NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT PAPERS 24

Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century

A *Naval War College Review* Reader



Peter Dombrowski, Editor

Cover

The Naval War College campus on Coasters Harbor Island—a view from the south. The buildings are, from left to right, Pringle Hall, Luce Hall, McCarty Little Hall, and Founders Hall (the original home of the College, now containing the Museum and offices of the Maritime History Department and of the Naval War College Press). Above Luce Hall, to the right of the cupola, is a portion of Conolly Hall. In the foreground is Dewey Field, site of June graduation exercises and summer Navy Band concerts.

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

Peter Dombrowski, Editor

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NAVAL TRANSFORMATION

Foreword

Two ideas motivated this anthology of articles published in our quarterly, the *Naval War College Review.* First, the U.S. Navy is today at a critical point in its history. At a time when the nation is at war—with campaigns in two countries and engagements across the globe as part of the war on terror—the roles and missions traditionally assigned to the Navy have been called into question. Budget pressures have forced the service to reevaluate shipbuilding plans for several ships, including the DD(X) family. Second, it has been nearly ten years since selections from the *Review* have been compiled in a single, easily accessible volume; in that time there have appeared a number of articles that particularly deserve a second or third look by those who study and practice national security and naval affairs.

The articles in this volume speak directly to the Navy's evolving role in the national and military strategies. The collection should serve as a handy reference for scholars, analysts, practitioners, and general readers interested in naval issues, and also that it will be useful for adoption as a reading by national security courses both in the United States and abroad. While the articles here certainly do not exhaust the range of views and important issues involving naval operations, strategy, or tactics, they do form a foundation for those interested in learning more. Moreover, they have enduring value; the perspectives and analyses they offer will not go out of fashion.

The articles are reprinted exactly as they originally appeared, except that: proofreading errors noticed since original publication have been silently corrected; biographical notes have been updated; copyrighted art has been omitted; citation format (which evolved over the years) has been standardized in certain respects; and one author has appended a brief commentary.

The volume is divided into three sections. The first introduces the changing security environment facing the United States and, by extension, the U.S. Navy. The articles examine both the external position of the nation and the emerging internal political and institutional contexts that constrain military and naval policies and decision making. The second part looks specifically at the roles and missions of the Navy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Its articles cover both long-standing issues, such as forward presence, and the new missions the Navy has assumed in recent years—from projecting power far inland to providing theater and national missile defense, especially against opponents armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The last

part of the volume concentrates on military and naval transformation. The articles in this section provide some perspective on, perhaps even ballast for, the claims of proponents of the revolution in military affairs. Finally, I supply a conclusion reviewing the main themes of the articles and the avenues to which they point.

The *Naval War College Review* remains one of the premier journals dedicated to publishing articles and essays with a naval and maritime focus. The chapters in the volume provide many of the intellectual building blocks for a maritime strategy designed to maintain American primacy and, if mandated by political leaderships, support a liberal empire that helps protect and spread the ideals of democracy and markets. The Navy's role will be arduous, and the need for continuous adjustments to the prevailing international security environment great. By reading or rereading the chapters that follow, specialists and nonspecialists alike can gain greater insights into the challenges ahead.

I would like to end with thanks to my predecessors as editor of the Naval War College Press—Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Dr. Thomas B. Grassey, and Professor Frank Uhlig, Jr.—under whose tutelage these and so many other excellent articles were published. It is a fine legacy to bequeath to my successor in this position, Dr. Carnes Lord.

PETER DOMBROWSKI
Editor, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island

U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century
A Brief Introduction

In this volume, Congressional Budget Office analyst Eric Labs issues a provocative challenge to the U.S Navy—he argues that while the Navy has done a fine job justifying the existence of a navy, it has been much less successful in defining just what type of navy the American taxpayer deserves.[1] Deciding what roles and missions the U.S. Navy should be responsible for within the overall context of the national security strategy is essential to determining what equipment the Navy buys, how many officers and sailors it requires, what types of skills, education, and training they need, where naval forces should be based, and, not the least, what doctrine and tactics it needs to develop for the coming decades. After all, rationalist approaches to defense planning usually attempt to determine the roles and missions of a nation's military services by means of top-down reviews, starting from the nation's interests and the grand strategy that is used to pursue them.[2] Military strategy, doctrine, tactics, force structure, weapons systems, and basing, among other essentials, are then organized around the ends of grand strategy. This is exactly what the formal planning processes of the Defense Department and the U.S. Navy are supposed to accomplish.

The perceived absence of a clear definition of the Navy's role in U.S. military strategy is unsurprising, however. The global threat of the Soviet Union disappeared nearly fifteen years ago, but the American military has adjusted only fitfully to the subsequent international security environment. The Navy in particular has changed only gradually. Most ships, aircraft, and other major weapons systems last decades or more; the procurement decisions and even purchases of the Ronald Reagan–era buildup in the 1980s remain with the fleet today. This will remain true far into the future. The V-22, for example, was conceived in the 1970s but is not yet operational, even though it promises to expand the ability of the U.S. Marines to project power ashore. Most general officers today had their formative professional experiences during the Cold War. More to the point, at the strategic level the Navy has gone through a number of, for the absence of a better term, "vision statements," including " . . . From the Sea"; Forward . . . from the

Sea";[3] network-centric warfare;[4] and now, Sea Power 21.[5] Yet to date, none has retained lasting hold on the Navy or the U.S. national security community in general.

Few efforts to redirect Navy strategy have endured beyond a particular set of naval leaders or their political masters in the Defense Department and the White House. Chief of Naval Operation Vernon Clarke's contribution, Sea Power 21, had the twin virtues of the apparent blessing of the civilian defense leadership and CNO's strong personal support, but it remains to be seen whether that view will prevail.[6] Critics have charged that it does not provide adequate justification for maintaining the current fleet and existing acquisition programs, let alone the most prominent programs, such as the DD(X), LPD-17, and future submarine programs in economically justifiable numbers. Recent cuts to naval programs appear to validate these concerns. Further, viewed as a window on the Navy's future, Sea Power 21 does not offer sufficient specifics to guide to transformation, at least by the model held by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the most strenuous proponents of transformation.[7] While Sea Power 21 may be another rethinking of the Navy's role in promoting national security, it does less well as advertisement for supporting the wider joint military strategy guiding the other services (e.g., the rhetorical approach of adding the word "sea" to standard missions—thus "Sea Strike," "Sea Shield," "Sea Warrior" and so forth—appears parochial to some). Finally, at this point in time, in the second term of George W. Bush, the administration's approach to national security beginning with the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Security Strategy of 2002 may be undergoing a substantial reorientation.

Grand Strategy and Naval Power

Outsiders trying to influence the internal debates about the United States often look to history to determine either what choices were made at similar points in a nation's history or what other nations have done in similar strategic environments. So, for example, proponents of American military innovation have studied the interwar period, the years between World Wars I and II, to help understand how the United States should seek to preserve its current military superiority in the lull, or strategic pause, between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of another peer or near-peer competitor. Over the last decade, innovation studies have examined the origins of a number of interwar innovations that influenced the course of World War II, including carrier operations and amphibious warfare. Unfortunately, there is no period in American history comparable to the position in which the country finds itself at the beginning of the twenty-first century; Michael Ignatieff argues that "we live in a world that has no precedents since the age of the later Roman emperors."[8]

Ignatieff aside, the search for historical parallels has led to reexamining the British empire in search of lessons for the United States.[9] It has also become almost commonplace to laud the role of the Royal Navy in creating and maintaining the British overseas empire over more than three centuries.[10] Although some have claimed the British acquired its empire by accident, it is clear that over time the pursuit of global maritime superiority and an overseas empire became a conscious strategy, pursued by many generations of British political leaders.[11] It was not until the failure of Winston Churchill's late efforts to maintain the remnants of empire that the conscious policy waned; of course, Margaret Thatcher reminded us how potent the symbol of the overseas territories remain when she roused the British military and public to defend the Falkland Islands against Argentina in 1981. Interestingly, as Jeremy Black points out, the imperial leftovers controlled by London today are larger than the territories controlled in 1500, at the very beginning of Great Britain's global shopping spree.[12]

What is less often recognized, at least by nonspecialists, is that the British navy's role in supporting the imperial strategy changed more than a few times in the course of those several hundred years. In the early years of Britain's nascent empire the Royal Navy was hardly a navy at all. It was a motley collection of gifted pirates, privateers, and one-of-a-kind Crown-sponsored expeditions intended largely to harass Britain's more successful imperial rivals and earn profits for those courageous or foolhardy enough to sally forth. Later the Royal Navy qua navy emerged, growing to provide a bulwark of defense against efforts, like the Spanish Armada, to invade the home islands or, later, major colonies like India. British naval forces were deployed and redeployed across the globe to meet, contain, and combat various geopolitical challengers and maintain Britain's commercial trade routes and lifelines to its colonies. In the final European conflicts that sealed Great Britain's fate as a world power, the Royal Navy largely returned to its home waters to deter a German invasion.

The expense of maintaining its imperial commitments and in particular its global navy may ultimately have weakened Great Britain's ability to resist the imperial challenges from Germany to Japan in the first half of the twentieth century.[13] This happened despite the widespread discussion and acknowledgement of the resourcing problem at the highest levels of the British government and political class. Caught between the rock of imperial commitments and the hard place of an economy in relative decline, Great Britain tried for as long as possible to have it both ways.

Great Britain itself was a liberal empire that practiced both the "imperialism of free trade" and the acquisition of a more traditional territorial empire, given its relentless accrual of colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence during and throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[14] In Great Britain's version of liberal empire,

the Royal Navy's lasting role was to protect commercial lines of communication, open up new markets (by force if necessary), and maintain the military infrastructure and network of bases necessary for the first two objectives.

The lessons of all this for the United States vis-à-vis the roles and missions of the U.S. Navy, military expenditures in general, and the Navy's budget in particular are highly contested. The two most recent American administrations, but most prominently the presidency of George W. Bush, have self-consciously chosen a path toward primacy, if not empire. In President Bush's first term many pundits and neoconservatives on both sides of the Atlantic clearly became increasingly comfortable with the notion that the United States already had and should strive to maintain, and perhaps expand, its liberal empire. The later stages of the president's first term and now the second term suggest that critics may have been correct in observing that primacy and running an empire, liberal or not, is harder than it looks.[15]

The implications of primacy, or perhaps a liberal empire, for the U.S. Navy are only now being explored. The issues of nonterritorial empire in the early stages of the twenty-first century facing the American navy are similar to those faced by the British navy in many ways but in the last analysis are decidedly different. The U.S. Navy, like the Royal Navy, pledges to maintain sea-lanes and protect freedom of navigation for all commercial vessels using the high seas. It has not, generally speaking, however, been asked to use force to impose its economic will on other countries and regions (although critics of U.S. foreign and national security policies claim, with some truth, that most American interventions and even wars have had a key commercial element). More recently, the Bush administration has argued its right to impose on the world American political values, including democracy and free markets. The invasion of Iraq has helped make the case; once the various rationales initially used to justify the war fell to pieces, what was left was the self-interest of the United States in controlling the second largest oil-producing state and offering the Iraqi people an opportunity to practice democracy and capitalism.

On the economic implications of maintaining a military and, specifically, a global navy capable of maintaining American primacy, the jury remains out. After several years of discussion of the Paul Kennedy's concept of "imperial overstretch" in the early 1990s, the consensus seems to be that the United States is not currently in danger of such overextension. U.S. military expenditures remain quite low, given its global missions and relative to the health and size of the American economy. Moreover, the nation manages to maintain its potent military with expenditures larger than those of any conceivable combination of potential competitors and allies, while spending roughly 4 percent of its gross domestic product in doing so.[16] The growing unpopularity of the

Iraq war and its growing cost, though, may now be demonstrating that absolute spending measures are less relevant than public perceptions.

The U.S. Navy and Primacy

The centrality of navies to the lives of great nations has long been proclaimed by navalists, culminating in the United States with Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt. Indeed there, in Germany, and other nations as well, "navalism" represented "the dedication to the creation of an imperial navy—among people in position of power."[17] American navalists won the day in the 1890s, thereby helping bring the United States to international prominence and power, though it was to take the First World War to demonstrate truly America's not-so-latent military strength. After a brief lull in the post–World War II period, when some theorists argued that the advent of the atomic age might mean the end of navies, the U.S. Navy found its métier in the Cold War. The Navy's emergence as the keeper of the third, sea-based leg of the nuclear triad ensured that later, as the strategists and politicians gradually decided that a conventional defense of Europe was possible and even desirable, if only to postpone a nuclear confrontation, the Navy's role would expand to fighting the growing Soviet fleet, which was thought to endanger the water bridge across the Atlantic that would be necessary to fight a war in the European theaters. Then as the Soviet Navy expanded its blue-water reach to include most of the world's seas and oceans, the impetus for a large and capable U.S. Navy was assured. It may be that an emerging power like China that becomes a near-peer competitor will play a similar role in the future.

As a global economic, political, and cultural power, the United States should choose to play a critical role in maintaining the global commons—from the surface to the subsurface, to airspace over international waters, to space. As Barry Posen has articulated most clearly, U.S. command of the commons—including both the ocean surfaces and undersea—has allowed it to pursue a strategy of primacy in recent years.[18] In a benign sense the United States should pursue this option in order to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods for all commercial nations. In a more self-interested sense, it needs to ensure that its exports and imports reach their ultimate destinations, especially given that 95 percent of America's imports and exports from outside North American arrive by ship. Moreover many of the tasks of the U.S. Navy discussed in the following chapters—from sea control to the defeating anti-access efforts of adversaries—also contribute to the command of the global commons. The issue, then, is calibrating the U.S. Navy's strategic vision to the fluid international system and the dynamics of domestic politics.

Notes

1. Eric J. Labs, "Building the Future Fleet: Show Us the Analysis!" *Naval War College Review* 57, nos. 3/4 (Summer/Autumn 2004), pp. 138–46. "First, while Navy officials may be doing an excellent job explaining why the United States needs a navy, they are not doing a good job explaining why it needs the navy they say it needs" (p. 138).
2. John Hattendorf provides an especially clear description of a rationalistic approach to naval strategy and planning in John B. Hattendorf, "Recent Thinking on the Theory of Naval Strategy," in *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and American in the Twentieth Century,* ed. John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (New York: St. Martin's, 1989), pp. 136–61. For a sophisticated argument that "navy budgets, procurement, and force mix" are "idea driven" and not the product of so-called rational actors, organizational or bureaucratic models of decision making, see Edward Rhodes, "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy," *World Politics* 47, no. 1 (October 1994), pp. 1–41.
3. Edward Rhodes, "'. . . From the Sea' and Back Again: Naval Power in the Second American Century," *Naval War College Review* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 13–54.
4. E. D. Smith, Jr., "Network-centric Warfare: What's the Point?" *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 59–75.
5. Of course, these iterations have been blessed to various degrees by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Defense Department, but they represent distinct evolutions in naval thinking since the end of the Cold War. For specifics see Rhodes, "'. . . From the Sea' and Back Again," and Peter J. Dombrowski and Andrew Ross, "Transforming the Navy: Punching a Feather Bed?" *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003).
6. Early reports suggested it will. See "Mullen to 'remain true' to Sea Power 21 Vision," *Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,* 25 April 2005, p. 2.
7. See Dombrowski and Ross, "Transforming the Navy."
8. Michael Ignatieff, "The Challenges of American Imperial Power," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 53–63.
9. For one example, see Patrick Karl O'Brien and Armand Clesse, *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2002* (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2002).
10. Arthur Herman, *To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).
11. A phrase and sentiment originally attributed to nineteenth-century historian John Robert Seeley, in his *The Expansion of England* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, repr. 1971).
12. Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 355–56.
13. Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press 1989).
14. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review* 6, second series, no. 1 (1953).
15. Stephen M. Walt, "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls," *Naval War College Review* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 9–28.
16. For a well informed and reasoned analysis of U.S. defense spending with some key international comparisons see Michael O'Hanlon, "U.S. Defense Strategy after Saddam," (Carlisle, Penna.: Army War College, July 2005), available at www.Carlisle.army.mil/ssi.
17. Mark Russell Shulman, *Navalism and the Emergence of American Seapower, 1882–1893* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 2.
18. Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5–46.

Addendum

Professor Uhlig offers this later commentary on the concept of the "fleet-in-being," supplied to him by Captain Wayne Hughes (USN, Ret.), of the Naval Postgraduate School:

You could without missing a beat strengthen the case, because there was a middle ground between (1) the evidence you offer of the beginning of the end of a fleet-in-being with the Grand Fleet's distant blockade, and (2) the present circumstances when satellites and other advanced systems will pinpoint a fleet in a harbor and make it vulnerable. . . . The middle ground occurred in World War II when carrier aircraft surprised supposedly safe fleets and did so much harm that [the fleets] were driven back or reduced to impotence. Examples: Taranto 1940, resulting in the Italians' withdrawing to La Spezia; Pearl Harbor 1941, which eliminated the U.S. battleships' viability for over a year; Rabaul in 1943, when a U.S. carrier attack did so much harm to the Japanese cruisers that the Imperial Japanese Navy recognized the base was useless; and Truk 1944, when in the expectation of a U.S. carrier air attack the Japanese fleet fled from its strongest bastion east of the Philippines. There are other examples in the Pacific, on the Atlantic face of Europe, and in the Mediterranean—and with instruments other than carriers, such as full-sized and mini-submarines, as well as land-based aircraft.

Technically, in none of these instances did the suffering fleet think of itself as a fleet-in-being, in port merely to forestall or tie down the attacker's fleet. It is interesting that in each case the fleet was the target, and command of the seas the objective. In no case was the attack connected with an invasion somewhere nearby.

By 1945 all naval officers saw that what had been a sanctuary was now more likely to be a death trap. What was bad enough with conventional bombs was going to be much worse with the coming of atomic (fission) bombs.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy will continue to evolve as it has throughout most of its long history with changes in the American political landscape and the evolving strategic consensus. One set of drivers in this evolution comprises information technology and the desire to take advantage of the opportunities provided by improved data processing, advances in telecommunications, the increasing use of robotics, and advanced materials for building naval platforms, among many others. Notwithstanding the long life-cycles of aircraft carriers, ships and aircraft generally have finite and knowable life spans. Standard replacement and modernization patterns will ensure that the instruments of naval power improve over time. With the Navy's increasing emphasis on naval transformation, the pace of change promises to be even more rapid in the next two decades. Even if more expensive costs and lower procurement budgets allow for fewer new platforms, advanced technologies will change naval capabilities. For example, more accurate and deadly precision-guided munitions for aircraft and extended-range munitions for naval guns will increase the deep-strike capacity of naval forces even if the platforms themselves age and new, more capable platforms are procured in smaller numbers than originally envisioned.

Another source of the Navy's ongoing evolution is the desire of the service itself to demonstrate its viability as an instrument of national policy. After all, and despite the Navy's long and storied tradition, respected national security analysts continue to pose questions like, "Will Globalization Sink the Navy?"[1] Even the absence of a dominant grand strategy will not inhibit the U.S. Navy from injecting its own "visions" of a strategy that supports the national military strategy. Indeed, George Baer has concluded about the Navy's advocacy of "The Maritime Strategy" of the 1980s that "its central failure lay in the fact that the maritime strategy was not fully accepted as the basis for a national policy of sea power. This did not mean all was lost. The Navy had hoped that it could justify major acquisitions for an offensive carrier-and-submarine fleet, and that it did."[2]

The default position of the modern Navy has been to do a little bit of everything. Ships, for example, have rarely been optimized for single missions; rather, they house weapons and systems capable of carrying out a wide range of roles.[3] Although some types of ships have dwindled in number, the Navy has rarely given up missions. Instead it prefers to keep available ships, aircraft, and other assets with a range of capabilities. This general principle is illustrated by the evolution of the submarine force. Nuclear-powered "boomers" armed with ballistic missiles and attack submarines designed to hunt and kill enemy submarines are less in demand now that the Soviet submarine fleet lies rusting on the shores of the Barents Sea. Instead, several SSBN hulls are being converted to SSGNs, capable of striking targets far inland or of inserting special operations personnel to conduct a wide variety of missions ashore.

The U.S. Navy has often been left to its own devices in devising a maritime strategy that supports the national security and military strategies of the United States. Several times since 1945 the service has sought and failed to "gain recognition for the concept [of a maritime strategy] a discrete element of national strategy" or even as the centerpiece of American strategy.[4] By some accounts this is an almost inevitable outgrowth of the natural evolution of U.S. national security concerns from a "continental," to an "oceanic," to what Samuel P. Huntington called a "transoceanic" outlook—"a clearly stated, offensive, strategic concept for applying power against nonnaval, nonmaritime state."[5] The Navy has been less than successful in promoting the maritime view versus continentalist opponents. Why?

In major conflicts against land powers navies are often unable to act decisively ashore without the participation of the other military services. Despite the claims of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, which sought to take the offensive against the Soviet Union, and the efforts of the U.S. Navy to conceptualize its role in the post–Cold War world with documents like "Forward . . . from the Sea," the Navy is still struggling to acquire the weapons, platforms, doctrine, and tactics necessary to influence events ashore in any but the smallest contingencies.[6] In fact, technology today actually limits the Navy's impact: naval guns, even with extended-range guided munitions, reach only so far inland; limited numbers of cruise missiles preclude extended engagements; naval aircraft, even with air refueling, remain as yet limited to relatively brief sorties against land targets; and naval task forces can only linger so long in one locale without refueling, refitting, and resting their crews. Innovations have undoubtedly extended this range—concepts like Sea Swap crewing, home porting ships closer to the battle space, and more capable tenders and perhaps sea bases for the fleet, and dockyards abroad—but still limits remain. For all the importance of the Navy's contributions to recent conflicts like the Persian Gulf War, the various Balkans conflicts, the Afghanistan campaign, and the invasion of Iraq, they were ultimately supporting.[7] For these reasons and

others related to political and bureaucratic realities, any future effort to promote a new equivalent of the Maritime Strategy, or even a new version relying on "naval forces for rapid power projection" and "more leverage over events ashore than has been possible from the sea in the past" as the key component of national strategy appears unlikely to succeed.[8]

In the future, the Navy will not be free to set its own course without reference to the roles and missions of the other services as it did during the nation's first great naval buildup in the 1890s. Unlike much of American history, when the Navy and War Departments operated as separate fiefdoms, the norm at least since the National Security Act of 1947 and reinforced by the Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms, has been toward joint and combined operations.[9] The Navy itself has recognized this in its rhetoric, if not always in its budget decisions, by emphasizing "jointness" in everything from the network-centric vision of warfare to renewed efforts to qualify more naval officers for joint command through professional military education. Even coalition operations with allies and temporary friends remain a key part of American naval thought. Whether through formal alliances like NATO or informal coalitions of the willing, whether in the Indian Ocean as part of maritime operations in support of the Global War on Terror or in deep-strike missions against Serbia from the Adriatic, the U.S. Navy almost always sails with other navies.

The service, in short, will keep searching for a strategic vision that complements American grand strategy, the capabilities of the other military services, and the emerging national security environment—characterized today by terrorism, "small wars" and, on the horizon, the possibility that a peer or near-peer competitor will arise once again. The Navy will do so not just to protect the American homeland and key allies but to maintain control over the global commons, both a necessity for stable international commerce and an enabler for continued American primacy.

Notes

1. James J. Wirtz, "Will Globalization Sink the Navy?" in *Globalization and Maritime Power,* ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 2002).
2. George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), p. 441.
3. Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross, *Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial Implications of Network-centric Warfare*, Newport Paper 18 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), esp. pp. 39–40.
4. Michael E. Palmer, *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945–1955* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 87.
5. Ibid., p. 5. See also Huntington's original article: Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 80 (May 1954), pp. 483–93.

6. For an excellent overview of this "maritime strategy" see John Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986,* Newport Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004).
7. For a brief overview see Edward J. Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Persian Gulf," www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/sword-shield.htm/. A more extensive full treatment can be found in Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller, Jr., *Shield and Sword: The U.S. Navy and the Persian Gulf War* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001).
8. Owen R. Cote, Jr., "Buying '. . . From the Sea': A Defense Budget for a Maritime Strategy," in *Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century,* ed. Cindy Williams (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2001), p. 141.
9. On Defense Department organization issues see James R. Locher III, "Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act" *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 95–116; for a brief summary of the Navy's initial position on Goldwater-Nichols see Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power,* pp. 443–444.

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