenses of Long Island and Manhattan. (Glover's regiment left Marblehead on 20 July and by August would be using its maritime skills to evacuate American troops from Brooklyn to Manhattan. In December it would help ferry troops across the ice-filled Delaware River just before the battle of Trenton.)

General Ward remained in overall command of the schooners until 3 March 1777, when Maj. Gen. William Heath relieved him. By then the only remaining vessel was *Lee*, commanded by Capt. John Skimmer. In July 1777 the creation of the Continental Navy's Board of the Eastern Department in Boston superseded John Bradford's role as agent for the schooners. This board worked to settle the schooners' accounts; some were never resolved.

Captains of Washington's Navy

John Adams (dates unknown). This John Adams formerly had been employed as a merchant ship captain by John Hancock. Naval agent John Bradford hired him in 1777 to command *Lynch,* when John Ayres refused to take that schooner to France with dispatches. Arriving at Nantes, France, on 3 April 1777, Adams took his dispatches to Benjamin Franklin in Paris. He sailed from the Loire River on 19 May, after loading thirty cases with 525 carbines and 450 pistols for the Continental Army. A few miles offshore, HMS *Foudroyant* captured *Lynch* and took it into Portsmouth as a prize. Adams, released after a few days of arrest, returned to Nantes, where he eventually found passage back to Boston. By the time he returned home, there were no longer any ships for him to command in Washington's fleet.

Winborn Adams (dates unknown) had spent most of his career in Durham, New Hampshire, and had participated in the seizure of military stores from Fort William and Mary at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in December 1774. Brig. Gen. John Sullivan, commanding New Hampshire's troops, commissioned him captain of the first company of Durham volunteers who joined the Continental Army. Adams was about forty-five years old when, recommended by Sullivan, he commanded *Warren* in October–December 1775. During this period, he captured three vessels, only one of which was judged a fair prize. Washington considered him an unsuccessful commander and did not reemploy him.

John Ayres (dates unknown). John Lee of Marblehead leased John Ayres's schooner (which became *Lynch*) in October 1775 and recommended that he command it. Washington approved, and Ayres participated in four captures in the company of other schooners but made none on his own. By January 1777, *Lynch* had no usable guns and needed a mast replaced, leaving Ayres only with cartel assignments to exchange prisoners of war at Boston, Newport, and New York. In mid-February 1777, when the Secret Committee of Congress needed a vessel to sail to France with dispatches, Ayres refused to accept the assignment, wanting instead a commission and a larger ship in the Continental Navy. John Bradford ended that ambition when he wrote to Robert Morris, "The late Capt. Ayres Refus'd to go with less than twenty men, and four

guns to support the dignity of his commisn we are luckily rid of him. . . . Why should Ayres like a rotten limb be supported by usefull members. . . . I leave you to judge Sir if that man is diserving a Commissn who the councel did not choose to trust a pacquet by, he is beyond dispute the most Bashful [i.e., unassertive] man on earth."[1]

Nicholson Broughton (1724–3 August 1798) was commissioned a captain in Col. John Glover's 21st (Marblehead) Regiment on 19 May 1775. On 2 September, Washington commissioned him a captain in the Continental Army to command *Hannah*. Over fifty years old at the time, Broughton had some twenty years of experience as a shipmaster in New England waters. After the loss of *Hannah* on 10 October 1775, Washington appointed Broughton to command *Hancock*. Broughton was the commodore of an expedition to the St. Lawrence River with *Franklin,* under John Selman, and *Lynch* in late October 1775. During the cruise Broughton's ships took five prizes, none of which were adjudged as enemy property, and from which they were accused of embezzling goods. In addition, without any authority, they captured and brought home three of the principal residents of Charlottetown, the capital of St. John's (now Prince Edward) Island, including the acting governor of the colony. On Broughton's return to Marblehead in early December, Washington cashiered both Broughton and Selman for failing to follow his orders. As Washington told John Hancock, "My fears that Broughton and Selman would not effect any good purpose were too well founded."[2] Initially Broughton refused Washington's offer of reappointment in Glover's regiment, but he later rejoined and rose to become a major.

William Burke (born ca. 1750) was an officer in four different maritime forces during the American Revolution: George Washington's navy, the Massachusetts State Navy, the Continental Navy, and the privateering fleet. Recruited from New Hampshire, he first served under Captain Adams as master in *Warren* from 30 October 1775. On 1 February 1776, Washington appointed him to command *Warren*. On 26 August 1776, HMS *Liverpool* captured *Warren* and took Burke prisoner. Taken to Halifax, he was first imprisoned ashore, then moved to HM frigate *Lark* for transfer to New York, where he was initially to be exchanged for Lt. Richard Boger, RN. Burke remained a prisoner at New York when this exchange did not take place, but he and three others escaped in February 1778. In May 1778, the Marine Committee appointed Burke captain in the Continental Navy to command the Continental brig *Resistance*. Ordered to locate the French fleet under the comte d'Estaing in late August 1778, Burke disobeyed his orders and sailed far southward, where the British fleet captured him. Again taken as a prisoner to New York, he remained there until exchanged in the spring of 1779. Returning to Boston, he took command of the sixteen-gun, 220-ton privateer *Sky Rocket*. Before he could sail on a privateering voyage, the Massachusetts Council impressed the ship into service in Commodore Dudley Saltonstall's Penobscot expedition. When *Sky Rocket* became trapped with other American vessels in the Penobscot River on 11 August 1779, Burke burned it to prevent its capture. In November 1779, he was appointed captain of the twelve-gun Massachusetts state ship *Henry*. Little is known of *Henry*'s activities or of Burke's subsequent life.

William Coit (26 November 1742–1802). William Coit's father, Daniel, from a prominent New London, Connecticut, shipbuilding family, was the New London town clerk from 1736 to 1771. William Coit attended Yale College, where he graduated with the class of 1761. Following Yale, he went on to study law and was admitted to the bar. Looking for adventure, he spent a few years at sea and became a shipmaster before returning to the practice of law at New London. Elected a selectman in 1771, Coit became a member of the local Committee of Correspondence in December 1774. A flamboyant eccentric, Coit was known as "The Great Red Dragon" for his scarlet cloak. He was described as tall, portly, soldierly in bearing, frank, and jovial. In early 1775 he organized with his own resources a militia company, which he drilled and eventually incorporated into Samuel Holden Parsons's 6th Connecticut Regiment. When the news of the engagements at Lexington and Concord arrived on 20 April, Coit immediately marched his company to nearby Cambridge, Massachusetts. Later he and his company fought at Bunker Hill. Following that battle, he volunteered to command one of Washington's schooners. On 25 October 1775, he arrived at Plymouth, Massachusetts, and took command of *Harrison*. Highly critical of the schooner, he described its outdated armament as "a pair of cohorns that Noah had in the Ark." While in command of *Harrison*, Coit captured four ships, none of which were adjudged enemy property. His one success was to take some enemy pilots in a small schooner. Relieved of command, in November, Coit returned to Connecticut, where the state's Council of Safety put him in command of the eighteen-gun Connecticut state ship *Oliver Cromwell*. In

1. Clark et al., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution,* vol. 7, p. 1217.

2. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1322.

April 1777, Capt. Seth Harding succeeded Coit, who had been unable to recruit enough sailors to get the ship to sea. In September 1777, Coit took command of the twelve-gun privateer *America,* with which he captured two prizes. In 1781, he was wounded and taken prisoner. In 1797, he left Connecticut to live near his daughter in North Carolina, where he died.

Charles Dyar (dates unknown) was recruited by naval agent William Watson at Plymouth to replace Coit in command of *Harrison* in January 1776. Watson sent Dyar, who had sailed in *Harrison* under Coit on its 1775 cruise, to Washington with a letter that described him as one who "wont at first interview appear to your Excellency to advantage, he is no orator & seems rather softly, but his character [stands] high as a good officer, & as an active smart sailor."[3] He commanded *Harrison* for only two months, January and February 1776.

John Manley (ca. 1733–12 February 1793). Reputed to have been born near Torquay, Devon, England, Manley settled in Marblehead, Massachusetts, where he commanded merchant ships. On 17 October 1775, Washington approved his appointment to command *Lee*. Manley took nine prizes before shifting to the schooner *Hancock* and becoming commodore of Washington's fleet in January 1776. In this post, Manley participated in the capture of four more prizes before 17 April 1776, when Congress appointed him to command the thirty-two-gun Continental frigate *Hancock,* then under construction at Newburyport, Massachusetts. In July 1777, the forty-four-gun HMS *Rainbow* captured *Hancock;* Manley was imprisoned at New York until March 1778, when he was exchanged. Acquitted in June 1778 by a court-martial brought to hear charges related to the loss of *Hancock,* Manley successively commanded the privateers *Marlborough* and *Cumberland*. On 29 January 1779, the thirty-six-gun HMS *Pomona* took *Cumberland* off Barbados; Manley was imprisoned with his crew in the town jail at Bridgetown, from which they escaped after several months. Returning to Boston, Manley took command of the eighteen-gun, two-hundred-ton privateer *Jason*. After taking four prizes, his vessel was taken by the twenty-eight-gun British frigate *Surprise*. This time, Manley was taken to the Mill Prison, near Plymouth, England, from where he was unable to escape in three attempts during his two years of incarceration. Through the diplomatic efforts of Benjamin Franklin, Manley was exchanged on 29 December 1781 and returned to Philadelphia on 1 April 1782. In September he was ordered to take command of the Continental frigate *Hague,* in which he captured four or five prizes. He retained command of *Hague* until it was paid off on 4 May 1783. Manley was the most successful of Washington's captains; his early exploits were the subject of the broadside ballad "Manly: A Favorite New Song, in the American Fleet" and of a woodcut portrait published at Salem in March 1776.

Sion Martindale (ca. 1733–ca. 1785). General Washington commissioned Martindale, from Bristol, Rhode Island, to take command of the brig *Washington* in early October 1775 as it was fitting out at Plymouth. Captured soon after setting sail on 3 December and without firing a shot, Martindale and his crew were taken to England in HMS *Tartar* as prisoners. With the brig's capture, the Admiralty also obtained General Washington's instructions to Martindale, through which they learned about American naval strategy, as well as the brig's pine tree flag as a trophy. Martindale and *Washington*'s crew were the first captured American seamen to arrive to England, and people flocked to see the rebels. When it was discovered that the American prisoners were in poor health and possibly contagious, the British authorities consigned them to the smallpox ward at Haslar Hospital near Portsmouth. In February 1776, Martindale with four of his officers and sixteen men were shipped back across the Atlantic to Halifax, where they were imprisoned again. Escaping on 19 June, Martindale went to Plymouth, Massachusetts, where he began a campaign for the reimbursement of his expenses. Eventually he received payment, but in the meantime he had returned to Rhode Island and served as master of the Providence-based privateer *Bradford S*.

James Mugford Jr. (19 March 1749–19 May 1776). After having first been sailing master on board *Franklin,* Mugford took command of the schooner when Samuel Tucker became senior captain and moved to *Hancock* in early 1776. Mugford completed the recruiting for *Franklin*'s crew but avoided formalities by naming his own acting lieutenants without obtaining army commissions for them. He first sailed in *Franklin* from Beverly on 15 May and quickly captured the valuable ordnance storeship *Hope*. *Franklin* and its prize ran aground coming into port, but Mugford efficiently and effectively organized their defense. In the action that ensued on 19 May, the American ships were saved; Mugford himself was the single American casualty.

---

3. Ibid., p. 796.

He was given a hero's funeral at Marblehead, and numerous eulogies of him were published in newspapers in many states.

John Selman (born ca. 1744) was a captain in Glover's Marblehead Regiment and the son of Archibald Selman, who had leased his schooner *Eliza* for Washington's use. Familiar with his father's schooner and already a shipmaster, the thirty-one-year-old Selman took command of the vessel, now named *Franklin,* in October 1775. Assigned to work under Commodore Broughton, Selman took *Franklin* on the expedition to the St. Lawrence River. He was ordered to send prizes of ammunition, clothing, and other stores to the nearest port; to avoid being discovered; and not to visit British-held ports. On Selman's return in December, Washington dismissed him from command; Selman declined Washington's offer to serve further in Glover's regiment.

John Skimmer (d. 3 August 1778). After Mugford's death, senior captain Samuel Tucker recruited Skimmer to take command of *Franklin*. Skimmer was a knowledgeable and established shipmaster, and Tucker was able to get him a brevet commission from Gen. Artemas Ward, who had initially insisted that he had no power to grant such commissions. Between June and December 1776, Skimmer in command of *Franklin* took six prizes. In February 1777, he took command of *Lee* and went on, by this time the last serving captain in Washington's fleet, to take eight more prizes that year. Overall, he took more prizes than any other captain in Washington's fleet. The Navy Board purchased one of Skimmer's last captures, *Industrious Bee,* and named it *General Gates*. In 1778, Skimmer was commissioned a captain in the Continental Navy to command it. During an action in *General Gates* on 3 August 1778, Skimmer was killed.

Samuel Tucker (1 November 1747–10 March 1833) was born in Marblehead, the son of an emigrant shipmaster from Scotland. He went to sea as a boy and by the age of twenty-one was a shipmaster himself. In 1774, he had commanded the brig *Young Phoenix* on a trading voyage to Spain and England. On the recommendations of Robert Morris and John Glover, Washington commissioned Tucker as captain of *Franklin* on 20 January 1776. With Manley's squadron, he took three prizes. In May 1776 he moved to take Manley's place in command of *Hancock* and took eight more prizes. On 15 March 1777, he was commissioned a captain in the Continental Navy to command the twenty-four-gun *Boston*. Captured at Charleston, Tucker was sent home on parole. In 1781, he took command of the Massachusetts privateer *Thorn*. Captured again and released once more on parole, he returned to Massachusetts, where in 1782 he became an owner of one privateer and commanded another.[4]

Daniel Waters (20 June 1731–26 March 1816). John Glover recruited Waters, an experienced seaman from Malden, Massachusetts, to command *Lee*. Receiving from Washington a commission on 20 January 1776, he went on to take nine prizes. Despite the animosity of naval agent John Bradford, Waters received a commission as captain in the Continental Navy on 15 March 1777. With no ship immediately available for him to command, he served initially as first lieutenant under his former commodore, John Manley, in the frigate *Hancock*. In September 1778, following John Skimmer's death, Waters took command of *General Gates*. Unemployed in 1779, he commanded the privateer *General Putnam* and with it was impressed into the Massachusetts navy for the Penobscot expedition. After *Putnam*'s loss, he commanded the privateers *Thorn* and *Friendship* in 1779–80.

---

4. Philip C. F. Smith, *Captain Samuel Tucker (1747–1833), Continental Navy* (Salem, MA: Essex Institute, 1976).

OPERATIONS IN 1775

Hannah, first schooner to get to sea, left Beverly on 5 September and made its first capture the next day. To the disappointment of *Hannah*'s crew, the prize turned out to be the American ship *Unity,* sailing under a British prize crew, and had to be released. Enraged, Broughton's crew, out-of-work fishermen, mutinied in protest of Broughton's choice of target; later Captain Broughton became more careful. He operated in and out of Marblehead on a daily basis but did not dare to stay out overnight. On 10 October, HM (i.e., His Majesty's) sloop *Nautilus* chased *Hannah* and forced Broughton to run it ashore, damaging it beyond repair.

By the end of October, the four schooners fitting out at Beverly were ready. On the 22nd the first of this group, *Hancock* and *Franklin,* sailed. Captain Broughton, now in command of *Hancock,* was designated commodore for an expedition to Nova Scotian waters in search of two British ships reportedly carrying gunpowder and ordnance supplies. On this mission the two schooners reached Prince Edward Island, then called St. John's Island, then returned to Beverly in early December 1775 without achieving their objective. They had captured a number of small vessels, but all had to be returned to their American owners.

The two vessels based at Beverly, *Lee* and *Warren,* were more successful. Capt. John Manley got *Lee* to sea on 28 October. Calling first at Plymouth, he cruised between Cape Ann and Cape Cod. He recaptured an American vessel under a British prize crew and some smaller craft. Most importantly, on 27 November, the small (seventy-four-ton) *Lee* captured the 250-ton ordnance transport *Nancy* and brought it safely into Gloucester, where its rich military cargo was immediately unloaded to supply Washington's army.

Captain Winborn Adams sailed from Beverly in the schooner *Warren* on 31 October. It captured a small schooner and the Boston-bound supply ship *Rainbow* in late November. On Christmas Eve north of Cape Ann, Adams recaptured from a British prize crew the brig *Sally,* bound from Lisbon with a cargo of wine, and brought it in as a Christmas present for General Washington.

Washington, the first of the Plymouth-based schooners to sail, left port at the end of October, but its first cruise ended quickly when its crew mutinied and refused to serve at sea, having enlisted for the army. On 23 November, *Washington* sailed with a new crew, together with *Harrison*. They soon separated: *Washington* remained off Plymouth, while *Harrison* audaciously sailed within sight of the British warships at the entrance of Boston Harbor. Neither schooner achieved results of the kind Washington desired.

Despite the arrival of winter weather, *Washington* put to sea again on 3 December, but within thirty-six hours HMS *Fowey* captured it and took it into Boston as the first American armed vessel to be seized. With the end of 1775, army enlistments expired and the remaining vessels returned to port to reorganize for the

Ships of Washington's Navy

Franklin was named for Dr. Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, chairman of the congressional committee overseeing the Continental Army, who visited Washington in October 1775, while the vessel was being outfitted. John Glover had leased the sixty-ton fishing schooner *Eliza* from Archibald Selman, a fish merchant from Marblehead. Appraised on 10 October 1775, it was valued at £300 3s. 8d. It carried six guns. John Selman was its first commander, in 1775, followed by Samuel Tucker. John Mugford succeeded Tucker and, at his death, in June 1776 John Skimmer took command of *Franklin*. The vessel was returned to its owner in early 1777.

Hancock was named for John Hancock, the Boston merchant and president of the Continental Congress. John Glover leased the seventy-two-ton fishing schooner *Speedwell* from Thomas Grant, a fish merchant of Marblehead. Appraised on 10 October 1775, it was valued at £331 3s. 8d. *Hancock* had a length of sixty feet and a beam of twenty feet, and it carried six four-pounder guns. Following the loss of *Hannah,* Nicholson Broughton became its first commander in October 1775. From January 1776, John Manley commanded it until May 1776, when Samuel Tucker succeeded him. On 30 January 1776, Manley ran it ashore in the engagement with HM brig *Hope,* though it was later refloated. By the end of 1776, it required a complete overhaul and was returned to its owner in early 1777.

Hannah. A fishing schooner owned by John Glover, it was built in 1765, purchased in 1769, and named for Glover's wife. Typically, the schooner fished the offshore banks for part of the year and then traded to the West Indies. Glover leased the ship to "the united Colonies of America" on 24 August 1775. Its exact dimensions are unknown; historians have disagreed on its size, some describing it as having a displacement of seventy-eight tons, as Glover's ledger states, and others forty-five tons, on the basis of the standard lease rate of the time paid per ton per month. It was commissioned on 5 September 1775, carrying four four-pounder guns under Capt. Nicholson Broughton. After a short career, Broughton ran it ashore near Beverly in an engagement on 10 October 1775 with HMS *Nautilus*. Later refloated, it was sold. *Hannah* is often identified as the first armed vessel manned and fitted out for the United States.[1]

Harrison was named for Benjamin Harrison, a member of the Continental Congress from Virginia who served on the congressional committee overseeing the Continental Army and who visited Washington in October 1775, while the schooner was being outfitted. Built in 1761 as *Triton,* the sixty-four-ton vessel was fitted out at Plymouth under the direction of Capt. Ephraim Bowen Jr. The smallest of Washington's schooners, it was armed with four three-pounders and ten swivel guns. It was first commanded by William Coit, in October and November 1775. Charles Dyar took command for January and February 1776. Small and no longer sturdy, the vessel was decommissioned as unfit for further service in early 1776.

Lee, named for Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia delegate to Congress, was originally the seventy-two-ton Marblehead fishing schooner *Two Brothers,* owned by Thomas Stevens. Appraised on 12 October 1775 at £340 10s. and fitted out at Beverly by John Glover, it was armed with four four-pounders, two two-pounders, and ten swivel guns. It was commanded first by John Manley, then Daniel Waters from January 1776, and finally John Skimmer in 1777. The most successful of all Washington's schooners, it captured nine prizes under Manley, another nine under Waters, and eight under Skimmer. The last serving schooner in Washington's fleet, *Lee* was returned to its owner in November 1777.

Lynch was named for Thomas Lynch, a member of Congress from South Carolina who served on the congressional committee overseeing the Continental Army and who visited Washington in October 1775 while the vessel was being outfitted. *Lynch,* originally owned by John Lee of Marblehead, was acquired by Glover to replace the captured *Washington* in late January 1776. John Ayres served as its first captain and in it joined in the capture of four prizes. Capt. John Adams replaced Ayres in February 1777. On 19 May 1777, while on a return passage from France, *Lynch* was captured by HMS *Foudroyant*.

Warren was named for Dr. Joseph Warren, who was killed at the battle of Bunker Hill. The sixty-four-ton schooner's original name was *Hawk,* its owner John Twisden of Marblehead. It was appraised on 12 October 1775 for £340 10s. and fitted out at Marblehead with four four-pounder guns. Capt. Winborn Adams

1. Philip C. F. Smith and Russell W. Knight, "In Troubled Waters: The Elusive Schooner *Hannah,*" *American Neptune* 30, no. 2 (1970), pp. 86–116.

first took *Warren* to sea on 31 October 1775. Its first cruising ground was northeast of Cape Ann, where it took three prizes. William Burke took command in 1776. *Warren* participated in the unsuccessful attack on the troopship *Unity* in June 1776. The twenty-eight-gun HMS *Liverpool* captured it off Nova Scotia on 26 August 1776. Condemned as a British prize, it was serving as a tender to HMS *Milford* when it ran aground and was wrecked in a storm off Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in December 1776.

Washington, named for the commander in chief, Gen. George Washington, was originally a 160-ton fishing schooner from Plymouth named *Endeavor*. It had two owners: George Erving, who owned a three-quarters share in the vessel, and Benjamin Wormwell, its master, who owned a one-fourth share. Early in the war, Erving left town to join the Loyalists in Boston, and the Plymouth Committee of Correspondence confiscated his share. The town and Wormwell leased it to Congress. During a protracted outfitting and manning period, it was rerigged as a brig and armed with six six-pounders and four four-pounders. *Washington* first sailed under the command of Sion Martindale in late November 1775, beginning a very short career. The largest vessel in Washington's fleet, it succeeded in capturing a sloop on 25 November, but on 4–5 December 1775 the twenty-gun HM frigate *Fowey* captured *Washington* off Cape Ann.

coming season.[21] For the fleet's first year of operations, 1775, the agents tallied up twenty-three captures: three ships, three brigs, nine sloops, and eight schooners.[22]

OPERATIONS IN 1776

Only Captain Manley, the most successful of the original six captains, remained in service in the new year. Recognizing his talent, Washington appointed him commodore of the fleet. Even before he learned of his own appointment, Manley put to sea in command of *Hancock* on 20 January. In heavy snow, *Hancock* captured two merchant vessels carrying supplies to the British army in Boston and fought a successful action with the small tender *General Gage*. On Manley's return to port he heard about both his appointment as commodore and Congress's decision to build thirteen frigates for the Continental Navy. He immediately requested a larger ship. Washington promised him one but warned that it would take time and asked him to continue in *Hancock* for the remainder of the season.

On 30 January, while other schooners were locked into harbor by ice, Manley managed to get *Hancock* out of Plymouth, but HM brig *Hope* immediately sighted it and forced Manley to beach *Hancock* south of Scituate. British reports indicated that the vessel was sunk, but in fact Manley succeeded in getting it off and sailed it into Scituate Harbor for repairs.

By the end of February, *Harrison, Lee, Lynch, Franklin,* and *Warren* were readying for sea, having made no captures yet this year. Forming a squadron at Gloucester of all but *Warren,* Manley took it to sea on the night of 2 March, just as Washington was bombarding Boston. The squadron encountered HM brig *Hope* off Cape Ann, and a half-hour running fight ensued. Although unaware of the British army's intention to withdraw from Boston to Nova Scotia, Manley's squadron cruised off Cape Ann, fortuitously on the British evacuation route. A few days later the schooners captured the three-hundred-ton British army transport ship *Susannah* and took it into Portsmouth, New Hampshire. A few days later, back on its cruising

station off Cape Ann, Manley's squadron captured another three-hundred-ton transport, *Stakesby.* As the schooners escorted their prize toward Gloucester, a heavy fog set in and *Stakesby* ran aground. The American seamen attempted to salvage the prize, but some days later the *Hope* brig appeared and burned the vessel to prevent American use of its cargo.

Manley's squadron returned to its station after repair to discover a large fleet of British transports under convoy protection sailing north toward Halifax carrying the troops evacuated from Boston. Manley trailed them in the hope that a vessel might stray from the protection of the convoy. Having no luck, the schooners returned once again to Cape Ann, where they captured the brig *Elizabeth,* carrying a number of Boston Loyalists with their personal belongings.

The schooners returned to their respective ports in early April, just as Washington was moving his command to New York. Shortly thereafter the Continental Congress ordered Manley into the service of the Continental Navy to command the frigate *Hancock,* then under construction at Newburyport, Massachusetts. Washington decided to continue to operate the Massachusetts schooners, despite the loss of his commodore and his own movement to the New York area, exercising command through General Ward.

In early May, the schooners *Hancock* and *Franklin* sailed from Beverly. Within a day *Hancock* captured two brigs bound to Boston with food for the British troops, unaware that they had evacuated. Ten days later, *Franklin* captured a similarly uninformed munitions ship, the 280-ton *Hope,* fully loaded with arms and gunpowder. *Franklin*'s captain, James Mugford Jr., tried to lead *Hope* directly into Boston through a narrow channel, Pulling Point Gut, but both *Hope* and *Franklin* grounded on an ebb tide. Learning of this, the British sent three armed boats from HMS *Experiment* and two from HMS *Renown* to recover *Hope*. The Americans successfully defended their prize, but in the action Mugford died.

Meanwhile, *Lynch* was being refitted at Portsmouth, *Lee* at Gloucester, and *Warren* at Beverly. When the schooners were manned and ready they put to sea and captured the 225-ton transport ship *Anne,* carrying the 1st Battalion of the 71st Highland Regiment from Greenock, Scotland. Shortly afterward, *Franklin,* which had returned to Beverly, came out and engaged two other transport ships in a separate action but failed to take either of them.

In early July, General Lord Howe attacked American positions at New York, at which Washington retreated into New Jersey. Washington was now too preoccupied and General Ward too ill to give much attention to the schooners, so their captains operated on their own initiative as they saw opportunities. Operating in and out of port from late July until early November, they attacked especially Howe's extended maritime line of communication between New York and Halifax. Also,

since British supply ships no longer tried to reach Boston, Washington's schooners ranged more widely along the coast, from the Virginia Capes to Nova Scotia.[23]

Meanwhile, in Congress, controversy was swirling around Esek Hopkins, commander in chief of the new Continental Navy. In the course of that politically charged debate, Congress voted on 5 August 1776 that its "Marine Committee be directed to order the ships and armed vessels, belonging to the continent, out on such cruises as they shall think proper."[24] This order was an attempt by Hopkins's congressional enemies to undercut him, but it also had the effect of bringing Washington's schooners under the immediate control of Congress and the Continental Navy. At the end of 1776, their agents counted twenty-four vessels captured for the year: ten ships, nine brigs, four sloops, and a schooner, many of them larger vessels than their own and carrying arms, troops, provisions, and military supplies.[25]

OPERATIONS IN 1777 AND DISSOLUTION

Notwithstanding their particularly successful 1776 season, the useful employment of the schooners was coming to an end; the Continental Navy and Congress's Marine Committee were gradually superseding Washington's naval arrangements. At the beginning of 1777 the schooners were not in good condition and funds for them were short. John Bradford was obliged to return two schooners, *Hancock* and *Franklin,* to their owners, leaving the little fleet with three captains—Samuel Tucker, John Skimmer, and John Ayres—and no mission.

Nevertheless, there was work to do. On 3 March, *Lynch* sailed to Nantes, France, carrying secret dispatches from Congress to the American commissioners in Paris, Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane. On its return passage in May, carrying arms for the Continental Army, *Lynch* was captured south of Belle Isle in the Bay of Biscay by the eighty-gun HMS *Foudroyant,* commanded by Capt. John Jervis—the future Admiral of the Fleet Lord St. Vincent—and taken as a prize into Portsmouth, England.

The final active vessel of George Washington's navy, *Lee,* left Boston on 20 March 1777, cruised as far south as Bermuda, then turned north to the Grand Banks before returning to Falmouth (present-day Portland, Maine) on 20 June with five prizes. Sailing again on 11 July, *Lee* stayed at sea for three months until it returned to Marblehead on 26 October, ending the longest and last cruise of Washington's schooners, and was returned to its original owner.[26] As the only active schooner in 1777, *Lee* captured all eight prizes taken that year: six brigs, one sloop, and one schooner.[27] With the termination of *Lee*'s lease, the schooner squadron's unresolved accounts and remaining management and prize issues fell to the Navy Board of the Eastern Department.

As the measure of its contribution to the war effort, between 1775 and 1777 Washington's navy seized a total of fifty-five vessels: thirteen ships, eighteen brigs,

fourteen sloops, and ten schooners. Of these, eleven were released as not being proper prizes, four were recaptured later, and two were retaken by the British before they could be brought to port, leaving a net total of thirty-eight enemy vessels captured.

NOTES

This paper appeared in Edward G. Lengel, ed., *A Companion to George Washington* (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 302–19, © 2012 by John Wiley and Sons. It is used by permission.

1 Washington to Lafayette, 15 July 1780, in *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799,* ed. John Clement Fitzpatrick (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931–44), vol. 19, p. 174.

2 David J. Starkey, "Privateering," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History,* ed. John B. Hattendorf (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), vol. 3, pp. 381–84.

3 J. Richard Hill, "Prizes," in ibid.

4 Christopher P. Magra, *The Fisherman's Cause: Atlantic Commerce and Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), pp. 184–85.

5 William Bell Clark et al., eds., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964–2005), vol. 1, pp. 724, 916.

6 Ibid., p. 229; George Athan Billias, *General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners: The Story of the Revolutionary War General Whose Fighting Fishermen Ferried Washington across the Delaware* (New York: Henry Holt, 1960), p. 69; Magra, *Fisherman's Cause,* p. 187 note.

7 Clark et al., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution,* vol. 1, pp. 1287–89.

8 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 290–91.

9 Ibid., pp. 301–302.

10 Ibid., pp. 415–16, 554.

11 Ibid., pp. 568–69, 575.

12 James L. Nelson, *George Washington's Secret Navy: How the American Revolution Went to Sea* (Camden, ME: International Marine, 2008), pp. 108–109, 156–57.

13 Clark et al., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution,* vol. 2, pp. 441–42.

14 Ibid., p. 1233.

15 Ibid., pp. 637–38.

16 Ibid., pp. 538, 565; vol. 3, pp. 321, 482.

17 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 492–93, 635–36.

18 Ibid., pp. 1131–33.

19 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 274.

20 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 659.

21 Chester G. Hearn, *George Washington's Schooners: The First American Navy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 58–115.

22 William Bell Clark, *George Washington's Navy: Being an Account of His Excellency's Fleet in New England Waters* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1960), p. 235.

23 Hearn, *George Washington's Schooners,* pp. 116–207.

24 Clark et al., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution,* vol. 6, p. 63.

25 Clark, *George Washington's Navy,* p. 235.

26 Hearn, *George Washington's Schooners,* pp. 207–22.

27 Clark, *George Washington's Navy,* p. 235.

XIII *Debating the Purpose of a Navy in a New Republic*
The United States of America

1775–1815

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, most European navies operated within contexts of established nation-states with developed bureaucracies and sufficient resources to build and to operate navies capable of a range of operations and roles. The new American republic, in thinking about establishing its own navy, faced not only practical and political problems but also conflicting domestic ideological viewpoints. These views ranged from total opposition to the maintenance of any naval force to specific ideas about what the republic's navy should do. From these and from the early experience of the American navy emerged an American naval ideology.

Americans made two separate attempts to create a navy. The first occurred during the American War of Independence from 1775 to 1783. The second, which began in 1793 after a decadelong hiatus when there was no American naval force, resulted in the navy that has existed since that time. This gestation was a lengthy one and, on many specific issues, reflected neither a clear vision of national independence nor an ideology, or doctrine, for the operation of a navy. There was at first only an impulse to react concretely to the British use of force, doing what one could with the equipment and capabilities at hand. Later generations were to see this ad hoc approach through the lens of a mythology that eventually contributed to the formation of a naval ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the experience of American naval operations during the four decades between 1775 and 1815 can be seen the range of ideological influences and perceptions that were to bear on the formation of the American navy.

THE GRADUAL FORMATION OF A NAVY DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

During the Revolutionary War in 1775–83, the republic that Americans established only very slowly and hesitantly developed the capability to maintain a naval force.[1] As the political crisis between Britain and its American colonies grew into open rebellion in 1774 and 1775, the Royal Navy was superior to all others in the world. However, at this point the French navy had a potential superiority—represented by its ships in unmanned reserve at Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort—and Spanish ships

of the line might come available through a Franco-Spanish alliance.[2] On the opposite side of the Atlantic, meanwhile, both the British and the Americans showed, for quite different reasons, reluctance to begin an all-out naval conflict.

The opening events of the conflict occurred ashore, at the towns of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, on 18 April 1775. The British government initially saw in them civil unrest of a common type, in which order was restored by army troops in a police action and then the situation resolved politically. Among the leading statesmen in the cabinet, only the secretary at war, William Barrington, second Viscount Barrington, advocated a naval solution. His cabinet colleagues quickly rejected his proposal of a blockade of New England ports as tending to encourage further American opposition rather than mollify it. Amid differing political and strategic views within the government, the cabinet eventually decided to send troops to Boston to quash the unrest. However, the commander on the North American Station at the opening of the rebellion, Vice Adm. Samuel Graves, had already begun to bombard colonial ports, although formally the Royal Navy's principal role at that point was to enforce the Navigation Acts in peacetime, and in wartime to support the British army.[3] Graves's action had an effect opposite to that intended, broadening resentment in America and encouraging a maritime response.

Meanwhile, American representatives had gathered in the Continental Congress and had begun a fifteen-year examination of and debate on nearly every fundamental aspect of representative democracy and the institutions appropriate to a republic. The Continental Congress, comprising delegations from the thirteen separate colonies, had no constitutional legitimacy or authority but nevertheless represented the first centralized government over the colonies. As Britain's first attempt to quell the unrest in Massachusetts failed and the rebellion grew, Congress began slowly and erratically to evolve methods, procedures, and authority for a naval force.

In 1774, 1775, and early 1776, the Continental Congress reached no clear consensus about how to form a government. The bitter debates to which that body was prone often reflected differences of personality and local interests as well as disagreements on ends and means with respect to current issues. Some members expressed then-radical ideas about complete independence; others were reluctant to take any steps that would so provoke the British government as to preclude an advantageous political solution within the empire. One such step, some believed, would be to create a united American naval force. For this reason, as well as the expense involved, the First Continental Congress did not raise the subject.[4] The practical difficulties of manning an American navy was another issue that gave pause to some members of Congress. The British Restraining Acts had left some American seamen unemployed, for whom a new American navy would be an opportunity

for new employment, but some of these men were not optimistic about what they could achieve against the well-trained Royal Navy.[5]

As the military situation drew toward the clash at Bunker Hill, Congress voted to create a Continental Army and selected George Washington to be that army's commander in chief.[6] The colonists were also well aware of the sea as a highway of communication, a source of food, and, if necessary, a place for battle. Many shared in the natural impulse of maritime communities to arm ships for their own protection and to promote their cause in the face of British maritime power. Interestingly, the first American maritime response to the actions at Lexington and Concord was to send a fast packet boat to England with the colonists' viewpoints.[7] This points to the importance of what would become a key function for the new American navy, ensuring safe and secure maritime communications.

Meanwhile, in North America, several events occurred that involved armed force afloat. Shortly after Lexington and Concord, the idea came up of capturing the British fortifications at Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga, on Lake Champlain, where the British kept most of their artillery. Militiamen from Massachusetts under Benedict Arnold, from Connecticut under John Brown, and from Vermont under Ethan Allen soon joined forces to undertake the project. Initially and briefly lucky, Arnold's troops captured an armed Loyalist schooner on 11 May 1775 at Skenesboro, New York, renamed her *Liberty,* and put her to use in their attack.[8] A week or so later, on 19 May, another group of Arnold's soldiers captured an armed British supply sloop in the nearby Richelieu River, renamed her *Enterprise,* and then employed her in capturing bateaux.[9] The usefulness of these chance acquisitions suggested the value an organized and trained naval force might have.

Similarly, on the New England coast between May and July 1775, local sailors made minor attacks on British naval forces using whatever arms and small craft were at hand. In late July, Americans in whaleboats attacked and burned the Boston Lighthouse, capturing the marines guarding it.[10] Throughout the war, Americans were typically to use whaleboats for such small raids, which were effective in that they forced the British to divert forces from other missions.[11] These attacks were more frequent off seaports, as "foraging" from ships taking supplies to British forces, again suggesting uses for an organized naval force.

One of the most famous early attacks on the Royal Navy occurred on 12 June 1775, at Machias, Maine. There, local townspeople got into a dispute with a Loyalist who was bringing much-needed supplies to the small lumbering community by sea, escorted by a small Royal Navy schooner, and wanted to obtain firewood for the British army in Boston. After a series of altercations ashore, Jeremiah O'Brien and a group of fellow militiamen put to sea and captured the British naval vessel.[12] This incident is illustrative of a more significant issue, colonists' refusal to honor British

military and naval demands for livestock, food supplies, and fuel as a reaction to British naval bombardments of colonial ports.[13]

At this point, with no central naval force to call on, the individual states had to act on their own. Almost simultaneously with the incident at Machias, the Rhode Island General Assembly on 12 June voted to charter two armed vessels to protect the colony's trade. The two ships—one manned with eight men and a larger one with thirty, all in the colony's pay—were under the overall command of Capt. Abraham Whipple. In Providence, the state capital, the merchant John Brown offered to sell his sloop *Katy* for this purpose.[14] Rhode Island so became the first of the thirteen colonies to create a naval force of its own.[15]

Meanwhile, representatives of all the American colonies had gathered for the Second Continental Congress in Philadelphia. One of South Carolina's representatives, Christopher Gadsden, who had served in it for several years as a purser, believed that the Royal Navy was not as formidable as many feared. He suggested that some smaller British units—cutters, sloops, and schooners—could be quickly seized and then used to take larger warships. John Adams circulated Gadsden's views to legislators in the Massachusetts Provincial Congress.[16] About this same time, Massachusetts too began considering the establishment of its own armed seagoing force. On 7 June, the state legislature established a committee to examine the issue;[17] on the 20th it resolved that Massachusetts supply not fewer than six vessels armed of eight to fourteen guns and a proportionate number of swivel guns and smaller weapons. On further consideration, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress decided that a naval force was too expensive just then.[18] No immediate further action was taken, but the thought remained.

Members of Congress in Philadelphia were beginning to perceive a distinctive role for American naval forces as such. First, they thought (unrealistically, notwithstanding Gadsden's view) about using small armed vessels adapted from merchant service to capture from the Royal Navy larger, purpose-built warships and the trained sailors on board them. Second, they saw an opportunity to force British forces to evacuate Boston by interrupting their supply lines across the Atlantic. Third, American seamen believed that with armed ships they could evade the British blockade of American ports efficiently enough to maintain their traditional maritime trade.[19]

The Continental Congress first moved from discussions about naval affairs to action on 18 July 1775. It was already clear that the conflict had an essential maritime dimension and that there were strategic roles that American naval forces could undertake. However, the delegates in Philadelphia agreed that the powers and resources of the Continental Congress were too limited for any useful naval effort. It could, however, "get out of the way": Congress delegated the matter to each of the thirteen individual colonies—"That each colony, at their own expence

make such provision by armed vessels or otherwise . . . for the protection of their harbors and navigation on their sea coasts, against all unlawful invasions, attacks and depredations, from cutters and ships of war."[20] Soon, however, events were to reveal additional requirements that could be met only by a naval force operating on broader terms than could those of the individual colonies.

Meanwhile, the Continental Congress's action renewed interest on the topic in Massachusetts. At some point between July and August 1775, John Glover, a leading fish merchant of Marblehead and the colonel of the regiment protecting that port, undertook to obtain and arm fishing vessels there. On 24 August 1775, Glover leased to the "United Colonies of America" his own fishing schooner, the seventy-eight-ton *Hannah,* "fitted out & equipp'd with Arms, Ammunition and Provisions, at the Continental Expence."[21]

In early September, Gen. George Washington directed Capt. Nicholas Broughton, a Marblehead fishing skipper and merchant, to take command of *Hannah* as an officer of the Continental Army in Glover's 21st (Marblehead) Regiment. As commander in chief of the army, Washington ordered him to seize "such Vessels as may be found on the High Seas or elsewhere, bound inward and outward to or from Boston, in the Service of the ministerial Army, and to take and seize all such Vessels, laden with Soldiers, Arms, Ammunition, or Provisions for or from s[ai]d Army."[22]

While Broughton and his fellow captains in army-contracted Marblehead fishing vessels carried out naval missions in support of Washington's army from 1775 until 1777, other, complementary initiatives were going forward that pointed to the need of a national naval force and of the central governmental apparatus necessary to build, outfit, man, supply, organize, and direct warships if they are to operate efficiently at sea.

BRINGING REGIONAL INITIATIVES TO CONGRESS

In nearby Rhode Island, the General Assembly passed a resolution on 26 August 1775 recommending to the Continental Congress "that the building and equipping of an American fleet, as soon as possible, would greatly conduce to the preservation of lives, liberty and property of the good people of these colonies."[23]

The Rhode Island delegation to the Continental Congress presented this proposition on 3 October.[24] On the 5th, the day before debate on it was scheduled, Congress received intelligence that two unarmed English brigs carrying supplies to the British army had set sail from England in August for Quebec with no convoy protection.[25] Congress immediately appointed a committee of three—Silas Deane, John Langdon, and John Adams—to prepare a plan for intercepting these vessels. On the same day, Congress ordered General Washington to request that Massachusetts place its two armed vessels under his command and then send them immediately to capture the British supply ships.[26] At the same time, Congress requested

that Rhode Island and Connecticut as well place their armed state vessels on Continental "risque and pay during their thus being employed."[27]

In his *Autobiography,* John Adams recalls that the opposition to these resolutions was "very loud and vehement."[28] The idea of intercepting and attacking British forces at sea was "represented as the most wild, visionary, mad project that ever had been imagined. It was an infant, taking a mad bull by his horns; and what was more profound and remote, it was said it would ruin the character, and corrupt the morals of all our seamen. It would make them selfish, piratical, mercenary, bent wholly upon plunder, &c. &c."[29]

Adams was an ardent advocate for a naval force, and his life experience on the Massachusetts seacoast and his career as a lawyer in local courts had given him much insight into maritime affairs. He explained:

> I had conversed much with the gentlemen who conducted our cod and whale fisheries, as well as the other navigation of the country, and had heard much of the activity, enterprise, patience, perseverance, and daring intrepidity of our seamen. I had formed a confident opinion that, if they were once let loose upon the ocean, they would contribute greatly to the relief of our wants, as well as to the distress of the enemy.[30]

There being no executive branch of government, Congress inched slowly forward with legislation, forming the new American state. On 6 October, the committee presented its report; it was made available to members of Congress before it was to be discussed on the floor. Also on the 6th the Rhode Island resolution was to be debated, but Congress delayed it yet another day.[31] Before that vote Samuel Chase of Maryland wondered aloud whether it was practical to have a naval force, whether an order for its creation would just be "a mere Piece of Paper," and whether a naval force could be raised and paid.[32]

The next day, Congress duly took up Rhode Island's resolution. As John Adams recorded in his notes, Chase vigorously attacked the notion: "It is the maddest Idea in the World, to think of building an American Fleet. Its Latitude is wonderful [i.e., the scope of the proposal and thus the scale of its cost are boundless]. We should mortgage the whole Continent. Recollect the Intelligence on your Table—defend N. York—fortify upon Hudsons River."[33] Gadsden of South Carolina, whose port of Charleston was one of the five largest in the colonies, took a less inflexible view: "I am against the Extensiveness of the Rhode Island Plan, but it is absolutely necessary that some Plan of Defence by Sea should be adopted."[34] After further acrimonious exchanges, the members put off further discussion for nine days, until 16 October.

The letter to Washington that Congress had directed on 5 October had been duly sent the same day by the body's president, John Hancock; on the 12th, Washington's response from his headquarters at Cambridge, Massachusetts, arrived. Washington explained his actions and plans at sea and sent copies of the orders he had given Captain Broughton. He also drew attention to the possible difficulties of

working with several naval forces, each with officers and men engaged on different terms and rates of pay for similar services.

General Washington had also written an earlier letter, on 5 October, and on the 13th it arrived and was read to Congress. By this letter Congress first learned that Washington had on his own already acquired three armed schooners, at Continental expense. He was now asking Congress how captured ships and cargoes were to be disposed of. The effect of Washington's taking this initiative, preempting Congress, was to allow members who had been hesitant to agree more readily to the proposed naval force.[35]

That same day, 13 October, Congress debated the committee's plan to capture the British arms ships and took two firm steps toward, as it proved, creating a navy. First, it authorized purchasing and arming two vessels "to cruize eastward, for intercepting such transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies for our enemies"—the first congressional authorization for national warships.[36] Second, Congress appointed another committee of three—again Deane and Langdon but this time Gadsden in place of Adams—to contract for fitting out these vessels, after having prepared for Congress an estimate of the expense involved and received its approval.[37] This resolution was a significant step toward centralized governmental control: it established the first American governmental supervisory body for a navy. These acts were a substantial advance over what had existed before in America, but what they created was only a faint glimmer of the complicated fiscal-military agencies that supported European navies.

THE CONTINENTAL NAVY IN PERSPECTIVE

Later events demonstrated the cogency of early American reservations about what a small, makeshift naval force could do against a major power. Not surprisingly, superior British naval force crushed the products of these overoptimistic ideas. Congress tried various approaches to efficient central naval administration, but none were successful, and very few men came forward who were capable of managing them.

The service that came to be known as the Continental Navy had a short history, lasting only from 1775 until 1785, when the government dissolved it and sold its last ship. In that brief period, however, the Continental Navy had reached a substantial size: nearly sixty vessels were at one time or another on its list. These included one seventy-four-gun ship of the line (never commissioned) and sixteen frigates, of which six never went to sea. Twelve merchant ships were acquired in America and converted into warships, eleven more purchased in Europe. Five prizes were taken up, as were some local and subsidiary vessels.[38] As Congress was acquiring ships, it was also trying, with great difficulty, to create the administrative structure necessary to manage and support it. To complicate matters, the Continental Navy was not the only force the new nation had at sea. Many operations

that, in theory, a small national navy could have undertaken were more often and more effectively handled by state navies or privateers.[39] The extensive privateering element also competed with the Continental Navy for political support, seamen, gunpowder, and supplies.[40]

During its ten years of existence, the Continental Navy played only a limited role. Its purpose was to contribute to what was for much of the period a civil conflict between colonists and the British government. The Continental Navy operated in the context of people's and partisan warfare. Aside from privateering activities, for which actual privateers were more precisely fitted, the navy did serve with some effectiveness. It undertook vital tasks for the nascent revolutionary government that privateers could not do as effectively, such as showing the flag in foreign waters, carrying government funds, and transporting diplomats. These were vital functions that underscore the navy's role in the rise of a fiscal-military state between 1775 and 1779 and of a symbiotic relationship between that new state and the navy. Thereafter, however, the naval component of this fiscal-military development lost its force as political ideologies resisted the creation of a bureaucratic, central government with executive powers.

With the Peace of Paris, which secured American independence in 1783, the few missions that the Continental Navy had efficiently and uniquely performed were no longer needed. Given the problems of finance and supply, as well as the nearly complete absence of administrators willing to undertake their management, it is not surprising that the new country disbanded its little navy and had for years very little interest in reviving it. In contrast to the great European naval powers, the United States at this point showed neither the desire nor the capability to assemble the infrastructure of bureaucracy, dockyards, and industry that necessarily accompany a navy. The essential centralization of fiscal, bureaucratic, and military control could not be achieved or sustained between 1775 and 1785. The basic elements did not begin to develop until 1794, and only after three decades, in 1815, would they allow at all for the sustainment of the U.S. Navy.

Nevertheless, the Continental Navy did leave a legacy. Recollection of its weaknesses initially deterred new attempts to establish a permanent naval force, but when the young republic decided again to have a navy, the experience of former Continental Navy officers, men, and shipyards was a resource the new navy could draw on for a decade, even two.[41] A fiscal-military organization for the U.S. Navy, comparable to those in Europe in the late eighteenth century, came to full fruition only with the establishment of the naval bureaus in 1842 and their refinement during the war years of 1861–65.

The American naval experience during the Revolutionary War created figures whose exploits made them national heroes. Around them, an extensive and mainly celebratory biographical literature developed, which became the first and

predominant form of naval historical writing in the United States.[42] Among these figures were John Barry, Nicholas Biddle, Gustavus Conyngham, Seth Harding, Lambert Wickes, and, above all, John Paul Jones.[43] Jones became the foremost among America's pantheon of warrior sailors. As President Theodore Roosevelt said at the ceremonial reburial of Jones's remains in the crypt of the Naval Academy Chapel in Annapolis, Maryland, on 24 April 1906: "Every officer in our Navy should feel in each fiber of his being an eager desire to emulate the energy, the professional capacity, the indomitable determination, the dauntless scorn of death which marked John Paul Jones above all his fellows."[44] The creation and sustainment of the ideal of the fighting sailor is a crucial characteristic of a national naval ideology.

THE PERIOD WITHOUT A NAVY

For the nine years between 1785 and 1794, the new American republic had no capacity for deploying armed force at sea. As early as 1777, the Continental Congress sought to establish a formal union of the thirteen states through a foundational document, a constitution. All thirteen states finally ratified it, and it became effective in 1781 as the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. It created a loose association that reserved most of the power to the states; there was no central executive or executive agencies, no judiciary, and no basis for taxation or other means to finance any such. While it did envisage armed forces, it set up no effective way to direct or to provide for them centrally.

Legislators began to find flaws in the Articles, but all the early attempts to make changes failed, owing to the requirement that all state legislatures agree to any proposal. Finally, in 1787, an agreement was reached to convene a grand convention of all the states to consider how to improve the arrangement. The result was the writing in 1787, adoption in 1788, and ratification over the next two years of the Constitution of the United States.[45]

In 1787–88, before final adoption of the Constitution, politicians extensively debated every element and article. Article 1, section 8, clauses 13 and 14, gave Congress the power "To provide and maintain a Navy" and "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." The main issue was whether Congress should actually exercise these powers and establish such a force. The two main political parties, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, took diametrically opposing views of the matter. The Federalists saw a navy as a means of self-defense that would also allow the country to have an active role in international relations. As James Wilson of Pennsylvania asked in debate, "With what propriety can we hope our flag will be respected, while we have not a single gun to fire in its defence?"[46] The main opposition argument held that there was no danger. The United States was separated by the entire Atlantic from the Old World and at peace with all nations: a navy would be superfluous. The Anti-Federalists wanted to focus

on internal expansion within North America, not across the oceans. A third group was allied with the Anti-Federalists but opposed national power in principle and was interested only in local, home rule. As historian Marshall Smelser describes its members, "They seem to have envisioned the United States as peopled by fiercely republican freemen, loosely confederated on a long narrow coastal strip, their provincial affairs more engrossing than the transactions of the distant, gaudy monarchies beyond the concentric arcs of the ocean and the sky."[47] The most effective argument for a navy capable of operating in distant waters appeared in the yearlong debate in the *Federalist Papers*. In that series of articles and elsewhere, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and David Ramsay argued that only a constitution of the nature of that now before the states could make naval defenses possible and create the federal union into a source of maritime strength.[48]

HISTORICAL DEBATES

For many years the prevailing interpretation of the early formation of the U.S. Navy from 1785 has been that of an ideological debate between two broad viewpoints. At first, historians described this schism as party-political differences between the Federalists (whose leaders, such as George Washington and John Adams, argued for centralized government), and the faction that would soon become known as Republicans, or Democratic-Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.[49]

In 1971, Joseph Henrich pointed out that those who opposed the establishment of a navy in the years following 1788 reflected the thinking of the English radical political theorists who had provided the rationale for the Revolution itself. That is, Republican politicians and publicists opposed the navy because they believed it just another tool that would destroy the liberties of Americans.[50] Two years later, John J. Kelly Jr. explained John Adams's opposing views about a navy in ideological terms.[51] W. G. Anderson immediately countered, showing that John Adams had entered the Revolutionary War believing that "human reason and international law would protect the rights of neutral shippers, thus rendering navies unnecessary."[52] However, growing practical experience in diplomacy in Europe during and immediately after the Revolution led Adams to modify his views and conclude that armed force was necessary for the safety of commerce at sea.[53]

From 1980, historians began to refer to the contending groups simply as "navalists" and "anti-navalists," moving away from purely party-political explanations. Craig Symonds has explained that the two opposing ideologies both supported having a navy but differed with regard to its employment. The navalists were those who considered a navy a symbol of national adulthood. They were "concerned with image, honor, prestige, and diplomatic clout."[54] The anti-navalists "opposed a navy whose mission would be to impress other nations with America's potential strength and vitality and therefore to act as either a deterrent to war or as a means

of exercising leverage on the policies of other nations."[55] The anti-navalists saw that a navy would involve the United States in European politics and be very costly.

In 2006, Joseph P. Slaughter II presented a critical revision to the earlier interpretations. He argued that there were five, not two, competing strategic visions for an American navy. The first view was that there should be no navy at all. Those who did desire a navy had, among them, four strategic visions: a commerce navy, a regional navy, a capital navy, and a coastal navy. Each of these, Slaughter argued, was a product of various factors: contingencies, international and domestic politics, republican ideology, and economic realities.[56] Each was put into practice at various points in the first thirty years of the republic.

A Country without a Navy

Slaughter argues that anti-navy policy makers held power between 1782 and 1793, a period when the country's finances were fragile and no external situations created pressure for a navy.[57] The only demand for armed ships was in connection with the customs and coastal shipping protection.

George Washington became the first president and John Adams his vice president on 30 April 1789. As a central government began to develop under the Federalist Party's leadership, the Treasury Department, under Alexander Hamilton, quickly became the largest of the new government agencies. In April 1790, Hamilton took the first step toward the establishment of the Revenue Marine, laying before Congress a bill authorizing a flotilla of ten cutters. These armed vessels, thirty-six to fifty feet long, began to get to sea in 1791 to guard trade in local waters and enforce the payment of customs duties, the only source of income for the new republic.[58]

A Commerce Navy, 1794–1796

There was no urgent need for an American navy until the Wars of the French Revolution, when Portugal, which had been protecting neutral trade to the Mediterranean from North African corsairs, was induced by Britain to divert its naval activity to the larger campaign against France. American shipping was now exposed to attack, creating the first demands in America for the establishment of a new naval force, what was to be the U.S. Navy, in 1794–96.[59]

A Regional Navy, 1797–1800

Americans saw the need to protect their neutral trade broaden to the North American coast and the West Indies when the French Directory authorized privateers to operate in those regions. It was in this initial context that Congress and the Federalist civilian leadership of the new U.S. Navy began to develop ideas for a more significant, capital-ship navy.

A Capital-Ship Navy, 1799–1800

In 1799, in the midst of the Quasi-War with France and in the last years of the Adams administration, Congress authorized the construction of six seventy-four-gun

ships of the line, but the program quickly proved overambitious. Naval expenses jumped to nearly $3.5 million, or 29 percent of the nation's total expenditures.[60]

A Commerce Navy, 1801–1805

The election of Thomas Jefferson as president in 1801 brought the Republican Party to power. Jefferson returned the Navy to its commerce-protecting role in the Mediterranean when the bashaw of Tripoli declared war on the United States in 1801 at the outset of the Barbary Wars. A peace treaty in 1805 ended the immediate threat, but commerce protection continued as the primary purpose of American naval operations for the following year or so.[61]

A Coastal Navy, 1806–1812

Already, despite the continuing overseas threat to commerce, Congress had been rapidly reducing the naval budget; as early as 1801, during the Barbary Wars, Congress had demanded that the Navy sell off its ships except for a small core of frigates. By 1810, the Navy's budget had been pared to under $1.7 million, or 12 percent of the federal budget.

At the same time, however, Great Britain's need for seamen to man its fleet to fight Napoleon was increasing, and a number of vessels were assigned to impress them. When in April 1806 one of these, the fifty-gun HMS *Leander,* intending to fire across the bow of an American ship off New York, hit and killed an American seaman, Americans began to become more concerned about coastal defense. Their agitation increased when in 1807 HMS *Leopard* attacked USS *Chesapeake* on suspicion of harboring British deserters.[62]

Jefferson's reaction was not to go to war but to turn to economic sanctions and defensive coastal naval operations. Congress resorted to constructing 188 gunboats as an alternative to expensive fortifications, although not a replacement for a seagoing navy.[63]

THE WAR OF 1812

In 1812, the American government initiated a war against Britain without the resources, military or naval, needed to fight a war effectively; it was still wedded to the idea of a coastal navy. In that war, which lasted from 1812 to 1815, the U.S. Navy achieved some remarkable single-ship victories and its sailors demonstrated laudable courage and stamina, but over the course of the conflict the Royal Navy virtually eliminated it.[64] That the war ended in American victory was not the result of military or naval prowess. Rather, as was the case in some twentieth-century "small wars," Britain, exhausted from the Napoleonic Wars, was unable and unwilling to stretch its resources to the extent necessary to defeat the Americans. The U.S. Navy tacitly benefited from the *Pax Britannica* that followed, developing independently from 1815 as a commerce-protection navy. Beyond that, however, the naval War of 1812 left among Americans an ideological legacy that had several dimensions.

Popularized retrospectively as "America's Second War of Independence," the conflict inspired inspirational legends and romantic, nationalistic notions about American naval excellence. The stories center mainly on the frigate actions of the first six months of the war, particularly those of the frigate *Constitution*—"Old Ironsides," still preserved today in Boston Harbor to perpetuate those sentiments. Other sources included the naval battles on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain and the British defeat at New Orleans.[65] The famous wartime slogan "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights," which evoked two naval goals of the war and which Capt. David Porter flew from the masthead of USS *Essex* to inspire his crew, remained a catchphrase for more than a century. A fusion of the Enlightenment with plebeian ideals of the Age of Revolution, the phrase captured American wartime sentiments and took on numerous dimensions in American culture and ideology.[66] Similarly, Capt. James Lawrence's dying words "Don't give up the ship," uttered as his USS *Chesapeake* was on the verge of capture by HMS *Shannon,* became a heroic slogan. Oliver Hazard Perry displayed it on a banner in his victory on Lake Erie a few months later. That flag in turn became a naval icon, still widely reproduced across America in the twenty-first century.[67] In particular, the American naval exploits of the War of 1812 became part of the ideological, rhetorical advocacy for an entirely different, major-power navy in the 1880s and 1890s.[68]

The American general public tends to forget the details of naval history between 1775 and 1815, but not such figures as John Paul Jones, James Lawrence, David Porter, and Oliver Hazard Perry, or the frigate *Constitution*. With these names are still associated important patriotic and inspirational stories that resonate today for many Americans, and especially for the professionals serving in the navy of the United States.

NOTES This essay appears in J. D. Davies, Alan James, and Gijs Rommelse, eds., *Ideologies of Western Naval Power, c. 1500–1815* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 280–99. It is used by permission.

1 This section uses material from John B. Hattendorf, "La formation et les missions de la Marine continentale américaine," in *Les marines de la guerre d'Indépendance américaine,* vol. 1, *L'instrument naval,* ed. Olivier Chaline, Philippe Bonnichon, and Charles-Philippe de Vergennes (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013), pp. 79–106; English version in Hattendorf, *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011), pp. 185–203. For the first studies of early American naval administration, see Charles Oscar Paullin, "The Administration of the Continental Navy of the American Revolution," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (September 1905), repr. in Paullin, *Paullin's History of Naval Administration* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968); Paullin, *The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy, and Its Achievements* (Cleveland, OH: Burrows Brothers, 1906); and Gardner W. Allen, "Naval Administration and Organization," chap. 2 in *A Naval History of the American Revolution* (1912, 1940; repr. New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), pp. 20–58.

2 Jonathan R. Dull, *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), p. 19.

3 For Navigation Acts enforcement see Neil R. Stout, *The Royal Navy in America, 1760–1775: A Study of Enforcement of British Colonial Policy in the Era of the American Revolution* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), and Thomas C. Barrow, *Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660–1775* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967). For support to the army, N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Allen Lane, 2004), pp. 330–33.

4 Raymond G. O'Connor, *Origins of the American Navy: Sea Power in the Colonies and the New Nation* (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1994), pp. 16–17.

5 Richard Buel Jr., *In Irons: Britain's Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 79–80.

6 Edward G. Lengel, *General George Washington: A Military Life* (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 81–91. See also Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789* (New York: Macmillan, 1971; 2nd ed., Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1983).

7 George C. Daughan, *If by Sea: The Forging of the American Navy—from the Revolution to the War of 1812* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 14–15.

8 Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, 11 May 1775, in *Naval Documents of the American Revolution,* ed. William Bell Clark et al. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1964–) [hereafter *NDAR*], vol. 1, pp. 312–13. For a thorough and modern study, see James L. Nelson, *Benedict Arnold's Navy: The Ragtag Fleet That Lost the Battle of Lake Champlain but Won the American Revolution* (Camden, ME: International Marine / McGraw-Hill, 2006).

9 Extract of a letter from Crown Point, 19 May; Arnold to the Albany Committee of Safety, 22 May 1775; both in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 1, pp. 367, 503–504.

10 Loose sheets in the narrative of Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, 31 July 1775; general orders issued by George Washington, 1 August 1775; both in ibid., pp. 1022, 1027.

11 David Syrett, "Defeat at Sea: The Impact of American Naval Operations upon the British, 1775–1778," in *Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution,* comp. Naval History Division (Washington, DC: Naval History Division, 1977), pp. 14–15.

12 Journal of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, 26 June 1775; Deposition of Thomas Flinn, Master of the *Falmouth Packet,* 10 July 1775; both in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 1, pp. 759, 848–49. See also James L. Nelson, *George Washington's Secret Navy: How the American Revolution Went to Sea* (Camden, ME: Ragged Mountain / International Marine, 2008), pp. 22–28; and Daughan, *If by Sea,* pp. 24–26.

13 David C. Hsiung, "Food, Fuel, and the New England Environment in the War for Independence, 1775–1776," *New England Quarterly* 80, no. 4 (December 2007), pp. 614–51.

14 Journal of the Rhode Island General Assembly, 12 June 1775; John Brown to Ambrose Page and Nicholas Cooke, 12 June 1775; both in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 1, pp. 664–65.

15 Eventually, twelve of the thirteen colonies formed naval forces of their own. Only Delaware lacked a navy. See Robert L. Scheina, "A Matter of Definition: A New Jersey Navy, 1777–1783," *American Neptune* 39, no. 3 (July 1979), pp. 209–17.

16 John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, [7] June 1775, in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 1, pp. 628–29; Christopher Magra, *The Fisherman's Cause: Atlantic Commerce and the Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), pp. 182–83.

17 Journal of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, 7 June 1775, in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 1, pp. 621–22.

18 Journal of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, 20 June 1775, in ibid., p. 724.

19 Magra, *Fisherman's Cause,* p. 186.

20 *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 18 July 1775, in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 1, p. 916.

21 George Washington's instructions to Captain Nicholas Broughton, 2 September 1775, in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 1, pp. 1287–89. For the "United Colonies of America," Magra, *Fisherman's Cause,* p. 188.

22 Washington's instructions to Broughton.

23 Journal of the Rhode Island General Assembly, 26 August 1775, in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 1, p. 1236.

24 *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 3 October 1775, in ibid., vol. 2, p. 285.

25 *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 5 October 1775, in ibid., pp. 307–309.

26 John Hancock to George Washington, 5 October 1775, in ibid., pp. 311–12.

27 John Hancock to Nicholas Cooke, 5 October 1775, in ibid., pp. 312–14.

28 John Adams, *Autobiography,* in *The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States,* vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1851), extract quoted in *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 5 October 1775, in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 2, pp. 308–309 note 2.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid. As early as 1755 Adams had written, "We have (I may say) all the naval Stores of the Nation in our hands, it will be easy to obtain the mastery of the seas, and then the united force of all Europe, will not be able to subdue us." John Adams to Nathan Webb, 12 October 1755, with comments by the writer recorded in 1807, in *Papers of John Adams,* vol. 1, *September 1755–October 1773,* ed. Robert J. Taylor, Mary-Jo Kline, and Gregg L. Lint (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), p. 5, available at *Founding Families: Digital Editions of the Papers of the Winthrops and the Adamses,* ed. C. James Taylor, 2007, www.masshist.org/ff/.

31 *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 6 October 1775, in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 2, pp. 328–29.

32 John Adams's notes on the debates of 6 October 1775, in *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams,* ed. L. H. Butterfield, Leonard C. Faber, and Wendell D. Garrett, vol. 2, *Diary 1771–1781* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard Univ. Press, 1962), p. 194, extract quoted in *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 6 October 1775, p. 329 note 2.

33 John Adams's notes on the debates of 7 October 1775, in Butterfield, Faber, and Garrett, *Diary 1771–1781,* p. 199, extract quoted in *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 7 October 1775, in Clark et al., *NDAR,* vol. 2, p. 341 note.

34 Ibid.

35 For an overview of this subject, see John B. Hattendorf, "George Washington's Navy," in *A Companion to George Washington,* ed. Edward G. Lengel (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 302–12, and in the present volume (chapter 12).

36 *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 13 October 1775, in Clark et al., ed., *NDAR,* vol. 2, pp. 441–42.

37 Today, the U.S. Navy recognizes this resolution of 13 October 1775 as marking its official "birthday."

38 For details of the vessels, see Howard I. Chapelle, *The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their Development* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949; repr. New York: Bonanza Books, n.d.), chap. 2, pp. 52–114. For a recently researched, succinct list with ships' data, see Paul H. Silverstone, *The Sailing Navy, 1775–1854* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–16.

39 Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power* (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 16–17; Daughan, *If by Sea,* p. 225.

40 William J. Morgan, "American Privateering in America's War for Independence, 1775–1783," *American Neptune* 36, no. 2 (April 1976), pp. 79–87.

41 Daughan, *If by Sea,* pp. 319–21.

42 The published literature going back to the early nineteenth century is large, but more recent, scholarly, or document-based works of collective biography are William James Morgan, *Captains to the Northward: The New England Captains in the Continental Navy* (Barre, MA: Barre Gazette, 1959), and James C. Bradford, ed., *Command under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1775–1850* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985).

43 For Jones: Lincoln Lorenz, *John Paul Jones: Fighter for Freedom and Glory* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1943); Samuel Eliot Morison, *John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959); Evan Thomas, *John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003); James C. Bradford, ed., *The Papers of John Paul Jones* (Cambridge, U.K.; Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1986), 10 microfilm reels, 35 mm; and Bradford, *Guide to the Microfilm Edition of the Papers of John Paul Jones, 1747–1792* (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1986). For Wickes: William Bell Clark, *Lambert Wickes: Sea Raider and Diplomat* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1932). For Harding: James L. Howard, *Seth Harding, Mariner* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1930). For Conyngham: Robert Wilden Neeser, ed., *Letters and Papers Relating to the Cruises of Gustavus Conyngham* (New York: De Vinne for the Naval History Society, 1915). For Biddle: William Bell Clark, *Captain Dauntless: The Story of Nicholas Biddle of the Continental Navy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1949). For Barry: William Bell Clark, *Gallant John Barry, 1745–1803: The Story of a Naval Hero of Two Wars* (New York: Macmillan, 1938); and Tim McGrath, *John Barry: An American Hero in the Age of Sail* (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2010).

44 "Address of President [Theodore] Roosevelt," in *John Paul Jones Commemoration at Annapolis, April 24, 1906,* comp. Charles W. Stewart (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1907; repr. 1966), p. 16.

45 For a general history, see Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1969); and Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010).

46 James Wilson, 11 December 1787, quoted in Marshall Smelser, *The Congress Founds the Navy, 1787–1798* (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1959; repr. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1973), p. 7.

47 Ibid., pp. 19–20.

48 Ibid., p. 9.

49 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1939); Smelser, *Congress Founds the Navy*.

50 Joseph G. Henrich, "The Triumph of Ideology: The Jeffersonians and the Navy, 1779–1807," abstract (unpublished PhD thesis, Duke Univ., 1971), pp. i–ii.

51 John J. Kelly Jr., "The Struggle for American Seaborne Independence as Viewed by John Adams" (unpublished PhD thesis, Univ. of Maine, 1973).

52 William Gary Anderson, "John Adams and the Creation of the American Navy," abstract (unpublished PhD thesis, State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 1975), pp. iii–iv.

53 Ibid.

54 Craig L. Symonds, *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785–1827* (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1980), p. 12.

55 Ibid., p. 11.

56 Joseph Payne Slaughter II, "A Navy in the New Republic: Strategic Visions of the U.S. Navy, 1783–1812" (unpublished MA thesis, Univ. of Maryland, College Park, 2006), p. 13.

57 Ibid., pp. 14–28, 105.

58 Irving H. King, *George Washington's Coast Guard: Origins of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, 1789–1801* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978), pp. 1–17, 33–62.

59 For this period, see Michael J. Crawford and Christine F. Hughes, *The Reestablishment of the Navy, 1787–1801: Historical Overview and Select Bibliography* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1995).

60 Slaughter, "Navy in the New Republic," pp. 38–44, 105–106.

61 Ibid., pp. 44–46, 106.

62 Ibid., p. 79.

63 Ibid., pp. 73–90, 106; Gene A. Smith, *"For the Purposes of Defense": The Politics of the Jeffersonian Gunboat Program* (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1995); Spencer C. Tucker, *The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1993).

64 Brian Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812–1815* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2011); Andrew Lambert, *The Challenge: Britain against America in the Naval War of 1812* (London: Faber & Faber, 2012).

65 Mark Collins Jenkins and David A. Taylor, *Yardarm to Yardarm: How the War of 1812 Created America's Navy* (Boston: Boston Publishing in association with the Naval History and Heritage Command, 2012); William S. Dudley and J. Scott Harmon, eds., *The Naval War of 1812: "America's Second War of Independence"—Collections of William I. Koch and the U.S. Naval Academy Museum* (Virginia Beach, VA: Donning, 2013).

66 Paul A. Gilje, *Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), pp. 337–43.

67 Nicole Eustace, *1812: War and the Passions of Patriotism* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), pp. 76–117.

68 See Mark R. Shulman, *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

XIV *The Naval War of 1812 in International Perspective*

If, as often has been said, the War of 1812 has been a "forgotten conflict," it hardly can be so now, in the light of the commemorative events surrounding its bicentenary in the United States and Canada and the scholarly conferences and waves of new books and articles on the topic. There was even doubt about this characterization a decade ago, but surely we must cast it aside now.[1] In the past few years, new work by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic has certainly brought the subject before a much wider audience and offered a range of interpretations. Authoritative accounts, such as that by Donald Hickey, have been updated and reissued in the past decade, and historians have made important new contributions to understanding the war.[2] These include Barry Gough, David Skaggs, Nicholas Rodger, Jon Latimer, Jeremy Black, Gordon Wood, Stephen Budiansky, George Daughan, Kevin McCranie, Brian Arthur, Andrew Lambert, J. C. A. Stagg, Troy Bickham, and Nicole Eustace.[3] The U.S. Navy itself has contracted for the writing of a commemorative coffee-table history of the naval war and is completing four large volumes of edited historical documents.[4]

Across all these books—not to mention scholarly articles—there is still, however, a surprising lack of unanimity on how and why the war began, what the effects of military and naval operations were, how the war ended, and what its ultimate outcome was. These are certainly the fundamental questions that students and faculty at any war college need to ask as they try to understand a major issue of human history: the problem of war itself. To grapple with these fundamental issues, one needs to go beyond the details of military and naval operations and look at the larger issues.

In the case of the War of 1812, that has been extremely difficult to do. Among the belligerents, fundamental patriotic passions survive after two hundred years, and even new scholarship reflects meanings assigned the war by national historians. For Canadians, who fought the war as British colonials, the War of 1812 has had a pivotal place in national history and recollection. For many years Canadians accepted the myth that militia in Upper Canada (now Ontario) had saved the province from conquest by the United States, a myth that became part of the national

narratives of loyalty to the Crown as well as an instance of an early nationalistic impulse. The eminent Canadian military historians George Stanley and Charles Stacey exploded the militia myth, only to replace the militia with the regular British army and the Royal Navy. On the maritime side, Canadian historians have studied actions on the Great Lakes and privateering.[5]

Recent Canadian scholarship in social and military history has shown that there was at the time of the War of 1812 a strong element of Americanization in the Canadian provinces resulting from economic developments south of the border. A large number of Americans had left the United States to take advantage of the availability of Crown lands in Canada. British officials feared that these recent arrivals were not loyal at all and gave the British army more reason to defend Canada than the Americans had to attack it. More broadly, modern research has shown that, in contrast to the traditional story, public attitudes toward the war outside Upper Canada were either ambiguous or ambivalent, certainly among francophones, of whom many were still doubtful about British rule and had little interest in American republicanism.[6]

In the United States, the War of 1812 was originally and widely seen as culminating what had been started in 1775. By the late nineteenth century there remained in public memory only such events as Andrew Jackson's victory at New Orleans in 1815, the Navy's frigate victories early in the war, the burning of Washington, and "the rockets' red glare" that showed that the flag was still there at Baltimore. In twentieth-century American historical writing, historiography of the war became somewhat confusing. On one hand, it was seen in terms of the rise of America as a world power, on the other as a product of the dynamics of internal American regional politics and interest groups in the expansion of the United States across the continent. A scholarly debate resulted over whether internal or external causes for the war had been foremost, to be replaced by exchanges about the rise and preservation of republicanism, the assertion of individualism, liberalism, and domestic political extremism.[7]

Meanwhile, there has been a more consistent discussion among naval historians. The discussion here falls into several national categories and perspectives. On the American side, the longest tradition in American naval historiography comprises the many heroic biographies of naval captains (such as James Lawrence, Stephen Decatur, John Rodgers, and Isaac Hull) and of the American commanders in the battles on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain (Oliver Hazard Perry and Thomas Macdonough).[8] This category has also included studies of the wartime frigates, both collectively and individually.[9]

A complementary American line of naval interpretation has been called the "navalist school," referring to those who between 1882 and 1905 argued for a strong U.S. Navy. This group interpreted the naval side of the War of 1812 as a cautionary tale of the dire straits that befall nations with inadequate naval preparation and

naval force.[10] The most prominent authors in this school were a future president of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, and the naval historian and theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan.[11] The nineteenth-century navalists argued that the lack of naval preparation before 1812 had crippled the United States at sea; the more extreme interpreters went further, to claim that it was the glorious victories won by heroic American sailors that had obtained an acceptable end to the war. The navalists concluded that the War of 1812 showed future generations the futility of land warfare and demonstrated the strategic imperative of a strong navy for national defense. Captain Mahan also used the War of 1812 as an instructive example for current policy but was more cautious: "Not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided, but by force massed, and handled in skillful combination." Mahan advised, "It matters not that the particular force be small. The art of war is the same throughout; and may be illustrated as readily, though less conspicuously, by a flotilla as by an armada."[12]

This American naval tradition of using the War of 1812 as an exemplar continues to this day. In the preface to the U.S. Navy's coffee-table, illustrated history of the war, the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus (served 2009–17), wrote, "The lessons that the Navy and Marine Corps learned during the War of 1812 continue to shape our history. Our earliest heroes—Decatur, Hull, Perry, Macdonough, Porter, and others—set the standard for leadership, courage, seamanship, and innovation that our modern leaders strive to emulate."[13] In the June 2012 issue of *Naval History* magazine, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, USN (served 2011–15), draws three "key lessons from the U.S. Navy's first sustained trial by fire": "Warfighting First. Operate Forward. Be Ready."[14] The Navy's experience in that war showed that shortfalls in preparation before the war had hurt the country. At the same time, its tactical proficiency, forward operations, and warfighting readiness became naval hallmarks that endure today in public memory.[15]

The interpretation of the war in British scholarship was established by William M. James soon after the conflict.[16] First, he sought to correct the exaggerated claims of American writers and to show how effectively a great navy had dealt with minor American naval forces at a time that it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle against Napoleon. As N. A. M. Rodger put it, "For the British the American War was a tiresome irritant, which they wished to end by bringing home to Madison's government the reality of its situation, without diverting major forces from the final effort to defeat Napoleon."[17] Brian Arthur has produced impressive and detailed research on the growing effectiveness of the British naval blockade, and Andrew Lambert has offered a precise, detailed, and documented demolition of the traditional American navalist interpretation.

This wide variety of nationally oriented scholarship points to the need for a balanced interpretation that views the war from all sides and in terms of those

basic questions that one should ask: How do wars begin?[18] What are the effects of armed force in achieving objectives or thwarting those of the opponent? How do wars end? To that end, Jeremy Black, J. C. A. Stagg, and Troy Bickham have already made impressive contributions. Certainly more new scholarship and interpretation will come in the future, but one can offer at the moment a tentative summary, a progress report.

HOW THE WAR OF 1812 BEGAN

The roots of the war stretched back a decade or more on both the British and American sides. For some in Britain, the new American republic had proved both erratic and irritating. Incessant American protests about impressment and neutral rights were bothersome and seemed entirely out of place in Britain's struggle, often alone, to survive against overwhelming French military power. The Americans seemed overambitious, greedy, and avaricious, eager to expand their territory, trade, and profits at the expense of Britain and Spain. A vocal group of British critics still resented the terms on which the Whig governments of Lord Rockingham and the Earl of Shelburne had granted American independence in 1783, thinking the terms and boundaries far too generous. Moreover, Americans appeared to favor France over Britain. It was understandable that Americans had some empathy with France, given that American independence resulted from French intervention and that there were ideological connections between American and French republicanism. But continuing American support for Bonaparte, the archdictator and destroyer of liberty, was going too far.[19]

From the American point of view, there was neither a single stated cause nor catalyst that moved President James Madison to propose war to Congress in June 1812. Madison's official war message amounted to twelve pages of meandering complaints that even he admitted were not all-inclusive. Britain's interference with American neutral trade through its orders in council and its continuing policy of stopping American ships and searching them for British subjects to impress into its naval service topped the list of Madison's complaints, followed by a charge that British agents were stirring up Native American tribes against the United States. But these and the others were all effects of a deeper cause—that is, Americans felt, that Britain did not respect America's independent sovereignty or its honor as a nation. War was an ideological and practical protest against an attitude that Americans did not like.[20]

On the domestic side, 1812 was a presidential election year in the United States, and Madison was maneuvering to keep his Republican Party in power. The declaration of war was made in June 1812; the presidential election was to be in November. Madison was not regarded as a strong leader, and during the first three years of his administration he had certainly preferred peaceful methods. For example, he had been behind the restrictive trade system that had been in place between 1806 and

1811.[21] By 1812, it was clear to Madison that these restrictions needed to be backed with force if they were to bring the results that he and the Republicans wanted, and his formal declaration of war stated that the central issues were maritime in nature.

However, this does not seem to have been the case. Nicole Eustace's research on the cultural history of the war among the general American population shows that the context of the Republicans' prowar rhetoric was completely different from what military, naval, and maritime professionals—and historians of these topics—typically think. This view helps to explain why this war has been so baffling and difficult to interpret.

The three main issues—impressment, trade, and Indians—were cast, Eustace argues, in terms of internal and domestic development. Impressment was portrayed to the American public as a British attempt to rupture American families: by taking away American men, putting them in a kind of slavery on board British warships, and destroying their rights as American citizens.[22] These issues also tied into a then-widespread discussion in America of Thomas Malthus's theory of population growth—that if unchecked it will outstrip available resources. That theory was a convenient strawman for the Madison administration, among whose supporters were printers who even produced an American edition of Malthus's 1798 *Essay of the Principle of Population*. Prowar polemicists pointed to Malthus's conclusion in order to rebut it, to celebrate and encourage American population growth.[23] Prowar rhetoric linked all this to Republican ideas about personal freedom inherent in American citizenship, trying to show that impressment, the British attitude toward neutral trade, and Britain's dealings with Native Americans contravened rights of Americans to happy families with numerous children, population growth, and expansion into Native American lands.[24]

The opposing political party, the Federalists, thought none of these issues were worth fighting about; every Federalist in Congress voted against the war.[25] Nevertheless, Republicans passed the declaration of war that Madison requested.

THE CONDUCT OF WAR TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

In comparison with those of many other wars in history, American political objectives in the War of 1812 were very limited. It was not to be a war for survival, and most of the population was not involved. Of a total population of about 7.2 million people in 1810, more than 500,000 served in some fighting capacity, but of these only 57,000 were regular soldiers, and casualties were only 2,260, or half of 1 percent.[26] Madison and his administration, however, were apparently unaware that war is contingent and that chance can lead to unintended consequences for a war's results.

The United States was curiously unprepared for war. The U.S. authorized strength of the Army had been since 1808 ten thousand officers and men, but in 1811 actually numbered just above half that number. The British army had 5,600 regulars in Canada—a figure the Americans overestimated at twelve thousand—and more

than 250,000 in other parts of the world. No senior leader in the tiny American military establishment, uniformed or civilian, could be described as having a "genius for war," the intuitive ability to size up a military situation, preserve his presence of mind when confronted by the unexpected, and maintain in himself and his command courage and determination in the face of mortal danger.[27] Few had extensive military experience, and none had more than a little professional military education, if any. The U.S. Military Academy at West Point was only ten years old in 1812 and had graduated only eighty-nine officers, all of them still quite junior. Senior officers who had served effectively thirty years before in the American Revolution, such as Gens. Henry Dearborn, Thomas Pinckney, and William Hull, soon demonstrated that they were no longer effective combat commanders.[28]

The U.S. Navy had at the end of 1811 only fifteen vessels in active service; five others laid up in reserve required six months for mobilization.[29] Although a tiny force to challenge the world's largest navy, its officers and men had more recent combat experience than their Army counterparts, in the Quasi-War with the French Republic, 1798–1800, and the First Barbary War against Tripoli and Algiers, 1800–1805. Since then it had kept a small force at sea. All this was important for naval readiness, but the purposes for which the Navy existed were unsettled, debated continuously over the previous two decades. "Navalists," as now known, similar in outlook to the interpreters of the war late in the century, saw American naval force as an arbiter in world politics, a standing deterrent to aggression, a visible sign of America's power abroad, and a safeguard for American commerce and overseas interests. As they would be later in the century, "anti-navalists" were not against a navy as such but saw different uses for it. Where they found the navalist vision impractical and far too costly, their navy would be a small seagoing militia, only a very few vessels operating distant stations, most in home waters for coastal protection and the suppression of piracy.[30]

For much of the first century of the nation's existence the anti-navalists were to hold sway over naval policy, but there would remain a constant tension between the two viewpoints. By and large in those years—with the notable exception of the War of 1812—American leaders were satisfied to accept the serendipitous benefits of the Royal Navy's exercise of global naval power and to focus instead on expansion across the North American continent. As Andrew Jackson told the American people in his inaugural address as president in 1829, the United States had "need of no more ships of war than are requisite to the protection of commerce."[31]

It was this type of thinking that had led to the building in the early 1790s of the large frigates that eventually made their mark in the opening six months of the Anglo-American War of 1812. Starting with the typical French and British frigates of the day, American shipbuilders sought to design six frigates that would be more than a match for possible single opponents. Thus, they designed forty-four-gun frigates

with scantlings (hull frames) the size of those in "seventy-fours," producing frigates that, in the words of USS *Constitution*'s builder, "in blowing weather would be an overmatch for double-deck ships, and in light winds to evade coming to action."[32]

Professional military and naval officers commonly remark that when a war begins, "you must come as you are." So it was with the United States in 1812, but it was in an oddly unprepared state for a country whose leaders started the fight. President Madison had tried to make some military preparations in early November 1811, only seven months before he requested a declaration of war: he asked Congress to double the authorized size of the Army, to twenty thousand men. Congress responded by authorizing thirty-five thousand, but Madison thought it impossible to reach that number in a short time. An army of thirty-five thousand men would have had the effect of creating a permanent establishment that he did not want, given his ideological opposition to a standing army. Some months later in April 1812, and more in line with Madison's political predilections, Congress authorized the president to call up a hundred thousand militiamen for six months of federal service. By June, however, the Army had succeeded in recruiting only five thousand more men, and even so, the War Department was unable to report to Congress exact figures on the country's military strength.[33] In November 1811, Madison had also asked Congress to build for the Navy twelve seventy-four-gun ships of the line and twenty more frigates—an action that he hoped British leaders would notice. Congress instead sent Britain the opposite message, defeating the bill and agreeing only to gather shipbuilding timber for ten frigates over the next three years.[34]

For this new war, if Britain would have to divert already-active forces and equipment from where they were sorely needed, the United States would have to create, train, and equip its forces, and nearly from scratch. The 5,600 British troops in Upper and Lower Canada were backed by a nation already fully mobilized for the war with which it was occupied in Europe.[35] Further, the United States, having chosen to be the aggressor, had few geostrategic options, in fact only one—an attack overland on Canada, the nearest British territory. It could not directly strike the British Isles. Even nearby Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the West Indian colonies were too difficult to attack without an amphibious force. At sea, America's tiny navy could hardly challenge effectively Britain's command of the world's oceans. Britain spent more than twenty million pounds per year on its navy and mustered 138,204 seamen in actual service in a thousand-ship fleet with between 120 and 150 ships of the line.[36]

As a minor nation with naval and military power insignificant in the global perspective of that time, the United States could not hope to win a struggle with Britain through armed force. It could do only what minor powers always can in such cases: irritate and embarrass the superior opponent in occasional local victories, use unconventional weapons, challenge local control in distant areas, engage in a

propaganda campaign, attack the enemy's trade and logistics in order to increase its costs, and hope the enemy government is pressured by domestic political opposition to the expense of protracted warfare to come to acceptable terms.

However, the United States, again because it was the instigator of the war, was in the weaker position in terms not only of armed forces but also of strategic position. First, it was attempting to force Britain to act against its own policy interests. Second, as Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, attacks tend to falter if owing to logistical constraints they must be delivered in stages, after each of which the weakened attacker must assume the defensive to recoup.[37] An offensive can be successful if it shatters the will of the defender at the outset, but failing that it can equally "steel the enemy's resolve and stiffen his resistance."[38] The psychological issues are so complex and varied that commanders often fail to take account of them, either falling short of the objective or overshooting it.[39] Britain in this war was on the strategic defensive and so held the stronger position: the defender can allow the attacker to wear itself down to the point of exhaustion, at which point a defensive counterattack can succeed.[40]

The 1812 Campaign

These thoughts from classical military theory can aid understanding of the course of the War of 1812, but, as in many cases of war in history, there are a few twists and turns that lead to the ending. Looking at the naval action within the broad perspective of the overall war, a historian can observe several patterns. First, in the campaigns in 1812 and 1813 the Americans were on the offensive generally, within the limited geostrategic and practical options available. In these years, the border region between Canada and the United States became one theater of war, the open ocean the other. There has been a tendency to look at these theaters separately, seeing only military issues on the border and naval issues at sea. That is misleading; the two are strategically interconnected. The military actions in the border area were conditioned by critical naval events on the Great Lakes, while the military campaigns strategically complemented and were influenced by the naval campaigns in both theaters.

The border theater was subdivided into three fronts: Detroit, Niagara, and Lake Champlain. On the Detroit front in July 1812, Gen. William Hull, commanding the largely volunteer Army of the Northwest, crossed the Detroit River and invaded Canada at Sandwich (present-day Windsor, Ontario). British forces under Gen. Isaac Brock received critical intelligence of Hull's movements from papers captured in a lake schooner and put the information to good use. Brock seized the initiative and counterattacked, taking distant Fort Mackinac at the northern end of Lake Huron, defending Fort Amherstburg in the south, and gaining the support of the Shawnee leader Tecumseh. Britain's Native American allies attacked Hull's long and vulnerable supply line. Thinking that an overpowering Native American

force was about to attack, Hull retreated, ordered the evacuation of Fort Dearborn (present-day Chicago, Illinois), and surrendered his army and the entire Michigan Territory.[41]

British victories in Michigan led to an American attack on the Niagara front. Here in October 1812 the American general Stephen Van Rensselaer, although in general somewhat better supported logistically, had to delay his planned attack across the swiftly moving Niagara River below the Niagara Falls by three days, for lack of oars. Eventually his troops crossed and surprised a British position, but its defenders quickly defeated them and forced them back. At the southern end of the Niagara River, above the falls, the Americans planned to attack Fort Erie on the Canadian side but were unable to cross.[42]

On the Lake Champlain front, lack of political and logistical support in New England for the war created severe difficulties. Recruiting was difficult. State governments were hesitant to authorize use of their militias alongside regular federal troops. Even purchasing goods for the Army was a problem. The underlying political issue was the Madison administration's failure to persuade Congress to expand the country's naval defenses to protect commercial shipping, the heart of the New England economy. (That failure also meant that American military supplies had to use overland transportation rather than maritime.)

In the presidential election in November 1812, every coastal state in the North voted against Madison. Pennsylvania's swing vote kept Madison and his aggressive war policies in place. Meanwhile, later in November, the Northern Army under Gen. Henry Dearborn withdrew from Canada, lacking both the logistical support and the troops it needed for a concerted assault on Montreal in winter. Moreover, Dearborn had seen no indication that French Canadians would rise in revolt against British control, as some Americans had predicted.[43]

Despite this series of military failures, the American government remained optimistic about the war, entirely because of naval victories at sea in the meantime. Despite congressional refusal to fund naval expansion, the U.S. Navy and American privateers had captured three British frigates and several small vessels in 1812. On both sides, losses were mainly results of single-ship actions, in which the more heavily gunned warship won the day. From the American point of view these actions—although American losses, if similar in number to those of the British, were proportionately heavier—had value. Their effectiveness was underscored by then–parliamentary backbencher George Canning, who told the House of Commons in February 1813, "The sacred spell of the invincibility of the British navy was broken by those unfortunate captures."[44] Nevertheless, the Royal Navy had not been inactive, capturing 150 American privateers during the first eight months of the war, about half of those at sea. In November 1812, the mutual trade war cost the Americans 185 merchant vessels and the British, 187.[45]

In Britain, despite the political clamor, the Admiralty moved effectively to control the situation. An order in council of 13 October 1812 provided a legal basis for economic sanctions against the United States: a blockade against the American coast and privateering against American merchant shipping. On 21 November 1812, the Admiralty was duly instructed to "institute a strict and rigorous Blockade of the Ports and Harbors of the Bays of the Chesapeake and of the River Delaware" in accordance with international law.[46] The purpose of the blockade was twofold: to protect British West Indian commerce and to put economic pressure on the United States. The order carefully specified the mid-Atlantic states—Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia—where British leaders thought the decision makers and supporters of the war were. It was hoped that the New England states, not being affected, might secede from the Union.[47]

The 1813 Campaign

On the North American station, Vice Adm. Sir John Borlase Warren reported on 23 February 1813 that the blockade was in place. By spring Warren had extended it to New York Harbor (leaving it open to neutral trade) and the U.S. Navy's ports at New London, Connecticut, in Narragansett Bay, and at Boston. A month later the Admiralty ordered a further extension—from Rhode Island to Louisiana—and revoked licenses given to British merchant ships to sail without convoy escort. The latter was designed to thwart privateers, whose main targets were ships sailing alone.

From March to September 1813, Warren's tightened blockade captured 138 American ships, including USS *Chesapeake,* thirty-eight guns; USS *Argus,* eighteen guns, was captured in British waters. At the same time, the Royal Navy effectively trapped in port eight important American warships—the frigate *John Adams* of twenty-eight guns; the sloop of war *Adams,* twenty-four guns; *Constellation,* thirty-eight; *Constitution,* forty-four; *Congress,* thirty-eight; *Hornet,* eighteen; *Macedonian,* thirty-eight; and *United States,* forty-four.[48] With few employable ships left, the U.S. Navy had a very limited ability to resist.

As of 1 April 1814, Admiral Warren calculated, in twenty months his North American station had captured, burned, or sunk 971 American ships.[49] Despite that remarkable success, the blockade was not impermeable; several of the blockaded warships were able to get to sea in 1814. To some extent that was intentional, in order for trade that was advantageous to Britain to continue, the rest owing to weather conditions and the insufficiency of warships to cover so long a coastline. Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1814 the Royal Navy effectively controlled the North American coast. Official American figures for exports fell by nearly 85 percent by 1814 from the 1807 high, for imports by about 90 percent. The American government's revenues dropped by 54 percent, from thirteen million dollars to six million between 1811 and 1814—at a time when the war was costing more than

twenty million dollars a year, creating a huge problem in war debt and serious loss of confidence in the fiscal stability of the United States.[50]

The naval balance was different on the Great Lakes, where warships had to be purpose-built on the spot. Also, the situation there was deeply integrated into the broader conflict along the border. Despite the continuing war in Europe, in 1813 Britain was able to shift forces from the West Indies to Canada, where troop strength reached twenty thousand men, and to build naval forces on the Lakes. Nevertheless, American forces renewed their attacks on the Detroit and Niagara fronts, while the British remained largely on the strategic defensive, interfering with American logistical support and creating diversions with Native American attacks.

The result was a number of strategically indecisive actions, among them an American amphibious raid across Lake Ontario against York, the capital of Upper Canada. Oliver Hazard Perry's naval victory on Lake Erie in September 1813, though also not decisive, constrained British options in shifting forces between the Detroit and Niagara areas, partly because some 25 percent of Gen. Henry Procter's British troops in Upper Canada had been sent to the British flotilla as gunners or marines before its defeat, but also because British water transport was thereafter severely degraded, affecting Britain's ability to move troops and also to supply Native American allies. The latter contributed to the British defeat at the battle of the Thames, near London, Ontario, and the temporary military evacuation of Upper Canada eastward toward Kingston on Lake Ontario.[51] American forces, however, were unable to exploit their victories and were soon pushed back across the Niagara River, even losing Fort Niagara on the American side. On the Lake Champlain front in 1813, the American attempt to attack Montreal failed.

As a distraction during these American military attacks, Britain made a series of raids along the coasts of Chesapeake Bay in 1813, a foretaste of the larger British counterattack in 1814 and 1815. The inability of either side to achieve decisive strategic gains through armed force resulted on both sides in increasing violence, destructiveness, and resentment.[52]

The 1814 Campaign

Napoleon's abdication in April 1814 marked a turning point for not only Europe but the Anglo-American war as well. Yet the end of warfare in Europe did not mean that Britain could turn the military resources there against the United States. Britain's indebtedness and internal taxation were high after twenty-one years of warfare, and yet until peace could be negotiated at Vienna it would be obliged to maintain an army of seventy-five thousand troops on the continent and financially support allied troops. In addition, French forces still controlled Belgium and the Netherlands, historically a geostrategic danger area for Britain; the situation posed an invasion threat while it remained unresolved.[53]

Napoleon's unexpected return from exile a year later in March 1815 created a new crisis in Europe that lasted until his defeat at Waterloo on 18 June. Nevertheless, even in 1814 Britain no longer needed to stop neutral trade with France, impress seamen, or blockade French warships in port. With hostilities in Spain ended, the troops there could be spared for North America, despite demands elsewhere and the national need to begin demobilization. With 16,300 additional troops, British forces in North America could defend Canada more aggressively. Accordingly, the operational focus in 1814 on the British side, aside from the blockade, was an invasion of the United States. Also, more aggressive raiding inside Chesapeake Bay was planned, to divert American attention from the Canadian border area and make American politicians aware of what could happen if they persisted.[54]

The Americans opened their 1814 campaign with several attacks. Attempts to retake Fort Mackinac in northern Lake Huron and to seize British positions farther west, in the Mississippi and Missouri River valleys, failed. British forces repulsed all these attacks and maintained control of Lake Huron. On the Niagara front, the Americans crossed the Niagara River above the falls, took Fort Erie, and later repulsed a British advance but could not exploit their success while Britain controlled Lake Ontario.[55]

Successful in these defensive actions, Britain now counterattacked. As the Americans had found difficulties in sustaining an offensive, so too did the British. The British army chose to strike into Lake Champlain rather than Detroit or Niagara, because this front offered better logistical support. On 1 September 1814, ten thousand British soldiers crossed the border, the largest force ever to do so, and defeated an American delaying force. When the British reached the shore of Lake Champlain, they faced the decision of whether to continue south by land or by water, with their supplies. A third choice—to do neither—was forced on them in a naval battle off Plattsburgh, where Thomas Macdonough's U.S. naval squadron sank or captured all the British ships, thereby establishing control of both Lakes Champlain and George. Without a maritime avenue of support, Sir George Prevost was unwilling to move his troops farther south, aborting the British counterattack on the United States.[56]

On the Atlantic coast, British amphibious forces had greater success. In Maine, Adm. Sir Thomas Hardy in July landed a thousand men just over the border near Eastport, captured the nearby fort, and claimed the entire region for Britain. In September, a force of 2,500 men landed at Castine, marched up the Penobscot River, and captured twenty guns from the sloop of war USS *Adams,* which had run aground in the river and had been burned to prevent capture. Soon all Maine east of the Penobscot was under British control, and it would remain so for the remainder of the war.[57]

In Chesapeake Bay, as on the coast of Maine, the British intention was to create a diversion in support of the army in Canada and to pressure the American government to end the war. Vice Adm. Sir Alexander Cochrane used his naval and amphibious forces flexibly in the bay's inlets and rivers. The main effort was the landing of Maj. Gen. Robert Ross's 4,700 troops along the Patuxent River, from where they advanced on the American capital at Washington, defeating en route some 6,500 Americans at Bladensburg in August. Entering the city with little resistance, the British burned the public buildings and destroyed arms. The government had retreated into the countryside, and the British troops, having accomplished their very limited objectives, withdrew to their ships.[58] The American government, as so often happens when military force is used to convey subtle messages, failed to get the point. Instead of seeing this raid as an inducement to end the war, its members interpreted it as uncivilized and barbaric conduct calling for stiffened resistance.

Meanwhile, Cochrane, moving on to a larger target, in mid-September attacked Baltimore, Maryland, a center of popular support for the war. Again landing Ross's 4,700 troops, the British squadron attacked nearby Fort McHenry with naval gunnery and Congreve rockets. Unable to subdue the fort, the British withdrew. The Americans not only failed again to understand what the British were trying to convey but became even more outraged than after the burning of Washington, a reaction that lives today in the evocation of the event in the American national anthem.[59] With the naval blockade of the coast continuing to strangle the American economy and to render harmless the few remaining ships of the U.S. Navy, Admiral Cochrane was free to withdraw to Halifax to plan the next operation.

The attempt to invade the United States from Canada having been blocked on Lake Champlain, Admiral Cochrane prepared plans to invade the United States from an entirely different direction, on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. British blockading vessels had been active on the Gulf Coast off Louisiana, the mouth of the Mississippi River, and Mobile Bay in the Mississippi Territory. Still balancing military threats in Europe with the North American theater, officials in London approved an attack on New Orleans. Cochrane undertook a three-pronged offensive. His plan was to have Rear Adm. Sir George Cockburn make amphibious landings on the Atlantic coasts of Georgia and South Carolina, to draw Americans away from the Native Americans of the Creek Confederacy, allied with the British. The Native Americans, in turn, would be freed to support the third prong, the main British strike under Vice Admiral Cochrane to capture New Orleans and control the mouth of the Mississippi River. In December and January, the New Orleans operation failed, again producing the effect of stiffening American resolve and promoting American nationalistic sentiment.[60]

The U.S. Navy had by this time been brought nearly to extinction by capture or blockade. It was unable to complete ships under construction or even to man

all those in service. In this situation, the Navy turned to what few, small ships it had left. In early 1815, however, two of the large frigates and a sloop of war did escape. Of these, HMS *Endymion* engaged and spectacularly captured the forty-four-gun frigate USS *President,* under Stephen Decatur, while USS *Constitution* and USS *Hornet* separately managed to capture three small British warships.[61] These American naval captures, notwithstanding the loss of one of the U.S. Navy's most important ships, the capture of one of its most famous naval officers, and the failure to break the powerful grip of the British blockade, had the effect not of ending the conflict but rather of encouraging further resistance and stalemate.

THE ENDING OF THE WAR

Meanwhile, in 1814, representatives of the United States and Great Britain had begun formal peace negotiations at Ghent, where discussions continued into December. The military and naval events of the latter part of 1814 remained unknown to the negotiators, but it was clear to them that the United States was now on the defensive, having failed in all its attacks, and that the issues of free trade, neutral rights, and impressment had become moot with the defeat of Napoleon's regime in Europe. Yet, for the United States, the fundamental, underlying purpose of the war remained: persuading Britain to treat the United States as an equal among nations.

In the peace negotiations, Britain was clearly in control. In their opening position, the British delegates made it clear that the United States had been soundly defeated on both land and sea. Additionally, they expressed the belief that the United States should be punished for its aggrandizing attacks on Canada, and the future security of Canada protected, by the cession of the southern shore of the Great Lakes, parts of Maine, and much northwestern territory to create an independent state for Native Americans. It should also release national control of the Mississippi River. The effect of these proposals would be to contain the United States along the Eastern Seaboard, blocking its expansion westward.

The first reaction of the American delegates was to resent every expression of British superiority, starting with such matters of protocol as the British delegation's summoning them to their residence rather than to a neutral location. After several weeks, the United States formally rejected the British proposals. Despite its economic distress and the pressure its armed forces were under, the United States saw the British stance as an attempt to grasp territory that had not been won by military action. In response, the Americans declared that the basis for peace between the United States and Britain should be "a mutual respect for the rights of each other, and in the cultivation of friendly understanding between them."[62]

Given these quite opposite viewpoints, the negotiations made little progress for months, and it seemed that the war would drag on. The negotiators saw in the course of combat no decisive action, one that would impose a mutual decision one way or the other. The burning of Washington and the repulses at Plattsburgh and

Baltimore canceled one another out. Britain had defeated American military and naval offensives, but it had been unable to use its armed forces to change American national sentiments. In the end, Lord Liverpool's government backed away from its harsh terms and accepted American intransigence, by agreeing to settle the war on the basis of the status quo ante. It did so not because of any American military or naval victory but in response to issues far beyond American control: internal British politics and broader international affairs. The British electorate opposed the war's high cost and taxes, and a significant element of public opinion was convinced that continuation would increase taxes and benefit only the war contractors, not the wider British economy. On the international scene, continuation of the war in America indirectly threatened the delicate negotiations at the Congress of Vienna where negotiators sought to establish a balance of power in Europe.

The ministry in London persisted in its initial views until well into December 1814. At that point, the opposition in Parliament threatened to force a formal acknowledgment that the war in America was the only basis for continued high taxes, a point that could not be denied. As a result, Liverpool's government agreed not to prolong the war. It further agreed to drop its support for the Native American allies—thereby condemning them to eventual dispossession—and to withdraw the punitive territorial demands.[63]

On the treaty's arrival in the United States in late February 1815 it was quickly approved by Madison and ratified by Congress. The country was celebrating the repulse of the British at New Orleans, an event just then becoming known across the ocean. The conjunction of this celebration with the ratification of the treaty gave rise to much subsequent patriotic myth that has obscured the fact that ultimately the outcome of the War of 1812 was determined by factors outside the military and naval events of the conflict.

Britain had thwarted all American offensive operations, both on land and at sea, and had pushed the United States to the brink of economic collapse. Notwithstanding, the Americans had achieved their fundamental war goal. The military operations themselves, the attacks and counterattacks by both sides, had only created a stalemate, neither side shattering the resistance of the other but rather intensifying it. The impasse was resolved only by Britain's domestic political forces and European concerns.

NOTES This essay, delivered as the Third (2012) Alan Villiers Memorial Lecture at the University of Oxford, appeared as "The Naval War of 1812 in International Perspective" in *Mariner's Mirror* 99, no. 1 (February 2013), pp. 5–22, © The Society for Nautical Research, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, www.tandfonline.com, on behalf of The Society for Nautical Research. An abbreviated version without apparatus appeared in *Naval Review* 101, no. 1 (February 2013), pp. 31–38, and in *Journal of the Britannia Naval Research Association* 5, no. 3 (February 2013), pp. 56–66.

1 Donald R. Hickey, "The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?," *Journal of Military History* 65, no. 3 (2001), pp. 741–69. See also J. C. A. Stagg, "An Essay on Sources," in *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 171–86.

2 Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict,* bicentennial ed. (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 2012).

3 Nicole Eustace, *1812: War and the Passions of Patriotism,* Early American Studies (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Troy Bickham, *The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the British Empire, and the War of 1812* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012); Stagg, *Conflict for a Continent;* Andrew Lambert, *The Challenge: Britain against America in the Naval War of 1812* (London: Faber & Faber, 2012); Brian Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812–1815* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2011); Kevin D. McCranie, *Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011); George C. Daughan, *1812: The Navy's War* (New York: Basic Books, 2011); Stephen Budiansky, *Perilous Fight: America's Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas, 1812–1815* (New York: Vintage Books, 2010); Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815,* Oxford History of the United States (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009); Jeremy Black, *The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon* (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2009); Jon Latimer, *1812: War with America* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard Univ. Press, 2007); N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Allen Lane, 2004); David Curtis Skaggs, *Thomas Macdonough: Master of Command in the Early U.S. Navy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003); Skaggs, *Oliver Hazard Perry: Honor, Courage, and Patriotism in the Early U.S. Navy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Barry M. Gough, *Fighting Sail on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay: The War of 1812 and Its Aftermath* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002).

4 William S. Dudley and Michael J. Crawford, eds., *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center / Naval History and Heritage Command [hereafter NHHC], 1985–): vol. 1, *1812* (1985); vol. 2, *1813* (1992); vol. 3, *1814–1815* (2002). The fourth and final volume of the series had not yet appeared in 2020. The Navy's official publication is Mark Collins Jenkins and David A. Taylor, *Yardarm to Yardarm: How the War of 1812 Created America's Navy* (Boston: Boston Publishing for NHHC, 2012). It has also been published commercially by National Geographic with an identical text under the title *The War of 1812 and the Rise of the U.S. Navy* (Boston: Boston Publishing for National Geographic and Random House, 2012). Jenkins wrote the text and Taylor the sidebars, with advice from Naval History and Heritage Command.

5 Faye Kert, *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812,* Research in Maritime History, no. 11 (St. John's, NL: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1997); Kert, *Trimming Yankee Sails: Pirates and Privateers of New Brunswick* (Fredericton, NB: Goose Lane, 2005). On the Great Lakes, for example, Gough, *Fighting Sail on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay;* Robert Malcomson, *Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812–1814* (Toronto: Robin Brass, 1998; repr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999); and Malcomson, *Capital in Flames: The American Attack on York 1813* (Montreal, QC: Robin Brass / Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

6 Stagg, *Conflict for a Continent,* pp. 8–12.

7 Ibid., pp. 1–8.

8 The most recent on Macdonough and Perry are Skaggs, *Thomas Macdonough* (2003) and *Oliver Hazard Perry* (2006). For Hull: Linda M. Maloney, *The Captain from Connecticut: The Life and Naval Times of Isaac Hull* (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1986). For Rodgers: John H. Schroeder, *Commodore John Rodgers: Paragon of the Early American Navy,* New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2006). For Decatur, recent examples: Robert J. Allison, *Stephen Decatur: American Naval Hero, 1779–1820* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 2005); James Tertius de Kay, *A Rage for Glory: The Life of Commodore Stephen Decatur, USN* (New York: Free Press, 2004). For Lawrence, a traditional rendering: Albert Gleaves, *James Lawrence: Captain, United States Navy, Commander of the "Chesapeake"* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1904).

9 For example, Tyrone G. Martin, *A Most Fortunate Ship: A Narrative History of "Old Ironsides"* (Chester, CT: Globe Pequot, 1980; rev. ed., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997); Charles E. Brodine Jr., Michael J. Crawford, and Christine F. Hughes, *Ironsides! The Ship, the Men, and the Wars of the USS* Constitution (Tucson, AZ: Fireship, 2007); Budiansky, *Perilous Fight;* and McCranie, *Utmost Gallantry,* the latter correcting, through the use of British archival sources, many previous factual errors of detail in earlier American renditions.

10 On this, see Mark Russell Shulman, *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 2–3, 9, 13–25.

11 Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812; or, The History of the United States Navy during the Last War with Great Britain* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1882); Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1905).

12 Mahan, *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812,* vol. 1, p. v.

13 Ray Mabus, in Jenkins and Taylor, *Yardarm to Yardarm,* p. vii.

14 Jonathan W. Greenert [Adm., USN], "Building on a 200-Year Legacy," *Naval History* 26, no. 3 (June 2012), p. 17.

15 Ibid., p. 16.

16 William M. James, *A Full and Correct Account of the Chief Naval Occurrences of the Late War between Great Britain and the United States of America: Preceded by a Cursory Examination of the American Accounts of Their Naval Actions Fought Previous to That Period* (London: T. Egerton, 1817; repr. as *Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812: A Full and Correct Account of the Naval War between Great Britain and the United States of America, 1812–1815,* London: Conway Maritime, 2004); James, *The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by France in 1793, to the Accession of George IV* (London: R. Bentley, 1837; repr. as *The Naval History of Great Britain during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,* Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), vols. 5, 6.

17 Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* p. 571.

18 Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812.*

19 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 49–75.

20 Ibid., pp. 20–48.

21 Hickey, *Forgotten Conflict,* pp. 18–22, 34.

22 Eustace, *War and the Passions of Patriotism.* On comparing impressment to slavery, see pp. 81, 84, 173–77, 179; on family separations, see pp. 78, 81–85, 114; on violations of citizenship rights, see pp. 88–92.

23 Ibid., pp. 14–15.

24 Ibid. On American Indians as British allies, see pp. 3, 23, 46, 128, 143–44, 149, 157, 207, 226–27; on taking Indian lands, see pp. 20–21, 23, 31, 70, 78, 113, 137, 139, 154, 161, 193, 209; as a war aim, see pp. 146, 212, 225, 234.

25 Stagg, *Conflict for a Continent,* p. 46.

26 Eustace, *War and the Passions of Patriotism,* p. x.

27 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to* On War (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2008), p. 131. For "genius for war," Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), book 1, chap. 3, pp. 103–104.

28 Stagg, *Conflict for a Continent,* p. 54.

29 Secretary of the Navy to the Chairman of the Naval Committee, 3 December 1811, in Dudley and Crawford, *1812,* pp. 56–57.

30 Craig L. Symonds, *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785–1827* (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1980), pp. 11–25.

31 Quoted in ibid., p. 235.

32 Joshua Humphries in ca. 1794, quoted in Martin, *A Most Fortunate Ship* (1997), p. 4.

33 Daughan, *Navy's War,* pp. 27–28.

34 Ibid., p. 29.

35 Stagg, *Conflict for a Continent,* pp. 49, 118.

36 Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* pp. 308, 639, 645; Rif Winfield, *British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1793–1817* (London: Chatham, 2005), p. xiv.

37 Clausewitz, *On War,* book 7: chap. 2, p. 524; chap. 3, p. 526; chap. 4, p. 527; chap. 22, p. 572.

38 Ibid., chap. 22, p. 573.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., book 1, chap. 2, pp. 90–91, 93.

41 Black, *Age of Napoleon,* pp. 61–66.

42 Ibid., pp. 66–70; Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 103–104.

43 Black, *Age of Napoleon,* pp. 70–75.

44 24 Parl Deb HC (1st ser.) (1813) col. 643 (U.K.), partially quoted in ibid., p. 129.

45 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* p. 129, based on CO 42/160, The National Archives, Kew, U.K.

46 Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812,* pp. 73, 76, 80.

47 Lambert, *Challenge,* pp. 109–10.

48 Ibid., p. 131; Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812,* p. 221.

49 Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812,* p. 106.

50 Wood, *Empire of Liberty,* p. 689. For more detailed statistics on this, see Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812,* app. B, pp. 227–50.

51 Black, *Age of Napoleon,* pp. 91, 96–101.

52 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 134–43.

53 Lambert, *Challenge,* p. 312.

54 Black, *Age of Napoleon,* p. 150.

55 Ibid., pp. 154–60.

56 Lambert, *Challenge,* pp. 310–12.

57 Ibid., pp. 314–20.

58 Ibid., pp. 320–26.

59 Black, *Age of Napoleon,* pp. 167–82; Lambert, *Challenge,* pp. 326–29.

60 Lambert, *Challenge,* pp. 341–45; Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* p. 266.

61 McCranie, *Utmost Gallantry,* pp. 241, 260; Lambert, *Challenge,* pp. 345–79.

62 The American delegation to the British delegation, 9 September 1814, quoted in Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* p. 247.

63 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 251–61.

XV *The Royal Navy and Economic Warfare on the United States during the War of 1812*

Stimulated by the beginning in 2012 of the bicentenary events marking the War of 1812, historians in Britain, Canada, and the United States began to reexamine that conflict.[1] Over just a few years academic historians stripped away many, if not all, of the nationalistic and patriotic interpretations, along with their accompanying myths and legends. At the same time, the complementary scholarship that observed the bicentenaries of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars added depth and context to the understanding of the simultaneous War of 1812. A wide range of scholarly contributions broke down the national viewpoints—such as, among British scholars, that the entire conflict was a "strategical sideshow"—and created, for the first time, an international scholarly consensus.[2] A significant aspect of the reevaluation centers on the British naval blockade of the United States and on British privateers as weapons of economic warfare.

From the standpoint of naval strategic theory as well as the historiography of the War of 1812, the late-nineteenth-century American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan had argued that commercial blockade is a very effective weapon for stronger maritime belligerents. The only practical response of a weaker nation to an effective blockade of commercial ports, Mahan pointed out, is commerce raiding on the high seas. A blockade is intrinsically more efficient than commerce raiding, Mahan argued: "To cut off access to a city is much more certainly accomplished by holding the gates than by scouring the country in search of persons wishing to enter. Still, one can but do what one can."[3] Further, Mahan saw, privateering is practiced more for the personal gain of the privateers, not injury to the enemy.[4] Writing eighteen years later, Sir Julian Corbett saw the commercial blockade within the wider context of the control of maritime communications and command of the sea. At the same time, he distinguished between a "maritime" and "naval" blockade, the latter (the blockade of naval forces in their ports) being an element of securing command of the sea.[5]

In 2003, the American historian Wade Dudley concluded that the British blockade of the American coast in 1812–15 was so permeable as to be essentially ineffective.[6] In 2006, two Amercian economic historians, Lance Davis and Stanley

Engerman, countered Dudley by showing the severe economic effects of the blockade on the United States. Davis and Engerman employed some of the early work of British economist and historian Brian Arthur.[7] Arthur's work appeared in final form in 2011 and rejected Wade Dudley's arguments, on the basis of changes in the American economy. Arthur's economic data confirmed the effectiveness of the British blockade, while his historical argument validated Mahan's and Corbett's earlier conclusions on the nature of the maritime blockade generally.[8]

THE BACKGROUND TO WAR

The causes of the War of 1812 stretched back to the Peace of Paris in 1783, by which what had been integral parts, as colonies, of British commerce and maritime trade became an independent and potentially competitive trading power.[9] Both sides shared responsibility for the troubled relations that followed. In British politics, a vocal group resented what it considered the overgenerous terms on which the governments of the Earl of Shelburne and Lord Rockingham had granted independence. This group would have been happy to have seen the new republic fail. On the other side, Americans showed little remorse for having risen in revolt. The best hope for improving relations between the two countries lay in expanding trade relations.[10] The fundamental prerequisites for that, however, were mutual respect and shared commitment to appreciation of the need for stability in their bilateral relations; creating these was the underlying challenge.[11]

For the near decade between the collapse of the Peace of Amiens in 1803 and the resumption of its own conflict with the British, the neutral United States found itself in an increasingly painful position between Britain and France, who were in that period continuously at war. The immediate objective of the Americans was to continue their profitable maritime trade with both belligerents. Both the French and the British soon realized that this trade, while neutral, was advantaging the other. Each suspected the Americans of duplicity and of favoring its enemy, despite the protests of American merchants that their interests were purely commercial. The British remembered well the French military and naval support given the Americans between 1778 and 1781, as well as, more recently, their shared republican ideals; however, what they perceived as American support for the hated Bonaparte was too much.[12] Some in Britain found the new American republic capricious and exasperating, its interminable protests about impressment and neutral rights entirely out of place. As they saw it, the greedy and grasping Americans were taking advantage of the absorption of Britain and its allies in their mortal struggle with Napoleonic France to expand their own territory and increase their revenue.

THE ECONOMIC CONFLICT PRECEDING NAVAL WARFARE

Economic warfare of a sort was already in progress between Britain and the United States when the declaration of war in 1812 brought navies into it. Between 1790

and 1807, merchant shipping had been a growing sector of the American economy; in those years the American merchant fleet had grown from 478,000 tons to 1,269,000. Over the same period, the number of American vessels engaged in foreign trade had declined as a percentage of the nation's total shipping from 72 percent to 66 percent but increased substantially in tonnage. The value of American exports also had risen, from $20.2 million to $108.3 million, of which Britain and its empire accounted for 43 percent. During these years the American economy was driven by maritime commerce; domestic production rose only from $19.9 million to $35.8 million.[13]

In November 1806, Napoleon's Berlin Decree established the Continental System, banning all trade with Britain and all British goods from entering French-held territories in Europe. Napoleon intended this action as economic warfare, but the Continental System was from the outset observed largely in the breach. On 11 November 1807, Britain added to its series of pronouncements, stretching back to 1793, relating to blockades of France a new order in council. This decree, first, banned not only all French trade with Britain or its allies but also all French trade with neutrals, and second, directed the Royal Navy to begin a commercial blockade against France. The Royal Navy was also to inspect merchant ships in port and at sea for contraband that could aid France and seize vessels that failed to submit to inspection. In turn, the emperor issued his Milan Decree in December 1807, enforcing and extending his earlier measures: all European nations and all neutrals were forbidden to trade with Britain, and any vessel sailing from a British-occupied area was liable to seizure, as was any neutral ship that had submitted to British search.

The neutral United States found itself caught in an economic vise. On one hand, the opposing decrees and orders of France and Britain were not intended to starve respective enemies and had numerous loopholes. They were, as one historian has described them, "exaggerated application[s] of traditional mercantilist principles designed to wreck each belligerent's commerce and to drain each other's specie" (cash reserves).[14] Nevertheless, both France and Britain had violated the rights of neutrals in their war against each other, and Americans thought neither was any better than the other. The United States wanted no part of their conflict. However, the British order in council of 1807 came to symbolize for Americans all that had been wrong with Britain's relationship with the new republic since their independence.[15] The response of the United States to this situation, however, did much more economic damage to itself than either the French or British had done.

At this point, neither Britain nor the United States wanted to go to war with one another. The initial American reaction was the passing in 1806 (but then suspending for nine months) of the Non-Importation Act. This act prohibited the importation from Britain only of goods readily made in the United States, but it was designed to signal the possibility of a stronger response and to back the American diplomatic effort to stop both impressment and violations of neutral rights.[16] All

this had little, if any, effect on British policy, and American leaders found themselves in a frustrating situation. In 1806, some began to worry that the other nations were misinterpreting the American desire to stay at peace. President Thomas Jefferson declared that the impression abroad that "our government is entirely in Quaker principles, and will turn the left cheek when the right has been smitten must be corrected when just occasion arises, or we shall become the plunder of all nations."[17]

Americans, then, became more and more suspicious of Britain's intentions. British encouragement for Native Americans in the Northwest Territory seemed to bode ill for the United States, as did British impressments, which were increasing. On top of these impressions, Americans took as a threat to all neutrals Admiral Lord Gambier's highly successful attack on Denmark [see chapter 11 in this book] in September 1807 and the subsequent seizure of Denmark's neutral navy. President Jefferson and others, wanting to make some "New World" republican rebuke short of war to the monarchs of the "Old World," turned again to economic warfare. By late 1807 the provisions of the 1806 Non-Importation Act, originally delayed, were in place. On 18 December President Jefferson announced, and on the 22nd Congress passed, the Embargo Act—the most significant example in American history of ideology driving public policy. This act prohibited all American-flag merchant ships from departing on international trading voyages. British vessels could bring goods to the United States but could not load American products for export. It is unclear how carefully the administration had thought through the economic implications of this act for the country. That is, if it had at all—Jefferson's dominating purpose was ideological:[18]

> The ocean presents a field only where no harvest is to be reaped, but that of danger, of spoliation and of disgrace.
>
> Under such circumstances the best to be done is what has been done; a dignified retirement within ourselves; a watchful preservation of our resources; and a demonstration to the world, that we possess a virtue and a patriotism that can take any shape that will best suit the occasion.[19]

But then, Jefferson was confident: "It is singularly fortunate that an embargo, whilst it guards our essential resources, will have the collateral effect of making it to the interest of all nations to change the system which has driven our commerce from the ocean."[20]

For American leaders in power at the time, the embargo seemed a highly useful way to forward the ideals of the Enlightenment with respect to reforming the character of international relations.[21] The embargo brought little progress toward that goal, but it did bring disaster for America's maritime economy.

Jefferson's confidence that the embargo would peacefully induce the British and French to cease their restrictions on neutral trade paralleled his exaggerated estimate of America's influence in the world. He even imagined that he was in a



Table 1
American imports and exports, 1807–15

Source: Davis and Engerman, *Naval Blockades in Peace and War,* pp. 80–81.

position to acquire East and West Florida from Spain. On the home front, the embargo built support for the opposition Federalist Party, particularly among New Englanders, whose maritime enterprises the embargo was ruining. The merchant fleet in Massachusetts alone accounted for 40 percent of the tonnage sailing under the American flag. The first year of the embargo saw merchants there lose fifteen million dollars in freight revenue, a sum equal to the federal government's entire income in 1808. By the end of 1808, it was clear that the embargo was failing to produce the results that the Jefferson administration desired. In January 1809 Congress passed an act tightening its enforcement, but political forces brought the end of the embargo on 4 March 1809, the day James Madison succeeded his fellow Republican Jefferson as president. Before leaving office, Jefferson replaced the embargo with the Non-Intercourse Act of 1 March 1809. This act lifted the embargo on all countries except for Britain and France and places under their control. The new measure brought a small and brief lift in exports and imports, but otherwise the policies of the new Republican administration and Republican-controlled Congress continued to stultify the American economy.[22]

THE ROYAL NAVY'S ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

In the period leading up to the outbreak of war, the United States had demonstrated to the world that its policies were more damaging to itself than they could be to France or Britain.[23] Inevitably, America's economic threats against others carried less and less weight. By the spring of 1812, the ministry in London, though it wanted to avoid war, began to take prudent steps to prepare for one. One of the most critical was to create a naval command in the western Atlantic to deal with the contingency.

The news of the American declaration of war reached London on 30 July, nearly six weeks after the fact. In response, the British government took the first step in economic warfare by banning British ships from trade with the United States and revoking licenses to sail to North America without convoy.[24] The Admiralty sent Adm. Sir John Borlase Warren to take under his command not only the ships of the North American station based at Halifax but also those in the West Indies, previously under separate flag officers in the Leeward Islands and on Jamaica. This organization allowed Warren to manage the whole scope of the naval war in the western Atlantic, from Nova Scotia south to Bermuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Antigua, and Jamaica. It foresaw the need not only to deal with the American navy and privateers off the east coast of the United States and Canada but also to protect Britain's economically valuable and politically significant sugar islands in the West Indies and its trade in the Caribbean.[25] With the outbreak of war, Britain's diplomatic representatives in the United States would necessarily depart the country, leaving Warren an ambassadorial role. Warren had practical experience in both aspects of his duty, having had some naval success as a rear admiral during the blockade of France in 1799–1801 and having served as ambassador to Russia in 1802–1804.[26]

Warren sailed from Portsmouth on 14 August 1812 and reached Halifax, after a very rough Atlantic crossing, on 26 September. Per his instructions, Warren's first move was diplomatic, to offer to the American secretary of state, James Monroe, an armistice on land and sea on condition that (the Orders in Council having been rescinded) the United States withdraw its letters of marque and reprisal from its privateers. Monroe replied on 27 October that Britain would have to stop all impressment; Warren forwarded the letter to London, where it arrived on Christmas Day. There the American condition was found unacceptable, given the critical manpower shortage that Britain faced in the war against Napoleon.[27] Anticipating the American rejection, the Privy Council had authorized on 13 October general reprisals against American ships, goods, and citizens. On 21 November, Lord Bathurst, the secretary of state for war and the colonies, issued orders to begin an immediate commercial blockade of the United States should the Americans decline the armistice offer.

Warren found immediate obstacles to the implementation of a commercial blockade. From the outbreak of war, American privateers had attacked British shipping to and from Halifax and with considerable success. With too few ships to blockade all Amercian ports, Warren was forced to use those he had to convoy and patrol in Nova Scotian waters. Further, creating a blockade that would strangle the Amercian economy was a complicated matter. The British had issued to a significant number of New England shipping companies licenses to carry grain, flour, and timber to the Duke of Wellington's army fighting the Peninsular War. The existence of these licenses (and forgeries), on one hand, made a blockade

almost unenforceable; on the other, the military operations supplied thereby had higher priority than those in North America. Also, the licensing system deliberately favored New England, a predominantly Federalist stronghold of opposition to the war. The ministry saw an opportunity both to further the higher-priority strategic goal of defeating Napoleon in Europe and to split the New England states away from the Union.[28] Reflecting these priorities, Lord Bathurst, in the name of the prince regent, ordered the Admiralty on 21 November 1812 to direct the naval officer commanding on the North American station to

> forthwith institute a strict and rigorous Blockade of the Ports and Harbors of the Bay of Chesapeake, and of the River Delaware, in the United States of America and do maintain and enforce the same according to the Usages of War in similar Cases and in the Event of the Blockade of the said Ports and Harbors being de facto Instituted, that he do lose no time in reporting the same, that the usual Notification may be made to Neutral Powers.[29]

By the spring of 1813, better weather and more ships enabled Warren to put in place an effective blockade. The focus on Chesapeake and Delaware Bays targeted major economic centers, the political centers that supported the war, and the capital, Washington, DC. This strategy had a direct crippling effect on the American economy (see table 1, above). The blockade of the Delaware River cut Philadelphia's maritime revenue by 90 percent. The blockade also served as a defense for British trade in the West Indies.[30]

Meanwhile, Admiralty orders were on the way to Warren to widen the blockade to the principal ports between Rhode Island and the mouth of the Mississippi River.[31] The Admiralty was apparently under the impression that Warren could efficiently blockade the cities of New York, Charleston, Savannah, and all the other American ports with his ten seventy-four-gun ships of the line, thirty frigates, and some small vessels. Lord Melville, the First Lord of the Admiralty, elaborated on his orders in a private letter to Warren: "We do not intend this as a mere *paper* blockade, but as a complete stop to all trade & intercourse by Sea with those Ports, as far as wind & weather & the continual presence of a sufficient armed Force will permit & ensure."[32]

By the summer of 1813, the blockade had nearly immobilized the small U.S. Navy, leaving the American privateers to operate in its place. Privateers did slip through the blockade, capturing some 435 British merchant vessels.[33] That was far from serious attrition to British global shipping, with its 20,951 ships totaling 2,349,000 tons, and rising.[34] It was a demonstration of American willingness to contest British command of the sea, but one of relatively small effect. As Mahan later pointed out, privateering was not a decisive weapon of war; in the language of the mid-twentieth-century theorist J. C. Wylie, it had nowhere near the level of a successful "cumulative" strategy.[35] The effect of the British commercial blockade—in which the Royal Navy was supported by British privateers based, mainly, in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia—was to keep American maritime trade in its sharp



Source: Kert, *Prize and Prejudice,* p. 154.

Table 2
British captures of American merchant shipping tonnage, 1812–15

decline (see table 2). A significant number of seamen in the Maritime Provinces had turned from smuggling to privateering, transforming a dubious and sometimes lawless activity into a respectable and profitable business that contributed to the defense of the provinces.

By this time, the national debt of the United States had reached a point where the accumulated interest payments nearly equaled the payments necessary to service the increasing amounts of loan needed to maintain the government. The American government could no longer either obtain loans or raise cash. The result was unemployment, bankruptcies, and inflation (see table 3). It seemed that Madison had little room to maneuver before political discontent would force the government to capitulate.[36] Worse, after mid-June 1813 North American supplies were no longer vital to Lord Wellington, freeing Warren to expand the blockade northward to include Long Island Sound, effectively closing New York and Connecticut ports.[37]

Notwithstanding Warren's success with the blockade itself, the war in Europe and politics at home continued to interfere with his priorities. Although in fact the blockade of the Atlantic coast had kept at bay American threats to the British West Indian trade, the West Indian planters were not satisfied. Highly influential in London, they repeatedly complained of the absence of visible naval presence for their local protection and of insufficient convoy protection for ships carrying specie. Their political pressure forced the Admiralty to recall Warren in November 1813 and reestablish the Leeward Island and Jamaica stations under separate flag officers who could be more attentive to local demands.

For reasons having to do with both Scottish and West Indian politics, Lord Melville chose Vice Adm. Sir Alexander Cochrane—a younger son of a Scottish peer and now governor of the West Indian island of Guadeloupe—to replace Warren.[38] Within six months it was clear that the preference given to New England merchants



	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809	1810	1811	1812	1813	1814	1815
U.S. National Debt	86,400,000	82,300,000	87,700,000	69,200,000	65,100,000	57,000,000	53,000,000	48,000,000	45,200,000	63,545,831	119,635,000
U.S. Customs Revenue					6,852,577	12,722,920	8,223,717	13,331,467	6,892,925	4,694,318	
U.S. Gov't Loan Interest Paid								2,451,000	3,599,000	4,593,000	5,990,000

Table 3
U.S. national debt, loan interest, and customs revenue

Source: Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812,* pp. 230–31, 249.

no longer had any chance of splitting the union of American states. Accordingly, as the weather improved in the summer of 1814 Cochrane extended the commercial blockade to the New England coast and even seized part of Maine.

Meanwhile in 1814 representatives of the United States and Great Britain had begun formal peace negotiations at Ghent. The negotiators were unaware of recent military and naval events but saw clearly that the United States was now on the defensive. The Americans' attacks had all failed, and their war goals regarding free trade, neutral rights, and impressment had been made moot by the defeat of Napoleon. Only their fundamental purpose, persuading Britain to treat the United States as an equal among nations, remained, and it was clear that the British delegates, who were effectively in control of the negotiation, were unmoved. Until well into December 1814, Lord Liverpool's government was intent on punishing the obstreperous Americans.[39]

At that point, however, the ministry suddenly backed away from its harsh terms and agreed to accept the status quo ante. It was driven to do so when the opposition in Parliament threatened to force a public admission of the undeniable fact that high wartime taxes were still in place solely because of the war in America. The opposition was backed by public opinion that continued warfare benefited only contractors, not the broader British economy. At the same time, the war in America indirectly threatened the work at the Congress of Vienna to create a new balance of power in Europe.[40]

Britain had thwarted efficiently all American offensive operations and blockaded the United States to the brink of economic collapse. Nevertheless, when the fighting ended, the Americans found that the ultimate purpose for which they had gone to war—full recognition as a nation and freedom to develop the country as they wished—had actually been achieved. That had not been brought about by

military or naval operations: on both sides, attacks and counterattacks had increased the opponent's determination and so had created a stalemate, resolved only by Britain's domestic politics and unrelated European purposes.[41] Britain came nearest to final success by maritime economic warfare, which it had waged with supreme effectiveness, but the fruits of that campaign proved too costly, inconvenient, and even pointless to claim fully. The War of 1812, then, is a useful reminder that the tools of war, however well or poorly utilized, are not necessarily decisive for the outcome of a war. Nor are they final determinants of its sequel: in this case, as soon as Britain lifted the commercial blockade, the American maritime-based economy began a rapid recovery.

NOTES This essay appears in David Morgan-Owen and Louis Halewood, eds., *Economic Warfare and the Sea: Grand Strategies for Maritime Powers, 1650–1945* (Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2020). It appears by courtesy of the coeditors.

1 For this author's contribution to the very beginning of the bicentenary events and new historical reflections, see John B. Hattendorf, "The Third Alan Villiers Memorial Lecture: The Naval War of 1812 in International Perspective," *Mariner's Mirror* 99, no. 1 (February 2013), pp. 5–22, reprinted with minor changes as chapter 14 of the present collection.

2 The quote, which reflected widespread views, is from Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the*

Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 137. The principal works that created the new international consensus on the naval-economic aspects were Brian Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812–1815* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2011); Brian Arthur, ed., "Sir John Borlase Warren and the Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States in the War of 1812," in *The Naval Miscellany,* vol. 8, ed. Brian Vale, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 164 (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge for the Navy Records Society, 2017), pp. 205–46; Troy Bickham, *The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the British Empire, and the War of 1812* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012); Faye M. Kert, *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812,* Research in Maritime History, no. 11 (St. John's, NL: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1997); Kert, *Trimming Yankee Sails: Pirates and Privateers of New Brunswick* (Fredericton, NB: Goose Lane, 2005); Kert, *Privateering: Patriots and Profits in the War of 1812* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2015); Roger Knight, *Britain against Napoleon: The Organization of Victory, 1793–1815* (London: Allen Lane, 2013); Andrew Lambert, *The Challenge: Britain against America in the Naval War of 1812* (London: Faber & Faber, 2012); and N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Allen Lane, 2004).

3 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1905), vol. 1, p. 288.

4 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 241.

5 Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911; repr. in Classics of Sea Power series, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 97, 183–208, 321–24, 340.

6 See Wade G. Dudley, *Splintering the Wooden Wall: The British Blockade of the United States, 1812–1815* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003); and Dudley, "The Flawed British Blockade, 1812–15," in *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-strategies, 1805–2005,* ed. Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2006), pp. 35–45.

7 Lance E. Davis and Stanley L. Engerman, *Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History since 1750* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 94–108; Brian Arthur, "The Role of Blockade in the Anglo-American Naval War of 1812" (MA thesis, Univ. of Greenwich, U.K., 2002).

8 Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812.*

9 This and the following section are taken, slightly revised, from the equivalent sections of Hattendorf, "Naval War of 1812 in International Perspective."

10 See Charles R. Ritcheson, *Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy toward the United States* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971).

11 See Bradford Perkins, *The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795–1805* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1967).

12 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 49–75.

13 Davis and Engerman, *Naval Blockades in Peace and War,* pp. 78–83, tables 3.4 through 3.8.

14 Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815,* Oxford History of the United States (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), p. 646.

15 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 26–27.

16 Wood, *Empire of Liberty,* pp. 644–46.

17 Quoted in ibid., p. 649.

18 Ibid., pp. 650–54.

19 Quoted in Dumas Malone, *Jefferson the President: Second Term, 1805–1809* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 488.

20 Ibid.

21 Wood, *Empire of Liberty,* p. 652.

22 Ibid., pp. 649–58.

23 For an amplification of this point, see chapter 14 of the present book.

24 Lambert, *Challenge,* p. 105.

25 Arthur, "Sir John Borlase Warren," pp. 209–10.

26 On Warren, see Peter Le Fevre, "Sir John Borlase Warren 1753–1822," in *British Admirals of the Napoleonic Wars: The Contemporaries of Nelson,* ed. Le Fevre and Richard Harding (London: Chatham, 2005), pp. 219–44.

27 Knight, *Britain against Napoleon,* pp. 433–48; Arthur, "Sir John Borlase Warren," p. 211.

28 Lambert, *Challenge,* p. 105.

29 Bathurst to Admiralty, 21 November 1812, in Arthur, "Sir John Borlase Warren," p. 230.

30 Lambert, *Challenge,* pp. 110–11.

31 Admiralty to Warren, 26 March 1813, in Arthur, "Sir John Borlase Warren," p. 237.

32 Melville to Warren, 26 March 1813, in ibid., p. 236.

33 Dudley, "Flawed British Blockade," p. 42.

34 Arthur, *How Britain Won the War of 1812,* p. 248.

35 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890, 1918), p. 138; J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control,* ed. with an introduction by John B. Hattendorf, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), app. A.

36 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 132–33.

37 Warren to Croker, 20 November 1813, in Arthur, "Sir John Borlase Warren," pp. 240–41.

38 Melville to Warren, 24 November 1813, in ibid., pp. 242–43; Lambert, *Challenge,* pp. 305–306.

39 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 164–65, 241–42.

40 Norman Gash, *Lord Liverpool: The Life and Political Career of Robert Banks Jenkinson, Second Earl of Liverpool, 1770–1828* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 110–11, 113.

41 Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance,* pp. 223–28, 251–61.

Part 4: The World Wars

XVI *The Strategic Roles of Navies during World War I*

For many, the naval war that took place between 1914 and 1918 is a forgotten subject. Some will, if prodded, eventually remember Jutland and the U-boat campaign, but the bloody battles in the trenches—like those of the Somme, Passchendaele, and Verdun—along with the war poetry reflecting on these experiences, have come to dominate the wider understanding of a conflict that occurred just a century ago.[1] One recent collaborative academic study on World War I extends to three volumes but has only a single chapter on the naval dimension.[2] That chapter is devoted to examining why the role of navies was so restricted in the war, compared with earlier wars, and concludes that "one could now forget about the naval history of the First World War."[3] Thus, it is time for a more nuanced, modern understanding of a major war in world history and to draw attention to new naval scholarship as well as to the standard naval histories of that war.

NAVIES AND THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR I

Many political leaders in the immediate aftermath of the war believed that the naval armaments race in the two decades before 1914 had been a major cause of the war. This assumption was widely shared by those who supported the Washington Conference in 1921–22 and the subsequent naval arms limitation treaties.[4] This interpretation has been intensely debated among historians; the modern consensus is that the causes of the war were much more complex.[5]

In the lead-up to World War I, all the major powers in Europe modernized all branches of their armed services to keep them current with developments in military technology and with one another. As result, the weapons and equipment of all the powers were comparable. In a wider perspective, this in itself was not an "arms race."[6] The trend for technological modernization clearly touched all navies, leading them to build heavily armed and armored battleships, design fast cruisers and destroyers, and develop the new aviation and submersible potentialities. It was part of the spiral of technological development that began in the early nineteenth century, continued with increasing speed to the present, and will into the future. It

is one of the characteristics that differentiates modern warfare from that of earlier periods.

From the outset, technological change affected and transformed not only the military sphere but communications, transportation, and financial services across the world. It enabled a dramatic spread of market capitalism and a trading system, in ways that embedded competing national economies in a mutually dependent global economic framework. The industrialized nations in particular relied increasingly on the undisturbed flow of maritime trade. National leaders and military planners saw that interruption or dislocation of this trade could have serious consequences on themselves but by the same token might be wielded by a belligerent power as a weapon against an enemy.[7]

Among the responses to this prospect were the further development of international humanitarian law and the creation of the first draft of a "law of naval warfare," the work of Rear Adm. Charles Stockton at the U.S. Naval War College and first published in 1900.[8] International conferences at The Hague in 1907 and London in 1909 extended the rights of neutral trade by restricting contraband to a short list of munitions and war supplies while at the same time creating a much longer list of free goods, including raw materials for industry. These initiatives in maritime law and the law of naval warfare ran directly counter to the thinking of naval leaders but were strongly supported by others.[9]

Another issue that affected all navies comprised the operational implications of technological advances in naval weapons and equipment; changes and refinements were numerous in the five years between 1909 and 1914. At the outset of the conflict, despite prewar exercises, no navy had carefully thought through what these changes meant for all levels of command. Many entirely unexplored issues arose, leaving navies to experiment in many aspects of naval warfare while trying actually to fight the war at the same time.[10]

The divisive naval issues during the lead-up to World War I may be seen most dramatically in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean. Both geographic regions were linked to the rival alliances that involved European states and beyond. In the 1870s and 1880s German leaders, feeling surrounded by enemies, had created a Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. Britain had entered into an alliance with Japan and had good relations with the United States. Britain's traditional rivals, Russia and France, created a Dual Entente. Britain initially regarded the latter with suspicion and might logically have pursued an alliance with Germany (despite the easing of tensions between Britain and France since the 1904 Entente Cordiale) had not Germany, already the major military power in Europe, recently become intent on becoming a major naval power as well. This led Britain into closer relations with both France and Russia. The new British connection with Russia had the advantage of momentarily easing British India's border disputes in Persia and Afghanistan.[11]

German-British relations had been quite friendly up until the end of the nineteenth century, but thereafter the German naval program raised serious concerns. Britain, an extensively urbanized and industrialized island nation, was the richest country in the world and had the most extensive global empire in world history. Standing aside from intra-European disputes, Britain had cultivated its global connections and overseas trade, by which it generated its wealth and fed its dense urban populations. The Royal Navy protected the sea-lanes by which that trade passed and thereby held the empire together. Any threat to Britain's ability to maintain its maritime system was a threat to its vital national and imperial interests.[12]

The German desire to become a great naval power was rooted in domestic politics. Germany was a highly prosperous and industrialized country with superior cultural achievements in all areas but had been established as a unified country and as a major power only in 1871. Its government, dominated by its kaiser, the aristocratic Junker elite, and the army, was militaristic and ambitious. Internally, however, the ruling elite faced critics with different agendas, the strongest among them the Social Democrats, who wanted both an expansion of democratic practices and the abolition of social privilege. The elite had divisions within their own ranks as well. The kaiser and his advisors found a means to confront and confound this internal opposition in their ambition to make Germany not just a great power but a world power. The only state with world-power status being Britain, it seemed entirely logical to insist that to be a world power, a nation had to have a world-class navy. The elected Reichstag held the nation's purse strings, and it was its members who had to be convinced that the massive expense of building a navy was necessary. The government embarked on a political propaganda campaign that proved very effective among the legislators and their constituents, depicting Britain as the hostile state that stood in the way, that prevented Germany from taking its rightful place. It was neither the first nor the last time that such arguments would be made to induce legislators to fund a large war fleet.

For Grand Adm. Alfred von Tirpitz, head of the Imperial Naval Office, a German battle fleet would contribute to keeping the peace between Germany and Britain if it were large enough to pose an unpredictable risk for the Royal Navy. Yet Tirpitz had warned Kaiser Wilhelm II in October 1910, "If the British fleet can achieve and maintain a permanent and structural strength sufficient to attack the German Reich without risk, then the fleet development was a historic mistake and your Majesty's naval policy a historic fiasco."[13]

By August 1914, the Royal Navy had twenty-six modern battleships and battle cruisers in the North Sea, the Imperial German Navy only eighteen. British naval superiority in terms of older battleships, cruisers, and destroyers was even greater. Only in submarines was Germany stronger, with twenty-eight, to eighteen comparable British boats (aside from forty smaller coastal submarines). The comparative

force ratio soon shifted even more in Britain's favor as the Royal Navy called back four battle cruisers to home waters from distant stations and commissioned seven new warships. In contrast, by 1915 the Imperial German Navy had added only five new ships.[14]

In the years before the war, a few German cruisers were stationed overseas. The East Asiatic Cruiser Squadron had two armored cruisers in the South Pacific and three light cruisers on various independent assignments. In the Mediterranean, Germany had a small squadron, two ships stationed there in 1912 to intercept transports bringing colonial troops from Algeria to France. The presence of German warships on distant stations, although few in number, played a significant role, drawing British forces away from home waters to deal with the potential threats they posed to shipping and overseas interests.

Notwithstanding such detachments, Britain's gradual concentration of naval forces in the North Sea was sufficient to make the Royal Navy after 1905 no longer dominant in the Mediterranean, as it had been for the previous century. France then became the leading naval power in the Mediterranean, followed by Italy. In 1909 German's ally Austria-Hungary, with bases on the Adriatic, began building modern battleships; by July 1914 the Austro-Hungarian navy had two new battleships in service and more under construction.[15]

As a result, whether or not the buildup in the North Sea had been a "naval arms race," there certainly was one in the Mediterranean among France, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, adding to the tensions in that region. As Britain and France grew closer together diplomatically, Britain began to leave to the French navy the security issues in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, in 1911, Italy had declared war on the Ottoman Empire to expand its territorial control in northern Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. In that quest Italy succeeded, but in doing so it strained relations with France just as those between France and Britain were becoming warmer. This shift in the structure of regional international relations left Italy momentarily isolated. Italy accordingly sought and won a revival of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, thereby creating a potential naval force in the Mediterranean that on paper was numerically superior to those in that region of the French and British combined.

The prewar Mediterranean naval situation involved few warships compared with that in the North Sea. However, as one historian concludes, it "tended to make up in heat whatever it may have lacked in scope."[16] Thus, it may be said that although the naval buildups in neither the North Sea nor the Mediterranean caused the war in Europe, both added to the overall tension and division among the powers in the years before its outbreak.

THE COURSE OF THE NAVAL WAR

The declarations of war in 1914 signaled the failure of the German naval policy of deterrence through an expensive "risk fleet." Many observers expected a climacteric fleet battle—a modern Trafalgar—to erupt immediately in the North Sea. Instead, attention turned to Germany's tiny Mittelmeer division, the battle cruiser *Goeben* and the light cruiser *Breslau*. Though initially aligned with Germany, Italy declared itself neutral when war broke out. Italy would a year later join the allies, but for the time being it was left to the British and French to capture or destroy the isolated German warships. After a dramatic episode, *Goeben* and *Breslau* evaded capture and reached Constantinople in August 1914. There, the Germans turned the ships over to Turkey. Although a small—and to some, obscure—action, this German success had far-reaching strategic effects.[17] Turkey soon joined the war in support of the Central Powers and created an entirely new theater in the Middle East, where there would begin a chain of events with which the world is still living today. In more immediate and naval terms, the presence of these heavily gunned ships, in combination with other defenses, effectively blocked the Dardanelles and the Bosporus to the allies. France and Britain were unable to use this route to provide supplies to their Russian ally, and the Russians were unable to get into the Mediterranean. As the British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett commented, "Few naval decisions more bold and well-judged were ever taken."[18] Meanwhile, Germany's three light cruisers and ten auxiliary cruisers scattered around the world sank 149 allied merchant ships, totaling 598,730 tons, before the Royal Navy put them out of action.[19]

The main naval focus, however, was the North Sea, the body of water that directly separates Germany and the British Isles. The High Seas Fleet (the German navy's battle force), having failed to deter war by its existence, now became—again by virtue of its existence—a "fleet in being," which even remaining in port serves as a strategic distraction and requires an enemy to divert forces from other tasks to watch it.[20] A "fleet in being" can sortie for battle at any time but need not unless conditions are favorable and yet the enemy is willing to engage. Having made this decision, the German naval staff placed its main emphasis on, first, offensive minelaying operations and, later, offensive submarine warfare. Both of these were new approaches, and neither had been well tested in combat; German naval forces were obliged to experiment in actual operations. At the same time, the Germans were finding their capacity to supply mines inadequate and their naval intelligence on allied naval movements insufficient, making their offensive mining campaign not as effective as it might have been.[21]

British naval operational plans for war had been a subject of prewar internal debate for some time, but by 1914 there was a general consensus that the main thrust would be to cut off Germany's maritime exits to the global seas. Not all the

operational details had been worked out, but the general approach was to create shortages and unemployment and disrupt the German economy by cutting cable telegraphic communications, capturing German merchant ships at sea or detaining them in port, and blocking trade. British war planners saw that urban, industrialized nations such as Germany (and Britain) depended on the global maritime system. On the declaration of war, the Royal Navy put into effect its plans for economic warfare against Germany, which its ships could actively prosecute while staying out of the reach of the main enemy naval forces.

An immediate outcry arose from the affected neutral powers—Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and, particularly, the United States. Very quickly, the protests forced Britain to back away from a complete economic stranglehold on Germany. The government still expected a quick end to the war and instructed the Royal Navy to implement a blockade, a much less aggressive form of economic warfare than originally intended.[22] The 10th Cruiser Squadron devoted its efforts first to stopping maritime traffic outbound from Germany and then traffic inbound. As the North Sea was a declared war zone in which it would have risked inadvertent attack by British submarines, the squadron operated on the opposite side of Great Britain, off the northwest coast of Scotland, on a line extending westward from the Hebrides toward Iceland. In 1915–17, this line was supplemented by barrier patrols both north and south of Iceland, north of the Faeroe Islands, and off the central Norwegian coast. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, though it kept its name, was only initially composed of cruisers; by early 1915 it had been reconstituted with requisitioned armed merchantmen. It was these vessels that began the slow process of halting Germany's trade and constricting its economy.[23]

Also by early 1915, German naval leaders had come to doubt that the Royal Navy could be defeated in a decisive battle should the High Seas Fleet abandon its role of a potential threat and sortie to meet it. This was an indication that Germany lacked a grand strategy, any concept of coordinating all its armed forces in support of one another. As a result, the Imperial German Navy missed strategic opportunities. For example, when the German army became heavily engaged on the western front, the High Seas Fleet could have attacked the British army's cross-channel logistical support but did not. Also, as some fleet officers argued, the German navy could have attempted to establish dominance in the Baltic, to protect the shipment of vital war matériel from Sweden, stop Russian trade, and prevent landings on the German Baltic coast. Again, the German Naval Command held back. The High Seas Fleet was left without a clear strategic purpose and the high command with a dilemma—how to induce the Royal Navy to perceive the fleet as a threat if actually unwilling to risk it in battle. The interim solution was to send the German fleet on several raids against the English coast between 1914 and January 1915 to demonstrate the reality of the threat at minimal risk.

However, since the beginning of the war British radio direction-finding stations had been able to determine the location of German warships whenever they transmitted. In addition, from about October 1914 the Royal Navy had intercepted and read German naval radio messages.[24] As a result, during the January 1915 raid the British intercepted the attacking German force in the North Sea at the Dogger Bank and sank the armored cruiser SMS *Blücher*. Nevertheless, the German fleet continued to make short sorties—seven in 1915 and two in early 1916, none encountering an enemy force until May 31, when the battle of Jutland (Skagerrak) occurred.

The celebrated battle, about which so much has been written, did not have the decisive result that either side wanted, although both declared it a victory.[25] On reflection, the commander of the High Seas Fleet, Vice Adm. Reinhard Scheer, realized that the battle had done nothing to reduce the ratio between the opposing battle forces in a way that would force Britain to make peace, as he and others had hoped. Scheer concluded, "A victorious end to the war within a reasonable time can only be achieved through the defeat of British economic life—that is, by using the U-boats against British trade."[26] The High Seas Fleet made only two more sorties, one in August 1916 toward the English coast and another, in April 1918, toward Bergen, Norway; neither made contact with enemy forces.[27]

The Imperial German Navy had been using submarines since the outbreak of the war. The spectacular successes that *U-9* had achieved in September 1914, when she had sunk three old British armored cruisers within an hour, had already inspired some unrealistic expectations in the public mind. In early 1915, Germany had only fourteen submarines that could effectively operate in the open Atlantic, and its leaders had not carefully thought through the operational factors, international law, or political risks. Nevertheless, the German government went ahead and started a major submarine campaign. Initially, German submarines could comply with international law to the extent of ordering merchant crews into lifeboats before sinking their ships, but this could not be done when merchant ships were armed or suspected actually to be Q-ships, auxiliary cruisers disguised as merchant vessels. Recognizing this dilemma, Germany declared on 4 February 1915 the sea areas around the British Isles a war zone in which all merchant ships would be destroyed and in which the safety of crews and passengers could not be guaranteed. For neutral shipping, safe-passage zones were established north of the Shetland Islands, on the eastern side of the North Sea, and in a thirty-mile-wide passage along the Dutch coast.

At the time the German submarine force was still not large enough to carry out immediately or fully this threat to merchant shipping and so accelerated submarine construction. The German commander initially ordered his captains not to shy away from sinking neutrals, as the loss of neutral shipping would create a major impression. The campaign did indeed make a strong impression and rapidly

produced strong reactions. British forces established minefield barriers at the Strait of Dover and the North Channel of the Irish Sea in an attempt to stop German submarines. Neutral nations complained bitterly; the United States was particularly vocal among them, despite the kaiser's retraction order in April 1915 that no neutral vessels be attacked.[28]

The sinking by the submarine *U-20* of the British passenger liner *Lusitania* off the coast of Ireland on 7 May 1915 set off a major diplomatic protest by the United States. Although the passenger liner had been carrying war matériel, the loss of 1,201 civilians—128 of them Americans—seemed atrocious to President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson called on Germany to respect the laws of warfare and the safety of Americans, and the German government, over the objections of its admirals, halted attacks on commerce west of the British Isles. Attacks to the east of Britain continued, however, and some of the German boats were deployed to the Mediterranean, where a submarine campaign was less likely to meet such objections and sea conditions were much better.[29]

By early 1916, Germany had been able to bring fifty-one U-boats into service. With these boats Germany intensified its submarine campaign around Britain, sinking armed merchant vessels without warning. When *UB-29* sank the French cross-channel ferry *Sussex* off Dieppe, killing fifty passengers, half of them Americans, another major diplomatic crisis flared with the neutral United States. In a note of 18 April 1916, President Wilson threatened to break off relations with Germany; in the aftermath of the battle of Jutland, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916; later that summer the Naval Act of 1916 followed. This legislation authorized a massive buildup of American armed forces, which up to this point Wilson's administration had pointedly refused to allow. Now the United States was determined to build "a navy second to none," not to maintain permanently but with which to bring about world peace and for defense if Germany won the war.[30]

From the German naval perspective, submarine attacks on shipping seemed increasingly useful when pursued in accordance with the prize regulations. They resumed in the Atlantic west of the British Isles in October 1915. By January 1917, the monthly average of vessels sunk had reached 189, a level that appeared to be damaging the enemy's economy but not enough to bring about the negotiated peace that Germany intended to achieve by this strategy. In December 1916, after Britain rejected a German peace offer, the German chancellor hoped that the United States could negotiate an end to the war, although in early 1917 military and naval leaders continued to demand an intensified submarine campaign.[31]

At just that time the United States was confronting two major objectionable maritime issues: British blockade policies that affected neutral shipping, on one hand, and on the other, Germany's submarine campaign on similar grounds. Having grievances with both sides, Wilson maintained his policy to keep the United

States out of the war.[32] By late 1916 he had moved from a position of strict neutrality to an active peacemaking role. Wilson outlined a settlement that in his administration's view would bring about a stable and peaceful postwar world. In a speech to Congress in January 1917, Wilson declared that there should be "peace without victory" and that the United States would use its power and influence to achieve it. At that point, however, Germany had already refused Wilson's proposals and Britain had countered with conditions unacceptable to the Central Powers. In January 1917, the German admirals demanded the resumption of unlimited submarine warfare, arguing successfully that American entry into the war would mean nothing: German submarines would prevent American troops and supplies from crossing the Atlantic.[33]

Wilson still refused the U.S. Navy and Army permission to make specific plans or preparations for war, but he broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and declared an armed neutrality. It was not until March 1917 that Wilson and his administration concluded that the United States needed to go to war with Germany. The decision was not a matter merely of whether the British blockade or the German submarine campaign was the central problem for the United States. There were larger issues that tipped the balance.

Most importantly, the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II on 15 March 1917 and his replacement by the Russian Provisional Government, under first Georgy Lvov and later Aleksandr Kerensky, seemed to Americans to bring Russia into the family of free nations. The United States was the first power formally to recognize this new government, on 22 March, followed by Britain, France, and Italy two days later. Second, British interception of Germany's diplomatic correspondence with its ambassador in Mexico exposed German encouragement for Mexico and Japan to join the war against the United States. Its publication convinced leaders in the United States that Germany could not be allowed to win the war.

It was these two factors that, combined with the continuation of the submarine campaign, persuaded Wilson to ask Congress for a declaration of war in April. Even so, the president was ambivalent about the extent of active American participation. Moreover, when French and British military delegations arrived in Washington and revealed the extent of secret allied commitments and mutual concessions over division of postwar spoils, Wilson was horrified. As a result, the United States refused to join any formal alliance but declared itself an "associated power," interested only in helping bring peace and stability. Wilson eventually encapsulated American interests in his "Fourteen Points," announced in January 1918. In the meantime, Wilson had agreed to provide only token forces, American naval units serving under British strategic command and military units under the French. It was not until March 1918, when American efforts for a negotiated peace had failed and the German army launched an offensive toward channel ports, that Wilson

concluded that the United States must wage war with all its strength. Even then, its war aim was limited to a single objective in common with the allies: defeating Germany and its allies.[34]

Under these overall guidelines and in contrast to the other navies, American naval forces in the war had six principal roles:

- Employing destroyers, armed yachts, and other patrol craft as convoy escorts
- Creating and operating a naval transport service to carry U.S. Army units to Europe and to supply it overseas
- Reinforcing the British Grand Fleet with a few battleships, reserving the remainder of the American battleship force for training
- Developing offensive means to combat the submarine, first an antisubmarine mine "barrage" across the North Sea from Scotland to Norway, then underwater sound detection systems
- Creating a naval air force to assist in both convoy escort and submarine detection
- Augmenting the U.S. Army in France with Marines and naval railway guns[35]

Among the results of the entry of the United States into the naval war was the gradual discontinuance of the blockade operations of the Royal Navy's 10th Cruiser Squadron. The widespread adoption of "Navicert," a system (which had come under complete neutral American management) of letters of assurance issued at the point of embarkation verifying the nature of merchant cargoes, had made interception and search at sea unnecessary. Except for dealing with the rare "blockade-runner," the vessels of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were soon transferred to convoy protection against submarine attack.[36]

American naval forces were widely scattered in groups, often small, assigned to a variety of missions, as their purpose was to assist or to fill gaps in allied naval coverage:

- In Britain, a squadron of battleships joined the Grand Fleet; a force of submarine chasers and a few destroyers were stationed at Plymouth for antisubmarine warfare in the channel. A mine force was at Inverness and Invergordon, Scotland, to support the antisubmarine mine barrage. At Liverpool, there were two oil tankers. At Southampton, four American transports carried troops across the channel. A fleet of some seventy-three American merchant ships carried coal from Welsh ports to France.
- On the southern coast of Ireland, a destroyer force based at Queenstown convoyed merchant shipping and troop transports bound for France, and a submarine squadron was at Berehaven Harbour in southwestern Ireland for offensive operations against German submarines at the entrance to the Irish Sea and English Channel.
- In France, a force based in various ports assisted the French navy in coastal and cross-channel convoys, as well as in minesweeping.
- At Gibraltar, a force assisted in escorting allied trade into and out of the Mediterranean.

- In the Mediterranean, a force of submarine chasers was based at Corfu at the entrance to the Adriatic for antisubmarine warfare against Austrian and German submarines. In addition, two tugboats were sent to assist the Italian navy at Genoa.
- In Russia, a cruiser supported allied forces at Murmansk.
- In Portugal, a force of four American submarines, a gunboat, a monitor, two yachts, and a detachment of Marines were based at Ponta Delgada in the Azores to keep the route from North America open in the vicinity of the islands so that the port could be safely used by shipping en route to Europe for coaling and supplies.[37]

An internal U.S. Navy report in August 1918 concluded, "While the United States Navy is doing its bit and doing it well, a sense of proportion must not be lost. Our effort is small compared with that of our Allies." The report gave the statistics shown in the table. It listed the Royal Navy as providing 91 percent of the major fighting force in the Grand Fleet, the United States only 9 percent. The British had had about 4.5 times as many naval aviation personnel as the Americans and about fourteen times as many seaplanes.

Proportions of Allied Warships in British Waters and the Eastern Atlantic					
	Great Britain	**France**	**Italy**	**Japan**	**United States**
Destroyers	80%	6%	0%	0%	14%
Submarines	78%	17%	0%	0%	5%
Miscellaneous Patrol Craft	86%	11%	0%	0%	3%
Proportions of Allied Warships in the Mediterranean					
Destroyers	27%	38%	26%	7%	2%
Submarines	13%	37%	50%	0%	0%
Miscellaneous Patrol Craft	22%	66%	4%	0%	0%

Source: "A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters," pp. 13–14.

The Imperial German Navy submarine force saw its greatest success in April 1917, when it sank 458 ships, a total 840,000 gross registered tons (grt). Between February and June, the monthly average was 363 ships (629,863 grt), but by the last three months of 1917 the rate had dropped to a monthly average of 159 ships (365,489 grt). With the introduction of the convoy system, new antisubmarine detection devices, and more efficient weapons, such as the depth charge, German submarine successes declined dramatically. The allies' intensive mining campaign cost the German navy at least fifty (or 38 percent) of the 132 submarines that it lost in 1917 and 1918. At the end of September 1918 the Imperial German Army's Supreme Command admitted defeat and wished to ask for an armistice, but the

Naval Command was not yet willing to give up. The admirals ordered the fleet to go out for one last battle to acquit itself honorably. The seamen, already disaffected by the inactivity of the fleet as it "rusted in harbor," refused to obey. The mutiny of the German sailors soon led to the collapse of the Imperial German Navy and to a general uprising that led to the ending of the war.[38]

CONCLUSION

A combination of factors ended World War I: economic hardship, political unrest, defeats, desertions in the army, mutiny in the navy, and the decision of the General Staff and the leaders of the other Central Powers that they could fight no longer. Navies had contributed strategically on both sides, even without the great decisive battle for which so many on both sides had hoped.

The Imperial German Navy had a number of great successes; at the very outset, *Breslau* and *Goeben* helped to bring Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers. From the German point of view, the High Seas Fleet acting as a "fleet in being" had had the strategic effect of restricting the Grand Fleet to watching and waiting on the northern edge of the North Sea. The German navy had effectively protected its own coast, blocked the Baltic route for allied supplies to Russia, and kept submarine departure and return routes open. By blocking both the Dardanelles and the Danish Straits, it eliminated any opportunity for Russian naval activity beyond home waters.

The Germans faced some serious internal, structural problems. The lack of coordination among military and naval operations, economic policy, and diplomacy led to missed strategic opportunities and to misjudgments. For their part, naval leaders were overly optimistic about what they could achieve; the allied blockade of merchant shipping and raw materials affected naval construction, lessening the navy's ability to obtain the operational results desired. The admirals' insistence on unlimited submarine warfare ultimately created an additional enemy, the United States. German forces did not target allied blockading forces or attempt to integrate their own surface and submarine operations so as to contest allied sea control in the Atlantic or the Baltic. Most importantly, German naval leaders failed to understand the geostrategic limitations of their own position and so found themselves trapped in the North Sea.[39]

The Imperial German Navy was a formidable force, and its equipment and weapons were in several respects superior to those of the allies. However, allied navies took effective advantage of the weaknesses they perceived in the navies of the Central Powers. What tipped the naval balance in favor of the allies was their strategic flexibility, manifest in their changing their conceptions of operations as the war progressed. They did not become wedded to particular concepts but improvised and innovated: underwater sound detection systems, naval aviation, offensive submarine-to-submarine operations, convoy protection, underwater mines, depth

charges, and application of all types of vessels to patrol work. Further, they created administrative and operational organizations to support and direct these new and varied approaches. Most fundamentally, however, the allied naval forces had to ensure that merchant cargoes and troop transports reached their destinations in the war zone. It was their success in this strategic function, rather than any major fleet-on-fleet battle, that most contributed to allied victory.

But with the war won, allied navies had new roles to play, maintaining postwar maritime security. In the first months of peacetime the Royal Navy, the French navy, the U.S. Navy, and the Italian navy were all involved in seeing that the provisions of the armistice and then the Versailles Peace Treaty were carried out as the signatories intended. Additionally, the U.S. Navy was employed in several regions in Europe for humanitarian relief. At the war's end, the navies did not rest.

NOTES This essay was originally delivered at the Conferência Portugal na Grande Guerra, held in Lisbon in March 2016. It was published in the proceedings, António José Telo, Jorge Semedo de Matos, and Nuno Sardinha Monteiro, eds., *A Marinha Portuguesa na Grande Guerra: Política e poder naval (1898–1922)* (Lisbon: Comissão Cultural de Marinha, 2019), pp. 21–36, © 2019 Comissão Cultural da Marinha. Used by permission.

1 See, in particular, Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975; rev. ed., Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000).

2 Paul M. Kennedy, "The War at Sea," in *The Cambridge History of the First World War,* ed. J. M. Winter (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), vol. 1, pp. 321–48.

3 Ibid., p. 348.

4 Thomas H. Buckley, *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922* (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 4.

5 James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War* (London: Longman, 1984).

6 Michael Howard, *The First World War* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 22–23.

7 Nicholas A. Lambert, *Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2012), p. 497.

8 See John B. Hattendorf, "Rear Admiral Charles H. Stockton, the Naval War College, and the Law of Naval Warfare," in *The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millennium,* ed. Michael N. Schmitt and Leslie C. Green, International Law Studies, vol. 71 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1998), pp. xvii–lxxii.

9 See John B. Hattendorf, "Maritime Conflict," in *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World,* ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 110–11.

10 James Goldrick, *Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914–February*

1915 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), pp. 299–302.

11 Howard, *First World War,* pp. 14–15.

12 Ibid., pp. 3–4.

13 Quoted from A. von Tirpitz, *Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht* (Stuttgart, Ger., and Berlin: Cotta, 1924), p. 182, in Werner Rahn, "Germany in World War One: Naval Strategy and Warfare," in *The Sea in History: The Modern World / La mer dans l'histoire: La période contemporaine,* ed. N. A. M. Rodger (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2017), pp. 446–57 at p. 446. I am grateful to Dr. Rahn for sharing this paper with me before its publication.

14 Ibid.

15 Paul G. Halpern, *The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908–1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), chap. 6. See also Jon K. Hendrickson, *Crisis in the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904–1914* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), and Zvonimir Freivogel, "Austria-Hungary: Die Kaiserliche und Königliche Kriegsmarine," in *To Crown the Waves: The Great Navies of the First World War,* ed. Vincent P. O'Hara, W. David Dickson, and Richard Worth (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 7–50.

16 Halpern, *Mediterranean Naval Situation,* p. 354.

17 While many historians have argued that *Goeben* and *Breslau* had a direct effect in bringing Turkey into the war, Lawrence Sondhaus holds that their influence was indirect and has been overemphasized; Sondhaus, *The Great War at Sea: A Naval History of the First World War* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 94–107.

18 Julian S. Corbett, *Naval Operations,* History of the Great War, Based on Official Documents (London: Longmans, Green, 1920–31), vol. 1, p. 71.

19 Rahn, "Germany in World War One."

20 On the origins of this concept, see John B. Hattendorf, "The Idea of a 'Fleet in Being' in Historical Perspective," *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 1 (Winter 2014), pp. 43–60, reprinted as chapter 26 of the present collection.

21 Rahn, "Germany in World War One."

22 Lambert, *Planning Armageddon,* p. 5; Goldrick, *Before Jutland,* p. 61.

23 John D. Grainger, ed., *The Maritime Blockade of Germany in the Great War: The Northern Patrol, 1914–1918,* Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 145 (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate for the Navy Records Society, 2003), pp. xv, 3.

24 Patrick Beesly, *Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983), p. 90.

25 See, among many others, Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919,* vol. 3 (revised), *Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978); Andrew Gordon, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (London: John Murray, 1996); Nicholas A. Lambert, "'Our Bloody Ships' or 'Our Bloody System'? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916," *Journal of Military History* 62, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 29–55; John Brooks, *Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland* (London: Routledge, 2005); and Michael Epkenhans, Jörg Hillmann, and Frank Nägler, eds., *Skagerrakschlacht: Vorgeschichte—Ereignis—Verarbeitung* (Munich, Ger.: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009).

26 Quoted in Marder, *Jutland and After,* p. 253.

27 Rahn, "Germany in World War One."

28 Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 293–300.

29 Rahn, "Germany in World War One." See also Diana Preston, *Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy* (New York: Walker, 2002).

30 George Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 59–60.

31 Rahn, "Germany in World War One."

32 Grainger, *Maritime Blockade of Germany,* pp. 21–22.

33 Rahn, "Germany in World War One"; Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany,* vol. 3, *The Tragedy of Statesmanship: Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917)* (Coral Gables, FL: Univ. of Miami Press, 1972), p. 334.

34 Tracy B. Kittredge, "A Comparative Analysis of Problems and Methods of Coalition Action in Two World Wars" (paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 6–8 September 1956), pp. 5–6, Papers of Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC.

35 Dudley W. Knox [Capt., USN (Ret.)], "American Naval Participation in the Great War (with Special Reference to the European Theater of Operations)," p. 2, *Naval History and Heritage Command,* www.history.navy.mil/research/library/on-line-reading-room/title-list/a/alphabetically.

36 Grainger, *Maritime Blockade of Germany,* pp. 15–16, 21.

37 "A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters with Outline of the Organization of Admiral Sims's Headquarters," prepared by the intelligence section of Admiral Sims's staff, 3 August 1918, pp. 11–13, Papers of Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC.

38 Rahn, "Germany in World War One." See also Daniel Horn, *The German Naval Mutinies of World War I* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1969); Nicolas Wolz, *"Und wir verrosten im Hafen": Deutschland, Großbritannien und der Krieg zur See, 1914–1918* (Munich, Ger.: DTV, 2013); and Stephan Huck, Gorch Pieken, and Matthias Rogg, eds., *Die Flotte schläft im Hafen ein,* Schriftenreihe des Militärhistorischen Museums der Bundeswehr, vol. 6 (Dresden, Ger.: Sandstein Verlag, 2014).

39 Rahn, "Germany in World War One."

XVII *Rear Admiral Henry B. Wilson and the U.S. Navy in France* 1917–1919

In late March 1917, President Woodrow Wilson made a significant change in his thinking. Following the Zimmermann Telegram (which compromised secret German attempts to make arrangements with Mexico at potential American expense) and the sinking of the liner *Lusitania,* Wilson and his cabinet concluded that the only way for the United States to help establish a just, postwar world was to participate directly in the war against Germany. Thereby, they felt, the United States could gain a position from which it could influence the peace settlement.

At this point, before Congress had formally declared war, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels consulted the president about the repeated recommendations of the American ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, to send high-ranking naval officers to England to study the naval situation and develop cooperative procedures to protect merchant shipping. Wilson and Daniels initially chose Capt. Henry B. Wilson for this duty.[1] Already selected for promotion to rear admiral, Captain Wilson was then president of the Board of Inspection and Survey. As Daniels tersely noted in his diary, however, the officer assigned "must work with Navies of Nations to which our shipping goes."[2] By the next day, that consideration had led Daniels to change his mind. He summoned to Washington the new President of the U.S. Naval War College, Capt. William S. Sims, also recently selected for promotion to rear admiral. Although the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. William S. Benson, had reservations about Sims's sympathies with the British, Sims had the practical advantages of experience as a naval attaché in Europe, good relations with a number of British naval officers, and personal acquaintance with the First Sea Lord, Adm. Sir John Jellicoe, whom he had first met in China during the Boxer Rebellion. Benson ordered Sims to proceed immediately and secretly to London and there to have discussions at the Admiralty on how to employ the U.S. Navy in the war. Daniels and Benson were suspicious of the British and did not want to provide any substantial direct support. Sims, however, had shown years before that his thinking paralleled Mahan's long-held views that only a coalition of free nations could prevent Germany from achieving victory.[3]

Meanwhile, with the U-boats continuing their attacks on merchant ships carrying Americans, President Wilson asked for a declaration of war against Germany "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles."[4] Congress passed the declaration with an overwhelming majority on 6 April 1917. In the following months, British and French military delegations came to Washington to discuss the potential contributions of American armed forces. In the course of these talks, they revealed a range of secret agreements between the allies for dividing among themselves the prospective spoils of war. Wilson and members of his administration were deeply shocked: the United States had no political goals of its own, only what it saw as the general good of mankind. Wilson nevertheless agreed that the United States would send a limited number of forces to Europe, the U.S. Army units serving under overall French command and the American naval units under British overall command, to achieve French and British strategic objectives, respectively.[5]

Of the urgency of the U.S. entry into the war in 1917, historian Thomas Frothingham observed that "a strong American reinforcement must be on the battlefield to meet the crisis of 1918, or the war would be lost. It must be produced in the United States; it must be transported overseas from the United States; in France, it must be handled and maintained by the United States."[6] With three thousand miles of ocean between France and the United States, the U.S. Navy became the facilitating agency for the U.S. Army, a fundamental role of sea power.

In London, Admiral Sims's personal liaison soon grew to a large naval command—U.S. Naval Forces, Europe—under Sims, who rose in rank first to vice admiral in 1918, then in 1919 to full admiral. Sims saw his command as an advanced headquarters of the Navy Department in Washington; he reported only to the Navy Department and, in turn, directed and coordinated the work of all the commands under his purview. Each of these commands reported to Sims for direction, matériel needs, supplies, and plans and with recommendations for improving operational effectiveness. One of the most important and innovative elements of his headquarters was the planning section, which employed highly talented officers who were Naval War College graduates, many of whom would become famous two decades later as senior officers in World War II.[7] Sims's headquarters was the first major operational staff organization in the history of the U.S. Navy, and it became a prototype for a counterpart in Washington after the war.[8]

Sims discussed the American naval role with representatives of the allied navies and concluded that the Navy could participate most effectively by strengthening the weak areas in already ongoing allied naval operations. He felt that any attempt to operate in separate regions or as distinctly American units would be wasteful

and inefficient. Sims made arrangements with the foreign governments for supplies and repairs; American warships would be allowed to put into any base of an allied navy and obtain urgently needed supplies as if they belonged to that country's navy. Receipts signed by American commanding officers would be passed through the appropriate channel within the allied navy to its headquarters, which would forward them to Sims's London office for auditing and reimbursement. At the height of activity in late 1918, there were U.S. naval forces based in Ireland, England, and Scotland, with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, in the Azores, at Murmansk, and at Gibraltar. For all these U.S. Navy elements, the primary concerns were getting men and supplies to the front in France and combating the German submarine threat.[9]

As the war progressed, the Supreme War Council at Versailles and the Allied Naval Council, which rotated the location of its meetings among London, Paris, and Rome, dealt with the higher interactions among the allies.[10]

INITIAL STEPS IN FRANCE

Historians typically explain American naval participation in the war in the context of British naval efforts. This approach is entirely logical, given the Wilson administration's broad strategic division of labor among American forces, the U.S. Army supporting the French army and the U.S. Navy the Royal Navy. However, issues immediately arose regarding the U.S. Navy's relationship with the French navy, and in general there were numerous problems in implementation. The Americans had done no contingency planning before the war, having been prohibited to do so by the administration; there were disconnects, confusions, disagreements, and personality issues between American naval leaders in Washington and Europe; and the procedures and organizations had to be developed with operations already under way. That the U.S. Navy had to rely on trial and error arose also from the fact that the allies were obliged to fight a novel threat, the underwater enemy, using new technologies. As one American admiral put it in reflection after the war, "The Allied Nations were no better prepared to face the issue after almost three years of war than was the U.S. Navy just entering upon it. It meant an entirely new and unheard of form of sea warfare, viz. submarine hunting, to which had also to be added the contained maintenance of adequate sea power to keep the naval forces of the Central Power 'bottled up,' both in the North Sea and in the Adriatic."[11]

When the United States declared war on 6 April 1917, the senior American naval officer in France was the acting American naval attaché in Paris, Lt. Cdr. W. R. Sayles. He had only an assistant and a clerk to support his work, and there existed no mobilization plan for American entry into the war. On his own initiative, Sayles had several American naval reservists who happened to be in Paris at the time recalled to active duty. Thereafter, without orders or instructions to guide him, he regularly and effectively dealt with a myriad of details on such matters as the armed

guards on ships coming to France.[12] From the French point of view, Admiral Sims was diplomatically accredited to Britain, not to France. By the end of April, Sims and Sayles had agreed that Sayles would consult Sims on any matter that involved U.S. naval policy in France. Additionally, Sims directed Sayles to consider himself Sims's staff representative in Paris. Sims traveled to Paris on 4–5 May for discussions with Sayles and the Ministry of the Marine. No one in France was aware that Admiral Benson had other intentions. Suspicion that he might have may have underlain Sims's assurance to Washington that relations with the French navy department were entirely satisfactory.[13]

On 6 May, the French naval attaché in Washington reported to Paris that "a rear admiral will probably be designated to perform in Paris, the same duties as Rear Admiral Sims in London." That same day, indeed, Secretary Daniels noted in his diary that "Benson & [Rear Adm. Leigh C.] Palmer [chief of the Bureau of Navigation and responsible for officer assignments] wanted to send an Admiral to France as well as to England. I waited. After cablegram from Sims, it was clear that there ought to be only one command in Europe."[14] Daniels's decision took time to implement, and in the meantime, Benson and senior naval officers in Washington continued to address Sayles in Paris on matters relating to French waters rather than Sims in London. Initially, Sayles dealt with intelligence, logistics, communications, and port facilities arrangements for ships arriving from the United States. The French government advised Sayles that Saint-Nazaire in the Loire Estuary would be the debarkation point for American troops in France. French officials needed such information about the ships as size, draft, fuel and supply requirements, and arrival and departure schedules. At first, neither Sims nor Sayles could obtain any information beyond that a group of patrol vessels, converted yachts, operating under the command of Rear Adm. William Fletcher would arrive at Brest about 1 June 1917. The chief of staff of the French navy, Vice Adm. Ferdinand de Bon, understandably complained to the American naval attaché that he "was in a fog as to what preparations to make in advance to receive American forces."[15] Meanwhile, U.S. naval units were beginning to arrive in uncoordinated fashion.

On 4 June, half of the U.S. Navy's 1st Aeronautical Detachment, under Lt. Grattan Dichman, arrived in France at the mouth of the Gironde Estuary on board the Navy collier *Jupiter*. Austrian prisoners of war at Pauillac off-loaded the aircraft and their supplies, and the aviators went on to temporary housing in barracks at Bordeaux. The second half of the unit, with the detachment's senior aviator, Lt. Kenneth Whiting, arrived at Saint-Nazaire on 8 June. Dichman's group remained at Bordeaux, and Whiting and his men proceeded to Brest and eventually around the bay to Camaret-sur-Mer, from which places they operated, initially independently of any command oversight. It became clear that there had been a serious misunderstanding between the French and the Americans. The Navy Department

had understood from the French naval delegation to Washington that new aviation recruits and novice aviators would be welcomed in France, but they arrived to find that French officials had been expecting trained pilots and experienced mechanics. To bring the Americans up to the necessary standards required a substantial training program. The new pilots went to an intensive course at Tours and the mechanics first to Saint-Raphaël, on the Mediterranean coast, and then to Lac d'Hourtin, the French seaplane school near Bordeaux.[16]

Meanwhile, Sayles, working with French officials, made arrangements for the first convoy of ships carrying troops from the United States. Fourteen transports, escorted by twenty-two warships under Commander Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, Rear Adm. Albert Gleaves, had left New York Harbor in four groups on 14 June, each group sailing at a different speed according to its capabilities. Sayles misled German intelligence agents into thinking that Brest was the destination; all four convoy groups arrived safely at Saint-Nazaire between 29 June and 2 July.[17] The ships were the first of 1,142 troopship sailings from the United States during the war.

Two days after their arrival, Admiral Gleaves was in Paris for a ceremony marking the 141st anniversary of American independence. One event in which Gleaves was involved was paying respects at the grave of the marquis de La Fayette in Paris's Picpus Cemetery, along with France's minister of war, Paul Painlevé, Ambassador Brand Whitlock, and the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen. John J. Pershing. Admiral Gleaves heard General Pershing's aide, U.S. Army colonel Charles E. Stanton, first pronounce the famous phrase "Lafayette, nous voilà!"[18]

For Gleaves, the task of organizing troopship convoys grew rapidly. His flagship, the armored cruiser USS *Seattle,* quickly proved inadequate. On Gleaves's return to the United States, the Navy Department appointed him to command the newly formed Cruiser and Transport Service. The complex management for transporting troops soon moved from the flagship to an office building in Hoboken, New Jersey, where the staff continued to use the letterhead stationery of *Seattle*.[19]

The organizational situation in France became confused when the Navy Department ordered Capt. Richard H. Jackson to Paris to act as Sims's representative and liaison with the French navy, leaving Sayles without a clear understanding of his role as the naval attaché. On 14 June, the Secretary of the Navy's official appointment of Sims as Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, resolved one aspect of the matter. As the new senior officer in France, Jackson took over the attaché and his office as well as all communications from U.S. naval commands in France to Sims and his London-based staff. In addition, however, Jackson represented the Navy Department in regard to American naval plans and policy and in that capacity reported directly to Admiral Benson in Washington.[20] To clarify in advance any misapprehension, Sims directed his chief of staff, Capt. Nathan C. Twining, to tell Jackson, "You will consider yourself as my [i.e., Sims's] Staff

Representative at the Ministry of Marine, Paris," and an adjunct to Sims's London office.[21] "There is nothing that gives you command of any of our forces in France," Twining emphasized.[22] He added the blunt warning, "The Admiral will not tolerate any sensitiveness or tenderness of feeling on the part of anybody which may operate to reduce efficiency."[23]

Meanwhile, on 4 July 1917, a month later than initially expected, Rear Adm. William Bartlett Fletcher arrived in Brest as commander of Squadron 3, Patrol Force, Atlantic Fleet, with what turned out to be a division of six former yachts that had been converted to naval patrol craft. Within a few days, a second division arrived at Brest, bringing the initial total to sixteen U.S. vessels under his command. At the invitation of the French navy, Fletcher established both his flag and living quarters in a small building near the French naval headquarters.

At the end of July, after discussion with officers in France, Sims advised Admiral de Bon, in terms that were consistent with his relations with the Royal Navy, that "it is my policy that the general nature of all operations to be performed by U.S. forces in French waters based on French ports should be indicated by the Ministry of the Marine in the same manner as if these forces were actually French Forces."[24] A few days later, Sims accordingly instructed Fletcher, "We [the U.S. Navy] must not in any way attempt to run a separate show. We must, as far as possible, keep the point of view that we are virtually a part of the French service—an addition to it but nevertheless a part of it."[25] Within a couple of months, as it became clear that American transport ships did not have enough protection in French waters, Sims needed to modify his directions to Fletcher: "The primary duty of the Forces placed under your command," Sims now emphasized, "is the protection of troop transports and supply transports, whether inbound or outbound. . . . Your secondary mission is to cooperate to the fullest extent with the French forces assisting them in every possible way not to conflict with your primary mission. . . . While I desire to assist the French in every way, nothing must be done to interfere in any way with providing sufficient escort for own vessels."[26]

By early October, Sims, who had been hearing accounts of inefficiency in the American command at Brest, was already losing confidence in Fletcher and beginning to think that he was temperamentally unfit for this duty.[27] As a result, Sims advised Rear Admiral Wilson, who was then in command of Patrol Force 2, Atlantic Fleet and was establishing the American naval contingent at Gibraltar, that he might be exchanging places with Fletcher.[28] The issue was settled when on 17 October, the U.S. Army–chartered transport *Antilles* was lost. The ship had been returning from Quiberon Bay, three days out, in a small convoy escorted by American patrol yachts, which had been reduced in numbers by weather and mechanical problems from five to two. *U-62* had taken the opportunity to sink *Antilles,* with the loss of sixty-seven lives—at this point the largest single loss of American lives in the war.[29]

Reacting immediately, Sims relieved Fletcher of duty and ordered Rear Adm. Henry B. Wilson to leave Gibraltar on 23 October and proceed first to London and then Paris for consultations, and finally to Brest. He arrived there and took up his new command on 1 November. On 28 October, before Wilson could take up his command, *U-93* torpedoed the civilian-manned Army transport *Finland,* carrying the survivors of *Antilles*. The shell-shocked survivors panicked and rushed for the lifeboats, taking some of the crew with them. The steadier elements in the crew restrained them all and were able to return the ship safely to Brest for repair. These two experiences led the U.S. Navy to man all American troop transports with its own trained officers and men.[30]

For three months, between November 1917 and January 1918, Rear Admiral Wilson was Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Brest. On 8 January the Navy Department instructed Admiral Sims in London to designate him Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, France. Wilson was to organize his command into six principal fields of activity: naval forces afloat, port organization and administration, aviation, intelligence, communications, and supply and pay. He was to deal with French authorities and the U.S. Army in all matters that did not require the attention of Admiral Sims and his staff in London or of the Navy Department.[31] In this new, broader capacity, Wilson flew his flag from January 1918 to January 1919 in the repair ship USS *Prometheus* (AR 3) at Brest.

AMERICAN USE OF FRENCH PORTS

Throughout the war, the majority of American ships used the western ports of France, on the Bay of Biscay. They were located the closest to the United States, and German submarine threat in that region, although considerable, was less than in the English Channel. In selecting specific ports, however, the U.S. Army and Navy had somewhat different priorities. While the Navy was interested in getting cargoes safely across the Atlantic, the Army had to consider port facilities and railroad transport to the front in eastern France. The ports mainly used were Brest, Saint-Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bordeaux. The Army preferred Saint-Nazaire, for its rail connections. However, some troopships—such as the former German passenger liners USS *Mount Vernon* (ex–*Kronprinzessin Cecilie*), USS *Agamemnon* (ex–*Kaiser Wilhelm II*), USS *America* (ex-*Amerika*), and USS *Von Steuben* (ex–*Kronprinz Wilhelm*)—were much too large to use any other port on the French Atlantic coast than Brest. In fact, Brest was the most important port, a natural port usable by ships of any draft. Shortly after the end of the war, Admiral Sims wrote in his memoir, *The Victory at Sea,* "It was a matter of regret that we could not earlier have made Brest the main naval base for the American naval forces in France, for it was in some respects strategically better located for that purpose than was any other port in Europe. Even for escorting certain merchant convoys into the Channel Brest would

have provided a better base than either Plymouth [England] or Queenstown [now Cobh, Ireland]."[32]

The primary reason it could not be was the lack of such critical necessities as oil tanks and repair facilities. The U.S. Army contingent at Brest, under Brig. Gen. Nathaniel F. McClure followed by Maj. Gen. George H. Harries, assisted in constructing additional port facilities there. The Army preferred Bordeaux and Saint-Nazaire, but Bordeaux lay sixty miles up the Gironde Estuary and Garonne River. The river's swift current made it difficult for large ships to anchor and swing with the tide. Additionally, the bar at the mouth of the estuary allowed only ships with a maximum twenty-five-foot draft to cross. The artificial harbor at Saint-Nazaire could take vessels with a thirty-foot draft but only in limited numbers. At its peak usage by American ships, Saint-Nazaire accommodated twenty-nine ships at one time. Farther up the Loire River, Nantes could accommodate vessels drawing less than twenty-four feet. La Pallice, near La Rochelle, had very little capacity in this period, and American ships seldom used it.[33]

TROOP TRANSPORTS

American-flagged ships were not the only ones to carry troops across the Atlantic to the western front, and not all troops went directly to France. Also, whereas of the 2,086,000 American troops transported most sailed from New York, a variety of other ports in both the United States and Canada were also used. About half the troops went to Britain before continuing to France. Apportionment among ports on both sides of the Atlantic aimed mainly to prevent congestion and expedite loading and unloading. British ships carried about 48 percent of the American troops, American ships 46 percent, French and Italian vessels the remainder. Owing to the large size and deep draft of many transports, 75 percent of the American soldiers who came directly from North America arrived at Brest. Saint-Nazaire received 19 percent and Bordeaux 5 percent. The American troops who went first to Britain arrived at any of several ports but eventually traveled to Southampton, where a small squadron of American transports was based. These ships, along with Channel ferries, transported the American troops from England to Le Havre.[34]

Among the American units that went to France was the 4th Marine Brigade. Assigned to fight alongside the U.S. Army's 2nd Brigade in the 2nd Infantry Division, the Marines were in combat at Belleau Wood, Saint-Mihiel, and Blanc Mont Ridge. By the end of the war, there were 857 Marine Corps officers in France and 23,698 Marines.

CARGO TRANSPORT

President Wilson had in his 1912 election campaign argued for expansion of American foreign trade and the building of a strong merchant marine. His administration made merchant shipping one of the four main elements of the nation's development. The Shipping Act of 1916 was designed for "encouraging, developing, and

Table 1
Ports of Departure and American Troop Numbers, June 1917 to November 1918

From Canadian Ports	
Quebec	11,000
Montreal	34,000
St. John's	1,000
Halifax	5,000
From American Ports	
Portland	6,000
Boston	46,000
New York	1,656,000
Philadelphia	35,000
Baltimore	4,000
Norfolk	288,000
TOTAL	**2,086,000**

Source: Gleaves, *History of the Transport Service,* p. 97.

Table 2
Ports of Arrival and Troop Numbers, June 1917 to November 1918

Great Britain	
Glasgow	45,000
Manchester	4,000
Liverpool	844,000
Bristol	11,000
Falmouth	1,000
Plymouth	1,000
Southampton	57,000
London	62,000
TOTAL	**1,025,000**
France	
Le Havre	13,000
Brest	791,000
Saint-Nazaire	198,000
La Pallice	4,000
Bordeaux	50,000
Marseille	1,000
TOTAL	**1,057,000**

Source: Gleaves, *History of the Transport Service,* p. 97.

creating a naval auxiliary and naval reserve."[35] The act provided for a foreign-trade program scientifically managed and efficiently regulated by a new body, the U.S. Shipping Board. In April 1917, Congress added to the board a shipbuilding agency, the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The similarity of roles of the two organizations initially brought great difficulties, but both were eventually successful, at least in the provision and control of merchant shipping for the war effort.

In late 1917 and early 1918, after many delays and much confusion, the president of the International Mercantile Marine Company, Philip A. S. Franklin, created a plan that put all America's oceanic shipping under the control of one agency, which became the Shipping Control Committee of the Shipping Board. The committee took over the former New York office building of the German shipping company Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (HAPAG); from there Franklin centrally allocated and organized ports of departure and arrival for various cargoes. Meanwhile, the Shipping Board was increasingly turning over the manning and operation of cargo ships supplying American forces in

France to the Navy. On 7 January 1918 the Navy Department established the Naval Overseas Transport Service (NOTS), which, headed by Cdr. Charles Belknap, eventually operated 450 government-owned vessels. Hampton Roads in Virginia became their main point of departure to ports in France. These ships carried an estimated total of six million tons of supplies as well as fifteen thousand horses and mules.[36] Their destination ports were mainly Pauillac, Bassens, and Bordeaux on the Gironde and the Garonne River, and Saint-Nazaire and Nantes on the Loire. Only a few U.S. government–owned cargo vessels sailed to other ports, such as Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest, La Pallice, La Rochelle, or Marseille.[37] American-flagged cargo ships that entered the Mediterranean were escorted by the U.S. naval command at Gibraltar and did not come under the purview of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, France.

Table 3
Nationality of Ships, with Total Number of Allied Expeditionary Troops Carried, June 1917 to November 1918

British	1,006,987	48.42%
U.S. naval transports	911,047	43.80%
Other U.S. vessels	41,534	2.00%
British-leased Italian	68,246	3.28%
French & Italian	52,066	2.50%
TOTAL	**2,079,880**	**100%**

Source: Gleaves, *History of the Transport Service,* pp. 91–92.



Source: Gleaves, *History of the Transport Service,* p. 95.

Fig. 1
Number of American troops arriving in France per month, December 1917 through October 1918

THE U.S. NAVY'S ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE

The central concerns for the commander of U.S. Naval Forces, France were the American warships operating on the Bay of Biscay and the American-flagged

troop- and cargo ships arriving at French Atlantic ports. The understanding between the French and American navies was that the senior naval officer present commanded all the forces in any particular area. Thus, the senior commander for the American naval forces in Brest was Vice-Amiral Frédéric-Paul Moreau, the Préfet Maritime of the Deuxième Arrondissement Maritime at Brest. Under Amiral Moreau, Contre-Amiral Antoine Schwerer commanded the patrol forces on the coast of Brittany, including the American patrol vessels. Initially, the former American yachts were all based at Brest, which was from the outset the base for Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, France. As the American naval facility there began to grow, the French navy offered part of the Château de Brest for use as a receiving barracks. In February 1918, the Americans named this building Carola Barracks, after the steam yacht USS *Carola IV,* which was moored nearby and also served as a barracks.[38] Over time the smaller and slower escorts shifted to other ports on the Bay of Biscay. American naval officers also served in the four districts, or *arrondissements maritimes,* on the French coast.

Between the end of December 1917 and early February 1918, Capt. T. P. Magruder gradually transferred his minesweeping division to Lorient, where he became the U.S. Navy's district officer. His force was made up of the converted yacht *Guinevere* and ten converted fishing boats: *McNeal, Cahill, Anderton, Bauman, Lewes, Courtney, Hubbard, James, Hinton,* and *Douglas*.[39] French naval officials assigned Magruder's vessels one of the sectors of the approaches to Saint-Nazaire, where many smaller American ships discharged cargo. The French navy entrusted Captain Magruder also with the responsibility for the Troisième Arrondissement Maritime, from Penmarc'h to a point south of Saint-Nazaire. Magruder's capable management of this area earned him the sobriquet of "le duc de Morbihan," the department in Brittany in which Lorient lies.[40]

Capt. Newton A. McCully, who had recently served as naval attaché in Russia, was assigned to duty in France in early 1918 and was appointed the district officer in the Quatrième Arrondissement Maritime at Rochefort, extending south to the coast of Spain. During the same period, the converted American yachts *Corsair, Noma, Wakiva, May, Nokomis,* and *Aphrodite* moved from Brest to Rochefort to escort American ships approaching the Gironde.[41]

As these officers left for other parts of the coast, an additional American naval officer was needed at Brest on the staff and to command the Deuxième Arrondissement Maritime, which stretched from Cap de Bréhat south to Pointe de Penmarc'h and had the most American shipping activity. On his arrival in France, Capt. Henry Hughes Hough was appointed to this post; Hough had been born in the French overseas colony of Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, off the coast of Newfoundland.[42]

The last of the district commands to be filled was the Premier Arrondissement Maritime, based at Cherbourg. In the first phase of U.S. participation in the war,

few American vessels ventured into the English Channel. That gradually changed, and Capt. David French Boyd took up the district position and that of port officer at Le Havre. His district stretched from the boundary of the Brest maritime district as far as Cap d'Antifer. Owing to the distance involved and practical difficulties, the American facility at Brest was unable to support Cherbourg, leaving Captain Boyd to work with whatever resources he could find.[43]

Under each of these American district officers were port officers, officers appointed from time to time as the American naval representatives in various ports, both large and small. These ports included Brest, Le Havre, Cherbourg, Rouen, Saint-Malo, Granville, Saint-Nazaire, Nantes, Quiberon Bay, Les Sables-d'Olonne, Bordeaux, La Pallice, Rochefort, Royan, Le Verdon-sur-Mer, Pauillac, and Saint-Jean-de-Luz.[44]

Perhaps the most unusual American naval elements to arrive in France were the five fourteen-inch (35-centimeter), fifty-caliber (127 cm) naval railway guns that were sent to Saint-Nazaire. Their transport across the ocean involved a complex series of shipments: fourteen American naval officers and 457 men, the disassembled parts of the newly purpose-built guns, ammunition, and supplies went to France in five ships between July and August 1918. These five batteries constituted a separate naval command, under Rear Adm. Charles P. Plunkett. Assembled at Saint-Nazaire, they went into action in September. Batteries 1 and 2 operated directly with the French army at Soissons and Compiègne, Batteries 3, 4, and 5 with the American army at Verdun.[45]

CONCLUSION

By the time of the armistice in November 1918, U.S. Naval Forces, France had grown under the leadership of Rear Adm. Henry B. Wilson from its faltering beginnings in Paris and Brest into a well-organized command that stretched across the Atlantic and Channel coasts of France. Its responsibilities ranged from overseas convoys for troops and supplies and coastal convoys, management of districts, ports, and harbors, minesweeping, salvage, communications systems and stations, hospitals, ship repair, water and fuel, and aviation to a growing shore establishment. By November 1918 the staff of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, France had ninety-nine officers. To it were assigned forty-three destroyers, twenty converted yachts, twelve submarine chasers, eleven tugs, eleven trawlers, two barges, one supply ship, one salvage vessel, and a gunboat.[46]

By the summer of 1919, Henry B. Wilson had moved on to become commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, as a full admiral. To mark his fifteen months in France, "the most cherished memory of [his] over forty years of service," Wilson distributed to those who had served with him there a small booklet summarizing the history of his command from 1 November 1917 to 31 January 1919. "It is to their efficiency, to their untiring zeal and keenness for work, and above all to their loyalty

to their commander, to their duty, and to our service, that our success was due; and it was their proudest boast that no soldier or passenger, embarked in a troop ship, escorted by American vessels, during the above period, was lost through the effort of the enemy."[47]

NOTES Available in French translation as "Le contre-amiral Henry B. Wilson et la marine des États-Unis en France (1917–1919)," in *L'engagement des Américains dans la guerre en 1917–1918: La Fayette, nous voilà!,* ed. Olivier Chaline and Olivier Forcade (Paris: Sorbonne Université Presse, 2020), the proceedings of the 2017 conference at the Sorbonne in Paris and at Brest. Published by courtesy of the publisher and coeditors.

1 Ambassador Walter Hines Page, telegram, 23 March 1917, in Josephus Daniels, *Our Navy at War* (New York: George H. Doran, 1922), p. 36; E. David Cronon, ed., *The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913–1921* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 123, entry for Sunday, 25 March 1917.

2 Cronon, *Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels,* p. 123, entry for Sunday, 25 March 1917.

3 See John B. Hattendorf, "Changing American Perceptions of the Royal Navy since 1775," *International Journal of Naval History* 11, no. 1 (July 2014), reprinted as chapter 3 of the present collection. On Sims, see Elting E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942; repr. New York: Russell & Russell, 1968); William S. Sims, *The Victory at Sea* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1920; repr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984) (the original edition was the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for History, 1921); David F. Trask, "William Sowden Sims: The Victory Ashore," in *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930,* ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990); and Branden Little and Kenneth J. Hagan, "Radical, but Right: William Sowden Sims (1858–1936)," in *Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries,* ed. Hattendorf and Bruce A. Elleman (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), pp. 1–10.

4 Woodrow Wilson, Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, 2 April 1917, S. Doc. No. 65-5, pp. 3–8 (1917), available at wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson's_War_Message_to_Congress.

5 "A Comparative Analysis of Problems and Methods of Coalition Action in Two World Wars" (paper for the International Relations Section, Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 6–8 September 1956), p. 5, Papers of Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC [hereafter NHHC OA]. I am grateful to Dr. David Kohnen for providing me with a copy of this interesting analysis.

6 Thomas G. Frothingham, *The Naval History of the World War,* unnumbered vol. 3, *The United States in the War, 1917–1918* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1926), p. 147.

7 "A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters with Outline of the Organization of Admiral Sims' Headquarters, Prepared by the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims' Staff for the Naval Committee of Congress on Tour of Inspection, 3 August 1918," p. 3, Papers of Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, NHHC OA. I am grateful to Dr. David Kohnen for providing me with a copy of this document. On this subject, see also U.S. Office of Naval Records and Library, *The American Naval Planning Section London,* Monograph 7 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1923); David F. Trask, *Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918* (Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1972); and Michael Simpson, ed., *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1919,* Publications of the

Navy Records Society, vol. 130 (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar for the Navy Records Society, 1991).

8 See John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), pp. 90–91.

9 For a succinct general overview of the American naval effort, see Dudley W. Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War (with Special Reference to the European Theater of Operations),* in *Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval Establishment, 1927–1928: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Naval Affairs,* 70th Cong., pp. 2653–74 (1928). References are to www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/american-naval-participation-in-the-great-war-with-special-reference-to-the-european-theater-of-operations.html.

10 Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 172, 395, 447–48.

11 Albert P. Niblack [Vice Adm., USN], *Putting Cargoes Through: The U.S. Navy at Gibraltar, 1917–1919,* ed. with an introduction by John B. Hattendorf (Gibraltar: Calpe, 2018).

12 Sayles to Sims, 18 January 1919, box 82, files: "Sayles, W. R.," Papers of Admiral William S. Sims, Library of Congress, Washington, DC [hereafter LOC].

13 William N. Still Jr., *Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I* (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2006), pp. 49–50.

14 Cronon, *Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels,* p. 148, entry for Sunday, 6 May 1917.

15 Still, *Crisis at Sea,* p. 50.

16 Geoffrey L. Rossano, *Stalking the U-boat: U.S. Naval Aviation in Europe during World War I* (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2010), pp. 11–15.

17 Albert Gleaves [Vice Adm., USN], *A History of the Transport Service: Adventures and Experiences of United States Transports and Cruisers in the World War* (New York: George H. Doran, 1921), pp. 32–43.

18 Albert Gleaves, *The Admiral: The Memoirs of Albert Gleaves, USN* (Pasadena, CA: Hope, 1985), p. 150.

19 Frothingham, *Naval History of the World War,* p. 133.

20 Ibid., pp. 131–41; Still, *Crisis at Sea,* p. 51.

21 N. C. Twining to Jackson, 28 September 1917, p. 1, box 68, folder: "Jackson, R. H.," Papers of Admiral William S. Sims, LOC.

22 Ibid., p. 2.

23 Ibid., p. 3.

24 Sims to de Bon, 30 July 1917, quoted in Still, *Crisis at Sea,* p. 51.

25 Sims to Fletcher, 3 August 1917, quoted in ibid.

26 Sims to Fletcher, 12 September 1917, quoted in ibid., p. 53.

27 Sims to Guy Mason, January 1926, box 57, file: "Fletcher, W. B.," Papers of Admiral William S. Sims, LOC. See also Force Commander [Sims] to Commander of the Patrol Squadrons Operating on French Coast [Fletcher], "Duties of U.S. Naval Port Officers," 28 September 1917, reproduced as "U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters," exhibit Q, Court of Enquiry on Rear Admiral Fletcher, March 1920, record group 125, entry 30, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, available at www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/wwi/september-1917/vice-admiral-william-41/_jcr_content.html.

28 See Niblack, *Putting Cargoes Through.*

29 Henry B. Wilson [Vice Adm., USN], *An Account of the Operations of the American Navy in France during the War with Germany* (n.p., 1919?), pp. 146–47. A court of inquiry on Fletcher's conduct was held after the war; Court of Enquiry on Rear Admiral William Fletcher.

30 Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War,* p. 5; Wilson, *American Navy in France,* pp. 147–48.

31 Henry P. Beers, "U.S. Naval Port Officers in the Bordeaux Region, 1917–1919 [Typescript]," Administrative Reference Service Report No. 3, Office of Records Administration, Navy Department, Washington, DC, September 1943, pp. 13–14.

32 Sims, *Victory at Sea* (1984), p. 349.

33 Wilson, *American Navy in France,* pp. 11–15.

34 Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War,* p. 5.

35 Quoted in Benjamin W. Labaree, William M. Fowler Jr., John B. Hattendorf, Jeffrey J. Safford, Edward W. Sloan, and Andrew W. German, *America and the Sea: A Maritime History* (Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1998), p. 496.

36 Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War,* p. 6.

37 Labaree et al., *America and the Sea,* pp. 493–500; Frothingham, *Naval History of the World War,* pp. 184–89; Lewis P. Clephane, *History of the Naval Overseas Transportation Service in World War I* (Washington, DC: Naval History Division, 1969), pp. 51–56.

38 Wilson, *American Navy in France,* pp. 102–103.

39 Ibid., pp. 18, 123–31.

40 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

41 Ibid., p. 18.

42 Ibid., p. 20.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 U.S. Navy, *The United States Naval Railway Batteries in France* (Washington, DC: GPO for the Office of Naval Records and Library, Historical Section, 1922; repr. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1985).

46 Ibid., pp. 7–10.

47 Wilson, foreword to *American Navy in France*.

XVIII *The U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean during World War I and Its Immediate Aftermath* 1917–1923

To understand the operations of the United States in the Mediterranean during World War I and its immediate aftermath, one needs first to understand the attitude toward the war of the American government under President Woodrow Wilson. American policy was unique among those of other powers, and its distinctive features reflected not only American war aims but also the ways that the U.S. Navy operated its warships.

PRELUDE

At the outbreak of the war in August 1914, President Wilson declared the United States neutral. Not only was it neutral in terms of international relations but, Wilson and his administration insisted, its citizens should also be neutral in thought, word, and deed. Government officials, including retired officers, were not permitted to discuss the war. Most notably, when the country's world-famous naval historian and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan published a letter to the editor of the *New York Evening Post* in August 1914, arguing that Britain must fight Germany's militaristic aims and that the domination of Europe by any power was a danger to the United States, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels rebuked him.[1] Mahan, who as a retired rear admiral was still under the secretary's authority, protested that he had been making similar arguments in print for more than twenty years, but Daniels forbade him to publish more. Mahan's pen was stilled. Already in poor health, he lived only a few more months and died in December 1914.

For their part, President Wilson and his cabinet were determined to stay out of the war and to follow the long-standing American policy of noninvolvement in European wars, meanwhile taking advantage of the situation to trade with both sides. For many Americans, the Atlantic Ocean seemed insulation enough. Wilson, as the elected leader of a nation of immigrants, noted in 1914, "We have to be neutral since otherwise our mixed populations would wage war on each other."[2] At the same time, Wilson saw the war as an opportunity for America to lead the world into a new world order of justice, freed of imperial conflicts. "Providence

has deeper plans than we could possibly have laid ourselves," he told his unofficial adviser, Col. Edward M. House, in August 1914.[3]

One of the things that Wilson thought that the United States could do most effectively was to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian victims of the conflict. The U.S. Food Administration—later called the American Relief Administration—was headed by future president Herbert Hoover, now earning early fame in relief work in wartime Europe. When it came to the armed forces and national security, however, Wilson refused for a long time to consider any form of preparation for war, even contingency planning. His stance was in part political, as the opposing Republicans supported military and naval preparedness. When the nation's military and naval leaders refused to be silent about the critical need to build up the Army and the Navy, Wilson suspended meetings of the Joint Army-Navy Board and forbade officers to give their opinions to members of Congress.[4] Wilson showed very little interest in naval matters, certainly, and concentrated his attention on his domestic "New Freedom" program.

At the beginning of 1915, as administration officials began to look at the new federal budget, they saw that the government's income was falling and that the budgets for the Army and Navy, like those of all other agencies, would need to be cut. But by now the political pressure for preparedness was beginning to have an effect on Wilson's thinking. The movement was even supported by film producers, who screened motion pictures such as *The Battle Cry of Peace* and *The Fall of a Nation* that depicted foreign troops invading the United States.[5]

THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR

During the first six months of 1915, Wilson's thinking changed significantly as he observed Japan present its Twenty-One Demands on the Republic of China, an attempt to extend Japanese control over Manchuria and the Chinese economy. On top of Japan's earlier seizure in 1914 of the German island colonies in the Pacific—the Mariana, Caroline, and Gilbert Islands—these demands seemed to Wilson continuing Japanese competition with the United States for influence in the Pacific region.

As a neutral, Wilson steadfastly opposed measures that interfered with America's neutral trade. He objected to the elements of the British economic blockade of Germany that hindered neutral trade, at the same time that he objected to the German U-boat campaign when it touched on Americans and American interests. In 1915 and again in early 1916, Wilson nearly took the United States to war in defense of neutral rights.[6] The major change in American opinion came when the German submarine *U-20* sank the Royal Mail Steamer *Lusitania* off the southern coast of Ireland on 7 May 1915. Of the 1,960 passengers and crew on board, only 39 percent, or 763, survived. Among the 1,197 dead were 128 of the 159 Americans who had been on board.[7]

Woodrow Wilson's three diplomatic notes of protest condemned Germany's submarine warfare campaign in the name of the "sacred principles of justice and humanity."[8] Almost immediately, the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, decided Wilson's position had become too provocative for a neutral and resigned. By the time Wilson received Germany's response to his third note, he and his administration had changed their views entirely about war preparation.[9] On 21 July, Wilson suddenly took the initiative and instructed the Secretaries of War and the Navy to prepare programs to strengthen the services. Wilson's directive was warmly welcomed by the Navy, but a naval armaments bill was strongly opposed in Congress, particularly among Midwesterners and southern Democrats committed to isolation from European affairs. As a result, the armament bill was slowed. It was not until the battle of Jutland in May 1916 demonstrated that the Royal Navy might not be adequate to halt German advances at sea and suggested that battleships were superior to battle cruisers in combat that Congress finally agreed. Wilson signed the Naval Expansion Act on 20 August 1916, the largest naval authorization in American naval history up to that time, providing for the construction of 156 new ships.[10]

During the 1916 presidential election, Wilson's Democratic Party backed him with their campaign slogan "He Kept Us out of War."[11] Winning the election by a slim margin, Wilson indeed redoubled his efforts to end the war, promoting ideas for a general peace that included a role for the United States as peacekeeper. He eloquently asked for "peace without victory" and replacement of the "balance of power" concept with "a community of power" that recognized the equality of nations, large and small. As he saw it, there should be a new world order that would guarantee freedom of the seas, limit armaments, and ensure the rights of all national groups to form their own independent governments.[12] Britain responded to Wilson with a list of conditions that were unacceptable to the Central Powers, Germany with a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. The massive bloodshed at Verdun served only to harden attitudes on both sides in Europe, not to promote the peace for which Wilson hoped. At this point he still thought that the United States could be the neutral mediator, but soon events forced Wilson to take sides in the war.

In late February 1917, Britain provided the United States with the text of a telegram (which British naval intelligence had intercepted and decoded) from German foreign secretary Arthur Zimmermann to the German ambassador in Mexico. In it, Zimmermann, anticipating that unrestricted submarine warfare would force the United States into the war, directed the ambassador to work secretly with the Mexicans to the end that should the United States declare war, an alliance would be formed among Germany, Mexico, and Japan. Germany would then support Mexico in reclaiming its lost territories in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Germany's intent was to create a strategic diversion that would hinder the United States from

supporting Britain and France, just as the German forces that had defeated Russia on the eastern front crossed over to overwhelm the allies in the west.

The Mexican government was not enticed by the German proposal, thinking it unrealistic in military terms, but the fact that Germany made this proposal convinced Wilson and his cabinet that Germany could not be trusted. In late March 1917, Wilson concluded that the only way for the United States to help establish a just, postwar world was to participate directly in the defeat of Germany and thereby to gain a position in which it could influence the peace settlement. Although Congress had not yet formally declared war, Secretary of the Navy Daniels summoned to Washington the new President of the Naval War College, Rear Adm. William S. Sims, and directed him to proceed immediately to London to discuss with the Admiralty how the U.S. Navy could be employed. Daniels and Adm. William S. Benson, who held the newly created post of Chief of Naval Operations, were suspicious of the British and did not want to provide them substantial direct support. Sims, however, had shown years before that his thinking paralleled Mahan's long-held view that only a coalition of free nations could prevent Germany from achieving victory.[13]

Meanwhile, the U-boats having continued to attack merchant ships carrying Americans, President Wilson asked for a declaration of war against Germany "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles."[14] With an overwhelming majority Congress passed the declaration on 6 April 1917.

U.S. NAVAL FORCES AT GIBRALTAR AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1917–1918

The initial focus for the United States was getting men and supplies to the western front in France and combating the German submarine threat. The thought of sending American ships to the Mediterranean area as well first arose in July 1917, when the British naval attaché in Washington, Capt. Guy Gaunt, telegraphed the First Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe, on 6 July 1917:

> The following ships have been put forward with a view to being [? sent at once]. [Capt. William V.] Pratt [Assistant Chief of Naval Operations] in favour. Admiral Benson [Chief of Naval Operations] told me that [he] thought it a waste of ships but Admiral [Henry T.] Mayo [Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet] implied that he would support it. I told Admiral Benson I thought that they would be of great use: USS *Birmingham, Chester, Salem, Sacramento, Yankton, Nashville, Marietta, Machias, Castine, Wheeling, Paducah*.[15]

Admiral Jellicoe cabled back the same day, "Should be grateful if Gunboats *Sacramento, Yankton, Nashville, Marietta, Machias, Castine, Wheeling* and *Paducah* could be sent to Gibraltar where they would be invaluable for seeing convoys clear of the submarine area off the coast. Admiral Sims concurs."[16] A month later, the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff in London, Rear Adm. A. L. Duff, RN, was able to

supply to the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, Rear Adm. Sir Heathcoat Grant, the details of the American ships to be based at Gibraltar, bringing the total from eleven to twenty-two.[17]

The first to arrive after the United States declared war was USS *Sacramento* (Gunboat No. 19) on 6 August 1917. Two days later, USS *Birmingham* (Cruiser No. 2) arrived with Rear Adm. Henry B. Wilson, USN, on board. Wilson had been in command of Patrol Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet since April 1917. To create a distinction that would allow an eventual separation of the Gibraltar command, the Navy Department ordered Rear Admiral Wilson to take command of "U.S. Patrol Forces Based at Gibraltar," also designated (for administrative reporting purposes) Squadron Two, Patrol Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.[18] While Rear Admiral Wilson was creating the initial organization in Gibraltar, under the direction of Admiral Sims in London and in cooperation with the Royal Navy, newly promoted rear admiral Albert P. Niblack was ordered to take the Gibraltar command and Rear Admiral Wilson to command U.S. naval forces in France. Wilson left Gibraltar on 23 October; Niblack arrived to take his place on 25 November, after three days of briefings from Sims and his staff in London and meetings in Paris at the French Ministry of the Marine.

Eventually, the U.S. Navy at Gibraltar comprised forty-one vessels—mainly small vessels such as gunboats, revenue cutters, antiquated destroyers, and steam-powered yachts brought into naval service—manned by an average of 314 officers and 4,660 enlisted men.[19] Niblack described the arrangement:

> As Rear Admiral in command, I was thus under the U.S. Force Commander in London, Vice Admiral W. S. Sims, but operated with the allied naval forces under all kinds of signal systems, codes, orders, and agreements, the senior allied naval officer present being in command of the combined forces for the time being. It was in effect one large "hat pool" from which were drawn every day the available ships of all nationalities for escorts to convoys, and the senior officer present on the occasion took charge of the escort. The convoy system was, however, practically under the British Admiralty in London, the British Vice Admiral in Malta, and the British Vice Admiral at Gibraltar, who actually issued orders to the convoys originating or formed up in the immediate waters under their control. To the credit of all concerned, the system worked harmoniously, silently and without recriminations.[20]

The Strait of Gibraltar was a key location. The influential American naval historian Capt. Dudley W. Knox, who had been on Sims's staff in London, succinctly assessed that "Gibraltar [was] 'the gateway' for more traffic than any other part in the world. Gibraltar was the focus for the great routes to and from the east through the Mediterranean, and from it extended the communications for the armies in Italy, Saloniki, Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia."[21] The forces based at Gibraltar were concerned with several problems: protecting allied maritime traffic approaching and departing the Strait of Gibraltar to and from the Azores, France, and the British Isles; in the immediate danger zone from German submarines in and around

the strait; and departing and approaching the strait to and from North Africa, Italy, Malta, and the eastern Mediterranean.

The Imperial German Navy had begun to deploy submarines to the Mediterranean as early as April 1915, when the British and French were involved in the Dardanelles campaign. Soon, they began to assemble prefabricated submarines at the Austro-Hungarian base at Pola, in Istria in the northern Adriatic. These boats began the submarine warfare campaign against allied shipping in the Mediterranean. The Germans also began to construct larger boats at bases on the Adriatic. The threat from both the Austro-Hungarian navy and submarine reinforcements from Germany created a major naval strategic problem for the allies in the Mediterranean. British, French, and Italian warships attempted various types of antisubmarine operations.

Without an organized allied naval command, the three navies attempted to work in agreed-upon, complementary ways but lacked the efficiency of central direction. The initial such attempt was to try to prevent the Austro-Hungarian battle force and Austrian and German submarines in the Adriatic from reaching the main routes of the Mediterranean. In 1915, the allies began to organize what came to be called the "Otranto Barrage," a blockade across the seventy-two-kilometer-wide Otranto Strait with allied naval forces based near both ends, at Brindisi and on the Greek island of Corfu. The strait was to be blocked not by minelayers but by small "drifters," converted fishing boats, dragging nets to entangle submarines; supporting them were destroyers and patrol boats carrying depth charges, naval aviation, and major warships. The ships, sensors, and weapons available proved inadequate to contain submarines, although they were effective in keeping the Austro-Hungarian battle fleet in the northern Adriatic.

When the United States entered the war, on 6 April 1917, it was at war only with Germany, not Austria-Hungary. It was not until eight months later, on 7 December 1917, that the United States declared war on Germany's ally. Thus, the American naval forces that had begun to arrive at Gibraltar in August 1917 were careful not to proceed too far into the Mediterranean. They took no part in the largest naval battle in the Mediterranean, when the Austro-Hungarian navy, based at Cattaro (Kotor), attacked the allied forces at the Otranto Barrage on 15 May 1917.[22]

However, in early 1918, American naval air bases were established at Pescara in the Abruzzo region on Italy's eastern, Adriatic, coast and at Porto Corsini near Ravenna. On 21, 22, and 23 August American naval aircraft attacked Austrian aircraft and military works at Pola.[23] Also, at the request of the Allied Naval Council the United States sent three groups of new 110-foot-long "submarine chasers" to Europe, one group, under the command of Capt. Charles P. Nelson, to Corfu. These vessels, with gasoline engines and underwater-sound detection devices were a distinctive and innovative U.S. Navy design, developed for antisubmarine work;

a total of 441 were produced between 1917 and 1919 for both the American and allied navies.[24]

On 2 October 1918, Captain Nelson with twelve of his submarine chasers joined in an allied attack on Durazzo (Durrës), Albania, from which the Germans and Austrians were sending supplies to their ally Bulgaria. British and Italian cruisers bombarded the port and the shipping anchored there, while destroyers and the submarine chasers screened them from submarine attack. One submarine chaser, *No. 129,* commanded by Ens. Maclear Jacoby, attacked the submarine *U-28,* and submarine chasers *215* and *128* attacked *U-31*. The American naval command claimed to have sunk both submarines, having sighted steel plates, surface oil, and bubbles.[25] (Actually, although severely damaged, both survived.)[26] This was the largest Mediterranean engagement in which the U.S. Navy participated during the war.

In the Atlantic, English Channel, and the North Sea, the adoption of convoy operations after May 1917 proved to be a very effective countermeasure to the German submarine threat. In April 1917, Britain's ally Japan sent a squadron of destroyers and a cruiser into the Mediterranean, where they efficiently assisted with the convoy operations. In general, however, as Admiral Niblack later noted, "the convoy system was apparently less effective in the Mediterranean than in the Atlantic . . . due to the narrowness of the Mediterranean, whereby the choice of routes was so restricted; the slowness of the cargo ships; and the relatively inferior character of the escort ships, which were the older and less effective ships, the newer and more efficient ones being used in the Atlantic and Channel."[27]

On 29 October 1918, American naval forces in the Mediterranean learned that Austria-Hungary was about to sign an armistice and that the German submarines in the Adriatic were refueling and preparing to make their way back to Germany through the Strait of Gibraltar. All available American vessels gathered at Gibraltar, including seven submarine chasers that had just arrived from the United States via the Azores and eleven more that had come with the destroyer USS *Parker* from Plymouth, England. Within hours of their arrival, the submarine chasers were deployed in offensive barrage lines that, with British forces, totaled thirty ships. The German submarines successfully passed through the strait. On 9 November, two days before the armistice with Germany, the predreadnought battleship HMS *Britannia* and her escorts, the destroyers HMS *Defender* and USS *Decatur,* were off Cape Trafalgar entering the strait after a passage from South Africa when *UB-50* attacked and sank *Britannia*.[28]

When the war ended, the American naval effort, which had begun only eighteen months before, had not yet reached its full potential. The U.S. Navy–developed naval mines widely used in the North Sea Mine Barrage appeared to be a more effective antisubmarine weapon than antisubmarine nets. The U.S. Navy was in the process of putting naval mines to use in the Otranto Barrage and, to prevent the

development of a German submarine base at Constantinople, across the Aegean from the Greek mainland to the island of Samos. When the war ended, construction had just begun on an American mine-warfare base at the French naval base at Bizerte, Tunisia, intended to support both the Otranto and the Aegean mine barrages.[29]

U.S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE POSTWAR SETTLEMENT, 1919–1923

On 11 November 1918, the American naval forces in the Mediterranean received the news that the armistice had been signed and immediately afterward orders to cease hostilities. Plans for demobilization were made and operating forces returned to the United States as rapidly as possible. The state of affairs in Turkish and Adriatic waters, however, required a number of ships to remain: USS *Nahma,* in Constantinople; *Buffalo,* flagship and repair ship at Gibraltar, with four large destroyers; and the cruiser *Birmingham,* with the destroyers *Gregory, Luce, Stribling,* and *Israel,* in the Adriatic.[30] These separate situations in which the U.S. Navy was involved in the immediate postwar years had much to do with President Wilson's objectives for the peace and arose directly from the peace terms. They occurred nearly simultaneously, although the Adriatic operations began and ended somewhat earlier than those off Turkey.

Operations in the Adriatic

In September 1918, Austria-Hungary had addressed a peace note to the United States, but President Wilson, suspicious of its sincerity, rejected it.[31] In the following month, Austria-Hungary joined Germany in requesting a peace on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points. By this time Wilson had recognized the Czech National Council and was sympathetic to Yugoslav national aspirations, so much so that the opportunity for autonomous development that the tenth of Wilson's Fourteen Points had asserted for the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was no longer enough. Wilson had already gone further and had tacitly recognized the prospect of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the authority and military capabilities of which were rapidly collapsing. Unaware that a twenty-four-hour hiatus was still to elapse, the Austrian army laid down its weapons at the armistice itself; the Italian army in its front promptly advanced and captured some 300,000 prisoners and much booty.

The area that Austria-Hungary had ruled along the Adriatic had been divided into various territories, but during the war a very active group of local political leaders had promoted unification into a single state. These leaders formed a national Yugoslav Committee and declared the state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In one of his last acts as monarch Emperor Karl I of Austria (who was also King Károly IV of Hungary) ceded the former Austro-Hungarian navy to the Yugoslav

Committee. This was a direct affront to the Italians, who had expected to receive the navy as a spoil of war, although they knew that mutineers had (on 30 October) hoisted Croat flags to the warships' mastheads. The United States fully supported the nationalist aspirations of the Yugoslavs and their right to their homelands along the Adriatic, but France and Britain had promised Italy these areas in the Treaty of London. Signed on 26 April 1915, while the United States was still neutral, the treaty had been the price that the allies paid to bring Italy into the war.[32]

On 5 November 1918, the Allied Naval Council in Paris met to discuss how to carry out the Austro-Hungarian armistice; it established and sent to Venice a committee of naval officers to take the necessary steps. With the approval of Admiral Benson, Admiral Sims assigned Rear Adm. William H. G. Bullard to the committee, where he would work with the three other members, from Britain, France, and Italy. Since the Austro-Hungarian navy had already been transferred to what was now Yugoslavia, it was no longer in Austria's power to deliver it to the allies as the armistice had stipulated, leaving the committee in a quandary. Meanwhile, Italy was moving its army to entrench itself in the former Austro-Hungarian territory and to halt the Yugoslav nationalist movement. The United States opposed the Italian intention, in the spirit of Wilson's Fourteen Points; the U.S. Navy now occupied a hundred miles of the Dalmatian coastline to protect it for Yugoslavia. This occupation would last until September 1921.

Turkish Waters

Following the Turkish armistice signed in Mudros Bay at Lemnos, the allied powers occupied the forts on the Dardanelles and Bosporus.[33] The United States had played no part in the war against Turkey, but Turkey had severed its diplomatic ties, which the American government decided not to resume immediately. In January 1919, Rear Adm. Mark L. Bristol was ordered to Constantinople as Senior U.S. Naval Officer, Turkish Waters—that is, the Aegean east of longitude 21° east. Bristol's duties were initially diplomatic and dealt with the administration of food and relief supplies in the region. On 11 May, however, Bristol took a force to join allied forces at Smyrna delivering the city to Greece, as had been agreed to protect its Greek citizens from hostile Turks during the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire. In August 1919, Bristol was named president of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation. Later, he dealt with the situation in Armenia and the arrival of refugees from Russia. In 1922, when Turkish forces entered Smyrna, American ships returned to guard American interests and evacuate more than 250,000 Greek refugees. By 1924, the political situation there had stabilized and the American naval forces withdrawn, but Admiral Bristol remained in Constantinople until 1927, when the Navy sent him to China, where a similar situation was developing.[34]

With the formal end of the war in 1919, American naval forces stationed in Britain and France went back to North America for demobilization. At home in the

United States, politicians engaged in a highly partisan debate about the country's future role in the world. With the drawdown in military and naval forces and the rise of isolationist viewpoints, the decade of the 1920s proved to be a period of "involvement without commitment" in American foreign policy.[35] Despite this, a small but significant group of American warships remained in the eastern Mediterranean for another five years. Their activities reflected the distinctive American interests in carrying out the naval aspects of the Versailles peace agreement, establishing peace and stability, and providing humanitarian relief assistance.

NOTES This essay was presented at an international conference held on the island of Lemnos in the northern Aegean in June 2015 and first published in Zisis Fotakis, ed., *The First World War in the Mediterranean and the Role of Lemnos* (Athens: Editions Hêrodotos, 2018), pp. 173–92, © 2018 Editions Hêrodotos. It is used by permission.

1 Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Britain Must Fight, Declares Mahan," letter to the editor, items E103 and E104 in *A Bibliography of the Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* comp. John B. Hattendorf and Lynn C. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1986); repr. Robert Seager II and Doris Maguire, eds., *The Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 698–700.

2 Quoted in George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776,* Oxford History of the United States (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), p. 399.

3 Ibid.

4 Tracy B. Kittredge, "A Comparative Analysis of Problems and Methods of Coalition Action in Two World Wars" (paper for the International Relations Section, Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 6–8 September 1956), p. 3, Papers of Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC. I am grateful to Dr. David Kohnen for providing me with a copy of this interesting analysis.

5 Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 178.

6 Douglas Peifer, "The Sinking of the *Lusitania,* Wilson's Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan," *Journal of Military History* 79, no. 4 (October 2015), pp. 1025–45.

7 Peter Engberg-Klarström, Mike Poirier, and Hildo Thiel, "Passenger and Crew Statistics," Lusitania *Resource: History, Passenger & Crew Biographies, and* Lusitania *Facts,* www.rmslusitania.info/people/statistics/.

8 Quoted in Herring, *Colony to Superpower,* p. 402.

9 Note of 21 July 1915 to Germany on the *Lusitania* case, in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement, The World War*, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), pp. 480–82.

10 Robert G. Albion, *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798–1947,* ed. Rowena Reed (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 222–23.

11 Herring, *Colony to Superpower,* p. 407.

12 Ibid.

13 See John B. Hattendorf, "Changing American Perceptions of the Royal Navy since 1775," *International Journal of Naval History* 11, no. 1 (July 2014), reprinted as chapter 3 of the present collection. On Sims, see Elting E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942; repr. New York: Russell & Russell, 1968); William S. Sims, *The Victory at Sea* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1920; repr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984) (the original edition was the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for History, 1921); David F. Trask, "William Sowden Sims: The Victory Ashore," in *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930,* ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990); and Branden Little and Kenneth J. Hagan, "Radical, but Right: William Sowden Sims (1858–1936)," in *Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries,* ed. Hattendorf and Bruce A. Elleman (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), pp. 1–10.

14 Woodrow Wilson, Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, April 2, 1917, S. Doc. No. 65-5, pp. 3–8 (1917), available at wwi.lib.byu .edu/index .php/Wilson's_War_Message_to_Congress.

15 Gaunt to Jellicoe, 6 July 1917, in *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1919,* ed. Michael Simpson, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 130 (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar for the Navy Records Society, 1991), p. 402, doc. 303. The following section is based on Albert P. Niblack [Vice Adm., USN], *Putting Cargoes Through: The U.S. Navy at Gibraltar during the First World War, 1917–1919,* ed. with an introduction by John B. Hattendorf (Gibraltar: Calpe, 2018).

16 Jellicoe to Gaunt, 6 July 1917, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations,* doc. 304.

17 Duff to Sir Heathcoat Grant, 9 August 1917, in ibid., doc. 305.

18 William N. Still Jr., *Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I* (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2006), pp. 478–79. See also Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 394–95.

19 Dudley W. Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War (with Special Reference to the European Theater of Operations),* in *Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval Establishment, 1927–1928: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Naval Affairs,* 70th Cong., chap. 2 (1928), available at www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/american-naval-participation-in-the-great-war-with-special-reference-to-the-european-theater-of-operations.html.

20 Niblack, *Putting Cargoes Through*.

21 Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War,* chap. 2.

22 Paul G. Halpern, *The Battle of the Otranto Straits: Controlling the Gateway to the Adriatic in World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2004).

23 Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War,* chap. 7.

24 Ibid., chap. 6. See also "Statistics: Facts and Figures on WWI Subchasers," *Subchaser Archives,* www.subchaser.org/statistics.

25 Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War,* chap. 6.

26 Halpern, *Naval History of World War I,* p. 176.

27 Niblack, *Putting Cargoes Through*.

28 Ibid.; Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War,* chap. 6.

29 Knox, *American Naval Participation in the Great War,* chap. 6.

30 Niblack, *Putting Cargoes Through*.

31 The following section is based on the ninety-nine-page unpublished typescript study by Dr. A. C. Davidonis of the Princeton University History Department: "The American Naval Mission in the Adriatic, 1918–1921," Administrative Reference Service Report 4 (U.S. Navy Dept., Administrative Office, Office of Records Administration, September 1943). Copy in the Henry E. Eccles Library, shelf number VA52.A24 No. 4, Learning Commons, Naval War College, Newport, RI [hereafter NWC Library].

32 Ibid., pp. 1–14.

33 The following section is based on the thirty-two-page study in typescript by Dr. Henry P. Beers, "U.S. Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters, 1919–1924," Administrative Reference Service Report 2 (U.S. Navy Dept., Administrative Office, Office of Records Administration, June 1943). Copy in NWC Library, shelf number VA52.A24 No. 2. A version appeared in *Military Affairs* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1943), pp. 209–20. See also William R. Braisted, "Mark Lambert Bristol: Naval Diplomat Extraordinary of the Battleship Age," in Bradford, *Admirals of the New Steel Navy,* pp. 331–73.

34 For a study of the period from 1919 to 1934, see William N. Still Jr., *Victory without Peace: The United States Navy in European Waters, 1919–1924* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).

35 Herring, *Colony to Superpower,* pp. 427, 436.

XIX *Aircraft Carrier Naval Aviation and the Changing Character of Naval Battle during the War in the Pacific*

The nature and character of major naval battles have changed dramatically over the course of world naval history. These changes have tended to punctuate and divide long periods during which the basic concept of naval battles remained largely the same. The key periods are traditionally seen as the ages of galley warfare, which characterized classical naval history; of the line of battle, from the mid-seventeenth century to the early nineteenth; of naval warfare under steam in the mid-to-late nineteenth century; of air and submarine combat in the first half of the twentieth century; and of the missile, space, and cyber warfare dating from the latter half of the twentieth century to the present. Each of these periods in naval history has typically been characterized by a dominant type of warship that is closely associated in its design with the new emerging weapons and weapon systems of the era.[1]

As that list suggests, the periods of characteristic naval battles have tended to become shorter over time; naval warfare reflects the ever-quickening pace of technological innovation since the Industrial Revolution. At the same time, however, the characteristic and dominant type of battle in a given period does not necessarily exclude the earlier forms, which may survive into a new era. For example, the galley that typified ancient warfare was used in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and North America well into the eighteenth century. Similarly, the tactic of "crossing the T" that became so famous in the battles between ships of the line in the eighteenth century was used by the American battleship force that engaged the Japanese in the Surigao Strait in October 1944. Such overlap occurs for a variety of reasons. Weapons, tactics, and technologies may continue to be employed even when they are no longer predominant. Also, conflicting human attitudes and understandings are typically involved in the adoption of any new technology.

AVIATION AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE U.S. NAVY

In the U.S. Navy, Eugene Ely became the first to pilot an aircraft from a ship when he took off from a platform on the bow of the cruiser USS *Birmingham* (CL 12) on 14 November 1910. Ely was also the first American to make a shipboard landing,

setting a biplane down on another jury-rigged platform, on board the armored cruiser USS *Pennsylvania* (ACR 4), on 18 January 1911. Just a little over three years later, on 25 April 1914, the Navy's first flight in a combat environment took place when Lt. P. N. L. Bellinger took a Curtiss AB-3 flying boat from the battleship USS *Mississippi* (BB 23), steaming off Vera Cruz, Mexico, to look for mines in the harbor. Over a period of eighteen days, *Mississippi* and *Birmingham* launched nine reconnaissance missions. From these small beginnings, naval aviation grew and continued to develop over the following quarter century.[2]

When the United States entered World War I in 1917 American naval aviators came to European waters, where they saw service over the North Sea, the English Channel, the Bay of Biscay, and the Mediterranean.[3] A U.S. battleship squadron joined the Grand Fleet, and there American naval officers observed the Royal Navy's development of the first aircraft carrier. As early as 1918, the American naval staff based in London proposed a naval building program along the lines of British ideas that included aircraft carriers. The Royal Navy even sent a senior naval constructor, Stanley V. Goodall, to Washington with plans of its prospective carriers.[4]

By the end of World War I, the U.S. Navy had some two thousand aircraft of various types. Key concepts for future use of aircraft carriers and naval aviation in combat were developed in conjunction with the Fleet Battle Problems, annual fleet exercises that took place between 1923 and 1940. These exercises involved not only the fleet and all its top commanders but also the Chief of Naval Operations and key agencies throughout the Navy, among them the Naval War College and the General Board.[5] By 1938–40, carrier operations in these exercises had come to resemble closely those that would be carried out in actual combat during 1941–45.[6] For many, the Fleet Battle Problems created a consensus about the value of carriers and of naval aviation:

- The aircraft carrier had become a partner with the battleship as a key element of naval power.
- High-speed, autonomous carrier task forces had enormous ability to project naval airpower over great distances.
- Aircraft carriers were highly vulnerable to air, surface, and subsurface attack.
- Aircraft carriers demanded extensive logistical support for success.
- Patrol bombers were ineffective as attack aircraft.
- Dive-bombers were more effective than horizontal bombers.
- Rigid airships were ineffective as fleet scouts.[7]

These observations reflected the progress made in the interwar years in thinking about the use of naval aviation; still, they did not fully anticipate how aviation would change the nature of naval battle during World War II.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE LECTURES ON NAVAL AVIATION

The Naval War College had been established in 1884 as the institution within which the U.S. Navy would consider the highest aspects of the profession of arms. It was designed to be a place to think about how wars begin, how wars end, and how wars may be avoided, as well as the nature and character of war at sea and of naval battle.[8] Thus the lectures that Naval War College students heard in the period between 1941 and 1945 on naval aviation and aircraft carriers are useful for the purposes at hand. They offer insight into what knowledgeable American naval officers were thinking and how they understood the changes in the character of naval battle taking place around them.

In February 1942, a faculty member at the U.S. Naval War College explained to his midcareer officer students a dichotomy that he was observing at the time: "To one, the airplane revolutionizes; to another, it merely adds a new branch to the Army and to the Navy. To one, 'control of the seas' can no longer be fitted to the static concept of the past—the battleship is doomed; to that one, air power is of itself sea power. To still another, the term 'air power' is a misnomer. The airplane is a weapon—the rifle, the bayonet, the cannon."[9] While many indeed referred to the airplane as merely a weapon, the lecturer argued instead that it was fundamentally a vehicle and as such should be grouped with other vehicles, like the battleship, cruiser, and the submarine. "All traverse a fluid medium," he said. "Ships float from a difference of specific gravity; the airplane is sustained by dynamic reaction."[10]

As the Pacific War began, naval officers at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, could see that in terms of tactical effects, the aircraft enlarged the area of contact and action. In coastal zones, it merged the naval and military spheres of influence, making it an important augmentation to the tactical means of obtaining information, maintaining security, and taking action. With the introduction of aircraft carriers, the Navy acquired a way to take the tactical offensive against all classes of surface vessels. Carrier-borne aircraft initially appeared to reduce the importance of destroyers and submarines as the principal means for afflicting attrition on enemy forces, while also having the capacity to destroy enemy aircraft and protect friendly assets. It seemed in early 1942 that these capabilities of naval aircraft particularly increased their importance in the preliminary and final phases of a naval action.[11]

In the late spring of 1942, the Naval War College received a new staff member who would be its principal lecturer on matters of naval aviation for the next two years: Capt. Archibald Hugh Douglas. A 1908 graduate of the Naval Academy, he had become a naval aviator in 1918 and during World War I had participated in combat operations in France with the Northern Bombing Group. From 1931 to 1933 he had been executive officer of the aircraft carrier USS *Saratoga* (CV 2) and returned to command her from June 1940 to April 1942. She had been one of the

ships that helped to refine carrier and naval aviation tactics during the prewar Fleet Battle Problems. Under Douglas's command *Saratoga* had been the center of the task force that attempted to relieve U.S. forces on Wake Island in the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. He had been in command when the ship was torpedoed in January 1942. Douglas had graduated from the Naval War College in 1929, had returned to teach tactics to the senior class in 1933–36, had been a student in the Advanced Class in 1938–39, and then had taught naval operations in 1939–40. He returned for a last tour of duty in Newport to put his extensive experience and expertise to use as advisor for air operations, 1942–45.[12]

Douglas built on lectures that his predecessor had given, adding new points for consideration almost immediately. In one of his first lectures, in July 1942, after commanding *Saratoga,* Douglas argued that "the successful application of air power necessitates air components properly trained, equipped, and staffed to operate both as independent striking forces beyond the range of surface forces, and in effective support of surface forces."[13] He drew the lesson of the sinking of HMS *Prince of Wales* and HMS *Repulse* in the South China Sea just months before that "surface ships and fleets cannot sustain operations with much effectiveness within range of shore-based enemy air without superior air support." The British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 1940 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 demonstrated another point, that "the existence of hostile and effective fleet air arms tends to deny or limit the use of geographically advanced bases and anchorages."[14] Conversely, the location, protection, stocking levels, and manning of operating bases and airfields are controlling factors for the capacity to apply airpower. Since they are, therefore, primary objectives of enemy attack, they must "be made secure against all forms of enemy attack," whether direct attack from hostile forces or air-transported forces or subversive attack.[15] In mid-1942, it was already apparent to Douglas that "sea power means naval and air power."[16]

As to the other side of this story, the Royal Navy had pioneered aircraft-carrier development during World War I, during which it had remained experimental. As its design matured in the 1920s and 1930s, the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy saw carrier naval aviation as "the eyes of the fleet," scouting for the approaching enemy battle line. A few far-seeing officers who specialized in carrier duty, however, developed attack functions, with the result that by the end of the 1930s bombing and torpedo planes outnumbered fighter aircraft on carriers.[17] Captain Douglas, in a lecture about aircraft carriers, made a key point in a very effective way, recounting that at the 1934 London Conference the future Japanese admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had publicly declared, "We consider the aircraft carrier the most offensive of all armament." Douglas continued,

> In Japan, Admiral Yamamoto had been criticized for his emphasis on aircraft to the neglect of battleships. "How," he was asked, "can you expect to destroy a battleship except with a battleship?"

> "With torpedo planes," replied Yamamoto and he quoted a Japanese proverb, "The fiercest serpent can be overcome by a swarm of ants."[18]

Douglas saw the aircraft carrier as possessing several important favorable attributes. The most important was the strong offensive power made possible through the effective use of its aircraft. With this came the capacity for surprise attack, through the mobility and range of both the carrier and its aircraft. Additionally, the carrier was the key to coordinating air capabilities with surface forces, principally through its ability to bring large numbers of aircraft to a fleet or force as needed. The principal unfavorable attributes of the carrier were its vulnerability to attack and its need for extensive, unhampered sea room to launch its aircraft.[19] The carrier, Douglas summarized, "has its weaknesses just as all other types have theirs. It is vulnerable just as all other ships are if attacked with proper and sufficient weapons."[20]

In 1943, Douglas delivered a lecture on the principal effects of aviation on naval strategy:

- Augmentation of both offensive and defensive powers within the zone of strong shore-based aviation.
- Relative increase in the employment of attrition as a chief means of inflicting damage.
- As between two naval adversaries, the disproportionate loss of power of the one without adequate aviation.
- Increase in the effectiveness of the control of sea areas.
- Increase in the strategic importance of outlying positions.

He proposed that a sustained air offensive against an enemy's internal organization would usually be a task for strategic aviation and so entirely outside the spheres of normal naval and military strategy.[21]

A year later, in 1944, during one of his last lectures at the Naval War College, Douglas reflected, "The airplane, by extending the area in which contact between forces operating from land and sea is possible, has greatly complicated the problem of gaining, maintaining, and exercising control of the sea. It presents an additional means by which control of the sea area may be attained and disputed. Likewise, the problem of coastal defense is extended to vital points several hundred miles inland."[22]

PUBLIC DISCUSSION, DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WAR

Outside the corridors of the Naval War College, there was much in the media about how aviation had changed the nature of naval warfare. Bernard Brodie, a lecturer at Dartmouth College in 1941–43 (later a key figure in the development of nuclear strategy and nuclear deterrence), had begun his career as a student of naval history with his 1941 University of Chicago PhD thesis, "Major Naval Inventions and Their Consequences on International Politics, 1814–1918."[23] In 1942, he published the widely read *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy*.[24] His background in historical research led him to caution readers against becoming too enthusiastic about any

new invention. Since the attack on Pearl Harbor, "air enthusiasts have had a field day," he wrote, adding:

> The admiral who can be charged with retaining "traditional notions" of naval strategy, by which is meant a disposition still to value the naval gun and the ship that bears it, is the target not only of ridicule but of suspicion. He is accounted as belonging neither to the quick nor the dead. Few press and radio commentators have dared or cared to remain off the band wagon lest they betray themselves as classed among the moribund "brass hats." The result is that all the honors of war have gone to the trim little ships with wings.
>
> In a pursuit so complex as is waging war, it might be set down as an axiom that no one factor, and certainly no one weapon, can be exclusively decisive.[25]

A chapter entitled "Must All Our Ships Have Wings?" concluded, "By properly combining weapons we achieve maximum strength. Which weapon becomes the 'dominant' one is of no consequence except to the operating personnel involved."[26] With that, Bernard Brodie clearly encapsulated the issue of the war in the Pacific. To counter the Imperial Japanese Navy, the U.S. Navy was having to use a variety of weapons in complementary and effective combinations. Those who fought in surface ships, submarines, and amphibious forces experienced naval battle in ways that, updated, would not be unfamiliar to previous generations of sailors. Those who fought in the air experienced naval battle of quite a different character.

In the immediate postwar period, naval officers began to reflect on their recent experiences. After graduating from the Naval War College in 1947, Cdr. Alfred R. Matter joined the faculty of the College's Strategy and Tactics Department for the academic year 1947–48. A naval aviator and a future rear admiral, Commander Matter had commanded Carrier Air Group 50 in the Pacific. Shot down in the battle for Truk in February 1944, he had been rescued by the submarine USS *Tang* (SS 306). In lectures on the "Carrier Task Force" Matter validated Brodie's earlier point: "Heavy combatant ships, antiaircraft fire support ships, and screening ships must accompany the aircraft carrier to insure her the necessary freedom of action required to employ her aircraft to the fullest extent of their capabilities. . . . The carrier task force is not based on the premise that the aircraft carrier has outmoded [*sic*] the battleship and cruiser. On the contrary, it recognizes the dominant characteristics of these ships and utilizes their elements of strength in forming part the most powerful air-sea striking force known."[27]

But even the newest things have elements of the old. After asserting that the carrier task force had become "the primary agency by which command of the sea is obtained and exercised," he made a fundamental point about operations that echoed the age of sail. Given that a carrier needs to turn into the wind to launch aircraft, "It can be seen that the effect of the wind upon carrier operations makes the leeward side of the enemy tactically the most advantageous where carrier forces are involved."[28]

In 1946, the German-born naval strategist Dr. Herbert Rosinski had come to speak at the Naval War College and impressed his professional audience by his wide-ranging and original insights into the topic.[29] Rosinski too grappled with the broad issue of how naval aviation had changed strategy. Returning to the College in 1948, Rosinski put the issue into a much wider perspective for students and faculty:

> In the field of naval strategy the development first to trans-oceanic and then to world-encircling strategic dimensions was effected not so much by the advances in the means of propulsion, as by the enormously increased powers of observation through the development of the plane, and further of radar, as well as the means of instantaneous and world-wide communication. Without these two developments it is inconceivable how the trans-oceanic campaigns of the last conflict could have been directed.
>
> Compared with the magnitude of these changes the fact that the traditional bearer of sea power, the battleship, has now been replaced in most, if not all, of its functions by the new instrument of the carrier constitutes a relatively subordinate, if still most impressive fact.[30]

In 1949, as the Cold War was just beginning and the American defense establishment was being reorganized, Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, who had served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1942 to 1945, reflected on "what it takes to win a war." Emphasizing the integrated and interdependent nature of various types of ships and weapons in naval warfare, King commented:

> A fast carrier force isn't something independent of the rest of the Navy. Antiaircraft defense for the flattops is provided by A/A [antiaircraft] cruisers. Destroyers throw a protective screen against submarines around the force. Friendly submarines stand by for lifeguard duty with crashed planes. The auxiliary ships—tankers, ammunition and cargo ships—keep supplies coming and enable the task force to remain at sea for months. And if a carrier is damaged it returns to a base that is guarded by Marines—one that they may have seized in the first place. Depending on circumstances, the primary mission of the carrier group might be in support of a separate amphibious fleet. In one way or another, in different degrees, the whole Navy is knit together in an interdependent unity.[31]

THE DEATH OF THE BATTLE LINE

Speaking a year later, in March 1950, Capt. George K. Carmichael of the Naval War College made an equally perceptive point on the war in the Pacific. As a lieutenant in 1941 Carmichael had led the party that boarded the German raider *Odenwald* and as a captain in 1944–45 had commanded a destroyer division at Leyte Gulf. Speaking as a specialist in surface warfare, Carmichael noted of the war years, "Particularly apparent was a lack of allied naval understanding of the predominant and indispensable role of air power in operations at sea. The day, not of the battleship, but of the battle line concept, was doomed by a rapid succession of serious losses to enemy air power."[32] The fact that such an observation was made at the Naval War College only five years after the end of the war and apparently not earlier at the Naval War College bears out Carmichael's point that the changing character of naval battle was only slowly being consciously recognized among naval professionals.

Since the Anglo-Dutch wars of the mid-seventeenth century, the idea of a linear battle formation (i.e., the line of battle) had been firmly in place as an effective way

to concentrate heavy broadside gunfire against an enemy fleet in a similar formation.[33] It was the tactical basis of fleet engagements through the battles of Trafalgar in 1805 and Jutland in 1916. It was a concept still prevalent among American naval officers in the battleship fleet on the eve of World War II.

While the aircraft carrier and naval aviation had been familiar for some decades, the Imperial Japanese Navy is generally credited with the first naval tactics based on the striking power of independent aircraft carrier forces.[34] Between 1937 and 1941, Japanese naval tacticians developed a system to mass aircraft by concentrating aircraft carriers in fleet formations. As against its tactical effectiveness, such doctrine created a strategic risk, that of an enemy first strike on the grouped carriers. By late 1940 the Japanese navy had developed a "box" formation that provided for a defensive boundary of ships with antiaircraft guns, while in the center the carriers massed air groups for offensive operations and kept combat air patrols aloft with flexible missions—reconnaissance, defense, and attack. To this end a fleet air system was established in January 1941. The First Air Fleet was formed in April 1941 of three aircraft carrier divisions, two seaplane divisions, and ten destroyers. This innovative administrative and operational organization created the most powerful naval air force in the world. In the months leading up to the outbreak of war, Japanese leaders planned to use the box formation for preemptive attacks against enemy aircraft carriers as a supplement to their main concern, the traditional engagement of battle lines. However, in the first six months of the war, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy had few large aircraft carriers in the Pacific or Indian Ocean. As a result, the Japanese primarily employed their effectively trained and organized naval air and carrier formations against land positions.[35]

THE MAJOR AIRCRAFT CARRIER BATTLES IN THE PACIFIC WAR

The five major aircraft carrier battles that subsequently occurred—the Coral Sea, Midway, the Eastern Solomon Islands, Santa Cruz, and the Philippine Sea—were all fought to decide the fate of an island or a point on land. As the experience of these battles accumulated, the opposing navies were obliged to learn and to adapt to the newly emerging and unanticipated conditions of naval battle.

The Battle of the Coral Sea

This engagement, on 7–8 May 1942, was the first naval battle in which the opposing fleets did not come within sight of one another. The Americans lost a carrier and suffered other heavy losses as well, but the Japanese lost 30 percent of their carrier aircraft and 10 percent of their trained naval aviators. The engagement was fought incident to a Japanese expedition to take Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, threatening the sea lines of communication between the United States and Australia. The Japanese, no longer having enough aircraft on hand to support the invasion after the battle, canceled it. The most important lesson that Americans

learned was the need for more fighter aircraft, which meant greater synergy among multiple carrier formations to manage attack, defense, and scouting. Also, an additional function emerged: protection of strike aircraft proceeding to a target.[36]

The Battle of Midway

In this major fleet engagement fought between 4 and 7 June 1942, Japanese naval forces sought to neutralize the Hawaiian Islands, secure Midway Island as part of its defensive perimeter, and create a launching point for a future attack on the United States. In this highly complex engagement, fought over a vast range of the northern Pacific with the main fleets out of sight of one another, the key event proved to be the chance but successful American dive-bomber attack that sank three Japanese carriers while their aircraft were being rearmed and refueled on deck. Another Japanese carrier was sunk shortly afterward. These losses in ships, aircraft, and pilots forced the Japanese to withdraw from their attempt on Midway Island, although a concurrent force far to the north in the Aleutian Island chain seized Attu and Kiska Islands.[37]

The Battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands

The next major carrier engagement occurred in the Solomon Islands in the southern Pacific on 23–25 August 1942, one of several surface engagements in the struggle for the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Demonstrating an important new capability in naval tactics, American radar detected attacking Japanese aircraft at an estimated altitude of twelve thousand feet and a distance of eighty-eight miles. Warned of the "threat axis" in time to launch additional fighters and to position them overhead, the American carriers, making radical evasive maneuvers at maximum speed, came through several bomb attacks with minimal damage, effectively defended from further attacks by their fighter aircraft and antiaircraft fire from the new battleship *North Carolina,* cruisers, and other surface ships, as well as the carriers themselves. At the outset of the battle, Japanese aircraft outnumbered American by an estimated 177 (a figure that included land-based aircraft) to 153. In the action the Japanese lost ninety aircraft, the equivalent of about two carrier air groups. Although the powerful warships of their main force were largely undamaged, the Japanese broke off the action and withdrew owing to their aircraft losses.[38] The next month, reflecting on the first three carrier battles, Vice Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher (who had been in command at all three) wrote to Adm. Chester Nimitz, commanding the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, "The experiences of this war so far have shown that command of the air is the decisive factor in naval engagements, and fleets should be built around the carrier rather than the battleship."[39]

The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

Japanese leaders did not accept their reversal but renewed their campaign to hold Guadalcanal in October 1942. One result was the carrier battle of the Santa Cruz

Islands a fortnight later, on 26 October. This fourth action had similarities to Midway. In both battles, American forces had to defend against a Japanese assault on a strategic island (though in the later case, to retake rather than seize it) involving several separate attacking groups. In both cases, each attempted to make preemptive attacks on the other's aircraft carriers, and accordingly both had strike aircraft in the air at the same time. The commanders on both sides had to apportion their aircraft among search, strike, and defense while themselves under attack.

In this action, the four Japanese carriers launched against the two American carriers about 175 planes. Of these, the Americans shot down an estimated 161. After such aviation losses, and although they had lost no warships, the Japanese retired from the battle.[40] The Americans lost twenty planes in combat and an additional fifty to accidents. In addition, one of their aircraft carriers and a destroyer had been sunk and a number of others damaged by bomb hits. This campaign ended Japan's most-serious attempts to retake Guadalcanal. Both the Japanese and the Americans withdrew their battleships and aircraft carriers from major fleet operations for an entire year.[41]

That interlude afforded the American admirals an opportunity for reflection and experimentation. A disagreement arose over whether the carriers or carrier task groups should be operated together or independently. Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, who had commanded a task force in the Solomons battles, believed that separating them caused delays and reduced battle efficiency: "By having two carriers together one carrier can take care of routine flying while the other maintains her full striking group spotted [on the flight deck] and ready to launch on short notice."[42] In the months that followed, a larger discussion developed on the proper use of carriers in battle, and carrier commanders experimented with different tactical formations at sea. No general consensus arose at this point. In general, the aviators were disappointed in the Guadalcanal campaign, believing that the carriers had been denied their mobility and that the carrier task forces would have been better commanded by trained and highly experienced naval aviators. The campaign, the aviators charged, had been planned by battleship admirals, who thought in terms of ships' fuel and ammunition for the ships' guns. They asserted that a task force commander in combat had to understand intuitively not only the maneuvering of warships on the surface but also the multidimensional maneuvering of aircraft. Carrier task force commanders needed to appreciate wind and weather in relation to ships but also—by a very different calculus—in terms of deploying, launching, and recovering aircraft. Aviation logistics were much more complicated than fuel and ammunition; replacement aircraft and a wide variety of spare parts were constant concerns. As naval historian Clark Reynolds put it, "Without a steady flow of spare parts, any damaged plane was a total loss; it simply could not fly again."[43]

Additionally, the aviators recommended, more than one carrier should be assigned to a task force.

The Navy Department agreed that carrier task groups would in the future be commanded by flag officers who were experienced aviators, but the debate over the use of single-carrier or multicarrier task forces continued for some time.[44] All agreed that mobility and flexibility were essential attributes of carriers that were hampered in confined waters. In early 1943, Vice Adm. John H. Towers, now Commander, Air Force Pacific Fleet (and himself a naval aviator since 1914), advised Admiral Nimitz that "it is fundamental in carrier operations that their attack power . . . be developed to use on offensive tasks, and that between tasks they should make use of their high strategic mobility to withdraw from areas of exposure to enemy action."[45]

In 1943, both sides in the air war in the Pacific shifted their primary reliance from carrier aviation to land-based aircraft. During this interval, new fleet air commands were developed and based on the West Coast at San Diego and at Alameda in California as well as Seattle, Washington. All of these were placed under the supervision of Vice Admiral Towers, with the role of maintaining a steady flow of aircraft, pilots, flight crews, spare parts, and aviation supplies to the combat areas in the Pacific.

As all this was taking place within the American naval aviation community, the conferences of Allied leaders at Casablanca in January 1943 and Washington in May 1943 had refined the grand strategy. On that basis, American naval leaders implemented for the Pacific War a two-pronged strategy that combined the recommendation of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (then commanding forces on New Guinea) of a southwestern Pacific approach along the New Guinea–Mindanao axis toward the Philippines and Admiral Nimitz's plan for "island-hopping" across the Central Pacific through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands to the Marianas and then to Japan. About the same time, U.S. naval forces intensified the unrestricted submarine offensive against Japan.[46]

The Battle of the Philippine Sea

Adm. Raymond Spruance's Fifth Fleet, part of the Central Pacific campaign, included fifteen aircraft carriers with 954 aircraft and ninety-three other warships, including seven new battleships, ten cruisers, and fifty-eight destroyers. By mid-June 1944, this force was in the vicinity of Saipan in the Marianas. Allied intelligence had revealed that two Japanese forces, under, respectively, Adms. Jisaburō Ozawa and Takeo Kurita, supported by land-based naval aircraft under Adm. Kakuji Kakuta, would oppose the American forces in the Philippine Sea. On 16 June, Admiral Spruance correctly inferred that the coming battle would be a duel between the air wings of the opposing aircraft carriers; accordingly, he made the enemy's carriers his main targets. On the following day, Spruance issued his battle

plan: "Actions against the enemy must be pushed vigorously by all hands to ensure complete destruction of his fleet."[47] However, the following day, as Spruance's forces were in motion, the subordinate admirals began to be critical of the plan.

First, the commander of the U.S. battleships, Vice Adm. Willis A. Lee, declined to prepare for a night surface action against Japanese forces, apparently not realizing that a daylight surface action was no longer possible, owing to the presence of enemy aircraft carriers launching attack aircraft. Second, the aviation admirals were also critical that the surface admirals did not appreciate the reach and the mobility of the aircraft carriers' airplanes. Specifically, Admiral Spruance (a surface officer) had decided to move his fleet eastward, away from the approaching enemy, to provide a defensive line close to Saipan (where troops were being landed), rather than westward to strike the approaching Japanese main body. The aviation admirals argued unsuccessfully that the carriers could simultaneously defend Saipan and attack.[48]

These prebattle disagreements were to be overtaken by events in what would be known as the battle of the Philippine Sea. Admiral King, with his overarching view, would lay this criticism to rest the next month when he told Spruance personally that he had done exactly the right thing, "because the Japanese Navy still had powerful ships, and might have done an end run against the amphibious forces engaged in the Saipan landing."[49]

The action began in the early morning of 19 June 1944 and lasted two days. The Japanese lost somewhere between 475 and 645 of their approximately combined 850 carrier and land-based aircraft, with all their pilots and crews. The Americans lost about 123 of 956 carrier aircraft but only sixteen pilots and thirty-three aircrewmen. The Americans had won the air battle, and the Japanese were unable to recover Saipan. The Japanese fleet had not been destroyed, but three of its nine carriers had been sunk and only two remained seaworthy. The Japanese naval air forces were left few aircraft to supply air cover in the Leyte Gulf campaign that followed.[50]

Over the course of four years of naval conflict in the Pacific between December 1941 and August 1945, the aircraft carrier and naval aviation brought important new changes to the character of naval battle. Many of the traditional and longtime characteristics of naval battle remained alongside the new ones. The new aspects arose through cumulative experience and development in naval aviation. Both naval aircraft and naval aviators became better. In 1942, for example, 5 percent of the American naval aircraft launched in combat in the Pacific were lost. In 1945, less than one-eighth of 1 percent of combat sorties were lost. In the first two years of the war, 19,701 combat sorties were flown, while in 1944–45, that number increased twelve times to 239,386. In 1941, there were only 1,774 aircraft and eight aircraft

carriers in the U.S. Navy; by 1945, there were 29,125 aircraft and 102 carriers of all types.[51] Tactical ranges of aircraft increased, as did the size and effect of weapons.[52] The composition of carrier air wings changed from a relatively even mix of reconnaissance, strike, and fighter aircraft to more emphasis on fighter aircraft.

Carrier-based naval aircraft proved extremely effective in combat because of the aircraft carrier's capacity to combine its offensive power with a high concentration of defensive fire and because its mobility allowed it to employ its aircraft optimally. According to one analyst, American carrier aircraft shot down or destroyed 12,268 Japanese aircraft, 60 percent in aerial combat and 40 percent on the ground or on deck. Of the latter number, 93 percent were land based.[53]

During the course of the war in the Pacific, aircraft carriers and naval aviation most certainly became, collectively, a distinctive new element in naval combat, but they were not independent elements. Reflecting on the recently concluded war and looking ahead to the future, Fleet Admiral King put the issue into graphically simple terms:

> Our Navy is the best in the world. Its superiority comes from taking advantage of all three elements of earth, water, and air—in order to control the seas, you must utilize the other two elements. . . .
>
> The Navy is organized like a living body. If you separate parts of that body the whole will perish. To put it in concrete terms, the Navy is like a duck. It can swim, dive, fly, and walk about on the land. If you cut off its wings by taking away naval aviation, it can't fly. If you destroy the Marine Corps, it can't walk on land. Without its wings and without its feet it won't even be able to do a good job of swimming.[54]

THE FACE OF NAVAL BATTLE IN THE AIR

The changes in naval battle brought by carrier aviation had multiple dimensions: technological innovation, strategy, operations, tactics, logistics, industrial support, professional military education, practical training. Additionally, it presented a different aspect of "the face of battle," a phrase that John Keegan made famous in 1976 with his book of that title.[55] Keegan's focus was on individuals in land battle and the personal, very human reactions to combat. He dealt with an individual's fear and courage, anxiety and sense of duty, leadership and insubordination—the whole range of emotions and perceptions that individuals typically face in combat. John Reeve and David Stevens extended that approach to battle at sea in their 2003 essay collection, published in Australia, *The Face of Naval Battle*.[56]

In his study *At War, at Sea,* the historian Ronald Spector described the new demands on naval aviators:

> The physical requirements for a naval aviator during the Second World War were stringent and reflected the need for flyers to operate in an extremely demanding environment. Aviation was a hazardous occupation, but naval aviation involving aircraft carrier operations was the most hazardous of all. For that very reason, naval aviation attracted adventurous young men looking for thrilling and demanding experiences that faced not only the dangers of an enemy but those of the sea itself.[57]

Continuing, Spector graphically described the environment of naval aviation during the war in the Pacific in this way:

> Both Japanese and American aviators operated in an extreme environment that made several demands on their minds, senses, and vital organs. An aviator's vision had to be at least 25% better than normal with perfect depth and peripheral vision and no color blindness. His body had to be able to withstand effects of dives and sharp turns at high speeds. These could increase the effective weight of a 150-pound [68 kg] man to over 750 pounds [340 kg] and cause blackouts.[58]

Additionally, aviators needed to endure cold and high winds. Flying at over eight thousand feet they needed oxygen, lacking which they suffered reduced physical coordination and mental concentration. Aircraft engine exhaust could cause fatal carbon monoxide poisoning. After a combat action in the air, a naval aviator had to find his way back to the carrier (which had been steaming at high speed since his takeoff) for a landing akin to a controlled stall on a flight deck that was not only moving ahead but rising, falling, and rolling with the motion of the sea. Casualties were high among naval aviators, even in routine flying.

The direct relationships of aircraft and aviator to the aircraft carrier, all complicated by wind and sea, were the major factors that made naval aviation unique within aviation generally. Naval aviation emphasized the capabilities of individuals and their personal control of the machines and weapons they operated. At the same time, naval aviators had a very close relationship with their aircraft carriers and the shipboard crewmembers who supported them. Typically in this period they flew and fought in fragile aircraft either alone or with small crews. However, the amount of time they spent in their aircraft was limited, as was any attachment they formed to them. This contrasted with a sailor's relationship to a warship, which seamen have traditionally seen as a floating home, a way of life, and a microcosm of society ashore modified by its unique circumstances of being afloat and a military environment.[59]

Sailors in warships and naval aviators in their aircraft are both, however, often personally detached from the destruction that they create at a distance. The flyer's immediate environment is a technical and professional one that can lack the sense of anger, struggle, or emotion that other forms of combat involve—though certainly not entirely. Those on the receiving end, in the ships being attacked from the sky, felt terror, witnessing at short range or being caught up in the mayhem that ensued. For Allied sailors in the Pacific, the unexpected emergence of Japanese kamikaze planes in late 1944 and early 1945 was something nearly unimaginable, entirely outside the moral framework. At the very least, deliberately losing both a trained pilot and an aircraft on a single mission seemed both inefficient and wasteful. Extended kamikaze attacks over a period of time created great traumatic stress in the survivors of those attacks.[60]

Air-to-air combat was a unique way to disable and kill opponents, but pilots at least shared with other combatants an urge to kill to avoid being killed. Those on surface ships, who, we have seen, might become very emotional indeed when their ships were struck, at other times in combat often gave the impression of detachment and mechanical action. A ruthless commitment to killing an enemy sometimes led to a feeling of indifference about one's own fate.

The aircraft carrier and naval aviation in World War II changed the long-standing character of naval battle by replacing the linear thinking that had characterized naval battles during the previous three centuries. The multidimensional movement of aircraft and the mobility of carriers catalyzed a new spatially complex and highly interdependent approach to naval battle, one that used all the specialized branches to meet objectives. Naval aviation linked surface, subsurface, and amphibious operations. Although naval aviation brought unique facets to naval warfare, one should never deny the similarities between naval aviators and others in the service. Certainly, fighting in a warplane at sea is different from fighting in a ship or a submarine or ashore. Yet all involve teamwork and group dynamics to manage effectively the interfaces among technology, human nature, and human skills.[61]

NOTES This essay was originally published in *La Bataille,* ed. Jean Baechler and Olivier Chaline (Paris: Éditions Hermann, 2018), pp. 251–66, and appears here by permission.

1 Giuseppe Fioravanzo, *A History of Naval Tactical Thought,* trans. Arthur W. Holst (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979); Samuel S. Robison and Mary L. Robison, *A History of Naval Tactics from 1530 to 1930: The Evolution of Tactical Maxims* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1942).

2 Stephen K. Stein, "The Experimental Era: U.S. Navy Aviation before 1916," in *One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power,* ed. Douglas V. Smith (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), pp. 5–30.

3 See Geoffrey L. Rossano, *Stalking the U-boat: U.S. Naval Aviation in Europe during World War I* (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2010).

4 Norman Friedman, "U.S. Aircraft Carrier Evolution, 1911–1945," in Smith, *One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power,* pp. 153–98. See also Friedman, *U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983); Friedman, *British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press; London: Conway Maritime, 1988); Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles, *American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999).

5 Albert Nofi, "Aviation in the Interwar Fleet Maneuvers, 1919–1940," in Smith, *One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power,* pp. 93–130. See also Nofi, *To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010); Craig C. Felker, *Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940* (College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2007); and John T. Kuehn, *Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the Japanese Navy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

6 Nofi, "Aviation in the Interwar Fleet Maneuvers," p. 124.

7 Ibid., p. 123.

8 On this topic, in general, see John B. Hattendorf, B. M. Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars,* 2nd ed. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, forthcoming).

9 "The Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare," staff presentation, 26 February 1942, box 14, Record Group [hereafter RG] 14: Faculty and Staff Presentations, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College Archives, Naval War College, Newport, RI [hereafter NHC].

10 Ibid., p. 8.

11 Ibid., pp. 54–55.

12 Papers of Captain Archibald Douglas, box 16, Manuscript Collection 60, NHC.

13 A. H. Douglas [Capt., USN], "The Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare," staff presentation, 23 July 1942, RG 14, NHC.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Clark G. Reynolds, *Navies in History* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 172.

18 A. H. Douglas [Capt., USN], "Aircraft Carriers," staff presentation, 2 September 1942, p. 2, box 17, RG 14, NHC.

19 Ibid., p. 54.

20 A. H. Douglas [Capt., USN], "Aircraft Carrier," staff presentation, 1943, p. 53, box 20, RG 14, NHC.

21 A. H. Douglas [Capt., USN], "Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare," staff presentation, 11 June 1943, pp. 20–21, box 20, RG 14, NHC.

22 A. H. Douglas [Capt., USN], "Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare," staff presentation, 12 June 1944, p. 15, box 26 1944 C-B, RG 14, NHC.

23 Published as Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age: Major Naval Inventions and Their Consequences on International Politics, 1814–1940* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941, 1944; repr. New York: Greenwood, 1969).

24 Bernard Brodie, *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1942, 1943). Revised and republished under the title *Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944 and four subsequent editions).

25 Brodie, *Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (1943), p. 176.

26 Ibid., p. 214.

27 Alfred R. Matter [Cdr., USN], "The Carrier Task Force," staff presentation, 23 July 1947, pp. 2–3, box 41, RG 14, NHC. See also Hal M. Friedman, *Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War College, the Lessons of World War Two, and Future Naval Warfare, 1945–1947* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), p. 325.

28 Matter, "Carrier Task Force," pp. 3, 34.

29 On Rosinski, see Richard P. Stebbins, *The Career of Herbert Rosinski: An Intellectual Pilgrimage* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., *The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977); and Manuscript Collection 91: Papers of Herbert F. Rosinski, NHC.

30 Herbert Rosinski, "The Evolution of Sea Power," 1948, box 11, RG 15: Guest Lectures, NHC.

31 Ernest J. King, "What It Takes to Win a War," Op-23, 2/16/49, p. 24, folder 3, box 29, Papers of Fleet

Admiral Ernest J. King: Speeches, 1947–48 and undated, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. I am grateful to Dr. David Kohnen for providing me with a copy of this document.

32 G. K. Carmichael [Capt., USN], "The Strategic Employment of Allied Naval Forces in the Pacific during World War II," 6 March 1950, box 44, RG 14, NHC.

33 N. A. M. Rodger, "The Development of Broadside Gunnery, 1450–1650," *Mariner's Mirror* 82 (1996), pp. 301–24, repr. in *Naval History, 1500–1680,* International Library of Essays on Military History, ed. Jan Glete (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 239–62. And see John B. Hattendorf, "Navies, Strategy, and Tactics in the Age of De Ruyter," in *Michiel de Ruyter: Dutch Admiral,* ed. Jaap R. Bruijn, Ronald Prud'homme van Reine, and Rolof van Hövell tot Westerflier (Rotterdam, Neth.: Karwansaray, 2011), pp. 95–118; repr. in Hattendorf, *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011), pp. 47–63.

34 Clark G. Reynolds, *Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires* (New York: William Morrow, 1974), p. 511.

35 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 347–52.

36 Douglas V. Smith, *Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), chap. 2, pp. 39–82.

37 Reynolds, *Command of the Sea,* pp. 516–18; Smith, *Carrier Battles,* chap. 3, pp. 83–150. See also, among many others, Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), and Craig L. Symonds, *The Battle of Midway* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011).

38 Smith, *Carrier Battles,* chap. 4, pp. 151–80.

39 Fletcher to Nimitz, 24 September 1942, quoted in Clark G. Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 399. See also John B. Lundstrom, *Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006).

40 Smith, *Carrier Battles,* chap. 5, esp. pp. 199–201. See also Gerald E. Wheeler, *Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet: A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1995), pp. 269–86.

41 Clark G. Reynolds, *The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 34.

42 Commander, Task Force 61 to Commander in Chief, Pacific, "Comments on U.S.S. *Hornet* Report of Action, 26 Oct 1942," 6 November 1942, in Wheeler, *Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet,* p. 285.

43 Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers,* p. 414.

44 Reynolds, *Fast Carriers,* pp. 34–35.

45 Towers letters to Nimitz, 12 and 14 April 1943, in Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers,* p. 410.

46 For the earlier origins of this, see Joel I. Holwitt, *"Execute against Japan": The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare* (College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2009).

47 Quoted in Reynolds, *Fast Carriers,* p. 183.

48 Ibid., pp. 185–90.

49 "Visit to Saipan, 1944," Whitehill memorandum of a discussion with Fleet Admiral King, 29 November 1950, folder 10, box 13, Manuscript Collection 37: Papers of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Thomas Buell–Walter Muir Whitehill Collection), NHC. I am grateful to Dr. David Kohnen for providing a copy of this document.

50 Reynolds, *Fast Carriers,* pp. 204–10; Smith, *Carrier Battles,* chap. 6, pp. 209–41. See also William T. Y'Blood, *Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981), and Barrett Tillman, *Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II* (New York: New American Library, 2005). On the battle of Leyte Gulf see Milan Vego, *The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006).

51 Hill Goodspeed, "Foundation for Victory: U.S. Naval Aircraft Development, 1922–1945," in Smith, *One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power,* pp. 210–15.

52 With thanks to Cdr. Jeffrey B. Barta, USN, assistant for aviation history and publications, Air Warfare Division, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC; and Cdr. John W. Kennedy, USN (Ret.), Naval War College Museum, Newport, Rhode Island.

53 Fioravanzo, *History of Naval Tactical Thought,* p. 206, quoting figures from Pierre Barjot's articles in *Rivista Marittima,* January 1953 and August–September 1954.

54 King, "What It Takes to Win a War," p. 25.

55 John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking, 1976).

56 John Reeve and David Stevens, eds., *The Face of Naval Battle: The Human Experience of Modern War at Sea* (Crows Nest, NSW, Austral.: Allen & Unwin, 2003).

57 Ronald H. Spector, *At War, at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Viking, 2001), pp. 161–63.

58 Ibid., p. 161. (The conversions from pounds to kilograms are this author's.)

59 John Reeve, "Introduction: An Anatomy of the Face of Naval Battle," in Reeve and Stevens, *Face of Naval Battle,* pp. 25–33.

60 David Stevens, "The Faceless Foe: Perceptions of the Enemy in Modern Naval Battle," in ibid., pp. 263–84; and Colin A. Wastell, "Stress in War: The Warrior's Confrontation with the Spectre of Death," in ibid., pp. 285, 289–90.

61 Reeve, "Introduction," p. 31.

Part 5: Maritime History of, at, and near Newport, Rhode Island

XX *The Brenton Family of Newport*

The extended Brenton family of Newport in Rhode Island and Newport Township and Halifax in Nova Scotia was a remarkable assemblage of merchants and public servants, one that produced also seven North American–born Royal Navy officers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries:[1]

Rear Adm. Jahleel Brenton (1729–1802)
Vice Adm. Sir Jahleel Brenton (1770–1844)
Capt. Edward Pelham Brenton (1774–1839)
Lt. James Wallace Brenton (1778–99)
Purser John Brenton (1779–after 1834)
Vice Adm. John Brenton (1782–after 1858)
Lt. William Brenton (1783–1808)

The American eugenicist and biologist Charles Benedict Davenport wrote in 1919 that "Thalassophilia is a family trait" among the Brentons.[2] While scholars today are skeptical of his underlying claim "that sea-lust is an inherited, racial trait," there is no doubt about the widespread and interrelated interests in the navy within the Brenton family during this period.[3]

THE BRENTONS COME TO AMERICA

The progenitor of this American naval family, the first to come to North America, was William Brenton (ca. 1610–74), born possibly in Hammersmith, Middlesex, England. No documentary evidence of his place of birth has been found, but a number of writers and genealogists have assumed that it was Hammersmith, because that was the name that William Brenton gave to his large farm in Newport, Rhode Island. Three centuries later, that farm became famous when the land, by then owned by the stockbroker and lawyer Hugh D. Auchincloss Jr., became the childhood summer home of his stepdaughter, Jacqueline Bouvier (1929–94). The Auchincloss summer home, built on the property in 1883, was the location for the reception that followed Jackie's marriage to Senator John F. Kennedy in 1953. Later,

President and Mrs. Kennedy used Hammersmith Farm on occasion as a summer White House. The farm name remains today, and "Brenton" continues to be a geographical name of features within the bounds of the original Hammersmith Farm in the southwestern part of Newport: Brenton Cove, Brenton Neck, Brenton Point, and Brenton Reef.

William Brenton came to America as a young man in 1633, sailing in the ship *Griffin* to Boston, Massachusetts, to join that three-year-old Puritan colony as a merchant. He carried with him a royal commission as surveyor of New England.[4] Admitted a freeman of Massachusetts, he quickly came into public office, first as a selectman in Boston and deputy for Boston to the General Court of Massachusetts, then as a member of a number of committees. Between 1636 and 1638 the Massachusetts Bay colony was deeply divided theologically by the antinomian controversy, concerning the concept of the "covenant of grace" as against the "covenant of works." This controversy provoked a political and religious crisis that led Massachusetts officials to banish Anne Hutchinson and Rev. John Wheelwright, leaders of the "free grace" viewpoint, and to force the adherents of that view to move south, beyond the bounds of Massachusetts. In March 1638, this group established a new settlement at Pocasset (renamed Portsmouth in 1639), at the northern tip of Aquidneck Island (from 1644, officially named Rhode Island) in Narragansett Bay. In August 1638, Brenton joined this group as an inhabitant. Unlike most of the others, he had been neither banished nor disarmed and thus was able to retain his property and business interests in Boston and other parts of Massachusetts.

In January 1639, William Brenton was elected to public office at Pocasset as an elder. On April 28 he was one of a group who decided to break away from the Pocasset settlement and move farther south to establish a settlement at Newport at the southern end of Aquidneck Island. They came on 1 May, and there he became one of the largest landowners in Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Among the many positions he held during his forty years of public service was the elective presidency of the Rhode Island colony in 1660–61 under its 1644 patent. In 1663–66, under King Charles II's charter of 1663, Brenton was the first deputy governor of the English Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations; in 1666–67 he was elected the second governor under that charter.[5]

Married twice, William Brenton had ten children, naming his eldest surviving son Jahleel (1655–1732);[6] Jahleel became the first of the Brentons to carry this biblical name.[7] In 1678, the twenty-three-year-old Jahleel was already highly literate in legal issues and argued for the first printed compilation of laws for Rhode Island. Between 1690 and 1699 he became widely known in the maritime affairs of New England while serving as the Crown's collector of customs in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.[8] He was additionally appointed Surveyor of His Majesty's Woods in Maine and New Hampshire and as agent for prizes.[9] In 1700, he

became the agent for Rhode Island to the Board of Trade in London. Otherwise, he was involved in trying to resolve a controversy over the border between Connecticut and Rhode Island.[10] Also, in 1698–99, the first Earl of Bellomont, then serving simultaneously as governor of New York, Massachusetts Bay, and New Hampshire, had headed an inquiry into Rhode Island's infractions of the Navigation Acts and its citizens' proclivity for piracy and smuggling. When Bellomont's report arrived in London, with a list of remedies headed by the request that an Anglican minister be sent to Newport, the Board of Trade consulted Brenton.



Genealogical chart of the Brenton family

Jahleel did not marry; the subsequent family members with the name and the farm descended through his brother, Governor William Brenton's second son, William Brenton (ca. 1657–97), one of the first settlers of Bristol, Rhode Island, and a mariner. William Brenton's son, Jahleel Brenton (1691–1767), named for his uncle, became the second to bear the name and inherited Hammersmith Farm. Unlike his forebearers, who had come to America to practice the Puritan faith in Massachusetts and eventually became Presbyterians or Congregationalists, the second Jahleel became a prominent member of the Anglican church. In 1715, he married Frances Cranston, eldest daughter of Samuel Cranston, governor of Rhode Island, 1698–1727, and granddaughter of John Cranston, who had been governor in 1678–80. Married at Newport's Anglican Trinity Church, Jahleel and Frances raised their twenty-two children in the ways of the Church of England. Jahleel served for several decades as a member of Trinity's vestry and in 1731 donated a large clock for its steeple, one of the earliest public clocks in America.[11] He was the first commanding officer of the Newport Artillery Company, with the rank of captain, serving from 1741 to 1747.[12] His and Frances's eldest son, Jahleel (1729–1802), became a rear admiral in the Royal Navy; his marriage and those of two other sons, William

(1750–1804) and James (1736–1806), produced between them grandsons who joined the Royal Navy and two granddaughters who married their naval officer cousins.

Rear Adm. Jahleel Brenton (1729–1802)

The son of Jahleel and Frances Cranston Brenton, the third Jahleel was born in Newport on 22 October 1729. This new Jahleel at age twenty-three passed his examination for lieutenant in the Royal Navy on 6 December 1752, having by then served five years and eleven months in warships and additional time in merchant ships. His passing certificate shows that he had been listed as an able-bodied seaman for short periods, one to seven months, on the books of *Chester* (fifty guns), *Devonshire* (seventy-four), *St. George* (ninety-six), *Vigilant* (fifty-eight), and *Kent* (seventy). His longest service had been four years and seven months as a midshipman in *Vigilant*. Four years after his examination, in April 1757, he was promoted from passed midshipman to lieutenant. In 1765, still a lieutenant, he married twenty-two-year-old Henrietta Cowley at Trinity Church in Newport. His new wife's mother was a Pelham, a prominent local merchant family, who were distant relations of Henry Pelham and his brother, the first Duke of Newcastle, who were successive prime ministers in the period 1743–62.

At Jahleel's father's death in 1767, the thirty-eight-year-old lieutenant inherited 377½ acres of Hammersmith Farm, including the mansion house. In the spring of 1775, at home on half-pay, Brenton was in touch with Capt. James Wallace, RN, whom he had apparently come to know when they were midshipmen in *Vigilant*. At this point, Wallace commanded *Rose,* a twenty-gun frigate that had been in Rhode Island waters since 1774, attempting to enforce the Navigation Acts and stop the flagrant smuggling in Narragansett Bay. With the outbreak of revolt in 1775, *Rose* operated against the American rebels on the coasts of Narragansett Bay and southern New England in ways designed to make them feel insecure.[13] Brenton was one of nine "Principal Inhabitants of Newport" who on 1 May 1775 sought the protection of Wallace and *Rose* as the colony began to arm itself for rebellion.[14] On 3 June, a mob attacked a Newport merchant who was supplying local British forces. Wallace, called on to prevent the destruction of Crown property, took a landing party ashore. In his later report he mentioned that "while on shore we were joined by Lieutt Brenton of the Navy upon half pay here, who I must do the Justice to Say Shewed every disposition of a good Officer, and Subject, and for which he is obliged to abandon his family and farm, and take shelter on board his Majesty's Ship."[15]

No other contemporary evidence has yet been found to corroborate information in the Brenton family genealogy to the effect that "he had many Whig friends who offered to see that he was appointed to the highest rank of naval service of Congress. These he declined, maintaining his staunchest loyalty to the Crown."[16] On 31 October 1775, the Rhode Island General Assembly approved the seizure

of the property of Jahleel Brenton, declaring him among the "persons inimical to the true interest of the colony."[17] His estates and personal property were ordered sequestered and sold for the public benefit. American patriot soldiers who took over his house and farm destroyed his barns and some of his outbuildings, as well as his orchards and gardens. During this period of violence, Brenton, who had not come ashore again after the riot, fled alone to Boston, where he borrowed money from his attorney for passage to London to apply in person to the Admiralty for an assignment at sea.[18]

On 4 May 1776, Rhode Island became the first of the American colonies to renounce its allegiance to King George III.[19] Only the six delegates in Rhode Island's House of Deputies from Brenton's hometown of Newport voted against the act.

Across the Atlantic, at nearly the same time, Brenton received orders to active duty and to command of *Pembroke,* forty-four guns. His ship was then at Chatham Dockyard being refitted to serve as a station ship at Halifax, Nova Scotia, to which port she sailed in July.[20] Returning to England in *Pembroke* with dispatches for the Admiralty in November 1776, Brenton applied to the Treasury for financial support for his destitute family in Rhode Island and received a grant of a hundred pounds a year. In the meantime, the difficult situation of his wife and children was alleviated, at least temporarily, by both Brenton's employment, which restored his full pay, and the arrival in December 1776 of a naval squadron under Gen. Sir Henry Clinton bringing some five thousand troops to Newport. Their presence meant that Brenton's family was safe for the time being. He attempted to gain further income by leasing the large house on his property for use as a hospital at fifty pounds a year and allowing peat to be cut for fuel on his land in 1778 and 1779 for an additional £427 20 shillings.[21] His hundred-pound Treasury grant was discontinued in 1777.

On 23 August 1777, he took command, in the rank of master and commander, of *Tortoise,* a twenty-six-gun storeship that had recently been purchased. Brenton remained in her in American waters until he sailed her back to England in early 1778.[22] Returning to American waters with supplies, the vessel foundered off Newfoundland in September 1779.[23] In October 1779 British forces evacuated Newport, the British strategic emphasis having shifted to the South and mid-Atlantic. Not to be left exposed again, when the British troops left Newport in transports for New York City, Brenton's wife and six of their children sailed with them. Soon thereafter, in December 1779, Brenton took command of the fireship *Strombolo,* then a hulk at New York. He remained near his family in New York until 23 May 1780, when it became clear that he would be on half-pay from June 1780 for some months awaiting promotion to post captain. At that point, the high cost of housing in the British-held city led Brenton to send his family to England, where they initially lived in Enfield, Middlesex, in what is now a northern borough of Greater London.[24] The cost of their passage to England and of house rental in London required

him to take a loan of £1,082.[25] Back in Rhode Island, the General Assembly passed an act in July 1780 ordering Brenton's apprehension as a traitor should he return to Rhode Island.[26]

On 29 September 1780, Brenton "made post"—that is, was promoted to captain—in command of the armed ship *Queen*. He soon moved on to command a sixth-rate, *Termagant,* twenty-six guns.[27] By 1783, Brenton, who had by then been in sea service for thirty-seven years, applied for a naval pension and received ninety pounds a year. In addition, he petitioned commissioners considering the claims of American Loyalists for compensation for his losses in Rhode Island, which he estimated at £4,500. He was eventually awarded only £646 for his loss; in any case, in February 1784 the State of Rhode Island dropped further claims against his estates, creditors' demands having exceeded the value of his property.[28] In 1784 or '85 Brenton moved with his family to Saint-Omer, France, where they lived until 1787. He settled for the remainder of his life in Edinburgh, Scotland. He was promoted to rear admiral of the Blue on 1 January 1801.[29] He died at the age of seventy-two on 10 January 1802.[30]

Vice Adm. Sir Jahleel Brenton, First Baronet (1770–1844)

Sir Jahleel Brenton was the fourth to bear the name.[31] The eldest of three sons, all of whom became naval officers, he was the third of the ten children born to Rear Adm. Jahleel and Henrietta Cowley Brenton. Born on 22 August 1770 in Newport and baptized at Trinity Church, he was placed at the age of seven on the muster roll of the storeship *Tortoise,* which his father commanded. His name appears there from December 1777 through April 1779 as an able seaman and then as a clerk. He followed his father to three successive ships: *Strombolo,* from 30 April 1779 to 6 April 1780; *Queen,* 7 October 1780 to 23 September 1781; and *Termagant,* 24 September 1781 to 17 May 1782. When his father left active service, Brenton continued as an able seaman in *Greenwich,* twenty-six guns, and then *Belleisle,* sixty-four, where ultimately he was to serve longest in this period. His initial service in her lasted only a month and a half, after which, in 1783, he was enrolled in the Maritime School at Chelsea, where he studied navigation and seamanship with other boys of similar age preparing for a naval career.[32] On completion of that course in 1785 he joined his parents, who had recently moved to Saint-Omer, France, and embarked on a study of the French language. In November 1787, he returned to duty in *Belleisle* for the next two years, thereafter in *Weazle,* fourteen guns, and *Bellona,* seventy-four. On 3 March 1790, he passed his examination for lieutenant and was certified as having more than six years at sea and being twenty-one years old.[33]

In fact, he was only nineteen years, six months, and nine days old. In any case, Brenton now saw very little opportunity for active service in the Royal Navy. He, like several other British naval officers and men—most notably Captain, later admiral, Sir Sidney Smith—went to Sweden in hopes of seeing action in the Russo-Swedish

War of 1788–90. Obtaining an immediate commission as a lieutenant in the Swedish navy, he was first assigned to *Konung Adolf Fredrik,* the flagship of Vice Adm. Karl Vilhelm Modée, where he was assigned to introduce the British approach to naval discipline.[34] He was transferred to the Swedish galley fleet, where he arrived very shortly after the battles of Vyborg and Svensksund, the latter of which ended the war. The king of Sweden, Gustav III, expressed gratitude to the British officers for their assistance; Brenton, by virtue of his recently acquired knowledge of French, had been an effective liaison between the Swedish officers, typically fluent in French, and their British counterparts.[35]

Returning to Britain, still a passed midshipman, Brenton became, through the patronage of Admiral Lord Hood, one of 160 new lieutenants in the Royal Navy on 22 November 1790. To establish their seniority, it was decided later that the eldest fifteen would rank from 13 November and the youngest from the 22nd. Brenton's group of fifteen took rank from 20 November.[36]

Brenton was delighted with his orders as second lieutenant in the troop transport *Assurance,* soon to sail for Halifax, Nova Scotia. It was, he wrote, "a station of all others I should have chosen, having numerous friends and relations at that place; but particularly, from having formed an early attachment there."[37] Twelve years later, in 1802, that early attachment—Isabella Stewart, the daughter of Maryland Loyalist Anthony Stewart—became his wife. Brenton had met her in Halifax in 1788 but had promised her father that they would not marry until he became a post captain. In 1790, the opportunity for a visit in *Assurance* had been dashed when he was arrested at Rochester, Kent, and imprisoned for a short time on a charge of impressing sailors within city limits.

Forced to miss the ship's sailing, Brenton was reassigned as first lieutenant of *Speedy* on customs duties. In 1792, he took command of the brig *Trepassy,* twelve guns, off Newfoundland. Extended cold weather put him on sick leave in late 1795. On recovery, he was sent to the Mediterranean as first lieutenant in the storeship *Alliance,* due to sail for the Mediterranean with supplies for the fleet. Just as the ship was about to leave, he learned from a private letter that he was to be appointed first lieutenant in the frigate *Diamond,* commanded by his friend Sir Sidney Smith. Jahleel's commanding officer, however, would not allow him to be detached from the ship without a successor. The officer designated to relieve him did not arrive in time, and *Alliance* sailed with Jahleel still on board.

On the ship's arrival in the Mediterranean, Jahleel's frustration at being unable to take up an assignment on a fighting frigate, the vacancy now being closed, was made known to the commander in chief, through Vice Adm. James Cumming. Adm. Sir John Jervis sent for Jahleel and, on hearing his family's story, gave him priority over other officers as the son of a retired naval officer and ordered him as first lieutenant in *Gibraltar,* of eighty guns. This action marked the beginning

of Jervis's interest in the Brenton brothers and their naval careers.[38] Jervis later credited Jahleel as having been a calming influence in *Gibraltar,* helping to unify a wardroom that had split into factions. When the ship was sent home for repair after suffering damage in a gale on the Pearl Rock near the Spanish shore of the Strait of Gibraltar, Admiral Jervis again took interest in the young Jahleel and ordered him on temporary duty to *Barfleur,* ninety-eight, the flagship of Vice Adm. William Waldegrave.[39] While in *Barfleur,* Brenton participated in the battle of Cape St. Vincent on 14 February 1797, following which he was appointed first lieutenant. Finding *Barfleur* a happy ship, he was at first reluctant to be ordered away to the flagship *Ville de Paris* in August 1798, but a month later, having gone briefly to *Ville de Paris,* was appointed to acting command of *Speedy,* in which he had served earlier.

In 1799, while preparing to convoy Neapolitan merchant vessels carrying corn from Cagliari to Neapolitan ports at a time when Naples, but not Britain, was at war with the Algerines, the young commander Jahleel asked Lord Nelson what he should do if the Algerines attacked. "Let them *sink you,*" Nelson replied, "but do not let them touch the hair of the head of one of your convoy[.] Always fight, and you are sure to be right."[40] Confirmed in his command in July 1799, Jahleel fought several successful actions against gunboats on the Spanish coast and in the Strait of Gibraltar, most notably on 6 November 1799, while under the command of Rear Adm. Sir John Duckworth. *Speedy* was entering Gibraltar Bay convoying two ships when she was attacked by twelve Spanish gunboats. Brenton fought off the gunboats, losing two men killed and one wounded. A few days after the action, Duckworth told Brenton that his brother Wallace had been seriously wounded and was in the hospital at Port Mahon, Minorca, and immediately ordered *Speedy* to take dispatches there, allowing Jahleel to look into Wallace's condition. While Jahleel was sailing from Gibraltar to Minorca, Admiral Lord Nelson reported to the Admiralty that Jahleel had displayed "uncommon skill and gallantry in saving the ship under his command and all his convoy"; the Admiralty promoted Jahleel to post captain on 25 April 1800.[41] Passing command of *Speedy* to Thomas, Lord Cochrane, whose adventures in her were to become widely known, he took temporary command of *Généreux,* seventy-four, captured from the French in February and taken into the Royal Navy. Under Brenton's command she participated in the blockade of Genoa.

In January 1801, Brenton was appointed to command *Caesar,* eighty guns, as flag captain under Rear Adm. Sir James Saumarez. The ship was seriously damaged during the repulsed British attack on the anchored French fleet at Algeciras on 6 July 1801, but Brenton had the ship back in action on the 12th in the defeat of the Franco-Spanish squadron in the second battle of Algeciras (sometimes called the battle of the Gut of Gibraltar).[42] After the event, Brenton drew a watercolor sketch of the departure of the fleet, quickly published as an aquatint.[43] This is the first known example of his artwork.

While in *Caesar,* Brenton was deeply impressed by how the influence of Chaplain Evan Halliday improved the conduct of the ship's company, reducing punishments and the infractions that produced them.[44] With the Peace of Amiens Saumarez hauled down his flag, but Brenton continued in command until 1802, when he returned to England to keep his long-standing promise to marry Isabella Stewart.

By March 1803 the uneasy Peace of Amiens was breaking down and Britain was preparing again for war. In March the Admiralty appointed Brenton to the command of the thirty-eight-gun frigate *Minerve,* to serve under Saumarez on the Channel Islands station. A series of mishaps ensued. First, he had been in command only a short time and was still in port when a falling block hit his head, causing a concussion that put him ashore until June. At the beginning of July he took *Minerve* to sea for the first time; Saumarez ordered him to take station off Guernsey. On the evening of the 2nd, after chasing a detachment of French gunboats into Cherbourg, the ship found herself in heavy fog in the roadstead immediately outside an artificial inner harbor then being constructed. In the fog, the pilot mistook the fort on the Île du Homet for that on the Île Pelée, about a mile away to seaward. *Minerve* ran aground on one of the rock-filled wooden frames from which a breakwater was being built. Immediately taken under heavy fire by forts and nearby ships, Brenton responded vigorously by sending *Minerve*'s boats, with an officer and party of armed men, to cut out a larger ship from the harbor and use it to set an anchor by which to get their ship off. Continually under fire, Brenton's men successfully refloated *Minerve,* but only momentarily; there was no wind, and she grounded again on the falling tide.[45]

After ten hours of gunfire and with eleven men killed and sixteen wounded, Brenton surrendered *Minerve*. Napoleon personally announced the news. Brenton and his officers and men were made prisoners of war and marched nearly four hundred miles to the citadel in Verdun. There Brenton remained with his officers and other senior prisoners of war, while his four hundred men were taken farther down the Meuse River to Givet and the ancient fortress of Charlemont. Among the other prisoners at Verdun were two Anglican clergymen, Rev. Lancelot Charles Lee and Rev. Robert B. Wolfe. Brenton became a very close friend of Lee, who accompanied him on visits to British prisoners of war in the area and ignited his initial interest in relieving the conditions of prisoners and promoting religion among them.[46] Somewhat later, Brenton encountered Wolfe, who had been detained earlier at Fontainebleau, where he had begun a prison ministry that he continued at Verdun.

Officer-prisoners who like Brenton had given their word not to escape were allowed considerable freedom. Placed on parole, Brenton conducted himself honorably by remaining in the area and at the same time was able to initiate measures that improved conditions for British prisoners. A proposed exchange of prisoners broke down in November 1804, but Brenton was eventually granted permission to

bring his family to join him. In April 1805 his wife arrived with his sister and eldest son—John Jervis Brenton (born 19 January 1803), whom he had named for Admiral Lord Jervis. Brenton was not in good health during this period, so he and his family were allowed to live in Tours, 250 miles to the southwest on the Loire, where his second child, Frances Isabella, was born in November 1805.

Meanwhile, the crew of *Minerve* was being housed in relatively harsh conditions. Recalling his positive experience with naval chaplains under Saumarez, Brenton worked in 1805 to see Wolfe, still at Verdun, appointed as chaplain to British prisoners of war in 1805 and meanwhile arranged for Wolfe to organize a school of navigation for the British prisoners at Givet, fifty miles south.[47] Wolfe's work there was impressive not only for the quality of its instruction in navigation but also for the crucible it created for a religious awakening among the British ratings at Givet, which in turn eventually contributed to a wider growth of Christian piety among British seaman.[48] Brenton himself experienced a religious awakening. Since his birth in Newport he had practiced his religion in form, but he had begun to take religion seriously only while serving under Saumarez in *Caesar*. The deep Christian faith and evangelical convictions he developed in France, as a prisoner and a colleague of Wolfe, marked the remainder of his career and life.[49]

In December 1806, Brenton was exchanged for Capt. Louis-Antoine-Cyprien Infernet (the nephew of Marshal André Masséna), who had fought bravely in command of the French seventy-four *Intrépide* at Trafalgar and had been captured. On 18 February 1807, soon after his return to England, Brenton's third child, Lancelot Charles Lee, was born and named after Brenton's inspirational friend. In the same month, a court-martial honorably acquitted Brenton of the loss of *Minerve,* and he went to command the newly built frigate *Spartan,* thirty-eight guns. Reporting on board immediately, Brenton took her to the Mediterranean for duty under Admiral Lord Collingwood. In Collingwood's eyes Brenton had lost *Minerve* due to rashness off Cherbourg, and Brenton's first action in *Spartan* did little to change that opinion, suffering heavy casualties attacking an enemy polacre off Nice in May. Although a court of inquiry acquitted Brenton, Collingwood remained wary of him and assigned *Spartan* a station off Toulon for the remainder of 1807.

Brenton redeemed his reputation with successful attacks on enemy shipping and French positions on the Spanish coast in 1808, followed by actions in command of a small (four-ship) squadron in the eastern Mediterranean in 1809. In an operation in the Adriatic he convoyed British and Spanish ambassadors to Trieste, drove French ships from Pesaro in the Marche region, and forced the surrender of the French garrisons at Lussin in Croatia and on the Ionian islands of Zante, Cephalonia, and Kythera.[50] These successes won over Collingwood, who wrote to Lord Mulgrave, the First Lord of the Admiralty, "I cannot say too much to your lordship of the zeal and talent of Captain Brenton."[51]

Another action followed on 2 May 1810, when Brenton in *Spartan* with *Success,* thirty-two, forced a large French frigate and three other Franco-Neapolitan warships to seek shelter behind the mole at Naples. On the following day Brenton returned hoping to lure the enemy ships out to battle. The enemy needed no prompting and stood out, this time with a reinforcement of seven gunboats and four hundred soldiers. The Franco-Neapolitan squadron met *Spartan* off the Amalfi coast at the entrance to the Bay of Naples, between the islands of Capri and Ischia. During a sharp and bloody action in a light breeze, *Spartan* caused severe damage to her opponents but lost ten men killed and twenty-two wounded. Grapeshot hit Brenton in the hip and forced him in the latter part of the engagement to place Lt. George W. Willes in charge.[52] In recognition of Brenton's achievements in combat, he was appointed on the following day commander of the Adriatic Squadron, but he was unable to assume the duty. The heavily damaged ship and wounded captain returned to England in July, where Brenton was placed on half-pay during a slow, two-year period of recovery.

While still in the Mediterranean, he was advised that King Ferdinand III of Sicily had conferred on him the honor of Commander of the Order of St. Ferdinand on 10 May 1810.[53] Additionally, Lloyd's Patriotic Fund awarded him a hundred-guinea sword.[54] While ashore, however, Brenton faced hardships beyond those of recovering from his wound. His agents had failed him and lost all his property; also, a prize appeal was lost, by which he was obliged to return a sum previously awarded. Now three thousand pounds in debt, he gave up his home in Bath and moved to London lodgings. However, friends came to his rescue and paid the debt, and he was awarded a pension of three hundred pounds for his wounds.

In March 1812 Brenton accepted command of *Stirling Castle,* seventy-four, although not fully recovered: "My profession had ever been my delight from the very early period of my life at which I entered it, and no circumstance, however happy, had as yet possessed the power to tranquillize my mind on shore, whilst I considered myself capable of active service."[55] Brenton took his eldest son, Jervis, aged nine, to sea with him, as his own father had taken him. Jervis had already shown interest in and aptitude for the sea, but his naval service was to be short. His father soon resigned his command owing to his health, and five years later on 27 August 1817, the boy died of scarlet fever while attending Hyde Abbey School in Winchester before he could become a midshipman.

On 3 November 1812, Brenton was made a baronet and on 24 December was granted arms. The arms showed a lion and three martlets, with the stern of a warship in one quarter, surmounted by a naval coronet labeled "Spartan" and a swan.[56] The grant of arms ended up being unusual in the very large number of people who, over the years, were allowed to bear them: all the descendants of Brenton's grandfather, the second Jahleel Brenton (1691–1767), who had had twenty-two children.

However, only the direct descendants of the captain of *Spartan* were allowed the naval crown with its label.

At the end of 1813 Brenton was appointed commissioner of the dockyard at Port Mahon on Minorca and in 1815 Knight Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath. With the disestablishment of the Port Mahon dockyard in 1815, he briefly commanded the ten-gun yacht *Dorset* before going on to the Cape of Good Hope to be commissioner of the dockyard there. During this period, Brenton supported British forces at St. Helena, where Napoleon was held prisoner. In addition, he worked to improve the wages and living conditions of the African civilian workers in the dockyard and developed an interest in evangelizing the indigenous peoples. In July 1817, Brenton's wife, Isabella, died after a long illness, as did Jervis in August. In late 1817, Brenton undertook a journey to the mouth of the Knysna River to develop a trade route to that easternmost edge of the Western Cape Province in an early effort to settle that region. He is remembered there today in Brenton-on-Sea, a resort and site of a reserve for the Brenton blue butterfly. He kept a journal of his journey and made a number of watercolors, five of which have survived.[57]

In January 1822, after six years at the Cape, Brenton returned to England, where in April he was appointed Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath.[58] On 9 October that same year, now aged fifty-two, he married his cousin Harriet Mary Brenton (–1863), the daughter of Judge James Brenton of Halifax, Nova Scotia. For a short period he commanded the king's yacht, *Royal Charlotte,* and from November 1829 to the summer of 1830 the guard ship *Donegal* at Sheerness. On 22 July 1830, he was promoted to rear admiral of the Blue and restored to the active list. In the following year, he reverted to captain and was appointed lieutenant governor of Greenwich Hospital, succeeding Capt. William Browell, with a salary of eight hundred pounds a year.[59] In that post Brenton improved the naval school and organized libraries for the Greenwich pensioners. He also published the first of his several books and pamphlets, *An Appeal to the British Nation, on Behalf of Her Sailors,* which represented the growing trend to consider seamen people of moral responsibility.[60] This was followed the next year with *The Hope of the Navy; or, The True Source of Discipline and Efficiency,* in which he looked to religion as that source.[61] For most of the last year of his service until his retirement on 1 July 1840, Brenton was the hospital's acting governor, following the death of Vice Adm. Sir Thomas Hardy in September 1839.[62]

At his retirement in 1840, he received multiple promotions. First, he was promoted again to rear admiral of the Blue, a rank for which he had been eligible by seniority but that had been held in abeyance as incompatible with his appointment at Greenwich. At the same time, he was promoted to rear admiral of the Red to date from 10 January 1837. Additionally, on 1 July 1840, his retirement date, he was

promoted to vice admiral of the Blue. Subsequently, on 23 November 1841, having gained the necessary seniority, Brenton became vice admiral of the White.[63] During his retirement years he published two more works: a book, *Memoir of Captain Edward Pelham Brenton,* his younger brother who had died in 1839, and a pamphlet, *Remarks on the Importance of Our Coast Fisheries,* which called on the public to reduce the sufferings of the poor by means of fishing, which would provide both food and work.[64] Brenton lived initially at Casterton in Westmorland, but his increasingly poor health forced him to move south, first to Elford House, near Litchfield, and then to 28 Lansdowne Place in Leamington Spa, where he died on 21 April 1844.[65]

Two years later, Rev. Henry Raikes published a memoir based on original documents. Jahleel's younger son, who succeeded as the second baronet, Rev. Sir Lancelot Charles Lee Brenton, brought out a revised second edition of the book.[66] In addition, Admiral Brenton's daughter by his second marriage, Harriet Mary Carey, published in 1860 a book of children's stories, *Evenings with Grandpapa,* based on stories that her father had told.[67]

Of Sir Jahleel it was written, as reported by Charles Davenport and Mary Scudder almost a century after his death,

> There is [in him] evidently conservatism rather than radicalism; calmness under disappointment; capacity for enduring hardships; firmness and self-reliance. . . . His taste so refined, his manners so gentle, his kindness so constant, that much of what the world calls goodness seemed to grow in him spontaneously and cost him nothing. He was amiable without an effort, benevolent without reflection, and habitually thinking more of others than himself.[68]

Unlike his elder brother, Jervis, who died young, Jahleel Brenton's second son did not carry on the naval tradition that his father and grandfather had set. The contrast between father and son was a stark one, but they did share a basic religiosity. The father had been a fighting man who saw no contradiction between his faith and warfare, while the son was an Oxford graduate, clergyman, biblical scholar, author of a book still in use in the early twentieth-first century, and a pacifist who left the Church of England to join the Brethren movement.[69] Looking back on his youth, the son graphically described his upbringing:

> From my birth upwards all my associations and impressions were in favour not only of the lawfulness but of the glory of war. All the senses of my childhood were crowded with memorials of the past, or tokens of the present connection of my family with the profession of arms. I was, so to speak, born and cradled in the midst of them. Epaulettes and cocked hats, the grapeshot that pierced my father's hipbone, the sword voted to him out of the Patriotic Fund . . . rich with blue steel and unwrought gold, my mother fainting at the news of my father's wounds—these are among the earliest visions of my infancy. The very playthings of our nursery were blocks, marlinspikes, or models of brigs and frigates with jacks and ensigns and appropriate rigging. War seemed the most normal condition of man, and peace a rare and vapid exception.[70]

While the son's recollection harbored a very personal reaction, it also reflected what many others must also have felt during the long years when Britain was at war against France.

Capt. Edward Pelham Brenton (1774–1839)

Edward Brenton was the middle of the three sons and the fifth child of Rear Adm. Jahleel Brenton and his wife, Henrietta Cowley. He was four years younger than his big brother, the future Sir Jahleel, and four years older than his little brother, James, known as "Wallace" to the family.[71] Edward's middle name, Pelham, was a family name on Edward's mother's side and one that carried much weight and social prestige in colonial New England. Herbert Pelham, who had immigrated from Hertfordshire to Massachusetts about 1640, became the first treasurer of Harvard College. He was from the same family line as Henry Pelham (1697–1754) and his elder brother, the Duke of Newcastle (1693–1768), successive Whig prime ministers of Great Britain who held power in the years, respectively, 1743–54 and 1754–56, with the duke serving a second stint in 1757–62. Herbert Pelham's son Edward (died 1730) was a member of the Harvard class of 1673 and lived the life of a very wealthy and cultured gentleman in Massachusetts. He had married Freelove Arnold, the daughter of Benedict Arnold (1615–78), president and then governor of the English colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations for eleven years, alternating in that position with William Brenton (ca. 1610–74). Edward Pelham's son, another Edward (died 1740), was a wealthy merchant and Anglican who lived in Newport. This second Edward had two daughters, one of whom married the prominent Newport merchant John Bannister, the other Joseph Cowley of Wolverhampton, England. The latter's daughter, Henrietta, was Edward Pelham Brenton's mother. Thus, Edward's name reflects a heritage uniting two of the most prominent families in the early history of Rhode Island.[72]

Edward was born in Newport on 20 July 1774 and was christened with the name of his maternal grandfather at Trinity Church on September 20.[73] According to his brother's memoir, Edward began his naval career in May 1781, at the age of six, when he joined his father in *Queen*.[74] However, Navy Office records certify that he had been borne, like his older brother, as an able seaman on the muster books of his father's ships *Tortoise* as early as December 1777, when he was only three years old, then *Dromedary, Tortoise* again, and *Strombolo* before joining *Queen* in October 1780. Remaining in her until September 1781, he served in *Termagant* as a clerk for eight months in 1781–82 before going on to *Belleisle* in 1782–83. With the end of the American war, he left active service to attend school at Ware in Hertfordshire for two years and then joined his father and family at Saint-Omer in France, where he developed fluency in French. In November 1788, he joined *Crown,* of sixty-four guns, then fitting out at Chatham under Capt. James Cornwallis, who was ordered to serve as commodore and commander in chief of the East Indies station in 1788–92. Among his papers, his brother and biographer Jahleel found a detailed account of his first months in *Crown,* in which Edward remarked, "Everything that

Smollet says about the miseries of a man-of-war I found exactly and correctly true in 1788."[75]

In June 1792, on his return from the East Indies, Edward passed his lieutenant's examination and was certified as having had more than eight years of sea service and being twenty-one years old when he did so.[76] He was in fact only eighteen at the time, but he would have turned twenty-one by the time he was actually promoted to lieutenant in 1795.

Between the examination and his promotion he was placed by a friend of his father's, Vice Adm. Philip Affleck, one of the commissioners of the Admiralty, in the seventy-four *Bellona,* Capt. George Wilson. In 1794 after the battle of the Glorious First of June, he was transferred to Admiral Lord Hood's flagship *Queen Charlotte,* where he was promoted to lieutenant; then to the frigate *Venus,* of thirty-two guns; and then to *Phoenix,* thirty-six. He was serving in *Agamemnon,* sixty-four, as fourth lieutenant and watch officer when mutiny broke out at the Nore in 1797, until he was appointed first lieutenant in the eighteen-gun brig *Raven*.[77] In February 1798 that vessel was wrecked near Cuxhaven at the mouth of the Elbe River. Boats from the town of Blankenese, about forty miles up the Elbe, rescued the ship's crew, who returned home, the officers to face a court-martial. After all were cleared, one of the members of the court-martial board, Capt. John Bligh, offered Edward Pelham an opportunity to serve under him in a "sixty-four," *Agincourt,* flagship of Vice Admiral Lord Radstock on the Newfoundland station. Readily accepting, Edward was initially appointed sixth lieutenant. When Sir John Jervis, as described above, ordered Edward's brother Jahleel into *Barfleur* and then *Ville de Paris,* he inquired into the situations of his brothers, Wallace and Edward, saying, "I will do the best I can for the sons of officers."[78] At that point, in 1801, Jervis could do no better for Edward, but Radstock immediately moved him up from sixth to first lieutenant in *Agincourt*. After Jervis had been created Earl of St. Vincent and then became First Lord of the Admiralty, Edward was ordered to serve as first lieutenant under John Bligh in the seventy-four-gun *Theseus,* in which he served in the West Indies. On 29 April 1802, following the Peace of Amiens in March, Edward was promoted by St. Vincent's favor to the rank of commander and to command of the sloop of war *Lark,* which he took home from the West Indies to be paid off.[79]

On half-pay after his return to England, he married Margaretta Diana Cox, the daughter of Maj. Gen. Thomas Cox, at St. Marylebone Church, London, on 29 March 1803.[80] With the renewal of the war in May 1803, Edward, again by St. Vincent's favor, returned to sea duty in command of the sixteen-gun *Merlin,* an old armed collier, in which he was frequently off the French coast near Cherbourg. On 10 December 1803, off the island of Tatihou near La Hogue, he saw the frigate *Shannon,* thirty-six, had run aground during a gale and was helpless under the island's gun batteries. During the night he sent his boats in to take the crew off and

burned the ship, preventing her capture by the enemy. In 1804, he commanded *Merlin* during the bombardment of Le Havre in July and August.[81]

In January 1805, Edward was appointed to command the newly built eighteen-gun brig-sloop *Amaranthe*. In her he cruised in northern waters, capturing several prizes. In 1808 *Amaranthe* was ordered to the West Indies, on the Leeward Islands station. In one incident there, Edward went ashore under a flag of truce to deliver a message to the governor of Martinique, the famous French admiral Villaret de Joyeuse, who had commanded the French fleet on the Glorious First of June in 1794. Later, on 13 December 1808, Edward and his men distinguished themselves during a blockade of Martinique by destroying the eighteen-gun French brig *La Cigne*.[82] Following this action, Commo. George Cockburn placed Edward in acting command of the seventy-four *Pompée*. This appointment was confirmed by the Admiralty with the promotion dating from the capture of *La Cigne,* but Edward did not receive the official news until he returned to England in May 1809.[83]

Still in the Caribbean, Edward's *Pompée* flew the broad pennant of his friend and supporter Commodore Cockburn and participated in the invasion of Martinique and the siege of its capital, Fort-de-France. That operation began on 30 January 1809 under the overall command of Vice Adm. Sir Alexander Cochrane, the troops under Lt. Gen. George Beckwith. Cockburn had been instructed to act additionally as a major general and Brenton to command under him a hundred of *Pompée*'s seamen with one of her long twenty-four-pounder cannons in a battery ashore. Brenton and his detachment participated in a five-day bombardment that began on 19 February and ended with Villaret's surrender of Martinique. Some 2,400 officers and men of the French garrison were taken on board ship; Cockburn shifted his flag to the seventy-four-gun *Belleisle,* with Brenton in command (as his father had been before him). The prisoners of war were taken directly to the Bay of Morbihan in France, in accordance with their terms of surrender, to obtain the release of an equal number of British prisoners of war held there. There, however, French officials refused to accept the arrangement, and the prisoners were taken to Portsmouth.[84]

In July 1809, Edward took temporary command of *Donegal,* seventy-eight guns, to deliver Richard, Marquess of Wellesley, to Cádiz, where he was to take up the post of British ambassador to Spain, governed during the Napoleonic occupation by the Supreme Central Junta at Seville. The ship's arrival coincided with the local celebration over the news that the ambassador's brother, Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley, had just won the battle of Talavera (27–28 July). Ambassador Wellesley was unsuccessful in his attempts to bring the junta into cooperation with his brother and in late November returned in *Donegal* to England, where he soon became foreign secretary in Spencer Perceval's ministry. Edward relinquished his temporary command and was on half-pay until April 1810, when he briefly commanded the

twenty-two-gun frigate *Cyane* on convoy duty. On returning from his first convoy, he was surprised to learn that the First Lord of the Admiralty, Charles Philip Yorke, had nominated him to succeed his wounded brother, Jahleel, in command of the frigate *Spartan* after the ship's battle damage had been repaired.[85] In appointing his brother, the First Lord wrote to Jahleel, "I beg you will consider this a testimony of . . . personal esteem and regard."[86]

After *Spartan* was ready for sea again, Edward commanded her on patrols off the coast of France until 25 July 1811, when he sailed for the North American station to serve under Vice Adm. Sir Herbert Sawyer and Vice Adm. John Borlase Warren, based at Halifax, Nova Scotia.[87] There Edward seized a number of American privateers. For example, between 16 July and 3 August 1812, he captured nine privateers in Nova Scotian waters.[88] The historian John Knox Laughton wrote of him that he "met with no opportunity of distinguished service" in the War of 1812, but an obituary that appeared in a Rhode Island newspaper in 1839 cast a different light on his service on that coast: "It was repugnant to his feelings to appear as a foe before his birth-place, and where some of his near kindred still resided, and he requested to be placed upon some other station."[89]

In any case, *Spartan* remained on the North American station for two years, until the summer of 1813, when she returned home. She paid off in September, after which Edward was on half-pay until April 1815, when he was appointed to command the hundred-gun *Royal Sovereign,* then fitting out as the flagship for Rear Adm. Sir Benjamin Hallowell. He soon followed Hallowell into HMS *Tonnant,* of eighty guns, during which time he had a brief interview with Napoleon in French, when the deposed emperor was being transferred to HMS *Northumberland* to be conveyed to St. Helena. Edward resigned his command in November 1815, having no desire to serve in peacetime.[90]

From a very early age, Edward had developed a passion for naval history and had read widely in the subject, including Anson's *Voyage* and all the national naval histories of the Royal Navy from the very first such work in English, Josiah Burchett's 1720 *Transactions at Sea*.[91] He had come to dream of becoming a naval historian, and shortly after his retirement from active service at sea in 1815 he began to think about how to realize that dream. He had already acquired a sound basis through his study and practical experience. As he explained, "I have been constantly in the habit of making memoranda of every public event which came under my notice and of taking sketches of any port in which I let go anchor."[92] By 1819 he was fully occupied in writing his *Naval History of Great Britain from the Year [1783] to [1822]*.[93] The first volume appeared in 1823, dedicated to the Earl of St. Vincent, with a frontispiece portrait, "as a mark of respect for his public service and of unfeigned gratitude for his parental kindness to the author."[94] The five volumes were

illustrated with engravings from his own sketches and those of his brother Jahleel, as well as maps and portraits.

His motive in writing history was to inspire young people with the "same ardour and zeal" for the navy that he felt.[95] He also wanted to communicate to the public an accurate understanding of the naval war, while at the same time presenting balanced professional judgments for his fellow naval officers, judgments that earned the trust of his superiors. Only a very small portion of his correspondence survives, but he obtained permissions from such senior officers as Sir George Cockburn; James Saumarez, Baron de Saumarez; Edward Pellew, Viscount Exmouth; Sir Richard Keats; George Elphinstone, Viscount Keith; Sir David Milne; and Earl St. Vincent. Many professionals became subscribers to his work, notable among them the Duke of Clarence, the future King William IV, who wrote Brenton that he took "great pleasure in subscribing to your highly useful work."[96] Edward's history also reflected his upbringing and family values in its references to the role of divine providence in naval affairs.[97]

As the volumes came out one by one, however, Edward quickly discovered the danger of writing contemporary history—that is, the controversy it typically creates. In the preface to volume 3 he remarked, "He who writes the history of his own time must, if he does his duty, make himself enemies."[98] In reply to his critics, Edward wrote in the front matter of the last volume:

> I hope the good sense and cool reflection of my opponents will convince them that I have had no other motive than the advantage of the profession: anxious above all things to do justice, I have invariably attended to kind and friendly communication; but the attacks in the daily prints, I have, by the advice of some of the best and bravest of my brother officers, treated with silent indifference.[99]

Brenton's work appeared nearly simultaneously with William James's five volumes on the same topic.[100] The two men came from quite different backgrounds and had quite different conceptions of the writing of naval history. Brenton was the trained naval professional and a Whig in his political leaning, while James was a Tory who had studied law and begun a career as a lawyer in the Vice-Admiralty Court of Jamaica.[101] The two writers quickly became involved in a highly public debate over the merits of their respective works. Brenton had taken a very broad view, placing the war in context, basing his work mainly on the dispatches of the major commanders published in the *London Gazette* provided directly to him, and providing general and succinct accounts of the naval actions. James was more skeptical of the reports of senior officers and focused more on the details of the engagements, drawing information from ships' logs and testimonies from individual ships' officers.[102] Brenton felt that logs were less likely to be accurate than the responsible officers' reports. There was another subtle aspect of their dispute. James had been held as a prisoner of war in the United States during the War of 1812 and retained some animus toward Americans, particularly resenting their accounts of their own

naval actions. In contrast, the Loyalist Brenton, born in America, had been careful not to show prejudice.

In the end, Brenton's work was overshadowed by James's. William James died in 1827, but Capt. Frederick Chamier (1796–1870), later well known as a naval novelist in the popular style of his fellow officer Capt. Frederick Marryat, issued a new and expanded six-volume edition of James's work in 1837, shortly after Brenton's second edition appeared.[103] As if to have the last word in the debate, James's work went through seven editions, the latest reprinted as late as 2002 with Chamier's introduction, which the eminent historian Professor Sir John Knox Laughton (1830–1915) described as having "good-humoredly disposed of disparaging criticism of the original work" by Brenton.[104] Damaging further Brenton's reputation, Laughton wrote,

> As an officer of rank, who had been actively employed during the period of his history, his opportunities of gaining information were almost unequalled, but he seems to have been incapable of sifting his evidence, and to have been guided more by prejudice than judgement. The plan of his work is good, but the execution feeble, and its authority as to matter[s] of fact is often slender.[105]

Notwithstanding such verdicts by influential writers, Brenton's history contains useful insights from his own direct observations as well as information and viewpoints he obtained directly from participants. In defense of his brother's history Jahleel pointed out that Edward had avoided personal attacks on individual officers, as he felt James had not. Edward's naval history "is not without faults and errors, I freely admit," Jahleel wrote,

> but my object has been to vindicate the writer from the charges made against him, of presumption in undertaking such a work, and of uncalled for harshness and severity in the execution of it. . . . My object has been to remove the false glare which has been thrown over some of the events recorded, which, if suffered to remain, would only tend to throw suspicion over others, and induce the rising generations to form an erroneous estimate of what is required to constitute a real triumph.[106]

Naval history had occupied the majority of Edward's time between 1819 and the publication of his final volume in 1825. In the following years, he shifted his focus to assisting poor and disadvantaged youth, with, as his elder brother described, "the most invincible perseverance, during the remainder of his life, not only to devising the means for improving the situation of the youthful poor, to promoting their temporal and eternal welfare, and making them good and useful servants to the state, but to ameliorate the conditions of the seafaring part of our population."[107]

In 1829 Edward had read in the newspapers accounts of Esther Hibner, a tambour lace worker in London who had held the young girls apprenticed to her in St. Pancras parish under a cruel tyranny and had murdered two of them.[108] This incident alerted him to the deplorable conditions of child labor in England. Joining a group of six other like-minded men, Edward was a key figure in establishing in 1830 the Society for the Suppression of Juvenile Vagrancy. He authored the first public

statement of the society's aims, explaining its purpose in "training the poor and destitute or partially depraved children, to such habits as would fit them for useful service in this country."[109] The plan was first implemented at West Ham Abbey, Essex, near Bow, in 1830, with twenty boys of "forlorn and neglected condition."[110]

In 1833 the society was moved to Hackney Wick and renamed first the Brenton Juvenile Asylum, then the Children's Friend Society. In 1834, Princess Victoria, the future queen, and her mother, the Duchess of Kent, became the patronesses of the society, which established an asylum for girls at Chiswick, the Royal Victoria Asylum. Some years earlier, from 1821 to 1828, Sir Robert Wilmot-Horton, as undersecretary of state for war and the colonies, had advocated resettling the poor in the British colonies. Initially Brenton opposed such plans;[111] the society nevertheless soon took them up and resettled several hundred poor English and Irish children in the Cape Colony in South Africa, in the Swan River Colony in Australia, and in New Brunswick and Upper Canada (now Ontario). Although such plans were well-intentioned—envisaging land, accommodation, and employment—the intentions were rarely if ever realized, and the results earned the condemnation of later generations.[112]

Edward Brenton returned to naval history in 1837, bringing out "a new and greatly improved edition" of his naval history in two large octavo volumes that extended the original work fourteen years, from 1822 up to 1836. He dedicated this edition to King William IV, whose "name . . . stands enrolled in every rank, from that of a Midshipman to that of Lord High Admiral," making him "the better able to appreciate the laborious task which I have undertaken."[113] In his preface Brenton commented on a number of points made by reviewers of the first edition, among them a "kind Reviewer" who had apparently taken issue with his characterization of American independence as the result of a rebellion:

> I wish the Americans every happiness as a nation. I cannot forget that I was born among them, and have forgiven their unkind treatment of my family when I was an infant. I will add one word of friendly admonition to them: as they fought and gained their own liberty, let them "do as they would be done by." Let them recollect their slave population; let them instruct, and then emancipate them; let them look to their parent country for a noble though recent example; and let them remember that the neglect of this and other similar warnings may be the cause of deluging their now happy land in blood: injustice ever brings its punishment along with it. Should England and America unhappily be ever at war, this most vulnerable point may prove the cause of interminable discord. Let us hope that such a contingency will never happen, and that the present bond of peace between us and the United States may remain for ever unbroken.[114]

He also included in this edition a five-page "Reply to Some of the Statements in James's Naval History," in which he lamented the attacks that James had initiated and Chamier had continued in the recent second edition of James's work, pointing out James's use of his own words as well as a number of inaccuracies.[115] Pointing out one instance, Brenton wrote, "This is one of the many errors arising from that want

of local knowledge so common to the class of writers who consider that an acquaintance with the subject is a very unimportant part of their business."[116]

The following year, 1838, Brenton published his two-volume *Life and Correspondence of John, Earl St. Vincent,* the first major biographical work to appear on that officer.[117] Edward dedicated the two-volume work to the second Earl of Minto, who was St. Vincent's current successor as First Lord of the Admiralty. Brenton had pointed, in the dedication of the first edition of his *Naval History,* to St. Vincent's important assistance to him, providing documents and personal insights. In this new work Brenton explained the wider range of St. Vincent's friendship and patronage to him and to his brothers, Jahleel and Wallace, as well as the friendship of his eldest sister, Frances, with Lady St. Vincent and the family. Lord St. Vincent had allowed Frances to transcribe his papers for her brother's *Life and Correspondence*. At the time of Lord St. Vincent's death in 1823, Frances was staying at Rochetts, St. Vincent's home near Brentwood, Essex.[118]

In Queen Victoria's coronation honors, Edward Brenton was appointed Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath on 19 July 1838.[119] He died at his home at 18 York Street, Gloucester Place, London, on 6 April 1839, at the age of sixty-four.[120] A hundred boys from the Children's Friend Society attended his funeral at St. Marylebone Church, London, where he was also buried and a monument to him erected. The society continued until about 1842, when it was disestablished for lack of funds.[121]

Lt. James Wallace Brenton (1778–99)

The sixth child and the youngest of the three naval officer sons of Rear Adm. Jahleel Brenton (1729–1802) and his wife, Henrietta Cowley, Wallace was born at Newport in 1778 and christened at Trinity Church on 5 November 1778, with Capt. (later Admiral of the Blue Sir) James Wallace as his godfather and namesake.[122] At this point, Wallace was in command of the fifty-four-gun, two-deck *Experiment* under Vice Adm. Richard, Viscount Howe and had been in the area that summer to oppose the French fleet under Admiral le comte d'Estaing that threatened the British position at Newport. The infant Wallace remained in Newport until the family was evacuated to New York with British forces in 1779 and later to England.

As he had done for his elder brothers, Jahleel and Edward, Wallace's father listed Wallace's name on the books of the successive ships that he commanded. Wallace was entered in *Strombolo*'s muster on 20 April 1779, when he was just six months old, youngest of all three at the time of enrollment, and was carried for just over a year as an ordinary seaman.[123] When his father transferred to *Queen* in April 1780 he listed Wallace as "Captain's servant," as he did again in *Termagant* until 16 May 1782, when he retired to Saint-Omer. Wallace's name does not appear again in ships' books for a decade, until July 1792, when he is enrolled for a month as a

supernumerary in *Bonito*. From September that year for thirteen months he is carried as "lieutenant's servant" in *Trepassy,* the brig commanded by his elder brother Jahleel, then a lieutenant, on the Newfoundland station. In April 1794, Wallace's godfather, Rear Adm. Sir James Wallace, was appointed commander in chief of the Newfoundland station with his flag in the fifty-gun *Romney*. From 1 June 1795 until April 1797, Wallace is listed in *Romney*'s muster book as an able-bodied seaman, then as a midshipman, and finally as a mate. At that point the Earl of St. Vincent, who had taken a personal interest in his brother Jahleel's assignments, ordered Jahleel to *Ville de Paris;* Wallace went with him and appeared in that ship's books until 20 January 1798.[124]

Wallace was certainly physically present in both *Romney* and *Ville de Paris,* as his brother Edward mentions him serving with his godfather and producing journals for his lieutenant's examination.[125] Wallace passed his lieutenant's examination on 20 January 1798, when he was nineteen, and, through the favor of St. Vincent, was promoted the next day and ordered as a lieutenant to the sixteen-gun sloop of war *Peterel,* under Cdr. Francis W. Austen, the brother of the author Jane Austen. Wallace participated in a number of successful actions in which prizes were taken.[126] On one occasion, off Barcelona, Austen ordered Wallace to take the ship's boats to capture a Spanish privateer that *Peterel* had driven ashore. In the action that followed, Wallace was gravely wounded; he was taken to the hospital at Port Mahon, Minorca. His brother Jahleel, arriving a week later, wrote to his father, "Poor Wallace is no more; he died of his wounds the 15th of last month [November]. He died as he lived, a hero; and a pattern to every young man both in public and private life, universally regretted and esteemed." Jahleel was careful to note that Lt. W. Pemberton and his wife took "unwearied care of the poor fellow during his illness."[127] Lord Nelson, in the report (quoted from above) to the Admiralty on Jahleel's action in *Speedy,* added, "If the merits of a brother may be allowed to have any weight, I have the sorrow to tell you, that he lost his life, then [lieutenant] of the *Peterel* attempting, with great bravery, to bring off a Vessel which the Sloop had run on shore."[128]

THE NOVA SCOTIA CONNECTION

Vice Adm. Sir Jahleel Brenton's marriage to his first cousin, Harriet Brenton, in 1822 was not the only Nova Scotian naval connection for the Rhode Island Brentons. Their long connection produced three more naval men and additional intermarriages of cousins who became socially and professionally prominent in Nova Scotia. The Brenton family was caught up in both the planter emigration to Nova Scotia of the 1760s and the Loyalist emigration during and after the American Revolution, becoming closely tied to strong interests in public service and the navy.

In the 1740s, Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts had proposed the resettlement of Nova Scotia with English speakers, replacing the original French settlers of Acadia. The first step of what became known as "Shirley's Great Plan"

had been the arrival there of and the founding of Halifax by two thousand English settlers in 1749. German Protestant immigrants soon followed, establishing Lunenburg, but thereafter the opening of additional lands for English resettlement was delayed by the Seven Years' War. Fort Beauséjour on the Isthmus of Chignecto between Nova Scotia and present-day New Brunswick fell in the spring of 1755, and there followed immediately the expulsion of the French Acadians from Nova Scotia and later, in 1758, the British capture of the fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton. With the province secure, King George II approved on 16 February 1760 the resettlement of the lands vacated by the Acadians with planters from New England. Among those who took advantage were a number of people from Newport who acquired fifty-acre grants in what is now Hants County, Nova Scotia. This group congregated in what the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, Jonathan Belcher, named Newport Township, primarily in honor of his friend Robert, second Viscount Jocelyn and second Baron Newport (1721–97), but at the same time recognizing the origins of the planters from Rhode Island. Among the planters given grants was Samuel Brenton (1733–97).[129]

Two of the sisters among the twenty-one siblings of Rear Adm. Jahleel Brenton had Nova Scotian connections: Mary Brenton (1721–64) and Susannah Brenton (1747–1818). Mary married Joseph Gerrish (1709–74) at Trinity Church in 1740. Gerrish, the son of a substantial Boston merchant, had first gone to Nova Scotia in the 1745 Louisbourg campaign. After the war he returned briefly to Boston, where he supplied goods to the Annapolis Royal garrison, but moved to Halifax shortly after its founding. Investing in a number of houses as well as in fishing and farming, he was given a lifetime appointment as naval storekeeper for the Royal Navy's dockyard in Halifax some time before 1759.[130] Susannah Brenton married John Halliburton (–1807) of Newport. Apparently born in Scotland, Halliburton had joined the navy as a surgeon's mate in May 1758. After serving in a frigate he settled in Newport, where he opened a medical practice.[131] With the commencement of the American Revolution, Halliburton was placed in charge of the naval hospital there until 1778–79. He remained in Newport after British forces withdrew in 1779, supplying intelligence on Patriot and French activities in Rhode Island until 1782, when he and his family left for New York City. In recognition of this service General Clinton gave him a choice of directing the hospital in New York City or the one in Halifax. Choosing Halifax, where his brother-in-law James Brenton, another of Rear Admiral Brenton's twenty-one siblings, was already located, Halliburton became principal surgeon and agent of the naval hospital on 28 April 1782 and served in that post for a quarter century. John and Susannah's Newport-born son, Sir Brenton Halliburton (1774–1860), was to be an army officer, lawyer, politician, and chief justice of Nova Scotia; he would marry the daughter of the Anglican bishop of Nova Scotia, Rt. Rev. Charles Inglis.[132]

James Brenton had come to Nova Scotia from Newport as a young man of twenty-four. Having been a junior member of the Rhode Island bar, James was admitted to the provincial bar of Nova Scotia in December 1760 and became an officer in the provincial militia. Subsequently becoming a politician, James served for brief periods as solicitor general, attorney general, and judge of the Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax.[133] James had nine children. Among them, his son Edward Brabazon Brenton (1763–1845) served as the civil secretary to Lt. Gen. Sir George Prevost when he commanded British forces in North America from 1811 to 1815, during the War of 1812. James's daughter Harriet Brenton (–1863) married her cousin Vice Adm. Sir Jahleel Brenton. A younger son of James Brenton, John Brenton, joined the Royal Navy as a purser and admiral's secretary.

Purser and Admiral's Secretary John Brenton (1779–after 1834)

Born in Halifax, John Brenton became a purser at the unusually early age of seventeen, which suggests that family connections were involved. The careers of warrant officers like John Brenton—pursers, masters, chaplains, and surgeons, who were of wardroom rank, and boatswains, carpenters, and gunners, who were not—are much more difficult to trace than those of commissioned sea officers. Normally, more senior pursers were appointed to ships of the line. By 1801, when John Brenton had more than twenty years of service, he was appointed purser in *Stately,* sixty-four guns. In 1806, he was purser of the seventy-four *Elizabeth,* followed by *Majestic,* another seventy-four. By 1810, he had reached the pinnacle of a purser's career as admiral's secretary to Rear Adm. Sir Robert Stopford, commander in chief of the Cape of Good Hope station. While he was in that post Stopford directed, in its later phases, the naval force involved in the capture of Java in August 1811. Following this successful action, Stopford appointed John Brenton as the senior of the two agents for the navy on the scene and gave them charge of the property that had been taken.[134] In 1827, Brenton appears again in the records, this time as secretary to Sir Robert, now a "full" admiral and commander in chief at Portsmouth. In 1832 he was listed as one of the directors of the Royal Naval School, and in 1834, in response to a survey from the Admiralty, he reported that he was fit for duty. Little more has yet been found about his life and career.[135]

Among the twenty-two children of Jahleel and Frances Brenton was another son, William Brenton (1750–1804), who eventually joined his brother James and his sisters Mary Gerrish and Susannah Halliburton in Halifax. William remained in Newport during the Revolution and, at the age of twenty-nine in 1779, married Frances Wickham. By 1780–81, he and his new bride had become so disgusted with the family's situation that they left for New York City. There, they reported to General Clinton the arrival of a French squadron at Newport under the command of the chevalier de Ternay bringing troops under the comte de Rochambeau to support the rebels. In New York, their son John was born. Shortly thereafter they moved to

Halifax, where their son William was born. In 1786 they obtained a grant of five hundred acres in Upper Wilmot, Kings County. Both John and William were to become officers in the Royal Navy.[136]

Vice Adm. John Brenton (1782–1859)

The son of William Brenton and Frances Wickham, John Brenton was baptized on 28 August 1782 in Halifax.[137] On 31 August 1798, at the age of sixteen—although his passing certificate describes him as twenty—John joined the sixty-four-gun *Asia,* flagship of Adm. George Vandeput, commander in chief of the North American station. Serving first as an able seaman and then, after only a month, a midshipman, he remained in that ship until Christmas Day 1800, after she returned to England. The next day he transferred to the fifty-gun *Assistance,* under, successively, Capts. Robert Hall and Richard Lee, remaining long enough to participate in the blockade of the Dutch fleet in the North Sea. On 1 March 1801, he was assigned to *Caesar,* eighty guns, Sir James Saumarez's flagship, commanded by John's first cousin, Capt. Jahleel Brenton. He was present at the battle of Algeciras on 6 July 1801, and on the 12th at the action in the Gut of Gibraltar in which two Spanish and one French ships of the line were destroyed. John Brenton's Naval General Service Medal for this and his 1812 boat service action (described below) is in the collection of the National Museum of the Royal Navy at Portsmouth.[138]

Promoted to acting lieutenant on 18 July 1801, he remained in *Caesar* for nearly a year, until June 1802. With the departure of Jahleel Brenton as *Caesar*'s commanding officer, John Brenton was assigned to *Kent,* seventy-four, the flagship of Rear Adm. Sir Richard Hussey Bickerton. Following the Peace of Amiens, John Brenton reverted to able seaman and was present in *Kent* at the evacuation of Minorca and afterward when Bickerton served as commander in chief in the Mediterranean during the peace. From 1802 to 1805 he was to follow Bickerton into several flagships. In July 1802 he was promoted again to midshipman; on 26 March 1803, he followed Bickerton from *Kent* into the hundred-gun *Royal Sovereign,* where Bickerton was second in command to Lord Nelson during the blockade of Toulon. On 26 June 1805, Midshipman John Brenton transferred to the ninety-eight-gun *Queen,* where five days later he was once again appointed acting lieutenant.

He was in *Queen* when Vice Admiral Collingwood shifted his flag to her following the battle of Trafalgar. From 8 December 1805, Brenton was assigned to the eighteen-gun sloop *Nautilus,* Capt. John Sykes, to which he was formally attached until 6 April 1806. A few weeks earlier, in March, he had been appointed temporarily to one of the Spanish seventy-fours taken at Trafalgar, *San Ildefonso,* to help get her back to England, where she was eventually made into a provision depot ship. John passed his examination for lieutenant, aged twenty-three, on 2 June 1806, but was not promoted immediately. Returning to sea again as an acting lieutenant, he served in *Hibernia,* 110, the flagship of Admiral Lord St. Vincent, commanding the

Channel Squadron, and then *London,* ninety-eight, Capt. Thomas Warren. On 5 September 1806, he was promoted to lieutenant in *Orion,* seventy-four, Capt. Edward Codrington, off Cádiz.

From January 1807 until July 1812, Lt. John Brenton followed Sir James Saumarez to his successive flagships—*San Josef,* 110; *Hibernia,* 110; *Diomede,* fifty; and *Victory,* one hundred guns—in the Channel, off Guernsey, and in the Baltic.[139] On 14 July 1812, John Brenton was promoted to acting commander. As background, Saumarez had placed Rear Adm. Sir Thomas Byam Martin off Riga, Latvia, to support a Russian army under Prince Pyotr Bagration, who had defeated advance units of the French and Prussian army under Gen. Louis-Nicolas Davout.[140] As a second Russian army under Gen. Mikhail Barclay de Tolly approached to support Bagration's army, Saumarez ordered Capt. Hew Steuart to proceed with John Brenton to assist a Russian admiral, A. V. Möller, in fitting out a flotilla of gunboats to defend Riga. On 28–29 September, British gunboats commanded by lieutenants under John Brenton led a flotilla of forty Russian boats and ten launches up the Kurländische Aa, or Lielupe River, toward Mitau (after 1917 called Jelgava), located inland some twenty-five miles southwest of Riga. When they reached a position five miles downstream from Mitau, they found a series of three well-constructed and strong booms across the river, half a mile apart. The third was defended by three batteries of four guns each. Leading the way, Brenton and his boatmen destroyed all the booms. As they approached, the gun batteries' defenders precipitously abandoned their positions, in such haste that they left behind four twenty-four-pounders.

The combined British and Russian forces captured Mitau on 29 September. Withdrawing on the 30th, they destroyed a bridge to prevent the retreat of the enemy troops and artillery, leading to their defeat.[141] For his service at Mitau, Tsar Alexander created John Brenton Knight of the Imperial Order of St. Vladimir, Fourth Class. The Admiralty promoted him to commander, dating his seniority from 20 November 1812. On 27 June 1814, he took command of the fourteen-gun brig *Hasty* and served on the North Sea and Irish stations until his ship was paid off on 14 November 1815. Meanwhile John Brenton had married, on 28 September 1815, his first cousin Henrietta Brenton (1767–), daughter of Rear Adm. Jahleel Brenton and sister of Vice Adm. Sir Jahleel Brenton, Capt. Edward Pelham Brenton, and Lt. James Wallace Brenton. He was promoted to post captain on 26 December 1822, serving as such until placed on retired half-pay on 1 October 1846. In December 1852 he was advanced by seniority to rear admiral on the retired list and on 17 May 1858 to vice admiral.[142]

Lt. William Brenton (1783–1808)

The son of William and Frances Wickham Brenton, William Brenton was baptized at Halifax on 16 April 1783.[143] According to the muster books, he joined the Royal Navy on 1 July 1797, at age eighteen—although he was actually thirteen or fourteen

years old—as a midshipman on board the flagship of the North American station, *Asia* at Halifax, just a year before his brother John joined the same ship. Remaining in *Asia* until 12 November 1799, he was assigned to the thirty-two-gun frigate *Boston,* where he remained from 5 November 1799 until 12 December 1804, starting out as an able seaman, then alternating between ordinary seaman and midshipman until 1802, finally ending up as a midshipman from 1802 to 1804. He passed his examination for lieutenant in January 1805 and was promoted on 29 August 1807.[144]

CONCLUSION

The extended Brenton family represents an interesting example of a socially prominent family from colonial Rhode Island developing connections to Nova Scotia that served its members well as Loyalists during the war for American independence and in the years beyond it. Their service in the Royal Navy between the mid-eighteenth century and the end of the Napoleonic Wars illuminates the family dynamics involved in forging naval careers, when by the patronage of family members in command of ships, small children could be entered on muster books, providing them seniority in future careers, as Rear Adm. Jahleel Brenton did for his three sons. It illustrates as well how such seniors could promote their later careers, as Rear Adm. Jahleel Brenton's son, Vice Adm. Sir Jahleel Brenton, did for his own brothers and cousin.

NOTES This article was published in 2020 by Helion in Sean Heuvel and John Rodgaard, eds., *From across the Sea: North Americans in Nelson's Navy,* © Helion and Company. It is used by permission. The author acknowledges with great appreciation the assistance of Henry L. P. Beckwith of North Kingstown, Rhode Island, and of Dr. Evan Wilson of Oxford and Yale Universities, as well as, since this article was written, the Naval War College.

1 There are others with the surname Brenton in the Royal Navy, but direct family connections with the North American branch of the family have not yet been fully researched and documented: John Brenton, appointed purser 21 October 1796; William Gagnon Brenton, purser 2 March 1810; Henry Brenton, purser 23 July 1827; Edward Brenton Stewart of Halifax, lieutenant 1814, married Frances Isabella Brenton 2 August 1830, commander 1844; Shovel Brenton Stokes, lieutenant 22 July 1830; Edward Pelham Brenton von Donop, captain 1855, retired 1870, rear admiral 1873. Reginald O. B. C. Brenton, born 1848, was a grandson of Vice Adm. Jahleel Brenton and the son of his daughter Harriet and Rev. Adolphus Carey (see Paul Dobrée-Carey, "Reginald Orme Brenton Carey 1848–1921," *Careyroots,* www.careyroots.com/hd2.html): lieutenant 1872, Royal Humane Society Medal second clasp 1875, commander 1885, superintendent for training Mexican navy 1891, died 21 April 1922, buried in Ometepec, Guerrero, Mexico. He is the namesake of a private secondary school, Colegio Almirante Reginald Carey Brenton.

2 Charles Benedict Davenport and Mary Theresa Scudder, *Naval Officers: Their Heredity and Development* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1919), p. 49.

3 Ibid., p. 29.

4 MSS 306: Papers of Jahleel Brenton (1655–1732) at the Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence, includes three folders for his nephew, Jahleel Brenton (1691–1767).

5 This early family history is based on Robert Charles Anderson, *The Great Immigration Begins: Immigrants to New England, 1620–1633,* Great Migration Study Project (Boston: New England Historic Genealogical Society, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 218–24. This work, based on primary sources, corrects such older works as John Williams Haley, *William Brenton of Hammersmith* (Providence, RI: Providence Institution for Savings, 1933), and Elizabeth C. Brenton, *A History of Brenton's Neck from 1638* (Newport, RI: John Sanborn, 1877).

6 Through Governor Brenton's daughter Sarah (born ca. 1670), who married Joseph Eliot, son of Rev. Joseph Eliot, there are two American naval officer descendants seven generations later: Rear Adm. Andrew Hull Foote (1806–63) and Commo. John Alfred Foote (1803–91). See Chester F. Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton, Governor of Rhode Island" (unpublished typescript, Spokane, WA, 29 May 1994), p. 59. Copies are located at the Redwood Library and the Newport Historical Society, Newport, Rhode Island.

7 "Jahleel is the third son of Zebulun, who is the tenth son of Jacob and sixth of Leah (Genesis 46:14). Jahleel is also one of the sixty-six who came to Goshen, and his brothers are Sered and Elon. The descendants of Jahleel formed their own sub-tribe: the יחלאלי, the Jahleelites (Numbers 26:26)." *Abarim Publications' Biblical Name Vault,* www.abarim-publications.com/Meaning/Jahleel.html. Also, "ja'-le-el (*yachle'el,* 'wait for God!')," *International Standard Bible Encyclopedia* (1915), available at www.biblestudytools.com/dictionary/jahleel/.

8 See, among other sources, Mary Sarah Bilder, *The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 58, 75–78. For his duties as customs collector, see references in *Calendar of Treasury Papers, 1697–1702* (London: Public Record Office, 1871), pp. 91, 326, 435; Douglas R. Burgess Jr., *The Politics of Piracy: Crime and Civil Disobedience in Colonial America* (Lebanon, NH: Univ. Press of New England, 2014), pp. 155, 179, 184; and some forty-five entries in the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies* (London: Public Record Office) between 1690 and 1719. For the year 1690, "Entry Book: October 1690, 11–20," in *Calendar of Treasury Books,* vol. 9, *1689–1692,* ed. William A. Shaw (London, 1931), pp. 847–55, available at *British History Online,* www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-treasury-books/vol9/pp847-855.

9 "Entry Book: April 1694, 16–20," in *Calendar of Treasury Books,* vol. 10, *1693–1696,* ed. William A. Shaw (London, 1935), pp. 582–97, CO 5/868, fols. 243–45v, The National Archives, Kew, U.K. [hereafter TNA]. Also *British History Online,* www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-treasury-books/vol10/pp582-597.

10 See, for example, J. Brenton to Council of Trade, 17 December 1700, in *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series,* vol. 18, *America and West Indies: 1700* (London, 1910), doc. 1018, pp. 748–50. *British History Online,* www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol18/pp744-759.

11 George Champlin Mason, *Annals of Trinity Church, Newport, Rhode Island, 1698–1821* (Newport, RI, 1890), pp. 34, 50, 61. And see John B. Hattendorf, *Semper Eadem: A History of Trinity Church in Newport, 1698–2000* (Newport, RI: Trinity Church, 2001), p. 73.

12 Walter K. Schroder, *The Artillery Company of Newport: A Pictorial History* (Berwyn Heights, MD: Heritage Books, 2014), pp. 1, 3, 98, 100. Jahleel Brenton's countinghouse from 1748 still survives in Newport, though in a different location. See "Brenton Counting House," *Newport Restoration Foundation,* www.newportrestoration.org/property/39-washington-street/. For the Jahleel Brenton townhouse in Newport, see John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Mary Gould Almy's Diary, 1778* (Pennsauken, NJ: Bookbaby for the Rhode Island Sons of the Revolution, 2018), pp. 17–23.

13 On Wallace, see Kenneth Breen, "Wallace, Sir James (1731–1803)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004) [hereafter *ODNB*], available at www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28536.

14 Some of the Principal Inhabitants of Newport to Capt. James Wallace, RN, 1 May 1775, in *Naval Documents of the American Revolution,* ed. William Bell Clark et al. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964–), vol. 1, pp. 255–56.

15 Capt. James Wallace, RN, to Vice Adm. Samuel Graves, 5 June 1775, in ibid., p. 615.

16 Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton," p. 25.

17 Proceedings of the General Assembly, 31 October 1775, in *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England,* ed. John Russell Bartlett (Providence, RI, 1856–65), vol. 8, pp. 376–77.

18 Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton," p. 25.

19 An Act Repealing an Act, Entitled "An Act for the More Effectually Securing to His Majesty, the Allegiance of His Subjects, in This His Colony . . . ," 4 May 1776, in Bartlett, *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island,* vol. 7, pp. 522–23. For the meaning of the act of 4 May 1776, see Patrick T. Conley, "July 19, the Real Rhode Island Independence Day," *Small State Big History,* 15 July 2016, smallstatebighistory.com/july-19-real-rhode-island-independence-day/.

20 The Present Disposition of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in Sea Pay, 2 June 1776, app. C in Clark et al., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution,* vol. 5, p. 1371. *London Gazette,* 18–20 June 1776, vol. 6, p. 421; and *London Gazette,* 9–11 July 1776, vol. 6, p. 469; photographic reproductions ADM 8/52, TNA. "Extract from a Letter from Chatham, 17 June," *Derby Mercury,* 21 June 1776, p. 1. The *Derby Mercury* reports the ship as having sixty guns, but ADM 8/52 gives forty-four.

21 R. Arthur Bowler, *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America: 1775–1783* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 1975), p. 77; Howard W. Preston, "Rhode Island and the Loyalists," pt. 2, *Rhode Island Historical Society Collections* 22, no. 1 (January 1929), p. 9; David Syrett, *Shipping and the American War 1775–83: A Study of the British Transport Organization* (London: Athlone, 1970), pp. 127–28. Also, I am grateful to Dr. D. K. Abbas, who shared with me her unpublished article "Newport's Brenton Estate and the Revolutionary War Royal Navy Hospital," unpaginated, footnotes 36–39, based on information from ADM 1/488, p. 429, TNA.

22 Disposition of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels, 5 January 1778, in Clark et al., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution,* vol. 11, p. 36.

23 See Rif Winfield, *British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1714–1792: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2007); and J. J. Colledge, *Ships of the Royal Navy: The Complete Record of All Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy from the 15th Century to the Present* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2010).

24 Now Enfield Town, in the London Borough of Enfield, about ten miles north-northeast of Charing Cross in central London.

25 Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton," p. 25.

26 An Act to Prevent Certain Persons Therein Named . . . Who Have . . . Joined the Enemy . . . from Being Admitted within This State, in Bartlett, *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island,* vol. 9, p. 139.

27 Henry Raikes, ed., *Memoir of the Life and Services of Vice-Admiral Sir Jahleel Brenton, Baronet, K.C.B.* (London: Hatchard & Son, 1846), p. 37.

28 Bartlett, *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island,* vol. 10, p. 12; Preston, "Rhode Island and the Loyalists."

29 *London Gazette,* 30 December 1800–3 January 1801, p. 1.

30 David Syrett and Richard DiNardo, comps., *The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660–1815,* Occasional Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 1 (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar for the Navy Records Society, 1994), p. 51.

31 Several sources on the life of Sir Jahleel Brenton are available in addition to the detailed volume by Rev. Henry Raikes cited above. These include "A Memoir," *Spectator,* 28 November 1846, pp. 17–18, available at tinyurl.com/ho317m7; "Obituary," *Gentleman's Magazine* 176 (July 1844), pp. 90–91, available at tinyurl.com/h3zfzuw; cataloging record of a portrait at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, available at collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/42076.html; baptismal record available at familysearch.org/ark:/61903/1:1:V2HJ-WQW; J. Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain: Consisting of Historical Memoirs of Those Officers of the British Navy Who Distinguished Themselves during the Reign of His Majesty George III* (London: Whitmore & Fenn, 1828), vol. 4, pp. 292–306; John Marshall, *Royal Naval Biography* (London: Longman, 1824), vol. 3, pp. 261–69; and William R. O'Byrne, *A Naval Biographical Dictionary: Comprising the Life and Services of Every Living Officer in Her Majesty's Navy, from the Rank of Admiral of the Fleet to That of Lieutenant, Inclusive* (London: J. Murray, 1849), s.v. "Brenton, John," note. This article has used all these sources but relied particularly on the most recent work: P. K. Crimmin, "Brenton, Sir Jahleel, First Baronet (1770–1844)," in *ODNB,* www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3326.

32 H. T. A. Bosanquet, "The Maritime School at Chelsea," *Mariner's Mirror* 7, no. 11 (1921), pp. 322–29.

33 Passing certificate for Jahleel Brenton, 3 March 1790, ADM 6/89/229, TNA.

34 For his commission, Hjalmar Börjeson, *Biografiska anteckningar om örlogsflottans officerare 1700–1799,* ed. Karl Wester (Stockholm: Generalstabens litografiska anstalt, 1942), p. 34.

35 Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* pp. 40–44.

36 Patrick Marioné, comp., *The Complete Navy List of the Napoleonic Wars, 1793–1815* (2003–2004), s.v. "Brenton, Sir Jahleel (2)," CD-ROM.

37 Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* p. 44.

38 Edward Pelham Brenton, *Life and Correspondence of John, Earl of St. Vincent, G.C.B., Admiral of the Fleet, &c. &c. &c.* (London: Henry Colburn, 1838), vol. 1, pp. 2–3.

39 For the damage, Edward Pelham Brenton, *The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Year MDCCLXXXIII to MDCCCXXII* (London: C. Rice, 1823–25), vol. 2, p. 140.

40 Edward Pelham Brenton, *The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Year MDCCLXXXIII. to MDCCCXXXVI.: A New and Greatly Improved Edition* (London: Henry Colburn, 1837) [hereafter Brenton, *Naval History* (1837)], vol. 2, p. 70. The last sentence appears in all capitals.

41 Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* pp. 90–96; Nelson to Evan Nepean, Palermo, 7 December 1799, in *The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, with Notes,* ed. Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas (London: Henry Colburn, 1845–46), vol. 4, pp. 130–31.

42 Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 2, pp. 489–90; vol. 3, pp. 37, 40–41.

43 *The British Squadron, Consisting of Five Two Deck'd Ships, & Two Frigates, Preparing to Pursue the Combined Squadron, of France, & Spain, on the Afternoon of the 12th of July, 1801,* by Hubert & Stadler (engraver), E. Harding (publisher), 1802, GB-N 1801 gf-1, Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown Univ., Providence, RI.

44 Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* p. 125; Richard Blake, *Religion in the British Navy, 1815–1879: Piety and Professionalism* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2014), pp. 113–14.

45 Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 3, pp. 209–12.

46 Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* p. 184.

47 Mark J. Gabrielson, "Enlightenment in the Darkness: The British Prisoner of War School of Navigation, Givet, France, 1805–1814," *Northern Mariner* 25, no. 1 (January 2015), pp. 7–41, available at www.cnrs-scrn.org/. The only known student work from this school is the William Carter navigation journal, MSC-364, File MSI 21, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI. The document is online at usnwcarchives.org/repositories/2/archival_objects/39992.

48 Richard Blake, *Evangelicals in the Royal Navy, 1775–1815: Blue Lights and Psalm-Singers* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2008), pp. 242–45.

49 Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 3, pp. 217–28; Blake, *Evangelicals in the Royal Navy,* pp. 184–85; Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* pp. 194–95.

50 Jahleel Brenton dispatch of 13 October 1809, in *London Gazette,* 2–5 December 1809, pp. 1929–30.

51 Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* p. 365; Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 3, pp. 339, 341–42, 355–56.

52 Jahleel Brenton dispatch of 3 May 1810, from Cerigo [Kythera], in *London Gazette,* 31 July–4 August 1810, pp. 1133–35.

53 Ralfe, *Naval Biography of Great Britain,* p. 306. Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 3, pp. 433–37. Marquis Circello, letter to Rear Admiral Martin, 10 May 1812, in Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* pp. 396–97, reports that Brenton was awarded "la croix de Commandeur de son Ordre." P. K. Crimmin in the *ODNB* and others interpret this as actually the Grand Cross of the Order.

54 The sword was sold at auction by Bonhams on 26 November 2008 for £84,000 in an antiques and armor sale; *Maine Antiques Digest,* January 2009, p. 4-D, also "A Fine and Rare Cased Lloyd's Patriotic Fund Sword and Belt of £100 Value to Jahleel Brenton Esq., Captain of H.M.S. *Spartan,*" *Bonhams,* www.bonhams.com/auctions/15843/lot/409/. Brenton also received a pair of flintlock dueling pistols, sold at auction in 2010 ("A Very Rare Pair of 30-Bore Flintlock Duelling Pistols Belonging to Jahleel Brenton," *Bonhams,* www.bonhams.com/auctions/17944/lot/381/).

55 Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* p. 419.

56 College of Arms, Grants XXVII, p. 112.

57 Frank R. Bradlow, "Five New Pictures by Sir Jahleel Brenton (1770–1844) with Special Reference to One of the *Arniston* Memorial," *Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Library* 24, no. 2 (June 1970), pp. 247–54.

58 *Edinburgh Gazette,* 30 April 1822, p. 1.

59 Ibid., 12 August 1831, p. 1

60 Sir Jahleel Brenton, *An Appeal to the British Nation, on Behalf of Her Sailors* (London: James Nisbet, 1838); Blake, *Religion in the British Navy,* p. 28.

61 Sir Jahleel Brenton, *The Hope of the Navy; or, The True Source of Discipline and Efficiency: As Set Forth in the Articles of War, Provided for the Government of the Fleet of Great Britain: An Address, etc.* (London, 1839); Blake, *Religion in the British Navy,* p. 70.

62 *Warder and Dublin Weekly Mail,* 28 September 1839, p. 3.

63 For admiral of the Red, *London Gazette,* 10 January 1837, p. 70. For the Blue, ibid., 3 July 1840, p. 1570.

64 "The Importance of Our Coast Fisheries," *Essex Standard,* 1 August 1843, p. 4; Jahleel Brenton, *Remarks on the Importance of Our Coast Fisheries, as the Means of Increasing the Amount of Food and Employment for the Labouring Classes, and of Maintaining a Nursery for Seamen* (London: James Nisbet, 1843).

65 Certified copy of Death Certificate of Sir Jahleel Brenton, Newport Historical Society. Obituary, *Hampshire Telegraph,* 29 April 1844, p. 4. Harriet Brenton [widow of Vice Adm. Sir Jahleel Brenton] and Sir Robert Peel, correspondence, 1844, 1845, Add MS 40543, fols. 292, 308; statement of services of Vice Adm. Sir Jahleel Brenton, 1st Baronet, 1844, Add MS 40543, fol. 296; both in Correspondence and Papers, Official and Private, of the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Peel, British Library, London.

66 L. C. L. Brenton, ed., *Memoir of Vice Admiral Sir Jahleel Brenton, Baronet, K.C.B.* (London: Longman, 1855).

67 Harriet M. Carey, *Evenings with Grandpapa; or, The Admiral on Shore: Naval Stories for Children* ([London]: [printed and published for the author by Dean & Son], 1860).

68 Quoted in Davenport and Scudder, *Naval Officers,* p. 49, from an as-yet-unidentified source.

69 Gareth Atkins, "Christian Heroes, Providence, and Patriotism in Wartime Britain, 1793–1815," *Historical Journal* 58, no. 2 (June 2015), pp. 412–13; L. C. L. Brenton, *The Greek Septuagint Version of the Old Testament, according to the Vatican Edition* (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons, 1851; repr. as *The Septuagint with Apocrypha: Greek and English,* Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1986).

70 Brenton, *Memoir of . . . Sir Jahleel Brenton,* p. lvii, quoted in Atkins, "Christian Heroes, Providence, and Patriotism in Wartime Britain," p. 412.

71 Biographical sketches of Edward Pelham Brenton appear in Marshall, *Royal Naval Biography,* vol. 9, p. 411; and O'Byrne, *Naval Biographical Dictionary,* vol. 1, p. 121 note.

72 John L. Sibley, *Biographical Sketches of Graduates of Harvard University, in Cambridge, Massachusetts,* vol. 2, *1659–1677* (Cambridge, MA, 1881), pp. 416–20. See also Carl Bridenbaugh, *Peter Harrison: First American Architect* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1949), pp. 7, 9, 16–17, 23. Harrison, a sea captain and self-taught architect, was John Bannister's son-in-law and part of the extended Pelham family.

73 "Rhode Island Births and Christenings," *FamilySearch,* familysearch.org/ark:61903/1:1:V2HJ-BPR. His baptismal certificate accompanying his passing certificate (cited below) gives the date of 20 April 1771 for his baptism at Trinity Church, Newport. The former is signed "Nathan Wheeler, Minister."

74 Jahleel Brenton, *Memoir of Captain Edward Pelham Brenton, R.N., C.B.: With Sketches of His Professional Life, and Exertions in the Cause of Humanity, as Connected with the "Children's Friend Society," &c.; Observations upon His "Naval History," and "Life of the Earl of St. Vincent"* (London: James Nisbet, 1842), p. 2.

75 Ibid., p. 3, continuing the quotation in great detail to page 6. Edward is referring to Tobias Smollett's popular novel *The Adventures of Roderick Random* (1748).

76 Edward Pelham Brenton's passing certificate, ADM 106/16/50, TNA.

77 For his account of the event see Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 1, pp. 222–23, and more fully in Brenton, *Naval History* (1837), vol. 1, p. 283.

78 Sir John Jervis, quoted in Brenton, *Life and Correspondence of . . . St. Vincent,* vol. 1, p. 3.

79 Brenton, *Memoir of . . . Edward Pelham Brenton,* pp. 11–13; J. K. Laughton, "Brenton, Edward Pelham (1774–1839)," rev. Andrew Lambert, in *ODNB,* www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3325; Brenton, *Life and Correspondence of . . . St. Vincent,* vol. 1, p. 4.

80 "Marriages," *Naval Chronicle* 9 (1803), p. 339; *FamilySearch,* familysearch.org/ark:/61903/1:1:V52H-C6Q. I am grateful to Dr. John Houlding for the following information from his database on eighteenth-century

British army officers: "Thomas Cox, Ens, 1st Ft Gds, 26.11.1753; Lt & Capt, 10.2.1758; Capt-Lt & Lt-Col, 5.2.1772; Capt & Lt-Col, 13.9.1772; Bvt Col, 19.2.79; 3rd Maj, 22.2.81; 2nd Maj, 18.3.1782; Maj-Gen, 20.11.1782; 1st Maj, 20.10.1784; died 12.3.1789." *London Magazine . . . ,* vol. 33, *For the Year 1764,* p. 599, lists under "Promotions Civil and Military" for 17 November 1764, "captains Cox and Blackwood [made] equerries" to the Duke of Gloucester.

81 Brenton, *Memoir of . . . Edward Pelham Brenton,* pp. 14–15.

82 Dispatch of F. A. Collier, 14 December 1808, in *London Gazette,* 31 January–4 February 1809, pp. 146–47.

83 Brenton, *Memoir of . . . Edward Pelham Brenton,* pp. 29–30.

84 Ibid., pp. 24–29.

85 Ibid., pp. 30–31.

86 Charles Philip Yorke to Jahleel Brenton, 21 August 1810, in ibid.

87 "Ships in Sea Pay," 1 July 1813, in *1813,* ed. William S. Dudley, vol. 2 of *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1985–2002), p. 170.

88 *London Gazette,* 19–22 September 1812, pp. 1907–1908.

89 Obituary, *Rhode-Island Republican,* 12 June 1839, p. 3; Laughton, "Brenton, Edward Pelham."

90 Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 5, p. 220.

91 Brenton, *Naval History* (1837), vol. 1, p. vii. For Burchett, see Josiah Burchett, *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea* (1720), facsimile edition with an introduction by John B. Hattendorf, Maritime History Series, John B. Hattendorf, series editor (Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints for the John Carter Brown Library, 1995). "Anson's *Voyage*" was a popular shorthand for Richard Walter and Benjamin Robins, eds., *A Voyage round the World in the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III, IV by George Anson, Esq; Commander in Chief of a Squadron of His Majesty's Ships, Sent upon an Expedition to the South-Seas* (London: John and Paul Knapton for the author, 1748).

92 Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 1, p. v.

93 Ibid., vol. 5, p. iii, where he states that it was the work of six years.

94 Dedication, ibid., vol. 1, p. iii.

95 Brenton, *Memoir of . . . Edward Pelham Brenton,* p. 222.

96 Sir George Cockburn to Edward Pelham Brenton [EPB], 6 October 1822, folder 2; Saumarez to EPB, 30 August 1821, folder 4; Exmouth to EPB, 5 August 1819, folder 5; Sir R. G. Keats to EPB, 25 February 1824, folder 8; Keith to EPB, 9 August 1819, folder 9; William, Duke of Clarence to EPB, 28 June 1821, folder 14; all E. P. Brenton Correspondence, OSB Mss. 35, box 1, Beinecke Library, Yale Univ., New Haven, CT.

97 Brenton, *Naval History* (1837), vol. 1, p. xi.

98 Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 3, p. viii.

99 Ibid., vol. 5, p. iv.

100 William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by France, in February 1793; To the Accession of George IV. in January 1820: With an Account of the Origin and Progressive Increase of the British Navy; Illustrated, from the Commencement of the Year 1793, by a Series of Tabular Abstracts, Contained in a Separate Quarto Volume,* 5 vols. (London: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1822–24). The 1837 edition appeared in six volumes.

101 Holden Furber, "How William James Came to Be a Naval Historian," *American Historical Review* 38, no. 1 (October 1932), pp. 74–85; Andrew Lambert, introduction to William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain* (London: Conway Maritime, 2002); James, *Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812: A Full and Correct Account of the Naval War between Great Britain and the United States of America, 1812–1815* (London: Conway Maritime, 2004).

102 Jahleel Brenton, *Memoir of . . . Edward Pelham Brenton,* pp. 222–324, offers a detailed, hundred-page defense of Edward's history.

103 James, *The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by France in 1793, to the Accession of George IV: A New Edition, with Additions and Notes, and an Account of the Burmese War and the Battle of Navarino* (London: Richard Bentley, 1837, 1847, 1859, 1860), (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1886), (London: Macmillan, 1902), (London: Conway Maritime, 2002). J. K. Laughton, "Marryat, Frederick (1792–1848)," rev. Andrew Lambert, in *ODNB,* www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/18097. Laughton, "Chamier, Frederick (1796–1870)," rev. Roger Morriss, in *ODNB,* www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5090.

104 Laughton, "Chamier, Frederick."

105 Laughton, "Brenton, Edward Pelham."

106 Brenton, *Memoir of . . . Edward Pelham Brenton,* pp. 323–24.

107 Ibid., p. 38.

108 Ibid., pp. 47–48, dates this to "1827, or thereabouts." A search of the newspapers shows that it was 1829. See, for example, "Horrible Cruelty to Parish Apprentices and Murder," *Bell's Life in London, and Sporting Chronicle,* 22 February 1829, p. 1.

109 Edward Pelham Brenton, *Statement of the Views and Reports of the Society for the Suppression of Juvenile Vagrancy: Upon the Plan That Has Proved So Successful in Holland, by Providing Agricultural and Horticultural Employment for the Destitute Children of the Metropolis* (n.p., 1830).

110 Quoted in Brenton, *Memoir of . . . Edward Pelham Brenton,* p. 51, from Edward P. Brenton, *The Bible and the Spade, or Captain Brenton's Account of the Children's Friend Society, etc.* (London: James Nisbet, 1837) or Brenton, *Continuation of "The Bible and the Spade"; or, The History of Fanny Forsher, a Moral Tale, etc.* (London: James Nisbet, 1837). In addition, Jahleel's memoir contains a very long (pp. 44–221) and detailed description of the society.

111 Edward Pelham Brenton, *A Letter to the Rt. Hon. R. W. Horton, Shewing the Impolicy, Inefficacy, and*

Ruinous Consequences of Emigration, and the Advantages of Home Colonies (London: C. Rice, 1830).

112 See, for example, Esther Inglis-Arkell, "The Dark and Twisted History of the Children's Friend Society," *Gizmodo,* 6 January 2015, io9.gizmodo.com/the-dark-and-twisted-history-of-the-childrens-friend-so-1677705809.

113 Brenton, *Naval History* (1837).

114 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. x–xi.

115 Ibid., pp. xvii–xxii.

116 Ibid., p. xvii.

117 Brenton, *Life and Correspondence of . . . St. Vincent*.

118 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 1–5; vol. 2, pp. 363–67, 374. Edward persistently refers to her only as his "eldest sister"; her identity as Frances Brenton is found in Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton," p. 26.

119 *Supplement to the London Gazette,* 20 July 1838, p. 1660.

120 Certified copy of Death Certificate of Edward Pelham Brenton, Newport Historical Society.

121 A photograph and description of the monument may be found at *The Second Website of Bob Speel,* www.speel.me.uk/chlondon/chm/marylebonenewch/marylebonebrenton.jpg.

122 "Rhode Island Births and Christenings, 1600–1914," *FamilySearch,* familysearch.org/. The records of Trinity Church at the Newport Historical Society do not list godparents, but this fact is confirmed in Brenton, *Life and Correspondence of . . . St. Vincent,* vol. 1, p. 3.

123 James Wallace Brenton's passing certificate, ADM 6/96/6, TNA.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.; Brenton, *Life and Correspondence of . . . St. Vincent,* vol. 1, p. 3.

126 Brenton, *Life and Correspondence of . . . St. Vincent,* vol. 1, p. 3 note; Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 3, pp. 5–6.

127 Raikes, *Memoir of . . . Jahleel Brenton,* pp. 94–95. A death notice appeared in "Marriages, Births, Deaths," *Scots Magazine; or, General Repository of Literature, History, and Politics,* January 1800, p. 71.

128 Nelson to Evan Nepean, Palermo, 7 December 1799.

129 For the grant, John Victor Duncanson, *Newport, Nova Scotia: A Rhode Island Township* (Belleville, ON: Mika, 1985), pp. 9–14, 20–22.

130 Stephen E. Patterson, "Gerrish, Joseph," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1966–), vol. 4, available at www.biographi.ca/en/bio/gerrish_joseph_4E.html; Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton," p. 22.

131 A receipt dated 29 December 1758 lists "a warrant for John Haliburton, surgeon's 1st mate of the *Thames*"; ADM 106/1120/145, TNA.

132 Phyllis R. Blakeley, "Halliburton, Sir Brenton," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography,* vol. 8, www.biographi.ca/en/bio/halliburton_brenton_8E.html; Allan Everett Marble, *Surgeons, Smallpox, and the Poor: A History of Medicine and Social Conditions in Nova Scotia, 1749–1799* (Montreal, QC, and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 131, 133, 140, 142, 155, 160, 177–78, 209–11. Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton," p. 29, lists an older son, John Halliburton, who died as a young man in the Royal Navy in 1791, but no archival evidence has yet been found to support this assertion.

133 Allan C. Dunlop, "Brenton, James," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography,* vol. 5, available at www.biographi.ca/en/bio/brenton_james_5E.html.

134 Brenton, *Naval History,* vol. 4, pp. 575–76.

135 Details of John Brenton's career in this paragraph were provided by Dr. Evan Wilson (by e-mail, 30 November 2015) from the database he compiled for his Oxford DPhil thesis and subsequent book *A Social History of British Naval Officers, 1775–1815* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2017). This may be the same John Brenton who was a naval agent in Portsmouth; see, for example, *London Gazette,* 20 February 1829, p. 327.

136 Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton," p. 29.

137 John Brenton's baptismal certificate (in ADM 107/34/547, TNA) states that he is the son of "William / Mary" Brenton, but all other references give his mother's name as Frances.

138 Kenneth Douglas-Morris, *The Naval General Service Medal Roll, 1793–1840* (Uckfield, U.K.: Naval and Military, n.d.), pp. 89, 248.

139 John Brenton's passing certificate, in ADM 107/34/547, TNA. Biographical sketches that include this information were also published in Marshall, *Royal Naval Biography,* vol. 3, pp. 419–21, and in O'Byrne, *Naval Biographical Dictionary,* p. 121.

140 The correct spelling of the surname in French was "d'Avout," but during his lifetime it was often spelled "Davous" or "Davoust."

141 O'Byrne, *Naval Biographical Dictionary,* p. 121; dispatch of Vice Adm. Sir James Saumarez to Admiralty, 17 October 1812, forwarding the dispatch of Captain Stewart to Rear Adm. Thomas Byam Martin, from Riga, of 5 October 1812, in "Foreign Intelligence," *European Magazine, and London Review* 62 (July–December 1812), p. 400; Brenton, *Naval History* (1837), vol. 2, pp. 429–30.

142 "Retired List," *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle,* 18 December 1852, p. 5; Joseph Allen, ed., *The New Navy List and General Record of the Services of Officers* (London: Parker, Furnivall & Parker, January 1852), p. 33; *London Gazette,* 24 December 1852, p. 3736; *The Navy List, Corrected to the 20th June, 1853* (London: John Murray, 1853), p. 12; *Edinburgh Gazette,* 21 May 1858, p. 1021.

143 Baptismal certificate with passing certificate, in ADM 107/32/7, TNA. However, Brenton, "Descendants of William Brenton," p. 30, indicates he was born on 16 April 1784.

144 William Brenton's passing certificates, in ADM 107/32/7, TNA. The promotion date is from Syrett and DiNardo, *Commissioned Sea Officers,* p. 51.

XXI *The Eighty-Gun Ship of the Line* Duc de Bourgogne

The Naval War College Museum in Newport, Rhode Island, recently commissioned the building of a model of the eighty-gun French ship of the line *Duc de Bourgogne,* flagship of the chevalier de Ternay and comte de Barras at Newport, Rhode Island, 1780–81. The museum commissioned the display-quality model with generous funding from the Naval War College Foundation provided by the Alletta Morris McBean Charitable Trust.

The model is now on permanent display in the museum and will soon take its place as part of the museum's display about French forces in Newport in 1780–81. *Duc de Bourgogne* is important for its role in supporting the cause of American independence and complements other materials on display, including an original printing of Georges-Louis Le Rouge's chart of Narragansett Bay that was made in 1778 in Paris using British sources for use by the comte d'Estaing's squadron.

The model, scale one-eighth inch to one foot, was completed in 2012 by model builder Richard S. Glanville at the American Marine Model Gallery in Gloucester, Massachusetts. The model builder used the original eighteenth-century plans of the vessel from the Royal Archives of Denmark. The detail of the rigging, weather deck, and ornamental decorations, as well as the materials used in the construction (the hull is actually covered in miniature copper sheathing plates), are all examples of the standard of excellence set forth by the *Ship Model Classification Guidelines*. The guidelines were written in 1980 by R. Michael Wall, the director of the American Marine Model Gallery. Wall consulted with the staff at Mystic Seaport Museum (in Mystic, Connecticut), the Smithsonian Institution, and the Mariners' Museum (in Newport News, Virginia) to encourage excellence and quality craftsmanship in gallery-model building.

Duc de Bourgogne was the flagship of the squadron under the chevalier de Ternay that brought the comte de Rochambeau and his troops to America to fight for American independence in July 1780. It was based in Newport, Rhode Island, for more than a year, from her first arrival on 11 July 1780 until her departure for Chesapeake Bay on 23 August 1781, to support the Yorktown campaign. During that period, the chevalier de Ternay died; his grave is still an honored space at Trinity Church in Newport. The monument that Louis XVI sent to be placed over his grave is today carefully preserved with honor inside the church.

On 29 August 1780, while the ship was anchored off Rose Island in Newport Harbor, a delegation of eighteen Native Americans from upstate New York came on board to pay their respects to the French naval commanders. On 6 March 1781, Gen. George Washington boarded the ship to meet with the comte de Rochambeau and all the senior French military and naval commanders present as part of a week-long visit to Newport to plan future joint operations. The event marked one of the two occasions on which General Washington is known to have visited an active warship. The only other known occasion is when Washington came on board *Ville de Paris* in Chesapeake Bay in September 1781.

Laid down in 1751 and launched in 1752, *Duc de Bourgogne* first served during the Seven Years' War. Refitted in 1761 and coppered in 1779, it took part in the battle of the Saintes between 9 and 12 April 1782, when a British fleet under Adm. Sir George Rodney prevented a Franco-Spanish invasion of Jamaica. During that battle, *Duc de Bourgogne* collided with the similarly named seventy-four *La Bourgogne*. In 1792, during the French Revolution, it was renamed *Peuple,* then *Caton* in 1794, before being destroyed in 1800.

NOTES This essay originally appeared as "American Naval War College Museum Has Ship Model Constructed of *Duc de Bourgogne,* 80 Guns, Flagship of the Chevalier de Ternay and Comte de Barras at Newport, Rhode Island, 1780–1781," in *Nautical Research Journal* 58, no. 2 (Summer 2013), © 2013 Nautical Research Guild. It is used by permission. A French version appeared under the title "Modèle du *Duc de Bourgogne* vaisseau de 80 canons réalisé à la demande de l'American Naval War College Museum de Newport (U.S.A.)," *Neptunia: Revue des Amis du Musée national de la Marine,* no. 270 (June 2013), pp. 44–45.

XXII *A New Model of the Steam Frigate USS* Minnesota

ca. 1877–1881

On the last day of December 1877, Capt. Stephen B. Luce, USN, took command of the steam frigate USS *Minnesota,* then designated a training ship for apprentice seamen. Remaining in command until 15 February 1881, Luce developed further there his nascent ideas on enlisted training. He had long been interested in improving the education and training of officers and seamen both in the merchant marine and in the Navy. He soon became the Navy's greatest advocate for this cause.[1]

While in command of warships during the Civil War, Luce had noted the poor quality of enlisted training and at the same time observed that European navies had much better approaches. In October 1863, after commanding the Naval Academy's midshipmen practice ship on a cruise to Europe, Luce published his first article in the *Army and Navy Journal*.[2] It was the first in a series of five articles on "Training Ships." In 1866, he issued a circular letter to leading citizens advocating the establishment of nautical colleges. Seven years later, in November 1873, he delivered a lecture to the newly established U.S. Naval Institute on "The Manning of the Navy and Mercantile Marine," which appeared as the lead article in the very first issue of the institute's *Proceedings*. At this point, the Navy assigned him to consult with the New York City Board of Education about establishing such a nautical school, which eventually evolved into today's State University of New York Maritime College at Fort Schuyler. Luce advised on the drafting of the congressional bill that became the law that authorized the Navy to loan vessels to a state as school ships and to assign officers as instructors. This authorization led to the loan in 1875 of the 1844 sloop of war *St. Mary's* to New York's nautical school, where she served until 1908.[3] On taking command of the steam frigate *Minnesota* in 1877, Luce was finally in a position to implement directly his practical plans for enlisted training in the U.S. Navy.

When Luce took command, the ship had had a varied career. Built in the Washington Navy Yard and launched in 1855, she was named after the Minnesota River as one of the *Colorado* class of steam frigates, of which *Wabash* was the lead unit, followed by *Roanoke* and *Merrimack*. Her first cruise was to the East Indies station,



This model of USS Minnesota *was custom built for the Naval War College Museum. It depicts the vessel during its period of service as an apprentice ship.*

during which she carried the American minister to China, William B. Reed, who was involved in negotiating a new multilateral treaty of commerce with China at the end of the first phase of the Second Opium War. On returning from the cruise, she was decommissioned for two years, but with the outbreak of the Civil War she was returned to service as the flagship of Louis M. Goldsborough, commander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. *Minnesota* is most famous for her role at the battle of Hampton Roads, where she witnessed the first clash between two

ironclad warships, USS *Monitor* and CSS *Virginia* (ex–USS *Merrimack*). In March 1862, while attempting to engage *Virginia* and two other Confederate ships at Hampton Roads, *Minnesota* ran aground and so found herself in the middle of the ensuing battle between the ironclads. In December 1864 and January 1865, *Minnesota* took part in the two battles of Fort Fisher; during the latter she sent ashore a 240-man landing party that assaulted and took the fort.

Decommissioned at the end of the war, she was activated briefly in 1867 for a midshipman cruise to Europe. She was placed in ordinary again in 1868 at the New York Navy Yard and so remained until tension between the United States and Spain in 1873 produced fresh interest in a formal naval training program. She was reconfigured to serve as an apprentice training ship and brought back into service in June 1875. She was sent to Newport, Rhode Island, transformed into a gunnery and sail training ship, and designated a "naval apprentice ship." The new naval apprentice program was designed for young men ages fifteen through eighteen. Apprentices spent a year studying seamanship, gunnery, navigation, reading, writing, and arithmetic. The program was designed to develop a disciplined body of enlisted personnel that would complement an equally well-trained and educated officer corps. She was placed under the command of Luce, now a rear admiral, from 1877 to 1881.

Just as the ship was taking up its new role, Luce anonymously published a textbook for use on board, *The Young Seaman's Manual*.[4] By 1889, the naval apprentice training system had grown into a training squadron formed around the USS *Minnesota*.

NOTES This article originally appeared in the *Nautical Research Journal* 60, no. 4 (Winter 2015), © 2015 Nautical Research Guild. It is used by permission.

1 John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, eds., *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1975), pp. 242–43.

2 S. B. Luce, "On Training Ships, no. 1," *Army and Navy Journal* 1, no. 9 (24 October 1863), p. 132, in ibid., pp. 166–67, items 5–9. The following four articles in the series appeared between October and December 1863.

3 Hayes and Hattendorf, *Writings of Stephen B. Luce,* pp. 240–41.

4 *The Young Seaman's Manual. Compiled from Various Authorities. And Illustrated with Numerous Original and Select Designs. For the Use of the U.S. Training Ships and Marine Schools* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1875), in ibid., p. 176, item 29.

XXIII *Here's for a Coriolis Effect in Maritime History*

The launching of a new scholarly journal for the broad field of maritime history is an event that should be warmly welcomed and strongly encouraged by all who work in the varied disciplines of the maritime humanities. The subject of maritime history is a wide theme in global history that cuts across the standard boundaries of academic disciplines. In many respects, it is a new and developing interdisciplinary field of scholarly research and writing, although it has deep roots in much older scholarship in specific and highly focused parts of the field, such as national naval histories, the history of nautical science, and the history of maritime exploration. At the same time, the study of some other areas—such as fishing history, aspects of maritime social and labor issues, art and literary history—is relatively recent, and even these have tended to be separate and national in outlook.

Maritime history is the field of historical study that encompasses mankind's relationships to the seas and oceans of the world. It is a multidimensional, humanistic study of human activities, experiences, interactions, and reactions to the vast expanses of water that cover more than 70 percent of the globe. A student who pursues the maritime theme may approach it from a variety of vantage points, including science, technology, industry, economics, trade, politics, art, literature, sociology and social issues, religion, military and naval affairs, international relations, cartography, comparative studies in imperial and colonial affairs, institutional and organizational development, communications, migration, intercultural relations, natural resources and environmental issues, archaeology, sports, and recreation. Under the overarching label of "maritime history," each subspecialty has a tie to a specific range of academic approaches.

The maritime economic historian has a fundamental connection to the academic fields of economic and business history; the naval historian has such a connection to the diplomatic, military, and international history fields; the historian of navigation, to the history of science and technology; the student of maritime art or literature, to the wider fields of art history and literature; the historian of exploration, to the history of imperial expansion and global cultural interaction. These

connections to particular academic disciplines and specialized academic fields of interest help define those particular subspecialties, but they are all interconnected through their shared maritime element. It is this common maritime element, with its cross connections and relationships across subspecialties, that reveals maritime history as an important extension of the broad aspects of national and international events ashore and contributes to the understanding of a shared global history.

One would hope that the explicit focus of *Coriolis: The Interdisciplinary Journal of Maritime Studies* on the historical flow of maritime affairs around the globe can create its own Coriolis effect for future historical studies—that is, it will help broaden the scholarly perspective on maritime affairs beyond the singular nationalistic outlook that has been traditional. Such an effect can link readers to maritime histories that have not yet become well known in the Anglo-American world, promote broader perspectives with innovative and comparative approaches, and contribute to global understanding of mankind's relationships with the seas and oceans that occupy the majority of our planet.

NOTES This article first appeared in *Coriolis: The Interdisciplinary Journal of Maritime Studies* 1, no. 1 (April 2010) and is reprinted by courtesy of the editor.

XXIV *The Naval War College and Fleet Admiral Nimitz's "Graybook"*

Among the vast number of documents to be found in the seventy-one feet of the Papers of Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz in the Archives Branch at the Naval History and Heritage Command in Washington, DC, are seven large bound books dated for the period between 7 December 1941 and 31 August 1945. An eighth book contains selected dispatches relating to the battle of Midway.[1] The books were originally bound in gray binders that gave the document the nickname that Nimitz's staff used: the "Graybook."[2] More formally, it was labeled on the cover as "Command Summary." A look inside reveals that this document is far more important than that. It is the record of the combat situation that the Commander in Chief, Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas faced each day of the war; it tells us what Nimitz knew and what the bases and reasons for his daily command decisions were. As one historian has written, "It is the most authoritative source on the Pacific war available anywhere."[3]

NIMITZ AND THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

This document has several important connections with the Naval War College. First, Nimitz had long-standing ties to the College. He was one of the very few officers who gave their first lectures to the Naval War College as lieutenants, in his case in 1912.[4] As executive officer of the battleship *South Carolina* (BB 26) in 1918, he took a Naval War College correspondence course. In autumn 1922 he joined the eleven-month resident course at Newport, during Adm. William S. Sims's final months as the Naval War College's president. With him in the class of 1923 under that great naval commander were others who like him would later become prominent: future Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark and future flag officers Thomas C. Hart, Ralph Earle, and Frederick J. Horne. The faculty included the future interwar Battle Fleet commander Harris Laning and World War I mine force commander Reginald R. Belknap.

In Newport, as a commander, Nimitz studied war planning and strategy and used war gaming as a tool in his education. During a lecture in Newport in 1960, Nimitz summarized the role of the College and its war gaming in his education

and preparation for high command by recalling that "the war with Japan had been reenacted in the game rooms here [at the Naval War College] . . . in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war, we had not visualized those."[5] At the same time, he and his fellow students were required to work out logistic support plans for an advance across the Pacific. Nimitz recalled finding the logistics part of the College curriculum an academic nightmare, but in retrospect "it forced us to look into the Pacific and study the geography of the Pacific. All through World War II in the Pacific, I didn't even have to look at a map of the Pacific to know where all of those little atolls and tiny pinpoints were."[6] Nimitz clearly understood the value of a Naval War College education and used his own during World War II.

As a rear admiral and chief of the Bureau of Navigation from 1939 to 1941, he found that the war plans called for closing the Naval War College, as had been done during the Spanish-American War and World War I. In March 1941, Nimitz formally changed that policy to allow the College to carry out its educational role during wartime and prepared for an expanded role in the postwar period.[7]

THE GRAYBOOK AND NAVAL WAR COLLEGE EDUCATION

Admiral Nimitz's personal connections to the Naval War College as an alumnus and key supporter are the essential background of the story of the Graybook. As a commander in chief, Nimitz certainly manifested his Naval War College education, which he shared with most of his flag-officer colleagues and their staffs during World War II. When the United States entered the war in 1941 every flag officer in the U.S. Navy but one was a graduate of the Naval War College.[8] By extension, the Graybook clearly reflects what the College had been doing in the interwar years to prepare officers for staff duties and to think critically when making operational decisions in positions of high command.

From 1910 through 1942, the Naval War College had been developing and refining a specific process for naval operational planning. This approach culminated with a 1942 College publication that students called "The Green Hornet"—formally, in its ultimate form, *Sound Military Decision*.[9] This volume captured the essence, was the crowning expression, of the Naval War College educational philosophy and approach in the interwar period, particularly as the text was refined under the guidance of Adm. Edward C. Kalbfus after 1934.[10] It was the only approach to planning in which American naval officers were trained, and its influence can be seen in American naval operations throughout World War II. The Nimitz Graybook, however, is one of the very few official records that actually document the daily use, sustained throughout the war, of this planning system—in particular of its final stage, its highest level, what the Naval War College called its "fourth step."

> [The fourth step] calls for mental effort in the solution of the problem of supervising the action, [and] requires a constant, close observation of the unfolding of the original situation. The procedure employed is customarily termed *The Running Estimate of the Situation*. Only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation is unfolding along the lines desired by him, as promulgated in the directives of the third step. In effect, the commander, after action is begun, considers the changing situation as a variable in the problem presented for his solution by the original (basic) situation. With the march of events, he is, therefore, constantly critical to detect whether variations . . . have introduced new incentives which demand modification or alteration of his plan, or its complete abandonment.[11]

In a chapter-long discussion, *Sound Military Decision* defines the running estimate as "intended to keep pace with the flow of events, so that the commander may be assured, at any time, that his concurrent action will be based on sound decision. To this end, there is a definite technique."[12] The aim of the technique is "the rapid and successful exercise of mental effort in the fast-moving events of the tactical engagement. It is under such conditions, more especially, that effective supervision of the planned action becomes a problem calling for every facility that can be afforded the commander."[13]

The technique was in fact to assemble in writing all the information bearing on the operational situation and organize it in a readily usable fashion. Among the various options *Sound Military Decision* recommended a journal of events, backed up by a file, which would aid the commander's continuing decision making. The publication offered a worksheet to assist the staff in organizing the journal, but the sheets were to be destroyed, as the journal formed the permanent record.

THE GRAYBOOK AND THE CINCPAC-CINCPOA STAFF

Prior to World War II, naval staffs were to some degree uniform in organization and composition, taking into account Navy Regulations, personnel allowances, the particular requirements of a command and its commander, and evolving naval practice. Still, each major naval staff had its differences from others. During the war, the problem of how to best organize a staff was an assigned topic for Naval War College student theses and the subject of many articles in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. The war created many changes to Navy staff organization, but standardization gradually became apparent—in, for instance, separation of administrative from operational staffs and the moving ashore of large operational staffs. The experience of World War II also gradually led the Navy to adopt some of the standard features of the Army's General Staff system.[14]

The staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC-CINCPOA)—that is, Nimitz—at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, also went through a number of changes. In September 1943, for example, there were three separate but interrelated staffs: Fleet, Army, and Joint, each with five sections. In May 1944 the Fleet and Army staffs disappeared and merged into one joint staff.[15]

The first three weeks of the Graybook predate Nimitz's arrival and serve to document the running estimate of the situation made by his predecessors, Adm.

Husband Kimmel (from 7 to 17 December) and Vice Adm. William S. Pye (acting commander in chief from 17 December to the 31st, when Nimitz took command). The records end in late August 1945 with the surrender of Japanese forces. The overall document remained classified until 1972.

The Graybook appears to have been maintained by the Naval Staff's plans division (designated N-1, later J-1). Even when the CINCPAC-CINCPOA staff became joint, the J-1 section was headed by a naval officer.[16] The officers in charge of the planning section were Capt. Charles H. McMorris, until March 1942; Capt. Lynde D. McCormick (the future first Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and later a Naval War College president), from March 1942 to 14 January 1943; Capt. James M. Steele, from January 1943 to January 1944; and Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman (later a Chief of Naval Operations), the deputy chief of staff from 9 January 1944 until the end of the war. McMorris and McCormick had been classmates in the senior class at the Naval War College in 1938. Steele had graduated in 1939 but stayed on as a faculty member in the College's Intelligence Department until June 1941. Sherman had been a student at the Naval War College in 1927 (when Raymond Spruance was also).

The Graybook shows some evolution owing to changes of staff members, but the basic organization is constant throughout. For every day of the war there is a running summary of events, originally classified top secret. This is followed by supporting documents, among which are occasional "briefed estimates of the situation" that list alternative courses of action, with advantages and disadvantages, as well as operation plans.

Some of the pages are color coded. At first all are white, interspersed occasionally with green sheets, classified secret, with directives and operational messages. From May 1942 one finds pink pages with information at very high classification to and from Adm. Ernest J. King in Washington and sometimes Allied commanders. In January 1945 yellow pages begin to appear, marked "Nimitz Only."

THE STORY OF THE GRAYBOOK'S DIGITIZATION

A number of historians have used the Graybook in their research. E. B. Potter lists it among his sources for his 1976 biography of Nimitz.[17] John Lundstrom used it extensively for his study of Vice Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher, Craig Symonds for his work on Midway.[18]

Professor Douglas V. Smith, former head of the Strategy and Policy section of the Naval War College's College of Distance Education, became aware of the Graybook during his graduate work at Florida State University and while teaching a Naval War College elective course on World War II. Recognizing its value for research and teaching, Smith discussed the prospect of funding for digitization with Rear Adm. Roger Nolan, then the executive director of the Naval War College Foundation. The foundation took up the suggestion and looked for possible sources. In

2008, Smith—now Historian-General of the Naval Order of the United States and then the commander of its Newport Commandery—interested the Naval Order in the project as part of its mission to promote naval heritage. The order donated five thousand dollars to the foundation, to which forty-six members of the foundation added enough to make a total of $10,535.

In the spring of 2009, the Naval War College Foundation worked with the Naval Historical Foundation in Washington, DC, to scan the Graybook. The first estimates indicated that it would be too expensive to digitize the original copies, as the books would have to be unbound at great cost. Soon, a more cost-effective method was found in scanning the loose carbon copies rather than the original bound ones. This work was completed in 2009 at reasonable cost. The scans were distributed widely on a CD and posted on the website of the American Naval Records Society, www.navalrecords.org/.

Usage exposed serious drawbacks with the scan. First, the carbon copies scanned did not themselves reproduce the color coding of the original manuscript; and, second, many copies were too blurry for searchable text. A high-resolution digital facsimile was needed to capture all the markings on each page, the different colors of paper, and handwritten marginalia. A copy with maximum research value would need to support browsing and full text and key-word searching. Making the Graybook searchable was especially challenging because many of the pages contain tabular and otherwise heavily formatted text.

Fortunately, the Naval War College Foundation, by then headed by Capt. John Odegaard, USN (Ret.), had some ten thousand dollars still available for the purpose. The director of the Naval War College Library, Dr. Allen Benson, hired a Providence, Rhode Island, firm, the Digital Ark Corporation, to create a high-resolution archival master file that would render all the manuscript's fine detail consistently and accurately and with no distortions. Under the direction of the Library's Naval Historical Collection archivist, Dr. Evelyn Cherpak, and the Digital Initiatives Librarian, Sue Cornacchia, a team headed by Mrs. Joyce Conyers at the Naval History and Heritage Command in Washington shipped the eight original volumes to the Digital Ark. There the documents were carefully unbound and scanned by hand, one page at a time, in an environmentally controlled room. The effort transformed the nearly inaccessible and fragile Graybook into a digitally preserved naval cultural document available to researchers worldwide.

Rear Adm. Ted Carter Jr., then President of the Naval War College, noted the following: "The Nimitz 'Graybook' has been hidden from the general public for nearly seven decades, first because of its formal military security classification (until 1972), and then due to its restricted availability to only those serious researchers who could travel to Washington, DC, to visit the Naval History and Heritage Command at the Washington Navy Yard. To greatly improve this situation, on February

24, 2014, a dedicated team at the Naval War College opened the door on this historical treasure to historians and naval enthusiasts around the globe through the release of the 'Digital Graybook.' . . . This project is in keeping with the Naval War College's long-term commitment to preserving and sharing the full-range of historical resources to the widest possible audience." It can now be accessed online through the College's website, at www.usnwcarchives.org/repositories/2/digital_objects/22.

NOTES This notice originally appeared in the *Newsletter of the Naval Order of the United States* 24, no. 7 (Summer 2014), pp. 12–15. It is republished by courtesy of the editor.

1 Papers of Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, series 1, subseries A, Collection 505, Archives Branch, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC. Boxes 1–8 contain the originals; boxes 9–18 contain copies.

2 Instances of the use of this term and its spelling can be found in book 6, pp. 2486 and 3171, and on the cover sheets for volumes 6 and 7.

3 Douglas V. Smith, "Chester Nimitz," in *Oxford Bibliographies Online: Military History,* www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199791279/obo-9780199791279-0030.xml.

4 Chester W. Nimitz [Lt., USN], "Defensive and Offensive Tactics of Submarines," June 1912, box 2, folder 24, Record Group [hereafter RG] 15, Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI. Published as "Military Value and Tactics of Modern Submarines," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings,* no. 144 (December 1912), pp. 1193ff.

5 Chester W. Nimitz [Fleet Adm., USN], Address to the Naval War College, 10 October 1960, p. 11, box 31, file 27, RG 15, Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI.

6 Ibid., p. 3.

7 Ibid., p. 5; John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), pp. 167–68.

8 See Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars,* p. 161.

9 U.S. Naval War College, *Sound Military Decision,* ed. Frank M. Snyder [Capt., USN (Ret.)], Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992).

10 Ibid., pp. ix–xxxv; Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars,* pp. 155–61; Thomas B. Buell, "Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and the Naval Planner's 'Holy Scripture': *Sound Military Decision,*" *Naval War College Review* 25, no. 5 (May–June 1973), pp. 31–41.

11 U.S. Naval War College, *Sound Military Decision,* p. 107.

12 Ibid., p. 204.

13 Ibid., p. 205.

14 (ANSCOL) D. J. Evans, "Organization and Functioning of Naval Staffs," pp. 1–2, RG 14: Faculty and Staff Presentations, Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI.

15 Ibid., pp. 19–21.

16 S. E. Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II,* vol. 6, *Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942–1 May 1944* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), pp. 10–11.

17 E. B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 475.

18 John Lundstrom, *Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Craig L. Symonds, *The Battle of Midway* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), p. 431.

XXV *The Decision to Close Rhode Island Bases in 1973*

On 17 April 1973 Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson made an announcement that shocked Rhode Islanders. Quonset Point Naval Air Station and Newport Naval Station would close by the end of the year. There had been no warning. Only the day before, the Pentagon had ordered Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner, President of the Naval War College in Newport, to brief Governor Philip Noel on the decision. Rhode Islanders reacted strongly to the news, but few could understand clearly the rationale for such a decision. Even today, thirty-seven years [as of the 2010 publication] after the decision, most people remember the reason as having been a political one. As Senator Claiborne Pell explained in 1973: "The answer? Last year was election year."[1]

On 7 November 1972, Richard Nixon had won an overwhelming victory in his campaign for reelection against Democrat George McGovern. Many Rhode Islanders assumed that Massachusetts and Rhode Island had voted for the same candidate in 1972 as they have done in nearly all presidential elections. As a result, a popular myth developed that Massachusetts's and Rhode Island's votes produced a case of political retribution. In fact, Rhode Island had narrowly voted for Nixon over his Democratic opponent George McGovern. Nevertheless, the narrow margin showed that Rhode Island had a notably higher percentage of Democratic voters than the rest of the country. In addition, the decision to close the bases was in jarring contrast to the situation, only a year earlier, when Rhode Island's John Chafee had been Secretary of the Navy. Rhode Island's naval community had prospered under his stewardship. Having assumed office on 31 January 1969, Chafee had led Congress to authorize nearly thirty-six million dollars for construction and improvements in Rhode Island during the fiscal years 1970 to 1973.[2] When Chafee resigned in May 1972 to pursue his unsuccessful bid to unseat Pell in the Senate, Chafee passed his office to his Under Secretary, John Warner of Virginia. Now, Virginia would reap the benefit of a new base alignment at Rhode Island's expense, an expansion of facilities at Norfolk. Rhode Islanders had every reason to feel they had been ill-treated. The *Newport Daily News* reported requests for federal disaster

aid, as the Navy's move threatened the state with the loss of eighteen thousand civilian and military employees and a billion dollars of income for the local economy.[3]

In terms of national defense, however, the situation looked very different. Key participants firmly denied that the decision was political; on the contrary, it was based on national security priorities in a time of fiscal constraint.[4] It was not vindictive party politics forced on the Navy but the Navy's own decision.

Secretary of Defense Richardson outlined the broad situation in his initial announcement. It was not merely an issue for Rhode Island but 274 separate actions affecting Defense Department installations and activities in thirty-two states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. These actions, Richardson projected, would bring a savings of $3.5 billion over the following ten years and allow the Defense Department to meet its fiscal year 1974 budget by eliminating 42,800 civilian and military positions.[5] As the Vietnam War drew to a close, the United States had no need for a huge armed force.

The Navy had already been reducing its forces. In the ten fiscal years from 1964 to 1974, the Navy declined from 917 active ships with 5,014 aircraft in 1964 to 523 ships with 3,956 aircraft in 1974. In the same period, the Navy reduced the number of aircraft carriers from twenty-four to fifteen. Despite this cutback of 20 to 45 percent in the operating forces, the Navy's shore establishment remained substantially the same. Up to 1973, the Navy had the same number of home ports for ships, air stations, and air rework facilities as it did in 1964. Only one naval shipyard closed in this ten-year period, leaving the remainder to operate far below their industrial capacities.

In 1970, the Navy began to study ways to meet its requirements in an era when aircraft carriers had clearly become the most important ships in the surface fleet. Using a new concept of dual function, the Navy had decided to use the large aircraft carriers for two roles: attack and antisubmarine warfare. Thus, the smaller antisubmarine aircraft carriers were to be phased out. After two years of examining the available options, the Navy decided that in evaluating ports the principal factor to consider was whether they could readily support the largest new aircraft carriers. Second, the Navy determined that for this purpose it should maintain at least two home ports on each coast, to ensure support in wartime. In examining the existing bases, the most expendable were those unable to support large, modern carriers. At the same time, air stations were expendable if they lacked unique advantages and could not provide a full range of facilities for all types of aircraft.

Before making the final decision, the Navy Staff in the Pentagon made a detailed analysis of all shore stations, looking carefully at all their facilities, costs, advantages, and disadvantages. Of the naval facilities in Rhode Island, the Navy saw that "Newport cannot handle modern carriers nor can the adjoining Naval Air Station

at Quonset Point handle the high-performance jet aircraft that go with modern carriers."[6]

Newport Naval Station

In examining the situation of the facilities on the east side of Narragansett Bay at Newport, the Navy decided to disestablish only the waterfront activities, retaining the Naval War College and other educational and training facilities. This involved disestablishing, relocating, or reducing twenty-one activities at Newport and relocating all ships to other home ports. Thirty-four ships went to Norfolk; five to Charleston, South Carolina; three to Yorktown and Cheatham, Virginia; one to Earle, New Jersey; at least one to Mayport, Florida; and six to bases overseas.

Newport: Disadvantages to Closing

The Navy Staff saw several disadvantages to making this move. No surface warships would be homeported in the northeastern part of the United States. The Navy needed to spend seven million dollars at Charleston, Norfolk, and Earle to upgrade those facilities to handle the increase. It relocated eighty-seven civilians, 13,590 officers and men, and 6,560 families, while reducing the civilian employment in the area by 871. As in any shift of facilities, there are short-term costs to pay before obtaining any long-term savings. In this case, the staff estimated, the short-term cost of closing the Newport Naval Station would add $7.9 million to the 1974 budget.

Newport: Advantages to Closing

From the Navy's point of view, closing Newport as a fleet base could also bring significant advantages. It would allow the Navy to use excess capacity at Norfolk and Charleston. It would concentrate the fleet in warmer climates, away from the main airline traffic routes near Boston and New York, for more productive year-round training. It would allow for the closure of the Boston Naval Shipyard, the primary support yard for the Rhode Island–based ships. It would eliminate 867 military billets and 784 civilian billets, while providing an annual reduction in costs of $15.9 million. The additional short-term costs of the reduction could be amortized within two years.[7]

Quonset Point and Davisville

Similarly, the Navy Staff made a study of the situation on the west side of Narragansett Bay. Here, they decided to disestablish the naval air station, the naval air rework facility, the naval hospital, and the construction battalion center. In addition, they would disestablish, relocate, or reduce twenty-three other activities. This involved relocating the Antarctic ground support activity to Norfolk; thirteen aircraft squadrons, including seven antisubmarine aircraft squadrons, to Jacksonville, Florida; five helicopter squadrons to Patuxent River, Maryland; and the Antarctic support aircraft to Point Mugu, California. Two mobile construction battalions would go to Port Hueneme, California, and one to Gulfport, Mississippi.

Quonset/Davisville: Disadvantages to Closing

From the Navy's point of view, there were some serious disadvantages here. It would separate the helicopter and fixed-wing antisubmarine aircraft squadrons. It would separate the air and ground support for Antarctic operations. It would temporarily degrade the maintenance capability for antisubmarine aircraft and aircraft engines while the workload was being redistributed to other facilities. Additionally, a move from Rhode Island would increase the distance that aircraft needed to fly to the East Coast operational training areas. The move would require relocating 5,790 officers and men, 2,278 naval families, and 1,702 civilian employees. The local area would lose jobs for 3,950 people. The relocation and closing costs would raise expenses by $33.8 million for the current fiscal year.

Quonset/Davisville: Advantages in Closing

The Navy saw advantages that outweighed the serious disadvantages. A move from Quonset utilized the excess capacity at the Jacksonville, Patuxent River, and Point Mugu naval air stations. The Seabee battalions at Quonset could use the excess that also existed at Port Hueneme and Gulfport. The move would eliminate the jet-noise problem facing Rhode Island with the introduction of the new S-3 antisubmarine patrol aircraft. The activities at Quonset Point and Davisville could move to new locations without any further construction of facilities. At the same time, the move would reduce the federal payroll by 1,265 military and 2,248 civilian billets. The change would reduce annual costs by $37.1 million and the added cost of the move could be amortized within two years.[8]

A key factor in the decision was the link between the naval facilities in Boston and those they served in Narragansett Bay. By closing the Boston Naval Shipyard and the Chelsea Naval Hospital, the Navy could more efficiently utilize the capacity of other shipyards, decrease modernization requirements at Boston, eliminate a hospital in poor condition, reduce military and civilian manpower by another 13,444 positions, and reduce annual costs by $102 million. Closing this shipyard would contribute to decreasing the annual total cost of ship overhauls by $24 million, helping to bring a net five-year savings of $283 million.[9]

Conclusion

Closing bases and transferring operations from one part of the country to another is always a politically very sensitive problem. The series of base closings in 1973 was one of the largest, if not the largest, that had ever taken place in the United States. It involved a long series of studies, and as Barry Shillito, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics at the time, would declare, "The single thing of which I can assure you, however, is that there was no political pressure as regards this action."[10] The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas Moorer, later recalled, "Of course, any time anyone objects to a move made by the government,

whatever it happens to be, you will always find those who are opposed to a move claiming it is only for political purposes. In this case, I believe such a claim is a myth. The real objective was to get the ships together and have the destroyers in a position where they could operate as a task force with other type ships, rather than being isolated in the Newport area."[11]

During the Senate hearings on the subject, Rhode Island senator John Pastore grilled the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt:

> Senator PASTORE. Admiral Zumwalt, . . . would you say that with the elimination and the close down of Quonset Point and the removal of the ships from Newport and the closing down of the Boston Navy Shipyard, that we have enhanced the security of the country?
>
> Admiral ZUMWALT. Absolutely not, Senator Pastore.
>
> Senator PASTORE. Have we injured it?
>
> Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; we have injured it.
>
> Senator PASTORE. . . . You stand here today and admit that we have injured the security of this country?
>
> Admiral ZUMWALT. In an absolute sense, that is correct. But relative to what we will be able to do with the money we save, we have enhanced the security of the country.[12]

As Admiral Zumwalt was later to recall, "I recommended closing up Rhode Island Fleet Naval activities at the time as the 'least worst' way to deal with an extremely difficult budget."[13]

The decision to close the Newport Naval Station, the Quonset Point Naval Air Station, and the Davisville Construction Battalion Base was rooted in the need to have the most-effective naval forces operating at sea in a time of stringent reductions in manpower and austere budgets. Naval officials, quite rightly, made their decisions in the utilitarian terms of strategic priorities, military budgets, and defense logistics. Neither political preferences, the impact on the local economy, nor even the high caliber in the performance of the units involved was at the heart of the issue. Nearly four decades later, one can ruefully reflect on the fact that a region for which defense facilities are an economic mainstay is therefore dependent on an organization whose frame of reference lies elsewhere, above and beyond the region. At the same time, however, one can observe that in the quarter century following the decision, between 1973 and 1999, there was a substantial recovery in terms of the Navy's payroll in the region, if not in the total number of personnel serving in Rhode Island.

NOTES

This essay was first published in *Newport History* 79, no. 262 (2010), pp. 54–65. It appeared without apparatus in *What a Difference a Bay Makes* (Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society, 1993), pp. 104–106. It appears here by permission.

1 *Base Closures or Realignment Program [in] Massachusetts: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Military Construction of the S. Comm. on Armed Services,* 93d Cong., p. 36 (1973) (statement of Sen. Claiborne Pell) [hereafter *Hearings*]. I am grateful to Senator Pell for providing me with a copy of this document from the Senate Library.

2 Ibid., p. 25. For an early assessment of Chafee's term as Secretary of the Navy, see Paul B. Ryan, "John Hubbard Chafee," in *American Secretaries of the Navy,* ed. Paolo E. Coletta (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 980–1002.

3 T. Curtis Forbes, "Disaster Aid Urged for Stricken Economy," *Newport Daily News,* 2 May 1973.

4 Letters to John B. Hattendorf from Barry J. Shillito (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics), 31 August 1992; from Senator John H. Chafee (Secretary of the Navy, 1969–72), 2 September 1992; from Adm. Thomas H. Moorer (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970–74), 6 August 1992; from Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt (Chief of Naval Operations, 1970–74), 30 July 1992; Rear Adm. Richard Rumble (Commandant, First Naval District, 1972–73), 30 July 1992.

5 "Statement by Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson on Base Realignments," U.S. Defense Dept. news release, 17 April 1973, quoted in *Hearings,* p. 301.

6 Ibid., pp. 302–303.

7 Information supplied to the committee, quoted in *Hearings,* p. 408.

8 Ibid., p. 411.

9 Ibid., p. 409.

10 Shillito to Hattendorf, 31 August 1992.

11 Moorer to Hattendorf, 6 August 1992.

12 *Hearings,* p. 250.

13 Zumwalt to Hattendorf, 30 July 1992.

Part 6: Naval Theory

XXVI *The Idea of a "Fleet in Being" in Historical Perspective*

The phrase "fleet in being" is one of those troublesome terms that naval historians and strategists have tended to use in a range of different meanings. The term first appeared in reference to the naval battle off Beachy Head in 1690, during the Nine Years' War, as part of an excuse that Adm. Arthur Herbert, first Earl of Torrington, used to explain his reluctance to engage the French fleet in that battle. A later commentator pointed out that the thinking of several British naval officers ninety years later during the War of the American Revolution, when the Royal Navy was in a similar situation of inferior strength, contributed an expansion to the fleet-in-being concept. To examine this subject carefully, it is necessary to look at two separate areas: first, the development of the idea of the fleet in being in naval strategic thought, and, second, the ideas that arose in the Royal Navy during the War of the American Revolution.

THE CONCEPT IN HISTORY

As a strategic concept, "fleet in being" became a point of discussion among naval strategists in 1891, with the publication of Vice Adm. Philip Colomb's book *Naval Warfare*.[1] In this work Colomb pointed to the origins of the phrase with Admiral Lord Torrington in his speech before Parliament explaining the rationale for his actions in the battle of Beachy Head (Cap Béveziers). In that action, the comte de Tourville, with seventy-five French ships of the line, had defeated the fifty-six ships of the Anglo-Dutch fleet under Torrington's overall command on 30 June / 10 July (Old Style / New Style) 1690.[2] When Torrington was called before Parliament to explain his defeat, he reputedly declared, "As it was, most Men were in fear that the French wou'd invade; but I was always of another Opinion, which several members of this Honorable House can witness: for I always said, that whilst we had a Fleet in being, they would not dare to make an Attempt."[3]

There is some question about the authenticity of the phrase "fleet in being" in that quotation, as it does not appear in the contemporary manuscript records of Torrington's speech;[4] it is known only from an anonymously prepared pamphlet that purports to be the speech, published twenty years after the event, in 1710.[5] In

a preface to the reader, the publisher of the 1710 pamphlet explained, "The following speech falling into my hands by Accident, and being pleas'd with the History it relates; I thought it might give the World a great deal of Satisfaction if it were made publick."[6] Those words might well impress a skeptical historian as the tone of invention, but be that as it may. Whether or not Torrington actually used the phrase in 1690, it is one that has certainly taken on a life of its own during the three hundred years that have followed.

Among naval strategists, Philip Colomb was the first in the Anglophone world to draw attention to the idea as a broad strategic principle, and his thinking developed into an exchange of differing opinions between such well-known writers as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Later writers, such as Herbert Richmond, Raoul Castex, Herbert Rosinski, and Geoffrey Till, have commented on their exchange and added their own thoughts in the process.

Colomb himself, in light of the controversy that he had raised in 1891, tried to clarify his thinking in a revised third edition of his work, eight years later: "Lord Torrington, in his definition of the principle, went no farther than to assert that while he observed the enemy's fleet with one certainly inferior, but yet not so inferior as to be debarred from offering battle on any advantageous circumstances appearing, it would be paralysed."[7] While this convoluted wording took into account some of the criticism that had been made of Colomb's initial understanding of the battle, he believed that the general principle should go further: "'A fleet in being,' even though it was discredited, inferior, and shut up behind sand banks, was such a power in observation as to paralyze the action of an apparently victorious fleet either against 'sea or shore.'"[8] Stating the concept again elsewhere in the same work, Colomb wrote, "A 'fleet in being' has come into general use to denote what, in naval affairs, corresponds to 'a relieving army' in military affairs. That is to say, a fleet which is able and willing to attack an enemy proposing a descent upon territory which that force has it in charge to protect."[9]

Captain Mahan's biography of Admiral Lord Nelson included a telling criticism of Colomb's concept of the idea of a fleet in being. Writing about Nelson's 1794 landing at Calvi in Corsica, Mahan declared that Nelson's actions in that operation showed the weakness of the fleet-in-being concept. If Nelson had been in Tourville's place, Mahan wrote, Tourville would not have thought the opposing English force, as a fleet in being, would be any kind of a deterrent to making a landing.[10]

Colomb responded by saying that Mahan misunderstood the fleet-in-being concept. He argued that Mahan himself, through his service as a member of the U.S. War Board during the Spanish-American War of 1898, had become associated with one of the most extreme examples in history of the potential effectiveness of a fleet in being when U.S. forces had been deterred for a time from capturing Santiago de Cuba by the Spanish navy's fleet in being, a squadron under Adm.

Pascual Cervera.[11] Mahan, however, would have none of it. Using an example from the Peloponnesian War, Mahan pointed out that during the Athenian expedition to Syracuse, the Syracusans moved their inferior fleet to Tarentum. "The momentary safety of Syracuse would illustrate the influence of a 'fleet in being'; its subjugation after the fall of Tarentum would show the limitations of such a fleet, which, by definition, is inferior."[12] Mahan felt that "the exaggerated argument about the 'fleet in being' and its deterrent effect is, in effect, assuming that war can and will be made only without risk."[13] That is, "it was not the beaten and crippled English and Dutch 'fleet in being' that prevented an invasion of England. It was the weakness or inertness of Tourville, or the unreadiness of the French transports."[14] Underscoring a related general point, Mahan noted that when a fleet is tied to defending a position ashore that is otherwise inadequately protected by fortification or by an army, it is unable to concentrate or move freely and forcefully against an enemy.[15]

Sir Julian Corbett took a different stance when he pointed out that a fleet in being is a legitimate method of disputing command of the sea by assuming a defensive attitude. He argued that historical misunderstanding about the circumstances that had given rise to the phrase and the subsequent limitation of the concept to deterrence against an amphibious landing obscured the full significance of the strategic concept. "For a maritime Power, then," Corbett wrote, "a naval defensive means nothing but keeping the fleet actively in being—not merely in existence, but in active vigorous life."[16] In Corbett's interpretation, Torrington's intention was to act on the defensive and to prevent the enemy from achieving any result until such time as Torrington could consolidate his scattered forces so as to have a fair chance of winning a fleet engagement with Tourville's fleet. "The doctrine of the 'Fleet in being,' as formulated and practiced by Torrington," Corbett explained, "goes no further than this, that where the enemy regards the general command of a sea necessary to his offensive purposes, you may be able to prevent his gaining such command by using your fleet defensively, refusing what Nelson called a general battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counterstrike."[17] Corbett concluded that those who criticized Torrington at the time—as well as those who had since used the historical example for developing a strategic principle—did not understand that the meaning of a fleet in being was at sea and in contact with an enemy.

Later commentators have continued this discussion but have achieved little resolution of the conceptual problems involved. Adm. Raoul Castex favored Mahan's argument over Corbett's.[18] Castex thought Colomb's argument exaggerated and Corbett an inexperienced civilian, harshly judging him as "an armchair strategist ignorant of the reality of war."[19] In contrast, Adm. Sir Herbert Richmond followed Corbett's view and added his own thoughts. "What Torrington meant is plain," Richmond wrote. "So long as he had an active fleet, prepared to seize any opportunity of slipping past the French and joining the score of [English] ships to the

west, Tourville, despite his superior numbers, could not commit himself to a major operation."[20] An inferior fleet, Richmond pointed out, could not prevent a raid and could not be an absolute or complete safeguard, only a temporary one. However, in a situation where a superior enemy fleet needed to obtain a rapid and decisive victory, to disable completely an inferior fleet to carry out an invasion or some other larger objective, the inferior fleet can have a temporary deterrent effect. It does this by avoiding action until such time as conditions might be more favorable, as the English eventually did in that war two years after Beachy Head, in 1692, as well as afterward.[21]

In the next generation of naval strategic thinkers, the German American Herbert Rosinski started in the 1930s a comparative study of maritime strategic thinkers, of which he completed only the section devoted to Mahan.[22] In this work, Rosinski noted that Mahan agreed completely with Corbett that "'dispute of command,' if attempted at all, can only be achieved by the greatest display of activity and offensive spirit conceivable."[23] Rosinski went on to exclaim, "It is therefore more than astonishing to find [Mahan] throughout all his writings violently opposed to the concept of a 'fleet in being,' which when rightly understood, stands precisely for such a watchful and aggressive 'hanging on the enemy's flanks.'"[24] Looking carefully at Mahan's reasoning, Rosinski concluded that Mahan had taken Torrington to mean a passive retreat to safety—the very opposite of what Torrington had actually intended, an aggressive defense. One might add that Mahan's understanding was similar to that which the king, queen, and council expressed in 1690 and that led to Torrington's dismissal, imprisonment in the Tower, and trial.[25] While naval historians and strategists have tended to study the concept as an abstract strategic idea, historians of the reign of King William III and the aftermath of the Revolution of 1688 are aware that there may have been other reasons why Admiral Herbert (that is, Torrington) did not fight the French, as he had been ordered to do. As the historian Stephen B. Baxter summarized the range of possibilities, "He [Torrington] may have resented the orders of the cabinet council. He may have been involved in the political squabbles that were almost destroying the fighting capacity of the English navy. He may have been jealous of the Dutch. He may have played the coward or the traitor."[26] After all, there was a parallel in very recent memory, the failure of the English fleet under Lord Dartmouth to oppose William III's invasion of England in 1688.

To complicate the issue further, the concept of fleet in being has come to be used very loosely, for a range of related naval options. Understanding the term as employed in twentieth- and twenty-first-century naval discussion, Geoffrey Till has identified within the concept four different types of operations, ranging from moderated offense to passive defense:[27]

1. Obtaining a degree of command of the sea by temporarily avoiding a decision in battle.
2. Achieving positive strategic benefit by carrying out missions, such as attack on trade, while avoiding a decisive engagement with a superior enemy.
3. Using continuous harassment and evasion of the enemy as a means of denying a superior enemy the unfettered use of the sea.
4. Using actions designed merely to ensure the survival of a weaker opposing fleet.

The historian Jerker Widén has recently commented that these four variants constitute collectively a potential problem for the proper interpretation of the fleet-in-being concept. He argues that the fourth—actions merely to ensure a fleet's survival—is not a legitimate form of fleet in being, which requires maintaining an active and credible threat against a superior enemy. The second and third are similar to one another, but they incorporate Corbett's alternative method of disputing command of the sea—minor counterattacks. For theoretical purposes, Widén recommends keeping conceptually separate the ideas of disputed command and minor counterattack. The fleet in being, he writes, is a defensive deterrent strategy by a weaker naval power, while minor counterattacks constitute a limited form of offensive action within a defensive strategy. However, in practice, Widén notes, these two tend to coincide as separate elements of a single strategy.[28]

THE NAVAL WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

It was the famous British naval historian and strategist Sir Julian Corbett who pointed out, in *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* that the War of the American Revolution provided further evidence about the meaning and application of the concept of the fleet in being.[29]

In the first three years of the war, between 1775 and 1777, Britain used its army and naval resources to try to end the rebellion in North America quickly, but those attempts failed. In this period, relatively few British warships were built, but with France's entry into the war in 1778 the Royal Navy began a building program to try to recover the superiority of warship numbers and tonnage it had let slip to France. It would take the Royal Navy years to recover that position.

The year 1778 witnessed not only the entry of France into the war but the departure of a French squadron under the comte d'Estaing to North America and then to the West Indies. The government in London now changed its strategic priorities and put home defense and the protection of the colonies in the West Indies at a higher level than the issues at stake with the North American colonies. Yet there were critics of this policy within the cabinet, notably the colonial secretary, Lord George Germain, who led efforts that, from time to time, diverted the ministry from its initial intentions. As a result of this and other factors, 1778 became a year

of missed naval opportunities for both Britain and France, as each in its turn looked across the Atlantic.

The French navy had the opportunity in 1778 to achieve something close to parity in naval strength with the Royal Navy, even local superiority in European waters, by uniting the Brest and Toulon squadrons for a decisive battle. Instead, d'Estaing took the Toulon squadron to North America. At the same time, London, instead of using its strength to seek a decisive action with the French navy, dispatched Vice Adm. John Byron and twenty ships to chase d'Estaing across the Atlantic. In the following year and a half neither of those fleets had any strategic effect in North American waters or even in the West Indies, where the naval battles they fought were indecisive. Meanwhile, in European waters, in the first major naval battle of the war, a French fleet under the comte d'Orvilliers clashed, also indecisively, with a comparably sized British fleet in the first battle of Ushant on 27 July 1778.[30]

During the following autumn and winter the Royal Navy and Britain generally became further distracted by an argument that arose between two of the commanders at Ushant over their actions in that engagement: Vice Adm. Sir Hugh Palliser and his superior, Adm. Hon. Augustus Keppel. This personal and professional dispute resulted in courts-martial for them both; in Parliament, vicious disputes between the supporters of the respective admirals created a political opposition to the government.

In the wake of all this, in the spring of 1779 the Royal Navy needed to prepare for a new campaign by finding a senior and experienced commander for the Channel Fleet, a fighting admiral who was a supporter of the government. Among the possible choices, there seemed to be no one who could meet all the necessary criteria. In the end, the selection fell on Adm. Sir Charles Hardy, a very senior admiral who was above the political fray but had not been to sea in years. Although Hardy had a reputation as a good-natured man, the divisive atmosphere of the day led some officers to refuse to serve under him. To back him up the Admiralty turned to some untried officers who seemed to have potential. Two captains in this group were promoted to rear admiral and given subordinate commands in the Channel Fleet. Another, Capt. Richard Kempenfelt, recognized within the navy as a thoughtful reformer and tactical innovator, was given the post of Hardy's captain of the fleet, a position that might be considered a precursor to a modern admiral's chief of staff.[31]

As the Channel Fleet prepared to put to sea in the spring of 1779, it was hampered by a shortage of seamen, a shortage largely caused by the impressment of men carrying infectious diseases.[32] At the same time, the strategic situation at sea was only gradually becoming clear to British leaders. In February, intelligence arrived in London that Spain was beginning military preparations in the vicinity of Gibraltar. In March, London learned that Spain was fitting out warships at El Ferrol, and France reportedly was preparing thirty-three at Brest. At first British

observers did not understand the full significance of these reports. It took them some time to conclude that Spain was changing from a neutral mediator between Britain and France to an active supporter of France against Britain. It took even longer to understand that this Franco-Spanish alliance was tied strategically to the Spanish siege of Gibraltar and to a design to occupy part of England by amphibious assault to force Britain to release Gibraltar to Spain in future peace negotiations.[33] Thus, the entry of Spain into the war altered the strategic situation for Britain.[34]

By July 1779 British officials were aware that a superior Franco-Spanish naval force was heading toward the Channel, but things were left in strategic suspense until it actually appeared off the British Isles. Meanwhile, senior British officers expressed a variety of opinions on the impending situation. Some thought the enemy force would prove too unwieldy and ineffective to be a real threat in battle. In fact, the sixty-three-ship Franco-Spanish fleet would not actually be sighted entering the Channel until mid-August, by which time thirty thousand troops would be waiting in France to invade England. In the interim, Captain Kempenfelt was at sea with Admiral Hardy on board Hardy's flagship, HMS *Victory,* with some of the thirty-nine ships of the line of the Channel Fleet. On 27 July 1779 Kempenfelt wrote to his friend Capt. Charles Middleton, the comptroller of the navy, reflecting on the strategic situation that he, as Hardy's fleet captain, faced:

> Much, I must say almost all, depends on this [i.e., the Channel] fleet; 'tis an inferior against a superior fleet; therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at some or other feeble part of the enemy's line; or if such opportunities don't offer, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting to execute anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, and oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard against your attack.[35]

In the event, actions such as these, combined with the collapse of supplies and of the health of seamen in the Franco-Spanish fleet, as well as the random effects of chance, eventually prevented the Franco-Spanish fleet from achieving success.[36]

The war for America continued without major strategic gains on either side, with roughly equally matched fleets opposing one another, until 1781. In that year Britain was successful in slowing the flow of naval stores—including timber, pitch, iron, and copper—to the Spanish and French navies, thus raising their costs; otherwise the British blockade had little effect on the enemy. However, it did create a new naval enemy in European waters, the Dutch Republic, by interfering with Dutch trade to France. As a result, a British squadron fought the Dutch fleet off Dogger Bank. Celebrated (although in fact tactically indecisive) as a victory by both sides, Dogger Bank became a British strategic victory when the Dutch fleet failed to venture out again during the remainder of the war.[37] In 1781, the combined Franco-Spanish fleet returned to the Channel, again in strength too great for the Royal Navy's Channel Fleet to dare challenge.

Meanwhile, in September 1781, the strategic crisis of the war occurred when the comte de Grasse was able to seize and maintain local command of the sea off Virginia to control the waters around the Chesapeake Capes and in Chesapeake Bay for several weeks, preventing relief from reaching British forces ashore at Yorktown. General Lord Cornwallis's surrender eventually brought down the ministry in London and replaced it with a government that was pledged to ending the war. Yet it would be some time before all that happened.

In this situation, Lord Sandwich at the Admiralty and his professional advisers, who included Capt. Charles Middleton, Captain Lord Mulgrave, and Richard Kempenfelt (promoted to rear admiral in 1780 and now in command of the Western Squadron of the Channel Fleet), proposed a dramatic new strategy. At this point, Britain's warship-building program, begun after the war started, was beginning to alter the strategic balance of forces between the combined French and Spanish fleets and Britain's. The numerical superiority of the Bourbon naval powers in capital ships in comparison to Britain's grew from 25 percent in 1775 to a high point in 1780 of 44 percent. From 1780 to 1785 it declined to a low of a 17 percent superiority.[38] The percentages in numerical superiority, however, do not reflect differences in fleet readiness. As the French navy increased in size, it experienced increasing difficulties in manning and funding.[39] Nevertheless, in the context of this overall situation, the Royal Navy's Channel Fleet remained considerably weaker than that in the West Indies. The cabinet in London had made a deliberate strategic choice to attempt a victory in the West Indies rather than in European waters. Its rationale might be justified by Adm. Sir George Rodney's victory on 12 April 1782 over de Grasse at the Saintes, preventing the loss of Jamaica. Yet Rodney's victory was not the kind of stunning strategic victory that could end a war, despite its considerable moral effect. The high-risk strategy that brought it about left more serious vulnerabilities exposed at home.[40]

While the ministry placed priority on the West Indies and reduced naval strength in the eastern Atlantic and North Sea to do so, the Royal Navy at home still had essential duties to carry out as an inferior fleet in being, unable to conduct a major fleet battle. Most importantly, the government's decision meant that the Royal Navy could not maintain control of the Western Approaches to the Channel with a sufficient number of its largest warships. Such a force at that important naval strategic position at sea had traditionally served the multiple purposes of protecting British trade, attacking enemy trade, preventing invasion, and deterring French forces from leaving Brest for overseas missions.[41] At the same time, the war with the Dutch required a blockade of the Dutch coast to prevent the Dutch navy from returning to sea. Meanwhile, British warships in the North Sea served to blockade the eastern approaches of the Channel and to intercept merchant ships carrying contraband naval stores to France. In addition, the war with

Spain called for a blockade of Spanish ports, as well as the convoying of supplies for the relief of Gibraltar during the Spanish siege. All of this needed to be done while avoiding a major, decisive fleet battle. The Royal Navy met this conundrum on an operational level by shuttling ships back and forth between the North Sea and the Channel as the situation required and by maintaining superior ship-to-ship fighting capabilities.[42]

As for the broad, strategic level, however, Rear Admiral Kempenfelt explained his views of the theoretical aspects of the situation in early January 1782, after receiving Admiralty orders for his Western Squadron. In comparison with Torrington's single-sentence statement, Kempenfelt's thoughts, as Sir Julian Corbett considered, represented the "developed idea of the 'fleet in being'" that showed how the concept had matured in British naval thinking some ninety years after Torrington:[43]

> When the enemy's force by sea [are][a] superior to yours and you have many remote possessions to guard, it renders it difficult to determine [what may be][b] the best manner of disposing of your ships.
>
> [When the enemy's designs are known],[c] in order to do something effectual, you must endeavour to be superior to them in [such parts][d] where, [if they should succeed in their design],[e] they would most injure you.
>
> If your fleet is so divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will then in all places have [the probability][f] of succeeding in their attempts.
>
> [If a squadron of sufficient force cannot be formed to face the enemy at home, it would be more eligible to let the number of that squadron be yet less, that thereby you may be enabled to gain a superiority elsewhere].[g]
>
> When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to watch and attend upon their motions, such squadron should be composed of two-decked ships only,[44] as [to answer its purpose][h] it must have the advantage [in sailing of the enemy, otherwise in certain circumstances they may be forced to action or to give up some of their heavy sailers.][i]

---

a. The 13 January version replaces "is" with "are."

b. The 13 January version adds "what may be."

c. The 13 January version replaces "When you know the enemy's designs" with the words between brackets.

d. The 13 January version replaces "some part" with the words between brackets.

e. The 13 January version replaces "if they succeeded" with the words between brackets.

f. The 13 January version replaces "a fair chance" with the words between brackets.

g. The 13 January version creates a new paragraph here and replaces "If a squadron cannot be formed of sufficient force to face the enemy's at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater, in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere" with the words between brackets.

h. The 13 January version replaces "as to ensure its purpose" with the words between brackets and eliminates the period after "purpose."

i. The 13 January version replaces "of the enemy in sailing; else, under certain circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle" with the words between brackets. "Heavy sailers" refers to slow, cumbersome, unweatherly ships, rather than simply large ones.

It is highly [expedient][j] to have such a flying squadron to hang [about][k] the enemy's large fleet, as it will prevent their dividing into [squadrons][l] for intercepting your trade [or other purposes],[m] or spreading [and extending][n] their ships for a more extensive view. [Such a squadron will be always at hand ready][o] to profit from any accidental separation or dispersion of their [ships][p] from hard gales, fogs or other causes. [They][q] may intercept supplies, intelligence, etc. to them. In fine, such a squadron will be a check and restraint upon their [activity],[r] and thereby prevent [much][s] of that mischief they otherwise might do.

When the enemy are near the Channel, I should suppose the best situation for such a squadron would be to keep without them to the westward [, as more favourable to protect your ships coming into the Channel. The squadron will also be more at liberty for its operations to approach or keep distance from the enemy as they may find convenient, and not liable to be forced into port and blocked up].[t]

When the enemy [perceive][u] your design of keeping the North Sea free by a stout squadron for your trade to return home that way, it may be supposed they will detach from [their][v] Grand fleet as many ships as the inferiority of your Western squadron will allow to endeavour, in conjunction with the Dutch, to turn in that sea, the balance of power on their side.[45] [But probably they will penetrate into this scheme of ours time enough to prevent its good effects this ensuing summer, and other projects they may have in view to attempt with their Grand fleet may divert their attention from it.][w]

The enemy I conceive [have][x] at this time two grand designs against us: the one, the conquest of our West India Islands; the other, at home, not confined merely to the interception of our trade, but to favour by [the superiority of their fleet][y] a formidable descent upon Great Britain;[z] and I [would][aa] suppose the blow would be directed where it would be most felt by us, either against the Metropolis or Portsmouth. I should rather think the latter, as [more practicable][bb] from the nature of the navigation.

---

j. The 13 January version starts a new paragraph with this sentence and replaces "necessary" with "expedient."
k. The 13 January version replaces "on" with "about."
l. The 13 January version omits the word "separate" before "squadrons."
m. The 13 January version adds the words between brackets.
n. The 13 January version adds the words between brackets.
o. The 13 January version replaces "You will be at hand" with the words between brackets.
p. The 13 January version replaces "fleet" with "ships."
q. The 13 January version replaces "You" with "They."
r. The 13 January version replaces "motions" with "activity."
s. The 13 January version replaces "a good deal" with "much."
t. The 13 January version adds the section between brackets, ending the paragraph with the additional words.
u. The 13 January version replaces "perceives" with "perceive."
v. The 13 January version replaces "the" with "their."
w. The 13 January version adds the sentence between brackets.
x. The 13 January version adds the word "have."
y. The 13 January version replaces "their superiority" with the words between brackets.
z. The 13 January version omits "and Ireland."
aa. The 13 January version replaces "should" with "would."
bb. The 13 January version replaces "less difficult" with "more practicable."

> They will with some reason conclude that [one][cc] of those designs will succeed; [knowing][dd] that we cannot, by our naval power, guard against both, and that if we employ a force sufficient to defeat their design in one place, we must necessarily leave the other exposed to them.
>
> [It may be (or might have been) in our power to send such a force of ships to the West Indies as would frustrate their designs there, but at home I imagine, with our outmost exertions, we must remain inferior by sea and trust our defence from a descent to our land forces.
>
> As our ships are now all coppered, they are always ready for service; therefore, when the enemy's fleet at the end of the campaign returns into port, which hitherto has been always early in the fall, you are then at liberty to send what number of ships you might think proper to act offensively or defensively in the West Indies during the winter months, and have them again at home in sufficient time for summer service.
>
> There is great advantage upon such occasions in letting ships slip out singly, as their voyage is thereby rendered much shorter, and your design a secret.][ee]

On the first of the two drafts of Kempenfelt's document, Sir Charles Middleton had written a short note that clarified the reasoning and was later incorporated in the final version sent to Lord Sandwich: "As something must [be] left exposed, it appears to me that Great Britain and Ireland are now more capable of defending themselves than our colonies; and that the present year will probably pass over before they discover our design in the North Sea. It behooves us thus to make the best of the time allowed us."[46]

To Sir Julian Corbett's way of thinking, Kempenfelt had already demonstrated, practically and "in the most positive and convincing manner," the positive side of the fleet-in-being theory a few weeks before drafting his memorandum.[47] Fifty-three leagues (approximately 159 nautical miles, or 294 kilometers) southwest of the Ushant on 12 December 1781, Kempenfelt's Western Squadron had encountered a French hundred-ship convoy sailing, under the escort of the comte de Guichen, from Brest with military supplies and reinforcements for the East and West Indies. Observing that de Guichen and his escorting warships were over the horizon, hull-down to leeward, Kempenfelt attempted to cut them off from the transports. Partially succeeding in this, Kempenfelt avoided a major action and took nine transports from among the hundred ships, as well as, on the following day, an additional five stragglers.

A number of critics of the action—including King George III, Rear Adm. Sir Samuel Hood, and Admiral Lord Rodney—thought that Kempenfelt should have followed the French squadron and taken more ships, even to the extent of going all the way to the West Indies to tip the naval balance there, rather than returning home. At the tactical level, Kempenfelt's skillful action in using an inferior force to embarrass the enemy and to take prizes in the presence of its escort was remarkable,

---

cc. The 13 January version replaces "one or the other" with "one."

dd. The 13 January version replaces "well knowing" with "knowing."

ee. The 13 January version adds the three final paragraphs, shown here within brackets.

but strategically it had little effect.[48] The strategic effect related to the convoy was caused by the weather on Christmas Day, five days after Kempenfelt returned to Spithead, when a violent storm forced most of the French convoy back into port and prevented the rest from reaching its intended destination.

Word of Kempenfelt's action, along with the news of the surrender of the British army at Yorktown (and the failure of the Royal Navy to relieve it), had arrived at London in late November and led to political attacks in the House of Commons on Lord North's ministry for naval mismanagement. Eleven days after Kempenfelt submitted his memorandum to Lord Sandwich, the House voted "to inquire into the causes of the lack of success of his Majesty's naval forces during this war, and more particularly in the year 1781," the first of a series of resolutions and charges that on 20 March 1782 forced Lord North's ministry from office, along with Lord Sandwich as First Lord of the Admiralty.[49] During the course of the debates, the young opposition politician Charles James Fox pointed out that the government's strategy had been the reverse of what it should have been. That is, he argued, having limited naval resources it sent major squadrons to distant stations and left home waters exposed when it should have concentrated in European waters, where it could have controlled enemy forces at their source, while at the same time providing for home defense.[50]

Kempenfelt and Middleton's thinking showed that their defensive, fleet-in-being strategy was based on a number of factors related to the specific context of the strategic situation in late 1781 and early 1782. At the tactical and operational levels, their thinking depended on a growing sense that the enemy's naval strength was becoming weaker in size and less unified in action.[51] In proposing more daring moves they were depending on this trend, as well as on easy strategic maneuverability of their own naval forces from one theater of operations to another; on subterfuge; on the enemy's limited ability to guess what they were doing and counter it; and on the (at least marginal) technological superiority provided by copper sheathing of the underwater hulls of ships, as well as on the adoption of carronades, which would prove their value as a new form of ordnance during the battle of the Saintes.[52]

At the strategic level, the application of the concept that Kempenfelt and Middleton were advocating abdicated the Royal Navy's traditional role as Britain's first line of defense, leaving home defense to the British army and to the militia at the beaches. It also assumed that the constraining effects of wind, weather, and inefficiency on the enemy's naval force would be less for the British. At the same time, it abandoned a strategic idea that had been proved valid in the past and would later be proved again in subsequent wars—that by maintaining naval superiority in European waters the Royal Navy could eliminate or reduce (as Fox argued on the floor of the Commons) the threat to overseas possessions at the source, by preventing French and Spanish forces from sailing to distant stations.

This discussion should not lead a reader to think that the idea of the fleet in being was one that was widely understood or discussed in the Royal Navy of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries. Admiral Kempenfelt was certainly a very unusual naval officer, a man whose thinking was not widely reflected in the British naval officer corps.[53] The instances and documents mentioned here are the only known examples to have existed before Colomb opened the idea for wider discussion as a general strategic concept in 1891. In both the 1690 example and that of the War of the American Revolution, the Royal Navy's use of the fleet-in-being concept resulted in severe political repercussions for those who were held responsible. In 1690, the commanding admiral was blamed, in 1782 the government. To the extent that the Royal Navy employed a fleet in being, it was not a war-winning strategy but a delaying gambit, or a device to protract the war at sea so as to achieve other objectives. At Beachy Head, its apparent success for the English navy was due largely to the inefficiency of the enemy and other factors within the larger context of that war. During the War of the American Revolution, however, a strategy of fleet in being in home waters had a role in allowing the Royal Navy to strengthen Rodney's fleet in the West Indies to the point that he could win the battle of the Saintes on 9–12 April 1782.

The ideas on a fleet in being that Richard Kempenfelt and Charles Middleton discussed during the final phase of the War of the American Revolution certainly represented an elaboration of an idea that had been only hinted at in Admiral Lord Torrington's single sentence. Their elaborated concept is more than an expansion on the original idea, and it expresses a much more precise meaning than Philip Colomb and a number of other commentators have allowed. An enemy cannot, as a strategic matter, entirely ignore such a fleet, presenting as it does an active threat that requires a significant response. In the context of a strategic situation involving naval forces dispersed in several geographic areas, an active and aggressive fleet in being can potentially serve as a temporary deterrent in one area, if for a very limited time, simultaneously maintaining morale and operational skills within that fleet and gaining time to concentrate forces in another area where a larger threat exists. The historical experiences that have been discussed here suggest, however, that it is a high-risk strategy to deal with particular circumstances, to be considered only when resources are strained and threats dispersed in different geographic areas, not to be expanded into the rationale for a general strategic naval posture.

NOTES This essay was originally an extemporaneous lecture given at All Souls College, Oxford, on 30 January 2013, repeated on 8 February 2013 at l'École militaire in Paris. It was first published in *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 1 (Winter 2014), pp. 43–60; it has since appeared in French translation in Olivier Chaline, Philippe Bonnichon, and Charles-Philippe de Vergennes, eds., *Les marines de la guerre d'indépendance américaine (1763–1783),* vol. 2, *L'opérationnel naval* (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2018). It is reprinted by courtesy of the Naval War College Press.

1 P. H. Colomb [Vice Adm., RN], *Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practices Historically Treated* (London: W. H. Allen, 1891). References in this article are from the reprint of the 1899 third edition, with an introduction by Barry M. Gough, Classics of Sea Power, 2 vols. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990). On the concept of fleet in being, see

vol. 1, pp. 5–9, 154, 170; and vol. 2, pp. 502, 550, 556–60.

2 For nearly a century, the standard account of the battle in English was William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1897–1903), vol. 2, pp. 333–41. For recent scholarly accounts of this battle, see E. Taillemite and P. Guillaume, *Tourville et Béveziers* (Paris: Economica, 1991); Daniel Dessert, *Tourville* (Paris: Fayard, 2002), pp. 233–40; and N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Allen Lane, 2004), pp. 145–46, 159.

3 *The Earl of Torrington's speech to the House of Commons, in November, 1690: Occasion'd by the ingagement at sea on the 30th of June that year, between the confederate and French fleets. To which is prefix'd, a draught of the line of battel, curiously engraven on copper* (London: n.p., 1710), p. 29.

4 Printed in J. B. Hattendorf et al., eds., *British Naval Documents, 1204–1960,* Publications of the Navy Records Society (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1993), vol. 131, document 131: The Battle of Beachy Head, 1690, pp. 223–25, manuscript SOU/2, pp. 27–29, Phillipps-Southwell Papers, National Maritime Museum (NMM), Greenwich, United Kingdom.

5 *Earl of Torrington's speech.* John Ehrman believes that the fact that similar concepts and wording of some of the statements in the pamphlet are also found in the manuscript summaries gives credibility to the thought that the pamphlet might be the full text of the speech that Torrington presented; *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689–1697* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953) [hereafter *Navy of William III*], pp. 323–24 note 6. The contemporary manuscript report on Torrington's speech that Ehrman cited in 1953—as Bibl. Phill, Admiralty Papers, vol. iv, ff. 101–108, NMM—is the same document as that cited in note 4 above. When the Phillipps Library manuscripts at Greenwich were later divided into separate groups, this one was given a new archival designation: SOU/2, Phillipps-Southwell collection, NMM. On Torrington's court-martial, see also Peter Le Fevre, "The Earl of Torrington's Court-Martial, 10 December 1690," *Mariner's Mirror* 76 (August 1990), pp. 243–49.

6 *Earl of Torrington's speech,* p. 3.

7 Colomb, *Naval Warfare,* vol. 2, p. 550.

8 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 154.

9 Ibid., p. 5. This quotation is from the preface to the second edition of 1895.

10 A. T. Mahan, *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1897), vol. 1, p. 137.

11 Colomb, *Naval Warfare,* vol. 2, pp. 558–59.

12 John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 205. The quote originally appeared in Mahan's *Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practices of Military Operations on Land* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), chap. 9, pp. 200–42.

13 Hattendorf, *Mahan on Naval Strategy,* p. 209.

14 Ibid., p. 247, from Mahan, *Naval Strategy,* chap. 10.

15 Hattendorf, *Mahan on Naval Strategy,* p. 263.

16 Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* ed. Eric J. Grove, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 212.

17 Ibid., pp. 224–25.

18 Raoul Castex, *Théories stratégiques* (Paris: Société d'éditions géographiques, maritimes et coloniales, 1929–35), vol. 4, pp. 140–49. Excerpts in English published in Castex, *Strategic Theories,* trans. and ed. Eugenia C. Kiesling, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 336–43.

19 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, "Corbett and Richmond in France," in *Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond,* ed. John B. Hattendorf and James Goldrick (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), p. 283; J. J. Widén, *Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and His Contribution to Military and Naval Thought* (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2012), p. 133.

20 Sir Herbert Richmond, *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558–1727* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953), p. 215.

21 Ibid., p. 216.

22 Herbert Rosinski, *Commentaire de Mahan,* preface by Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (Paris: Economica, 1996). Originally written in English in about 1938, it has been published only in French. The original typescript document is in Manuscript Collection 91: Herbert Rosinski Papers, box 7, folder 3: Mahan, 1938, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

23 Rosinski, *Commentaire de Mahan,* pp. 71–72 (English typescript pp. 33–34).

24 Ibid. See A. T. Mahan, *Lessons of the War with Spain, and Other Articles* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1899), pp. 78, 123–24; Mahan, *Life of Nelson,* vol. 1, pp. 136–37; and Mahan, *Naval Administration and Warfare: Some General Principles, with Other Essays* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1908), p. 149.

25 Ehrman, *Navy of William III,* pp. 349–52; *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* s.v. "Herbert, Arthur, Earl of Torrington (1648–1716)," by John B. Hattendorf (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), January 2008 revision available at dx.doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/13017.

26 Stephen B. Baxter, *William III and the Defense of European Liberty, 1650–1702* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1966), p. 267.

27 Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century,* 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 173.

28 Widén, *Theorist of Maritime Strategy,* pp. 132–33.

29 Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* p. 222.

30 N. A. M. Rodger and Daniel A. Baugh, "The War for America, 1775–1783," in *Maritime History,* vol. 2, *The Eighteenth Century and the Classic Age of Sail,*

ed. John B. Hattendorf (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1997), pp. 205–206.

31 David Syrett, *The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolutionary War* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 61–62.

32 Ibid., p. 66.

33 For further background see Stetson Conn, *Gibraltar in British Diplomacy in the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1942), chap. 8, pp. 174–98, and John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 319–22.

34 Syrett, *Royal Navy in European Waters,* p. 69.

35 Kempenfelt to Middleton, 27 July [1779], in *Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham, Admiral of the Red Squadron, 1758–1813,* ed. John Knox Laughton, Publications of the Navy Records Society (London: Navy Records Society, 1907–11) [hereafter *Barham Letters and Papers*], general series vol. 32, vol. 1, p. 292.

36 Rodger and Baugh, "War for America, 1775–1783," p. 206.

37 Jaap R. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1993), p. 157; Syrett, *Royal Navy in European Waters,* pp. 131–32.

38 Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1993), vol. 1, p. 276.

39 Jonathan R. Dull, *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 143–44, 256 note 30, 278–79; Henri Legohérel, *Les trésoriers généraux de la Marine (1517–1788)* (Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1965), p. 341.

40 N. A. M. Rodger, *The Insatiable Earl: A Life of John Montagu, Fourth Earl of Sandwich, 1718–1892* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 273, 292.

41 Michael Duffy, "The Establishment of the Western Squadron as the Linchpin of British Naval Strategy," in *Parameters of British Naval Power, 1650–1850,* ed. Michael Duffy, Exeter Maritime Studies, no. 7 (Exeter, U.K.: Univ. of Exeter Press, 1992), pp. 75–76; A. N. Ryan, "The Blockade of Brest, 1689–1805," in *Les marines de guerre européennes, XVII–XVIII^e siècles,* ed. Martine Acerra, José Merino, and Jean Meyer (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1987), p. 184.

42 Syrett, *Royal Navy in European Waters,* p. 167.

43 For the Corbett quotation, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* p. 221. There are two published versions of this document that follows. The text quoted here follows the second, more complete version. The first, which Corbett used, appears to be a draft, made a week before the second; it is in "Admiral Kempenfelt's Observations on the Arrangements Given to Him by Lord S[andwich]," in Laughton, *Barham Letters and Papers,* vol. 1, pp. 361–62 (copy in Middleton's hand, 6 January 1782). The second text appears as "Admiral Kempenfelt's Ideas about the Mode of Carrying on the War," 13 January 1782, in *The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771–1782,* ed. G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen, Publications of the Navy Records Society (London: Navy Records Society, 1932–38), general series vol. 78, vol. 4, pp. 80–82. The later document makes changes to the wording of the draft that appears in *Barham Letters and Papers* and adds several points, as well as three new paragraphs at the end. See the footnotes for the exact differences between the two documents, as well as glosses on certain terms.

44 The seventy-four-gun third rate was the typical example, being both heavily armed and highly maneuverable, but there was also a large, two-deck, eighty-gun third rate and a small, two-deck, forty-four-gun fifth rate. See David Lyon, "The American War of Independence 1776–1783," chap. 5 in *The Sailing Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy, Built, Purchased and Captured 1688–1860* (London: Conway Maritime Books, 1993), pp. 214–16.

45 "Return home that way": an allusion to a long-standing British wartime trade-protection strategy of having British merchant ships return home not through the western entrance to the Channel but "north about" Scotland, then south to London and other ports through the North Sea.

46 "Mem. By Sir C.M.," in Laughton, *Barham Letters and Papers,* vol. 1, pp. 362–63.

47 For the quotation, Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* p. 222.

48 Syrett, *Royal Navy in European Waters,* pp. 149–50.

49 For Lord Sandwich's statements defending his actions as First Lord, see ibid., pp. 271–364. House of Commons motion quoted in Barnes and Owen, *Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich,* vol. 4, p. 271.

50 Syrett, *Royal Navy in European Waters,* p. 152.

51 Rodger, *Insatiable Earl,* p. 294.

52 Ibid., pp. 294–99.

53 For a general evaluation of Kempenfelt see *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* s.v. "Kempenfelt, Richard (1718–1782)," by J. K. Laughton, January 2008 revision by Nicholas Tracy available at www.oxforddnb.com/.

XXVII *The Quest to Understand Naval Leadership*
Educating Admirals for High Command in the U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy did not quickly recognize that there is both an art and a science to leadership and that higher command at the flag-and-general-officer level requires a unique approach in professional military education. As understanding slowly developed, the Navy began by using history and biography, then later applied social science theory and business management applications. In the early twenty-first century, the Naval War College began a new approach, a previously untried method of individual flag-officer development.

THE INITIAL AVERSION TO ADMIRALS

In the late eighteenth century, the United States of America took form in the context of ideologies from the Enlightenment that informed not only political debate over the purposes and functions of a navy but also the way in which Americans viewed naval officers.[1] At the outset, Americans did not like the title of "admiral," which they thought inappropriate to their new republic. Americans viewed the Royal Navy, primarily because of its name, as a product of the monarchical and aristocratic values they were trying to escape. Similarly, many thought military and naval education a danger to the new republic, believing instead in the innate abilities of Americans as militiamen and privateers.[2] They had no corresponding distaste for the rank of general, which Congress gave to George Washington and others, associating it with Oliver Cromwell and militia rather than aristocracy.

The most senior officers of the Continental Navy of 1775–85 and the U.S. Navy, established in 1794, were captains, not admirals. On 22 December 1775, Congress appointed Capt. Esek Hopkins commander in chief of the Continental Navy with the courtesy title of commodore—a Dutch term that King William III had introduced into the Royal Navy in 1689. Congress, however, overwhelmingly voted to deny Hopkins the perquisites of an admiral, such as table money for expenses.[3] Hopkins's career was short and unsuccessful, and when Congress dismissed him from service no one replaced him as commander in chief.

On 15 November 1776, the Continental Congress had created a table of equivalent ranks for the officers of the Army and Navy that included the naval ranks of

admiral, vice admiral, rear admiral, and commodore. Congress did not, however, authorize the use of the flag ranks. The same legislation established a pay table for naval officers and men, but it went no higher than captain.[4]

Capt. John Paul Jones of the Continental Navy coveted promotion to admiral, but with the disbandment of the Continental Navy in 1785, that became impossible. When in 1788 Catherine the Great invited Jones to come to Russia to command the Black Sea Fleet as a rear admiral, he wrote to Thomas Jefferson requesting that Congress promote him to admiral, backdated to his victorious 1779 battle off Flamborough Head. Angry and frustrated when the United States would not honor this request, Jones accepted Catherine's appointment, vainly hoping that when the United States eventually decided to reestablish a naval force, the country would see the wisdom of calling him to command it.[5]

The U.S. Navy was established in 1794, but it was to Capt. John Barry, not Jones, that President George Washington issued the service's first commission, in 1797. As, accordingly, the service's senior captain, he too used the courtesy title of commodore, connoting a captain who had command over other warships.[6] The service followed this approach for the next fifty years, during which the Navy firmly established its "service culture" and understanding of command. American commanding officers typically had individual orders and operated their warships independently, rarely operating in the context of a squadron or a fleet. Attempts to do so were governed by neither a refined strategy nor formal tactics and typically broke down in disputes over seniority and personal honor. In this context, a command culture arose that was based on a commanding officer's unquestioned authority over a ship's company, independence of action, and the expectation of quick and effective action in the absence of guidance or direction from seniors. Commanding officers on distant stations were governed by the intent conveyed by their broad initial orders, but they made their decisions in light of the situations they found on the scene.[7]

At the lower levels of the officer structure, the progress of an officer from the grade of midshipman to that of captain was relatively clear. After initial entry-level practical training on the job, at sea—or the U.S. Naval Academy, after it was established at Annapolis, Maryland, in 1845—one rose to the command of a warship by mastering the practical, technical, and procedural skills necessary in peace and war. One learned them by serving at sea in positions of increasing responsibility while being correspondingly promoted.

The prevailing culture of independent ship command continued, but in 1857, it became clear that there was a need to apply discipline among individual captains. To this end Congress created the temporary rank of "flag officer" for captains in command of squadrons;[8] the practical necessities of the Civil War led Congress to make it permanent in December 1861. Seven months later, on 16 July 1862, new

legislation discontinued the rank of flag officer and established, for the first time in the history of the Navy, those of rear admiral and commodore. At this point Congress intended the new ranks only for wartime, but soon the Navy began to award them to recognize exemplary wartime service, with the effect of preserving flag ranks beyond the conflict.[9] In 1864, during the war, Congress authorized the president to promote David Glasgow Farragut, the son of an immigrant from Minorca, to vice admiral for his victory at Mobile Bay. But after the war, in 1866, the Navy honored Farragut further by promoting him to full admiral and appointing in his place as vice admiral David Dixon Porter. With Farragut's death in 1870, Porter moved up to admiral, and another Civil War hero, Stephen C. Rowan, became vice admiral. These appointments affected only three individuals, who were essentially retired but retained administratively on active duty. With one exception, no other officers were promoted above the rank of rear admiral until 1915.[10] The one exception was Commo. George Dewey, who had won the battle of Manila Bay in 1898. Congress promoted him to rear admiral on news of that victory and in 1899 authorized the president to make him "Admiral of the Navy," a rank he held until his death. No successor has ever been appointed to that rank.

Aside from the particular cases of Farragut, Porter, Rowan, and Dewey, Congress retained its wariness about senior flag rank. Even after 1915 when the appointment of vice admirals and admirals resumed, these promotions were considered only temporary and ad hoc. After relief from a post for which, specifically, he had been promoted to one of those grades, an officer reverted to his permanent grade of rear admiral, from which he could not rise. This practice continued until 1944, when Congress created the five-star rank of "fleet admiral." A step below the level of Admiral of the Navy that George Dewey had held, the rank of fleet admiral was limited to officers who served in World War II. Only four naval officers attained it: William D. Leahy, Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, and William F. Halsey Jr. From that point onward, however, naval officers could retain the highest flag rank they had held on active service.[11]

FOUNDING THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Americans were both hesitant about using the title of admiral and largely indifferent to the professional aspects of higher naval command. Even in the service, little was done until 1833 with the establishment of the Naval Lyceum to provide a beginning for professional thinking; only in 1873 did a group of officers establish a permanent forum, the U.S. Naval Institute, in which to discuss such issues.[12] Before the Naval War College's first class convened in 1885, no formal training or preparation was available for naval officers taking up positions of high command and senior leadership. Nor was there much practical need for it until the Navy began to think of fleet operations and their support and direction; into the 1880s, American warships still operated independently, not in formations. The founding of the

Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, through the instrumentality of Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, marked a crucial change.[13]

In his introductory address to the College's class in 1886 Admiral Luce declared, "Now, it must strike any one who thinks about it as extraordinary that we, members of a profession of arms, should never have undertaken the study of our real business—war. For members of the naval and military profession it should be not only the principal study, but it should be an attractive study."[14] This view soon shaped the curriculum of the new College, which touched on topics ranging from tactics and strategy to history and international law. Luce was inspired in devoting the institution to preparing students for positions of high command and leadership by personal friendship with Brig. Gen. Emory Upton of the U.S. Army, who had studied the German army's General Staff, as well as with Professor Sir John Knox Laughton, author of the 1874 article "The Scientific Study of Naval History."[15] On the basis of their ideas Luce suggested a "comparative method" for stimulating naval thinking—comparison, that is, to land warfare. There was much to be learned by naval officers from the campaigns, biographies, and letters of such great military commanders as Marlborough, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Wellington.

Significantly, one of the first books the Naval War College acquired for its library, in 1885, was Clarke and M'Arthur's *Life of Nelson*.[16] Biography was (and has always been) the traditional source on specifically naval warfare; little existed in the way of focused professional studies. To fill that gap, Luce specifically selected Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan to undertake for the Naval War College two series of lectures. These lectures, which pioneered the link between naval operations and international politics, eventually became Mahan's famous *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (1890) and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire* (1892).

Taken as a whole, Mahan's argument has two major aspects: grand strategy and the naval profession. This second theme comprised naval command and operational leadership.[17] Mahan was deeply sensitive to the increasing emphasis on technology in navies, but to his mind, technology was not the key to success. "Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships," Mahan wrote.[18] "In following the story of Trafalgar it must be remembered that the naval superiority of Great Britain lay not in the number of her ships, but in the wisdom, energy, and tenacity of her admirals and seamen."[19] Mahan saw that there must be a balance between the science and art of command. Mahan believed that a critical study of history was the most important path by which future commanders might become able to exercise intelligent judgment in war. While history did not provide direct answers, the study of it helped to mature a leader's discretion in ways that the memorization of maxims and doctrine could not. Doctrine, Mahan thought, collected a framework of similar thoughts and thereby helped build cooperation,

an essential feature of successful operations, but was no replacement for intelligent judgment.[20]

Not often noticed among Mahan's works (and not a part of what is considered his four-volume sea-power series, which began with his two *Influence of Sea Power* titles) is a short biography of Admiral Farragut completed in 1892 as he was returning to Newport to begin his second tour of duty as President of the Naval War College. Its final chapter is a study of Farragut's character, a pioneering professional analysis of an American naval leader and of naval leadership.[21] As another author has written, "The history of Farragut's life is of importance less as a study of naval tactics, strategy and history than a study of the character of one whom many believe to have been the ideal of what a naval commander should be. He proved that kindliness, honor, love of friends and family, and a tolerant disposition are not incompatible with inflexibility in discipline and greatness as a warrior. But the secret of this success in war was in straight thinking and determined action."[22] The study of Farragut's character closes with comparisons with the leadership of Nelson, St. Vincent, and other naval commanders.

Mahan completed his sea-power series with *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain* (1897) and *Types of Naval Officers Drawn from the History of the British Navy* (1901). The latter looked at the differing leadership styles of Edward Hawke, George Rodney, Richard Howe, John Jervis, James Saumarez, and Edward Pellew. As Mahan put it, "Eminent all, though in varying manner and degree, each illustrated a distinct type in the same noble profession."[23] Jervis (Lord St. Vincent) had broad intuition and farsighted views that he manifested in spontaneous and relentless action. Howe's actions were marked by conscientious and painstaking effort that rose to greatness in emergencies. Mahan considered Saumarez and Pellew (Lord Exmouth) able and devoted flag officers but not great: Saumarez the exemplar of a fleet commander's principal subordinate, Exmouth of the innate seaman and energetic warrior who does best on detached service.[24]

Leadership studies at the Naval War College continued along such biographical lines for many years. In general, however, in the first quarter-century of its existence, the College developed from voluntary original research to the systematic creation of the art and science of naval warfare, as Admiral Luce had intended. Over that period its approach to senior-level professional naval education matured. The chief contributions were Mahan's lectures and books on strategy, command, and leadership; Cdr. Charles Stockton's work toward a body of law of naval warfare; and Capt. Henry C. Taylor's adoption into the curriculum of Lt. William McCarty Little's adaptation of German *Kriegspiel* to create naval war gaming.[25]

THE APPLICATORY SYSTEM

The next phase in the professional development of senior officers at the Naval War College began in 1909, when Cdr. William L. Rodgers returned to Newport after

serving as liaison officer at the newly established Army War College in Washington, DC. Its first commandant, Brig. Gen. Tasker Bliss, who had been the first military faculty member at the Naval War College as a lieutenant in 1885–87, was genuinely interested in establishing a connection with Newport. Among other things, Bliss introduced the joint study of war problems by the two colleges. Bliss's successors continued his initiatives, and the first naval officers attended the Army War College in 1906–1907. Rodgers returned with ideas that the Army had developed about the German General Staff and the methods by which it trained its staff officers. Rodgers was particularly interested in what the Germans called "the applicatory system," which several American army officers attempted to adapt. Maj. C. H. Barth's 1906 translation of Otto von Griepenkerl's *Letters on Applied Tactics,* Maj. Eben Swift's *Field Orders, Messages and Reports* (also 1906), and Army captain Roger S. Fitch's 1909 *Estimating Tactical Situations and Composing Field Orders* became the standard reference works for the Navy as it began to develop its own applicatory system.[26]

Over the next half-century, the Naval War College developed and refined this task-oriented approach in its curriculum. The applicatory system as adapted by the College focused on three major elements: the estimate of the situation, the philosophy of the order form, and naval war gaming to demonstrate the applicatory system in practice. The "estimate of the situation" imposed a logical mental process by which admirals and senior commanders reached and expressed tactical or strategic decisions. Its preparation involved four sequential steps:

1. Statement of the naval commander's mission
2. Assessment of the strength, disposition, and likely intentions of an enemy force
3. Evaluation of the disposition and strength of one's own forces
4. Determination of the courses of action open to achieve the mission

This estimate was not a prescription for action but a structured and logical method for analyzing particular operational naval problems.

The next phase of the system was the thinking through and drafting of orders. Future admirals learned to write their orders clearly, logically, and in a consistent format, an "order form." They also learned in this phase that there were different types of orders, appropriate to varying levels of command authority. Now, all concerned understood what was involved in any strategic or tactical situation. Juniors remained in their subordinate roles, but equipped with knowledge of the situation and their seniors' reasoning and decisions, they could and were expected to execute their orders intelligently. In place of blind obedience, subordinates could now adapt to the fluid and ever-changing conditions of war, applying the means at hand to achieve their seniors' objectives.[27]

The implications of these new approaches were profound for the U.S. Navy. In the past, juniors had simply obeyed the directions of their seniors without question. In the earliest years of the U.S. Navy, both autocratic and paternalistic styles of leadership had predominated. In the early nineteenth century "relationship-oriented" leadership had emerged in response to pressure for the abolition of flogging and concern for the conditions under which seamen worked. Relationship-oriented leadership emphasizes human interrelationships in groups and is more concerned with the overall well-being and satisfaction of group members than with meeting tasks. That style was replaced when the new ideas of the applicatory system entered the Navy in 1909–10 with "task-oriented" leadership, wherein the focus is on the tasks that need to be performed to meet defined goals. In the Navy's case, that more regimented system was modulated by an expectation of intelligent execution of orders, based in turn on a common understanding among junior and senior officers about actions and procedures.

The concepts of the applicatory system soon became identified as "doctrine," something that had not previously existed in the U.S. Navy before 1910 and now needed development—not an easy task, as the senior officers of the day had been initially trained in the age of sail. Additionally, the roots of naval service culture were rooted in the traditions and intangible values of the sailing navy. Naval warfare in the early twentieth century, with its burgeoning technologies, increasing mobility, and growing firepower, required a more comprehensive approach. The mental processes involved in the estimate of the situation and the disciplined philosophy of order writing filled the intellectual need and became the basis for the new American doctrinal approach to naval science.[28]

There was steady progress in developing this body of thought from 1910 into the 1940s. Capt. William S. Sims made one of the first notable contributions. A graduate of the Naval War College's first two-year "Long Course" in 1912, he went on to develop tactical doctrine as Commander, Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla, in 1913. Sims's aide in that post, Lt. Cdr. Dudley W. Knox, made the next significant advance. Knox had graduated from the College's long course of 1913, the next after Sims's. In 1915, he published the first public statement of the Navy's understanding of naval doctrine in a prizewinning essay, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare."[29] On Sims's return to the College presidency in 1919 (in his permanent grade of rear admiral) after having commanded U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters during World War I as a temporary four-star admiral, he reinvigorated the institution through his reflections on his own experiences in the war. Sims reorganized the College into five departments, among them the Command Department, which taught all aspects of the applicatory system as well as leadership and doctrine.[30] That department was nominally headed by the College's chief of staff, a rear admiral; now-Captain Knox effectively led it during Sims's presidency.[31]

During the interwar period, the Naval War College focused increasingly on the tactical level of fleet operations. In these years, repeated examinations of the battle of Jutland by wargaming allowed students to examine the leadership of the key figures involved and to draw conclusions about their effectiveness.[32] They also assessed the battle from the standpoints of tactics and the performance of different types of ships, but it was only in the area of individual leadership that students reached notably different conclusions.[33] Relatedly, Sims began to broaden the curriculum, with assistance from professional academics. In 1920 he brought in William Ernest Hocking, professor of philosophy at Harvard. Hocking regularly returned to the College, lecturing on such topics as morale, psychology, and leadership.

SOUND MILITARY DECISION

Rear Adm. Edward C. Kalbfus, who became President of the Naval War College in 1934, began a substantial effort to revise the course materials, organized as a short pamphlet, used to teach the estimate of the situation. Kalbfus wanted to replace it with a book on the art of logical thinking, one that would be an appropriate guide to any military or naval situation. Kalbfus asked Professor Hocking to deliver a lecture, "Logic and Its Process," then directed the faculty to use that lecture as the foundation of a new publication. Kalbfus made little progress during his first year. In the following year, Maj. Edward S. Johnston, U.S. Army, joined the senior class of 1936. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Indiana University, where his father was head of the Latin Department, Johnston had already made a name for himself as a military thinker and critic of the *Army Field Service Regulations* for failure to deal with the fundamental factors in warfare. In the year before coming to Newport, Johnston had been at the Army War College, where he had served on a committee that examined those fundamental factors with respect to planning and executing joint operations.[34]

Johnston played a critical role in the drafting of the Naval War College's new booklet, which Kalbfus entitled *Sound Military Decision*. First printed in 1936, it was notable—and controversial—for abandoning the Army's doctrinal "nine principles of war." Such views of the principles were typical in the Navy—Kalbfus was only the latest to object to them—but there had been many other criticisms of the draft text as well. Some thought it too long, some too ponderous, and others too complicated. Three prominent faculty members at the College—Capt. Raymond Spruance, head of the senior class tactics department; Capt. Robert Theobald, head of the senior class strategy department; and Capt. Richmond Kelly Turner, advisor on air operations—all had criticisms of the first draft, most of which were incorporated into the 1936 printed version.

The College continued to revise *Sound Military Decision* after Kalbfus left the College for the Battle Force in 1936. Three years later Kalbfus returned for a second term as President of the College. Disapproving of what had been done to *Sound*

Military Decision in his absence, Kalbfus immediately began again to revise the work. He brought back to the College Edward S. Johnston, now a lieutenant colonel. With Johnston's help and in light of Kalbfus's own recent experience as a four-star admiral and Commander, Battle Force, Kalbfus added an entirely new section that filled a notable omission: "The Supervision of the Planned Action," which became the fourth and final step of the Naval War College's process.

"In war," Kalbfus wrote, "mistakes are normal; errors are usual; information is seldom complete, often inaccurate, and frequently misleading. Success is won, not by personnel and materiel in prime condition, but by the debris of an organization worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock of battle."[35] Emphasizing issues below the strategic level, he explained that the nature of warfare requires that every plan needs constant supervision and revision during its execution. Through the collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of new information, a commander will be able to maintain a grasp of both the progress of his forces and future possibilities. He can correct deficiencies and errors in the plan and its execution as he makes adjustments toward the attainment of the objective. Through this method, the commander can ensure that his forces conform their movements to the objectives and to each other, reapportioning strength to meet new conditions, comparing actual losses with those he had anticipated. Taking appropriate measures for freedom of action, the commander will evolve and adopt a plan. If the old plan requires changes to its broader aspects, he will make such changes. Otherwise, the commander will modify details of his plan as the situation may demand, always endeavoring to retain the integrity of its larger aspects and objectives.[36]

The key to this final step was the "running estimate of the situation," which forced the commander to evaluate the situation continually and adjust his orders in light of it. The Chief of Naval Operations during World War II, Adm. Ernest J. King, summarized in this way his idea of leadership, one that reflected both his Naval War College education in the 1930s and his own historical and biographical study: "Leadership requires the capacity to grasp the essentials of a particular job—plus the ability to impart knowledge and directions to subordinates in such manner that they can effectively do their several parts without close supervision."[37]

The approach that the Naval War College had taken up in 1909–10 reached its apogee with the 1942 publication of *Sound Military Decision*.[38] It was the most important expression of the College's teaching and influence in the interwar years. When the United States entered World War II in 1941, nearly every flag officer eligible for command at sea understood its concepts and procedures. Widely distributed throughout the Navy and reprinted several times during the war, it was the Navy's only guide to operational planning and execution in that period. Some officers found the manual too ponderous and academic to use directly, but the underlying ideas found extensive application. For instance, the "Nimitz Gray Book"—the

Pacific Fleet staff's running estimate of the situation—clearly shows that Admiral Nimitz followed *Sound Military Decision* in that he supervised execution, revised his assessment, and adjusted his orders throughout the Pacific War.[39]

AFTER WORLD WAR II

From the late 1930s to the 1950s, the leading student of military leadership in the United States was Douglas Southall Freeman. He was for thirty-four years the editor in chief of the *News-Leader,* the major afternoon newspaper in Richmond, Virginia. He was also, as a sideline to his daily newspaper work, the most prominent military biographer in the country. His four-volume biography of the best-known Confederate general during the American Civil War, *R. E. Lee,* was published in 1934–35 and was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in Biography in 1935. The prize led the Army War College in Washington, DC, to invite Freeman to give the first of many lectures on military leadership. Freeman's next work was *Lee's Lieutenants,* whose three volumes appeared between 1942 and 1944 and were widely read in wartime military circles. His final major work was his seven-volume study *George Washington,* published between 1948 and 1957, which earned a second Pulitzer Prize in 1958, five years after his death.

Freeman lectured at the Naval War College in 1948 and 1949. In 1948, in his first presentation for a primarily naval audience Freeman argued that the great American commanders have all been men of character. For Freeman, character was the most important quality in a leader. As he later defined it,

> [Character] is that quality of man which is going to make a man, in an hour of strain, do the just and if possible the generous thing. Character is that quality of mind which makes truth-telling instinctive rather than strange. Character is the essence of all that a man has seen in life and regards as high and exalted. Character is like truth, the substance of the things that a man has forgotten but the substance of things that are worth remembering in life. Character is the starting point from which we go on.[40]

Freeman held that great American leaders had won their battles through superiority of numbers, equipment, and morale. If one element in this triumvirate of superiority were missing, the commander of character made up for it with overwhelming supremacy in one of the others. In 1949, Freeman spoke again at the Naval War College. On this occasion he gave his standard postwar lecture on leadership, one that he had delivered at many other institutions. By this time, the lecture had merged his historical studies of leadership with observations and discussions on many prominent American military leaders of World War II. It distilled his definition of leadership into three concise points that, emphasizing the relationship between officers and enlisted personnel, applied "on the deck plates" as well as to senior command: "Know your stuff," "Be a man," and "Look after your men."[41]

In the immediate postwar period, nearly every senior flag officer in the Navy had extensive wartime experience and had little time for or patience with the philosophical approach to command that had characterized the interwar years. Their

view of successful command leadership was epitomized by that of Adm. Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961. Burke pointed to decentralization as the critical facilitating element.

> Decentralization means we offer officers the opportunity to rise to positions of responsibility, of decision, of identity and stature—if they want it, and as soon as they can take it.
>
> We believe in command, not staff. We believe we have "real" things to do. The Navy believes in putting a man in a position with a job to do, and let him do it—give him hell if he does not perform—but be a man in his own name. We decentralize and capitalize on the capabilities of our individual people rather than centralize and make automatons of them. This builds that essential pride of service and sense of accomplishment.[42]

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND BUSINESS MODELS

The 1960s brought massive changes to all the military services, epitomized by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's procedural reforms. His process- and cost-management-centered initiatives, which had the effect of emphasizing civilian control over the armed forces, applied "systems analysis" and the insights of academics and industrial leaders to the Defense Department. The war colleges, which focused on professional military education, only slowly adapted to these changes, concentrating instead on the operational issues raised by current events, such as the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, by 1965 Edward J. Katzenbach Jr., director of the American Council on Education and McNamara's former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education and Manpower, was severely criticizing all the country's senior professional-military-education institutions. In an article entitled "The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," Katzenbach argued that the colleges had become so civilianized that they were no longer service oriented but at the same time did not reach the academic standard of civilian colleges and universities.[43]

Between 1966 and 1974, the Naval War College responded with two periods of reform. The first, under, successively, Vice Adms. John T. Hayward, Richard Colbert, and B. J. Semmes, began the process of raising the academic level and of teaching the new ideas of defense management more effectively. The second reform period, begun by Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner in 1972, has in many respects continued to the present. The "Turner Revolution" began with a reexamination of what was essential in the progressive education of a midcareer officer destined for senior command, focusing on first principles. At the same time, Turner's thinking returned the institution to the basic idea of its founder, Rear Admiral Luce, that the Naval War College was to be a "place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war."[44] In Turner's approach, studies of leadership were part and parcel of the historical case studies examining the elements of strategy and policy from the Peloponnesian Wars to World War II. Students read the book-length works of the best recent historians, leavened with the occasional novel, such as Stephen Crane's *Red Badge of*

Courage (1895) on combat experience in the American Civil War and C. S. Forester's 1936 *The General*.[45]

LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE: TO THE PRESENT

Turner's historical-case-study approach has continued to the present for the study of strategy and policy, but the teaching of leadership has evolved three different elements: ethical and moral dimensions, new management practices from industry, and social-science theories and applications. It has also evolved new structures in which to teach it.

Ethical and Moral Dimensions

In 1977, Vice Adm. James B. Stockdale became President of the Naval War College. Stockdale was a naval aviator who had been shot down over North Vietnam in 1965 and held as a prisoner of war for nearly eight years. Awarded the Medal of Honor on his release in 1973 for his valor and heroism as the senior American officer in the prisoner-of-war camp, Stockdale was uniquely qualified to improve aspects of the Naval War College's curriculum. In particular, he wanted officers to acknowledge more deeply the irrational and unpredictable elements of warfare. He introduced in 1978 into the electives program (the expansion of which was his most important contribution to the College) a course entitled "Foundations of Moral Obligation." He taught the course personally, team-teaching with Professor Joseph G. Brennan, professor emeritus of philosophy at Columbia University's Barnard College.

Stockdale's course began with *The Enchiridion* by Epictetus, an ancient Greek Stoic philosopher whom Stockdale had read toward his master's degree at Stanford University in 1962.[46] Other course readings were the Gospel of John, the Socratic dialogues of Plato, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* Immanuel Kant's *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,* and John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* and *Utilitarianism*. Stockdale supplemented these with selections from Albert Camus, Joseph Conrad, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and others before returning to *The Enchiridion* and ending with a careful study of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ethic of silence. Professor Brennan elucidated the readings with lectures for the course, which he continued to teach for the next fourteen years.[47] To Stockdale, the point of the course was that individual character, freedom, and personal responsibility were more important for a moral life than a "rule book."[48]

Stockdale's innovative and influential course at the Naval War College coincided with the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and the resignation of President Richard Nixon, especially the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. This legislation dealt with ethics at a level entirely different from that which Stockdale had discussed, but it ushered in a series of laws and regulations that are in force today to promote ethical conduct in the armed forces and among civilian government employees.

Management Practice and Social-Science Theory

In the 1950s and 1960s the American engineer, statistician, and management consultant W. Edwards Deming became highly influential in Japan through his advocacy among Japanese industrial leaders of what he called "Statistical Product Quality Control." Many credited him with being the inspiration behind Japan's economic recovery after World War II and the ideas of "Total Quality Management" in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1984, the U.S. Navy began to work with this approach for aviation supply. In 1990, the Chief of Naval Operations adopted the method, renamed "Total Quality Leadership" (or TQL), for leadership throughout the entire service.[49]

Based on Deming's management philosophy for improving product quality, TQL was designed to improve mission effectiveness by applying to the management of organizations theories of variation and systems, psychology of work, and use of the scientific method.[50] Under this system, leaders were to

- Teach their people how the work of the group supported the aims of the organization.
- Act as a coach and counselor, rather than simply as a judge.
- Not rely solely on formal authority but rather develop systems knowledge and interpersonal skills. "Be an unceasing learner. Encourage everyone to study."
- Create an environment that encourages participation and innovation.[51]

TQL remained the Navy's basic leadership approach into the early twenty-first century, when newer variants from industry, such as "Lean Leadership" and "Six Sigma," began to be used.

The College of Operational and Strategic Leadership

On 1 October 2007, the President of the Naval War College, then Rear Adm. Jacob Shuford, formally established a new entity within the school specifically to deal with leadership issues: the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL). It was initially headed by retired rear admiral Thomas E. Zelibor, who was followed as dean by, successively, Dr. Thomas Bayley and Rear Adm. James D. Kelly. (This new organization was the sixth "college" within the Naval War College, the others being the College of Naval Warfare, for senior-level American students; the College of Naval Command and Staff, for intermediate-level American students; the Naval Command College, for senior international officers; the Naval Staff College, for intermediate-level international officers; and the College of Distance Education, for off-campus, correspondence, and Internet-based courses.)

Several developments led to the creation of COSL. In 2005, a proposal to bring the Naval War College (and its component colleges), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Naval Academy under one organization, the "Naval University," led instead to the expansion of the Naval War College's responsibilities. In addition to

its traditional focus on intermediate- and senior-level officer professional military education, the College took up responsibility for professional military education above and beyond the entry level for all personnel, officer and enlisted, in the Navy. Second, the College was to develop and to deliver the Joint/Combined Force Maritime Component Commanders' (JFMCC/CFMCC) Course for selected groups of flag and general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service, focusing on the operational level of war. The College of Operational and Strategic Leadership was the Naval War College's organizational response to these new tasks; it was to marshal for the purpose a wide range of team assistance, courses, panels, seminars, and discussion groups. Within COSL was created the "Stockdale Group," in which selected students would examine issues surrounding strategic and operational leadership. The new officers appointed each year to the Stockdale Group built cumulatively on the previous years' work to develop a set of recommendations.

The idea of strategic and operational leadership as a specific type of leadership was one that had not been developed fully among naval scholars. In response to this challenge, the Naval War College's Maritime History Department undertook a volume of comparative biography, a pioneering attempt to identify, for twentieth-century American naval officers who had been effective in the highest levels of operational leadership, strategic planning, and interaction with coalition allies and partners, the specific factors that led to success.[52] Twenty-one scholars joined in the effort to produce a volume of nineteen biographical case studies. This work found, across the case studies, that individuals who demonstrated an affinity for work in strategic, operational, or diplomatic leadership had not been taught that capacity but had learned it on the job and by the examples of their seniors.[53]

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

In January 2013, Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, then Chief of Naval Operations, issued "The Navy Leader Development Strategy." Drafted by the College of Strategic and Operational Leadership, this document laid out a "continuum"—a comprehensive, career-long process—that integrated four elements: experience, education, training, and personal development. At the top level of the continuum were the flag officers, who were expected to be guardians of the Navy's core values of honor, courage, and commitment; exemplars for the Navy of moral character; forward thinkers, strategic in their judgments; stewards of the naval profession of arms; and conveyors of the highest standards of strength, determination, and dignity.[54] Admiral Greenert's successor, Adm. John M. Richardson, issued a revision in January 2017 entitled the "Navy Leader Development Framework," modifying it with "Version 2.0" in April 2018 and "Version 3.0" in May 2019. The latter emphasizes two lanes by which to achieve its goals: operational and war-fighting competence and character to behave by the Navy's core values:

> As effective Navy leaders, we must demonstrate a deliberate commitment to grow personally and professionally throughout our careers. We work from a foundation of humility, embracing our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. We pursue excellence in accordance with our core attributes of integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness. We commit to improving competence, character, and connections in ourselves and in our teams. We set ambitious goals and then inspire our teams to achieve the best possible performance.[55]

For the highest levels, the framework emphasizes that "*senior leaders are judged by the performance and character of their teams.* The standard for personal performance and character remains extremely high—this is a given. What distinguishes senior leaders is their ability to consistently and sustainably inspire our teams to constantly improve, to continuously perform at 'best ever' levels, and to win."[56]

The Naval War College played an essential role in the implementation of this framework, providing original research, insight, and teaching. The President of the College, then Rear Adm. Jeffrey A. Harley, moved the leadership and ethics components of the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership to a new deanery, Leadership and Ethics, under the direction of retired rear admiral Margaret D. Klein. This new organization quickly established a Graduate Certificate of Leadership and Ethics that students at the College could earn through a ten-month series of focused electives, in addition to the core course for one of the master's programs. The elements of the certificate formed the basis for shorter, four- or five-day, courses for flag officers across the U.S. Navy.

The hallmark of this new program was a focus on the individual leader, through psychological and personality assessments and self-examination of character, values, and moral standards. This approach was aimed at finding hidden biases and problem areas in which an individual needed further development. A key element was understanding oneself and adjusting one's leadership style to the ethos of the naval profession of arms.[57] It capitalized on the still-prevailing culture of American naval command that stretched back to the founding of the service in the eighteenth century. It did not prescribe a particular approach to leadership but built up the ability of individuals to deal with a multiplicity of independent missions and tasks.

The U.S. Navy has traveled a long way in its understanding of what has been called "admiralship."[58] For its first century, institutional thinking about the leadership of senior captains and admirals in the U.S. Navy was nonexistent. Historical studies began only in the mid-1880s, with the founding of the Naval War College. By the first half of the twentieth century, the emphasis changed from the heroics of individual commanders with authoritarian and paternalistic styles of leadership to leadership of interrelated organizations and relationships within organizations. Defining leadership in ways that would be useful in the Navy is a challenge that has defeated academics. At the same time, the Navy's culture has, for most of its history, tended to define professional education as a cost rather than an investment.[59] The

results were, in the late twentieth century, the widespread application of business and industrial management practices to senior naval leadership and a new concern for the ethical and moral responsibilities of senior leaders. Most recently, the focus has shifted yet again, to the development of individuals within the ethos of the naval profession. At the same time, the current understanding of senior naval leadership often recalls the characteristics of individual ship commanders of the early years of the American republic: taking charge at sea, carrying out individual missions, and acting independently under only general supervision.

NOTES This article will ultimately appear in Richard Harding and Agustín Guimerá, eds., *Naval Leadership in the Atlantic World, 1550–2019: Strategic, Operational and Tactical* (forthcoming). It appears by courtesy of the coeditors.

1 On the political issues, see John B. Hattendorf, "Debating the Purpose of a Navy in a New Republic: The United States of America, 1775–1815," in *Ideologies of Western Naval Power, c. 1500–1815,* ed. J. D. Davies, Alan James, and Gijs Rommelse (New York and London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 280–99, and Craig L. Symonds, *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785–1827* (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1980).

2 William P. Leeman, *The Long Road to Annapolis: The Founding of the Naval Academy and the Emerging American Republic* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2010), p. 5.

3 *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 22 December 1775; Diary of Richard Smith; and "Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies"; all in William Bell Clark et al., eds., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964–), vol. 3, p. 207; p. 209; vol. 2, pp. 1174ff.

4 *Journal of the Continental Congress,* 15 November 1776, in ibid., vol. 7, pp. 179–80.

5 Samuel Eliot Morison, *John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959), pp. 360–61; Evan Thomas, *John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), pp. 267–70.

6 Tim McGrath, *John Barry: An American Hero in the Age of Sail* (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2010), pp. 423–24.

7 Gene R. Andersen, "Historical and Cultural Foundations of Navy Officer Development," in *Cultivating Army Leaders: Historical Perspectives—The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2010 Military History Symposium,* ed. Kendall D. Gott (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011), pp. 197–203. See also Louis Arthur Norton, *Captains Contentious: The Dysfunctional Sons of the Brine* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 2009).

8 Donald Chisholm, *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 230, 232, 251, 259, 264.

9 Ibid., pp. 290–91, 295, 349.

10 William B. Cogar, *Dictionary of Admirals of the U.S. Navy,* vol. 1, *1862–1900* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. xi–xvi; vol. 2, *1901–1918* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. ix–xiii.

11 Act of 23 March 1946, ch. 112, 60 Stat., p. 59.

12 Claude Berube, "The Crucible of Naval Enlightenment," *Naval History* 28, no. 5 (October 2014), available at www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2014/october/crucible-naval-enlightenment; Leeman, *Long Road to Annapolis,* pp. 130–41.

13 On the development of a fleet, see James C. Rentfrow, *Home Squadron: The U.S. Navy on the North Atlantic Station* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014).

14 Stephen B. Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," in *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce,* ed. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, Historical Monograph 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1975), p. 50.

15 Andrew Lambert, *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession* (London: Chatham, 1998); Lambert, ed., *Letters and Papers of Professor Sir John Knox Laughton, 1830–1915* (London: Navy Records Society, 2002).

16 Rev. James Stanier Clarke and John M'Arthur, *The Life and Services of Horatio Viscount Nelson, Duke of Bronte, Vice-Admiral of the White, K.B., etc., from His Lordship's Manuscripts* (London: Fisher, Son, 1840). See John B. Hattendorf, *Trafalgar and Nelson 200: Catalogue of an Exhibition of Rare Books, Maps, Charts, Prints, Models, and Signal Flags Relating to Events and Influences of the Battle of Trafalgar and Lord Nelson* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Museum, 2005), p. 14, available at permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo109166/trafalgarexhibit.pdf.

17 For a detailed analysis of Mahan's thinking, see Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1997), pp. 6–7.

18 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1892), vol. 1, p. 102.

19 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 141.

20 Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy,* pp. 67–68.

21 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Admiral Farragut* (New York: D. Appleton, 1892), pp. 308–26.

22 "David Glasgow Farragut, 5 July 1801–14 August 1870," *Naval History and Heritage Command,* www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/research-guides/z-files/zb-files/zb-files-f/farragut-davidg.html.

23 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Types of Naval Officers Drawn from the History of the British Navy with Some Account of the Conditions of Naval Warfare at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century, and of Its Subsequent Development during the Sail Period* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1902), p. 477.

24 Ibid., pp. 477–78.

25 John B. Hattendorf, B. M. Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), chaps. 2–3.

26 Ibid., pp. 69–71.

27 Ibid., pp. 72–73.

28 Ibid., p. 74.

29 Dudley W. Knox, "The Rôle of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 41, no. 2 (March–April 1915).

30 On Sims, see Benjamin F. Armstrong, ed., *21st Century Sims: Innovation, Education, and Leadership for the Modern Era, 21st Century Foundations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015).

31 On Knox, see David Kohnen, ed., *21st Century Knox: Influence, Sea Power, and History for the Modern Era,* 21st Century Foundations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016).

32 David Kohnen, with Nicholas Jellicoe and Nathaniel Sims, "The U.S. Navy Won the Battle of Jutland," *Naval War College Review* 69, no. 4 (Autumn 2016), pp. 123–45, available at digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/11.

33 Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars,* p. 142.

34 Ibid., p. 157. See also "Edward Scott Johnston," *Find a Grave,* 6 March 2010, www.findagrave.com/memorial/49239266/edward-s-johnston.

35 Naval War College, *Sound Military Decision* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1942), chap. 9, available at www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/28178.

36 Ibid.

37 Buell–Whitehill–Fleet Admiral E. J. King collection, Ms. Coll. 37, box 5, folder 10, p. 0134, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

38 A scholarly edition still in print is *Sound Military Decision,* with an introduction by Frank M. Snyder, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992).

39 Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars,* pp. 157–61; Hattendorf, "Saving Nimitz's 'Graybook,'" *Naval History* 28, no. 3 (June 2014), available at www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2014/june/saving-nimitzs-graybook.

40 Stuart W. Smith, ed., *Douglas Southall Freeman on Leadership* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1990), p. v (epigraph).

41 Ibid., pp. 205–14.

42 Adm. Arleigh Burke to Rear Adm. Walter G. Schindler, 14 May 1958, quoted in David A. Rosenberg, "Admiral Arleigh Burke," in *The Chiefs of Naval Operations,* ed. Robert William Love Jr. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 287.

43 Edward L. Katzenbach Jr., "The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (March 1965), pp. 34–41.

44 Stephen B. Luce, "An Address . . . ," in Hayes and Hattendorf, *Writings of Stephen B. Luce,* pp. 39–40.

45 For Adm. Stansfield Turner's changes to the curriculum at the Naval War College, see Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars,* pp. 274–95.

46 James B. Stockdale, "The World of Epictetus," *Atlantic Monthly* (April 1978). Stockdale elaborated on this in later lectures. See, for example, his two lectures collectively titled "Stockdale on Stoicism" available on the webpage of the Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership on the site of the U.S. Naval Academy, respectively www.usna.edu/Ethics/_files/documents/stoicism1.pdf and www.usna.edu/Ethics/_files/documents/stoicism2.pdf.

47 Joseph Gerard Brennan, *Foundations of Moral Obligation: The Stockdale Course* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1992).

48 Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars,* pp. 309–11.

49 Archester Houston and Steven L. Dockstader, *Total Quality Leadership: A Primer* (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Dept. Total Quality Leadership Office, 1997), p. 11, available at www.balancedscorecard.org/portals/0/pdf/primer.pdf.

50 Ibid., p. 13.

51 Ibid., p. 33.

52 John B. Hattendorf and Bruce A. Elleman, eds., *Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010).

53 Ibid., p. 257.

54 "The Navy Leader Development Strategy," 2013, pp. 7, 11, available at www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=748304.

55 "Navy Leader Development Framework, Version 3.0," May 2019, p. 2, available at www.navy.mil/cno/docs/NLDF3May19.pdf.

56 Ibid., p. 6.

57 John Meyer, Deputy Dean, College of Leadership and Ethics, interview with John B. Hattendorf, Naval War College, 24 September 2019.

58 Edgar F. Puryear Jr., *American Admiralship: The Moral Imperatives of Naval Command* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), and *American Admiralship: The Art of Naval Command* (Minneapolis, MN: MBI, 2008).

59 Gene R. Andersen, comment during Hattendorf Historical Center Working Group discussion on an earlier draft of this paper, 1 October 2019.

XXVIII *The Idea of Maritime and Coastal Space in U.S. Naval Thinking since 1970*

The idea of maritime and coastal space has changed significantly in American naval thinking over the past half-century, but, in a modified form, it is still related to earlier thinking about the role of navies and freedom of the seas. American thinking on this subject falls into two major categories: legal and strategic.

In terms of classical American naval strategic theory—that is to say more accurately, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Anglo-American naval theory—the concept of conquering or occupying maritime space, as one would a land area, was explicitly rejected. Alfred Thayer Mahan famously observed that "the first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social view is that of a great highway, or better perhaps, a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions."[1] At the same time, Mahan also popularized the use of the term "command of the sea" as an important matter of national policy, national security, and for a great-power navy, national obligation.[2] In using this term, Mahan implied both the broad denial of an enemy's use of maritime space and asserting one's own use of it.

It was the British writer Sir Julian Corbett who defined the concept of command of the sea with precision, noting that the normal situation in naval warfare is an uncommanded sea that neither side dominates at the outset but command of which is the object of both. The analogy with conquest of land is false, Corbett declares, because "the sea is not susceptible of ownership, at least outside territorial waters."[3] "Command of the sea," he wrote, "means nothing but the control of communications, whether for commercial or military purposes."[4] While this definition is distinctly different from the occupation of land territory, Corbett saw that there is a clear analogy with a land victory that leads to the occupation of an enemy's inland communications and principal points of distribution. "It is obvious," Corbett explained, "that if the object and end of naval warfare is the control of communications it must carry with it the right to forbid, if we can, the passage of both public and private property upon the sea."[5]

The broad ideas about the fundamental nature of naval power and its purposes that Mahan initially expressed and that Corbett took into a more sophisticated statement of theory were the fundamental basis alongside which Anglo-American naval thinking developed and was applied in practice during the first half of the twentieth century.[6] It is significant that in that body of writing and practice, the emphasis is on free access to lands across the globe and strategic maneuverability on the oceans. One of the very few references to the occupation of maritime space is that quoted from Corbett: a passing reference to national sovereignty over territorial waters.

It is particularly interesting to see the historical background to this in the ideas of the eighteenth-century Dutch jurist Cornelis van Bynkershoek. He in a 1702 work was instrumental in furthering and refining the seventeenth-century thinking of Hugo Grotius toward an understanding that the extent of a coastal state's possession of the coastal sea depends on the effective power that the coastal state can project from the shore. In this regard control of the coastal areas by ships was considered ephemeral; the determining factor became the range of shore-based cannon shot. Half a century later, in 1758, the Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel endorsed this understanding, and soon afterward, in 1762, the cannon-shot measure became part of a treaty between Britain and Algiers. In a 1782 work on the principles of neutrality, the Neapolitan Ferdinando Galiani suggested the limit of three geographical miles, or one sea league. Ten years later, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson advocated this definition of the American territorial sea.[7]

THE U.S. NAVY AND CONCEPTS OF MARITIME SPACE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

A century and a half later, in the wake of the two world wars, developmental advances in weapons, improved commercial and military technologies at sea, and increased use of natural resources, some fundamental changes occurred in American national ocean policy and understandings of the broad context within which naval warfare should take place. First, the United Nations Charter of 1945 permitted nations to resort to force only in self-defense, when authorized by the UN Security Council or through a regional arrangement or agency. Second, President Harry S. Truman made two proclamations in 1945 that fundamentally changed long-held ideas about ocean space. First, Truman proclaimed that the seabed of the continental shelf contiguous to the United States, with its mineral resources, was no longer subject to the freedom of the seas. While the water over it was still the high seas, the seabed itself was now to be regarded as an extension of the landmass and subject to U.S. national jurisdiction and protection. In a separate proclamation, Truman established conservation zones for fisheries in areas of the high seas contiguous to American territorial waters, pointing out both the special rights of the coastal states involved as well as those of other states that had established interests in those fisheries.

These initiatives in 1945 on the part of the United States to widen its coastal jurisdiction on the continental shelf for the protection of fisheries were quickly matched by other nations, who developed their own separate views and claims. These differing views eventually led to a series of three United Nations conferences on the law of the sea, in 1958, 1960, and 1982. The last of these produced the twentieth century's most significant document on the law of the sea: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This huge document constituted nothing less than a constitution for the governance of the world's oceans.

An indirect result of UNCLOS has been a proliferation of navies and coast guards as nations exercise their rights and responsibilities in maritime areas. From a naval point of view, UNCLOS required fundamental changes to thinking about naval theory, strategy, and operations, particularly in regard to maritime space. While the concept of maritime space had been previously ignored beyond consideration of the narrow (three-mile, 5.5-kilometer) band of territorial water, UNCLOS created several new factors. A concept of baselines was established to serve as the basis for calculating territorial seas. The acceptable breadth of the territorial sea grew to twelve nautical miles (twenty-two kilometers), which increased the number of international straits that overlap territorial seas. A new idea of "archipelagic waters" was established involving straight baselines that connect outlying islands and drying reefs with the adjacent territorial sea of archipelagic states. These provisions reduced the neutral areas of the sea where belligerent naval operations could take place. In addition, the creation of exclusive economic zones, which extend up to two hundred nautical miles (370 kilometers) into the sea, along with the location of the continental shelf under the sea, requires belligerent forces to have due regard for the rights of coastal states in those maritime areas when engaged in hostilities between the territorial sea and the high sea and in waters over the continental shelf.

Overall, however, UNCLOS recognizes that government-owned vessels, including warships and military aircraft, have sovereign immunity from legal processes of foreign states. UNCLOS's limits on naval activities at sea deal with only a few carefully defined circumstances. For example, warships and military aircraft may neither threaten nor use force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of a coastal state while engaged in innocent passage, transit passage, or archipelagic sea-lane passage. Warships must transit through straits without delay. Additionally, submarines must pass on the surface, showing their own national flags. UNCLOS does not apply any of these or similar limitations to warships or aircraft in exclusive economic zones or on the high seas. However, there are some coastal states that seek to limit military activities in the exclusive economic zone. They have used a variety of legal arguments and interpretations to support their claims to bring military activities in these zones under their legal control as coastal states. In many cases, these claims have sought to identify a state's exclusive

economic zone as a security zone, asserting that it has a higher security interest in the zone than the international community. These claims to deny foreign naval access to coastal zones and prevent naval operations in the narrow seas are challenges to the use of maritime spaces that are critical to major-power naval operations.[8]

In dealing with these assertions, a number of countries have concluded that naval operations for self-defense in an exclusive economic zone are consistent with UNCLOS. Further, in 1985, the United Nations *Study on the Naval Arms Race* concluded that military activities at sea that are consistent with the UN Charter are not prohibited by UNCLOS.[9] Also, a range of international agencies have recognized a wide range of naval activities are lawful in an exclusive economic zone, including exercises and missile firings. Additionally, the International Maritime Organization and International Hydrographic Organization's Worldwide Navigational Warning Service has recognized military operations at sea as appropriate to create a "temporary naval area" for which appropriate warnings to mariners may be issued.[10]

The United States has consistently asserted the rights of all naval powers to the freedom of conducting military activities in the areas beyond the territorial sea, in both the exclusive economic zones and on the high seas. In supporting this view during the negotiations leading up to UNCLOS, the United States found strong support for its views on this matter from its archenemy and naval rival during the Cold War: the Soviet Union.[11] Since the 1970s, the U.S. Navy has been engaged in a series of formal protests and naval operations that assert America's long-standing support for the concept of freedom of navigation and overflight on a global basis.[12] One of the best known of these actions has been the series of incidents in the Gulf of Sidra, in which Libya has claimed the entire gulf as a territorial sea. Incidents between American and Libyan forces dealing with the freedom of navigation in or over the Gulf of Sidra occurred in 1973, 1980, 1981, 1986, and 1989.

To prevent international acceptance of or passive acquiescence to claims to maritime space that exceed the limits prescribed by UNCLOS, the United States makes diplomatic protests through the Department of State as well as asserts freedom of navigation by the operations of warships, submarines, and aircraft. In addition, the United States engages in bilateral and multilateral consultations with other governments in an effort to promote maritime stability and consistency with international law, stressing the need for all states to adhere to the customary international law rules and practices reflected in UNCLOS and their obligation to do so. In making these diplomatic protests and operational assertions of rights against excessive maritime claims that restrict the freedom of navigation, the United States believes, it is taking a position of international leadership. It further believes that all maritime states should make similar protests to prevent such excessive claims from being recognized under international law as accepted practice and thereby becoming binding on the international community. The U.S. policy and operational practice

of carrying out these protests is designed to be politically neutral, in the sense of not threatening the security of the coastal state involved, but rather to draw attention to the need for that state to revise its maritime claims to conform to the provisions of UNCLOS.[13]

This explicit policy to assert freedom of navigation was begun in 1979 during the Jimmy Carter administration and has continued to the present. President Ronald Reagan stated the continuing policy clearly on 10 March 1983:

> The United States will exercise and assert its navigational and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention [i.e., UNCLOS]. The United States will not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other high seas uses.[14]

The U.S. freedom-of-navigation program has continued but has gradually become less active in recent years. In the late 1970s and 1980s, when it had a navy approaching six hundred ships, the United States exercised freedom-of-navigation rights against the excessive claims of fifty different countries, averaging thirty to forty direct challenges a year. As the U.S. Navy gradually decreased in size to less than half that number, with 288 ships at the end of 2010, the number of operational assertions declined—to twenty-five in 1998, fifteen in 2000, and nine in 2008.[15]

The United States has signed, but not yet ratified, UNCLOS. Nevertheless, the Navy has consistently been a key advocate within the government recommending its ratification and encouraging its use by its own officers at sea.[16] Adm. Jay L. Johnson, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), stated the Navy's position clearly to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 29 June 2000:

> During the past decade, coastal states and regional groups of coastal states have continued their efforts to extend jurisdiction beyond that which is recognized and permitted under the Convention. Although the United States Navy does its best to counter those illegal extensions of jurisdiction by operationally challenging such claims and arguing that they are contrary to the principles of customary international law, we are increasingly marginalized, both internationally and domestically, by the fact that the United States has not acceded to the Convention.[17]

Another naval concern in regard to maritime space under UNCLOS is the implementation of the articles that obligate states and the International Maritime Organization to prescribe and to enforce regulations to preserve and to protect fragile undersea ecosystems in the exclusive economic zone.[18] The convention (art. 56) allows states to prescribe these regulations as long as the international community's freedom of navigation is not hindered. Under this authority, "Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas" have been established in places such as the Canary Islands, the Florida Keys, the Galapagos Islands, Australia's Great Barrier Reef, Malpelo Island in the Pacific, much of the Atlantic coast of Western Europe from Portugal to the Orkney Islands, and the entire Baltic Sea.

The largest of all these sensitive sea areas is the 144,000 square miles of sea that constitutes the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve.[19] It was created in 2000 by President Clinton, and President George W. Bush made it into a marine national monument in 2006. While this issue was under discussion within the government, the Department of Defense objected that it would be a precedent that undermined global freedom of navigation. However, the administration overruled the Defense Department's recommendations, and the United States has since sought the International Maritime Organization's recognition for the sanctuary.[20]

CONCEPTS OF MARITIME SPACE IN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THINKING

The basis of American naval strategic thinking is a body of literature quite different from the one that underlies American naval legal thinking about the law of the sea, but there are key interrelationships. In naval thought, the operations of World War II and aspects of the Cold War clearly resonate with early-twentieth-century strategic thinking of Mahan and Corbett. In both cases, two contending power blocs considered various types of fleet engagements. As occurred in international law, new elements in naval strategic thought began to develop after World War II. As the strategist Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie put it in the 1960s, "Prior to the middle of the twentieth century no one had set forth in writing the second half of the maritime theory of warfare, the exploitation of control of the sea toward the establishment of control on land."[21] This second phase, as Wylie noted, was "a diffuse and indirect process."[22]

> The pressure of exploitation was exerted largely through economic avenues with the resultant political and social by-products reinforcing the economic pressure. The blockade in all its forms and ramifications was a principal tool of exploitation of maritime strength. Of intermittent importance as a means of exploitation was the injection and support of armies in a sensitive land area, a process that was possible only to the power exercising control of the sea.[23]

It was only during the latter stage of World War II that navies developed means, equipment, and techniques to deliver successful amphibious assaults against determined resistance ashore. This wartime advance provided the basis for much late-twentieth-century development. The use of carrier-based aircraft for attack on land targets and technical progress from the 1950s in the submarine-launched ballistic missile brought new dimensions to the exploitation of sea control in aid of control on the land.

By the early 1970s, leading thinkers within the U.S. Navy had seen the need to revise traditional naval strategic concepts. Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner led off with new definitions of the missions of the service, asserting that the naval contribution to deterrence during the Cold War was a matter of "sea control," "naval presence," and "projection of power." These were new formulations that expressed significant

changes in naval thinking. All three involved concepts of utilizing maritime space but in a much more nuanced manner. As Turner pointed out,

> The new term "sea control" is intended to connote more realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods of time. It is conceivable today to exert air, submarine, and surface control temporarily in an area while moving ships into position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas forces. It is no longer conceivable, except in the most limited sense, totally to control the seas for one's own use or to deny them totally to an enemy.[24]

In 1978, an official naval study into alternative options for future naval force development, entitled "Sea Plan 2000," made some important conceptual observations. In the context of a conference discussion, it put forward the idea of "calibrated use of force against the shore."[25] The idea here was to use sea forces in ways ranging from containment of crises ashore to prevention of larger conflicts and to protection or evacuation of Americans from volatile situations.

These ideas from the 1970s were precursors to and incorporated and further refined in the Navy's maritime strategy of the 1980s.[26] A series of documents produced between 1982 and 1989 put forward the concept of "global forward defense" in the face of Soviet and Warsaw Pact naval rivalry. These several iterations, both classified and unclassified, reveal a process of incremental, detailed conceptual developments in maritime strategy across the decade of the 1980s, but the basic understanding remained consistent. The maritime strategy was in fact the maritime element of a national security strategy—based on both U.S. and NATO defense principles for deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity—that provided a framework for coordinated, global, forward operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Its key aspects were the mobility and flexibility of maritime power exercised in early deployment, forward posture, and initiative for offense.[27] In terms of concepts of maritime space, the maritime strategy of the 1980s responded to what American naval intelligence had identified as a strategy of "maritime bastion defense." In part, forward American naval presence was meant to deal with the Soviet bastion concept for its ballistic-missile submarine force, in part to keep the Soviet navy in its homeland-defense role and away from the open ocean where it could challenge the NATO sea-lanes.[28] In this regard, American naval intelligence estimates had shown that the Soviets had been thinking about maritime defensive zones around the Soviet Union. The U.S. Marine Corps's 1985 amphibious-strategy document characterized them:

> Initial estimated Soviet operating areas are composed of sea denial zones out to 2000 kilometers, which contain within them sea control zones. The sea denial zones engulf most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and several of our allies, extending far out into "blue water." These zones, if occupied, would sever the vital sea lines of communications.
>
> In the sea control areas, the Soviet threat would be multi-platform; in the sea denial zones, largely air and subsurface; and beyond the sea denial zones, largely subsurface.[29]

This Soviet thinking about maritime zones in terms of echeloned defenses contrasted with American assumptions of mobile and flexible naval forces, forward deployed and operating on a global scale without reference to specific zones.

Nevertheless, there was the practical matter of the maritime space occupied, on a mobile and temporary basis, by a carrier battle group's dispersed formation. In that period, such a formation could extend over 56,000 square miles, ships operating out to several hundred miles from the carrier, combat air patrol stations beyond that range, and air strikes at up to seven hundred miles from the carrier.[30]

This broad expanse of maritime space is a fundamental aspect of a carrier battle group's self-defense as well as of its projection of military power. Additionally, the very nature of maritime battle space had been transformed, into a highly complex interaction within the Navy and among the services for the coordination of ships, submersibles, and aircraft in their differing realms on the surface of the sea, under the sea, in the air over the sea, and in distant space. It also reached a considerable distance over land, to complement and directly support land forces.[31]

In the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, concepts of battle space were changed in adaptation to a new global strategic situation. The Navy suddenly found itself in an unusual situation: for the moment, it had neither a peer navy nor a potential superior naval adversary. At the same time, U.S. forces, including the Navy, were going through organizational changes as well as size reductions. Much of this restructuring focused on combined, interservice integration of planning, interoperability, and shared procurement, and routine operational cooperation. Thinking now emphasized joint operations—the Army, Air Force, and Navy working together—and created new concepts of joint battle space that transcended those of individual services. Among the many changes of this period, much greater emphasis was given to the maritime dimensions of battle space as well as projection of power from the sea onto the land. The 1992 official Navy and Marine Corps strategic statement, " . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," underscored that shift and placed particular stress on the "shift from a Cold War, open ocean, blue water naval strategy to a regional, littoral, and expeditionary focus."[32] "The littoral region," the Navy and the Marine Corps stated,

> is frequently characterized by confined and congested water and air space occupied by friends, adversaries, and neutrals—making identification profoundly difficult. This environment poses varying technical and tactical challenges to Naval Forces. It is an area where our adversaries can concentrate and layer their defenses. In an era when arms proliferation means some third world countries possess sophisticated weaponry, there is a wide range of potential challenges.[33]

The incremental development of ideas along these lines can be traced across the 1990s and into the first decade of the twenty-first century. In 2000, Chief of Naval Operations Jay Johnson approved and released a document entitled "Navy

Strategic Planning Guidance with Long Range Planning Guidance," a summary of cumulative thinking on the battle space. "Battlespace control," this document asserted, "encompasses the range of actions required to assure our access and shape the battlespace for naval, joint, and combined forces. Our enduring mission of sea control remains both a cardinal prerequisite for, and a unique naval contribution to, joint warfighting; it is essential to assuring the flow of follow-on forces into a theater."[34] However, the document cautioned, "it is no longer sufficient to think only in terms of sea or area control."[35]

The attacks of September 11, 2001, greatly changed the strategic situation of the United States and the rest of the world; nevertheless, many concepts and understandings about international law as well as maritime and battle space continued to inform naval operations. Mahan's striking concept of the sea as a "common" reemerged a century later, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as an expanded idea that included maritime space as well as airspace, cyberspace, and "outer" space.[36]

As an example, Adm. Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations from 2000 to 2005, in his "Sea Power 21" strategic statements, laid down the Sea Shield concept: ships establishing umbrellas of missile defense over both sea and shore areas as a maritime contribution to joint and allied operations. The subsequent "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" expands on Admiral Turner's thinking in the 1970s, adding to it maritime roles in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The concept of "maritime domain awareness" and the problems of modern piracy at sea, drug smuggling, and the movement of weapons of mass destruction at sea highlighted the constabulary roles of navies and the need to counter such threats from land, air, and sea.

Echoing those trends, Adm. Michael Mullen noted his concern as CNO in the February 2011 *National Military Strategy of the United States:* "Assured access to and freedom of maneuver within the global commons—shared areas of sea, air, and space—and globally connected domains such as cyberspace are being challenged by both state and non-state actors."[37] The overview in this paper has attempted to demonstrate that conceptions of maritime space, largely absent from and even rejected by classical naval thought, have become increasingly important over the past three decades.

NOTES This paper first appeared as "L'idée d'espaces maritimes et côtiers dans la pensée navale aux États-Unis depuis 1970," in *Entre terre et mer: L'occupation militaire des espaces maritimes et littoraux en Europe de l'époque moderne à nos jours,* ed. Jean de Préneuf, Eric Grove, and Andrew Lambert (Paris: Economica, 2014), pp. 109–22. Used by permission.

1 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), p. 25.

2 See, for example, A. T. Mahan, "The Importance of Command of the Sea," *Scientific American*, 9 December 1911, p. 512.

3 Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* with introduction and notes by Eric J. Grove, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 93.

4 Ibid., p. 94.

5 Ibid., p. 95.

6 See John B. Hattendorf, "The Anglo-American Way in Maritime Strategy," in Hattendorf, *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 2000), pp. 109–20. This essay is a summary of an analysis laid out in more detail in Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan, eds., *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1989).

7 David H. Anderson, "Early Modern through Nineteenth-Century Law," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History,* ed. John B. Hattendorf (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), vol. 2, p. 332.

8 See James Kraska, "Naval Force in the Exclusive Economic Zone," chap. 5 in *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), pp. 221–98.

9 Particularly UN Charter articles 2(4) and 51; U.N. Doc. A/40/535 (1985).

10 Kraska, *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea,* p. 256.

11 Ibid., p. 260.

12 For a detailed study and catalog of these issues, see J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, *Excessive Maritime Claims,* International Law Studies, vol. 66 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994), and *United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,* 2nd ed. (The Hague, Neth.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996).

13 Kraska, *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea,* p. 397.

14 United States Oceans Policy: Statement by the President, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 383 (10 March 1983), available at www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/031083-reagan_ocean_policy.pdf.

15 See Kraska, *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea,* pp. 400–403, and annex 1, pp. 431–41, for tables listing the countries against which the United States made operational protests on freedom of navigation between 1994 and 2008.

16 For an example of a manual provided to the U.S. Navy, see A. R. Thomas and James C. Duncan, eds., *Annotated Supplement to* The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, International Law Studies, vol. 73 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1999).

17 An electronic copy of the original signed letter may be seen at www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/ADMJohnson Ltr-Chairman-Helms.pdf.

18 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 194(5), 211, *opened for signature* 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S., p. 397.

19 *Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument,* www.papahanaumokuakea.gov.

20 Kraska, *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea,* pp. 372–73.

21 J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control,* with an introduction by John B. Hattendorf, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 34.

22 Ibid., pp. 34–35.

23 Ibid.

24 Stansfield Turner, "Missions of the U.S. Navy," in *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents,* ed. John B. Hattendorf, Newport Paper 30 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007), p. 39.

25 "Sea Plan 2000," in ibid., p. 115.

26 For background see John B. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986,* Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004).

27 John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz [Capt., USN (Ret.)], eds., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents,* Newport Paper 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008), pp. 21, 109, 139, 272.

28 Hattendorf, *Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy,* pp. 30–32, 84–85, 196, 246.

29 P. X. Kelley [Gen., USMC] and James D. Watkins [Adm., USN], "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, 1985," in Hattendorf and Swartz, *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s,* pp. 112–13.

30 "The Maritime Strategy, 1986," in ibid., p. 220.

31 See figure 6 illustrating "the complexity of modern naval warfare," in ibid., p. 222.

32 Frank B. Kelso II [Adm., USN], Sean O'Keefe, and C. E. Mundy Jr. [Gen., USMC], ". . . From the Sea," in *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents,* ed. John B. Hattendorf, Newport Paper 27 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006), p. 93.

33 Ibid.

34 "Navy Strategic Planning Guidance with Long Range Planning Guidance," in ibid., p. 202.

35 Ibid.

36 Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5–46. See also Scott Jasper, ed., *Securing Freedom in the Global Commons* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2010).

37 *National Military Strategy of the United States,* 8 February 2011, available at www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf.

XXIX *Statesmen and Sea Power*

Reflections on Aspects of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond's Thinking

The phrase "statesmen and sea power" immediately calls to mind Adm. Sir Herbert Richmond (1871–1946), who used it as the title for his series of lectures at the University of Oxford in Michaelmas term (October–December) 1943, when he served as Ford Lecturer in English history. It was also the title of the published version of the lectures that appeared, with the editorial help of Richmond's daughter Nora, just a few weeks before the admiral's death at the age of seventy-five on 15 December 1946.[1]

FORD LECTURES

A bequest to Oxford from an antiquary, James Ford, had established the annual series of Ford Lectures in English (for the past twenty years, British) History.[2] The series had been inaugurated nearly half a century after the death of its benefactor by the distinguished Oxford historian of the seventeenth century Samuel Rawson Gardiner in 1897. Today, these lectures normally take place in the Examination Schools over the space of six weeks during Hilary term (January–March). From the very beginning they were recognized as the most prestigious annual series of public lectures in history at Oxford, and the books that have come from the series, usually published by the Oxford University Press, have often become standards on their themes.[3]

Certainly Richmond's volume is among the important and widely read works that have emerged from that series. In fact, his Ford Lectures were a conceptualized summary of what Richmond intended to produce himself as his greatest work but did not live to complete. His unfinished manuscript *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy,* covering only the years from 1558 to 1727, was edited and published by the naval historian Edward Arthur Hughes in 1953.[4] After Richmond's death, Hughes had found attached to the manuscript a note that Richmond had written in March 1942 while he was seriously ill. It concluded, "I do hope that some-one will finish the book with a second volume, keeping in view the same object of explaining the main strategy of the war—not minor strategy, not tactics, no detailed descriptions

of campaigns, but outlines of what ministers intended and how their intentions were translated into terms of action."[5]

Richmond had written to the businessman and naval-gunnery innovator A. H. Pollen even earlier, in 1936, shortly after Richmond had become Master of Downing College, Cambridge: "I am working on an outline of British strategy from Elizabeth to 1918, with special reference to the statesman's problem and how he must use the Sea and Land forces he had at his disposal, and how the strategy worked out in practice—the perpetual clash between the two schools of thought, maritime operations and land operations in the main theatre on the continent."[6]

While Richmond's *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy* has remained an important interpretive volume on the years it covers, it lacks the broader view taken in *Statesmen and Sea Power*. For historians of naval policy and strategy, both are very important works. Most importantly, they aim at raising the naval historian's sights from the tactical and operational levels to the realms of policy and strategy; they examine primarily what statesmen, rather than admirals and captains, were thinking in their use of the navy to reach the nation's goals. This broader approach to naval history raises a number of issues and perspectives that are sometimes forgotten. Before we look at how we might think about these issues today, some seventy or eighty years after Richmond was contemplating the problem, it is worthwhile to think about how Richmond defined them.

THE OBJECT

Richmond's fundamental starting point was a thought that he took from the military historian Sir John Fortescue: "The statesman . . . has first to decide what object he wishes to attain and, having done that, on the best means for attaining it."[7] He complemented and expanded the concept with a further thought, which he took from the naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan: "The office of the statesman is to determine and to indicate to the military authorities the national interests most vital to be defended as well as the objects of conquest or destruction most injurious to the enemy."[8] The key phrase in Richmond's mind was "the object," which he took to mean the broad strategic purpose to be achieved or the strategic disadvantage to be avoided, as distinguished from a specific and concrete "objective" in a particular operation.

Richmond carefully differentiated between the "object *in* a battle" and the "object *of* a battle."[9] The former is an immediate operational goal, the latter a battle's ultimate strategic purpose. It may not be obvious to the casual reader today, but Richmond's distinctions concerning the "object" derived from "The Principles of War," which J. F. C. Fuller had put forward and which had been incorporated into the *Naval War Manual* in 1925. Richmond was one of the outspoken naval thinkers who did not accept Fuller's assertion that all eight principles were of equal importance. Richmond argued that "the object" was the overarching principle from

which the others flowed. Others agreed with Richmond, and eventually the British army removed "object" from the list of principles, placing it instead among the overarching ideas that introduced the other principles.[10] Richmond had the same criticism of the strategic theory that his mentor, Sir Julian Corbett, had put forward in *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*.[11]

THE ROLE OF STATESMEN

Richmond put the issue of the responsibility of statesmen for sea power very clearly:

> If the statesman misinterprets the nature of national defence or the ultimate object of a war, or fails to make the necessary preparations; if, in war, he misdirects the strategy employed for the attainment of the object; the results will be far more injurious than those of errors in minor strategy or tactics: for they are more far-reaching . . . ; they may render useless all the skill and courage of the fighting men at sea, on land, and in the air. Even if defeat is averted, success is deferred.[12]

In Richmond's argument, the key element is whether the statesman—or as he called it, "the directing hand"—makes effective and complete use of national resources in their numerous forms to use available force with superior strength at the decisive spot, at the decisive moment. As Richmond pointed out, whether that could be done depends on whether the nation has the strength to carry this out, whether it has the appropriate weapons at hand, whether those weapons are provided and maintained efficiently and effectively, and whether the fighting men and their tools "have been kept sharp or blunted by ill-considered policy, surrender of territory, of interests, or of rights concerning their use."[13]

For Richmond the statesman is the civil authority responsible for the maintenance of sea power in peace and its effective use in war as a national weapon:

> Its maintenance in peace consists in determining the policy of national defence and the part which sea power plays in it; deciding the standard of naval strength in relation to other Powers; providing and maintaining the fighting instruments at the required strength and efficiency, the bases necessary for their use, and the shipping and seamen which transport the armies and the commerce.[14]

Reading between Richmond's lines with twenty-first-century eyes, what he is suggesting here (but not explaining in any explicit way) is that in a modern state the term "statesman" is perhaps better used in the plural, encompassing the wider administrative, consultative, legislative, and political processes within government that produce the range of actions necessary to maintain and operate a navy under the broad leadership of a particular statesman.

THE NATURE OF SEA POWER

The other key element in Richmond's consideration was the nature of sea power. It is, he wrote, "that form of national strength which enables its possessor to send his armies and commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean which lie between his country or the countries of his allies, and those territories to which he needs access in war; and to prevent his enemy from doing the same."[15] The fighting instruments

of sea power, Richmond carefully pointed out, were not just capital warships but all kinds and types of vehicles that operate on, under, and above the surface of the seas and oceans of the world, ranging from the largest warship to submarines, motorboats, airplanes, and cargo and transport ships.

In Richmond's mind, three issues link statesmen with sea power:

1. The "fighting instruments capable of overcoming whatever resistance an opponent can offer to the desired movements of troops or trade across the sea, and of closing the sea to an enemy."
2. The "positions in which those fighting instruments can be continuously maintained and from which they can, readily and without undue expenditure of their powers of endurance, reach the scene of their operations and there remain as long as is needed for the fulfilment of their purposes."
3. The "vehicles of transport in which the troops and trade can be carried."[16]

Beyond these elements, Richmond understood clearly that sea power was also beyond the direct control of the statesmen but within the purview of those professionals who go to sea. Here, he made reference to what he called elements of a moral nature, which included the basic aptitudes, character, and courage that are essential to a seaman. While Richmond chose not to discuss those matters in his lectures or books, we in the twenty-first century might have suggested to him that one of the statesman's explicit roles today should be providing the funding, the facilities, and the qualified instructors for effective professional education and training. They might concern themselves as well with the moral support and encouragement of those in the naval services, the nurturing of their core values, and their professional understanding of the limitations, roles, experiences, and character of sea power. Today, such things do not come, if they ever did, by osmosis, by wearing a uniform. Richmond, more than most others, would have understood the interrelated professional value of historical research, museums, and education to assist and to promote deeper understanding within the naval profession, for the public, and in parliaments and ministries.

THE OBJECTS OF SEA POWER

The final element in this discussion of Richmond's thought is his understanding of the objects of sea power. Richmond had explained his thoughts on this point in earlier works: his contribution "Sea Warfare" to Maj. Gen. Sir George Aston's 1927 edited collection *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens,* his 1930 reprint of the piece in *Naval Warfare,* and the first chapter in his 1931 *Economy and Naval Security*.[17] It is these works that Daniel Baugh usefully analyzed for his 1993 analysis of Richmond's original thinking on sea power.[18] Briefly stated, Richmond's understanding of the "object" fell under two broad categories, assault and investment, which Richmond analyzed in both offensive and defensive roles.

Assault

In defensive terms, the most important object for the navy was to defend against invasion, whenever that threat arose. Richmond meant not a passive stance but rather an offensive defense that included active operations and preemptive strikes. In offensive terms, the objects included maintaining command of the sea to the extent needed to sustain military operations ashore in a major theater; launching diversionary operations; securing islands or regions that could be used to threaten an opponent's vital communications; and capturing enemy bases, to reduce the range of an enemy's naval power. A key part of Richmond's conception for naval assault was the essential need for interservice and interallied cooperation in both strategic planning and operations.[19]

Investment

This was a term that Richmond used as a shorthand for both the defensive and offensive aspects of the economic and logistic dimensions of naval warfare. In terms of investment, the most important role that Richmond saw in British naval history was the defense of trade and the protection of vital trade routes and supply lines throughout the British Empire from enemy pressure. On the offensive side of this, the navy could prevent an enemy from reinforcing or supplying a distant army. Additionally, it could put pressure on an enemy's national life by a general economic blockade.[20]

Directly related to investment were the role of allies and the need for statesmanship and diplomacy in dealing with them in a wide range of maritime issues. Key among these issues for wartime Britain was maintaining its traditional position of asserting belligerent legal rights at sea and preventing neutral rights from emasculating British sea power, preventing the Royal Navy from controlling the seas when and where needed.[21]

Notably, Richmond's discussion of the objects in naval warfare did not specifically include destruction of an enemy fleet. While he clearly understood that a concentration of enemy warships might overwhelm the defenses available in his time and that destruction of that fleet might therefore be an object *in* a battle, it was not the ultimate object *of* a battle. The real object of sea power was to use the sea for one's own purposes for assault or investment. Enemy naval forces blocking the ultimate object of operations were obstacles to be overcome in the process, but their defeat was not the ultimate purpose. Richmond saw clearly that to provoke a fleet battle is to take a great risk, even for a major navy, but also that it was heresy for a naval officer to suggest that a sea power could achieve its object without a battle. The clear roles for the statesman are to achieve a balance between the objects of sea power and to prioritize them for the naval service.[22]

RICHMOND IN RETROSPECT

Adm. Sir Herbert Richmond made a major contribution to the understanding of sea power in his time. His thinking significantly improved on and modified what we categorize today as classical Anglo-American naval theory, the sources of which were Sir John Knox Laughton, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett—and now Richmond as well. Richmond's thinking was a product of the light shined by his predecessors; his own historical studies in British naval history between 1558 and 1918; his experiences in naval service leading up to and during World War I; and his observations, from a distance, of navies from his retirement in 1931 until World War II.

When we look back on Richmond's thinking today, it seems curious that he did not stress the joint responsibilities of statesmen and commanders more explicitly, placing as he did sea power in the broad context of international, domestic, economic, and military considerations. Barry Hunt explains that Richmond had "his own experience of twentieth-century naval politics and their terrible legacy in two world wars pressing in on his thoughts, [as] he showed that it is the statesman who bears the ultimate responsibility for these developments in peace and war."[23] Hunt's point is a very good one; Richmond's purpose had been "to say something by way of guiding the statesman's uncertain steps" when faced with issues relating to navies and sea power.[24] Perhaps it was useful at the time to right the balance, but lacking this context a reader can form the impression that senior leaders can somehow wash their hands of the issue when in fact they share responsibility for carrying it out.

Richmond could be too one-sided. On one occasion, when he was commandant of the Imperial Defence College, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, took him to task for blindness to political realities. Richmond had asserted that "the Empire is, in fact, an alliance for the defence of the interests of all its members," to which Hankey retorted tartly, "Possibly two of the four Dominions would admit the truth of that, though there were days when Australia did not admit it. Neither Canada nor South Africa would admit it."[25] Richmond's didacticism was not entirely wrong, but it does overlook a part of the story that had been absent neither in history nor in Richmond's experience and has since become increasingly important.

Richmond's separation of the two realms is much too strict for our times but was typical of the professional viewpoint before and during World War II. As to how things have changed since, I would propose that while statesmen and uniformed officers operate within distinctive social, cultural, and procedural contexts, in terms of the conceptual distinction that Richmond was making the two should be seen as working at different levels of shared interests rather than in entirely discrete worlds, different from and foreign to one another.

Richmond had pointed out the responsibility of a statesman to provide resources, to establish policy and strategic priorities, and to make strategic choices. As recent experience has emphasized, these are really cooperative enterprises rather than strictly divided and separate realms of activity. Certainly there are stresses in this cooperative relationship, as has been illustrated in Britain in the context of Strategic Defence Reviews and in the United States by its Quadrennial Defense Reviews. Even though statesmen may be ultimately responsible for the decisions regarding preparedness in peacetime and the strategic conduct of the forces in wartime, they depend on professional effectiveness, advice, judgment, and information. By the same token, the uniformed services are dependent upon the decisions and choices that governments, ministers, and legislators make.

A statesman cannot procure something so complex as a modern aircraft carrier or a nuclear submarine without the technical understanding of the uniformed professionals who design, build, and go to sea in them. The choice to obtain such tools of sea power must rest on an agreed professional and governmental understanding of their utility in meeting a national strategic need—or, as Richmond would have put it, the object of sea power. This relationship was realized from the early twentieth century by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and Richmond had much to do with it. In the years that followed, it became the model for the American Joint Chiefs of Staff after World War II, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[26]

POST–WORLD WAR II THINKING

In the seventy years that have passed since World War II, the relationships between statesmen and sea power have grown even more complex and important than Richmond might have predicted. Although he was certainly aware of the need for statesmanship concerning navies in eras of violent peace, as seen in history, the experience of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has brought out a number of new dimensions. The traditional issues certainly affirm the need for the statesman to provide the means and funding for navies, in all their complexity.

The Cold War was, in some respects, remarkably different from the wars that Richmond had studied. The mutual thermonuclear deterrence that prevented direct conflict in Europe pushed actual fighting to the periphery in proxy wars. There, however, the objects for sea power that Richmond had discussed could be exercised, in such small-scale, limited wars as Korea and Vietnam. But the larger strategic context of the naval events reflected the global object, rather than the regional ones. As the Cold War progressed, the dominant focus on nuclear weapons gave rise to a heightened understanding of the latent political effects of weapons and of how the threat of their use had a power of its own. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, a number of writers and commentators—notably, Sir Laurence Martin, Sir James Cable, Edward Luttwak, and Ken Booth—collectively developed an

entirely new dimension of naval strategic thinking in terms of the statesmanship of sea power and the relationships of political power with navies.[27]

To apply Richmond's terms, the object in undertaking certain types of naval operations became the political message inherent in the latent deterrent force inherent in a powerful navy. In some ways the strict division in functions between naval officers and statesmen was eroded. While naval officers had traditionally carried out specific diplomatic missions on overseas stations at the direction of statesmen, the new situation demanded of them a new and sharper self-awareness of the political dimensions of even routine operations. The ideas of naval presence and naval diplomacy were developed more fully. In this context, a distinguished French author translated for a book title Oliver Cromwell's observation that a "ship of war is the best ambassador"—a blunt statement that he went on to develop in a much more nuanced way.[28]

The Cold War brought the need for closer relations among navies. While integrated multinational naval operations are not unknown in naval history, they have been few. As examples, one can think of the fleet of the Holy League at Lepanto, the Anglo-Dutch squadrons in the time of William III and Queen Anne, the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar, ABDA Command in the battle of the Java Sea in 1942, and allied operations during both world wars.

In 1968, under the cognizance of NATO, the first permanent multinational naval force was established: the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). At the outset, many felt it would be impossible to bring together on an equal basis warships, considering differences in language, training, communication equipment, and logistics support requirements. But it did work. It flourished for thirty-five years, later becoming Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1).[29] Its story would take us off in other directions, but the point here is that this NATO maritime coalition illustrates a subtle modification to Richmond's notion of the relationship between statesmen and sea power.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is itself interesting as combining the realm of the statesmen and diplomats with that of uniformed officers in ways that have become common since Richmond's time. Their interaction is no longer limited entirely to the very top levels of naval command. The rise and development of naval staffs—ashore, afloat, and in national capitals—has had much to do with this change from the traditional division that Richmond described. Additionally, the fact that most navies have since World War II been subsumed under larger ministries or departments of defense has added yet another dimension.

Richmond played a key role in the development of naval staff—as a founder of the *Naval Review,* a member of the Naval Staff, Admiral President of the Royal Navy College, Greenwich, and later the founding commandant of the Imperial Defence College—but he might not have foreseen how it would evolve, even if he

hoped for it. Naval staff colleges and naval war colleges have been educating their students for their careers differently than they did before World War II. From the 1960s and '70s, and certainly after 2001, there have been even more changes.

The changes are directly focused on the development in officers of critical thinking and analysis and broad understanding of their roles and of their interactions throughout government. In effect, these changes recognize that modern sea power is best exercised not as a unitary and isolated instrument of power but as an element of a coordinated grand strategy that achieves the aims of national policy. Naval officers must, of course, learn their trade of handling warships and aircraft in the unique and unforgiving conditions of the open ocean and off dangerous shores; their skills and traditions remain distinctive in that regard. But from midcareer onward—if not earlier—naval officers need to be made fully aware of how sea power interacts with and complements other elements of armed force in joint operations. Combined operations (i.e., with other countries) are also important in the context of alliances as well as less formal arrangements. Richmond was fully aware of these needs and was a prominent advocate for them; today there is an even wider appreciation that they are needed—indeed, required.

The effects of this demand for wider professional understanding can be seen in numerous ways today. One sees it in the classrooms of the U.S. Naval War College, where only half the uniformed students are naval officers; the rest are from other services or (a significant percentage) civilians from government agencies and congressional staffs. One sees it in the increasing numbers of officers who need to learn foreign languages. One sees it in the increasing number of officers sent on exchange to other navies at sea as well as in staff and war colleges. One sees it in encouragement to naval officers to become regional or area specialists.

In the United States in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, it was revealing to see municipal, state, and regional governmental agencies using naval wargaming facilities to improve their emergency command and control procedures. One now sees naval officers sent to obtain advanced degrees in international relations and then to agencies outside the navy devoted to foreign policy studies. On the other side, a naval commander in chief may well have a political advisor on his immediate staff. In these many ways, then, the realms of the naval officer and of the civilian statesman are no longer as distinct as they appeared to be before World War II. They have come closer together through bureaucratic mechanisms and liaisons intended to promote a more efficient and smoother working relationship. This is particularly important in an era when sea power plays so important a role in peacetime foreign policy.

Despite these measures, the general problem that Richmond was trying to deal with has not gone away. Not all statesmen and civilian officials instinctively understand sea power and its potential value, let alone the preparations, lead times,

and direction needed to keep it ready for use. One cannot, however, put the entire blame on statesmen if naval officers have not made their case effectively and plainly. Many countries have experienced what has come to be called "sea blindness," a serious problem when the traditional political interest and support no longer seem present or active.

Those who write and conduct research in naval affairs and the wider realm of maritime history and affairs also have an important role in educating the public, statesmen, and naval officers about these matters. Certainly it is our responsibility as naval historians to explain with critical insight why things happened the way they did in whatever period we are studying. Among the vast number of topics and approaches that a naval historian may choose from, there is a special niche for those who explore historical events, problems, and parallels that resonate with current issues or perceived future problems. Such work can make a very special contribution if done with dispassionate scholarship and skill so as to widen and deepen perceptions about the nature, character, and role of sea power.

If statesmen or the public—or even naval officers, for that matter—think that the sole function of a navy is to fight another battle of Trafalgar, then navies are deeply misunderstood. Often, people are just unaware of what navies do, why they do it, and what effects they may have. For historians who undertake to counter that situation, there are many dimensions of the theme of statesmen and sea power that need to be examined. For example, one needs to ask why some cases of naval presence have the intended diplomatic effect and why some do not. We need to have a better understanding of why and under what conditions statesmen might choose to go to war over an incident at sea or instead some lesser reaction.

Many issues in this area require the close examination of perceptions on both sides, requiring in turn language skills and archival diversity. When one set of statesmen decides to make a political or diplomatic statement by means of naval actions, a question remains whether the statesmen on the receiving side understand what was intended or something entirely different. Too often naval historians have looked at the intent of one side without examining the other to see whether the intended effect was taken, disregarded, or regarded with doubt.

STATESMEN AND SEA POWER TODAY

Now, let us turn to how all this might connect to the current naval situation. A timely case is the U.S. Navy's *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,* published on 13 March 2015.[30] This document is one of a type that began to appear from the U.S. Navy in the 1970s and 1980s making public statements about the strategic roles of the Navy.[31] The audiences for this document are both internal, informing all within the Navy of a unified concept; and external, informing Congress, allies, partners, and industry as well as foreign-policy experts and those who influence national security policy. The objective is to

educate, inform, and generate discussion about how essential are forward, engaged, and ready naval forces to meeting the strategic needs and priorities of the United States in the twenty-first century. This gives purpose and direction to what American sailors and Marines are doing and planning, while it might also deter a potential enemy, or generate the support of statesmen for the three uniformed maritime services—Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—in their planning to work in a complementary and cooperative way to carry out national goals.

The reason for the publication of this statement, updating and revising a similar statement that had been made in 2007, is that the government's guidance to the maritime services has been updated in a series of three major documents: *Defense Strategic Guidance* of 2012, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* of 2014, and the president's 2015 statement of the *National Security Strategy*. The new statement of maritime strategy is designed to bring the navy and its sister services into line with the guidance of statesmen, while also explaining to and educating the civilian authorities about what is needed in general to design, organize, and employ the services for the stated strategic objects, and why.

There are political and educational objects and objectives in making such a public statement, but there are also strategic objects for the foreseen uses of maritime forces. The document explains that the United States currently faces security threats that are becoming more widespread and sophisticated, with evolving challenges from extremists such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, North Korea, Iran, and China, as well as Russia's recent agression. In this strategic environment, the object of the new strategy is deterrence. This deterrence is created by emphasizing the combat credibility and capability of forces forward deployed in the areas of concern. Forward deployment for deterrence places maritime forces in an advantageous position where they can also exercise sea control; maintain maritime security for shipping, logistic support, and communication; and be readily available on short notice to project power against targets ashore with surface, subsurface, air, and amphibious forces. An essential objective to achieving the main strategic object of deterrence is what the new document calls "all-domain access." This means the need to maintain freedom of action in the multiple domains of sea, air, land, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum.

This newly published concept foresees a modern, efficient, and capable force of more than three hundred ships, including eleven aircraft carriers, fourteen ballistic-missile submarines (to be replaced by twelve of the *Ohio* class), and thirty-three amphibious ships. This number is designed for a forward presence of 120 ships in 2020, up from ninety-seven today; four ballistic-missile-capable ships based in Spain by the end of 2015; increased presence in the Middle East from thirty ships today to forty by 2020; increased ship and aircraft presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific

region by as much as 60 percent by 2020; and an additional attack submarine at Guam to bring the total to four.

Although the U.S. Navy is a considerable force by world standards, it is still not large enough to do everything that needs to be done, even assuming that it and the other maritime services receive the funding they need to carry out this concept in full. Alliances and maritime partnerships are essential. The Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy announced in December 2014 a combined strategic narrative for deeper cooperation between the two services: "Combined Seapower: A Shared Vision for Royal Navy–United States Navy Cooperation."[32] Significantly, this navy-to-navy agreement provides links among the U.S. Navy's new strategic statement, the United Kingdom's *National Strategy for Maritime Security,* and the *European Union Maritime Security Strategy.*

The point of this short foray into these very recent developments is to underscore the gradual but steady movement since Richmond's time toward closer cooperative relationships in the shared responsibility between statesmen and seamen. Richmond was very much the product of the Victorian era.[33] If we read his writings on statesmen and sea power today without understanding their historical context, he seems to have overlooked the shared responsibilities of seamen and statesmen. Within historical context, however, Richmond was at the forefront. He was making a radical departure from the typical viewpoint of his era, one that had placed the naval profession in a separate world, disconnected from that of statesmen. Adm. Sir Herbert Richmond's *Statesmen and Sea Power* was a key work that brought fresh, new light to a subject that continues to be fundamental. Today, the partnership between statesmen and seamen is vital for the maintenance of a navy, but it is one that can be easily frustrated when statesmen disagree merely for political advantage rather than for substantive reasons based in understanding of defense and foreign policies.[34]

NOTES This essay was originally presented at the "Statesmen and Seapower Conference" held on 17–18 April 2015 at the National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth, the United Kingdom. It was first published in *Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet,* no. 2 (2016), pp. 151–64. It appears here by courtesy of the editor.

1 Herbert W. Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1946; repr. with corrections, 1947).

2 W. W. Wroth, "Ford, James (1779–1850)," rev. M. C. Curthoys, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), available at (2007 ed.) www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9860.

3 "The James Ford Lectures in British History," *Faculty of History, University of Oxford,* www.history.ox.ac.uk/james-ford-lectures-british-history#collapse387331.

4 Herbert W. Richmond, *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558–1727,* ed. E. A. Hughes (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953).

5 E. A. Hughes, editor's preface to ibid.

6 Quoted in Barry D. Hunt, *Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871–1946* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 1982), p. 225.

7 Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power,* p. vii. Richmond's paraphrase of Fortescue, with no source given.

8 Ibid., quoting from Mahan, with no source indicated.

9 Daniel A. Baugh, "Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and the Objects of Sea Power," in *Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond,* ed. James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), pp. 25–26.

10 Joseph Moretz, *Thinking Wisely, Planning Boldly: The Higher Education and Training of Royal Navy Officers, 1919–39* (Solihull, U.K.: Helion, 2014), pp. 182–89.

11 Baugh, "Richmond and the Objects of Sea Power," p. 30. See also Baugh's review article on Eric Grove's 1988 edition of Corbett's *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* "'An Achievement of Unusual Interest and Stature,'" *Naval War College Review* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1991), p. 131.

12 Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power,* p. vii.

13 Ibid., pp. vii–viii.

14 Ibid., p. ix.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., p. x.

17 Herbert W. Richmond, *Economy and Naval Security: A Plea for the Examination of the Problem of the Reduction in the Cost of Naval Armaments on the Lines of Strategy and Policy* (London: E. Benn, 1931); Richmond, *Naval Warfare* (London: E. Benn, 1930); Richmond, "Sea Warfare," in *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens,* ed. Sir George Aston (London: Longman, 1927).

18 Baugh, "Richmond and the Objects of Sea Power," pp. 24–30.

19 Ibid., p. 27.

20 Ibid., p. 30.

21 Ibid., p. 28.

22 Ibid., pp. 29–32.

23 Hunt, *Sailor-Scholar,* p. 233.

24 Ibid.

25 Sir Maurice Hankey, quoted in ibid., p. 162.

26 Robert S. Jordan, "The Influence of the British Secretariat Tradition on Twentieth-Century International Peace-Keeping," in *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century,* ed. John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan for St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1989), pp. 56–80.

27 Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (London: Croom Helm, 1977); Edward Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975); Sir James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force,* 3rd ed. (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1994); Cable, *The Political Influence of Naval Force in History* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1998); Laurence Martin, *The Sea in Modern Strategy* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967).

28 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Le meilleur des ambassadeurs* (Paris: Perrin, 2010).

29 John B. Hattendorf, "NATO's Policeman on the Beat: The First Twenty Years of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, 1968–1988," in *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 2000), pp. 187–200.

30 U.S. Navy Dept., "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 141, no. 4 (April 2015), supplement, pp. 97 ff., but with its own pagination 1–37.

31 For a general introduction to this topic, see John B. Hattendorf, "The United States Navy in the Twenty-First Century: Thoughts on Naval Theory, Strategic Constraints and Opportunities," *Mariner's Mirror* 97, no. 1 (February 2011), pp. 285–97. More detailed studies are in Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents,* Newport Paper 30 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007); Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents,* Newport Paper 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008); Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents,* Newport Paper 27 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006). Also, Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986,* Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004).

32 U.S. Navy, "US, UK Navies Sign Framework for Future Cooperation," news release no. NNS141215-16, 15 December 2014.

33 I am grateful to Dr. Nicholas Rodger, who made this point in discussion following the original conference presentation.

34 I am grateful to Dr. Samuel McLean, who made this point in discussion following the original conference presentation.

XXX *Naval Power and the Multidimensional Roles of the Armed Forces*

Each of the armed services has a full range of multidimensional roles for its employment and its operations. Each is distinctive and defined by its functional capabilities and its sphere of operations. While the multifaceted features may be evident to the beholder within a single service, when seen more broadly they are also complementary; when viewed as a whole, these roles may overlap or even open gaps between the efforts of the different services. An understanding of the traditional core capabilities of each service is essential, but that knowledge needs to be modified by an appreciation of the changing character of both warfare and the uses of military force in operations other than war. The mechanisms for coordinating multiple service roles in a multidimensional manner often come down to issues of command and control, dealing with the differing procedures or even terminology that one or another service uses. A significant factor in making such very complex organizations function cooperatively alongside each other is to educate officers who work in such joint environments to have a deeper and more sensitive appreciation of the mind-sets, methodologies, and even myths of the other services. It sometimes turns out that individuals involved in the process have focused too narrowly on what one might call "the hinges" between the services and have not fully appreciated the substantive scope or demands of the central issues. All services might face this problem, but how can one think about this from a naval perspective? What does a modern navy do?

The most basic and obvious answer is that navies are integral parts of what has come to be called the maritime domain. They operate both in peace and in war, on matters of security, defense, fighting, movement, and support and projection of force that arise on, above, and below the surface of seas, oceans, and waterways. In this, a navy is distinct from an army, whose traditional focus is on land. It is complementary to the functions of a coast guard, which operates in the same domain but with a focus on the homeland security and border patrol. It is complementary to an air force, which has its interests focused above the surface of the earth and even far beyond into space. It is also complementary to a mutual concern with the new cyber domain of security and defense.

Navies are traditional expressions of individual states, in terms of the actual exercise of national power and also the symbolic expression of that power in both home waters and distant seas. The fundamental purpose of a navy has always been to make maritime areas safe and dependable for one's use and to prevent any enemy from using them to one's detriment. For that reason, the concept of the freedom of the seas has been a major one in naval history. In this fundamental role, navies have played an essential part in global economics. One can predict that they will continue to do so, as long as there is any danger to or need to protect critical maritime routes and goods. This understanding is sometimes seen only in the context of battles of massive fleets, as in the age of sail and as recently as World War II. While such things could happen, they seem only a remote possibility.

Interestingly, since the end of World War II the number of the world's navies has increased dramatically. Not all the new navies have remained small. Among others, both China's and India's navies have made "the transition to eminence" in the naval world in only half a century.[1] Immediately after the end of World War II, the authoritative *Jane's Fighting Ships* listed only fifty-four countries with navies;[2] *Jane's World Navies, 2015* lists more than three times that many: 168 countries with navies of all different types.[3] A number of these countries have, like the United States, separate armed coast guards, and these have become increasingly important.

At the same time, the latest maritime trade statistics show that the seas are vital to the global economy and that world shipping has already reached unprecedented scale. According to the report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, for the first time in recorded history the world's seaborne trade exceeded ten billion tons of merchandise in 2015, a rise of 2.1 percent over the previous year and accounting for 80 percent of all world trade. Of this tonnage 38.8 percent originated in Asia, 13.2 percent from the Americas. In the same year the world's merchant fleets grew by 3.5 percent, reaching a total of 1.8 billion deadweight tons.[4]

In a significant departure from past practice, today the number of merchant vessels under a particular national flag no longer directly indicates that nation's involvement in maritime affairs. The structure and ownership of the world's merchant fleet have changed dramatically and now reflect the expansion of national business interests across the globe. For example, on the United Nations' most recent list of the world's most important maritime countries, the United States has the world's eighth-largest merchant fleet, after Greece, Japan, China, Germany, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Republic of Korea. But 86.47 percent of the merchant vessels in which Americans have controlling interests fly foreign flags. The top two merchant fleets follow the same pattern: Greece has 77.92 percent of its merchant ships under foreign flags, Japan has 87.43 percent; Germany has 90.51 percent, Iran 77.29. China is an exception among the top six, with just 53.56 percent of its fleet

under foreign flags; Cyprus, ranking thirty-first on the list, has just 63.14 percent of its merchant fleet under foreign flags.[5]

The global economy, as some think about it today, is all about the transformation of the way the world does business. The increasing ease and speed of global-scale communications, economic interdependence, collaboration, and market competition have converged to create for individuals, companies, and customers less-expensive, easier, more "friction free," and more-productive lives.[6] With globalization, industrial products, even from individual companies and traditional brand names that have long been sources of national pride, are no longer the product of single nations. Production through more economically and productively efficient cooperation and collaboration combine local skill and concentrated specialization with competitive costs to reach significant global markets. These fundamental economic and world-trade factors have transformed the production of numerous products that many of us use on a daily basis. What we used to think of as an industrial product of a particular country may now be owned by a multinational consortium of investors and businesspeople from many countries. It may have parts from a variety of Asian and Latin American countries and be assembled and marketed simultaneously in various other areas of the world. As this goes on around us and continues to develop, one cannot help but make the mental leap and ask, What is the effect of this globalization on such a "national brand" as a navy? How does this bear on new naval concepts that come with the associated new security concerns and changes in procedures that some years ago we labeled "transformation"?

If one is to think of the global economy as an explicit or tacitly agreed-upon grand strategy for the mutual benefit of the nations of the world, the first logical conclusion is that the world must avoid conflicts like the twentieth century's world wars or Cold War. Such wars typically close off major parts of the globe from interactions with the other parts and serve to perpetuate closed economic systems that cannot interact with one another to share in the practical and positive results that a global economy produces.

While the images of geopolitical warfare in the twentieth century and before tend to dominate naval thought, the twentieth century also provided the foundation on which naval operations within the context of a global economy must build. Our abstract understanding of naval strategic roles developed and changed over the course of the twentieth century, and the historical record has led us to widen further our perception of naval roles. Above all, we see that strategic naval roles represent not merely abstract questions for naval officers but concepts enmeshed in broader issues that range from grand strategy, bureaucracy, and finance to diplomacy and international law. At the naval operational level, issues ranging from cooperation with other services to combat effectiveness define naval roles.[7]

When seen from the very broadest perspective, the importance of maritime affairs ebbs and flows in relation to events. Within maritime affairs, context—even the very nature of ships and aircraft, their mobility and multidimensional capabilities—is everything for understanding and defining strategic roles. Noticeable change is taking place in not only the global economy but international law, the character and effectiveness of weapons, and the joint and combined employment of naval forces; there are as well the organizational and technological implications of innovation. All these changes continue to underscore the need to see conflict at sea and the strategic roles of maritime forces in the widest perspective.

As in all times of major change, the procedures of the past seem irrelevant and outmoded. In fact, however, a careful look at old ideas and approaches helps to formulate the new questions that need answering. The old answers can stimulate broad new approaches and new applications and lead to useful insight. A broad look at the twentieth century and its experience with changing strategic roles for navies suggests that the specific roles for which a navy is built are often very different from those it ends up performing. The twentieth century provides numerous examples, as one contrasts the strategic roles that were foreseen in coming wars with those actually carried out in the event. It was true of the great wars of 1914–18 and 1939–45 and also of the smaller wars of that century. Navies have many and often unexpected uses. But this truth serves to remind us that naval strategy depends on an ever-changing calculus of what one side does in the context of what the other side wants to do and can do effectively.

Just over a hundred years of experience has fully borne out the fundamental distinctions both Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett recognized for naval forces at the opening of the last century. But their thoughts need refinement to meet modern concerns. Put in the broadest terms, those that we use today, the fundamental strategic role for navies is preventing any opponent from blocking the safe passage of any friendly craft on, over, or under the sea and blocking any force that attempts to. If sea passage can be assured, an interdependent global economy, dependent on the movement of goods across the seas, can continue to grow and to sustain peaceful world development. In a twenty-first-century global economy, the safety of sea passage is no longer the strategic role of a single nation's navy. It is a multilateral role that reflects global concerns and the range of accepted, agreed, and customary practices of peoples and nations that form what we have come to call international law.

From that fundamental strategic role flow secondary roles. The strategic focus may be narrowed a step downward and expressed in national terms, but the overriding global and international terms of reference restrict the degree to which any single nation may acceptably assume a controlling influence at sea. A nation that can assure safe passage for friendly commercial ships as well as for friendly naval

and military vessels, preventing interference from enemy forces, is in a position to defend itself. It can also provide and defend a secure passage for military forces and support them on a distant shore, where they can assist allies or defend key places against the threats of the moment.

At a third level, a series of supporting strategic naval roles in wartime allow one to gain an essential position, either sequentially or cumulatively, that facilitates the higher strategic functions. Such roles include reconnaissance, control of information, and the exertion of political or economic pressure to help friends or hinder enemies. In periods of peace, or at least in the absence of direct hostilities, a perceived capacity to carry out such strategic roles creates the basis for political perceptions in either friends or enemies.

The epilogue to the twentieth century is yet unknown, but if one reads the known prologue as played out during the twentieth century and the first decade and a half of the twenty-first, one observes the initial indications of its course. One of the major characteristics we observe is the changing character of warfare during the past fifteen years, its expansion beyond the traditional core competencies of each of the armed services. As one former army officer observed, the problem was "learning to eat soup with a knife."[8] Later, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan proceeded, as another scholar put it, a "failure to understand the interaction of the conflict's micro-dynamics with the patronage politics and struggles over power and resources at the centre meant that the actions of NATO allies often played into and contributed to the entrenchment of violent and exploitative political economies in perverse and unintended ways."[9]

One finds that in these new contexts, maritime forces will need the material and intellectual resources to meet the unexpected and be able to shift from one strategic role to another within whatever context appears and to understand with greater depth and sensitivity the local political natures of the conflicts and problems they face. If the leading naval trends of the second half of the twentieth century continue, the naval history of the twenty-first century will be a story of both large nations and small, great powers and littoral states, cooperatively carrying out multilateral, joint, and combined operations at sea to maintain international order while working closely with other armed services.

The realization of this broad vision would affect navies in two ways: first, as an important strategic object of grand strategy toward which naval operations can contribute, and second, in the logistical and organizational means and methods through which a navy sustains its efficiency.

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AS AN OBJECT OF FUTURE GRAND STRATEGY

If the global economy were taken as an object of future grand strategy, its intended purpose would be to contribute to the betterment of the human condition around the globe through the latest means of communication, economic diversity, market

competition, and increased efficiency in work and production. Such a strategy must carefully nurture economic, cultural, ethnic, and national diversities, as these are the characteristics that provide for the fundamental differences in regions, markets, and workplaces that are the engines for a successful global economy.

Necessarily, however, certain types of commonalities in business procedures and approaches must be developed and sustained to permit and promote an effective and increasingly efficient global economy. This move toward commonality in some areas may well be fraught with difficulty if it means subjugation of traditional values, work opportunities, and products to foreign ideas, labor, and means. These changes toward certain types of commonalities could conceivably be limited to business procedures and communications in ways that would not undermine the more fundamental differences that form the driving forces of the global economy. Stress of this nature, arising from economic forces and perceived ethnic and cultural values, might become a source of regional tension that could affect global economics and balance. This tension and other types of fragmentation of an international cooperative and collaborative market economy would become fundamental international security issues.

The most fundamental maritime need would be to maintain the safe and free use of the seas for commerce and international economic communication and exchange. In the modern age, one can no longer think in terms of just the traditional uses of ocean surfaces. The undersea regions, sea bottom, and skies over waterways have now become essential and interrelated aspects. The issues are not just naval ones, although they deeply concern navies. This line of thinking reaches even beyond interservice cooperation toward international cooperation. For navies, the issues at hand lead one to think in broad terms that encompass all aspects of human relationships with the world's oceans. The most proper adjective to describe that wider range of issues is the word "maritime."

One of the major developments of the late twentieth century that provide a beginning for thinking about maritime security in a global context, now and in the future, was the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982. This agreement, now very widely accepted among the world's nations, lays out, first, a geographical basis for each nation to understand the ocean areas for which it has responsibility: its twelve-mile coastal waters, the continental shelf, and waters surrounding offshore island dependencies, and beyond that, its exclusive economic zone, for the protection of offshore maritime resources. Also, it attempts to resolve the many very specific and knotty questions involving the rights of international passage in narrow waters in which one or more countries have interests. It provides a range of approaches to defuse conflicts over claims and rights within sea areas while also setting limits.[10] These are very helpful as basic, practical steps toward relevant fundamentals, but practices and uses will need to

develop further to regulate the emerging and larger issues of the global economy itself.[11] What we have now, however, helps to empower the coastal state in the role of managing its maritime resources.

Coastal power is local, not global, but it has an effect on global maritime issues. Coastal naval powers build their navies with equipment and training specifically attuned to the particular range of tasks necessary to their geographical areas. Their navies are ready to operate and, if necessary, fight in very different circumstances and ways than do fleets designed for distant transoceanic work.[12] Such navies may well be hard-pressed to win an old-fashioned sea battle with a larger navy, but their purposes are different: helping avert war, prevent crises, and firmly establish national control over ports, local maritime resources, and innocent transits through national waters. At the same time, these local navies can valuably cooperate with the world's largest navies by virtue of specialized naval knowledge, techniques, and equipment. Such attributes are all areas of much importance to naval roles in a global economy. Thus, small and medium-size navies can have, in addition to their independent roles, new and particularly important parts to play in partnership with large and superpower navies.

NAVAL ROLES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY

In supporting an established and growing global economy, a navy's principal focus will not be on the traditional concept—one set of powers gaining command of the sea by defeating a rival or coalition fleet whose purpose is to establish a rival political and economic system for the world or a major part of it. In a global economy, there would be no economic dimension that would require a modern Trafalgar. Nevertheless, the example of Horatio Nelson's leadership, prescience, and sacrifice in that event, along with the determination, professional skill, and hardened experience that he and his sailors showed, will always remain an icon to naval professionals the world over.[13] Such epic battles are so dramatic and such towering events in naval history as we have understood it that some people may have trouble imagining what the role of a navy is in their absence. The last such engagement occurred at Leyte Gulf in 1944, just seventy-some years ago, and navies have been very profitably employed otherwise since that time, giving us pause to think further about the topic.

For the security of a global world economy, one must think somewhat differently about the central thought that emerges in classical naval theory. In that body of literature, naval battles were one means to achieve command of the sea. When Sir Julian Corbett defined command of the sea a century ago, in 1911, he said that "it means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes."[14] Corbett meant that control was a national or allied naval objective that involved removing the barriers to the use of the sea that an opposing nation's or coalition's naval power creates. In the context of a global

economy, such control would be not just a national function but rather a shared world function for the general good of all; it would not be in the context of national or imperial rivalry. So, in terms of naval theory, we must look beyond the process of gaining command, as that is already achieved, to the concept of exercising it. Here, too, one will need to think in terms of international cooperation rather than competition. But as Rear Adm. Chris Parry cautioned,

> At the start of a century that is already witnessing significant changes to the balance of power in the international landscape, the only certainty is that countries will continue to make decisions on the basis of their own interests, with regimes (whether democratic or authoritarian) determining which policies will preserve or extend their legitimacy in the eyes of their elites or populations. Therefore, States may operate either inside or outside the system depending on the balance of risk and advantage. Experience has shown that it would be prudent for both navies and ship-owners, thinking strategically, to prepare for both eventualities.[15]

The Global Economy and the Military Function of a Navy

In an ideal and completely global economy, founded on the acceptance and full participation of the world's community of nations, the military role of individual national navies would be mainly responding to threats to the internationally recognized, global world order.

The military capabilities needed would be primarily (1) the capability to conduct limited wars and interventions and (2) the capability to oppose guerrilla or terrorist attacks. These two naval activities would supersede the previously held idea that navies exist principally to fight large-scale, general, or conventional wars and in which intervention and guerrilla warfare are lesser included tasks. The latter would now become the primary naval tasks, with general and conventional war perhaps removed entirely or placed in a lower category as a more theoretical contingency than a practical, immediate concern.[16]

The capabilities needed to perform in extreme circumstances are those that navies very rarely use, but these same capacities that navies have for meeting their most extreme challenges are the very strengths that indirectly give them the effective power to perform other operations on a more routine basis. Thus, the peacetime roles of naval power would be the main, day-to-day, future functions of the world's navies in such a new world order.

Traditionally, a trident has symbolized naval power. Its three prongs represented surface, sky, and underwater weapons. One could still use that symbol, but it may be more useful in the future to think of it in terms of the three integral categories of a navy's functions—its military, its diplomatic, and its police functions—symbolized by a single instrument. The fundamental role of a navy is its military capability, and this forms the basis on which a navy may act in a diplomatic and policing function. There is much to consider regarding the global economy and the military role of navies, but these issues first need to be seen in the light of the combined effect of the two main additional functions of naval power: policing and diplomacy.

The Global Economy and the Policing Function of a Navy

The policing role of a navy is a major contribution that armed force at sea makes. It is a conceptual and practical extension of the military role of navies. On the one hand, nations need to be concerned about their coastal maritime areas and the littoral seas that surround them. These, UNCLOS has suggested, are the specific areas for the exercise of national sovereignty. In some cases, national authorities may assign the specialized law-enforcement duties in these areas to some separate armed service other than a navy—for example, a coast guard, a maritime border patrol service, or a fisheries-, undersea-, or seabed-resource-protection agency. But when this is the case, it is essential that such an agency work closely and cooperatively with its associated navy in its complementary tasks.

Cumulatively, such coastal waters are central to the concept of exercising maritime power. This function maintains stability for both local and global commercial activity that passes through these areas. As such, it is a feature of the global economy. The coastal responsibility for exercising sovereignty in these maritime areas involves ensuring the good order and safe use of these areas as well as regulating the uses and harvesting of the fishing and undersea resources within them and the airspace above them. All this contributes to both the internal and external components of the national maritime development that, in turn, serves the individual national contribution toward cooperative, global economic growth and stability.

While these national dimensions are central in considering the concept of navies and national maritime policing power, the global economy demands that one move beyond them and look at the international dimension and multinational cooperation. A single nation has clear responsibility within its coastal waters and exclusive economic zones. There are no fences at sea, so what comes into, goes out of, or remains in those waters is, in one way or another, tied to some other part of the world's oceans. The oceans fill the center of the surface of our globe, and we, the varying peoples around the edges of the sea, look across to one another and reach toward each other through oceanic transport. International cooperation in such an interdependent world is an essential dimension, even in carrying out one's own national responsibilities in one's own local waters. Maritime affairs are undeniably tied to the shore, just as the origin or destination of ships and merchandise. The separate national elements are the key to international cooperation.

Thinking back to the definition of the most basic function of naval power—the idea that focuses on the control of maritime communication, military or commercial—leads us to look at the policing function of navies in a new way. Understanding the fundamental use of naval force as maritime control leads us to ask some pertinent questions for implementation: Control of what? Control for how long? Control for what purpose? One definition of the word clarifies the point at hand and the particular use of the word: *control* is the "application of policies and

procedures for directing, regulating, and coordinating production, administration, and other business activities in a way to achieve the objectives of the enterprise."[17] In this case, the objective of the enterprise is to protect and defend the operation of the global economy that is the engine of mutual global well-being. Put simply, this translates into directing, regulating, and coordinating shipping and other maritime activities insofar as they affect the objectives of the global economy: eliminating threats that disrupt safe global commerce and create serious problems for it. In the modern and emerging new world, these issues include such new types of perceived threats as illegal drug trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, environmental threats, and terrorist activities.

To deal with policing these aspects of the maritime arena, intelligence and detailed information about shipping movements and cargoes are essential and derive from observation and regulation in national coastal areas where shipping originates or is destined. A navy needs to share such information with other nations, navies, and maritime regulatory agencies to be effective. Thus, policing is very much involved in what has recently come to be called "Maritime Domain Awareness," that is to say, gaining an effective knowledge of all activities associated with the global maritime environment that could have an impact on the security and safety of the economy or environment. In this way, the sharing of knowledge and awareness is part of the diplomatic function of navies.

The Global Economy and the Diplomatic Function of a Navy

The international, diplomatic function of navies is a fundamental one for the global economy. The diplomatic function in this new era is quite different from that imagined by theorists in the Cold War era when the issues of negotiation from strength, manipulation, and prestige were the characteristics of naval diplomacy. The global economy of today and the future requires and will require a cooperative security network if it is to function fully and effectively. No one country, not even a superpower, can begin to provide this fully. Such a network must be built through multilateral and cooperative operations. In doing this, naval diplomacy requires a quite different approach.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the world's navies cooperatively organized some important initiatives that provide for us today a viable foundation for this new kind of naval diplomacy to grow. In the mid-1950s, new initiatives began with the creation of student, staff, and faculty exchanges at naval academies, on staffs, and at war colleges. In 2016 the U.S. Naval War College celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the 1956 establishment of its Naval Command Course. This farseeing initiative has done much to help build closer relationships among the current and future leaders of the world's navies. Its educational contribution is one of mutual understanding working toward global stability, and thus it is in itself the

kind of initiative that is essential for what we may come to call the age of the global economy.

Following on from this first step in the professional educational field, NATO created the first viable example of an operational, multilateral naval force in its Standing Naval Force, Atlantic. At its outset in 1968, many naval leaders of that era thought it too idealistic and functionally impossible for large, medium, and small navies to work together in any useful, practical, or effective way. Certainly, there were serious strains, but practice proved that it not only was possible but also has continued to be very successful. It has now been extended to other operational groups in the Channel and the Mediterranean and serves as a model outside the NATO context. The keys to this success are in standardized logistics, standardized communication procedures and equipment, and standardized operational doctrine.[18] The multilateral naval operations in the Adriatic, and in the Afghanistan and Iraq operations, demonstrated this cumulative insight.

Adding another dimension that built directly on these two initiatives was the creation in 1969 of the International Seapower Symposium. These biennial meetings were the first in which chiefs of naval staff and the heads of the world's senior professional naval colleges could meet with their counterparts from around the world to discuss shared professional problems. In September 2016, the twenty-second meeting of the International Seapower Symposium took place. In the forty-eight years since the beginning of these symposia, some valuable initiatives have grown from them. First is the establishment of regional symposia and regional cooperative initiatives that have been direct spin-offs from the International Seapower Symposium, which had first inspired the approach of using regional discussions as part of its agenda. Second is the initiative of a manual for multinational operations used beyond the NATO arena.

All these initiatives in the fields of education, multinational operational art, and top-level professional discussion are strong foundations for what will be needed. The very sinews of the global economy are transoceanic communication, transport, and shipping. In a truly global world economy, national security—most particularly the naval component involved—must be a shared effort with other nations. This observation leads us back to the point where this discourse began, the global economy and the military function of navies.

FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY FUNCTION OF NAVIES

In the modern age, it has become important, even essential, to think about maritime forces—navy, coast guard, amphibious forces—in their joint context, alongside the other national armed forces: the army and the air force. That is a very important task, but in the course of doing this one must first understand that a navy is different from the other services, which is the very reason one needs to think of navies in complementary ways to other services rather than in identical terms. This

is not to say that a navy is more important, just that it is different and performs different functions in different ways within a different medium. Of the various kinds of military forces—land, air, and maritime forces—only navies have the ready and established ability to be both weapons in war and benign elements in peace. One of the essential differences between what an army might do and what a navy might do in peacetime is that navies do not need to intrude on sovereign territory to carry out their mission effectively. This is a fundamental feature of the maritime presence of naval forces. As the great naval theorist J. C. Wylie once wrote,

> This almost indefinable quality of "maritime presence"—subtle, benign, ubiquitous presence—actual or potential presence—is the great asset of sea power in times of peace and even in times of one or another variety of tension. This quality of actual or even potential maritime presence anywhere around the world is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces in employments short of war. This world-wide and benign ubiquity, this subtle evidence of naval and thus national strength is what makes viable the other and normally benign elements of national strength when extended overseas.[19]

Wylie's point is fundamental in considering the global economy and the military function of navies. The military object of naval operations is to ensure some degree of effective control at sea. In this sense, the control may be economic, political, or psychological, and it may range from complete control to ranges of influence that can either be felt immediately or have a long-term effect.[20] In terms of a world economy, that means that the primary role is preventing anarchy at sea, ensuring law and order for the safe passage of peaceful shipping across the open oceans, from its ports of origin, beyond coastal waters and local exclusive economic zones, to its worldwide destinations. In such a world, one can anticipate that among the most typical forms of naval operations will be the naval blockade—a primal type of naval operation, but one little studied until recently.[21] Often such operations are conducted in the context of maritime coalitions, another fundamental dimension.[22]

These kinds of core-competency naval operations on the open sea are linked to and extended from the separate and national police activities inside coastal waters. Multinational maritime coalition operations may be effectively empowered to deal with emerging military threats to economic stability and the international exchange of raw goods and manufactured products. These threats may be on the open sea, in the form of piracy or illegal maritime trade; alternatively, as military threats or actions that disrupt the equilibrium of the global economy, they may require access and intervention ashore. Such coalitions are also effective in dealing with humanitarian relief operations, as was seen following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2011 tsunami in Japan. Such a wide range of operations may well result in more carefully defined—even mutually agreed upon—national specialization in naval roles, as vision and understanding broaden to see more clearly an individual navy's role within a global context.

In the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century, we have come to see clear advances in regional cooperation in defense. This is seen particularly in

- Role specialization that creates a division of labor between nations for specific capabilities
- Pooling and sharing weapons through joint procurement used in operations either jointly or singly
- In addition, education, training, exercises, maintenance, armament development, and international operations that generate joint force cooperation[23]

In the naval sphere, the Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation and the newly developing Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic provide interesting, innovative examples. Both are reactions to declining defense budgets by building capabilities through international partnerships.[24]

Broadly speaking, the discussion here deals almost entirely at the level of grand strategy and national strategy. But the global economy has another impact for navies that, at another time and place, deserves an equal focus, to consider more closely its effects on the logistical and organizational means and methods through which a navy sustains its efficiency. The global economy, logically extended, will put an end to the traditional national approach to defense procurement. Even naval weapons and systems will be, and in many areas already are, provided to one country from others. A truly global economic system will not allow defense industries to have privileged positions, and it will create many challenges to the production and industrial systems now in place.[25] This should lead to more competitive, better, and cheaper supply for navies, while helping to standardize systems around the globe for multinational cooperation and bringing home very directly the critical importance of global interchange.

In another area worthy of closer examination, the global economy, like the implementation of network-centric warfare, creates a result that empowers many more individual elements with a status that they previously did not enjoy and provides a clearer role for participation. This is as true of the small or medium-size navy that may have been overshadowed previously by the large or superpower navy as it is for the individual sailor who now with a mobile telephone can communicate directly as never before with home, family, senior officers, or even news reporters. These are both challenges to the traditional approaches among and within navies, but perhaps no more serious an adjustment than an adult makes in allowing youngsters to grow and mature. They are things to be encouraged, nurtured, and focused for mutual benefit, not denied.

To return to the broader theme, in conclusion, it is clear that the global world economy and its functioning is a maritime economy at its base. Navies around the world have a fundamental role to play in maintaining and defending this global

economy as a shared system for the peaceful enjoyment of the world's resources. Neither one nation nor any single navy, no matter how large or how powerful it may be, can achieve this purpose alone. If the global economy is to endure and to grow to its full potential in the long term, every individual navy will eventually need to define its role in terms of a maritime strategy and a wider concept of the seas for individual nations and for the global community. The ability to succeed in this endeavor involves close integration of navies with the multidimensional roles of both other navies and other armed services.

NOTES This paper, not previously published, was delivered at the Third International Symposium on Security and Defence, Lima, Peru, on 15 September 2016. A revised version was presented in an open seminar at the Haifa Research Center for Maritime Policy and Strategy, University of Haifa, Israel, on 24 May 2017.

1 See G. M. Hiranandani [Vice Adm., Indian Navy], *Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy, 1976–1990* (New Delhi: Lancer, 2005).

2 *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1944–45 (Corrected to April 1946)* (New York: Macmillan, 1947).

3 *Jane's World Navies,* janes.ihs.com/WorldNavies/.

4 United Nations, *Review of Maritime Transport, 2016* (New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2016), pp. 1, 11, 30, available at unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2016_en.pdf.

5 Ibid., chap. 2, p. 37, table 2.3: "Table of the 35 Most Important Maritime Countries and Territories as of 1 January 2016."

6 Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2005), p. 200.

7 This paragraph and the following are based on my more detailed discussion in "Les États-Unis et les mutations de la puissance maritime au XX^{e} siècle," in *La puissance maritime,* ed. Christian Buchet, Jean Meyer, and Jean-Pierre Poussou, Collection histoire maritime (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2004), pp. 577–96, published in English in John B. Hattendorf, *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011), pp. 269–87.

8 John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2005); Nagl and Octavian Manea, "The Uncomfortable Wars of the 1990s" in *War, Strategy & History: Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O'Neill,* ed. Daniel Marston and Tamara Leahy (Canberra: Australian National Univ. Press, 2016), pp. 127–53.

9 Mats Berdal, "A Mission Too Far? NATO and Afghanistan, 2001–2014," in Marston and Leahy, *War, Strategy & History,* p. 170.

10 On this topic, see, for example, J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, *Excessive Maritime Claims,* International Law Studies, vol. 66 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994).

11 See, for example, Daniel Moran, "The International Law of the Sea in a Globalized World," in *Globalization and Maritime Power,* ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 221–39.

12 Jacob Børresen, "Coastal Power: The Sea Power of the Coastal State and the Management of Maritime Resources," in *Navies in Northern Waters, 1721–2000,* ed. Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 249–75.

13 See John B. Hattendorf, "Nelson Afloat: A Hero among the World's Navies," in *Admiral Lord Nelson: Context and Legacy,* ed. David Cannadine (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 166–92.

14 Sir Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* ed. Eric J. Grove, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 94.

15 Chris Parry, *Super Highway: Sea Power in the 21st Century* (London: Elliott & Thompson, 2014), p. 5.

16 This and the following paragraphs are a revision and rethinking of the ideas outlined in K. Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (London: Croom Helm; New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), pp. 1–25.

17 *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (1993), s.v. "Control."

18 See John B. Hattendorf, "International Naval Cooperation and Admiral Richard G. Colbert: The Intertwining of a Career with an Idea" and "NATO's Policeman on the Beat: The First Twenty Years of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, 1968–1988," in *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 2000), pp. 161–85, 187–200.

19 J. C. Wylie, "Mahan: Then and Now," in *The Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahan's* The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991), pp. 41–42.

20 J. C. Wylie, "Postscript: Twenty Years Later," in *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control,* introduction by John B. Hattendorf, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 103.

21 On this subject, for example, see Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds., *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-strategies, 1805–2005* (London: Routledge, 2006).

22 See for examples the individual case studies in Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds., *Naval Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (London: Routledge, 2007).

23 Stefan Lundqvist and J. J. Widén, "Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea: Motives, Prospects and Challenges," *Defence Studies* 16, no. 4 (2016), p. 351, available at www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2016.1220805.

24 Ibid., p. 351. See also T. Sauer, "Deep Cooperation by Belgian Defence: Absorbing the Impact of Declining Defence Budgets on National Capabilities," *Defence Studies* 15, no. 1 (2015), pp. 46–62.

25 See Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross, *Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial Implications of Network-centric Warfare,* Newport Paper 18 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003).

APPENDIX: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS AND ARTICLES BY JOHN B. HATTENDORF, 2015–2023 AND FORTHCOMING

The following is a continuation of "A Bibliography of Books, Articles and Reviews Authored, Co-authored, Edited or Co-edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1960–2015," an appendix to N. A. M. Rodger, J. Ross Dancy, Benjamin Darnell, and Evan Wilson, eds., *Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell & Brewer, 2016), appearing on pages 255–84.

2015

"Report on the NASOH Annual Conference Monterey, May 2015." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 15 (August 2015), pp. 9–11.

"The Hattendorfs from Western Springs, Illinois, Lead the Way to Portage Park." In *Portage Park Resort: Centennial Album,* edited by Thomas H. Gerhardt et al., pp. 57–60. Onekama Township, Manistee County, MI, 2015.

"Luce's Idea of the Naval War College Is Today's Reality." *The Sextant: Taking a Fix on the History and Heritage of Today's U.S. Navy* (blog), 5 October 2015. usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/luces-idea-of-the-naval-war-college-is-todays-reality/.

"The French Replica Frigate 'Hermione' on the North American Coast in June and July 2015," and "The 2015 McMullen Naval History Symposium." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 16 (November 2015), pp. 12–17.

"'Those Far Distant Ships upon Which the Grand Army Never Looked': The Influence of Sea Power, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the US Naval War College." *Trafalgar Chronicle,* no. 25 (2015), pp. 11–28. Repr., slightly revised, in the present volume.

"A New Model of the Steam Frigate USS *Minnesota,* circa 1877–1881." *Nautical Research Journal* 60, no. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 253–64. Repr. in the present volume.

"What Is a Maritime Strategy?" *Tidsskrift for Søvæsen* 186, nos. 1–2 (2015), pp. 3–12.

2016

"*The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1890)." In *America in the World, 1776 to the Present: A Supplement to the* Dictionary of American History, edited by Edward J. Blum, vol. 1, pp. 500–502. Farmington Hills, MI: Scribner's, 2016.

"Navy, US." In *America in the World, 1776 to the Present: A Supplement to the* Dictionary of American History, edited by Edward J. Blum, vol. 2, pp. 733–36. Farmington Hills, MI: Scribner's, 2016.

"Statesmen and Sea Power: Reflections on Aspects of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond's Thinking." *Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet,* no. 2 (2016), pp. 151–64. Repr. in the present volume.

Foreword to *Bound to the Coast of Africa: The 1817 Cruise of the Brig* Hiram *from the Journal of Edward Watson,* edited by Timothy J. Demy and Jeffrey M. Shaw, pp. 9–10. Sheetz Manuscript Series, vol. 1. Newport, RI: Stone Tower Books, 2016.

Review of *Oriel College: A History,* edited by Jeremy Catto. *Anglican & Episcopal History* 85, no. 3 (September 2016), pp. 385–87.

Foreword to *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Seventeenth McMullen Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy 15–16 September 2011,* edited by Marcus O. Jones, pp. ix–x. Historical Monograph 23. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2016.

"Report on the Annual Conference of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH), 2016." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 19 (August 2016), pp. 30–32.

Review of *The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701–1714,* by James Falkner. *Journal for Maritime Research* 18, no. 2 (2016), pp. 159–61.

2017

"Ubi Sumus? Twenty-Five Years Later." *Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 27 (January 2017), pp. 1–13. Repr. in the present volume.

"What Is Victory?" Review of *The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War,* by James Q. Whitman, and *Understanding Victory: Naval Operations from Trafalgar to the Falklands,* by Geoffrey Till. *Naval War College Review* 70, no. 1 (Winter 2017), pp. 162–67.

Foreword to Michel Laguerre Kleimann, *U.S. Naval War College & Escuela Superior de Guerra Naval del Perú: An Historical Partnership in Maritime Security Studies,* pp. 13–14. Lima, 2017.

"2017 Annual Conference of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH)." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 23 (August 2017), pp. 20–22.

Preparations for the Defense of Rhode Island, 1755: Historical Documents Edited, Transcribed, and Annotated, with an Introduction by John B. Hattendorf (Providence: Rhode Island Society of Colonial Wars, 2017).

Review of *Coffins of the Brave: Lake Shipwrecks of the War of 1812,* edited by Kevin J. Crisman. *Middle West Review* 4, no. 1 (Fall 2017), pp. 150–52.

Foreword to *Naval Advising and Assistance: History, Challenges, and Analysis,* edited by Donald Stoker and Michael T. McMaster, p. xiii. Solihull, U.K.: Helion, 2017.

Foreword to Hal M. Friedman, *Blue versus Purple: The U.S. Naval War College, the Soviet Union, and the New Enemy in the Pacific, 1946,* pp. xv–xvii. Historical Monograph 24. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2017.

"*Ubi Sumus?* Reflections by a Veteran Maritime Historian." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* special issue (2017), pp. 5–12.

2018

"North America as a Theatre of Conflict and Imperial Competition during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701–1713." In *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives,* edited by Matthias Pohlig and Michael Schaich, pp. 445–64. Studies of the German Historical Institute, London. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018. Repr. in the present volume.

Putting Cargoes Through: The U.S. Navy at Gibraltar during the First World War, 1917–1919, by Vice Adm. Albert P. Niblack. Edited by John B. Hattendorf. Gibraltar: Calpe, 2018.

"The Aircraft Carrier, Naval Aviation, and the Changing Character of Naval Battle during the War in the Pacific, 1941–1945." In *La Bataille,* edited by Jean Baechler and Olivier Chaline, pp. 251–66. Paris: Éditions Hermann, 2018. Repr. in the present volume.

Review of *Marlboroughs Geheimnis: Strukturen und Funktionen der Informationsgewinnung im Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg,* by Matthias Pohlig. *German Historical Institute London Bulletin* 40, no. 1 (May 2018), pp. 125–27.

"Fleet in being: Le concept de *fleet in being* et la Royal Navy dans la guerre d'indépendance américaine." In *L'opérationnel naval,* pp. 329–44. Vol. 2 of *Les marines de la guerre d'indépendance américaine (1763–1783),* edited by Olivier Chaline, Philippe Bonnichon, and Charles-Philippe de Vergennes. Paris: PUPS [Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne], 2018. English version printed in this volume.

Foreword to *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Eighteenth McMullen Naval History Symposium Held at the U.S. Naval Academy 19–20 September 2013,* edited by Lori Lyn Bogle and James C. Rentfrow, pp. xi–xii. Historical Monograph 25. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2018.

Review of *Naval Warfare: A Global History since 1860,* by Jeremy Black. *International Journal of Maritime History* 30, no. 2 (May 2018), pp. 369–70.

Charles XII: Warrior King. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, Åsa Karlsson, Margriet Lacy-Bruijn, Augustus J. Veenendaal Jr., and Rolof van Hövell tot Westerflier. Rotterdam, Neth.: Karwansaray, 2018.

Semper Eadem: *A History of Trinity Church in Newport, 1698–2000*. Vol. 1, 2nd ed. Newport, RI, 2018.

Mary Gould Almy's Journal during the Siege at Newport, Rhode Island, 29 July to 24 August 1778. Edited by John B. Hattendorf. Newport: Rhode Island Sons of the Revolution, 2018.

"2018 Annual Conference of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH)." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 27 (August 2018), pp. 26–28.

"An Interview with the RISCW's Distinguished Historian John Hattendorf." *E-warrior: A Publication of the Rhode Island Society of Colonial Wars* (Fall 2018), [pp. 3–6].

"The United States Navy in the Mediterranean during the First World War and Its Immediate Aftermath (1917–23)." In *The First World War in the Mediterranean and the Role of Lemnos,* edited by Zisis Fotakis, pp. 173–92. Athens: Editions Hêrodotos, 2018. Repr. in the present volume.

2019

"Debating the Purpose of a Navy in a New Republic: The United States of America, 1775–1815." In *Ideologies of Western Naval Power, c. 1500–1815,* edited by J. D. Davies, Alan James, and Gijs Rommelse, pp. 280–99. New York and London: Routledge, 2019. Repr. in the present volume.

"The Strategic Roles of Navies during the Great War." In *A Marinha Portuguesa na Grande Guerra: Política e poder naval (1898–1922),* edited by António José Telo, Jorge Semedo de Matos, and Nuno Sardinha Monteiro, pp. 21–36. Portugal e a Grande Guerra. Lisbon: Comissão Cultural de Marinha, 2019. Repr. in the present volume.

Review of *The General in Winter: The Marlborough-Godolphin Friendship and the Reign of Queen Anne,* by Frances Harris. *English Historical Review* 134, no. 566 (February 2019), pp. 226–28.

Review of *Mapping Naval Warfare: A Visual History of Conflict at Sea,* by Jeremy Black. *Sea History,* no. 165 (Winter 2018–19), pp. 49–50.

A Redcoat in America: The Diaries of Lieutenant William Bamford, 1757–1765 and 1776. Edited and annotated by John B. Hattendorf. Warwick, U.K.: Helion, 2019.

"2019 Annual Conference of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH)." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 31 (August 2019), pp. 29–31.

Review of *Treasures from the Map Room,* edited by Debbie Hall. *Terrae Incognitae* 51, no. 1 (2019), pp. 101–102.

Review of *Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life,* by Thomas Alexander Hughes. *Naval War College Review* 72, no. 1 (Winter 2019), pp. 156–57.

Review of *The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–1922: Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George,* by G. H. Bennett. *Naval War College Review* 72, no. 2 (Spring 2019), pp. 111–12.

2020

"Competing Navies: Anglo-Dutch Naval Rivalry, 1652–88." In *War, Trade and the State: Anglo-Dutch Conflict, 1652–1689,* edited by David Ormrod and Gijs Rommelse, pp. 92–116. Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 2020. Repr. in the present volume.

"The Brenton Family of Newport." In *From across the Sea: North Americans in Nelson's Navy,* edited by Sean M. Heuvel and John A. Rodgaard, pp. 162–95. Warwick, U.K.: Helion, 2020. Repr. in the present volume.

"Admiral of the Fleet James, First Baron Gambier, GCB." In *From across the Sea: North Americans in Nelson's Navy,* edited by Sean M. Heuvel and John A. Rodgaard, pp. 238–63. Warwick, U.K.: Helion, 2020. Repr. in the present volume.

"The Royal Navy and Economic Warfare against the United States during the War of 1812." In *Economic Warfare and the Sea: Grand Strategies for Maritime Powers, 1650–1945,* edited by David Morgan-Owen and Louis Halewood, pp. 137–55. Research in Maritime History, no. 55. Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2020. Repr. in the present volume.

"Navies and Naval Operations." In *The Routledge Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 1400–1800,* edited by Claire Jowitt, Craig Lambert, and Steve Mentz, pp. 242–72. London: Routledge, 2020. Repr. in the present volume.

"In Memoriam: A. Hunter Dupree, 1921–2019." *Perspectives on History: The Newsmagazine of the American Historical Association* 58, no. 4 (April 2020), p. 28.

Foreword to *Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy: Festschrift for Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (Ret.),* edited by Sebastian Bruns and Sarandis Papadopoulos, pp. 9–11. ISP Kiel Seapower Series, vol. 3. Baden-Baden, Ger.: Nomos, 2020.

"2020 Annual Conference of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH)." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 35 (August 2020), pp. 35–36.

"Life on the Lower Deck: Finding the Real Jack Tar." Review of *Sons of the Waves: The Common Seaman in the Heroic Age of Sail,* by Stephen Taylor. *Times Literary Supplement,* no. 6125/6126 (21–28 August 2020), p. 31.

"Le contre-amiral Henry B. Wilson et la marine des États-Unis en France (1917–1919)." In *L'engagement des Américains dans la guerre en 1917–1918: La Fayette, nous voilà!,* edited by Olivier Chaline and Olivier Forcade, pp. 247–69. Paris: Sorbonne Université Presses, 2020.

Forging the Trident: Theodore Roosevelt and the United States Navy. Edited by John B. Hattendorf and William P. Leeman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020.

"Harold David Langley (1925–2020): Naval, Diplomatic, and Church Historian." *Catholic Historical Review* 106, no. 4 (Autumn 2020), pp. 669–71.

Review of *The Kremlin Letters: Stalin's Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt,* edited by David Reynolds and Vladimir Pechatnov. *Naval War College Review* 73, no. 4 (Autumn 2020), pp. 167–68.

"Captain William Bamford." In James Scully, *Forgotten Souls: Memorials in Saint Rynagh's Old Graveyard, Banagher, County Offaly,* pp. 37–39. Tullamore, Ire.: Offaly Historical and Archaeological Society, 2020.

2021

The Battle of Rhode Island in 1778: The Official British View as Reported in the London Gazette. Edited by John B. Hattendorf. Middletown, RI: Stone Tower for the Rhode Island Society Sons of the Revolution, 2021.

"Practices: Translating Oral Traditions and Practical Experiences into Print." In *A Cultural History of the Sea in the Early Modern Age,* edited by Steve Mentz, pp. 53–81. London: Bloomsbury, 2021.

To the Java Sea: Selections from the Diary, Reports, and Letters of Henry E. Eccles, 1940–1942. Edited by John B. Hattendorf and Pelham Boyer. Historical Monograph 28. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2021.

Review of *Mutiny, Mayhem, Mythology:* Bounty*'s Enigmatic Voyage,* by Alan Frost. *Terrae Incognitae* 53, no. 1 (2021), pp. 71–72.

Review of *"I Am Determined to Live or Die on Board My Ship": The Life of Admiral John Inglis; An American in the Georgian Navy,* by Jim Tildesley. *Naval War College Review* 74, no. 2 (Spring 2021), pp. 169–71.

"Obituary: Berit Maria Hattendorf." *Newport Daily News,* 20 May 2021, p. 4A, and 21 May 2021, p. 4A.

Review of *The Letters of Henry Martyn: East India Company Chaplain,* edited by Scott D. Ayler. *Anglican and Episcopal History* 90, no. 2 (June 2021), pp. 180–81.

"2021 Annual Conference of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH)," and "The 2021 McMullen Naval History Symposium." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 40 (November 2021), pp. 31–34.

"Landstigningen i Humlebaek 1700—Karl XII:s första seger," by John B. Hattendorf and Carl-Johan Hagman. In *I Fred och Örlog: Svensk och Engelsk Sjömakt under 500 År; En Antologi,* edited by Gustaf von Hofsten, pp. 27–34. Göteborg, Swed.: Breakwater Publishing, 2021.

2022

"2022 Annual Conference of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH)." *Topmasts: The Quarterly Newsletter of the Society for Nautical Research,* no. 43 (August 2022), pp. 33–35.

Introduction to *Society of Colonial Wars in the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 2022 Member Directory, Roster & Constitution,* p. 1. Publication no. 75. Providence, RI: By the Society, 2022.

"Historian's Corner: The Navy and *Top of the Hill*." *Top of the Hill Association Newsletter,* Summer 2022, pp. 8–10.

2023

The Naval Novel: A Literary Genre in Historical Perspective. Middletown, RI: Stone Tower, 2023.

"The Landing at Humlebaek in 1700: Karl XII's First Victory." In *The Baltic Cauldron: Two Navies and the Fight for Freedom,* edited by Michael Ellis, Gustaf von Hofsten, and Derek Law, pp. 21–29. Caithness, Scot.: Whittles Publishing, 2023.

Reflections on Naval History: Collected Essays. Historical Monograph 30. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2023.

FORTHCOMING

Recovering Naval Power: Henry Maydman and the Revival of the Royal Navy. Edited by John B. Hattendorf and Geoffrey Till. London: Routledge, forthcoming.

"How an Unexpected Enemy with Innovative Tactics Started an Arms Race with Long-Term Strategic Consequences: The First Anglo-Dutch War, 1652–1654." In *Thinking about Enemies,* edited by Evan Wilson and Paul M. Kennedy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

John B. Hattendorf, DPhil, DLitt, LHD, FSNR, FRHistS, is the emeritus Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He occupied the E. J. King chair from August 1984 through September 2016. He was additionally chairman of the Maritime History Department and director of the Naval War College Museum from January 2003 through September 2016. Currently he is Senior Advisor of the Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research, established in 2017 by the Naval War College and so named to honor his more than fifty years of service to the College, the U.S. Navy, and the discipline of naval history. Professor Hattendorf holds degrees in history from Kenyon College (1964), Brown University (1971), and the University of Oxford, where he completed his DPhil in war history at Pembroke College in 1979. In 2016, Oxford awarded him its higher doctorate, the Doctor of Letters degree (DLitt). On his retirement after thirty-nine years as a civilian professor, the Chief of Naval Operations presented him with the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award.

A WORD ABOUT THE COVER IMAGES

The art appearing on the front cover, as an inset on the front cover, and on the back cover come from *Command of the Sea: Catalogue of an Exhibition of American Naval Art from the U.S. Naval Academy Museum, the U.S. Navy Art Collection and the U.S. Naval War College Museum Displayed at the Newport Art Museum, Newport, Rhode Island, 6 June–12 August 2007,* by John B. Hattendorf. Hattendorf was in 2007 the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, chairman of the College's Maritime History Department, and director of the Naval War College Museum, in Newport, Rhode Island. The notes that follow are adapted from the catalogue as well.

The 2007 exhibition of American naval art was a unique occasion that allowed the public to see, in one exhibit, unusual examples of naval art that are normally found only separately, at several naval commands: the U.S. Naval Academy, in Annapolis, Maryland; the Navy Art Collection, at the Naval History and Heritage Command (or NHHC, in 2007 the Naval Historical Center), in Washington, DC; and the Naval War College Museum. Since October 2006, the Museums Division of the NHHC has coordinated the activities of all museums within the Navy and helped to facilitate this exhibition. The Naval War College cosponsored the event with the Newport Art Museum, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the graduation in June 1957 of the first class of midcareer officers from foreign navies who attended the College's senior international course, the Naval Command College.

Among the collections represented in this exhibit, the oldest was that of the Naval Academy Museum, a collection that originated with the Naval School Lyceum, founded in 1845. Today the Art Collection at the Academy contains more than 1,200 paintings and sculptures representing the work of many notable artists. When the Brooklyn Naval Lyceum and the Boston Naval Library and Institute were disbanded in 1888 and 1921, respectively, their accessions were donated to the Naval Academy and formed the nucleus of the present Museum Art Collection.

The Navy Art Collection at the Naval History and Heritage Command traces its origins to the U.S. Navy's Combat Art Program, which began in 1941. In 1986, the Navy's Chief of Information transferred that collection to the then Naval Historical Center. Today, the U.S. Navy Art Collection has more than fifteen thousand paintings, prints, drawings, and sculptures. It contains depictions of naval ships, personnel, and actions from all eras of U.S. naval history. Thanks to the works created under the Combat Art Program, the eras of World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the First Gulf War are particularly well represented.

The Naval War College, established in 1884 under Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce as "a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war," began its own art collection in 1900, when it raised a subscription of a thousand dollars to commission a formal portrait of its founder. Since then the collection has grown through the acquisition of numerous additional portraits. The collection widened further with the establishment of the Naval War College Museum in 1954, which today maintains exhibits on the history of the College since 1884, of naval activities in the Narragansett Bay region from the colonial period onward, and generally of the art and science of naval warfare since ancient times.

The large image on the front cover, *USS* Constitution *vs. HMS* Guerriere, *19 August 1812,* by Charles Robert Patterson (1878–1958) is an oil-on-canvas painting, 28½ inches by 42 inches. The U.S. frigate *Constitution,* under Capt. Isaac Hull, left Boston, Massachusetts, on 2 August 1812, bound for a raiding cruise off Nova Scotia, in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, and off Newfoundland. On 19 August she encountered HMS *Guerriere,* Capt. James R. Dacres, some four hundred miles southeast of the British naval dockyard at Halifax, Nova Scotia. This battle, the first of several U.S. Navy victories in ship-to-ship contests, encouraged Americans.

A quarter hour of intense gunnery by *Constitution* battered *Guerriere* in the hull and masts. The British frigate's mizzenmast fell over the side, crippling her ability to maneuver. *Constitution* then moved ahead to rake *Guerriere,* whose bowsprit caught in the American's mizzen rigging. Firing continued while the two ships were thus tangled, and both sides prepared boarding parties. Marksmen in the mast tops took aim on the exposed American sailors with deadly effect. Many officers and men were killed, including *Constitution*'s Marine lieutenant. Others, Captain Dacres among them, were wounded. As the ships separated, *Guerriere*'s foremast collapsed, pulling down the mainmast with it. Now a "defenseless hulk," she surrendered at 7:00 PM as *Constitution* approached to renew the action after making brief repairs to her modest damage.

The painting is one of the set of four commissioned by Edward Berwind in 1928 and presented to the Naval War College Museum in January 1963.

The inset image on the front cover is *Home from a Cruise,* by Norman Rockwell (1894–1978), oil on canvas, 28 by 28 inches. The preeminent American illustrator of the mid-twentieth century, Rockwell is most famous for the 322 cover illustrations that he painted for the *Saturday Evening Post* between 1916 and 1963. During World War I, Rockwell served briefly in the U.S. Navy in 1918, assigned to the Charleston Navy Yard in South Carolina. In the summer of 1923, five years after he left the service, the Navy Department commissioned Rockwell to paint this piece for a calendar for the year 1924.

Born in a New York City brownstone house in 1894, Rockwell enrolled in his first art classes at the age of fourteen in 1908 at the New York School of Art (formerly the Chase School of Art). Two years later he left high school to study art at the National Academy of Design, thereafter transferring to the Art Students League. There he studied with Thomas Fogarty, who prepared him for doing commercial commissions, and with George Bridgman, who taught him technical skills he used throughout his artistic career.

Rockwell quickly became successful as an illustrator. He got his first commercial commission before he was sixteen years old—a set of four Christmas cards. While still a teenager, he became the art director of *Boys' Life,* the magazine of the Boy Scouts of America. Then in 1916, at the age of twenty-two, he began his forty-seven-year career as a cover illustrator for the *Saturday Evening Post.*

The scene that Rockwell depicts in this painting captures the essence of a sailor's experience throughout history: a young man coming home to tell of his adventures at sea. In this case, the ship model and seashell on the shelf in the background suggest that the listeners may be old sailors themselves, listening with fascination as they link their own memories with the sailor's new sea stories. The man who posed as the sailor for this painting was a sailor named Bonney M. Powell, who twenty-five years later in 1949 became a Navy commander. The older men in the painting have similarities with figures Rockwell used in later paintings, notably his *Outward Bound,* an illustration painted for the *Ladies' Home Journal* in 1927, and another work, *The Lighthouse Keeper's Daughter.* Another thematically related image is the *Post* cover for 18 January 1919 of two sailors in blue uniforms, *Reminiscing.*

Home from a Cruise is from the collection of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum.

On the back cover is *Boston Harbor from Constitution Wharf,* by Robert Salmon (1775–after 1845), oil on canvas, 26¾ inches by 40¾. This view of Boston harbor, celebrating America's rise as a maritime nation, is one of the best known works of Salmon, an English-born artist, who influenced many mid-nineteenth-century American maritime artists, including Fitz Henry Lane. It is the most famous and most widely traveled item in the collection of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum. An image of it was used as the dust jacket for John Wilmerding's pioneer study *A History of American Marine Painting* (1968).

Salmon was born in Whitehaven, Cumberland, England, in October or November 1775, the son of a jeweler of Scottish origin. He was probably self-taught in art, and his work shows the influence of the Anglo-Dutch tradition, particularly the work of John Cleveley the Elder (1712–77). He spent his early years painting around the ports of Liverpool, England, and Greenock, Scotland. In 1828, he moved to Boston, Massachusetts, where he spent fourteen years and became the preeminent maritime painter. During his career Salmon painted more than a thousand works, of which at least four hundred were of the Boston area. His production slowed by 1840, perhaps from failing eyesight. He left Boston in 1842; details of his life after that point are not known.

In an entry dated 20 May 1833, Salmon recorded this painting in his own catalogue of completed work as "number 789, *View of Charlestown,* painted in 31 days on a $150 commission from Mr. John Perkins Cushing." Cushing (1787–1862) was a prominent figure in Boston's China trade. Within a year the work was transferred to his cousin Robert Bennet Forbes (1804–1849), another Bostonian in the China trade. In 1842 Forbes became one of the founding members, and the first life member, of the Boston Naval Library and Institute, one of the pioneer organizations in the development of American professional naval education and a forerunner of the U.S. Naval Institute. In 1842 Forbes donated the work to the Boston Naval Library, where it remained until 1921, when Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt urged that the organization's collections be donated to the U.S. Naval Academy.

Salmon used some artistic license in painting this work. The large obelisk in the background is the Bunker Hill Monument, commemorating the battle fought on 17 June 1775. The monument, however, was not begun until 1827 and not completed, as shown here, until 1842. The large, three-masted ship is often assumed to be USS *Constitution,* and it may be that Salmon intended to depict her. Salmon would, however, not have been able to paint her under sail, as she had been "in ordinary" with her hull roofed over since 1828. Also, the vessel shown is pierced for thirteen guns on the gun deck, USS *Constitution* for fifteen.

Boston Harbor from Constitution Wharf is in the U.S. Naval Academy Museum.

INDEX

Note: Names that begin with articles—such as "the," "a," "le," "la," "les," and "el"—and surnames with "de," "von," "ter," and "af" are indexed under the next word of the name.

ABC (American-British Conference) staff talks, 39, 50
ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command, 52, 434
Abenaki, 130
Académie de Marine, 15
Acadia, French, 122, 130, 131, 134, 348, 349
Acapulco, Mexico, 124
Acheson, Dean, 54
Adams, John (president of the United States), 30, 222, 223, 228, 229
Adams, John (ship captain), 209
Adams, John Quincy, 192, 194
Adams, William, 193
Adams, Winborn, 209, 213, 214–15
admirals, education and training of, 397–414, 435. *See also* Naval War College (U.S.)
admiralties (Dutch), 101, 103, 110, 114, 116
Admiralty (British), 21, 31, 34, 45, 51, 84, 171, 182, 186, 188, 189, 244, 258, 259, 260, 299, 341, 342
  First Lord of, 67, 186, 190, 192, 259, 341, 343, 347, 392
  First Sea Lord, 298
  Senior Naval Lord, 182, 185, 186
Admiralty Court, 208
Adrianople, Ottoman Empire, 162
Adriatic Sea, 90, 189, 270, 277, 283, 300, 301, 302, 303, 336, 337, 451
Adventures of Roderick Random, The (Smollett) 19
Aegean Sea, 90, 303
  Aegean mine barrage, 302
Affleck, Philip, Vice Adm., 341
Afghanistan, 268, 451
Africa, 110
Agincourt, Battle of, 78
aircraft, types
  airship, 308
  biplane, 308
  Curtiss AB-3 flying boat, 308
  dive-bomber, 308
  kamikaze, 320
  patrol bomber, 308
  S-3, antisubmarine patrol aircraft, 376
  seaplane, 314
Aix, Île d', 189
Åkerhielm, Samuel, 155
Alaska, 49, 172, 181
Albemarle, Duke of. *See* Monck, George, Duke of Albemarle
Alberoni, Giulio, 148, 165
Albion, Robert G., 3–4, 6
Aldrich, Nelson, 64
Aleutian Is., 315
Alexander I (tsar of Russia), 187, 352
Algeciras, Spain, 334
Algeria, 270
Algiers, 240, 334
Allemand, Zacharie, 189
Allen, Ethan, 221
Allied Naval Council, 283, 300, 303
All Souls College, Oxford, 68, 195
Alameda, CA, 317
Alletta Morris McBean Charitable Trust, 359
Almagest (Ptolemy), 16
Almansa, battle of, 146
Almonde, Philips van, 153
Altranstädt, Saxony, 157, 159
America. *See* North America; South America
American Coast Pilot, The (Furlong), 21
American Council on Education, 407
American Historical Association, 5
American Marine Model Gallery, 359
American Naval Records Society, 371
American Neptune, 9
American Pilot, The (Norman and Carleton), 21
American Relief Administration, 295
amphibious operations, 89, 111, 114, 115, 116–17, 123, 126, 145, 153, 246, 247, 382, 420, 421, 451
Amsterdam, Netherlands, 114, 164
Anderson, W. G., 228

Andrews, Charles McLean, 128
Anghiera, Peter Martyr d', 18
Anglicanism. *See* Church of England
Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 52, 53
Annapolis, MD, 60
Annapolis Royal, NS, 132, 349. *See also* Port Royal
Anne (queen of Great Britain), 132, 141, 151, 154–62
Anson, George, Adm., 19, 23, 343
Antarctic support activity, 375
Anti-Federalists, 227, 228
Antigua, 258
anti-navalists, 32, 228–29, 240
antinomianism, 328
antisubmarine warfare, 55, 276, 278, 283, 300–301, 374, 376
Antwerp, Belgium, 67
ANZAM region, 55
Apalachee tribe, 127
Appeal to the British Nation, on Behalf of Her Sailors, An (Brenton), 338
Appleton, Henry, 105
applicatory system, 401–404
Aquidneck I., 61
Aragon, 146
Arbuthnot, Marriot, 177
Arcadia Conference, 52
Archimedes, 84
Arctic, 173
aristocracy, 397
Aristotle, 408
Arizona, 124, 297
armed forces, multidimensional role of, 441–55
Armitage, David, 8
Armour, Norman, 48
arms race, naval, 102
Army and Navy Journal, 361
Army Field Service Regulations, 404
Army War College (U.S.), 36, 46, 61, 401, 404, 406
Arnold, Benedict (governor, RI), 340
Arnold, Benedict, Maj. Gen., 205, 221
Arnold, Freelove, 340
art de la guerre sur mer, L' (Grenier), 88
art des armées navales, L' (Hoste), 18, 88
arte of navigation, The (Cortés), 17
art history, 5, 7, 467–70
Arthur, Brian, 234, 237, 254
Articles of Confederation, 227
Articles of War, 181
Ashton, E. C., 50
asiento, 148
assault, 431
Aston, George, Maj. Gen. Sir, 430
astrolabe, 16
astronomy, 15, 16, 20
  astronomical tables, 20, 21
Athens: Athenian navy, 82–83, 383
Atlantic Fleet (U.S.), 39, 53
Atlantic history, 8
Atlantic Neptune, The (Admiralty), 21
Atlantic Ocean, 40, 106, 295, 301
  eastern, 277
  North, 40, 51, 56, 122, 144
  transatlantic communication, 129
  western, 258
atlas, maritime, 21
Attu, 315
Auchincloss, Hugh D., Jr., 327
Augustus II (king of Poland and elector of Saxony), 154, 155–56, 158, 159, 160
Austen, Francis W., 348
Austen, Jane, 348
Australia, 21, 45, 46, 49, 51, 55, 314, 432
  Swan River Colony, 346
Australian Association for Maritime History, 9
Austria, 139, 140, 146, 147, 148, 154, 157, 158, 159, 161
  Austria-Hungary, 268, 301, 302, 303; Austro-Hungarian Navy, 270, 300, 302–303
  Austrian Netherlands, 148
Auxiliary Bible Society, 195
aviation, naval, 276, 278, 284, 285, 292, 307–23
  environment of, 320
  losses, 318–19
Ayres, John, 209, 214, 217
Ayscue, George, 104
Azores, 277, 283, 299, 301

Backhaus, Jürgen, 81
Bagration, Prince Pyotr, Gen., 352
Bahamas, 173, 241, 258
Bailyn, Bernard, 8
Balance, F. A., 55
balance of power, 139, 141, 146, 149, 161, 261, 390
Balard, Michel, 10
Balearic Is., 138
Baltic Sea (East Sea), 81, 90, 99, 110, 115, 151, 153, 155, 160, 163, 164, 187, 272, 278, 352, 419
Baltimore, MD, 235, 247, 249, 289
Banckert, Adriaen, 114
Bannister, John, 340
Baptist Missionary Society, 183
Barbados, 102, 205, 211, 258
Barbary corsairs, 32, 115
Barcelona, Spain, 145, 146, 348
Barclay de Tolly, Mikhail, 352
Barker, Richard, 77, 100
Barkley, Andrew, 175
Barnard College, 408
Barras, comte de, 359
Barrington, William, 2nd Viscount Barrington, 220
Barry, John, Capt., 176, 226, 398
Barth, C. H., Maj., 402
Bartlett, William, 207, 209
bases, naval, 310
Bassens, France, 290
Bath, England, 337
Bath, Order of the, 193–94, 338, 347
Bathurst, Henry, 3rd Earl Bathurst, 258, 259
Battle Cry of Peace, The (motion picture), 296
baton of the Admiral of the Fleet, 196

"battle, face of," 319
battles, naval, 70, 75, 77, 83, 85, 87, 93, 104, 108, 383, 431, 447
Algeciras, 334, 351
aviation, 307–24
Basque Roads, 189–91, 196
Beachy Head, 381, 384, 393
Coral Sea, 314–15
Dogger Bank, 273, 387
Dover, 104
Dungeness, 104, 105
Flamborough Head, 398
Four Days', 88, 110–11
Gabbard Bank, 87, 105, 106
Glorious First of June, 180–81, 182, 196, 341, 342
Guadalcanal, 315, 316
Gut of Gibraltar, 334, 351
Hampton Roads, 362
Java Sea, 52, 434
Jutland, 273, 274, 297, 314
Kentish Knock, 104
Lake Champlain, 231, 236, 242, 243
Lake Erie, 231, 236, 245
Lepanto, 434
Leyte Gulf, 313, 318, 447
Lowestoft, 109
Manila Bay, 399
Midway, 41, 314-315, 316
Mobile Bay, 399
North Foreland, 105
Öland, 115
Pearl Harbor, 51, 52, 310, 312
Philippine Sea, 314, 317–18
Plattsburg, 246, 248
Plymouth, 104
Portland, 87, 105
Schooneveld, 114
Saintes, 388, 393
Santa Cruz Is., 314, 315–16
Scheveningen, 105
Skaggerak, 273. *See also* battles, naval: Jutland
Solebay, 113–14
Solomon Is., 314, 315, 316
St. James's Day, 111
St. Vincent, 334
Surigao Strait, 307
Svensksund, 333
Taranto, 310
Terheide, 105, 106
Texel, 114–15
Toulon, 88, 191
Trafalgar, 41, 64, 88, 182, 185, 191, 271, 314, 336, 351, 400, 434, 436, 447
Truk, 312
Ushant (Ouessant), 385, 391
Vélez-Málaga, 123, 145
Vyborg, 333
Baugh, Daniel A., 430
Bavaria, 139, 143, 146, 149
Baxter, Stephen B., 384
Bayard, James A., Sr., 192
Bayley, Thomas, 409
Bay of Biscay, 90, 165, 188, 217, 287, 290, 308
Bazon, Theodoro, 84
Beatty, David, Lord Beatty, 39
Beaufort, duc de, 110
Beckwith, George, Lt. Gen., 342
Beechy, William, Sir, 191
Belcher, Jonathan (lieutenant governor), 349
Belgium, 67, 245
Belgian navy, 453
Belknap, Charles, 290
Belle Isle, 217
belligerent rights, 37
Bellin, Jacques Nicolas, 19
Bellomont, 1st Earl of (Richard Coote), 130, 329
Bender, Ottoman Empire, 160, 162
Bennett, Richard Bedford, 48
Benson, Allen, 371
Benson, William S., Adm., 36, 281, 284, 298, 303
Berehaven, Ireland, 276
Berlin, Germany, 159
Berlin Decree, 255
Berlin Wall, 422
Bermuda, 50, 217, 241, 258
Berwick, Duke of, 146
Berwind, Edward, 468
Beverly, MA, 207, 208, 213, 216
Bexley, Baron (Nicholas Vansittart), 195
Bible, 189, 408
Bickerton, Richard Hussey, Rear Adm. Sir, 351
Bickham, Troy, 234, 238
Biddle, Nicholas, 227
Bigot, Sébastien-François, vicomte de Morogues, 18, 88
bilateral relations between navies, 41
Billy Budd (Melville), 24
Biloxi Bay, 125
Binckes, Jacob, 114, 115
biographical studies, naval, 75–76, 226–27, 236, 397, 400, 401, 410
Bizerte, Tunisia, 302
Black, Jeremy, 234, 238
Black Sea, 160, 398
Blackwall, England, 183
Bladensburg, MD, 247
Blagrave, John, 16
Blake, Richard, 171, 175
Blake, Robert, 87, 104, 105
Blathwayt, William, 154
Blaydes Maritime Centre, 9
Blenheim, Battle of, 143, 156, 157
Bligh, John, Capt., 341
Bliss, Tasker, Gen., 61, 402
blockade, 30, 37, 47, 66, 87, 89, 109, 113, 165, 188, 189, 220, 244, 246–48, 253–63, 274, 275, 276, 278, 387, 388, 389, 431, 452
Bluestocking Society, 174, 179
Blunt, Edmund March, 21
boarding, 86–87, 104, 105, 113

Board of Admiralty (U.S.), 30
Board of Trade (England), 128, 129, 131, 329
Boat Swain's Art, The (Bond), 19
Bodin, Jean, 76
Bolivia, 60
Bon, Ferdinand de, 284, 286
Bond, Henry, 19
Book of Common Prayer, 17–18, 186
books, maritime, 15–28
Booth, Ken, 433
Bordeaux, France, 285, 287, 288, 289, 290, 292
border patrol, maritime, 449
Borough, William, 16
Bosporus, 271, 303
Boston, MA, 30, 39, 59, 64, 131, 175, 213, 221, 244, 289, 328, 470
  Boston Harbor from Constitution Wharf (Salmon), 469, *back cover*
  Boston Naval Library, 467, 470
  Boston Naval Shipyard, 375, 376
  Chelsea Naval Hospital, 376
  View of Charlestown [Boston, MA] (Salmon), 470, *back cover*
Boswell, James, 174
Bouëdec, Gérard Le, 10
Bouguer, Pierre, 85
Bourbon, house of, 137, 141, 146
Bourdé de Villehuet, Jacques, 88
Bouverie, Elizabeth, 174
Bouvier, Jacqueline, 327
Bow, Middlesex, England, 346
Bowditch, Nathaniel, 21
Bowen, Ephraim, Jr., 207, 208, 214
Boyd, David French, 291
Boydell Press, 10
Bradford, James C., 9
Bradford, John, 209, 212, 217
Brandenburg-Prussia, 142–43, 148, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 165, 187. *See also* Prussia
Brandt, Gerard, 75
Brazil, 107, 148
Breisgau, 148
Bremen, 162, 163, 165
Brennan, Joseph G., 408
Brenton blue butterfly, 338
Brenton family, 327–58
  Brenton, Edward Brabazon, 350
  Brenton, Edward Pelham, Capt., 23, 191, 327, 329, 339, 340–47, 348, 352
  Brenton, Frances, 347
  Brenton, Harriet Mary, 329, 338, 339, 348, 350
  Brenton, Henrietta (wife of Vice Adm. John), 329, 352
  Brenton, Henrietta Cowley (wife of Rear Adm. Jahleel), 330, 332, 340, 347
  Brenton, Jahleel, I, 328, 329
  Brenton, Jahleel, II, 329, 337
  Brenton, Jahleel, III, Rear Adm., 327, 329–32, 340, 347, 352
  Brenton, Jahleel, IV, Vice Adm. Sir, 327, 329, 332–39, 340, 341, 343, 343, 345, 347, 348, 351, 352
  Brenton, James (judge), 329, 338, 349, 350
  Brenton, James Wallace, Lt., 327, 329, 340, 341, 347–48, 352
  Brenton, John, Purser, 327, 329, 350–51
  Brenton, John, Vice Adm., 327, 329, 350, 351–52
  Brenton, John Jervis, 336, 337, 339
  Brenton, Lancelot Charles Lee, Rev. Sir, Bart., 336, 339
  Brenton, Mary, 349, 350
  Brenton, Susannah, 349, 350
  Brenton, William (father of Vice Adm. John and Lt. William), 329, 350, 353
  Brenton, William (governor), 327–28, 329, 340
  Brenton, William, Lt., 327, 329, 352–53
  genealogical chart, 329
Brenton Juvenile Asylum, 346
Brest, France, 29, 92, 188, 219, 284, 286, 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 386
  Carola Barracks, 291
  Deuxième Arrondissement Maritime, 291
Brethren movement, 339
Breve compendio de la sphera (Cortés), 17
bribes, diplomatic, 154, 159, 166
Brihuega, battle of, 146
Brindisi, Italy, 300
Bristol, England, 289
  bishop of, 160
Bristol, Mark L., 303
Britain's glory, or shipbuilding unveiled (Sutherland), 17, 19
British Admiralty delegation, Washington, 40, 51, 52
British and Foreign Bible Society, 192
British army, 220, 239–41, 245, 246, 247, 385, 392
  71st Highland Regiment, 216
British Columbia, 196
Brixham, England, 116
Brock, Isaac, 242
Brodie, Bernard, 311–12
Broeze, Frank, 3
Brooklyn, NY, 209
  Brooklyn Naval Lyceum. *See* Naval Lyceum
Broughton, Nicholas, 207, 210, 213, 223, 224
Browell, William, Capt., 338
Brown, John, 222
buccaneering, 75
Buchet, Christian, 10
Buckingham, Benjamin, 69
Budiansky, Stephen, 234
Bueil, Jean V de, 82
Bulgaria, 301
Bullard, William H. G., 303
Bunker Hill, battle of, 214, 221
buoyancy, 84, 85
Burchett, Josiah, 6, 23, 75, 343
bureaucracy, 82, 100, 101, 443
Bureau of Navigation (U.S. Navy), 66, 68, 284, 368
Bureau of Ordnance (U.S. Navy), 66

Burke, Arleigh, Adm., 407
Burke, William, 210, 214
Burma, 52
Burnet, Gilbert (bishop), 161
Bush, George W. (president of the United States), 420
Bushnell, Edmund, 17, 19
business management, 397
Bynkershoek, Cornelius van, 91, 416
Byron, John, Vice Adm., 173, 385

cabinet (British), 34, 45, 384
Cable, James, Sir, 433
Cadillac, sieur de (Antoine de La Mothe), 125
Cádiz, Spain, 124, 145, 342, 352
Caen, France, 172
Cagliari, Sardinia, 334
Cahokia, IL, 125
California, 133, 375
  Alta, 124
  Baja, 124
Callao, Peru, 60
Calvi, France, 382
Camaret-sur-Mer, France, 284
Cambridge, MA, 206, 207, 224
Camisards, 143
Camus, Albert, 408
Canada, 34, 35, 37, 45–50, 51, 52, 56, 125, 131, 193, 234, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 253, 258, 288, 432
  Parliament of, 48, 56
  See also Royal Canadian Navy
Canadian Air Force, 53
Canadian National Defence College, 53, 54
Canadian Nautical Research Society (CNRS), 9, 13
Canadian Navy. *See* Royal Canadian Navy
Canadian-U.S. Joint Defense Board, 53
Canary Is., 419
Cancale Bay, 177
CANCOMARLANT, 53
CANLANT, 53
Canning, George, 243
Cap Béveziers (Beachy Head), 381
Cap d'Antifer, 292
Cap de Bréhat, 291
Cape Ann, 208, 213, 214, 215, 216
Cape Breton I., 134, 148
Cape Cod, 213
Cape Horn, 52
Cape of Good Hope, 338, 350
  dockyard, 338
Cape Trafalgar, 301
Capri, 337
captures, ship. *See* prizes
Carey, Harriet Mary, 339
Caribbean Sea, 99, 115, 258, 342. *See also* West Indies
Carleton, Osgood, 21
Carmichael, George K., 313
Carolina, 125–28. *See also* North Carolina; South Carolina
Caroline Is., 296
carpenter's rule, The (More), 17
Carpi, Modena, 140
carrier battle group, 422
carrier task force, 312
Carter, Jimmy (president of the United States), 419
Carter, Walter E. "Ted," Jr., Vice Adm., 371
Carteret, John, 2nd Earl Granville, 165–66
Carteret, Philip, 183
cartography, 6, 16, 19, 20
Casablanca, Morocco, 317
Caspian Sea, 160
Casterton, Westmorland, England, 339
Castex, Raoul, Adm., 382, 383
Castile, 145
Castillo de San Marco, Saint Augustine, FL, 126–27
Castine, ME, 246
Castlereagh, Viscount, and 2nd Marquis of Londonderry (Robert Stewart), 188, 193
Catalonia, 145, 146, 148
Cathcart, William Schaw, 1st Earl Cathcart, 187, 188
Catherine II, "the Great" (empress of Russia), 398
Catholic Church. *See* Roman Catholic Church
Catholic University of Paris, 10
Cattaro, Austria-Hungary, 300
Cederhielm, Josias, 155, 159, 160
Cephalonia, 336
Certaine errors in navigation (Wright), 16
Cervera, Pascual, Adm., 383
Cévennes, France, 143
Chafee, John, 373
Chamberlain, Neville, 51
Chamier, Frederick, Capt., 345, 346
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 195
Channel, English, 104, 110, 115, 144, 188, 276, 287, 288, 292, 301, 308, 352, 386, 390, 451
Chapman, Fredrik af, 20, 85
Chapman, John, 176
character, 406
Charente River, 90, 189, 190
Charlemont (fortress), 335
Charles I (king of England), 100, 116
Charles II (king of England), 107, 112, 113, 115, 329
Charles II (Carlos) (king of Spain), 138, 139, 140
Charles V (Holy Roman emperor), 138
Charles VI (Holy Roman emperor), 146, 149
  as Archduke of Austria, 124, 139, 140, 145, 146
  as Charles III (Carlos) of Spain, 124, 145, 146
Charles XI (king of Sweden), 151–52
Charles XII (king of Sweden), 151–69
  field chancery of, 155, 158, 159, 160
  proposed war mediator, 158–59
Charles Town (Charleston), SC, 125, 177–78, 259, 375
  Fort Moultrie, 178
Chase, Philander, 194–95
Chase, Samuel, 224
Chatham Dockyard, England, 108, 340
Chatta tribe, 127
Cherbourg, France, 290, 291, 292, 335, 336, 341
  Premier Arrondissement Maritime, 291–92
Cherpak, Evelyn, 371
Chesapeake Bay, 114, 244, 245, 246, 247, 260

Chiari, Republic of Venice, 140
Chicago, IL, 243
Chief of Naval Operations (U.S.), 36, 39, 41, 51, 298, 308, 313
Chiefs of Staff (U.K.), 54
Chignecto Isthmus, 349
Children's Friend Society, 346, 347
Chile, 60
China, 5, 281, 296, 362, 437, 442
Choctaw tribe, 127
Choiseul, Étienne François de, duc de Choiseul, 85
Christianity, 138
Christ's Hospital, 17
Chronique d'Histoire Maritime, 8
Churchill, Awnsham and John, 18
Churchill, John. *See* Marlborough, Earl of, then 1st Duke of (John Churchill)
Churchill, Winston, 52
Church Missionary Society, 171, 175, 192, 195
Church of England, 101, 174, 186, 194, 329, 339
  evangelical activities, 174–75, 183, 188, 191, 195, 336, 338
  Overseas Missionary Society, 183
Cipolla, Carlo, 77, 100
Clapham Sect, 175, 183
Clark, Vern, Adm., 423
Clark, William Bell, 6
Clarke, James Stanier, 400
Clarkson, Thomas, 174
Clausewitz, Carl von, 82, 242
Clay, Henry, 192, 194, 195
Clement XI (pope), 141
Clerk, John, of Eldin, 18, 88
Cleveland, Grover (president of the United States), 67
Cleveley, John, the Elder, 470
Clinton, Henry, Gen. Sir, 177, 349
Clinton, William J. (president of the United States), 420
clock, public, 329
coalition warfare, 113, 281
coastal protection, 89, 223, 278
coastal waters, 91, 101, 416–18, 447, 449, 451
Coasters Harbor I. *See* Narragansett Bay: Coasters Harbor I.
Coast Guard (British), 47
Cochrane, Alexander, Vice Adm. Sir, 247, 260, 342
Cochrane, Thomas, 10th Earl of Dundonald, Adm., 171, 189–91, 194, 334
Cockburn, George, Sir, 247, 342, 343
Codrington, Edward, Adm. Sir, 352
Coit, William, 210, 214
Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 84, 92, 106
Colbert, Richard G., Adm., 52, 407
collection of voyages, A, 18
Collingwood, Cuthbert, 1st Baron Collingwood, Adm., 189, 191, 192, 336, 351
Collins, John, 16
Collins, John A., 55
Cologne, principality of, 113, 141, 146, 148
Colomb, John, Sir, 34
Colomb, Philip, Vice Adm., 381, 382, 393
colonial defense, 128–29
Colonial Office, 34, 45
colonies
  proprietary, 128
  royal, 128
Colson, Richard, 17, 20
Colton, Charles, Rev., 41
Columbia University, 408
combined arms, 312–13, 435
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). *See* Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS)
command
  art and science of, 400, 401
  culture of, 398, 403
  of the sea, 415–16, 431
Commander, Western Atlantic (COMWESTLANT), 53
Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (U.S.), 39
Committee of Imperial Defence, 433
Commonwealth navies, 45–58
communications, maritime, 253, 284, 314, 415, 421, 446, 449, 453
COMOCEANLANT, 53
compass, 16
Compiègne, France, 292
Compleat Modellist, The (Miller), 19
Compleat Ship-wright, The (Bushnell), 17
Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea, A (Burchett), 23, 343
compromise, 146–47
Comptroller of the Navy, 176
concentration of force, 111, 112
Concord, MA, 220, 221
conflict, spectrum of, 421
Congregational Church, 183
Congress (U.S.), 64, 241, 243, 255, 274, 275, 281, 282, 297, 298
  Naval Expansion Act of 1916, 297
  Shipping Act of 1916, 288-289
  See also Continental Congress; House of Representatives (U.S.); Senate (U.S.)
Congreve, William, Sir, 188
Connecticut, 33, 129, 132, 221, 244, 260, 329
  Connecticut State Navy, 223
Connecticut River, 131
Connaissance des temps, La, 20
Conrad, Joseph, 408
Consolato del Mare, 90
Constantinople, Ottoman Empire, 161, 162, 271, 302
Constitution of the United States, 227
constructor, naval, 85
containment
  crisis, 420
  strategic, 125
Continental Army, 205–18, 221
  14th Regiment, 208, 209
Continental Congress, 29, 30, 31, 205, 207, 220, 222–25, 227

Continental Navy, 29–30, 31, 82, 177, 206–18, 225–34, 397, 398
Navy Board of the Eastern Department, 209, 217
Continental System, 254
contraband, 161, 388
control, concept of strategic, 420, 421, 447–50
convoy, 40, 101, 104, 105, 113, 164, 165, 183, 244, 258, 259, 276, 278, 292, 298, 301
routing, 55, 104
Conyers, Joyce, 371
Conyngham, Gustavus, 227
Cook, James, 20, 23, 183
Cooke, Edward, 19
Cooper, James Fenimore, 24
"Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," 423, 436
Copeland, Robert, 16
Copenhagen, Denmark
attack on (1700), 153
attack on (1807), 171, 186
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 16
copper sheathing, 177, 392
Corbett, Julian S., 76, 253, 254, 271, 382, 383, 384, 385, 389, 391, 415–16, 420, 429, 432, 444, 447
Corfu, 189, 277, 300
Coriolis: Interdisciplinary Journal of Maritime History, 9, 365–66
Cork, Ireland, 155, 178
Cornacchia, Sue, 371
Cornish, Samuel, Sir, Bart., 172, 173
Cornish, Samuel Pitchford, 172, 173
Cornwall, ON, 46
Cornwallis, Charles, 1st Marquis Cornwallis, 177, 388
Cornwallis, James, Capt., 340
Cornwallis, William, Adm., 183
Corsica, 382
Cortés, Martin, 17
Cosmographia (Münster), 18
cosmographical glass, The (Cuningham), 16
Council of American Maritime Museums, 4
Courland, 163
court-martial, 190, 191, 336, 386
courts. *See* Admiralty Court; High Court of Admiralty; law; vice-admiralty courts
Coutances, France, 177
Coventry, William, Sir, 108
Cowes Week, 67
Cowley, William, 340
Cox, Margaretta Diana, 341
Cox, Thomas, Maj. Gen., 341
Crane, Stephen, 407
Cranston, Samuel, 329
Creek Confederacy, 247
Creighton, Margaret, 8
Crimea, 160
Croatia, 336
Croats, 302, 303
Cromwell, Oliver (lord protector of England), 91, 105, 106, 107, 115, 151, 397, 433
Crown Point (fort), 221
cultural history, 5, 6, 7
culverin, 86
Cumming, James, Vice Adm., 333
Cunningham, Andrew, Lord Cunningham, 40
Cunningham, William, 16
currents, 16, 22
Cushing, John Perkins, 470
customs duties, 8, 328
Cuxhaven, Hamburg, 341
Cyprus, 443
Czechoslovakia, 302

Dacres, James R., Capt., 468
Dalley, William, 34
Dampier, William, 19
Dana, Richard Henry, 25
Daniell, Stephen, 127
Daniels, Josephus, 36, 281, 284, 295, 298
Danish Straits. *See* Great Belt; Little Belt; Sound (Øresund)
Danube River, 121, 143
Danzig, Poland, 155, 156, 158
Dardanelles, 271, 278, 300, 303
Dartmouth, 1st Baron (George Legge), Adm., 116, 384
Dartmouth, 2nd Earl of (William Legge), 133
Dartmouth College, 311
Darwin, Australia, 51
Daughan, George, 234
Dauphin I., Mobile Bay, 125
Davenport, Charles Benedict, 327
Davidson, John F. 53, 54
Davies, J. David, 92
Davis, John, 17
Davis, Lance, 253
Davis, Norman H., 49
Davisville, RI
Naval Construction Battalion Base, 375–77
Davout, Louis-Nicolas, Gen., 352
D-Day, 40
Dean, Joseph, 176
Deane, Anthony, 85
Deane, Richard, 87, 105
Deane, Silas, 217, 223
Dearborn, Henry, 240, 243
Decatur, Stephen, 236, 248
decentralization, 408
decisiveness in war, 262, 272
Deerfield, MA, 131
Defence Is., 196
"defense, global forward," 421, 437
Defense Department (U.S.), 374, 407, 420
Defense Strategic Guidance, 437
Defoe, Daniel, 19
De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Grotius), 91
Delaware, 244
Delaware River, 209, 244, 259
Deming, W. Edwards, 409
demobilization, 302, 303–304
Denain, France, 147

Denmark and Denmark-Norway, 80, 85, 90, 91, 99, 110, 115, 142, 152, 153, 156, 157, 160, 162, 163, 165, 256, 273
Danish navy, 153, 163, 171, 187–88, 256
Royal Archives, 359
tonnage of navy, 102, 107
Deptford Dockyard, 182
depth charges, 278–79
Depot of Charts and Instruments, U.S., 22
deterrence, 161, 271, 421, 434, 437
Detroit, MI, 125, 242, 245
Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, 8
Deutsches Schifffahrtsmuseum, 8
Dewey, George, 399
Dichman, Gratan, 284
dictionaries, nautical, 17, 22, 24
polyglot, 22–23
Dieppe, France, 274
Digital Ark Corporation, 371
Dillon, William Henry, 179–81
diplomacy, 60, 431
diplomatic bribes. *See* bribes, diplomatic
diplomatic history, 7
naval, 89, 434, 436
disarmament, naval, 37
discipline, shipboard, 181, 188–89
discours of the variation of the cumpas, A (Borough), 16
Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Nelson (Nicolas), 24
displacement, 84, 102, 107
diversity, 445
Divers voyages (Hakluyt), 18
Dixon, William Hepworth, 75
Dnieper River, 160
dockyards, 82, 112
doctrine, naval, 219, 314, 383, 400–401, 403, 451
Dominions (British), 34, 37, 45–58
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, 408
Douglas, Archibald Hugh, 309–11
Dover. *See* Strait of Dover; treaty: Dover
Downs, 103
Drake, Francis, Sir, 91, 127
Dresden, Saxony, 157
dry dock, 79
Duckworth, John, Adm. Sir, 334
Dudley, Joseph, 130, 131, 132
Dudley, Wade, 253–54
Duff, A. L., 298
Duguay-Trouin, René, 145
Duhamel du Monceau, Henri Louis, 19, 85
Duker, Carl Andreas, 83
Dumaresq, Thomas, 175, 176
Dundas, Henry, 1st Viscount Melville, 174–75, 185, 259
Dungeness, 116
Dunkirk, France, 115, 148
Duquesne, Abraham, 114, 115
Durand, James, 33
Durazzo (Durrës), Albania, 301
Dutch East Indies, 52
Dutch language, 22, 88
Dutch navy, 81, 87, 99–117, 144, 153, 163, 164, 165, 388, 453
squadron organization 104, 111
tactical developments, 104, 110–12, 113
tonnage of, 102, 107, 122
warship design preferences, 104, 112
Dutch Republic, 81, 91, 99–117, 138, 139, 141, 146, 147, 156, 157, 162, 163, 387
States General, 139, 154, 157, 161
See also Netherlands
Dyar, Charles, 211, 214

Earle, NJ, 375
Earle, Ralph, Adm., 367
East Carolina University, 12
East India Company, British, 173, 174
East India Company, Dutch, 22, 81
Eastland (North Sea) Company, 103
Eccles, W. J., 125
Eclectic Society, 183
economic history, maritime, 5, 6, 7, 253–63, 365
economic warfare, 66, 124, 243–45, 249, 272, 273, 431
economy, global, 442, 443–56
Economy and Naval Security (Richmond), 430
ecosystems, underwater, 419, 420
Eden, Richard, 17, 18
Edinburgh, Scotland, 183, 332
education: technical vs. strategic, 63–64, 66
Edward III (king of England), 78, 90
Elbe River, 161, 341
Eleanor (Duchess of Aquitaine), 90
Élemens de l'architecture navale (Duhamel du Monceau), 85
Elias, Norbert, 92
Elizabeth I (queen of England), 87, 90, 91
Ellery, William, 30
Elphinstone, George Keith, 1st Viscount Keith, 178, 343
Ely, Eugene, 307
Ely Cathedral, 195
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 289
encyclopedia, 22
Engerman, Stanley, 253–54
English Channel. *See* Channel, English
English language, 22
English Pilot, The (Seller), 19
Entick, John, 23
entrepreneurs, 82
environmental history, 12
Epictetus, 408
Episcopal Church in the United States, 194
Epitoma institutorum rei militaris (Vegetius), 82
Erben, Henry, 67
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History, 5
Erskine, Thomas, 1st Baron Erskine, 188
Essay on Naval Tactics (Clerk), 18, 88
Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus), 239

Estaing, Charles Henri Hector, comte d', 176, 347, 359, 385, 386
estimate of the situation, 368–69, 402, 404
Estimating Tactical Situations and Composing Field Orders (Fitch), 402
Estonia, 154, 167
Estrées, duc d', 113, 114
Eugene of Savoy, Prince, 140, 143, 147
Europe
  northern, 78–79, 83, 84, 87
  southern, 84, 87
  western coast of, 419
  See also Mediterranean Sea
European Reference List, 9
European Science Foundation, 9
European Union, 149
  European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 438
Eustace, Nicole, 234, 239
Evenings with Grandpapa (Carey), 339
Evertsen, Cornelius, the Youngest, 114
examinations, naval promotion, 92, 175, 330, 332, 341, 348, 353
Exchequer (British), 129
exclusive economic zone, 418, 419, 452
exploration, maritime, 5

Faeroe Is., 90, 272
Falconer, William, 19, 24
Fall of a Nation, The (motion picture), 296
Falmouth, England, 289
families, naval, 92
Farragut, David Glasgow, Adm., 399, 401
Federalist Papers (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay), 228
Federalists, 227, 228, 229, 239, 257, 259
Ferdinand III (king of Sicily), 337
Ferrol, El, Spain, 386
fiction, maritime, 19, 23
Field Orders, Message and Reports (Swift), 402
fighting instructions, 87, 105, 108, 111, 113
Fiji Is., 46
filibustering, 75
Finamore, Daniel, 8
Finland: Finnish navy, 453
fire control, 36, 86
fiscal-military bureaucratic state, 78–82, 100, 225–26
Fischer, Lewis "Skip," 6, 8
Fisher, William, 20
fisheries and fishing, 31, 91, 103, 104, 114, 133, 134, 148, 184–85, 339, 416, 417, 449
Fitch, Roger S., Capt., 402
fitting out, 85
Fitzjames, James, 172, 173
flag, pine tree, 208, 211
Flanders, 99, 158, 159. *See also* Netherlands: Austrian; Netherlands: Spanish
Fleet Battle Problems, 308
fleet exercises, 62
fleet in being, 106, 271, 278, 381–95
Fleet Prison, 172
Fletcher, Frank Jack, 315, 370
Fletcher, William Bartlett, 284, 286, 287
floating batteries, 208
flogging, 403
Florence, Tuscany, 80
Florida, 125, 127, 133, 134, 138, 257, 375–76
  Florida Keys, 419
Fontainebleau, France, 335
Forbes, Robert Bennet, 470
Ford Lectures, 427
Forester, C. S., 408
Forrestal, James, 52
Fort Amherstburg, 242
Fort Beauséjour, 349
Fort Dearborn, 243
Fort Erie, 243, 246
Fortescue, John, Sir, 428
Fort Fisher, 363
Fort Louis de la Louisiane, 125
Fort Louis de la Mobile, 125
Fort Mackinac, 242, 246
Fort Maurepas, 125
Fort McHenry, 247
Fort Moultrie, 178
Fort Niagara, 245
Fort Ticonderoga, 221
Fox, Charles James, 392
France, 53, 81, 82, 84, 85, 90, 91, 92, 110, 112, 113, 121–34, 137–50, 151, 154, 156, 158, 159, 163, 187, 254, 257, 258, 270, 271, 275, 282, 288, 297, 303
  Admiral of, 82
  arrondissements maritimes, 291
  Dauphin of, 139, 140
  French navy, 29, 31, 79, 92–93, 102, 106, 112, 123, 144, 145, 177, 188, 189, 190, 219, 240, 246, 270, 276, 277, 279, 283, 286, 347, 385, 386, 388; tonnage of, 102, 108, 122
  U.S. Navy in France, 281–94
Frank C. Munson Institute of American Maritime Studies, 4, 12
Frankfurt am Main, 146
Franklin, Benjamin, 207, 214, 217
Franklin, John, Sir, 173
Franklin, Philip A. S., 289
Frederick (Friedrich) I (king in Prussia), 142, 157, 159
Frederick (Friedrich) II, "the Great" (king in Prussia), 400
Frederick (Friedrich) III (elector of Brandenburg), 142
Frederick (Friedrich) Wilhelm I (king in Prussia), 163
Frederik IV (king of Denmark), 153
Fredrik I (hereditary prince of Hesse-Kassel and king of Sweden), 165
freedom of the seas, 37, 90, 91, 415, 418, 442
Freeman, Douglas Southall, 406
free trade. *See* trade: neutral
Freiburg im Breisgau, Breisgau, 148
French language, 22, 59, 83, 333
French Polynesia, 171
Freneau, Philip, 24

". . . From the Sea," 422
frontier (U.S. western), 69
  southern (English North American colonies), 126–28
Frothingham, Thomas, 282
Froude, James Anthony, 6
Fuller, J. F. C., 428
Furlong, Lawrence, 21
Fury, Cheryl, 8
Fusario, Maria, 8

Gadsden, Christopher, 30, 222, 224, 225
Galapagos Is., 419
Galen, Jan van, 105
Galiani, Ferdinando, 91, 416
Gallatin, Albert, 192
Gambier, OH, 172, 194–96
Gambier Bay, 172
Gambier family
  Gambier, Edward John, Sir, 172, 173
  Gambier, Ester 172
  Gambier, Ferdinand Wake, 172
  Gambier, George Cornish, 172
  Gambier, James (1692–1747), 172, 173
  Gambier, James (1725–89), Vice Adm., 172–73, 175, 176
  Gambier, James (1756–1833), 1st Baron Gambier, 171–201, 256
  Gambier, James, Sir (consul general), 172, 173
  Gambier, John (1723–82), 172, 173–74
  Gambier, Margaret (1730–92), 172, 179
  Gambier, Margaret (ca. 1756–1818), 172, 173, 174
  Gambier, Mary, 172
  Gambier, Nicolas, 172
  Gambier, Robert, 172, 173
  Gambier, Robert Fitzgerald, 172, 173
  Gambier, Samuel, Sir, 172, 179
  Gambier, Samuel John, 172, 173
  Gambier, Susan, 172
  genealogy, 172
Gambier I(s)., 171, 172, 183, 196
Garcie, Pierre, 16, 18
gardes de la Marine, 92
Gardiner, Samuel Rawson, 427
Gardiner, William Howard, 3
Gardiner Professorship of Oceanic History and Affairs, 3, 12
Garonne River, 288, 290
Garrick, David, 174
Gaskin, George, 195
Gaunt, Guy, 298
Geertruidenberg, North Brabant, 132
General, The (Forester), 408
General Theological Seminary, 194
Geneva, NY, 194
Genoa, 79, 80, 99, 334
Gentlemen and Tarpaulins (Davies), 92
gentlemen officers. *See* officers, naval: gentlemen
geography, 15
geometry, 85
geopolitics, 138, 149, 443
geostrategy, 104, 241, 242, 245, 278
George I
  as Georg Ludwig, elector of Hanover, 159, 162–63
  as George I, king of Great Britain, 162–66
George II (king of Great Britain), 349
George III (king of the United Kingdom), 181, 183, 391
George IV (prince regent and king of the United Kingdom), 193
George V (king of the United Kingdom), 67
George Washington, 406
Georgia, 177, 247
Gerard of Cremona, 16
Germain, George, 1st Viscount Sackville, 385
German language, 59
Germany, 34, 35, 49, 67, 70, 80, 138, 146, 160, 268, 269–71, 281, 295, 297, 301, 442
  colonies, 296
  General Staff, 35, 400, 402
  German navy, 37, 269, 270, 271, 277, 278, 300; East Asiatic Cruiser Squadron, 270; High Seas Fleet, 272, 273, 278; Mediterranean Squadron, 271, 300, 301; mutiny, 278; Naval Staff, 271, 272
  kaiser, 6, 269
  Reichstag, 269
  Swedish provinces in, 161, 162–63
  See also Brandenburg-Prussia; Cologne, principality of
Gerrish, Joseph, 349
Gibraltar, 67, 115, 145, 147, 276, 283, 290, 298, 299, 344, 386, 389
  American consul at, 33
  U.S. Navy at, 286, 287, 299, 302
  See also Strait of Gibraltar
Gidoin, John Lewis, 177
Gilbert Is., 286, 317
Gilje, Paul, 8
Gironde River, 284, 288, 290, 291
Givet, France, 335, 336
Glanville, Richard S., 359
Glasgow, Scotland, 183, 288
Gleaves, Albert, 285
Glete, Jan, 8, 80
global history, 8
globalization, 442–54
Gloucester, MA, 208, 213, 215, 216
Glover, John, 206–209, 212, 214, 223
Godolphin, Sidney, Earl of Godolphin, 141, 159, 160
Goldsborough, Louis M., 362
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, 16
Goodall, Stanley V., 308
Goodrich, Caspar F., 60, 64
Görtz, Baron Georg von, 164
Gothenburg (Göteborg), Sweden, 153
Gough, Barry M., 235
Goulburn, Henry, 193
Grafton, 3rd Duke of (Augustus Fitzroy), 175
Graham, Gerald S., 6
Grand Banks, 31, 217

Grant, Heathcote, Sir, 299
Granville, France, 292
grappling. *See* boarding
Grasse, comte de, 388
gratifications. *See* bribes, diplomatic
Graves, Samuel, 220
gravity, 84
Great Awakening, 174
Great Barrier Reef, 419
Great Belt, 187
Great Britain. *See* United Kingdom
Great Circle, 9
Great Lakes, 46, 134, 235, 242, 245, 248
  Great Lakes Center for Maritime Studies, 12
Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, England, 187
Greece, 302, 303, 442
Greek language, 83
Greene, Jack P., 8
Greenert, Jonathan W., Adm, 237, 410
Greenland, 90
Greenwich Hospital, 338
  Collection of, 181
Grenier, Jacques-Raymond, vicomte de, 88
Grenville, William, 1st Baron Grenville, 185
Griepenkerl, Otto von, 402
Grotius, Hugo, 91, 416
Guadeloupe, 115, 260
Guam, 437
Guernsey, Channel Is., 177, 335, 352
guerrilla warfare, 448
Guiana, French, 115
Guichen, comte de, 391
Guilmartin, John, 77, 100
Gulf and Inland Waters, The (Mahan), 60
Gulfport, MS, 375
Gulliver's Travels (Swift), 19
Gunfleet, 116
gunpowder, 80, 85, 86
guns and gunnery. *See* ordnance (gunnery)
Gustav II Adolf (Gustavus Adolphus) (king of Sweden), 90, 152, 157
Gustav III (king of Sweden), 333
Gyllenborg, Carl, Count, 164

Habsburg, house of, 79, 137, 138, 146
Haersolte, Johan van, 158
Hague, The, Netherlands, 99, 158, 159
Hague Conventions
  of 1899, 77
  of 1907, 77, 268
Hakluyt, Richard, 6, 18
half-pay, 178
Halifax, NS, 35, 46, 48, 53, 175, 216, 247, 258, 289, 338, 343, 349, 350, 352, 468
Hall, Robert, Capt., 351
Halliburton, Brenton, Sir, 349
Halliburton, John, 349
Hallowell, Benjamin, Rear Adm. Sir, 343
Halsey, William F., Jr., Fleet Adm., 399
Hamburg, Germany, 22, 152, 160
  Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (HAPAG), 289
  Hamburg Merchant Adventurers, 103
Hamilton, Alexander, 228, 229
Hammersmith, England, 327
Hammond, Andrew Snape, Sir, 178
Hampton Roads, 290
Hancock, John, 214, 224
Hankey, Maurice, Sir, 432
Hanover, 158, 162–66
  King's German Legion, 187
Hanseatic League, 99
Harding, Seth, 211, 227
Hardy, Charles, Adm. Sir, 385, 386
Hardy, Thomas, Vice Adm. Sir, 246, 338
Haring, Clarence H., 6
Harley, Jeffrey A., Rear Adm., 411
Harley, Robert, Earl of Oxford and Mortimer, 156, 157, 161
Harries, George H., 288
Harris, John, 18
Harrison, Benjamin (congressman), 207, 214
Harrison, Benjamin (president of the United States), 64
Hart, Thomas C., Adm., 367
Harvard University, 3, 12, 340
Harvey, Eliab, 190, 191
Haslar Hospital, 211
Havana, Cuba, 127
Havre, Le, France, 288, 289, 290, 292, 341
Hawaii, 51, 52, 55, 310, 312 315
  Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve, 420
Hawke, Edward, Adm., 401
Hawksmore, Nicholas, 184
Hawksworth, John, Dr., 23
Hayward, Edward, 17
Hayward, John T., Vice Adm., 407
Heath, William, 209
Hebrides, 272
Heidbrink, Ingo, 6, 11, 12
Heinrich, Joseph, 228
Heinsius, Anthonie (grand pensionary of Holland), 154, 158
Hellevoetsluis, Netherlands, 116
Henry V (king of England), 78
Henry VII (king of England), 79
Henry VIII (king of England), 79
Herbert, Arthur, 1st Earl of Torrington, Adm., 116, 381, 382, 383, 384, 389, 393
Herbert, Hilary, 62, 67, 69
Hermelin, Olof, 155, 159, 160
heroes, naval, 75–76, 226–27
Hertel de Rouville, Jean-Baptiste, 130–31
Hesse-Kassel, 161, 165
Heup, Ester Le, 172
Hibner, Esther, 345
Hickey, Donald, 234
High Court of Admiralty, 90

history, categories of
cartographic, 6
comparative, 93
contemporary, 344
early modern Europe, 76
See also art history; diplomacy: diplomatic history; economic history, maritime; environmental history; global history; maritime history; naval history (academic field); oceanic history; social history
History of American Marine Painting (Wilmerding), 469
History of My Own Time (Burnet), 161
History of the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides), 82–83
Hitler, Adolf, 49
Hoare, Henry, Sir, 195
Hobart, John Henry (bishop), 194–95
Hobart, Robert, 4th Earl of Buckinghamshire, 185
Hobbes, Thomas, 76, 83
Hobson, Edward, 163
Hocking, William Ernest, 404
Holland (province), 108, 115
Holmes, Robert, Sir, 113
Holstein-Gottorp, Duchy of, 152, 157, 159, 160, 163, 165
Holy League, 434
Holy Roman Empire, 141, 146, 158, 161. *See also* Austria
Holywood, John, 15–16
Home from a Cruise (Rockwell), *cover, title page,* 469
Homet, Île du, 335
Hong Kong, 52, 442
honor, concept of, 191, 398
Hood, Samuel, 1st Bart., Adm. Sir, 177, 187, 391
Hood, Samuel, 1st Viscount Hood, Adm., 333, 341
Hoover, Herbert (president of the United States), 296
Hope of the Navy; or, The True Source of Discipline and Efficiency, The (Brenton), 338
Hopkins, Esek, Capt., 397
Horatii, 33
Horne, Frederick J., Adm., 367
horses, 79
horticulture, 184
Hoste, Paul, Père, 18, 85, 88
Hough, Henry Hughes, 291
Hougue, La, France, 341
House, Edward M., 296
House of Representatives (U.S.): Naval Affairs Committee, 62, 63, 67
Howe, Richard, 1st Earl Howe, Adm., 173, 179, 180, 182, 196, 347, 401
Howe, William, 5th Viscount Howe, 216
Howe Sound, 172, 196
Hudson, Charles, 178
Hudson Bay, 133, 134
Hudson River, 224
Hughes, Edward Arthur, 427
Huguenots, 22, 172
Hull, Isaac, Capt., 236, 237, 468
Hull, William, 240, 242, 243
Hume, David, 91
Humlebæk, Denmark, 153
Hungary, 161
Hunt, Barry, 432
Hutchins, John G. B., 6
Hutchinson, Anne, 328
hydrodynamics, 85
Hydrographic Service (British), 20, 21–22
Hydrographie Françoise, L' (Bellin), 19
hydrostatics, 85

Iberville, Pierre Le Moyne, sieur d', 125
Iceland, 90, 272
ideology, naval, 219
Illinois, 125, 126, 193
Illinois River, 125
Imperial Defence College, 432, 434
imperial defense, 128
"imperial federation," 34–35, 46
Imperial War Council, 48
impressment, 33, 91, 239, 246, 248, 255, 258, 261
Imray, Laurie & Norie, 20
Independence Seaport Museum, 4
India, 21, 45, 51, 268
Indian navy, 45, 47. *See also* Royal Indian Navy
Indiana, 193
Indiana University, 404
Indian Ocean, 314, 452
Indians. *See* North America: indigenous peoples of
Indo-Asia-Pacific region, 427
Infernet, Louis-Antoine-Cyprien, Capt., 336
Influence of Sea Power upon History, The (Mahan), 33, 59, 61, 64, 65, 400
Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, The (Mahan), 33, 59, 64–66, 68, 69, 400
Ingersoll, Royal E., 51
Inglis, Charles (bishop), 349
innovation, 77, 81, 84, 108, 139, 237, 307, 319, 409, 444
intelligence, naval, 40, 284, 297
International Commission for Maritime History, 11, 12
International Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation, 303
International Committee of Historical Sciences, 5
International Hydrographic Organization, 418
International Journal of Maritime History, 6, 8, 9, 10
International Journal of Naval History: A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship, 9
International Maritime Economic History Association, 9, 11
International Maritime History Association, 11, 12
International Maritime Organization, 418, 419, 420
International Mercantile Marine Company, 289
International Seapower Symposium, 451
interoperability, naval, 55
Invergordon, Scotland, 276
Inverness, Scotland, 276

investment, 431
Ionian Is., 336
Iowa, 193
Iraq, 437
Ireland, 38, 10, 276, 283, 296, 391
Irish Sea, 274, 276
Iroquois tribe, 132
Isabel de Farnesio (queen of Spain), 148
Ischia, 337
Isle of Wight, 67, 116, 177
Italy, 67, 99, 138, 139, 140, 157, 268, 270, 275, 288, 299, 300, 303
  Italian navy, 270, 277, 279
Iver Grove (house), 184, 191, 193, 195, 196

Jackson, Andrew (president of the United States), 32, 236, 240
Jackson, Richard H., 285
Jackson, Robert, 155, 160, 164, 165
Jacksonville, FL, 376
Jacobites, 163, 164. *See also* James III
Jamaica, 107, 173, 258, 344, 360, 388
James, Alan, 8
James, John, 184
James, William (naval historian), 23–24, 75, 237, 343–45, 346
James I (king of England), 172
James II (Duke of York, later king of England), 88, 108, 111, 113, 115, 116, 125, 139, 140
James III (pretender to the English throne), 140–41. *See also* Jacobites
Jane's Fighting Ships, 442
Jane's World Navies, 442
Japan, 49, 51, 52, 70, 275, 296, 297, 317, 409, 442, 452
  Japanese navy, 277, 301, 314–18; First Air Fleet, 314
Japanese language, 59
Jarvis, Michael J., 8
Java, capture of, 350
Jefferson, Thomas (president of the United States), 228, 230, 255–57, 398, 416
Jefferyes, James, 155, 159, 160, 161
Jellicoe, John, Earl Jellicoe, Adm., 39, 281, 298
Jersey, Channel Is., 177
Jervis, John. *See* St. Vincent, 1st Earl of (John Jervis)
Jinan, China, 5
John Carter Brown Library, 12
Johnson, Jay L., Adm., 41, 419, 421
Johnson, Samuel, 174
Johnston, Edward S., Lt. Col., 404, 405
Joint Army-Navy Board, 296
Joint Canadian-U.S. Military Coordination Committee, 53
Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.), 53, 54, 376, 433
Joint/Combined Force Maritime Component Commanders' Course (JFMCC/CFMCC), 410
joint operations, 422, 435, 441, 451
Jomini, Henri, 82
Jones, John Paul, Capt., 227, 231, 398
Jones, William, 33
Jonge, Johannes Cornelius de, 75
Joseph I (Holy Roman emperor), 146, 158
Journal for Maritime Research, 9
Judichær, Olaus, 85
Jurika, Stephen, 55

Kakuta, Kakuji, 317
Kalbfus, Edward C., Adm., 368–69, 404–406
Kalisz, battle of, 158
Kant, Immanuel, 408
Karlskrona, Sweden, 155, 165
Károly (king of Hungary and emperor of Austria), 302
Kaskaskia, IL, 125
Katzenbach, Edward J., Jr., 407
Kauffman, Draper, 38
Keats, Richard, Sir, 187, 343
Keegan, John, 319
Kelly, James D., Rear Adm., 409
Kelly, John J., Jr., 228
Kelvedon, England, 179
Kemble, John H., 6
Kemp, John, 178
Kempenfelt, Richard, Rear Adm., 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392
Kennedy, John F. (president of the United States), 327–28
Kennedy, Paul M., 4
Kent, Duchess of (Princess Victoria of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha), 346
Kenyon, George, 2nd Baron Kenyon, 195
Kenyon College, ix, 172, 194–96
Keppel, Augustus, Adm., 191, 386
Keppel, George, 176
Kerensky, Aleksandr, 275
Kew, vicar of (Charles Colton), 41
Kijkduin, Texel, Netherlands, 114
Kimmel, Husband, Adm., 370
King, Ernest J., Fleet Adm., 39–40, 52, 313, 318, 399
  on leadership, 405
King, William L. Mackenzie, 48–49, 50
Kingston, ON, 53, 245
Kinkaid, Thomas C., 316
Kino, Eusebio, 124
Kiska, 315
Klein, Margaret D., Rear Adm., 411
Knight, Roger, 8
Knowles, John, 178
Knox, Dudley W., Commo., 299, 403
Knysna River, 338
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North), 437
Korea, Republic of (South), 442
Kotor, Austria-Hungary, 300
Kriegspiel, 401. *See also* war games
Kungliga Örlogsmannasällskapet, 15
Kurita, Takeo, 317
Kurländische Aa River, 352
Kythera, 336

Labaree, Benjamin W., 6
labor, maritime, 22. *See also* seamen
Lac d'Hourtin, 285

Lacour-Gayet, Georges, 75
Lafayette, marquis de, 285
Lake Champlain, 205, 221, 245, 246
Lake Erie, 46, 245
Lake George, 246
Lake Huron, 46, 242, 246
Lake Michigan, 46
Lake Ontario, 35, 46, 245, 246
Lake St. Clair, 46
Lake Superior, 46
Lambert, Andrew, 8, 234
landing. *See* amphibious operations
Landrecies, France, 147
Lane, Fitz Henry (Hugh), 469, *back cover*
Langdon, John, 223
language, maritime, 22
languages, foreign, 435
Laning, Harris, Adm., 367
Latimer, Jon, 234
Latvia, 154
Laughton, John Knox, Sir, 60, 65, 67, 68, 75, 343, 345, 400, 432
Laurier, Wilfrid, Sir, 49
law
  courts of, 90
  international, 16, 36, 37, 47, 61, 76–77, 90–91, 443
  law of the sea, 91, 417
  naval warfare, 76–77, 91, 196, 268, 274, 401, 420
Lawrence, James, 231, 236
Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy, A (Brodie), 311
leadership, naval, 93, 397–414
  autocratic, 403
  business models for, 407
  character and, 406, 408
  decentralization and, 407
  ethical and moral dimensions, 408
  lean leadership, 409
  Navy Leader Development Framework, 410
  paternalistic, 403
  relationship-oriented, 403
  Six Sigma, 409
  systems analysis and, 407
  task-oriented, 403
League of Nations, 47, 48
Leahy, William D., Fleet Adm., 50, 399
Leamington Spa, England, 339
Lee, Lancelot Charles, Rev., 335
Lee, Richard, Capt., 351
Lee, Richard Henry, 214
Lee, Robert E., 406
Lee, Willis A., 318
Lee's Lieutenants (Freeman), 406
Leghorn, Tuscany, 105
Leijonkrona, Christoffer, 156
Leipzig, Saxony, 157, 158, 159
Lemnos, 303
Leopold (Holy Roman emperor), 139, 142, 161
Lescallier, Daniel, 22
Lestock, Richard, Adm., 191
Letters on Applied Tactics (Griepenkerl), 402
Levant Company, 103
Leviathan (Hobbes), 76
Lewis, Michael, 92, 180
Lexington, MA, 220, 221
Libya, 418
Lielupe River, 352
lieutenant. *See* officers, naval: lieutenant
Life and Correspondence of John, Earl St. Vincent (Brenton), 347
Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of Sea Power (Mahan), 59, 382, 401
lighthouses, list of American, 22
Ligurian Sea, 90
Lima, Peru: Phoenix Club, 60
Linebaugh, Peter, 8
Lisbon, Portugal, 115, 145, 173
Litchfield, England, 339
literature, 5, 7, 20, 24, 25
  American, 24
Little, Brown & Co., 59, 64, 66, 68
Little, William McCarty, Capt. *See* McCarty Little, William, Capt.
Little Belt, 187
littoral region, 422
Liverpool, 2nd Earl of (Robert Jenkinson), 192, 193, 249, 261
Liverpool, England, 194, 276, 289
Livonia, 154, 157, 160, 166
Livorno, Tuscany, 105
Lloyd, Christopher, 92
Lloyd George, David, 38
Lloyd's Patriotic Fund, 337, 339
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 70
logic, 404
logistics, 242, 243, 245, 283, 284, 292, 316, 317
Loire River, 284, 288, 290, 336
London, England, 20, 21, 52, 114, 132, 159, 160, 163, 183, 187, 193, 194, 195, 281, 282, 283, 287, 289, 299, 337, 390
  Common Council, 172
  Guildhall, 35
  Hackney Wick, 346
  London Gazette, 344
  London Missionary Society, 184
  Mayfair, 174
  St. Marylebone Church, 341, 347
London, ON, 245
Long I. Sound, 130, 260
Lord Chancellor, 188
Lord High Admiral of England, 90, 129, 346
Lord Privy Seal, 160
Lorient, France, 291
Louis XIV (king of France), 90, 106, 113, 116, 137–41, 148, 152, 158
Louis XVI (king of France), 360
Louisbourg (fortress), Cape Breton I., 349
Louisiana, 125, 126, 133, 134, 244, 247
Loyalists, 330–32, 333, 345
Lübeck-Eutin, bishop of, 157, 160
Lublin, Poland, 155

Luce, Stephen B., Rear Adm., 59–60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 76, 361–63, 400, 401, 407, 468
Ludwig of Baden (margrave of Baden-Baden), 143
Lundstrom, John, 370
Lunenberg, NS, 349
Lussin, 336
Luttwak, Edward, 433
Lützen, Saxony, 157
Luxembourg, 53
Lvov, Georgy, 275
Lynch, Thomas, 207, 214

MacArthur, Douglas, 317
MacDonald, Malcolm, 51
Macdonough, Thomas, 236, 237, 246
Machias, ME, 205, 221
Madison, James (president of the United States), 193, 228, 237–39, 243, 257, 260
Madras, Chief Justice of, 172, 173
Madrid, Spain, 146
Magellan. *See* Strait of Magellan
Magra, Christopher, 8
Magruder, T. P., 291
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 33–35, 46, 59–71, 76, 237, 253, 254, 259, 281, 295, 382, 383, 384, 400, 401, 415–16, 420, 423, 432, 444
  translations of, 59
Mahan, Dennis Hart, 60
Maine, 129, 246, 248, 261, 328
Malaya, 51, 52, 54
Malpelo I., 419
Malta, 67, 80, 299, 300
Malthus, Thomas, 239
Manchester, England, 289
Manchuria, 296
maneuvering, 20
Manila, Philippines, 52, 124, 172
Manley, John, 211–16
manning ships, 20, 79, 85, 223, 361
Manœuvrier, Le (Bourdé de Villehuet), 88
Marblehead, MA, 206, 207, 208, 212, 214, 223
Marche region, 336
Marder, Arthur, 6
Mare Clausum (Selden), 91
Mare Liberum (Grotius), 91
Mariana Is., 296, 317
Maria Theresa (Holy Roman empress), 149
Marine Committee (U.S.), 30, 217
Mariner's Mirror, 8, 9
Mariners' Museum, 4
Mariner's New Calendar, 17
maritime and coastal space, 415–25, 441
maritime books
  English, 15–28
  French, 18, 20
maritime domain, 423, 441, 450
maritime history, 23
  discipline of, 3–14, 365–66
Maritime Powers, Anglo-Dutch, 122, 144–46, 151, 154, 157–60, 181, 433
Maritime School, Chelsea, 332
Marlborough, Earl of, then 1st Duke of (John Churchill), 141, 143, 154, 158–60, 400
  view of Charles XII, 159
Marquesas Is., 183
Marriott, George Wharton, 195
Marryatt, Frederick, 24, 345
Marseille, France, 289, 290
Marshall Is., 317
M'Arthur, John, 400
Martin, Laurence, Sir, 433
Martin, Thomas Byam, Rear Adm. Sir, 352
Martindale, Sion, 210, 215
Martinique, 114, 341, 342
Martyr, Peter, d'Anghiera, 18
Mary II (queen of England), 116, 139, 165, 384
Maryland, 129, 224, 244, 333, 375
Massachusetts, 30, 129, 130, 131, 132, 205–18, 221, 328, 348
  Massachusetts State Navy, 206, 222
  Provincial Congress, 206, 222
Masséna, André, Marshal, 336
masters, 17, 21
  master's mates, numbers of, 21
mathematical jewel, The (Blagrave), 16
mathematics, 15, 16, 85, 92
Matter, Alfred R., 312
Matthew, Daniel, 178–79
Matthew, Jane, 179
Matthew, Louisa, 172, 178
Matthews, Thomas, 191
Maury, Matthew Fontaine, 22
Maximilian II Emanuel (elector of Bavaria), 143
Mayo, Henry T., 39, 298
Mayport, FL, 375
Mazarin, Jules (cardinal), 106
McAdoo, William, 67
M'Arthur, John, 400
McCarty Little, William, Capt., 61–62, 64, 401
McClure, Nathaniel, F., 288
McCormick, Lynde D., 370
McCranie, Kevin, 234
McCully, Newton, 291
McGovern, George, 373
McKenzie, Murdock, 20
McMorris, Charles H., Capt., 370
McMullen Naval History Symposium, 13
McNamara, Robert S., 407
Mead, Mary, 172, 173
Mead, Samuel, 172, 174
Mecklenburg, 158–59, 161
  Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 163
mediation, war, 158–59, 162
Mediterranean Sea, 4, 16, 24, 77, 80, 84, 87, 90, 101, 103, 105, 106, 112, 115, 121, 122, 138, 143, 145, 147, 164, 166, 188, 229, 268, 270, 274, 276–77, 290, 295–305, 308, 333, 336, 451
Medway River, England, 112
Melville, Herman, 24–25
Memoir of Captain Edward Pelham Brenton (Brenton), 339

Mercator, Gerardus, 16
merchant marine, 91
  global, 442
  United States, 32, 442
merchant shipping. *See* trade
Mesnager, Nicolas, 133
Mesopotamia, 299
Methodist Church, 174, 194
Meuse River, 335
Mexico, 124, 125, 138, 275, 281, 297, 298
Mexico, Gulf of, 121, 125, 247
Michigan, 125, 193, 243
Middle East (Levant), 40, 437
Middleton, Charles, 1st Baron Barham, Adm. Sir, 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 185, 186, 191, 196, 387, 388, 390, 392
midshipmen, 17
Midway Night, 41
Mi'kmaq tribe, 131
Milan, Duchy of, 138, 140, 148
Milan Decree, 254
Military Academy (U.S.), 60, 240
military operations, 113
"military revolution," 77, 81, 100
militia, 241, 243, 392
Mill, John Stuart, 408
Miller, Thomas, 19
Mill Prison, 211
Milne, David, Sir, 344
Mindanao, 317
mine warfare, 271, 274, 276, 278, 301
  minesweeping, 38, 276, 308
  See also Aegean Sea: Aegean mine barrage; North Sea: Mine Barrage; Otranto mine barrage
Minneapolis, MN, 126
Minnesota, 193
Minorca, 147, 334, 351, 399
Minto, 2nd Earl of (Gilbert Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound), 347
missiles, ballistic, 420, 421
Missionary Society, 183. *See also* Baptist Missionary Society; Church Missionary Society; Church of England: Overseas Missionary Society; London Missionary Society
mission command, 402
Mission Junction, BC, 46
Mississippi River, 121, 125, 131, 134, 246, 247, 248, 259
Missouri, 193
Missouri River, 246
mistresses, naval, 92
Mitau, Russia, 352
Mobile, AL, 125, 127, 247
Mobile River, 125
Moby Dick (Melville), 24
Modée, Karl Vilhelm, Vice Adm., 333
models, ship, 84, 359–63
Mohawk River, 132
Mohun, Charles, Baron Mohun, and Elizabeth, Lady Mohun, 184
Moldova, 160
Möller, A. V., Adm., 352
Mompesson, Jane, 172
Monck, George, Duke of Albemarle, 87, 105, 110, 111
Monroe, James (president of the United States), 258
Monroe Doctrine, 48
Montreal, QC, 131, 132, 243, 245, 289
Moore, James, 126, 131
Moore, John, 21
Moorer, Thomas, Adm., 376–77
morale, 404
Morbihan Bay, 342
More, Hannah, 174, 179, 195
More, Richard, 17
Moreau, Frédéric-Paul, 291
Morison, Peter G., 38
Morison, Samuel Eliot, 6, 38
Morris, Robert, 212
Moscow, Russia, 160
motion pictures, 296
Mount, Richard, 20
Mount & Page, 20
Moylan, Stephen, 207, 208
Moyne de Bienville, Jean-Baptiste Le, 127
Mr. Midshipman Easy (Marryat), 24
Mugford, James, Jr., 210, 214, 216
Mulgrave, 3rd Baron, later 1st Earl of Mulgrave (Henry Phipps), 186, 189, 190, 336, 388
Mullen, Michael, Adm., 423
multinational naval operations, 52, 434, 444, 452
Munson Institute. *See* Frank C. Munson Institute of American Maritime Studies
Münster, principality of, 113, 161
Münster, Sebastian, 18
Murcia, 146
Murmansk, Russia, 277, 283
Murray, Mungo, 19
museums, 430
mutiny, 277, 341
Mystic Seaport Museum, 4, 9, 12

Nairne, Thomas, 127, 131
Nantes, France, 217, 290, 292
  Edict of, 172
Naples, 91, 138, 148, 334, 337
Napoleon I (emperor of the French), 64, 187, 237, 245, 246, 248, 254, 258, 259, 261, 338, 343, 400
Narragansett Bay, 61, 62, 244, 330, 359
  Coasters Harbor I., 61, 64
  Goat I., 63, 64
  naval facilities on, 373–78
NASOH. *See* North American Society for Oceanic History
National Endowment for the Humanities, 12
national identity, 91
National Maritime Historical Society, 12
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 9, 181
National Museum of the Royal Navy, 351
national power, 60
National Security Strategy, 437
National Strategy for Maritime Security, 438

National Strategy of the United States, 423
NATO, 41, 52, 53, 54, 149, 421, 433, 434, 445, 451
  standardization agreements (STANAGs), 55
  Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1), 434
  Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, 54, 55, 434, 451
Nautical Almanac, 20
nautical ephemerides, 20
nautical jargon, 22
nautical science, 5, 6, 82
naval academy
  British, 92
  French, 92–93
  United States, 13, 60, 62, 66, 227, 309, 398, 409, 467
  U.S. Naval Academy Museum, 467, 469
Naval and Military Bible Society, 192
naval architecture, 19, 83–86, 93, 112, 182
Naval Chronicle, 181
Naval Committee (U.S. Congress), 30
Naval Evolutions (O'Bryen), 18
Naval Historical Foundation, 371
naval history (academic field), 23–24, 33, 62, 75–78, 93, 311–12, 343–45, 400, 430
  research in, 430
  subdiscipline of, 6, 7–8, 436
Naval History (magazine), 237
Naval History of Britain, A (Rodger), 78
Naval History of Great Britain, The (Brenton), 23, 343–45, 346–47
Naval Institute Press, 9. *See also* United States Naval Institute
navalists, 32, 228–29, 236, 240
Naval Lyceum, 15, 399, 467
naval novel, 19, 23, 24, 345
naval operations. *See* operations, naval
Naval Order of the United States, 371
Naval Postgraduate School, 409
Naval Review, 434
naval stores, 110, 151, 156, 161, 164, 387
Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, RI, 63, 64, 66
Naval Tripartite Standardization Program, 54
Naval University, 409
Naval War College (U.S.), 4–5, 39, 47–49, 59–71, 268, 281, 282, 298, 308–11, 367–72, 373, 375, 397, 399–412, 435, 450
  Foundation, 359, 370
  Founders Hall (almshouse), 61, 62, 64
  Luce Hall, 64
  Naval Command Course/College, 450, 467
  Naval War College Museum, 359–63, 467, 468
naval warfare
  law of, 76–77, 91
  principles of, 33
Naval Warfare (Colomb), 381
Naval Warfare (Richmond), 430
Naval War Manual, 428
Naval War of 1812, The (Roosevelt), 63
Navicert system, 276
Navigantium atque itinerantium biblioteca (Harris), 18
navigation, 82
  examinations in, 17
  history of, 6
  instruction in, 17, 92, 336
  instruments, 16, 20
  manuals, 16, 17, 25
  textbooks, 17, 20
Navigation Acts, 103, 128, 220, 328, 330
navy
  debate over (U.S.), 32
  diplomatic functions, 450–51
  functions of, 31, 33, 40, 86, 87, 89–90, 219–34, 441–54
  military functions, 448–49, 451–54
  multidimensional roles and character of, 78, 93, 441–55
  peacetime role, 448, 452
  permanent standing forces, 91
  policing function, 449–50
  size of, 101, 102, 107, 122
  specialization in roles, 452–53
  world navies, 442
  See also Continental Navy; Dutch navy; Royal Australian Navy; Royal Canadian Navy; Royal Indian Navy; Royal Navy; Royal New Zealand Navy; United States Navy; Washington, George: George Washington's navy; *and under individual countries and states*
Navy as an Instrument of Policy, The (Richmond), 427
Navy Board (British), 31, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 186
Navy Board (U.S.), 30. *See also* Continental Navy
Navy Department (U.S.), 60, 64, 67
Navy League of the United States, 3
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Zeegeschiedenis, 8
Nelles, Percy, 50
Nelson, Charles P., 300–301
Nelson, Horatio, 1st Viscount Nelson and 1st Duke of Bronte, Vice Adm., 24, 33–34, 66, 68, 75, 88, 176, 191, 334, 351, 382, 383, 401, 447
Ne Plus Ultra Lines, 147
Neptune François, 19
Netherlands, 245, 272, 273
  Admiral General of, 79
  Austrian, 148. *See also* Flanders
  Kingdom of, 53, 79, 173
  Spanish, 112, 121, 122, 138–40, 143, 147, 148. *See also* Flanders
  See also Dutch navy; Dutch Republic
neutrality, 50, 151–52, 161, 162, 163, 187, 229, 239, 254–56, 273, 274, 295, 303
New American Practical Navigator, The (Bowditch), 21
New Bedford Whaling Museum, 4
New Brunswick, 259, 346
Newburyport, MA, 21, 216
Newcastle, 1st Duke of (Thomas Pelham-Holles), 330, 340
New England, 122, 131–33, 175, 205–18, 244, 257, 258, 259, 260–61, 340
  Confederation, 128
  Dominion of, 128

Newfoundland, 50, 114, 133, 134, 148, 171, 184–85, 291, 333, 341, 348, 468
Memorial University of Newfoundland, 9
New France, 129, 130–34, 148
New Guinea, 314, 317
New Hampshire, 129, 130, 328, 329
New Jersey, 132
New London, CT, 244
Newman, John Henry, 194
New Mexico, 297
New Orleans, LA, 231, 236, 247
Newport, 2nd Viscount Jocelyn and 2nd Baron (Robert Jocelyn), 349
Newport, RI, 60, 61, 67, 327–28, 347, 349, 360, 363, 400
Hammersmith Farm, 327, 329, 330
Naval Station Newport, 374–75, 377
Newport Artillery Company, 329
Newport Daily News, 373–74
Trinity Church, 329, 330, 332, 340, 347, 349, 360
See also Narragansett Bay; Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
Newport Township, NS, 349
New Practical Navigator, The (Moore), 21
New Providence I., 173
New South Wales, 34
New Spain, 124–25, 134
Newton, Isaac, 85
New York, 35, 60, 64, 66, 114, 129, 130, 132, 134, 173, 176, 194, 209, 216, 224, 244, 259, 260, 288, 289, 329, 349
New York City Board of Education, 361
New York Evening Post, 295
New York Navy Yard, 363
New York Public Library, 60
New York Yacht Club, 60
New York Times, 65
New Zealand, 45, 46, 49, 51, 54. *See also* Royal New Zealand Navy
Niagara, 242, 243, 245, 246
Niblack, Albert P., 299, 301
Nice, France, 336
Nicholas II (tsar of Russia), 275
Nicholson, Francis, 132, 133
Nicolas, Nicholas Harris, Sir, 24, 76
Nimitz, Chester W., Fleet Adm., 52, 315, 317, 365–72, 399
"Graybook," 365–72, 405–406
Nixon, Richard (president of the United States), 373, 408
Nolan, Roger, Rear Adm., 370
Non-Importation Act, 255, 256
Non-Intercourse Act, 257
Nore (anchorage), 176, 341
Norfolk, VA, 288, 373, 375
Norling, Lisa, 8
Norman, John, 21
Normandy, 172
Norris, John, Sir, 163, 164
Norsk Maritimt Museum, 8
Årbok, 8
North, Frederick, Lord North (prime minister of Great Britain), 175, 392
North Africa, 40
corsairs of, 32, 115
North America, 50, 51, 114, 121–36, 145
expansion across trans-Mississippi West of, 124–25, 228
indigenous peoples of, 121, 122, 124, 127, 129, 131, 193, 238, 239, 242, 247, 248, 360
North American Air Defense Agreement (NORAD), 54
North American Society for Oceanic History, 4, 9, 12, 13
Northampton, MA, 131
North Atlantic Fisheries History Association, 11
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *See* NATO
North Carolina, 126
North Edisto River, 177
Northern Mariner, 3, 9
North Sea, 115, 116, 144, 187, 268, 270, 272, 276, 278, 283, 301, 308, 351, 388, 389, 390, 391
Mine Barrage, 301
See also Eastland (North Sea) Company
Norway, 163, 164, 165, 276. *See also* Denmark and Denmark-Norway
Norwood, Richard, 17
Nova Scotia, 35, 46, 132–34, 148, 213, 215, 217, 258, 259, 343, 348, 468
German immigrants in, 349
St. Margarets Bay, 56
See also Halifax
novels. *See* naval novel
nuclear propulsion, 41
nuclear weapons, 433

O'Brien, Jeremiah, 205, 221
O'Bryen, Christopher, 18
Observatory, U.S. Naval, 22
oceanic history, 3–4
Océanides Association, 10
oceanography, 22
Odegaard, John, Capt., 371
Oder River, 161
Office of Naval Intelligence (U.S.), 46
Monthly Information Bulletin, 38, 51
officers, naval, 91–93
admiral, 397–414
Admiral of the Navy, 399
arguments among, 191
captain, 397
chaplains, 336
commissioned, 91–92
commodore, 397, 398, 399
deck, 21
education of, 13, 60, 62, 66, 92–93, 397–414, 435
engineering, 41
executive, 41
flag, 398–99
fleet admiral, 399
gentlemen, 92, 100
lieutenant, 17, 92, 175, 330

petty, 91
seniority, 398
social aspects, 191
tarpaulin, 92, 101
warrant, 17, 91
Ohio, 103, 194–95
Oise River, 147
Old Dominion University, 11, 12
Oléron
island of, 189
Laws of, 16, 90
Ontario (Upper Canada), 234, 235, 241, 346
operations, naval
conceptions of, 278, 441–54
humanitarian relief, 279, 303–304, 452
planning and supervision of, 405
scope of, 89–91
Opie, J. N., III, 38
Oppenheim, Michael, 76
Orange, principality of, 142
Orde, John, Adm. Sir, 178
Order of St. John, 80
Order of St. Stephen, Sacred Military, 80
ordnance (gunnery), 36, 79, 85, 86–89, 103–105, 109, 403
Ordonnance de la Marine, 90
Øresund. *See* Sound (Øresund)
Orfordness, Suffolk, 156
organizations, complex, 77
Oriel College, Oxford, 194
Orkney Is., 419
Orléans, duc d', 146
Ormonde, 2nd Duke of (James Butler), 165
Orvilliers, comte d', 386
Otranto mine barrage, 300, 301
Ottawa, ON, 46, 51, 55
Ottoman Empire, 99, 154, 160, 161, 270
navy of, 80
See also Turkey
Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History (Hattendorf), 10
Ozawa, Jisaburō, 317

Pacific Fleet (U.S.), 55
Pacific Ocean, 21, 40, 51, 54, 55, 121, 122, 124–26, 183, 314
Central, 317, 318
North Pacific, 181
South Pacific, 183, 270
pacifists, 339
Page, Walter Hines, 281
Paine, Lincoln, 10
Painlevé, Paul, 285
Palestine, 299
Pallice, La, France, 287, 288, 289, 290, 292
Palliser, Hugh, Vice Adm. Sir, 191, 386
Palmer, Leigh C., 284
Panama, 124
Panama Canal, 46, 51
pansy (flower), 184
Papua New Guinea. *See* New Guinea
Paris, France, 147, 283, 285, 287, 299, 303
Paris Declaration on Maritime Law, 76
Parker, Geoffrey, 77, 100
Parliament (British), 101, 105, 113, 128, 156, 190, 193, 249, 261, 381, 386
House of Commons, 191, 243, 391
House of Lords, 190
member of, 31, 172, 173, 189, 190
thanks of, 190–91
parole, 212
Parry, Christopher J., Rear Adm., 448
Parry, John H., 7
Parry, William, 175
Pastore, John, 377
patrolling, 87, 279
patronage, 100, 179
Patterson, Charles M., 468
Patuxent River, 375, 375
Pauillac, France, 284, 290, 292
Pax Britannica, 230
Peabody Essex Museum, 4
peace treaties, compromise in, 146–48, 248–49, 302. *See also* treaty
Pearl Harbor, HI, 55
attack on, 51, 52, 310, 312
Pearson, Lester, 54
Pelée, Île, 335
Pelham, Edward [I], 340
Pelham, Edward [II], 340
Pelham, Henry (prime minister of Great Britain), 330, 340
Pelham, Henry (treasurer of Harvard University), 340
Pell, Claiborne, 373
Pellew, Edward, 1st Viscount Exmouth, 344, 401
Pemberton, William, Lt., 348
Penmarc'h, France, 291
Penn, William, Sir, 104, 108
Pennsylvania, 129, 132, 194, 207, 227, 244
Pennsylvania State Navy, 205
Penobscot Bay, 176, 246
Peoria, IL, 125
Pepys, Samuel, 23, 108
Perceval, Spencer (prime minister of the United Kingdom), 193, 342
periplus, 16
Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), 50, 53
Perry, Oliver Hazard, 231, 236, 237, 245
Pershing, John J., 285
Peru, 60, 124, 195
Pesaro, Papal States, 336
Pescara, Italy, 300
Peter, Hugh, 102
Peter I (tsar of Russia), 154, 157, 162, 163, 164
Peter Simple (Marryat), 24
Petit Atlas Maritime (Bellin), 19
Pett, Christopher, 107
Pett, Peter, 107
petty officer. *See* officers, naval: petty
Pevsner, Nikolaus, 184
Philadelphia, PA, 178, 259, 289

Philip II (king of Spain), 83
Philip IV (Felipe) (king of Spain), 138
Philip IV (king of France), 79
Philip V (Felipe) (king of Spain), 125, 143, 145, 147, 148
  as Duke of Anjou, 139
Philippines, 52, 138, 317
Philippine Sea, 317
Phillips, Carla Rahn, 85
Phillips, Tom S. V., Sir, 51
Physical Geography of the Sea, The (Maury), 22
Pickney, Thomas, 240
Pilot, The (Cooper), 24
Pinneberg conference, 152
Piper, Carl, Count, 155, 158, 159, 160
piracy, 32, 75, 89, 452
Pitt, William, "the Younger," 173, 185
Pitt, William Morton, 172, 173
Pizan, Christine de, 82
Placentia, NL, 131, 133
Plato, 408
Plunkett, Charles P., 292
Plymouth, England, 177, 276, 288, 289, 301
  naval dockyard, 177
Plymouth, MA, 207, 211
poetry, 23, 24
Point Gambier, 172, 181
Point Mugu, CA, 375, 376
Pocock, Nicholas, 181, 182
Pola, Austria-Hungary, 300
Poland, 154–56, 158–62
policing functions, 89, 449–50
Polónia, Amélia, 8
Poltava, Russia, 160
Pomerania, 165
Poole, England, 173
Popham, Home, Sir, 187
Porter, David, 231, 237
Porter, David Dixon, Adm., 399
Port Hueneme, CA, 375
Portland, 3rd Duke of (William Cavendish), 186, 187
Portland, ME, 217, 289
Port Mahon, Minorca, 115, 334, 338, 348
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 314
Porto Corsini, Italy, 300
Porto Delgado, Azores, 277
portolano, 16
Port Royal, Acadia, 130, 131, 132. *See also* Annapolis Royal
Portsmouth, Hampshire, England, 79, 108, 114, 217, 258, 342, 350, 390
  dockyard, 175, 177, 178, 181
  Royal Sailors Home, 173
  Spithead anchorage, 391
Portsmouth, NH, 207, 215, 216
Portsmouth, RI, 328
Portugal, 32, 80, 90, 91, 99, 103, 107, 121, 145–46, 148, 229, 277, 419
  Portuguese language, 88
  Portuguese navy, tonnage of, 102
Potter, E. B., 370
Powell, Bonney M. (seaman), *cover, title page,* 469
power, projection of, 420, 421, 422
Pratt, William Veazie, 298
Presbyterianism, 101, 329
presence, naval, 260, 270, 420, 434, 452
Prevost, George, Sir, 246
Prince Edward I., 148, 213
Prince of Wales I. (Penang), 173
principal navigations, The (Hakluyt), 18
Principia (Newton), 85
principles of war, 404, 428–29
printing, 15
  printing house, 20
prisoner of war, 171, 176, 211, 335, 336, 342, 344
privateers, 31, 75, 76, 89, 101, 131, 144, 145, 148, 151, 161, 206, 226, 235, 243, 244, 253, 258, 259, 343
Privy Council (British), 129, 158
prizes, 129, 161, 208, 217–18, 243, 247, 248, 260, 343
  prize agents, 209, 337
  prize regulations, 274
Proctor, Henry, 245
procurement, naval, 56
professional military education (PME), 430, 435
  Canadian, 54
  See also Army War College (U.S.); Naval War College (U.S.)
Protestants and Protestantism, 138, 141, 143, 158, 151
  "Protestant Wind," 116
Provost, George, Lt. Gen. Sir, 350
Prussia, 35. *See also* Brandenburg-Prussia
Psilander, Gustaf von, 156
psychology, 404
Ptolemy, Claudius, 15, 16
Public Advertiser, 31
publishing, 25
  in England, 20
Puget Sound, 35
  Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, 64
Pulitzer Prize, 293n3, 406
punishment, 403
Purchas, Samuel, 18
Purchas his pilgrimes (Purchas), 18
Puritans, 102, 328, 329
Pye, Thomas, Sir, 177
Pye, William S., Vice Adm., 370
Pym, John, 101

quadrant, 16
Quadrennial Defense Review, 433, 437
Quadruple Alliance, 148–49
Quebec, 36, 130–33, 241, 243, 289
Queenborough, Inquisition of, 90
Queenstown (Cobh), Ireland, 276, 288
Queen's University of Belfast, 100
Quesnoy, Le, France, 147
Quiberon Bay, 286, 292
Quonset Point Naval Air Station, 373, 374–77

Radford, Arthur W., 55
radio direction finding, 273
radio intercepts, 273

Radstock, 1st Baron, Vice Adm. *See* Waldegrave, William, 1st Baron Radstock, Vice Adm.
Raikes, Henry, Rev., 339
ram and ramming, 86
Ramillies, Battle of, 143, 156, 158
Ramsay, David, 228
Ramsay, Francis M., 66, 67, 68
rates (of ships)
  first, 112
  third, 112
Reagan, Ronald (president of the United States), 419
recruit training, U.S. Navy, 61
Red Badge of Courage, The (Crane), 407–408
Rediker, Marcus, 8
Red Rover, The (Cooper), 24
Reed, Joseph, 207, 208
Reed, William B., 362
Reehorst, K. P. ter, 23
Reeve, John, 319
Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea, 30, 185–86, 196
religion, 91, 92, 101
Remarks on the Importance of Our Coast Fisheries (Brenton), 339
Rensselaer, Stephen Van, 243
reprisal, 163
Republican Party, 228, 238, 239, 257
Research in Maritime History (book series), 8, 9
Reserve naval forces (British), 47
Revenue Marine (U.S.), 32, 229
revolution
  in military affairs, 77
  in naval affairs, 77
Revue d'histoire maritime, 8
Reynolds, Clark, 316
Reynolds, Joshua, 174
Rhine River, 121, 148
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 30, 61, 129, 132, 244, 259, 332, 340, 343
  General Assembly, 222, 223, 224, 232, 332
  naval bases in, closure of, 373–78
  Rhode Island State Navy, 205, 206, 222, 223
Rhodian Sea Law, 90
Richards, George Henry, 196
Richardson, Elliot M., 373, 374
Richardson, John M., Adm., 410
Richelieu, Cardinal (Armand-Jean du Plessis), 92, 106
Richelieu River, 221
Richmond, Herbert, Adm. Sir, 382, 383, 427–39
Richmond, VA, 406
Riga, Latvia, 352
rigging, 17
rights, maritime, 192–93
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 145, 173
Roberts, Michael, 77, 81, 100
Robinson, John, Rev., 152–56, 158–60
Robinson, Mary, 158
Robinson Crusoe (Defoe), 19
Rochambeau, comte de, Gen., 350, 352, 360
Rochefort, France, 29, 92, 189, 219, 291, 292
  Quatrième Arrondissement Maritime, 291
Rochelle, La, France, 288
Rochester, Kent, England, 333
rockets, Congreve, 188, 190, 196, 247
Rockingham, 2nd Marquis of (Charles Watson-Wentworth), 238, 254
Rockwell, Norman, 469
Rodger, N. A. M., 7–8, 10, 77, 78, 81, 92, 235, 237, 439n33, 457
Rodgers, John, Commo., 33, 236
Rodgers, William L., Vice Adm., 401–402
Röding, Johann, 22
Rodney, George Brydges, 1st Baron Rodney, 360, 388, 391, 393, 401
Rogers, Charles C., 46
Rogers, Woodes, 19, 124
Roman Catholic Church, 101, 115, 116, 124, 138
Roman maritime law, 90
Rome, Italy, 283
Roncière, Charles de La, 75
Rooke, George, Sir, 153–54
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (president of the United States), 49, 52, 470
Roosevelt, Theodore (president of the United States), 63, 65, 70, 227, 237
Rosinski, Herbert, 313, 382, 384
Ross, Robert, Gen., 247
Rosse, Countess of (Alice Parsons), 195
Rotterdam, Netherlands 116
Rouen, France, 16, 292
Rouge, Georges-Louis Le, 359
routes, maritime, 22
Rowan, Stephen C., Vice Adm., 399
Royal Academy of Art (London), 191
Royal Australian Navy, 45, 47, 51, 52, 54, 55
Royal Canadian Navy, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56
  relations with USN officers, 51
Royal Indian Navy, 47, 51. *See also* India: Indian navy
Royal Marines (British), 47
  Colonel of the Marines, 181
Royal Mathematical School, 17
Royal Navy, 17, 19, 23–24, 32, 47, 48, 55, 66, 70, 78–79, 80, 84, 87, 91, 99–117, 123, 132, 144, 145, 156, 163, 164, 166, 219, 241 , 243, 269, 283, 381–91, 437
  administration, 101
  Adriatic Squadron, 337
  American perceptions of, 29–44, 217, 221
  Americans serving in, 38
  Baltic squadron, 187
  Channel Fleet, 181, 188–92, 385, 386, 387, 388, 390, 391
  Channel Is. station, 335
  Cruiser Squadron: 1st, 36; 10th, 272, 276
  East Indies Squadron, 172, 340, 341
  finances of, 101, 105
  Grand Fleet, 36, 39, 47, 276–78, 283, 308
  Jamaica Station, 258, 259
  Leeward Is. station, 175, 176, 258, 260, 342
  Lord High Admiral, 101, 109
  Mediterranean Fleet, 270
  naval aviation, 308, 310, 314

Royal Navy *(continued)*
Naval Gold Medal (Britain), 181
North American Station, 173, 175, 176, 177, 206, 244, 258, 259, 343, 351, 352
North Sea Fleet, 269, 270, 390
Pacific Ocean operations, 40, 314
relations with Canadian officers, 51
Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 434
Royal Naval School, 350
squadron organization of, 108
strength/tonnage, 102, 107, 122, 269–70, 277, 388
See also battles, naval
Royal New Zealand Navy, 45, 51, 52, 54, 55
Royal Society of London, 15
Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences, 15
Royal United Services Institution, 67
Royal Victorian Asylum, 346
Royan, France, 292
Ruck, Mary, 172
rudder, 84
Rügen, 187
Rupert of the Rhine, Prince and Duke of Cumberland, 111, 114
Russell, Jonathan, 192
Russia, 142, 148, 154, 159, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 187, 258, 268, 271, 275, 277, 278, 298, 303, 398, 437
Russian language, 88
Russian navy, 82, 163, 164, 165, 278, 398
See also Alexander I; Peter I
rutter of the sea, The (Garcie), 16
Ruyter, Michiel de, 75, 104, 107, 108, 110–15

Sables-d'Olonne, Les, France, 292
Sacro Bosco, Johannes de, 16
"safeguard of the sea," 83
sailing directions, 16, 18, 21, 22
sailing instructions, 87, 105, 108, 111
sailors. *See* seamen
Saint, names starting with. *See also* St.
Saint Augustine, FL, 126, 127
Saint-Jean-de-Luz, France, 292
Saint Lawrence, Gulf of, 131, 134, 148
Saint Lawrence River, 133, 210, 212. *See also* Saint Lawrence, Gulf of
Saint-Malo (St. Malo), France, 124, 177, 292
Saint-Nazaire, France, 284, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292
Troisième Arrondissement Maritime, 291
Saint-Omer, France, 332, 340, 347
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, 291
Saint-Raphaël, France, 285
Saipan, 317, 318
Salmon, Robert, 469–70, *back cover*
Saloniki, Greece, 299
Samos, 302
Sampson Low & Co., 59
San Diego, CA, 317
San Diego Maritime Museum, 4
Sandwich, 1st Earl of (Edward Montagu), 109, 110
Sandwich, 4th Earl of (John Montagu), 391, 392
Sandy Hook, NJ, 176
San Francisco Maritime National Historical Park, 4
Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, 382
Sardinia, 138, 148, 149
Saturday Evening Post, 469
Saumarez, James, 1st Baron de Saumarez, Adm., 192, 334, 335, 336, 344, 351, 352, 401
Savannah, GA, 177, 259
Savoy, 143, 148, 157
Sawyer, Herbert, Vice Adm. Sir, 343
Saxony, 154, 157–61. *See also* Augustus II
Sayles, W. R., 283–85
Scheer, Reinhard, Vice Adm., 273
Schleswig, 152, 163
schoolmaster, naval, 92
Schumpter, Joseph, 81, 100
Schurman, Donald M., 6
Schwerer, Antoine, 191
science and technology, history of, 7
scientific education, 62
Scituate, MA, 215
Scotland, 103, 163, 164, 165, 216, 272, 283, 349
union with England, 159
sea control, 253, 259, 278, 309, 311, 415, 420, 421, 422, 447
sea denial, 89, 421
Sea Education Association, 12
Sea in History, The (Buchet), 10
SEALs, Navy, 38
sea lines of communication. *See* communications, maritime
Seamans Kalendar, The (Tapp), 17
seaman's practice, The (Norwood), 17
Seamans Secrets, The (Davis), 17
seamen, 91–93, 103
conditions of work, 403
impressment of, 33, 212, 255
literacy of, 17, 22, 23
numbers of British, 21
religion, 189
"Sea Plan 2000," 421
sea power (term), 59, 68, 429–31
"Sea Power 21" (Clark), 423
Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812 (Mahan), 33, 59
Sea Shield, 423
Seattle, WA, 317
Secretary of the Navy (U.S.), 60
Seignelay, Marquis de, 92
Selden, John, 91
Seller, John, 19
Selman, John, 212, 214
Semmes, B. J., Vice Adm., 407
Senate (U.S.), 63, 419
Serbs, 302
Seville, Spain, 17, 342
Sharp, Granville, 174
Shaw, John, 33
Shawnee tribe, 242

Sheerness, England, 338
Shelburne, Marquess of Lansdowne and Earl of (William Petty [né Fitzmaurice]), 238, 254
Shelvocke, George, 19
Sherman, Forrest P., Adm., 370
Shetland Is., 273
Shillito, Barry, 376
Ship-builder's assistant (Sutherland), 19
shipbuilding, 17, 19–20, 23, 82, 83–86, 110
ship design. *See* naval architecture
shipping, merchant. *See* trade
ships, names of
128, U.S. submarine chaser, 301
215, U.S. submarine chaser, 301
Adams, U.S. sloop of war, 244, 246
Adventure, HM frigate, 174
Agamemnon, HMS, 341
Agamemnon, USS, 287
Agincourt, HMS, 341
Alliance, HM storeship, 333
Amaranthe, HMS, 342
America, privateer, 211
America, USS, 287
Amerika, 287
Anne, HM transport, 216
Antilles, transport, 286, 287
Aphrodite, USS, 291
Ardent, HMS, 176
Argus, USS, 244
Asia, HMS, 351, 353
Assistance, HMS, 351
Assurance, HM transport, 333
Barfleur, HMS, 334, 341
Belle Isle, HMS, 332, 340, 342
Bellona, HMS, 332, 341
Birmingham, USS, 298, 299, 302, 307
Bismarck, 39
Blücher, SMS, 273
Bonito, HMS, 348
Boston, Continental ship, 212
Boston, HM frigate, 352
Breslau, SMS, 271, 278
Britannia, HMS, 301
Broadway, HMS, 50
Buffalo, USS, 302
Caesar, HMS, 334, 335, 351
Carola IV, USS, 291
Castine, USS, 298
Caton, 360
Charleston, HMS, 50
Chatham, HM armed ship, 181
Chatham, HMS, 175
Chelsea, HMS/HMCS, 50
Chesapeake, USS, 230, 231, 244
Chester, HMS, 330
Chicago, USS, 67, 68, 69
Congress, USS, 244
Constellation, USS, 244
Constitution, USS, *cover,* 231, 244, 248, 468, 470
Corsair, USS, 291
Crown, HMS, 340
Cumberland, 211
Cyane, HMS, 343
Decatur, USS, 301
Defence, HMS, 178–81, 182, 196
Defender, HMS, 301
Devonshire, HMS, 330
Diamond, HMS, 333
Diomede, HMS, 352
Discovery, HM sloop, 181
Dolphin, USS, 69
Donegal, HMS, 338, 342
Dorset, HM yacht, 338
Dromedary, HM storeship, 340
Duc de Bourgogne, 205, 359–60
Duff, 183
Eendracht, 109
Elizabeth, brig, 216
Elizabeth, HMS, 350
Encarnación, 124
Endymion, HMS, 248
Enterprise, 221
Erebus, HMS, 173
Essex, USS, 231
Experiment, HMS, 176, 177, 216, 347
Finland, transport, 287
Foudroyant, HMS, 214, 217
Fowey, HMS, 213, 215
Franklin, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217
General Gates, Continental ship, 212
General Mifflin, 178
General Putnam, 212
Généreux, HMS, 334
Georgetown, HMS, 50
Gibraltar, HMS, 333–34
Goeben, SMS, 271, 278
Grace Dieu, 78, 79
Greenwich, HMS, 332
Gregory, USS, 302
Greyhound, Pennsylvania ship, 178
Griffin, 328
Guerriere, HMS, *cover,* 468
Guinevere, USS, 291
Hancock, Continental frigate, 211, 216
Hancock, schooner, 210, 211, 213, 215, 216, 217
Hannah, 206–208, 210, 213, 214, 223
Harrison, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 215
Hector, 176
Henry, 210
Hibernia, HMS, 351, 352
Hind, HMS, 176
Hohenzollern, SMY, 67
Hood, HMS, 39
Hope, HM brig, 214, 215, 216
Hope, transport, 216
Hornet, USS, 244, 248
Imperieuse, HMS, 189
Industrious Bee, 212
Intrepid, HMS, 178

ships, names of *(continued)*
Intrépide, 336
Israel, USS, 302
John Adams, USS, 244
Jupiter, USS, 284
Kaiser Wilhelm II, 287
Kent, HMS, 330, 351
King Alfred, HMS, 38
Konung Adolf Fredrik, HSwMS, 333
Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 287
Kronprinz Wilhelm, 287
Lark, HM brig, 210
Lark, HM sloop of war, 341
La Signe, French brig, 342
Leander, HMS, 230
Lee, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217
Leopard, HMS, 230
Liberty, 221
Liverpool, HMS, 215
London, HMS, 352
Lusitania, RMS, 274, 281, 296
Lynch, 207, 208, 212, 215
Macedonian, USS, 244
Machias, USS, 298
Majestic, HMS, 350
Marietta, USS, 298
Marlborough, HMS, 180
Marlborough, privateer, 211
Mary Rose, 79
May, USS, 291
Merlin, HM armed collier, 341, 342
Merrimack, USS, 361, 363
Milford, HMS, 215
Minerve, HMS, 335, 336
Minnesota, USS, 35, 361–63
Mississippi, USS, 308
Monitor, USS, 363
Mount Vernon, USS, 287
Nahma, USS, 302
Nancy, HM transport, 213
Narcissus, HMS, 33
Naseby, 107, 112
Nashville, USS, 298
Nautilus, HM sloop, 213, 214, 351
Neptune, HMS, 183
Newark, HMS, 50
Newport, HMS/HMNoS, 50
Nokomis, USS, 291
Norma, USS, 291
North Carolina, USS, 315
Northumberland, HMS, 343
Odenwald, German raider, 313
Ohio, USS, 437
Öland, HSwMS, 156
Oliver Cromwell, Connecticut frigate, 210
Orbit, Black Ball packet, 194
Orion, HMS, 352
Paducah, USS, 298
Parker, USS, 301
Pennsylvania, USS, 308
Peterel, HM sloop of war, 348
Peuple, 360
Philomel, HM sloop, 172
Phoenix, HMS, 341
Plumper, HMS, 196
Portland, HMS, 176
President, USS, 248
Prince of Wales, HMS, 182, 310
Prometheus, USS, 287
Queen, HMS, 332, 340, 347, 351
Queen Charlotte, HMS, 180, 341
Raleigh, Continental ship, 176
Raleigh, HMS, 176, 177–78
Raven, HMS, 341
Renown, HMS, 216
Repulse, HMS, 310
Resistance, Continental ship, 210
Richard, 107
Roanoke, USS, 361
Rodney, HMS, 39
Roman Emperor, 178
Romney, HMS, 348
Rose, HMS, 330
Royal Charles, HMS, 108, 112
Royal Charlotte, HM yacht, 338
Royal Oak, HMS, 176
Royal Sovereign, HMS, 107, 343, 351
Sacramento, USS, 299
Salisbury, HMS, 175
Sally, 213
San Ildefonso, 351
San Josef, HMS, 352
Saratoga, USS, 309–10
Shannon, HMS, 231, 341–42
Shark, HMS, 176
Sky Rocket, 210
Spartan, HMS, 336, 337, 343
Speedy, HM brig, 333, 334, 348
Spencer, HMS, 187
Spy, HM sloop, 175
Stakesby, HM transport, 216
Stately, HMS, 350
St. George, HMS, 330
Stirling Castle, HMS, 337
St. Marys, HMS, 50
St. Mary's, USS, 361
Stribling, USS, 302
Strombolo, HM bomb vessel, 332, 340, 347
Success, HMS, 336
Sultan, HMS, 176
Surprise, HM frigate, 211
Susannah, HM transport, 215
Sussex, ferry, 274
Tang, USS, 312
Tartar, HMS, 211
Termagant, HMS, 332, 340, 347
Theseus, HMS, 341
Thorn, 212
Thunder, HM bomb ketch, 176
Tonnant, HMS, 343

Tortoise, HM storeship, 332, 340
Trepassy, HM brig, 333, 348
Triton, HMS, 182
U-9, 273
U-20, 274, 296
U-28, 301
U-31, 301
U-62, 286
U-93, 287
UB-29, 274
UB-50, 301
United States, USS, 244
Vaillant, 176
Venus, HMS, 341
Victory, HMS, 352, 386
Vigilant, HMS, 230
Ville de Paris, French ship, 205, 360
Ville de Paris, HMS, 334, 341, 348
Virginia, CSS, 363
Von Steuben, USS, 287
Wabash, USS, 361
Wachusett, USS, 60
Wakiva, USS, 291
Warren, 208, 210, 212, 213, 214–16
Washington, 208, 211, 213, 214, 215
Weasel, HMS, 332
Wheeling, USS, 298
Wyoming, USS, 36
Yankton, USS, 298
Yarmouth, HMS, 175
Young Phoenix, 212
ships, sizes of, 78–79, 102
ships, types of, 86
aircraft carrier, 55, 308–23, 374, 420, 422, 437
amphibious, 313
auxiliary, 313
balinger, 78
battle cruiser, 271
battleship, 70, 269, 270, 276, 308, 309, 316, 317
bomb vessel, 86
carrack, 79
carvel, 84
cog, 84
cruiser, 269, 270, 271, 272, 301, 302, 309, 311, 317
destroyer, 50, 269, 276, 277, 292, 299, 301, 302, 309, 314, 317
East Indiaman, 190
fireship, 86, 190
frigate, 32, 33, 86, 177, 182, 236, 240–41, 243, 259
galleon, 85, 87, 182
galley, 80, 83, 86, 177
"great ship," 78
gunboat, 277, 292, 298, 299, 352
"long ship," 83, 84
merchant cargo, 79, 102, 259, 301, 334
monitor, 277
patrol craft, 277, 279
Q-ships, 273
revenue cutter, 299
round, 83, 84
salvage vessel, 292
school, 361–63
ship of the line, 32, 86, 241, 259, 381
submarine, 269, 272, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 283, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 309, 418; ballistic missile, 437; nuclear, 55
submarine chaser, 292, 300, 301
supply ship, 292
training, 361–63
transport, 270, 276, 286, 391
trawler, 292
tugboat, 292
yacht, 276, 277, 286, 291, 292
ship sinkings. *See* trade: ship sinkings
shipwreck, 23
Shirley, William (governor), 348
Shuford, Jacob, Rear Adm., 409
Sicilian expedition, 83
Sicily, 138, 148, 149, 337
Sicking, Louis, 77, 100
Sidra, Gulf of, 418
signal book, 111, 182
Sims, William S., Adm., 34, 39, 47, 281, 282–87, 298, 299, 303, 367, 403–404
Singapore, 52, 442. *See also* Straits Settlements
Six Livres de la République, Les (Bodin), 76
Sizes and lengths of riggings (Hayward), 17
Sjöhistoriska Samfundet, 8
Skaags, David, 235
Skenesboro, NY, 221
Skimmer, John, 209, 212, 214, 217
Slaughter, Joseph P., II, 229
slavery, 239
slave trade. *See* trade: slave
Slingelandt, Simon van, 158
Slovenes, 302
Smelser, Marshall, 228
Smith, Adam, 91
Smith, Billy G., 8
Smith, Douglas V., 370
Smith, Gaddis, 4
Smith, Gene A., 9
Smith, Joshua M., 12
Smith, Sidney, Adm. Sir, 332, 333
Smollett, Tobias, 19, 24, 340
smuggling, 260, 330
Smyrna, 113, 303
Social Darwinism, 63
social history, 5, 6, 7, 78, 92
social sciences, 397
Société Française d'Histoire Maritime, 8
society and the navy, 92
Society for Nautical Research, 8
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 195
Society for the Suppression of Juvenile Vagrancy, 345–46
Socrates, 408
Soissons, France, 292
Soley, James R., 62
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 408

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Corbett), 385, 429
Somerville, James, Sir, 51, 52
Sonora, 124
Sound (Øresund), 103, 110, 153, 165, 178
Sound Military Decision, 368–69, 404–406
South Africa, 49, 301, 338, 432
  Cape Colony, 346
  South African navy, 51
  West Cape Province, 338
South America, 51, 138, 148
Southampton, England, 36, 67, 69, 276, 288, 289
South Australia, 171
South Carolina, 30, 125, 126, 129, 131, 177, 207, 214, 222, 224, 247
South China Sea, 310
South Sea Bubble, 166
South Street Seaport, 4
Southwold, England, 113
Souza, Philip de, 10
sovereignty, national, 416
sovereignty of the seas, 83, 90, 113, 156, 186
Soviet Union. *See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
space
  airspace, 423, 437, 441
  battle space, 422, 423
  cyberspace, 423, 437, 441
  maritime, 415–25, 441
  outer space, 423
Spain, 67, 84, 90, 91, 99, 107, 115, 121, 141, 145–48, 164, 238, 246, 342, 437
  silver fleet, 122, 123, 124–25, 144, 182
  Spanish empire, 138, 139, 141, 144, 146, 147
  Spanish language, 59
  Spanish navy, 29, 40, 80, 82, 87, 122, 144, 148, 162, 219–20, 386
  succession to the crown, 138, 139, 148, 154
Spanish Netherlands. *See* Netherlands: Spanish
Spector, Ronald, 319–20
Spencer, John, 5th Earl Spencer, 67
Spencer Gulf, 171
Spithead, 176, 183
Spragge, Edward, Sir, 113, 114
Spruance, Raymond A., Adm., 317, 318, 404
St., names starting with. *See also* Saint
stability, 85, 112
Stacey, Charles, 235
Stackpole, Edouard, 4
Stade, Bremen, 162
Stagg, J. C. A., 234, 238
stalemate, 262
Stanford University, 408
Stanhope, Henry, 187
Stanhope, James, 146, 164
Stanisław I Leszczyński (king of Poland), 158, 159, 162
Stanley, George, 235
Stanton, Charles E., 285
Stark, Harold R., Adm., 39, 367
state formation, 78–82
statesmen, 427–38
Statesmen and Sea Power (Richmond), 427–39
State University of New York Maritime College at Fort Schuyler, 361
"Statistical Product Quality Control," 409
Stato dei Presidi, Italy, 138
Steele, David, 20
Steele, James M., Capt., 370
sternpost, 84
Steuart, Hew, Capt., 352
Stevens, David, 319
Stevin, Simon, 84
Stewart, Anthony, 333
Stewart, Isabella, 333, 335, 338
St. Ferdinand, Order of, 337
St. Helena, 338, 343
St. Helens, Isle of Wight, England, 177
Stiles, Deborah, 172–74
St. John, Henry, Viscount Bolingbroke, 132–33, 161, 162
St. John's, NL, 289
Stockdale, James B., Vice Adm., 408
Stockholm, Sweden, 20, 155, 160
Stockton, Charles, Rear Adm., 64, 65, 268, 401
Stopford, Robert, Adm. Sir, 187, 190, 350
Stow, James, 181
Strait of Dover, 116, 274
Strait of Gibraltar, 103, 299–300, 301, 334
Strait of Magellan, 91
Straits Settlements: Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 51
Stralsund, Swedish Pomerania, 155, 162, 163, 187
Strategic Defense Review, 433
strategy, 60
  cumulative, 259
  defensive, 242, 245, 261, 383, 385, 421
  defensive-offensive, 35
  fleet in being, 381–95
  flexibility in, 278, 317, 421
  grand strategy, 83, 400, 443, 445–47
  maritime, 420, 421
  objects of, 428–29, 430–31
  offensive, 242, 249, 317, 421
  strategic planning, 63, 275, 283, 423
  strategic superiority, 392
  strategic thinking, maritime, 59, 78, 82–83, 104, 108, 271–72, 420–34
Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens, The (Aston), 430
Study on the Naval Arms Race, 418
Sturdee, Doveton, 39
St. Vincent, 1st Earl of (John Jervis), 217, 333–34, 336, 341, 343, 344, 347, 348, 351, 401
St. Vladimir, Imperial Order of, 352
Suckling, Maurice, 176
Supply of Prayer for the Ships of This Kingdom, A, 18
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, 55
Supreme War Council, 61, 283
surrender, unconditional, 147

Sutherland, William, 17, 19
Suva, Fiji Is., 46
Sweden, 80, 81, 90, 112, 115, 142, 151–69, 272
  Swedish language, 20, 59
  Swedish navy, 156, 453
  Swedish Tar Company, 156
  tonnage of navy, 102, 107
  See also Stockholm
Swift, Eban, Maj., 402
Swift, Jonathan, 19
Sykes, John, Capt., 351
Symonds, Craig, 228, 370
Syracuse, Sicily, 383
Syria, 67

tables
  "American Imports and Exports, 1807–15," 257
  "British Captures of American Merchant Shipping Tonnage, 1812–15," 260
  major european navies (1640–1715), 102, 107, 122
  "U.S. National Debt" (1805–15), 261
tactics, naval, 18, 60, 75, 77, 82, 86–89, 104–106, 112, 307, 309, 404
  line-ahead formation and tactics, 104, 105, 106, 108–11, 180–81, 307, 313–14
  naval aviation, 310–11, 314, 317
Tactique navale (Morogues), 88
Taft, William Howard (president of the United States), 35
Tagus River, 145
Tahiti, 183
Talavera, battle of, 342
Tallapoosa tribe, 127
Tangier, Morocco, 115
Tapp, John, 17
Tarentum, 383
tarpaulin officers. *See* officers, naval: tarpaulin
Tatihou, Île de 341
Tawasa, 127
taxation, 81, 100
Taylor, Henry C., Rear Adm., 401
Taylor, William E. G., 38
technology, 83–86
  technological change, 23, 25, 33, 77, 100, 403
Tecumseh, 242
Tenold, Stig, 6
Ternay, chevalier de, Adm., 350, 360
Teston, Kent, England, 174
  Barham Court, 174, 185
Texas, 125, 297
Texas A&M University, 12
thalassokratia, 83
thalassophilia, 327
Thames River, England, 104, 110, 112, 114, 116, 183
Theobald, Robert A., Rear Adm., 404
Théorie de la construction des vaisseaux (Hoste), 85
theory, naval, 382–455
Thompson, Charles, 175
Thomson, William, 184
threat axis, 315
Thrush, Andrew, 77, 100
Thucydides, 82–83
tide, 16
Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis, 8
Till, Geoffrey, 382, 384–85
Tirpitz, Alfred von, Adm., 269
Tobago, 115
Tor Bay, England, 116
Torch operation, 40
torpedo station. *See* Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, RI
Torrington, 1st Earl of (Arthur Herbert), Adm. *See* Herbert, Arthur, 1st Earl of Torrington, Adm.
Tory (political party), 344
"Total Quality Management" / "Total Quality Leadership" (TQL), 409
Toulon, France, 29, 92, 110, 123, 143, 188, 219, 336, 351, 386
Tours, France, 285, 336
Tourville, comte de, 381, 383, 384
Towers, John H., 317
Tractat om Skeppsbyggeriet (Chapman), 85
Tracy, Benjamin F., 64, 65, 66
trade, 37, 40, 51, 66, 91, 99, 100, 103, 104, 110, 148, 151, 156, 161, 166, 239, 269
  attack on, 87, 89, 109, 111, 113, 114, 145, 206, 207, 243, 253–63, 273, 336, 390, 431
  flagging of merchant ships, 442–43
  licenses, 258–59
  Navicert system, 276
  neutral, 239, 246, 248, 261, 272, 273, 274, 296
  protection of, 83, 89, 101, 105, 109, 115, 123, 145, 163, 206, 222, 229–30, 240, 243, 260, 269, 277, 278, 281, 296, 388, 431, 442
  regulation of, 103
  ship sinkings, 277
  slave, 148, 174
  world trade, 442
  See also naval stores
Trafalgar Night, 41
training, 41
Traité du navire (Bouguer), 85
transformation of armed forces, 443
Transport, Commissioners of, 129
  Transport Service, 178
travel literature, 18, 19, 23
Treasury (British), 129
Treasury Department (U.S.), 229
Treatise of maritime surveying (McKenzie), 20
treaty
  Altona, 152, 153
  Altranstädt, 159, 160, 162
  Amiens (1801), 183–84, 185, 254, 335, 341, 351
  Anglo-French commercial (1713), 148
  Anglo-Prussian-Dutch, 157
  Anglo-Swedish, 151, 152, 154
  Anglo-Swedish-Dutch, 156
  Carlowitz, 139
  Dover, 112

treaty *(continued)*
Dual Entente, 268
Entente Cordiale (1904), 268
Ghent, 171, 192–94, 248–49, 261
Grand Alliance (1701), 140, 141, 143, 145, 149, 155, 157, 158
Hague (1698), 139
Hague (1907), 268
London (1909), 268
London (1915), 303
London Naval (1930), 49
Methuen (1703), 145
Nijmegen (1678), 115
Nystad, 166
Paris/Versailles (1783), 226, 254
Paris/Versailles (1919), 37, 47, 279, 304
Partition: First (1698), 140, 143; Second (1700), 140
Quadruple Alliance, 164
Rijswijk, 139, 151, 152
Swedish-Hanoverian, 165
Tilsit, 187
Tordesillas, 90
Travendal, 153, 154, 156, 160
Triple Alliance, 164, 268, 270
Turin, 139
Utrecht, 121, 137–50, 162–65
Vienna (1815), 245, 249, 261
Washington Disarmament, 37
Westphalia, 103, 152
See also peace treaties, compromise in
treatyse of the newe India, A, 18
Trenton, NJ, 209
trident, as a naval symbol, 448
Trieste, Austrian Empire, 336
Trinity College, Dublin, 155
Trinity College, Oxford, 67
Tripoli, 230, 240
Trois Rivières, New France, 131
Tromp, Cornelius, 110, 114, 115
Tromp, Maarten Harpertszoon, 103–105
troop transportation, 123, 145, 276, 285, 288–90, 383
Truman, Harry S. (president of the United States), 54, 416
Tuamotu Is., 183
Tucker, Samuel, 211, 212, 214, 217
Tulagi, 314
Tull, Malcolm, 6
Turkey, 67, 271, 278, 302, 303. *See also* Constantinople; Ottoman Empire
Turner, Frederick Jackson, 69
Turner, Richmond Kelly, Adm., 404
Turner, Stansfield, Adm., ix, 373, 407–408, 420, 423
Twining, Nathan C., 285
Types of Naval Officers (Mahan), 59, 401

Ubi Sumus? (Hattendorf), 4
Ukraine, 160
Ulrika Eleonora (queen of Sweden), 165
uniforms, naval, 36
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 52, 418, 421, 421
United Kingdom, 53, 59, 69, 151–69, 242, 254, 268, 269, 275, 282, 297, 391, 433, 437
Act of Union (1707), 159
arms, grant of, 337–38
invasion of, 388, 390
Orders in Council, 255, 258
See also Admiralty (British); British army; cabinet (British); London, England; Privy Council (British); Royal Navy; *and names of sovereigns*
United Nations, 54, 416, 417, 433
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 417–19, 445, 446, 449
UN Conference on Trade and Development, 442
United States Army 35, 46, 61, 239–41, 276, 282, 283, 287, 288, 400, 422
2nd Brigade, 288
2nd Infantry Division, 288
General Staff, 368
United States Coast Guard, 32, 437
United States Food Administration, 296
United States Marine Corps, 276, 277, 288, 313, 421, 422, 437
4th Marine Brigade, 288
United States Naval Institute, 361, 399, 470
Proceedings, 369
See also Naval Institute Press
United States Navy, 31, 35, 46, 52–56, 240, 241–42, 247, 248, 258, 259, 276–77, 437
Antarctic support, 375
apprentice training, 361–63
Board of Inspection and Survey, 281
CINCPAC-CINCPOA, 369–71
core values, 410–11
debate over functions of, 32, 217–34
Destroyer Force, Atlantic, 285
European station, 67
freedom of navigation policy, 418–19, 420, 442
General Board, 308
Mediterranean Sea operations, 295–304
mobile construction battalions (SeaBees), 375
naval attachés, 55–56
naval aviation, 284, 285, 292, 307–23
Naval History and Heritage Command, 371, 467–68
Naval Overseas Transport Service (NOTS), 290
naval reserve, 289
North Atlantic Squadron (U.S.), 61, 62
operational command system, 53
Patrol Force, Atlantic, 286, 299
railway guns, 276, 292
relations with RCN officers, 51
Rhode Island bases, 373–78
roles during World War I, 276–77, 286
uniforms, 68
U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, 281–94
view of Commonwealth navies, 45–58
view of the Royal Navy, 29–44
War Board (1898), 382
war-game role, 36

United States of America, 21, 31, 46, 49, 56, 59, 82, 147, 254, 314, 344, 346, 433
embargo, 256–57
exports, 244, 253–63
imports, 244, 253–63
marine national monument, 420
Pacific northwest coast of, 63
population of, 239
United States Shipping Board, 289
University of Cambridge, 16, 34, 67, 173
University of Chicago, 311
University of Connecticut, Avery Point, 12
University of Hull, 9
University of Leiden, 83
University of Oxford, ix, 15, 34, 67–68, 155, 194, 339, 427
Sheldonian Theatre, 67
University of Washington, 12
University Press of Florida, 9
Upton, Emory, Gen., 400

Valencia, Spain, 145, 146
Vanbrugh, John, Sir, 184
Vancouver, BC, 48, 172
Vancouver, George, 181
Vandeput, George, Vice Adm., 351
Vansittart, Nicholas, Baron Bexley, 195
Vattel, Emer (Emmerich) de, 91, 416
Vaudreuil, marquis de, 130, 131
Veere, Netherlands, 79
Vegetius Renatus, Publius Flavius, 82
Vendôme, duc de, 146
Venice, 16, 79, 80, 90, 303
Arsenale of, 84
Venn, Henry, 183
Venn, John, Rev., 175, 183
Vera Cruz, Mexico, 124, 308
Verden, 162, 163, 165
Verdon-sur-Mer, Le, France, 292
Verdun, France, 292, 297, 335, 336
Vermont, 221
Vernon, William, 30
Vetch, Samuel, 131, 132
Veth, Lucas de, 163
vice-admiralty courts, 90, 128–29, 344, 350
Vickers, Daniel, 8
Victor Amadeus II (duke of Savoy), 143
Victoria (queen of the United Kingdom), 67, 346
Victory at Sea, The (Sims), 287
Vienna, Austria, 146
Congress of. *See* treaty: Vienna (1815)
Villaret de Joyeuse, Louis-Thomas, Adm., 180, 342
Villars, Claude-Louis-Hector de, 147
Vincennes, IN, 125
Virginia, 102, 114, 129, 207, 214, 244, 373
Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), 81
voyage literature, 19
Voyage Round the World, A (Anson), 19, 23, 343
Voyages (Smith), 12

Wabash River, 125
Wachtmeister, Hans, 153
Wake I., 310
Walcheren I., 114
Waldegrave, William, 1st Baron Radstock, Vice Adm., 334, 341
Walker, Hovenden, Sir, 133
Wall, R. Michael, 359
Wallace, James, Adm. Sir, 177, 330, 347, 348
Wallis, Samuel, 183
war aims, 142, 240–42, 249, 261
Ward, Artemas, Gen., 209, 216
War Department (U.S.), 241
Ware, England, 340
warfare, theory of maritime, 420
war games, 35, 36, 47, 62, 367–68, 401
Warner, John, 373
War Office (British), 129
war plans (U.S.), 35, 51, 275, 283, 367
Rainbow, 52
War Plan Red, 36, 46–48
warrant officer. *See* officers, naval: warrant
Warren, John Borlase, Vice Adm. Sir, 244, 258, 259, 260, 343
Warren, Joseph, Dr., 214
Warren, Thomas, Capt., 352
wars
Afghanistan, 445, 451
American independence, 24, 31, 171, 177–78, 205–18, 219–27, 254, 330–32, 340, 359–60, 381, 385–94
Anglo-Dutch, 76, 116–17, 313; First, 87, 99, 103–106, 151; Second, 87, 99, 108–12; Third, 99, 112–15, 138
Anglo-French, 76
Barbary, 230, 240
Boxer Rebellion, 281
Civil War (American), 60, 362, 398–99
Civil War (English), 101, 115
Cold War, 40–41, 54, 56, 313, 420–22, 433, 434, 443, 450
Devolution, 137
Eighty Years', 99, 101
Franco-Dutch, 137
Franco-Spanish (1635–59), 106
French Revolution, 32, 179–81, 253, 258
Great Northern, 142, 151–69
Hundred Years', 81, 89
Iraq, 445, 451
King Philip's, 130
King William's, 121
Korean, 54, 56, 433, 468
Napoleonic, 22, 23–24, 33, 64–66, 85, 91, 93, 117, 185–94, 230, 246, 253, 258, 259, 261
Nine Years', 82, 129, 130, 138, 139, 151, 381
Opium: Second Opium War, 362
Peloponnesian, 82, 383, 407
Peninsular, 258
Persia, 268
Persian Gulf, 56

wars *(continued)*
Quadruple Alliance, 149
Quasi-War with France, 229–30, 240
Queen Anne's, 121
Reunions, 138
Russo-Swedish, 332–33
Seven Years', 93, 174, 360
Spanish-American, 368, 382
Spanish Succession, 121–36, 137–52, 154, 156, 159, 162, 166
Thirty Years', 99, 152
Vietnam, 56, 374, 407, 408, 433, 468
War of 1812, 24, 32, 33, 36, 63, 171, 192–94, 230–31, 235–63, 343, 344, 468
War on Terror, 56, 423, 435
World War I, 35, 36–37, 39, 47, 61, 267–305, 308, 368, 443, 444
World War II, 38–40, 49, 50–52, 56, 147, 149, 307–23, 420, 432, 433, 443, 444, 468
Warsaw, Poland, 155
Warsaw Pact, 421
Warwick, Earl of (Robert Rich), 101
war zones, 273
Washington, DC, 50, 51, 52, 69, 235, 247, 248, 259
Washington Navy Yard, 60, 361
Washington, George, 206–18, 215, 223, 228, 229, 360, 397, 398
George Washington's navy, 206–18, 223, 225
Washington Territory, 64
Wassenaer, Jacob van, heer van Obdam, 108
Waterloo, Battle of, 246
Waters, Daniel, 212, 214
Watson, William, 207, 209
weapons, 309
weather or windward gauge, 86, 104, 111, 180
Weber, Max, 76
Wellesley, Arthur, 1st Duke of Wellington, Sir, 187, 192, 258, 260, 342, 400
Wellesley, Richard, 1st Marquess of Wellesley, 342
Wellings, Joseph H., 39
Wentworth, Joshua, 207
Western Chiefs of Staff Committee, 53
Western Hemisphere, 35
Western Michigan University, 12
Western Union Defence Organisation, 53
West Friesland, 109
West Ham Abbey, Essex, 346
West India Company, Dutch, 81
West India Directory, The, 22
West Indies, 50, 101, 103, 110, 114, 122, 129, 130, 131, 176, 189, 241, 244, 245, 258, 259, 260, 341, 342, 385, 388, 390, 391, 393. *See also* Caribbean Sea
West Point. *See* Military Academy (U.S.)
Wheelock, John, 176
Wheelwright, John, 328
Whidbey, Joseph, 181
Whig (political party), 164, 344
Whipple, Abraham, 222
White, William (bishop), 194
Whitefield, George, Rev., 174
White-Jacket (Melville), 24
Whiting, Kenneth, 284
Whitlock, Brand, 285
Whitney, William C., 63
Whitworth, Charles, 160, 164
Wickes, Lambert, 227
Wickham, Frances, 350, 351, 352
Widén, Jerker, 385
Wilberforce, William, 174, 179, 183
Wildt, David de, 108
Wildt, Jacob de, 108
Wiley, Henry A., 36
Wilhelm II (kaiser), 67, 269
Wilkes, Charles, 23
Willaumez, Jean-Baptiste, 189
Willes, George W., Lt., 337
William III
as stadtholder, 114–16, 142
as king of England, 116, 128, 139, 141, 148, 151–54, 162, 165, 384, 434
William IV (king of the United Kingdom), 196, 344, 346
Williams, David M., 10
Wilmerding, John, 469
Wilmot-Horton, Robert, Sir, 346
Wilson, George, Capt., 340
Wilson, Henry B., Rear Adm., 281–94, 299
Wilson, James, 183, 227
Wilson, Woodrow (president of the United States), 274, 275, 281, 288, 295, 296, 297, 298, 302
Winchester, England, 337
winds, 22
Windsor (Sandwich), ON, 242
Wing-and-Wing, The (Cooper), 24
Winks, Robin, 45
Winnipeg, MB, 46
Wisconsin, 193
With, Witte Corneliszoon de, 104
Witt, Cornelis de, 114
Witt, Johan de, 106, 108, 109, 111, 114
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 408
wives, naval, 92
Wolfe, Robert B., Rev., 335, 336
Wolfenbüttel, 161
Wolverhampton, England, 340
wood, 85, 182
Wood, Gordon S., 234
Wooden World, The (Rodger), 92
Woolwich Dockyard, England, 107
Works, Office of (British), 184
Worldwide Navigational Warning Service, 418
Wright, Edmund, 16
Wroth, Lawrence C., 6
Wylie, Joseph Caldwell, Rear Adm., 259, 420, 452

Yale University (College), 4, 45, 210
Yamamoto, Isoroku, 310–11
Yamasee tribe, 126, 128
Yarmouth, Norfolk, England. *See* Great Yarmouth

York, Duke of (George, later George V, king of the United Kingdom), 67
York, Duke of (James, later James II, king of England). *See* James II
York, Upper Canada, 245
Yorke, Charles Philip, 192, 343
Yorktown, VA, 375
  Yorktown, battle of, 360, 388, 391
Young, James, 176
Young Seaman's Manual, The (Luce), 363
Yugoslavia, 302, 303

Zante, 336
Zealand (Sjælland), Denmark, 187
Zeeland, Netherlands, 109
Zelibor, Thomas E., Rear Adm., 409
Zimmermann, Arthur, 297
  Zimmermann Telegram, 275, 281, 297
Zumwalt, Elmo, Adm., 377
Zúñiga y Zerda, José de, 127

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH SERIES

1. *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce,* edited by John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf (1975).
2. *Charleston Blockade: The Journals of John B. Marchand, U.S. Navy, 1861–1862,* edited by Craig L. Symonds (1976).
3. *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession,* Ronald Spector (1977).
4. *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941,* Michael Vlahos (1980).
5. *On His Majesty's Service: Observations of the British Home Fleet from the Diary, Reports, and Letters of Joseph H. Wellings, Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché, London, 1940–41,* edited by John B. Hattendorf (1983).
6. *Angel on the Yardarm: The Beginnings of Fleet Radar Defense and the Kamikaze Threat,* John Monsarrat (1985).
7. *A Bibliography of the Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* compiled by John B. Hattendorf and Lynn C. Hattendorf (1986).
8. *The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform: Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy and Allied Naval Cooperation,* Joel J. Sokolsky (1991).
9. *The Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahan's* The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, edited by John B. Hattendorf (1991).
10. *Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond,* edited by James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (1993).
11. *Ubi Sumus? The State of Naval and Maritime History,* edited by John B. Hattendorf (1994).

12. *The Queenstown Patrol, 1917: The Diary of Commander Joseph Knefler Taussig, U.S. Navy,* edited by William N. Still Jr. (1996).
13. *Doing Naval History: Essays toward Improvement,* edited by John B. Hattendorf (1995).
14. *An Admiral's Yarn,* edited by Mark R. Shulman (1999).
15. *The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt,* edited by Evelyn Cherpak (2004).
16. *Three Splendid Little Wars: The Diary of Joseph K. Taussig, 1898–1901,* edited by Evelyn Cherpak (2009).
17. *Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War College, the Lessons of World War Two, and Future Naval Warfare, 1945–1947,* Hal M. Friedman (2010).
18. *To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940,* Albert A. Nofi (2010).
19. *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays,* John B. Hattendorf (2011).
20. *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy 10–11 September 2009,* edited by Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones (2012).
21. *Blue versus Orange: The U.S. Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945–1946,* Hal M. Friedman (2013).
22. *Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945,* Milan Vego (2014).
23. *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Seventeenth McMullen Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy 15–16 September 2011,* edited by Marcus O. Jones (2016).
24. *Blue versus Purple: The U.S. Naval War College, the Soviet Union, and the New Enemy in the Pacific, 1946,* Hal M. Friedman (2017).
25. *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Eighteenth McMullen Naval History Symposium Held at the U.S. Naval Academy 19–20 September 2013,* edited by Lori Lyn Bogle and James C. Rentfrow (2018).
26. *The Hattendorf Prize Lectures, Volume 1: 2011–2019,* edited by Evan Wilson (2020).
27. *Major Naval Operations in European Waters, 1939–1945,* Milan Vego (2021).
28. *To the Java Sea: Selections from the Diary, Reports, and Letters of Henry E. Eccles, 1940–1942,* edited by John B. Hattendorf and Pelham Boyer (2021).
29. *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Nineteenth McMullen Naval History Symposium Held at the U.S. Naval Academy 17–18 September 2015,* edited by James C. Rentfrow (2022).