

FROM NEW LOOK TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

Donald A. Carter



U.S. Army in the Cold War

From New Look to Flexible Response

The U.S. Army in National Security, 1953–1963

by

Donald A. Carter



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CONTENTS

FOREWORD	xiii
PREFACE.....	xv
INTRODUCTION	1
1 OUT OF KOREA AND INTO THE NEW LOOK	5
The Army in 1953	5
Eisenhower Takes Over	13
The Army Takes Stock.....	24
Korea: Sorting Through the Rubble.....	30
Morale and Recruitment	35
Personnel Strength and Reserve Issues	39
Year in Review	43
2 COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE NEW LOOK.....	45
Funding the New Look Army.....	46
Fighting the Battle for Public Relations	51
Building an Atomic Army.....	58
Exploring Other New Forms of Warfare.....	70
Reorganization	79
Personnel Issues	83
Peering Into the Future	88
The Year Ends	92
3 YEAR OF “STABILIZATION”	93
Changing of the Guard	93
Army Organization Continues to Evolve	101
Building an Atomic Army	106
Army Versus Air Force	116
Adapting to the New Look	122
The Reserve Forces Act of 1955	128
The Army and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program	133
Coming to Terms with the Legacy of Korea.....	139
Moving Toward Stability?	142

4	THE U.S. ARMY: PROUD OF ITS PAST, IN SEARCH OF A FUTURE?.....	143
	Ike's Challenge.....	144
	Army Versus Air Force	147
	Research and Development: Thinking Inside and Outside the Box	155
	Building an Atomic Army	163
	Making the Army Relevant Again.....	175
	The Army Gets a "Swagger Stick"	180
	Owning Vietnam	184
	The Army in 1956: True to its Motto	187
5	1957: THE YEAR OF THE MISSILE.....	189
	The New Look Enters a Second Term.....	190
	Implementing the Pentomic Army	196
	The Army Embraces the Missile Age	204
	Selling Limited War.....	210
	Forward Deployments	216
	Recruiting and Training Atomic Soldiers.....	222
	Coping With the Missile.....	228
6	EVOLUTION	231
	Reorganizing the Defense Department	231
	An Army in Transition.....	236
	Revising the Pentomic Structure	244
	Second Thoughts on Atomic War.....	248
	The Evolution of the Strategic Army Corps	253
	Missiles and More Missiles.....	258
	The Special Warfare Debate.....	265
	Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Southeast Asia.....	267
	Continuing the Search for an Identity	271
7	MOVING FORWARD	273
	Reshuffling the Deck	274
	Manpower for the Army of the Future	283
	Redefining Ground Combat and Limited Warfare	289
	Army Versus Air Force	296
	Managing the Bureaucracy.....	301
	A Ticking Bomb.....	304
	Saying Farewell to the New Look	308

8	TURNING THE PAGE	309
	Twilight of the New Look.....	309
	Building an Army for the 1960s	317
	Keeping Busy.....	322
	Project MAN.....	330
	Retention Issues: Keeping the Right People In.....	334
	The Lure and the Danger.....	337
	Sizing Up the New President	342
	Looking Forward.....	347
9	PLAYING A PART IN MCNAMARA'S BAND	349
	Introducing a New Team.....	350
	A Troubling War.....	358
	The Army Moves from Pentomic to ROAD	364
	Expansion and Response to the Berlin Crisis.....	368
	Maintaining Readiness	374
	Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the Army's Embrace of Sub-limited Warfare	382
	From Famine to Feast	387
10	EMBRACING A NEW FUTURE	389
	Presenting a New Army.....	390
	Reorganization.....	400
	Keeping an Eye on Europe	405
	Resetting the Force.....	410
	Army Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis	417
	Mainstreaming Counterinsurgency.....	423
	Drawing the Line in Vietnam	428
	Conclusion	431
11	ENTERING THE MORASS	433
	Moving the Army Forward.....	434
	A New Look for the Army.....	445
	Reflecting Social Change.....	451
	Deeper Into Vietnam	456
	Passing the Torch.....	461
	CONCLUSION.....	465
	FURTHER READINGS	471

ABBREVIATIONS.....	481
CHART ABBREVIATIONS	483
MAP SYMBOLS	485
INDEX.....	487
THE AUTHOR.....	521

CHARTS

1. Organization of the Department of the Army, 11 April 1950	16
2. Atomic Field Army Infantry Division, 30 September 1954.....	67
3. Atomic Field Army Armored Division, 30 September 1954.....	68
4. Secretary of the Army's (The Slezak) Plan, 14 June 1954.....	82
5. Airborne Division (ROTAD), 10 August 1956.....	166
6. Infantry Division (ROCID), 21 December 1956.....	169
7. Armored Division (ROCAD), 1956	171
8. Medium Division (MOMAR), 1960	291
9. Heavy Division (MOMAR), 1960	292
10. ROAD Division Base, 1961	365
11. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for Reorganization of Department of the Army Headquarters, October 1961	402
12. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for a Logistics Command, October 1961.....	403
13. Howze Board—Air Assault Division, 1963.....	442

MAPS

1. Line of Demarcation, 27 July 1953.....	6
2. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, United States, December 1953.....	10
3. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, Germany, December 1953.....	11
4. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, United States, December 1957.....	197
5. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, Germany, December 1957.....	198
6. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, South Korea, December 1957	200
7. Eastern Mediterranean Area, 1958	257
8. Southeast Asia, 1959	305

9. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, United States, December 1960.....	323
10. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, South Korea, December 1960.....	324
11. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, Germany, December 1960.....	325
12. Vietnam, 1960.....	341
13. Cuban Invasion Plan, 1962	419

ILLUSTRATIONS

1. General Clark signs the Korean armistice agreement	2
2. A former prisoner of war arrives at “Freedom Village”	8
3. Sergeant Archibald elevates a Nike Ajax missile to firing position.....	12
4. President Eisenhower visits troops in Korea	13
5. Secretary Wilson at a press conference, 16 June 1953	15
6. Admiral Radford is sworn in as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.....	17
7. Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens	19
8. Former and new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	21
9. General Matthew B. Ridgway	24
10. Members of the 39th Field Artillery Battalion calibrate and sight in a 280-mm. cannon.....	25
11. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.....	53
12. New summer uniforms.....	55
13. Boy Scouts visit a retired cavalry horse at Fort Riley, Kansas	57
14. Members of Company E, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, after a training mission.....	61
15. A 5-ton truck pulls a 155-mm. gun out of a C-124 aircraft during Exercise FLASHBURN	63
16. General John E. Dahlquist	64
17. Col. Aaron Bank, 31 March 1953.....	74
18. A 75-mm. Skysweeper radar-guided antiaircraft gun	77
19. A Corporal missile is elevated in firing position, 15 September 1961	78
20. Secretary Stevens congratulates General Taylor.....	97
21. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker.....	99
22. Sergeant Stover gives the signal to advance and attack.....	107
23. General Dahlquist questions a soldier participating in Exercise FOLLOW ME	108

24. A mannequin intentionally exposed to an atomic blast to demonstrate damage	112
25. Phil Silvers and Paul Ford on the set of what would become <i>Sergeant Bilko</i>	124
26. Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris	157
27. H-19 Chickasaw carrying an external load	159
28. Troops deploy from an H-34 helicopter in a battle exercise	161
29. The Army's "flying platform"	162
30. Harold Graham demonstrates a new twin-jet rocket-propulsion system	163
31. The new U.S. Army flag, 1956	178
32. Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams	185
33. General Nathan F. Twining	193
34. Hercules missiles in Homestead, Florida	206
35. A Nike Zeus launches successfully in New Mexico	207
36. A Hawk missile and launcher in Key West, Florida	208
37. Generals Eddleman, Boland, and Breckinridge	212
38. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke	233
39. Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin	237
40. General Gavin confers with General Hodes	239
41. Colonel Milligan is sworn in as the director of the Women's Army Corps	242
42. General Bruce C. Clarke	246
43. A 68th Armored tank guards a bridge near Wertheim, Germany	250
44. Explorer 1 nears launching time at the Florida Missile Test Range	262
45. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles	275
46. Thomas S. Gates Jr. is sworn in as secretary of defense	276
47. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer takes the oath of office	277
48. The Bell XH-40 Iroquois helicopter, later known as the "Huey"	299
49. An HU-1 helicopter firing an SS11 missile	300
50. A Chinook helicopter stops at Davidson Army Airfield en route to the Pentagon	301
51. General Decker with Secretary Brucker	312
52. Soldiers read magazines during a lull in Exercise LITTLE BEAR	328
53. The presidential party arrives at Fort Benning, Georgia	332

54. Director Dulles, Colonel Lansdale, General Twining, and General Cabell at the Pentagon	337
55. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in the inaugural parade.....	350
56. President Kennedy at the Army's combat-readiness demonstration.....	353
57. Secretary McNamara, General Freeman, and General Taylor	354
58. Secretary Stahr climbs into an Army helicopter	355
59. General Adams inspects an aircraft before Exercise DEEP FURROW	376
60. Testing the M60A1 tank.....	379
61. Maintenance personnel assemble a UH-1B helicopter	385
62. Generals Howze and Critz troop the line	396
63. An AC-1 Caribou plane taking off.....	398
64. Secretary of the Army Stahr and future Secretary of the Army Vance.....	399
65. General Earle G. Wheeler	400
66. Special forces soldiers learn to make booby traps	426
67. Special forces soldiers learn about insurgent assistance	427
68. Soldiers arrive in Frankfurt, Germany, for Operation BIG LIFT	438
69. Tanks and ammunition pre-positioned for Operation BIG LIFT	439
70. Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard	440
71. 101st Airborne Division paratroopers in Exercise SWIFT STRIKE III	444
72. Helicopters take off from Butts Army Airfield.....	445
73. Specialist White takes position with a new M16 rifle.....	448
74. A soldier prepares to fire a light antitank weapon during training.....	449
75. A soldier demonstrates the new 40-mm. grenade launcher.....	450
76. President Diêm arrives for the National Day parade	457
77. General York, Colonel Vann, and Captain Johnston during an inspection tour.....	459
78. Private Rehkamp of the 57th Helicopter Company.....	461
79. A special forces beret at the grave of President Kennedy	462

Cover images, top to bottom, left to right: Chinook helicopter at Davidson Field; Nike Ajax missile in firing position; Corporal missile in firing position; Skysweeper anti-aircraft weapon system (Stadtarchiv Kiel, Schleswig-Holstein, Germany); Hawk missile and launcher. (Unless otherwise noted, all images are from the U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch.)

FOREWORD

The decade after the Korean War was a relatively peaceful one for the United States despite the ongoing Cold War with the Soviet Union and its Communist allies. It was nevertheless a turbulent time for the U.S. Army as it dealt with innumerable challenges. It faced a burgeoning struggle for primacy with the Air Force and Navy, which seemed to fit better into President Eisenhower's New Look strategy and its focus on nuclear weapons. The personnel-intensive nature of ground warfare also put the Army in the crosshairs of the administration's efforts to rein in defense spending during a time of rapid and expensive technological change that took primacy in the budget. Army leaders sought to leverage their own research and development efforts to make their service a bigger player in the nuclear arena and to demonstrate their own forward-looking approach to future conflict. Many of those programs did not pan out because of the limits of scientific innovation or the weakness of the concepts themselves. As the largest and seemingly least glamorous of the military services, the Army had difficulty attracting enough quality personnel and continued to rely heavily on the draft. Although the service largely had completed racial integration, the Army's high proportion of major bases in southern states and its involvement in civilian desegregation struggles there kept it in the forefront of the ongoing national problem of racial discord.

Notwithstanding those troubles, the U.S. Army not only formed a credible deterrent force against a potential major conventional conflict in Europe with the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact, but it also made significant and enduring changes that prepared it better for the war it would fight in Vietnam. The service quickly and wisely cast aside the failed pentomic structure and replaced it with a much more flexible system that could adapt to a mix of capabilities and a wider array of missions. It developed better, more capable helicopters and, equally significant, acquired them in substantial numbers and created an innovative, workable air mobile doctrine and a divisional organization to execute such operations. While the Army, not surprisingly, took the lead in advising and assisting the fledgling army of South Vietnam, it also devoted considerable attention to the question of fighting a guerrilla war. Via doctrine, plans, formal schools, and training evolutions, it thus had more than a passing familiarity with that growing realm of conflict. Special forces, originally designed to carry the war behind enemy lines in Europe by working with partisans, looked increasingly at counterinsurgency as a

new and important mission and grew accordingly in size and significance. The Army also developed and fielded a wide array of basic weapons and equipment that would prove their worth in the jungles, mountains, and rice paddies of Southeast Asia, from the Claymore mine and the M79 grenade launcher to the M113 armored personnel carrier, the M60 tank, and a range of more powerful, more mobile artillery pieces.

From New Look to Flexible Response explains how the Army and its leaders maneuvered at the institutional level through this tumultuous period. It fills an important gap in official history, which frequently focuses on wars to the detriment of the often-critical periods of peace when military organizations must predict the nature of the next conflict and do their best to prepare for it. How well they accomplish those tasks does not necessarily determine victory or defeat, but it certainly contributes in large measure to the ultimate outcome. This important volume in the Center of Military History's U.S. Army in the Cold War series provides the context for all that the service did around the world in those early years of superpower rivalry, from the Fulda Gap in Germany to the Taiwan Strait in the far Pacific, the burgeoning battlegrounds in Southeast Asia, and the strategic backwater of Latin America. It provides soldiers and scholars with a ready resource for understanding how well the Army navigated these troubled waters.

Washington, D.C.
14 August 2023

JON T. HOFFMAN
Chief Historian

PREFACE

The end of World War II began a period of transition for the United States Army that would prove to be both expansive and turbulent. It began slowly. The force that entered Korea almost five years later still closely resembled the victorious commands from Europe and the Pacific. Beginning in 1953, however, spurred on by the strategic policies of the Eisenhower administration, the Army reexamined almost every aspect of its organization. As the nation accelerated its involvement into another conflict—this time in Southeast Asia—its Army bore scant resemblance to the one that had departed Korea ten years earlier.

This book examines, year by year, this remarkable reconstruction. Within a national security environment captivated by the power and potential of atomic weapons, the Army experimented with developments in its organization, weapons, equipment, and doctrine, as it struggled to define its place on an atomic battlefield. At the same time, the service's leaders slowly embraced concepts of limited warfare and counterinsurgency that seemed to offer new opportunities to expand the Army's relevance. New technologies, particularly the helicopter, also offered avenues for exploitation. As a result, the Army that emerged in the early 1960s was designed less for atomic combat and more for the flexible role that its chief of staff had championed.

This book chronicles the period of transition between the New Look and Flexible Response. For a thesis, it poses the question, "How did the Army that left Korea in 1953 become the force that began moving into Vietnam ten years later?" It addresses the key leaders and the decisions that they made to place the service on its new course. To some extent, it also illuminates how the war in Vietnam became an almost inevitable conflict.

As always, many individuals and organizations have helped to bring this book to publication. During the research phase, the archivists and librarians at the National Archives and the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center provided invaluable help in locating and making available the documents required. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Holly Reed at the National Archives Still Picture Branch. She was able to identify and provide numerous images that bring the Cold War Army to life.

My colleagues at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) also made innumerable contributions. The chief historian, Jon Hoffman; the former director of the Histories Directorate, Dave Hogan; and the chief of the General Histories Division, Shane Story, composed the editorial review

panel that oversaw this work from start to finish. Their advice and support throughout the process has been essential to the book's completion. My friend Mark Bradley took the time to review each chapter and to identify most of my more egregious grammatical errors. Special thanks go to Kendall Cosley, who spent days at the National Archives at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic gathering the photographs I needed for the book. In the library, James Tobias and Dennis Wilson met all of my requests for assistance quickly and with a smile.

The external review panel was chaired by Jon Hoffman and included the former director of the Joint History Office in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) John Shortal, John Bonin from the Army Heritage and Education Center, Chris DeRosa from Monmouth University, Adam Seipp from Texas A&M University, and Michael Doidge from the United States Vietnam War Commemoration. These gentlemen generously donated their time to review the manuscript and provided thoughtful and articulate feedback. This is a far better book for their efforts.

The Multimedia and Publications Division at CMH did its usual fine job in preparing the manuscript. Editor Margaret McGarry, assisted by Debbie Stultz, transformed my often meandering prose into a story well worth reading. Matt Boan created all of the maps, and Kristina Hernandez completed the final layout for publication. Throughout my career at CMH, I have been consistently amazed at the magic they perform on each manuscript that comes through their office.

This book is the product of the efforts, guidance, and advice of all those noted above. As always, I alone am responsible for whatever errors or inadequacies remain.

7 August 2023

DONALD A. CARTER

Note: Chapter 2 of this book is based, in part, upon my article "Eisenhower Versus the Generals," which appeared in the October 2007 issue of the *Journal of Military History* (vol. 71, no. 4).

INTRODUCTION

On 27 July 1953, representatives of the United Nations Command, the Korean *People's Army*, and the Chinese *People's Volunteer Army* met at Panmunjom, a small village situated along the demarcation line separating the military forces of the United Nations from those of North Korea and Communist China, to sign the armistice that would effectively end hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. For the U.S. Army, the agreement meant the end of a conflict that had lasted for a little more than three years and had cost nearly 35,000 battle dead. At the end of the Korean War, the U.S. Army was not too different from the force that had concluded World War II just eight years earlier. Its organization, equipment, and doctrine had undergone few changes, and most of its senior personnel were the same individuals who had fought in Europe and the Pacific during the previous war.

Following World War II, the Army entered a period of rapid demobilization, just as it had after every other major American conflict. By June 1950, as the Korean War began, the force of more than 8 million soldiers that had existed at the end of World War II had shrunk to fewer than 600,000 officers and enlisted personnel. Of the twenty-three corps and ninety divisions that had deployed during World War II, only one corps and ten regular army divisions remained on active duty: the 1st Infantry Division on occupation duty in Germany; the 1st Cavalry, 7th Infantry, 24th Infantry, and 25th Infantry Divisions in Japan; and the V Corps, 2d Infantry, 2d Armored, 3d Infantry, 11th Airborne, and 82d Airborne Divisions in the United States. All were understrength, and most had dispersed across a variety of installations. An additional six divisions in the United States existed as cadre only, serving as training center headquarters.¹

Nonetheless, the world was still a dangerous place. American political and military leaders recognized the potential threat of Soviet expansionism to Western Europe and had risen to the challenge. The National Security Act of 1947 provided for a unified command structure and created the National

1. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 232. The Allies split the occupation of Germany four ways, whereas the United States provided the occupation forces for all of Japan, which is slightly larger than Germany.



General Mark W. Clark signs the Korean armistice agreement, 27 July 1953. (U.S. Navy)

Military Establishment, which would eventually become the Department of Defense. The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, committed the United States to the defense of its European allies. The beginning of the war in Korea temporarily suspended the precipitous demobilization that had begun following World War II. Then, in September 1950, President Harry S. Truman approved substantial increases in the strength of U.S. forces in Europe. In November, the Army reactivated the Seventh Army in Germany and placed all remaining elements of the 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary under its command. Beginning in 1951, the United States deployed an additional two corps and four divisions to Germany to serve as part of Seventh Army's deterrent force.

Much of the rhetoric during the 1952 presidential campaign dealt with finding a way to bring the war in Korea to a close. Republicans blamed the Democrats for being unprepared for the conflict. In an October campaign speech, Republican candidate General of the Army (Ret.) Dwight D. Eisenhower famously announced that he would go to Korea to determine the best way to end the war. Aside from the conduct of the ongoing war, military policy did not play a major role in the campaign. Foreign policy and economic issues figured more prominently. A substantive discussion

of Eisenhower's views on defense policy would have to wait until after his election in November 1952.

When the Korean War ended, most of the senior officers within the Army were loath to reduce, once again, the standing force to a hollow shell. In the strategic environment of the Cold War, they believed that the nation could not afford unilateral disarmament. For them, the only real question was how large an Army would be necessary to achieve security and to accomplish the numerous missions they envisioned. Maintaining a large standing force was expensive, and troops required new weapons, equipment, and facilities on which to train and retain any level of combat proficiency. Army leaders understood that the post-World War II, post-Korean War Army would have to evolve to handle the new issues that the Cold War would present.

The most obvious challenge all of the military services would face in the coming decade would be the integration of new and emerging weapons and technology into their doctrine and force structure. Although the atomic bomb had helped to bring about the end of World War II, no one had employed it in Korea. Nonetheless, most military leaders expected such weapons to be a decisive component of modern warfare. German World War II rocket programs had sparked research and development in that area, too. Already by 1953, scientists in the United States and the Soviet Union were improving on the German V-1 and V-2 weapons. In Korea, U.S. military units were also beginning to exploit the capabilities of another new technology, the helicopter. As the war came to a close, the Army would have to address the need to develop and field these and other new weapons within the construct of the service's traditional roles and missions.

By 1953, the United States Air Force was barely five years old. Almost all of its officers had begun their careers as part of the U.S. Army Air Corps, and many of them still bore the animus of the long struggle to create an independent air force. In the years since 1947, Air Force officers had fought bitter battles against their Army and Navy counterparts to secure funding for advanced aircraft and to promote their vision of victory and security through airpower. Early agreements between Army Secretary Frank C. Pace Jr. and Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter, attempting to coordinate the roles and missions of each service, were proving to be unsatisfactory to all involved. Both services claimed primacy over many of the emerging technologies and demanded the lion's share of the research and development funding.

The end of the Korean War also prompted both the Army's civilian and military leadership to reassess many aspects of the service's personnel system. Although many Army National Guard and Army Reserve units had served

admirably in Korea, most had consisted primarily of veterans from World War II. The reserve system did not seem up to the task of preparing civilian-soldiers to become the backbone of national defense. With the concept of universal military training all but abandoned, the Army investigated new ways of organizing and training a general reserve. The service also faced challenges in filling the active force. Army recruiters struggled to compete with their counterparts in the other, more glamorous, services. They would have to find new ways to sell the Army, both as a service and as a mission, to an evolving American public. All the while, alone among the services, the Army would have to rely upon the draft to maintain its personnel strength.

By the end of 1953, the racial integration of the American military was well underway. The Army had disbanded almost all of its all-Black units. Nevertheless, service leaders at all levels struggled to provide equal opportunities for minority soldiers. Significant problems would remain for local commanders, particularly those serving at Army posts in the South, where civilian populations remained more hostile toward integration. The 1950s also would produce an increase in the number of women serving in the armed forces. The Women's Army Corps would come to play a more active role in the administration of the force, and female soldiers would question limitations placed upon the roles and positions that they could fill.

Perhaps the greatest challenge the Army would face after Korea would be determining the nature of future conflict and designing a force prepared to deal with it. Atomic weapons had obviously changed many aspects of modern warfare, and the Air Force had already seized upon its monopoly on atomic weapon delivery systems to proclaim preeminence in American defense posture. The Army would have to learn how to define itself as a force on the atomic battlefield. But might other contingencies appear as well? Not all potential battlefields seemed destined for a nuclear exchange. Even conflict in Western Europe, some believed, might be limited to conventional combat. Post-World War II insurgencies in Malaysia and Indochina alerted others to the prospect of more unconventional conflicts.

The ten-year period following the end of the Korean War would thus become a period of remarkable transformation for the United States Army. The many challenges the service faced as it emerged from the conflict would force its leaders to reexamine nearly all aspects of its organization, equipment, and doctrine. As a result, the force that found itself entering a deepening conflict in Vietnam in 1963 bore scant resemblance to the organization that had ended hostilities in Korea ten years earlier.


1

Out of Korea and Into the New Look

The U.S. Army began its ten-year transition in 1953 still deeply mired in the conflict in Korea. As a new administration under President Dwight D. Eisenhower moved into office, it began to exert its influence over U.S. defense policy almost immediately. Eisenhower held deep convictions about how he wanted to approach national security. Once elected, he moved into position an almost completely new slate of advisers, military and civilian, to bring about the changes he desired. As a result, as the Korean War ended, the Army soon found itself responding to challenges from many different directions as it began to withdraw and redeploy its forces.

THE ARMY IN 1953

By the time the new president took office in January 1953, the U.S. Army was well into its third year of combat in Korea. U.S. Army Forces, Far East, consisted of more than 200,000 soldiers serving in the Eighth Army in Korea and another 100,000 support troops stationed throughout Korea and Japan. By this time, the opposing forces had halted most offensive operations and had settled into parallel lines of outposts and trenches that ran the width of



Map 1

the peninsula. The Eighth Army line ran from Munsan-ni and the western coast to the northeast, passing across Bunker Hill, Little Gibraltar, and Old Baldy, outposts whose names had become famous in the newspapers and the newsreels. From the Ch'orwŏn Valley and the Iron Triangle in the center of the peninsula, the line ran further to the east before ending on the coast near the village of Kosong and the aptly named Anchor Hill. Major U.S. Army units in Korea included the I, IX, and X Corps; and the 2d, 3d, 7th, 25th, 40th, and 45th Infantry Divisions. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division had rotated to Japan late in 1951 and remained there under the XVI Corps on occupation duty and, later, as the theater reserve (*Map 1*).¹

The Army had fought the Korean War very much as it had World War II. Little had changed during the short interval between the two

1. Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), 370–76; Brochure, G–3, Dept. of the Army, 12 Oct 1953, sub: How the Army Uses its Manpower, File Unit: Entry A1

conflicts. Although the nature of the terrain, climate, and enemy dictated some changes in tactics and unit composition, the organization, equipment, and doctrine remained much as they had been in 1945. By the third year of the war, the stalemate resembled—as much as anything else—the Western Front in Europe during World War I.

Negotiations to bring the war to a close began in mid-1951 but foundered for months as the combatants jockeyed for position. By the end of the year, however, they had agreed upon the existing line of contact as a basis for an armistice, and they moved on to discuss other issues. Ultimately, the repatriation of prisoners of war became a point of contention that bedeviled negotiators for months. The United States supported the principle of voluntary repatriation whereby prisoners could decide for themselves whether or not they wanted to be returned to their native countries. This had been the U.S. practice in postwar Europe. The Communists, however, vigorously demanded a policy of mandatory repatriation, a position that delegates had incorporated into the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and then strengthened in the 1949 conventions. After another extended period of squabbling, both sides agreed to an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, culminating in Operation LITTLE SWITCH in April 1953. More negotiations ensued, and, on 27 July, envoys from the United States (representing the United Nations Command), North Korea, and China signed an armistice that brought to an end the active hostilities on the Korean peninsula.²

At the same time as it had been fighting in Korea, the Army had been engaged in a major reinforcement of its forces in Europe. After reactivating the Seventh Army in Europe in December 1950, the Army had sent two corps headquarters, one armored division, and three infantry divisions to Germany to augment forces already reconsolidating from occupation duties. By 1953, the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), numbered more than 250,000 soldiers. In addition to the combat forces of the Seventh Army, USAREUR had begun construction of a massive infrastructure, known as a support base, across France and western Germany. This command, dubbed the USAREUR Communications Zone, provided the logistical support for

137C, Series: Security Classified Correspondence, 1953 (hereinafter SCC 1953), Subgroup: Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations (hereinafter G-3 Ops), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

2. It is not my purpose to retell the story of the Korean War or the negotiations leading to the armistice. There are numerous, well-written, commercial histories on the war. The previously cited volume, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, is as good as any in describing the end of the war.



The G-3 Section, Eighth Army, welcomes a former prisoner of war (POW) at "Freedom Village" in Munsan-ni, Korea. The initial POW exchange program was known as Operation LITTLE SWITCH. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

almost all of the western forces in Europe as part of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.³

Although the Army had deployed the vast majority of its overseas forces to Europe and Korea, smaller units carried out missions in dozens of other locations. Regimental combat teams and supporting elements served in U.S. Army, Pacific; U.S. Army, Alaska; and U.S. Army, Caribbean. The service staffed military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) and military missions in thirty-six countries, providing training to allied military forces and assisting with the disbursement of U.S. military aid and equipment under the provisions of the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Mobile training teams and technical advisers also provided assistance to allied nations learning to use American weapons and equipment. Army service

3. Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015).


schools in the United States hosted more than 2,600 foreign students from forty-six nations.⁴

In 1953, U.S. Army forces in the continental United States, collectively referred to as the General Reserve and serving at the direction of the chief of Army Field Forces, existed almost exclusively to train and prepare soldiers for service in Europe and Korea. Six continental U.S. Army headquarters, from the First through the Sixth Armies, supervised eleven division headquarters that ran basic training centers, which, along with several technical service centers, provided cadres of new recruits for the active divisions. At the end of the year, these training divisions included the 3d, 5th, and 6th Armored Divisions; the 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Infantry Divisions; and the 31st, 37th, 44th, and 47th Infantry Divisions (National Guard), which had been brought into federal service for the Korean War. Each division received new recruits at regular intervals and incorporated them into unit training. As soon as these divisions began to reach minimum levels of training effectiveness, soldiers moved on to Europe and Korea as part of replacement packages. In the continental United States, only three divisions—the 11th and 82d Airborne Divisions and the newly reactivated 1st Armored Division—retained any responsibility for combat readiness. Of those, only the 82d received a passing grade for operational readiness in spring evaluations. Evaluators deemed the others ineffective owing to a lack of trained personnel.⁵ (*See Maps 2 and 3.*)

The first Soviet atomic test in 1949 and the recognition that its long-range bombers could reach the United States prompted the Army to reactivate many of its World War II-era antiaircraft and coast artillery units. In June 1950, the service established the last major component of the General Reserve, the U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Command. Antiaircraft battalions defended twenty-six urban areas and military installations with a mix of 40-mm., 90-mm., and 120-mm. guns. Throughout 1953, many battalions transitioned to new 75-mm. Skysweeper radar-controlled guns. The Army

4. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1953* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 Dec 1953), 144–48; Brochure, G–3, Dept. of the Army, 12 Oct 1953, sub: How the Army Uses its Manpower.

5. Memo, Lt. Col. Ziegler, Ops Div, G–3, for Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 7 Mar 1953, sub: Operational Readiness of Major Units in the U.S.; Memo, Col. J. L. Wilken Jr., Asst Executive Ofcr, G–3, for Lt. Col. D. R. Pierce, Ofc Sec Gen Staff, 20 Jul 1953, sub: Major Army Units Located Within the Continental United States; both in File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Jean R. Moenk, *A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental United States, 1919–1971* (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1972); John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 242–47.



Map 2



Map 3

also had begun site surveys throughout the nation for the installation of new Nike guided-missile battalions, which it expected to deploy in the near future.⁶

The Army's Reserve and National Guard organizations reflected a force that had been at war for three years. The Army had activated eight national guard divisions for service during the Korean conflict. Two, the 28th and

6. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jan–30 Jun 1953, 140–41.



Sgt. Gene L. Archibald, Battery D, 1st Missile Battalion (Ajax), 202d Artillery, elevates a Nike Ajax missile to firing position. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

43d Infantry Divisions, had deployed to Europe for service in the newly activated Seventh Army. The 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions had deployed to Korea and were actively engaged in combat. The remaining four—the 31st, 37th, 44th, and 47th Infantry Divisions—had stayed in the United States, where they served as training divisions preparing replacements for overseas service. Because of the tremendous demand for replacements as the war dragged on, the Army Reserve struggled to maintain anything close to full unit strength. By the end of the war, it seemed clear to many Army leaders that the existing reserve structure was not capable of fulfilling the service's personnel needs in the event of a full mobilization.⁷

In summary, by mid-1953, a total of 1,533,815 Army troops were dispersed widely around the globe with a multitude of missions and responsibilities.⁸ Three years of war had strained the service's resources to the breaking point, and the support base struggled to provide a steady stream of reinforcements. Leftover stocks of World War II ammunition and equipment had long since

7. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 244–55.

8. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 99.



President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower walks across a snow-covered footbridge in Korea, December 1952. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

been exhausted. Although most of the Army's soldiers possessed a wealth of combat experience from World War II and the Korean War, many observers questioned whether that experience would be relevant in the new atomic age. The remainder of the year found the service taking stock of its condition and preparing to move forward under the strategic policies and constraints of a new presidential administration.

EISENHOWER TAKES OVER

As he had promised during the 1952 presidential campaign, Dwight D. Eisenhower traveled to Korea shortly after the election to assess, for himself, the military situation there. What he observed confirmed his belief, developed in Europe during World War II, that conventional warfare was becoming obsolete. In his mind, the prolonged stalemate in Korea demonstrated the futility of trying to match foreign armies on a one-for-one basis. More than anything else, the conflict convinced him that such "small wars" wasted

personnel and placed an unacceptable burden on the economic resources of the nation.⁹

The new president came into office convinced that a strong economy was the true source of national security. He believed that the Soviet Union and its satellites could never defeat the United States as long as the latter retained its superiority in productive capacity. Eisenhower disparaged the idea that military planners could identify a fixed time of crisis, that is, that they could accurately predict when the next war might start or when the United States might need to employ its military strength. He encouraged planners to design a security policy and a military force that the nation could support over the long haul. The policy would need to include enough military strength to provide adequate security, but not so much as to damage the growth and stability of the economy. With these goals in mind, the president viewed a balanced budget as a necessary component to a sound security policy. To that end, he appointed George M. Humphrey as his secretary of the treasury and Joseph M. Dodge as his budget director. At Eisenhower's direction, both men became regular participants in meetings of the National Security Council and urged steady reductions in both the amount of money allocated to the defense budget and the authorized personnel strength of the armed forces.¹⁰

The president believed that he could reduce military spending, at least in part, by eliminating the waste and duplication that seemed endemic throughout the Pentagon. Considering the Department of Defense the equivalent of a big corporation, he recruited the head of General Motors, Charles E. Wilson, to be his secretary of defense. Eisenhower instructed Wilson to tighten controls over the department's procurement, storage, transportation, distribution, and other administrative functions. The new

9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 454; Donald A. Carter, "Eisenhower Versus the Generals," *Journal of Military History* 71, no. 4 (Oct 2007): 1169–99.

10. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Charles E. Wilson, 5 Jan 1955, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Louis Galambos, 21 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–1996), vol. 16, 1488–91; Memo of Discussion at the 160th Meeting of the National Security Council, 27 Aug 1953, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954* (hereinafter cited as *FRUS 1952–1954*), vol. 2, pt. 1, *National Security Affairs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 443–57; Memo of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 Oct 1953, in *FRUS 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 534–49.



Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson at a press conference, 16 June 1953 (*Department of Defense, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)


secretary enthusiastically pursued the president's goals of reducing waste and duplication and reining in Defense Department spending.¹¹

From the beginning of his presidency, Eisenhower and his administration had expressed their ideas regarding national defense as part of their commitment to a complete reexamination of American security policy. The president and his supporters had frequently referred to this process as a "new look." Inevitably, media reports of their pronouncements began to use the phrase as a collective description of Eisenhower's approach to national security. Ironically, the president himself claimed not to care much for the phrase. In a news conference in March 1954, he told reporters that the New Look (as it had become known) was simply an attempt to keep abreast of the times. He said that the organization and type of military that he took across the channel in 1944 would have little usefulness in an era in which two atomic bombs could destroy the entire force. If reporters wanted to call the policy a New Look, that was fine with him, but, he said, "I don't like this expression because it doesn't mean much to me."¹² Nevertheless, it served

11. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 86; E. Bruce Geelhoed, *Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1979).

12. Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National*

Chart 1—Organization of the Department of the Army, 11 April 1950



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Source: James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 207.



Admiral Arthur W. Radford (*left*) is sworn in as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (*right*), while Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson looks on. (*Department of Defense, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

as a convenient shorthand for Eisenhower's sense that a new age of warfare could not be fought with old ideas and practices (*Chart 1*).

On 11 February 1953, shortly after taking office, Secretary Wilson appointed a committee to study Department of Defense reorganization. The committee, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, made several recommendations that Congress approved on 30 June 1953 as Reorganization Plan No. 6. The act abolished several research and logistics agencies and transferred their functions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from three to nine and granted to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority to manage the Joint Staff and approve the selection of its members. The effect of the legislation and the studies leading up to it was an increase in the authority of the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs over the individual services. In a message to Congress on 30 April 1953, President Eisenhower confirmed the authority of the secretary by firmly stating that "no function in any part

Policy, 1953–1954, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 369; News Conf, 17 Mar 1954, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 330.

of the Department of Defense, or in any of its component agencies, should be performed independent of the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.”¹³

In May, the president and Secretary Wilson selected Navy Admiral Arthur W. Radford to replace Army General Omar N. Bradley as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Radford had commanded a carrier division during World War II and had served most recently as the commander in chief of U.S. Pacific Command. An advocate for naval aviation, he had been a key figure in the “Revolt of the Admirals” that had opposed defense unification in the late 1940s. Radford perceived Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson’s abrupt cancellation of the construction of the Navy’s supercarrier, USS *United States*, in 1949, to be a direct threat to the future of naval aviation and he played an active role in the congressional hearings that followed. Despite his partisan record, the naval officer had impressed Eisenhower and Wilson during their tour of Korea in December 1952. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he became the principal military adviser to both the president and the secretary of defense and attended all meetings of the National Security Council. Whereas the service secretaries had an open invitation to attend any meeting of the council, service chiefs only sat in on matters directly related to their services and usually only by specific invitation. Before Radford’s confirmation as chairman, the president asked him to acknowledge publicly before Congress that his new position divorced him from exclusive identification with the U.S. Navy and that he now would become a champion for all services, governed by what was best for the nation as a whole.¹⁴

As if to reinforce the concept of a New Look for the nation’s defense, Eisenhower and Wilson replaced three of the four sitting Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Matthew B. Ridgway took over as Army chief of staff from General J. Lawton Collins as part of the normal rotation of that position. After a distinguished combat record in World War II and Korea, Ridgway

13. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, in *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978*, eds. Alice C. Cole et al. (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 1978), 151–57; Memo, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Ch Staff, for Sec Def, 10 Jul 1953, sub: President’s Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

14. Hanson W. Baldwin, “Radford’s Strategy Views,” *New York Times*, 4 Jun 1953; Stephen J. Jurika Jr., ed., *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1980), 174–95; Rpt, [Robert] Cutler, Special Asst to the President for National Security Affairs, 16 Mar 1953, in *FRUS 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 246–57; Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Arthur R. Radford, 18 May 1953, in Galambos, *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, vol. 14, 234–36.



Robert T. Stevens, the secretary of the Army during the Eisenhower administration, 1953–1955. Oil on canvas by Thomas Edgar Stephens, ca. 1955. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

had served most recently as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. General Alfred M. Gruenther, one of Eisenhower's closest friends and his frequent bridge partner, replaced Ridgway in Europe. Air Force General Nathan F. Twining replaced General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who retired because of declining health. Twining had been serving as vice chief of staff of the Air Force since 1950. Admiral Robert B. Carney followed Admiral William M. Fechteler as the chief of naval operations, even though Fechteler had served less than two years of what had been expected to be a four-year tour. Perhaps because he had served in the position for little more than one year and sat with the Joint Chiefs only when they considered matters of interest to the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. remained in his position. Eisenhower explained the wholesale

shift in military leadership by saying that Secretary Wilson deserved an “entirely new team” with which to begin his tenure.¹⁵

The changes in the administration also brought with them changes in the senior leadership of the Army. Robert T. Stevens had replaced Frank C. Pace Jr. as the secretary of the Army on 4 February 1953. Like Secretary Wilson, Stevens had built a solid reputation as an industrial leader. A veteran of World War I and World War II, he had served since 1929 as president of J. P. Stevens Company, a well-respected textiles firm. He also had served as the chair of the Business Advisory Council of the U.S. Department of Commerce from 1951 to 1952. Soon after his own appointment, the new Army chief of staff, General Ridgway, recalled General Charles L. Bolte from his position as Commanding General, USAREUR, to be the new vice chief of staff. Bolte, a veteran of both world wars, had established an admirable combat record as the commander of the 34th Infantry Division in Italy. The most significant holdover on the Army Staff was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman. Before becoming the G-3, Eddleman had served as General Walter Krueger’s assistant chief of staff with the Sixth Army during World War II in the Pacific and as the Army’s chief of Plans Division.¹⁶

Before they assumed their duties, the president sent the new chiefs on a tour of U.S. military installations. He asked them to submit an analysis reflecting “a fresh view as to the best balance and most effective use of our armed forces.”¹⁷ Through this exercise, the president hoped to instill in his new military advisers a sense of duty to the nation as a whole that would take precedence over personal allegiance to their services. He repeatedly exhorted them to be ruthless in eradicating duplication and unneeded programs from their annual budget proposals. In their initial report to the president concerning the nation’s military posture, the chiefs had recommended no sweeping changes. They concluded that the balanced forces, as they existed, were adequate to ensure the nation’s defense.¹⁸ The president rejected those conclusions almost immediately and sent the chiefs

15. Anthony Leviero, “Radford is Named Joint Chiefs’ Head; Ridgway for Army,” *New York Times*, 13 May 1953; Hanson W. Baldwin, “New Team at Pentagon to Review U. S. Strategy,” *New York Times*, 17 May 1953; Harold B. Hinton, “Senate Unit Backs New Joint Chiefs,” *New York Times*, 29 May 1953.

16. In describing the composition and nomenclature of the Army Staff positions, the G represented the General Staff, with the numbers 1 through 4 corresponding to personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics, respectively.

17. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Charles E. Wilson, 1 Jul 1953, in Galambos, *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, vol. 14, 355.

18. *New York Times*, 9 Oct 1953.



Former and new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Left to right:* General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, General Nathan F. Twining, Admiral William M. Fechteler, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, General J. Lawton Collins, and Admiral Robert B. Carney (*Defense Department, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

back to work, accusing them of being overly parochial. He reminded them at almost every opportunity that their primary responsibilities were to the secretary of defense and himself. They had to put this corporate sense ahead of their natural inclination to support their individual services.¹⁹ Spurred on by Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, Eisenhower told the assembled National Security Council, "What I'd like to see is a complete and thorough reexamination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of this whole problem, in which they would really take a corporate view and see how far we could get."²⁰ Generally, when the president spoke of getting the chiefs to take a corporate

19. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edward Everett Hazlett Jr., 20 Aug 1956, in Galambos, *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, vol. 17, 2255; "Military Is Told to End Rivalries," *New York Times*, 3 Feb 1953.

20. Memo of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 Oct 1953.

approach, what he really meant was for them to follow his instructions and cut defense expenditures.

With his new national security team in place, President Eisenhower set out to restructure the nation's armed forces in accordance with his own priorities. He intended to emphasize strategic atomic forces at the expense of conventional ground troops. "Our first objective must . . . be," he stated in a letter to Secretary Wilson, "to maintain the capability to deter an enemy from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes by a combination of effective retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing effectiveness."²¹ At the start of his administration, that retaliatory strength meant the long-range bombers of the Strategic Air Command. Only they had the capability to reach targets deep within the Soviet Union. The Navy fought a rear-guard action to preserve its status, arguing that carrier-based aircraft offered a more flexible means of delivering atomic weapons to most strategic targets. As the administration progressed, all three services competed to develop long-range and intermediate-range missiles that could deliver the appropriate nuclear response. In the environment that developed, with purse strings tightening, the administration had few funds available to support the Army's conventional land forces once it had paid all the bills for strategic weaponry.

Throughout these early discussions, Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway struggled to get his service's position recognized within the framework of the New Look. During a thirty-six-year career, Ridgway had forged an impressive reputation as a forceful combat leader and an uncompromising advocate for the foot soldier. His tours in Korea and his most recent assignment as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe had provided him with a well-rounded appreciation for the nation's security requirements around the world. In that light, he disagreed completely with one of the central premises of the president's vision—that atomic weapons had made ground forces obsolete. On the contrary, he believed that atomic warfare, with its increased casualties and greatly expanded battlefield, would increase ground force requirements.²² He saw no justification for the cuts the president and Secretary Wilson wanted to make within the Army because none of the Army's commitments had been reduced accordingly.²³

As a professional soldier, Ridgway was also uncomfortable with the introduction of economic considerations into a discussion of military

21. Ltr, Eisenhower to Wilson, 5 Jan 1955, 1488–91.

22. Interv, Maurice Matloff with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 19 Apr 1984, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI); Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 33–34.

23. Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Pamphlet 21–70, *The Role of the Army* (Washington, DC:

security. He held to the more traditional view that the chiefs should make recommendations for force structure based upon their assessment of the military situation. Economic factors, he believed, should be left to the consideration of the civilian leaders, who would have much more expertise in that area.²⁴ In a message to the Army Staff upon his taking over as chief of staff, Ridgway wrote that it was not the responsibility of a “military man” to decide whether the nation could afford the military means they felt it required. Rather, he said, “his over-riding responsibility is to give his honest, objective, professional military advice to those civilians who, by our Constitution, are his Commanders.”²⁵ His remarks echoed those of the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, who, less than a month earlier, had noted that the role of the Joint Chiefs was to advise the president and the secretary of defense on the nation’s military capabilities based upon the resources at hand. Economic and political factors, he concluded, “should not be the basis of our military recommendations.”²⁶

Nonetheless, with the Korean War over, Secretary Wilson concluded that he could make substantial reductions in both the defense budget and in overall military personnel strength. After minor reductions in February, the administration initiated discussions for more drastic cuts by the end of the year. The budget for fiscal year 1955, for the period beginning 1 July 1954, would be the first post-Korea budget to be negotiated between the services and the Eisenhower administration.

On 23 October, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel John A. Hannah met with representatives of the three services to issue planning guidance for the upcoming budget negotiations. He told all services to plan for a 10 percent reduction in military strength, at the least, for fiscal year 1955. For the Army, this meant a decrease to 1.281 million personnel, far less than the 1.5 million that Army Secretary Robert Stevens had requested a week earlier as the minimum necessary to accomplish all assigned missions. Additional discussions and negotiations further reduced the Army end-strength for fiscal year 1955 to 1.162 million people.

Department of the Army, 29 Jun 1955).

24. Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1956), 269–73; Ltr, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 11 May 1955, Box 78, Ridgway Papers, MHI; Memo, [Unnamed] for Sec Army, 21 Jun 1955, Box 78, Ridgway Papers, MHI.

25. Memo, Col. F. W. Moorman, Asst Sec Gen Staff, for Army Staff, 27 Aug 1953, sub: Remarks by the Chief of Staff to the Army Staff, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

26. Omar N. Bradley (remarks, Quantico, VA, 24 July 1953), Box 16, Ridgway Papers, MHI.



General Matthew B. Ridgway
(U.S. Army)

Accordingly, Ridgway proposed reductions in the number of Army divisions from twenty to seventeen. Although the general pointed out that the Army would lose some combat force strength and materiel readiness, he did not formally protest the final budget. In his memoirs, Ridgway wrote that the implications that dawned on him were stark: "This military budget was not based so much on military requirements, or on what the economy of the country could stand, as on political considerations."²⁷

THE ARMY TAKES STOCK

The manner in which the president and Secretary Wilson had pushed through Congress the reductions in the defense budget and military personnel rankled the Army chief of staff and eliminated any chance of rapport developing between the Army and the Department of Defense. When, in January 1954, the president asserted in his State of the Union message that the Joint Chiefs had unanimously endorsed his New Look military strategy, Ridgway felt betrayed. Likewise, the relationship between the general and Secretary Wilson continued to deteriorate. Ridgway later reflected in his memoir that Wilson had come into office with a preconceived dislike for the Army. Other officers on the Army Staff also described their perception that the defense secretary was "out to get" the Army chief of staff.²⁸ Wilson would peremptorily dismiss Ridgway's opinions, saying, "Well, Eisenhower is the

27. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 61–69; MFR, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Asst Ch Staff, G–1, 23 Oct 1953, sub: Personnel Planning for 1955; Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Sec Def, 14 Oct 1953, sub: Justification of Army Strength; Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Sec Army, 9 Dec 1953, sub: Military Strategy and Posture; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified Correspondence, 1948–1954 (hereinafter SCC 1948–1954), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), RG 319, NACP. Quote is from Ridgway, *Soldier*, 272.

28. Interv, Col. John J. Ridgway and Lt. Col. Paul B. Walter with Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, 9 Mar 1976, 66, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.



After setting up the 280-mm. cannon in firing position, members of the 39th Field Artillery Battalion calibrate and sight in the weapon, Grafenwoehr Training Area, 28 September 1958. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

premier military man. What do you give me these views for? He knows far more about it than you do.”²⁹ Wilson also questioned the Army’s efforts to refurbish its obsolescent conventional weapons and equipment, telling them that they should focus their efforts on more modern purchases. Ridgway would also get little support from Admiral Radford who, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had thoroughly embraced almost all aspects of the New Look.

The Army had already begun research and development that would help bring its arsenal into the atomic age. The service had tested the 280-mm. cannon in May, firing the first artillery-launched atomic projectile. It was also well along in the development of the Honest John, a surface-to-surface nuclear-capable rocket with a range of about 15 miles, and the Corporal, a guided missile with a range of about 75 miles. The former entered service late in 1953 and the latter early in 1954. The first Nike Ajax anti-aircraft missile batteries also deployed in December 1953. Helicopters already had proven

29. Ridgway, *Soldier*, 288; Interv, Col. John M. McNair with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 24 Mar 1972, 31; Interv, Ridgway and Walter with Hamlett, 9 Mar 1976, 66; Interv, Arthur J. Zobelein with Gen. Charles L. Bolte, 1 Feb 1972, 54; all in Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.

useful in several roles in Korea. Units throughout the Army, particularly those in Europe, experimented with new ways to employ them.³⁰

Despite this progress, service leaders recognized that the Army had to do more to demonstrate that it belonged on the atomic battlefield if it was to retain a significant role in the nation's defense policy. Project VISTA, a Defense Department-sponsored study on potential warfare in Europe, had recommended the establishment of a combat developments group within the Army to consider new weapons and tactics, with an emphasis on the potential use of atomic weapons. In response, the Army established a committee under the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces to study how best to utilize the potential of new weapons under development and to determine what changes in organization and doctrine the force required. Specific projects included doctrine for the employment of atomic weapons, tables of organization and equipment for atomic units, tactical testing of the 280-mm. cannon, and special forces' employment of atomic demolition munitions.³¹ The Army's chief of information, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, went so far as to urge that the service rename its installation at Fort Bliss, Texas, the Army Atomic Weapons Center. He described this as a "bit of semantics" to inform the public that the Army was looking ahead and thinking ahead.³² He argued that the "well fostered impression in the public's mind of the Navy's and Air Force's lead in guided missiles and atomic weapons is either consciously or unconsciously reflected in Congress with regard to supporting our programs."³³ Surely, he believed, the Army could capitalize on a more forward-looking image.

This effort to portray the Army as a player on the atomic stage did not escape the attention of some members of the news media. On 16 May, columnist Drew Pearson wrote in the *Washington Post* that "some atomic experts" believed that the only reason for atomic artillery was so the Army could get in on the atomic act.³⁴ Although the article was long on hyperbole

30. Elliott V. Converse III, *Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960*, vol. 1, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2012), 596–98.

31. Memo, Brig. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Asst for Planning Coordination, for Col. [F. W.] Moorman, 16 Dec 1953, sub: OCAFF Combat Development Group Activities, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

32. Memo, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 21 Jan 1953, sub: Army Atomic Weapons Center, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

33. Memo, Parks for Ch Staff, 21 Jan 1953, sub: Army Atomic Weapons Center.

34. Memo, [Unnamed] for Lt. Col. Baker, G–3 Plans Div, 26 May 1953, sub: The Washington Merry-Go-Round, May 16, 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

and short on facts, it did raise a valid point and caught the Army's attention. The Army would have to fight its battle to retain relevance in the New Look in the various news media just as much as in the hallways of the Capitol Building and the Pentagon.

Public relations were not a new concern for the Army in 1953, but with the competition for a share of a decreasing defense budget growing more intense, public affairs and the Office of the Chief of Information became even more critical interests for the Army Staff. The Army television series, *The Big Picture*, debuting in 1951, became one of the service's most effective tools for placing its message before the American public. Its goal, one reviewer noted, was to "emphasize change, and show how the contemporary Army's embrace of technology constituted a break with the past and that this was not your father's or grandfather's Army."³⁵ Motion pictures also offered a venue to popularize the Army with its public. The Office of the Chief of Information sponsored documentaries and cooperated with the makers of more commercial films to ensure that they presented the service in the most favorable light.³⁶

Although publicity before the general public was important, presenting a positive message to members of Congress was critical. Members of the Army Staff took great pains to cultivate good relationships with congressional representatives and senators alike. Early in 1953, Chief of Legislative Liaison Maj. Gen. Miles Reber forwarded to the chief of staff a loose-leaf book containing the military biographies of members of Congress. The book was labeled "Confidential," and Reber advised the staff that some members were inclined to be a bit sensitive about their service records. Later, Reber sent recommendations to the chief of staff for a series of briefings for members of Congress. "Our objective," he said, "must be to please, to entertain, and to inform."³⁷ He suggested combined intelligence and operations briefings

35. Jeffrey Crean, "Something to Compete with 'Gunsmoke': 'The Big Picture' Television Series and Selling a 'Modern, Progressive and Forward Thinking' Army to Cold War America," *War and Society* 35, no. 3 (Aug 2016): 204–18.

36. Memo, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, for the Under Sec of the Army, 27 Nov 1953, sub: Showing of Film, "This is the Army"; MFR, Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, Acting Ch Info, 3 Nov 1953, sub: Exploitation of Motion Picture "Cease Fire"; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. See also Lawrence H. Suid, *Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002).

37. Memo, Maj. Gen. Miles Reber, Ch Legislative Liaison, for Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Ch Staff, 2 Jan 1953, sub: Military Biographies of Members of Congress; Memo, John G. Adams, Dept. Counselor, for Sec Army, 19 Nov 1953, sub: Program for Congressional Briefings; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1948–1954 (hereinafter SCGC 1948–1954), Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

with colorful maps and charts to convey the Army's message. He warned that lengthy personnel and logistics discussions of force strength revisions, troop rotations, and maintenance costs would force staff officers to awaken their audience before transporting them back to the Hill.³⁸

The Army Staff also now took the time to examine some of the post-World War II studies that had evaluated staff organization and performance during that conflict. Those critiques rejected the traditional notion that the staff should limit its considerations to broad policy and planning. They also viewed with distaste the establishment of an Operations Division-type war headquarters such as that which General George C. Marshall Jr. had employed throughout World War II. Rather, one analysis observed, the Department of the Army and the Army Staff must be so organized as to provide a smooth and seamless transition to a wartime footing without reorganization or disruption of its existing agencies. In September, Secretary Stevens appointed the Advisory Committee on Army Organization, chaired by Paul L. Davies, vice president of the Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation and a director of the American Ordnance Association. Stevens instructed the Davies Committee, as it became known, to examine the Army's top management in light of President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6. Stevens also asked for recommendations for coordinating the technical services, proper locations for the department's legal and legislative liaison functions, changes required for the Army's research and development program, and the organization and function of the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces.³⁹

The Davies Committee launched a reorganization process that would play out over the next ten years. The analysis of Army Staff operations in World War II and Korea identified numerous flaws in the organization that would have to evolve as the service prepared for its future. The post-World War II abolition of the Army Service Forces had left the technical services without a workable organizational structure. Both the Davies Committee and the Operations Division recommended the formation of some type of logistics command to coordinate support. That transition, however, would be a lengthy process. The structure of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, had

38. Memo, Reber for Collins, 2 Jan 1953, sub: Military Biographies; Memo, Adams for Sec Army, 19 Nov 1953, sub: Program for Congressional Briefings.

39. Memo, Col. John G. Hill, Asst Ch Organization and Training Div, for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 26 Aug 1953, sub: Reorganization of the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: Decimal Files 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 223-24; Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 16.

also outlived its usefulness. The committee recommended the creation of a continental Army command to oversee combat forces in the United States, as well as a training command to supervise the various training centers. Those transitions would also take some time to come to fruition. Finally, the various studies also identified new functions that should be represented at the department level. Civil affairs, psychological warfare, and research and development all required focused and independent representation on the Army Staff. None of this would be resolved in 1953, but by the end of the year, General Ridgway and his senior advisers recognized that they needed to address these and other issues.⁴⁰

The end of the war in Korea also initiated a period of reflection and reappraisal for the Army. The brief interlude between the end of World War II and the beginning of the conflict in Korea had not allowed for any serious reconsideration of the service's role in the nation's military policy. The Army had barely completed its postwar demobilization before it began combat operations in Korea. Now, with an armistice in Korea, would the inevitable drawdown and public demand to bring the soldiers home once again emasculate the force? Facing an administration whose military policies were not exactly hospitable to the Army's interests, General Ridgway, Secretary Stevens, and other leaders grappled with how to keep the force relevant in the emerging nuclear age. Although it was clear that the Army should not return to the minimally staffed organization and structure of the pre-World War II force, military and civilian leaders reached no consensus on what the size of the Army should be nor on what its proper role might be in facing the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Army began the serious task of preparing for the future.

In a long-range strategic estimate released in May 1953, the Army's planning and operations staff noted that "the conflict of interests between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World is now and must for at least the next decade be considered as a global conflict."⁴¹ Communist China had also demonstrated its ability to threaten the stability of its neighbors in the Far East. Facing those two major threats and protecting the free world from the

40. Memo, Brig. Gen. J. A. Elmore, Ch Ops Div, for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 27 Aug 1953, sub: Army Organization for War, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: Decimal Files 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 224-27.

41. Strategic Estimate, Dep Ch Staff for Plans and Research, 27 May 1953, "Army Long Range Strategic Estimate, FY 1959 to 1963, Inclusive," File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: Decimal Files 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

threat of Communist expansionist policies defined the Army's perception of its role in American security policy.⁴²

In describing the Army's long-range strategy and objectives, the paper forecast policies and initiatives that would shape the Cold War Army. It identified deterring armed conflict with the Soviet Union as a primary objective. In keeping with the Eisenhower conception of a "Long Haul" defense policy, the planners noted that the Army had to develop a level of readiness that could be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. American security would also require reliance upon the armed forces of friendly allied nations to assist in the effort. Planners noted that U.S. MAAGs had made great strides in cultivating relationships with armed forces in Europe, Asia, and South America. Advancing another theme promoted by the new administration, the strategic estimate also endorsed the use of propaganda and psychological warfare to advance U.S. interests without involving unacceptable risk. In moving toward the future, the Army had to prepare to fight an atomic war, while still developing the weapons, organization, and tactics appropriate for general war. At the same time, it had to retain the flexibility to operate in lower-intensity environments against less-sophisticated foes. In April 1953, the chief of psychological warfare for the assistant chief of staff, G-3, noted that the Army needed to integrate provisions for psychological warfare units and special forces into its training program.⁴³

KOREA: SORTING THROUGH THE RUBBLE

For many officers and senior enlisted personnel, another issue troubled their conscience. The Army expended a great deal of time and effort over the next several years trying to identify and distill the lessons it could take from its experiences during the Korean War. In the immediate aftermath of the war, however, a few important considerations came to the forefront. The most important was largely unspoken, but it seemed to weigh on the minds of most. No triumphant parades had marched down the streets of Seoul or Pyongyang, such as those that had ended the two great world wars.

42. Strategic Estimate, Dep Ch Staff for Plans and Research, 27 May 1953, "Army Long Range Strategic Estimate, FY 1959 to 1963, Inclusive."

43. Strategic Estimate, Dep Ch Staff for Plans and Research, 27 May 1953, "Army Long Range Strategic Estimate, FY 1959 to 1963, Inclusive"; Memo, Col. William J. Blythe, Acting Ch Psy Warfare, for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 12 May 1953, sub: Review of Army Training Program, File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Chief of Special Warfare, 1950-1954, RG 319, NACP.

Although it would take some time for service members to sort out all of the implications of the armistice that had ended the fighting, one thing was clear. They had not won.

Even before the armistice had been signed, the Department of Defense Office of Armed Forces Information and Education had prepared a pamphlet entitled “What Next in Korea” for distribution to troops there. Its purpose was to explain that a truce in Korea did not mean that they would be heading home immediately. With the pamphlet as their primary resource, unit commanders reminded their soldiers that the Communists had consistently violated truces and agreements, and the nations of the West could not trust them to honor the armistice. The war in Korea was only one part of the worldwide conflict between the free world and Communist expansion. The pamphlet concluded that troops would have to remain in Korea for six months or more before they could begin returning home. Political and military leaders alike hoped to avoid the wholesale demobilization and gutting of the postwar force that had marked the end of World War II.⁴⁴

The Army leadership attempted to place Korea into the context of a larger confrontation. In June, then Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a paper on postarmistice deployment. “Our position must be that the conflict in Korea is but a single engagement in a global struggle which cannot be won or even kept from American shores without constant vigilance on our part,” stated Collins.⁴⁵ A month after the agreement was signed, General Ridgway pointedly asked the secretary of defense for guidance on future U.S. policy in Korea. He asked whether the Army would be expected to fight if hostilities resumed or would it be asked to evacuate. If the decision was to fight, would the nation seek a military victory? Many of the Army’s looming decisions on force structure, budget allocation, and personnel requirements depended on how the Eisenhower administration perceived the stalemate in Korea.⁴⁶

The effort to collect and digest tactical and operational lessons from Korea had begun early in the war and would continue for the foreseeable future.

44. Memo, Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn, Dep Ch Info for Distribution, 27 Jul 1953, sub: Orientation of Troops Going to Korea, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

45. Memo, Col. John W. Browning, Asst Sec Gen Staff, for Sec Joint Chs Staff, 24 Jun 1953, sub: Information Plan: Post Armistice Troop Deployment, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

46. Memo, Browning for Sec Joint Chs Staff, 24 Jun 1953, sub: Information Plan: Post Armistice Troop Deployment; Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Sec Army, 22 Aug 1953, sub: U.S. Policy on Korea, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

The X Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, offered one of the first postwar appraisals in a 6 October letter to the Eighth Army commander, General Maxwell D. Taylor. Jenkins stressed that, though Korea might be considered a special case, the Army had faced many examples of Soviet-based tactics and doctrine during its three years there. The extreme distance between the front lines and the supporting Zone of the Interior made logistical support challenging and allowed replacements to arrive in theater unready mentally and physically for combat. He cited familiar complaints about air support and recognized that the infantry had grown far too reliant upon artillery support in lieu of their own weapons. Nonetheless, he believed that still more artillery would be required in future combat.⁴⁷

More ominous were concerns that emerged over the conduct of American prisoners of war while in the custody of the Chinese and North Koreans. In March 1953, Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin, the adjutant general, sent a memorandum to all of the major Army commands warning them that Communist efforts at indoctrination had attained some degree of success and that the Army would have to screen returning prisoners carefully. Without citing any specific evidence, Bergin wrote that they must assume that some prisoners had accepted Communist ideology to the extent that they would constitute security risks. These prisoners could embarrass the Army and the United States by a public embrace of Communist policies and war aims. He recommended that commanders set up a program to interrogate returnees before integrating them back into Army commands. In the cases of returnees who would soon retire or be released from the service, Bergin asserted that local branches of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should receive information covering their name, grade, service number, and home address, as well as information concerning any potential Communist indoctrination. Reassuringly, the memo concluded that it was not the intent to prejudice the careers or future assignments of returnees, but only to monitor their actions until such time as they demonstrated that their loyalty was not affected by Communist influence.⁴⁸

Bergin's concerns were borne out as numerous statements and stories of released prisoners confirmed the brutal nature of their captivity and the level of their exposure to indoctrination. Evidence mounted that some prisoners had broken under torture or the duress of captivity and had committed various acts of collaboration, including recording statements on the radio

47. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 6 Oct 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

48. Memo, Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin for Cmdg Gens, 13 Mar 1953, sub: Intelligence Processing of Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel-Korea, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

or signing statements contrary to positions of the U.S. government. Most disturbing was the revelation that some American prisoners had refused repatriation and chose to remain in North Korea after the armistice was signed. As the stories continued to circulate in the media, the level of concern, particularly in Congress, escalated. In September, Senator Richard B. Russell, a prominent member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote a letter to Secretary Wilson decrying the conduct of “so-called progressives who cooperated with the Communist enemy.”⁴⁹ Russell expressed his belief that these soldiers should be discharged dishonorably from the service and he asked Wilson whether the Department of Defense would take any disciplinary action against those identified as progressives and false confessors.⁵⁰ Indeed, as more information came to light about conditions in the prisoner of war (POW) camps and the misconduct of a small number of U.S. prisoners, this issue would become even more problematic for the Army.⁵¹

General Ridgway recognized the potential threats that the POW issue posed to the Army, but he also perceived an opportunity to exploit the situation to the service’s benefit. He directed the chief of psychological warfare, Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, to collect and release as much factual data as possible in the belief that accurate information, and not propaganda, would reinforce in the public’s mind the brutal, cold-blooded nature of the enemy they were fighting. Through a series of radio and television interviews, magazine and newspapers articles, and public appearances by selected POW returnees, the Army could fortify the will of Americans to fight communism while simultaneously minimizing the significance of the few U.S. prisoners who had refused repatriation or had returned as Communist sympathizers. By Ridgway’s direction, Army press releases were to include and emphasize the number of Americans who had died in captivity or who remained missing. Sensing an opportunity to turn a potential negative into inspiration for public support, Ridgway wrote that the exploitation of Communist

49. Ltr, Richard B. Russell to Charles E. Wilson, 18 Sep 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

50. Memo, Brig. Gen. John C. Oakes, Sec Gen Staff, for Ch Psy Warfare, 21 Aug 1953, sub: Communist Treatment of United Nations Prisoners of War, File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Chief of Special Warfare, RG 319, NACP; Interv, Lt. Col. James W. Wurman with Gen. John E. Hull, 1974, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI; Ltr, Russell to Wilson, 18 Sep 1953.

51. Interv, Wurman with Hull, 1974.

mistreatment of POWs was a positive and dynamic project that could achieve psychological gains beneficial to the Army.⁵²

Despite the opportunities for propaganda presented by the POW issue, General Ridgway and others recognized that they also had education and training challenges to address. Before teaching young soldiers how to stand up to Communist ideology and propaganda techniques, it was first necessary, they believed, to ground these soldiers in an American “way of life.”⁵³ The chief of staff instructed the chief of information to prepare troop-level information and education programs that promoted popular American values such as the dignity of the individual, respect for the rule of law, and respect for spiritual values. He expressed the view that the failure of American prisoners had been, in part, the fault of American society, which had failed to inculcate in its youth the proper appreciation for the aforementioned principles. Ridgway instructed unit commanders to stress, in all phases of training, pride in the history of their unit, knowledge of its mission, and the understanding of how those two things fit into the overall goals of the nation and the United States Army.⁵⁴

General Eddleman, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, believed that the POW issue was also a matter of preparation. He expressed the belief that proper training and improved unit confidence would make it less likely that troops would be captured in the first place. He noted that the Army had expanded and improved its escape and evasion training and that the subject was now receiving adequate attention. Resistance to interrogation and indoctrination, and survival as a POW, Eddleman observed, were not simple problems with obvious solutions. He did note that Army research organizations were studying interrogation data from the Korean War prisoner exchanges and believed that new ideas and information might be forthcoming.⁵⁵

The reports of brainwashing and incidents of collaboration eventually caused some in the United States to question the loyalty of soldiers returning

52. Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, Ch Psy Warfare, for Ch Staff, 26 Aug 1953, sub: Plan for Exploiting Communist Mistreatment of U.S. Prisoners of War; Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, for Army Staff, 1 Sep 1953, sub: Implementation of Plan for Exploiting Communist Mistreatment of U.S. Prisoners of War; both in File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Office of the Chief, Special Warfare, RG 319, NACP.

53. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Ch Info, 30 Sep 1953, sub: Education Phase of our Troop I&E Program, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

54. Memo, Ridgway for Ch Info, 30 Sep 1953, sub: Education Phase of our Troop I&E Program. The Army's efforts to indoctrinate its young soldiers reflected a Pentagon-wide effort. See Lori Lyn Bogle, *The Pentagon's Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004).

55. Memo, Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman for Ch Staff, 25 Nov 1953, sub: Worldwide Com-

from Korea. The more general anti-Communist paranoia that characterized the early Cold War period caused this suspicion to extend to the Army's civilian workforce as well. With Senator Joseph R. McCarthy looking for Communists throughout the government, the Army's leaders themselves grew concerned about sympathizers in their midst. Near the end of 1953, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Brig. Gen. Mark McClure reported to Ridgway that the Army had 452 active loyalty investigations among thirteen major commands. He reminded Ridgway that Senator McCarthy was closely monitoring Army procedures for granting security clearances. When several civilian workers at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, came under investigation for various real and imagined violations of security regulations, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), Maj. Gen. Richard C. Partridge complained to General Ridgway that too many investigations of subversives were being overturned by appeals boards who were placing the rights of the individual above national security. He suggested that the Army consider requiring all civilian workers who participated in classified military contracts to take the same loyalty oath taken by uniformed military personnel. This suggestion was quickly endorsed by Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens.⁵⁶

MORALE AND RECRUITMENT

Publicity and public support were important to the Army to secure not just its share of the defense budget but also the personnel needed to maintain its force structure. In 1953, almost 60 percent of the service's enlisted personnel had come through the draft. Even though the Army still received the majority of its enlistees through conscription, it counted on recruiting and reenlistment to obtain volunteers capable of learning the highly technical skills required in a modern army. More important, the Army also relied on retaining a high proportion of those soldiers it had already trained through reenlistment. By the end of hostilities in Korea, however, the American

munist Treatment of United States Hostages and Prisoners of War, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

56. Memo, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Partridge for Ch Staff, 14 Oct 1953, sub: Department of the Army Civilian Security Program; Memo, Brig. Gen. Mark McClure for Ch Staff, 1 Dec 1953, sub: Mr. Paul Chadwell and Mr. Henry Forbes; Memo, Brig. Gen. Mark McClure for Ch Staff, 9 Nov 1953, sub: Complaint Type Investigations; Memo, Robert T. Stevens for Asst Sec [Hugh M.] Milton, 15 Feb 1954, sub: Requirements for Loyalty Oaths in the Industrial Security Program; all four in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

public had grown weary of shouldering wartime burdens. American youth were less interested in military careers than in finding other opportunities in a booming economy. Soldiers who had served their time in Korea or during World War II saw little attraction to continued military service. All of the branches of the armed forces, but particularly the Army, were forced to find ways to make military service more attractive.⁵⁷

By early 1953, observers would see plenty of evidence that recruiting and retention were becoming a problem. In February, the *Army Times* reported that reenlistments of regulars had fallen off drastically and that many of the Army's experienced noncommissioned officers were electing to leave the service. In the past year, reenlistments had dropped by two-thirds. In addition to the obvious conclusion that few wanted to fight the war in Korea, the report identified many other sources of dissatisfaction, including long overseas tours, infrequent promotions, and erosion of benefits such as the post exchange, the commissary, and dependents' medical care.⁵⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the secretary of defense saying that they had become increasingly concerned that armed forces personnel had a growing lack of confidence in military service as a worthwhile and respected career. After some consideration, the Armed Forces Policy Council appointed an ad hoc committee, chaired by R. Adm. John P. Womble and staffed by senior personnel officers from all four services, to identify those causes that had reduced the attractiveness of military service. In an interim report released in July, the Womble Committee identified three contributing factors. First was the unstable international situation, particularly the conflict in Korea and the military standoff in Europe. Next was the inability of the military to compete with industry for capable personnel. Finally, the committee cited an adverse national attitude toward the military in general.⁵⁹

The final report of the Womble Committee, released on 30 October 1953, provided few new answers, but confirmed most of the suspicions concerning the decline of the military's popularity in American society. The continuing practice, it said, of stationing large forces overseas without family living accommodations had created lengthy family separations. The recent conflict in Korea had contributed to a decline in support from the public, with the

57. Donald A. Carter, *The U.S. Army Before Vietnam, 1953–1965*, The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 11.

58. "Re-Up Drop Is Big Jolt," *Army Times*, 28 Feb 1953.

59. Rpt, Army Staff, 16 Jul 1953, sub: Background and Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of the Military Services as a Career that will Attract and Retain Capable Personnel, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

continuation of selective service particularly distasteful. The committee commented at length on the decline in military authority and leadership, saying, "Service leaders must accept full responsibility for yielding to popular and political pressure to adopt policies which served to further diminish the distinction between ranks."⁶⁰ This was a thinly veiled refutation of the post-World War II Doolittle Board, which had tried to create a more egalitarian Army.⁶¹ Those reforms, the report continued, lessened esprit de corps throughout the organization and impeded the ability of officers and noncommissioned officers to lead their units. The overall effect was a decline in military standards that made the service less prestigious and less attractive.

The Womble Committee's report also included other, more specific recommendations. The full range of military benefits that had been under the knife since the Truman administration demanded restoration. Congress needed to increase military pay and make retirement more attractive. The report pointed out the counterintuitive effect of veterans' loans and the G.I. Bill of Rights, which tended to make getting out of the service more attractive than staying in it. In a direct shot across the bow of the Eisenhower administration, the report concluded that "in the furtherance of cost consciousness there exists positive danger that budgetary considerations will be permitted to transcend the attainment of combat effectiveness."⁶²

After reviewing the final report of the Womble Committee, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens formed a separate committee within the Army to coordinate actions that the Army could take on its own to increase the attractiveness of military service as a career. Assistant Chief of Staff,

60. Memo, R. Adm. John P. Womble for Asst Sec Def (Manpower and Personnel), 30 Oct 1953, sub: Final Report-Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of Military Service as a Career that Will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

61. In March 1946, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson directed the establishment of a group, chaired by retired Army Air Forces Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, to study the relationships between officers and enlisted personnel in the U.S. Army. The report of the Doolittle Board recommended better living and working conditions for enlisted personnel and the elimination of the wide official and social gaps between commissioned and enlisted personnel. Although most of the recommendations were aimed at raising the standard of living for enlisted personnel, some, like proposing the elimination of the requirement for enlisted soldiers to salute commissioned officers off of military installations, were not well received. During the next several years, many senior officers blamed the Doolittle Board and its recommendations for what they perceived to be a dramatic decline in discipline and military standards throughout the Army.

62. Memo, Womble for Asst Sec Def (Manpower and Personnel), 30 Oct 1953, sub: Final Report-Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of Military Service.

G-1 (Personnel), Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, a member of the Womble Committee, submitted to the chief of staff a plan detailing options along those lines. Young acknowledged that the Army could do little in the area of pay and promotions, two of the major complaints. He noted that the service had recently instituted an eighteen-month stabilized tour in the United States for Regular Army enlisted soldiers returning from overseas duty, but he suggested that the best remedy for complaints about the length of foreign deployments would be concurrent travel for dependents of officers and senior noncommissioned officers. He encouraged the secretary and the chief of staff to join the other services in taking a firm stand against any further deterioration of fringe benefits such as the post exchange, the commissary, and leave accumulation. In support of this position, the president himself wrote to the secretary of defense, saying that although soldiers cared little about cost-of-living increases, their fringe benefits such as medical care for dependents "have been very dear to them."⁶³ He encouraged Secretary Wilson to support what he called the military's "so-called perquisites."⁶⁴

Many of the Army's leaders believed that the Army's prestige also could be enhanced if the service restored some of the discipline and high standards that had eroded since the end of World War II. General Young's report recommended increasing the authority and responsibility of noncommissioned officers, addressing one of the most frequently cited complaints of departing soldiers. He suggested that more emphasis on discipline and professionalism would benefit the Army. A similar report submitted by the chief of the Organization and Training Division decried the lost traditions and heritage of regimental affiliations, something that the U.S. Marine Corps had been emphasizing throughout its existence. Even though the Army had regiments with splendid traditions, the Army system had failed to capitalize on their potential for morale and unit cohesion. As an important example, the Organization and Training report lamented the loss of regimental bands and the unit pride they helped to instill.⁶⁵

Improving public relations and increasing the prestige of military service thus became perhaps the most important military concerns in the period

63. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Sec Def, 23 Nov 1953, Ann Whitman Files (microfilm), Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

64. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Asst Ch Staff, G-1, for Ch Staff, 9 Sep 1953, sub: Plan to Improve Attractiveness of Military Service as a Career, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Eisenhower to Sec Def, 23 Nov 1953.

65. Memo, Young for Ch Staff, 9 Sep 1953, sub: Plan to Improve Attractiveness of Military Service as a Career; Memo, Brig. Gen. Carl H. Jark, Ch Organization and Training Div, for Committee to Improve the Service as a Career, 15 Oct 1953, sub: Improvement of the Mil-

immediately following the Korean armistice. The Army's leaders pledged to address, internally, any issues that they already had the means to support. To affect changes that only increased funding could bring about, they vowed to lobby Congress and the president. On 16 November, Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway, also a strong supporter of regimental bands, announced an "all-out campaign" to raise the morale and prestige of the Army.⁶⁶ He directed his deputy chief of staff for operations, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, to study the issue further and to work out the details of the program.

Beyond the effort to make military service more attractive, personnel officers on the Army Staff explored options that would make the pool of potential recruits even larger. In October 1951, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services had established the goal of having 72,000 women in all services by 1952. Although the services did not meet that goal, primarily due to an increased emphasis on higher quality recruits, the Army, in particular, remained committed to growing the number of women in its ranks and improving the public perception of women in uniform. In November 1953, General Ridgway expressed his concern that the Women's Army Corps no longer had an officer serving on the advisory committee. After some investigation, the assistant chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, informed the Army chief of staff that Army women were represented by an enlisted member, who would soon be replaced by an officer as part of a normal rotation.⁶⁷

PERSONNEL STRENGTH AND RESERVE ISSUES

The Korean War had interrupted the dramatic post-World War II demobilization over which President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson had presided. The intensifying conflict with the Soviet Union and the active hostilities in Korea seemed to prove to Army leadership that the rapid reduction in force had been a mistake and that the service could not return to the prewar peacetime levels of personnel and readiness. Despite President Eisenhower's desire to shrink the defense

itary Service as a Career, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

66. MFR, Col. F. W. Moorman, Sec Gen Staff, 16 Nov 1953, sub: Morale and Prestige of the U.S. Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP

67. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, for Director, Women's Army Corps, 10 Nov 1953, sub: The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

budget and to rely on atomic weapons to guarantee the peace, even he and his administration recognized that the Cold War presented new challenges and requirements that could not be addressed with the nation's traditional peacetime force.

In Eisenhower's view, the most obvious challenge was to find an equitable method of securing the necessary force strength in the reserves for the nation to mobilize in the event of war. Combat in Korea had demonstrated that even a limited conflict required the commitment of greater numbers of troops than could be supported comfortably by a peacetime economy. This meant that the active force had to be backed up by reserves sufficient in size and training to provide the numbers required. The president had been particularly troubled that so many veterans of World War II had been recalled, once again, to active duty in Korea. Although he remained a firm believer in universal military training, which would require a one-year training commitment from all young men in order to provide a reserve pool of potential service members in wartime, Eisenhower recognized the political liabilities of supporting such a program. In August, he appointed retired Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs Adler, general manager of the *New York Times* and former commander of the Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association, to chair a committee that would study and recommend plans for reserve forces recruitment and training.⁶⁸

While the National Security Training Commission, also known as the Adler Committee, went about its business, the Army worked within the parameters of the recently passed Reserve Forces Act of 1952 to reform its reserve component programs. The act identified the primary purpose of the reserve force to be the provision of trained units and individuals for the armed forces during time of war or national emergency. The legislation also established three levels of liability for service during a national emergency. The first level, the Ready Reserve, consisted of those units and individuals liable for initial call-up to active duty and included almost all of the National Guard as well as some selected Army Reserve units. The second level, the Standby Reserve, consisted of units of the Army Reserve held at a lower level of readiness and liable for call-up only in the event that the secretary of the Army determined that the Ready Reserve could not meet all of the force requirements. The third level, the Retired Reserve, included those members of the reserve components placed on the reserves' retired list. They could be called up to active duty only by special legislation enacted by Congress. The legislation had little effect on the day-to-day operations of the National

68. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Julius Ochs Adler, 1 Aug 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Guard, but it necessitated major revisions in most regulations pertaining to Army Reserve affairs. Nonetheless, Army leaders regarded the codification of reserve policies across all services and the efforts to prioritize categories for recall as positive developments.⁶⁹

Despite these advances, Army leaders expressed numerous concerns about the ability of the reserves to reinforce the active force in a time of national emergency. In general terms, both the National Guard and the Army Reserve had grown, primarily because of the large number of soldiers released from active duty who retained reserve obligations. Although operating at a somewhat reduced strength, national guard units maintained high levels of participation in required training and drill periods. The number of Army Reserve units, however, and the assigned strength of those units showed an alarming decrease. Although regulations required many personnel leaving active service to spend time in the reserves, no statutory requirement existed for them to actually join units or participate in training activities. Skills gained during the course of a two-year active duty service obligation would diminish quickly and would seriously limit the value of such reserves if recalled in an emergency.⁷⁰

A study conducted by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, in July and updated in October 1953 reported a serious imbalance in the organization of forces assigned to the General Reserve. The study found that more than 90,000 troops would be required during the first four months of war to bring active duty formations up to strength, expand overseas support operations, expand the mobilization base, and offset early losses. This requirement, it concluded, was of greater urgency than procuring and preparing additional divisions for deployment. As organized, the General Reserve consisted of twenty-seven national guard divisions and twenty-five Army Reserve divisions. Because current mobilization plans envisioned a force of thirty-two divisions to be prepared for deployment, the report recommended using twenty Army Reserve divisions to provide the initial troop requirements and to alleviate shortages in other, support-type units. The study acknowledged the political complications that would accompany a similar conversion of national guard divisions, particularly

69. Franklin L. Orth, Special Asst to Sec Army (remarks, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 7 Dec 1953); Memo, James P. Mitchell, Asst Sec Army, for Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board, 15 May 1953, sub: Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress; both in File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

70. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jan-30 Jun 1953, 102-5.

for state governors faced with losing the prestige of sponsoring a national guard division.⁷¹

To address the requirement to expand the training base in the event of full mobilization, the report suggested converting seven of the surplus reserve divisions into replacement training centers, or training divisions. To promote flexibility, the five remaining combat divisions and the seven training divisions would be considered together as twelve divisions that could be used interchangeably, with selection of roles determined upon the initiation of full mobilization. All twelve divisions would spend the 1954 summer camp—the National Guard’s primary field training—with active Army training divisions. During full mobilization, once all national guard divisions had deployed, the Army could convert training divisions back to combat divisions as required. The report also noted that only two armored divisions existed in the reserve program and recommended converting four national guard infantry divisions into armored divisions.⁷²

Most senior officers agreed that increasing the number of trained reservists was the most important aspect of the program, regardless of whether they served as members of reserve units or as individual replacements. Attempts to increase the numbers of reservists participating in organized training had not proven successful. Recruiting efforts on the part of military district personnel and reserve unit commanders also had failed to increase participation. General Ridgway blamed the underperformance on a lack of public understanding of the Army Reserve program, and he directed the six continental Army commanders to initiate an “energetic informational and procurement campaign to impel interest and active participation.”⁷³ As the Army waited on the final report of the Adler Committee, however, it retained an assumption that only some form of universal military training could provide the kind of numbers required to adequately fill the General Reserve.⁷⁴

That belief found some support in the National Security Training Commission report, which Adler’s committee released in December.

71. Staff Study, Ofc Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 1 Jul 1953, sub: Reserve Components Mobilization Preparedness Objectives Plan I, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

72. Staff Study, Ofc Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 1 Jul 1953, sub: Reserve Components Mobilization.

73. Memo, Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 8 Dec 1953, sub: Actions Required in Connection with NSTC Report, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

74. Staff Study, Ofc Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 1 Jul 1953, sub: Reserve Components Mobilization; Memo, Eddleman for Ch Staff, 8 Dec 1953, sub: Actions Required in Connection with NSTC Report.

Although the report acknowledged the political infeasibility of a universal military training initiative, its recommendations differed only slightly. It urged for a six-month training program, proposed in earlier legislation, to be put into effect, with an initial increment of 100,000 trainees chosen by lot through selective service. That program could be expanded gradually until virtually all American males incurred a service obligation. Lastly, the commission recommended that the program be taken out of the hands of the services and assigned to the Selective Service System. Both the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Defense Mobilization embraced portions of the report and designated it for further study. President Eisenhower also approved the findings and directed the Department of Defense to consider the recommendations as part of a new reorganization plan for reserve forces.⁷⁵

YEAR IN REVIEW

For the Army, 1953 marked the termination of combat operations in Korea, although significant levels of forces would remain there for many years to come. The end of the war enabled the service to examine much of its organization, equipment, and doctrine, in depth, for the first time since the beginning of World War II. Leaders began with a suspicion that what had worked in World War II and Korea might no longer apply to the atomic-age force. The year also saw the beginning of the Eisenhower presidency. For the Army, this would be a period of scarce resources as it would compete for its share of a diminishing defense budget. By the end of the year, the service had begun a battle for survival as it struggled to carve out a meaningful role in the president's New Look defense policy. The next year would find Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway committed to reshaping the force to meet what he perceived to be the requirements of the modern battlefield.

75. Statement, National Security Training Commission to Joint Chs Staff, 20 Nov 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 165-67.

2

Coming to Grips with the New Look

As he summarized the progress his service had made during the first half of 1954, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens wrote that no generation of Americans had faced the assortment of complexities and worldwide responsibilities such as those now confronted by the current U.S. Army. Acknowledging the philosophies of the New Look, he reported an Army that was adjusting itself to the prospect of a continuing period of uneasy peace. Despite those concerns, he noted that the Army's force strength was scheduled to be reduced by one-quarter of a million in the coming year. It was, he said, the tendency of Americans to shrug off the need for an Army or military training once wars had concluded; he reminded readers that at the end of the Revolutionary War, Congress had slashed the Regular Army to eighty troops and two officers. Historically, the United States had frequently maintained the peacetime Army of a third-rate power. This should not, he warned, ever happen again.¹

1. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1954* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 Mar 1955), 69–71; Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 35–37.

FUNDING THE NEW LOOK ARMY

The bruising battle to develop the military budget for 1955 proved to be only a prelude to conflicts between the Army and the Eisenhower administration as the latter began to implement a defense policy more reliant on the threat of atomic retaliation than on the presence of a large standing army. The president's conviction that economic prosperity was the most important aspect of national security resonated in his selection of the individuals he had chosen to run the Defense Department.

In a 14 February feature article for the *New York Times*, Hanson W. Baldwin highlighted the business approach the administration was taking in shaping the Pentagon. Where predecessors like Louis A. Johnson, George C. Marshall, and Robert A. Lovett had come from political, military, and legal backgrounds, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson and his deputy, Roger M. Kyes, were both formerly of General Motors. The Defense Department, Baldwin noted, spent annually as much as the sales of the twenty-two largest industrial corporations in the country. Wilson and his associates had come to Washington, D.C., to apply their business acumen to the task of getting that spending under control. Wilson and Kyes arrived at the Pentagon with barely concealed skepticism, if not also some degree of contempt for the military brass. In their first year, they presided over a more or less clean sweep of senior military leadership. Of the thirty-four top civilian and military jobs in the Pentagon, only three were occupied by the same people who had held them a year earlier. The previous year, Wilson had enthusiastically supported President Dwight D. Eisenhower's calls for reductions while preparing the 1955 defense budget. Now, in 1954, he was encouraging further cuts as the military services continued planning for outlying years.²

The president and the secretary of defense found a willing and vocal disciple in the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford. The admiral embraced all of the tenants of the New Look and had testified forcefully before the Senate Appropriations Committee in favor of the president's 1955 budget. He emphasized that, in addition to military factors, the chiefs had to include economic and political considerations as they made their recommendations. His emphatic description of the unanimous nature of their recommendations belied the strong reservations held by some of the other chiefs, most noteworthy,

2. Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Men Who Run the Pentagon," *New York Times*, 14 Feb 1954; "Army Mere Support Force for Air Under '55 Budget," *Army Times*, 23 Jan 1954; Interv, Maurice Matloff with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 1 Aug 1984, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI).

General Matthew B. Ridgway. Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), noted that Radford had formed a habit of speaking for the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body when it was clear that the opinions he was expressing were solely his own. Although General Ridgway clearly was irritated that his objections to the budget had been so blatantly misrepresented, he told his subordinates that the time was not right to challenge the chairman.³

For his part, Admiral Radford grew increasingly frustrated and irritated by what he considered to be Ridgway's intransigence. Not only did Radford completely embrace almost all of the tenets of Eisenhower's emerging defense policies, but he also seems to have forged a close personal relationship with the president. As such, Radford regarded the Army's refusal to fall in line with the New Look to be disloyal and disrespectful. He made it a point in his published memoirs to mock Ridgway's reluctant acceptance of proposed budget allocations as a concession made simply to get home to his "young bride" for the weekend.⁴ Radford particularly railed against the Army's refusal to acknowledge that future wars would inevitably involve atomic weapons. With both Radford and Secretary of Defense Wilson so closely allied with the president's intentions and beliefs, Ridgway and his successors would find little sympathy for their contrarian views.⁵

Eisenhower himself did create something of a back door in October when he named Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster as his staff secretary and defense liaison officer. Goodpaster had commanded a combat engineer battalion during World War II and had later joined the War Planning Office under General George C. Marshall. He had received a PhD in politics from Princeton University in 1950 and had begun to develop a reputation as a

3. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 90; Statement, Adm. Arthur Radford, U.S. Navy, Ch Joint Chs Staff, *Hearing Before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee*, 83d Cong. (15 Mar 1954), Series: Chairman's Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup: Records of the Chairman, Record Group (RG) 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 24 Jul 1954, sub: Unilateral Action by Admiral Radford, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1948-1954 (hereinafter SCGC 1948-1954), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), RG 319: Records of the Army Staff; both in National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP). General Ridgway described his fury at both Radford and President Eisenhower for their description of the unanimous nature of the chief's budget recommendations in his memoir. Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1956).

4. Stephen J. Jurika Jr., ed., *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1980), 321.

5. Jurika, *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam*, 321; Notes and Questionnaire, "Ridgway," 26 Feb 1955, Series: Chairman's Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup: Records of the Chairman, RG 218, NACP.

scholar-soldier. Although Goodpaster was solidly an Eisenhower loyalist throughout his tenure, he did provide a sympathetic ear to senior Army officials and sometimes a way to bypass the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs in order to present Army concerns to the president.⁶

The Army chief of staff took the time to register formally with the secretary of defense his concerns over the manner in which the budget was announced. In his memo to Wilson, Ridgway noted that the impression of unanimity was misleading. He affirmed that the Joint Chiefs had been given budgetary and force strength ceilings by “competent authority” before they began their discussions.⁷ The recommendations that the chiefs developed, while unanimous within those limitations, were further qualified by several assumptions regarding the international situation. Ridgway expressed his opinion to Secretary Wilson that the interests of the Department of Defense would be served better by openly acknowledging the limitations Wilson had placed upon the chiefs’ deliberations.⁸

By March 1954, with the 1955 budget approved, the services turned their attention to planning for the ensuing years. Events in Europe and the Far East already had raised doubts among some over the wisdom of the previous year’s force reductions. A deterioration of the French position in Indochina and the uncertain prospects for the French ratification of the European Defense Community caused even Secretary Wilson to take a second look at proposed force levels. The Force Plan for 1957, published as JCS 2101/113, established an Army force strength of one million service members, comprising fourteen divisions. General Ridgway and the Army Staff countered that the service’s worldwide responsibilities required a force of at least seventeen divisions, a goal it could not meet at that personnel level. Because the troop strength in Europe was controlled by the American commitment to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), most of the personnel cuts overseas would fall upon Army forces in the Far East. Ridgway argued that the reduction in combat readiness would reduce the U.S. contribution to collective security and might be interpreted by allies as further evidence of the administration’s reliance upon massive retaliation as the primary instrument of national policy. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Materiel) John Slezak told Ridgway that if the Army could not get

6. Robert S. Jordan, *An Unsung Soldier: The Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

7. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Ch Staff, for Sec Def Charles E. Wilson, 11 Mar 1954, Ridgway Papers, MHI.

8. Memo, Ridgway for Wilson, 11 Mar 1954.

Secretary Wilson to reconsider the force strength target, it had to get him to understand and accept the serious results of that target.⁹

The other service chiefs appeared to share some of the Army's concerns and made similar appeals to the secretary of defense. Based upon these apprehensions, in July, Secretary Wilson tentatively confirmed a force level of 1.173 million for the Army with "as near a twenty division structure as feasible."¹⁰ The other services received similar augmentations. The president, however, had not abandoned his desire for major reductions in the defense budget. In a meeting with Wilson on 8 December, Eisenhower rejected the idea of any increases for the Army and Navy and reaffirmed the force strength objectives established in JCS 2101/113. Not only did the president turn down the requested increases, but he also insisted that the reduced strengths be reached by the end of fiscal year 1956—a year earlier than planned—with part of the reduction in 1955. Although he did not couch it as an order, the president expressed the opinion that he saw no reason that the Army divisions in Korea could not be maintained at reduced strength.¹¹

General Ridgway met with his primary staff the next evening to begin planning a way forward. He was particularly anxious to avoid a morale and public relations calamity that news of the force reductions might provoke. He directed his staff to handle the required opening and closing of installations in a methodical and orderly manner so that those affected might receive the maximum possible notice. He also instructed that the divisions in Korea and Europe be maintained, for the time being, at 100 percent strength. Maj. Gen. George H. Decker, Comptroller of the Army, concluded the meeting with the observation that the president's decision would cause him to throw out months of work and to start over on the budget process.¹²

Later in December, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens wrote a detailed memorandum for Secretary Wilson describing the impact the accelerated force reduction would have on Army readiness. Given a troop ceiling of one million, Stevens informed Wilson that the maximum supportable troop strength for overseas forces was approximately 375,000. The remaining

9. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 70–72; MFR, Lt. Col. Alfred J. F. Moody, Gen. Staff, 1 Mar 1954, sub: Briefing of Chief of Staff on Mid-Range Estimate (MRE) Committee Report for FY 1957; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 19 Jul 1954, sub: Army Program for FY 1955; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

10. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 72.

11. Staff Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 8 Dec 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

12. MFR, Brig. Gen. Frank W. Moorman, Sec Gen Staff, 9 Dec 1954, sub: Staff Conference Reference Staff Memorandum dated 8 December 1954 signed by General Ridgway, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

soldiers were required in the continental United States to constitute the training base, provide logistical support, assist with Army Reserve and Army National Guard functions, and maintain a small strategic reserve. Given the numbers, he continued, the Army would consist of thirteen mobile, one static, and three training divisions, for a total of seventeen divisions. The thirteen mobile divisions included five in Europe, two in Korea, and four in the United States, prepared for prompt shipment overseas. The remaining two divisions would be maintained in a reduced state of readiness and only be deployable after six months of training. The static division consisted of scattered elements in Alaska and the Caribbean. The three training divisions, also in the United States, provided only cadre for the training of new recruits and inductees. Given that status, Stevens wrote, the United States was eight divisions short of meeting its commitment to NATO of seventeen divisions by D+6 months. The Army secretary also reminded Wilson that further redeployments from Korea would interfere with the recovery of supplies and materiel there and require a disproportionate number of service troops to remain in the Far East to support allied forces and U.S. Air Force units that remained. Finally, Stevens concluded, the reductions would render several installations superfluous, and he warned that Camp Kilmer, New Jersey; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, would have to be closed.¹³

Throughout the budget process, General Ridgway had premised his defense of Army troop strength requirements on the belief that a battlefield dominated by atomic weapons would require a greater number of soldiers, not fewer as the New Look advocates had proposed. Early experiments with integrating atomic weapons into military war games had indicated that the high number of casualties anticipated in such a conflict would require greater numbers of replacements and additional resources to evacuate the dead and wounded. He also frequently had warned members of the administration that local wars, and even global war, conceivably might be fought without resort to nuclear weapons. In his testimony before Congress regarding the budget, Ridgway had warned that a situation might well occur wherein no nation would use atomic weapons for fear of retaliation. The considerations and decisions in preparing the budget for fiscal year 1955 provided a clear indication that the Army chief of staff's arguments had fallen on deaf ears. In decrying the force reductions, an editorial in the *Army Times* noted that the cuts were "a fair indication that General Matt Ridgway's single-handed

13. Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Sec Def Charles E. Wilson, 22 Dec 1954, sub: Impact of Reduction in the Authorized Military Strength of the Army for FYs 1955 and 1956 on the Capabilities of the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

and valiant effort to prove the value of landpower in the atomic age has not gained full recognition in the Pentagon or the White House.”¹⁴

FIGHTING THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS

For the Army, 1954 became a period of almost unrelenting bad news and negative publicity. The conflict in Korea had ended without a clearly successful resolution, and evidence was mounting that some Army prisoners of war (POWs) had not conducted themselves honorably while in captivity. By now, the implications of Eisenhower’s New Look defense policy had become clear. Not only would the Army absorb the greatest share of reductions in both force strength and budget, but the administration’s statements about its reliance upon atomic weapons and the United States Air Force indicated that service’s ascendancy. On the domestic front, an expanding economy and plentiful employment opportunities made military service and particularly the draft increasingly unpopular. Despite the end of the war in Korea, 1954 saw 253,230 draftees enter the United States armed forces, most of them joining the Army. Less than ten years after the Army’s success in World War II, the public’s perception seemed to lack the favorable, nostalgic glow that it seemed to have for the other services.

In a further indignity, the Army found itself enmeshed in another controversy in 1954, when it ran afoul of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and his bombastic quest to eliminate communism from all aspects of American life. McCarthy had seized upon the security-related investigations of some federal workers at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to open up a widespread investigation of alleged Communists in the Army. When Army officials accused McCarthy’s chief counsel, Roy M. Cohn, of seeking preferential treatment for his aide, Pvt. G. David Schine, who had been drafted into the Army, McCarthy accused the service of retaliating against his aggressive investigations. Secretary Stevens, in an attempt to mollify the senator, met with McCarthy, Cohn, and Private Schine, and allowed himself to be photographed with the young soldier. This apparent show of support for the private, along with Stevens’s reluctance to speak out against McCarthy’s wild accusations, earned him a lecture on service loyalty from General Ridgway and condemnation throughout much of the news media. The

14. Testimony, *Hearing Before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee*, 83d Cong. (4 Feb 1954); Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Ch Staff, for Special Asst to the President for National Security Affairs, 22 Nov 1954, sub: Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2); both in Ridgway Papers, MHI; “Butchery,” *Army Times*, 25 Dec 1954.

Army eventually recovered from its black eye, largely through a series of nationally televised Senate hearings that systematically destroyed McCarthy's arguments. Stevens, however, was devastated by the beating he had taken in the press, and even more so by the perceived lack of support he had received from anyone in the Eisenhower administration. Although Secretary Wilson and Vice President Richard M. Nixon would talk the Army secretary out of resigning, Stevens remained bitter about the treatment he had received. For the Army, the McCarthy hearings were still more bad publicity the service did not need, and the intense congressional and popular scrutiny of its leadership contributed to its perception that the American public neither understood nor appreciated the service's role in national defense.¹⁵

In May, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, prepared a memo for distribution to the General Staff titled, "A Program to Improve the Public Attitude Toward the United States Army." Gavin's main point was that despite the real accomplishments of the United States Army in the past twenty-five years, the American public tended to take its soldiers for granted. The unpleasant aspects of its role, including disproportionate battle casualties, relatively poor pay, extremely unpleasant battle environment, and the traditional American aversion to militarism all worked to limit any significant public affection for the Army. As a result, Gavin affirmed, the Army must no longer take itself for granted and must sell itself. He suggested that the service call upon some of the "many expert writers of national repute" with demonstrated affection for the Army (based on their own prior service) to explain at Army schools the requirements for public relations.¹⁶ Commanders should encourage soldiers to join civic groups such as Kiwanis, Lions Clubs, and Rotary to promote Army interests. The

15. Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Ch Staff, 26 Feb 1954, sub: Recent Developments Regarding Senator McCarthy, Ridgway Papers, MHI; Robert Shogan, *No Sense of Decency: The Army-McCarthy Hearings: A Demagogue Falls and Television Takes Charge of American Politics* (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2009), 148-54; "Stevens in Attack," *New York Times*, 14 Mar 1954; Telecon, Sec Def, 6 May 1954, "Telephone Calls," Ann Whitman Files (microfilm), Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA (hereinafter AHEC); Ltr, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, 3 Nov 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

16. Memo, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin for Distribution, 17 May 1954, sub: A Program to Improve Public Attitude Toward the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified Correspondence, 1948-1954, (hereinafter SCC 1948-1954), Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (*U.S. Senate Historical Office*)

general concluded his piece with a peroration urging the Army to hustle and sell itself from every rooftop and crossroads.¹⁷

The Army's chief of information, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, seized upon the memo to promote his own efforts and to recommend that General Gavin's ideas represented a sound strategy for promotion of the Army. He noted that the sister services placed a higher priority on public information and public relations activities than did the Army. The Army might better campaign for its long-term policies, he said, by reorganizing its public-facing informational activities under a deputy chief of staff for public affairs. That decision, however, and a more fundamental public relations policy for the Army as a whole were outside the control of the Army Staff and would have to await consideration by the executive branch and the Department of Defense.¹⁸

Two weeks later, on 4 June, General Ridgway prepared a memorandum for primary members of the staff and a personal letter to all commanding generals of major continental and overseas commands. He directed commanders at

17. Memo, Gavin for Distribution, 17 May 1954, sub: A Program to Improve Public Attitude Toward the Army.

18. Memo, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, Ch Info, for Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, 17 May 1954, sub: General Gavin's Memorandum on a Program to Improve Public Attitude

all levels to consult with troop and public information officers as an integral part of the planning process. He stressed the importance of community relations, particularly to those commanders of installations in the United States. He reminded officers of the public's antipathy to the continuation of selective service and its desire to reduce defense expenditures. The chief of staff was confident that the public would continue to support the Army as long as it understood the service's problems, accomplishments, and potentialities.¹⁹

Army Vice Chief of Staff General Charles L. Bolte followed up on Ridgway's memo with his own letter to the six continental Army commanders. In the correspondence, Bolte expressed his opinion that the best way to keep the American public informed about the actions of the Army was to let members of Congress visit military installations to see Army activities for themselves. That way, he said, when deliberating legislation and appropriations of critical importance to the Army, members would have first-hand knowledge of what was going on in the field. Bolte directed Chief of Legislative Liaison Brig. Gen. Clarence J. Hauck Jr. to send representatives from his office to visit Army Headquarters to discuss the program in more detail.²⁰

The Army's campaign to improve its public image thus moved forward on several fronts. Movietone News produced a 55-minute color documentary entitled *This Is Your Army*, illustrating the activities of U.S. soldiers around the world. The film showed the service's new weapons and missiles in breathtaking action, and demonstrated to American taxpayers what their money was buying. Army spokesmen took great pains to show to the public that theirs was a modern, forward-looking service. The film received endorsements from the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and both organizations pledged to assist in generating public interest in its release. When the weekly news magazine *Newsweek* published a cover story about the Army's atomic artillery, the former chief information officer and Second Army commander, Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, complained that the cover photo had not identified the guns as belonging to the Army. The

Toward the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

19. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Ch Staff, for Primary Staff, 4 Jun 1954, sub: Army Troop, Public and Congressional Relations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

20. Ltr, Gen. Charles L. Bolte to Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, Cmdg Gen, Second Army, 18 Aug 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



An army officer models the new summer cotton khaki shirt and short trousers for male officers, 17 December 1956. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

letters *USA* were not enough for the hasty reader, he argued. All vehicles and equipment should be stenciled “U.S. ARMY.”²¹

Army leaders enthusiastically released public notices highlighting the Army’s support for the Boy Scouts and other youth activities. The chief of information labeled service assistance in overseas disaster relief efforts as targets of opportunity to be exploited in the public relations campaign. In Europe, General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,

21. Ltr, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to Council of Motion Picture Organizations, Inc., 29 Sep 1954, Ridgway Papers, MHI; “Civilian Audiences to See ‘This is Your Army’ Movie,” *Army Times*, 4 Dec 1954; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks to Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, 30 Dec 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “The Army Is Still in Business,” *United States Army Combat Forces Journal* 4 (May 1954): 11–14.

reminded General Ridgway of the upcoming ten-year memorial services for the Normandy landings. He noted that U.S. military participation in the ceremonies, and those for subsequent observances, would also be useful in bringing to the public eye the service and sacrifice of Army veterans. On a less somber note, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (Personnel), Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Powell, announced in August that the Army soon would begin testing a new summer uniform of shorts and short-sleeved shirts, sure to keep the service in the public's eye.²²

For an Army that was desperately trying to improve its public image, the conduct of its POWs during the Korean conflict was an issue that would not go away. By the spring of 1954, Army officials were still debating the appropriate level of disciplinary action for suspected collaborators or traitors. In a memorandum to major commanders dated 15 March, Adjutant General Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin argued that the Army should take vigorous action to bring those individuals to justice. Annexes to the same document, however, pointed out the percentage of prisoners who had suffered from disease, malnutrition, and mistreatment at the hands of the enemy. One attachment noted that although soldiers participated in intensive and detailed combat training, they received only minimal, broadly generalized information regarding their deportment in the event of capture by the enemy. Given the enemy's success in breaking down the resistance of so many prisoners, the analysis concluded that the armed forces required a code of conduct clearly stating the military duties and responsibilities of those taken prisoner.²³

A general court-martial sitting at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., reinforced the point two months later when it convicted Cpl. Edward S. Dickenson of collaborating with the enemy while held as a POW in North Korea. His was the first trial for misconduct as a POW to come out of the Korean War. Dickenson received a sentence of ten years' confinement at hard labor, total forfeiture of all pay, and a dishonorable discharge. Exploiting extensive media coverage, the defense had based most of its case on the harsh treatment Dickenson had received while in captivity and his

22. Memo, Gen. Charles L. Bolte for Asst Sec Army (Manpower and Reserve Forces), 19 Aug 1954, sub: Cooperation with the Boy Scouts of America; Memo, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett for Distribution, 29 Dec 1954, sub: News Coverage of Overseas Disaster Relief; Ltr, Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther to Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 20 Apr 1954; MFR, Col. Alexander D. Surles Jr., Asst Sec Gen Staff, 19 Aug 1954, sub: Army Staff Meeting, 1130 hours, 18 August 1954; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

23. Memo, Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin for Cmdg Gens, 15 Mar 1954, sub: RECAP-K (Part II) Policy, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



Boy Scouts John Murray and Stephen Worden visit Chief, a 32-year-old retired cavalry horse, held by Sgt. Ben Parker at Fort Riley, Kansas. (U.S. Army, National Archive Still Picture Branch)

lack of preparation for such an ordeal.²⁴ Despite General Ridgway's written objections to what he considered to be an excessively harsh punishment, Secretary Wilson also ordered Army Secretary Stevens to issue dishonorable discharges to the twenty-one POWs who had refused repatriation.²⁵

In August, the secretary of defense established an ad hoc committee, chaired by the assistant secretary of defense for manpower and personnel, to study the problems surrounding the conduct of American POWs. He directed the committee to delineate the scope of the problem; to isolate its military, medical, civil, and judicial aspects; and to begin moving toward a program of indoctrination and training for the entire U.S. military organization. The committee returned its report to the assistant secretary on 3 November. Its primary conclusion was that the services required a determination of the standards of conduct that were applicable to all military personnel. It noted that each service had already undertaken intensive studies on the subject based upon their experiences in Korea. Although they agreed on

24. "The Trial of a Korean War Turncoat: The Court Martial of Corporal Edward S. Dickenson," in *Lore of the Corps: Compilation from The Army Lawyer 2010–2017*, ed. Fred Borch (Washington, DC: Judge Advocate General's Corps, 2018).

25. MFR, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 22 Jan 1954, Ridgway Papers, MHI.

most aspects of the duties required of prisoners, the services differed on the types and amount of information prisoners might reveal when interrogated. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps clung to the traditional approach of the Geneva Conventions that prisoners must provide only their name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. The Air Force, however, advocated a policy allowing prisoners to reveal any information that “reasonably cannot be used to the injury of the United States or its Allies.”²⁶ This discrepancy was a major sticking point. The committee prepared a draft uniform policy on prisoner conduct containing options for either interpretation. It then referred the policy back to the services for comment. Army internal discussions on the proposal flatly rejected the Air Force interpretation, and, by the end of the year, the services achieved no further progress on the issue.²⁷

Meanwhile, the Army began to work its way through the investigations related to reports of collaboration and misconduct. Of the roughly 3,200 soldiers repatriated at the end of the war, the service determined that 225 required further investigation concerning their conduct while in captivity. By October 1954, one officer, two corporals, and one private already had been tried by court-martial. The cases of thirty-six others remained in pretrial investigation, determining whether or not court-martial was appropriate. Fifteen others had received general or undesirable discharges. The fate of the remaining 170 service members remained uncertain, except that they did not warrant trial by court-martial. In contrast to those statistics, the Army also announced that it had recognized and decorated fifty-seven soldiers for withstanding enemy coercion and attempts at indoctrination.²⁸

BUILDING AN ATOMIC ARMY

With the war over in Korea, and with demobilization in high gear, the Army began resetting its corps and divisional forces to account for the new peacetime

26. Memo, Brig. Gen. John H. Ives for Asst Sec Def (Manpower and Personnel), 3 Nov 1954, sub: Indoctrination and Training of Military Personnel Concerning Conduct While in a Prisoner of War Status, File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Special Warfare, 1950–1954, RG 319, NACP.

27. Memo, Charles E. Wilson for Service Secs, 7 Aug 1954, sub: Indoctrination and Training of Military Personnel Concerning Conduct While in a Prisoner of War Status; Memo, Ives for Asst Sec Def (Manpower and Personnel), 3 Nov 1954, sub: Indoctrination and Training of Military Personnel; both in File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Special Warfare, 1950–1954, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 15 Dec 1954, sub: Indoctrination and Training of Military Personnel Concerning Conduct While in a Prisoner of War Status, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series: SCGC 1947–1964, RG 335: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, NACP.

28. “PW Record is Defended,” *Army Times*, 30 Oct 1954.

realities. Based upon guidance from President Eisenhower, the Army began to send units home from Korea in the spring of 1954, commencing with the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, two national guard formations that returned to state control. Later in June, Secretary Wilson decided to release the 28th, 31st, 37th, 43d, 44th, and 47th Infantry Divisions, also national guard units, back to state control as well. In Europe, the 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions replaced the 28th and 43d. The Army reactivated the 69th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division to fill the gaps in the training base left by the departures of the 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions. To help balance the service's combat strength, General Ridgway directed the activation of a new armored division, the 4th, at Fort Hood, Texas. Later in the year, in an effort to give the Army more divisions without any corresponding increase in force strength, Secretary Wilson authorized the activation of the 23d and 71st Infantry Divisions. These two units, dubbed "Wilson Divisions," made use of existing regimental combat teams and smaller units, with the 23d stationed in the Panama Canal Zone and Puerto Rico, and the 71st stationed primarily in Alaska. Because both divisions were severely understrength and widely scattered, the Army Staff labeled them as "static units," meaning they were not capable of early deployment.²⁹

By the end of 1954, when the dust had settled, the Army had six corps, and nineteen active and six training divisions. In Europe, the Seventh Army controlled the V and VII Corps, the 2d Armored Division, and the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry Divisions. While the XVI Corps had been inactivated in Japan, and the X Corps returned to the United States to be inactivated in 1955, the I and IX Corps—with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions—remained as part of U.S. Army Forces, Far East, in Korea and Japan. The 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions returned to the continental United States and the 25th Infantry Division had moved to Schofield Barracks in Hawai'i assigned to U.S. Army, Pacific. In the United States, the III and XVIII Corps with the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington; the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia; the 8th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado; the 10th Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas; the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions at Fort Hood, Texas; the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, made up the General Reserve. The two static divisions brought the total to nineteen. Also in the United States, the 6th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California; the 69th Infantry Division at Fort Dix, New Jersey; the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Jackson, South

29. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 244–53; "Two Wilson Divisions Formed," *Army Times*, 20 Nov 1954.

Carolina; the 3d Armored Division at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the 5th Armored Division at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas; and the 6th Armored Division at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, operated as training divisions.³⁰

As the post-Korea demobilization began in earnest, the Army's leaders began to reevaluate the service's mission and how it could best fit into the defense of the United States. In a February *Army Times* editorial that expressed what many Army officers believed, military analyst and columnist George Fielding Eliot wrote that the service needed to develop a concept of land power that could compete with the ardent Navy and Air Force proponents of sea power and air power. Any ensign, he wrote, could explain the importance of sea power to the United States. The Air Force, he continued, was always ready with a new scheme to "bomb something from somewhere."³¹ Those organizations had grabbed most of the glamor of military service, which was why they received the lion's share of the military budget and had no problem maintaining their numbers by voluntary enlistment rather than by selective service. If the Army was to compete with the other services, Eliot concluded, it had to present the case for its readiness for the modern atomic battlefield. If the Army was developing mobile tactics and modern weapons of great striking power, it must show not only the ways in which those elements applied to the battlefield but also the strategic conditions under which the service could employ them.³²

The theoretical underpinning for such a philosophy was already underway. While serving as commandant of the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy had appointed a small group of officers to study the role of the Army in modern warfare, with a special focus on the employment of atomic weapons. The study group formed a partnership with the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University and ultimately produced a text for officer students on the divisional aspects of atomic warfare. Two of the officers, Col. George C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, published the text in 1953 as *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*. Although he was disturbed by some of the book's conclusions regarding the inevitability of atomic combat, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin wrote in a review that its publication was proof that atomic weapons were here to stay and that the Army had to learn to deal with them. A short time later, Lt. Col. Ferdinand O. Miksche, a Czech

30. "Two Wilson Divisions Formed"; Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Asst Ch Staff, G-1, for Staff Coordination, 23 Jun 1954, sub: First Cavalry Division Designation, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

31. George Fielding Eliot, "Army Can't Afford Policy of Silence," *Army Times*, 13 Feb 1954.

32. Eliot, "Army Can't Afford Policy of Silence."



The tank-infantry team of Company E, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, on the road to the rendezvous area after a training mission at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in the Southern Area Command, 28 July 1955. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

officer who had served in the British and French Armies, published another book entitled *Atomic Weapons and Armies*. Miksche's book made many of the same points, but applied them to the armies of the world, not just the United States. Atomic war would be, most assuredly, a two-way affair.³³

Other Army officers expressed and exchanged ideas regarding atomic warfare through the professional military journals. The *Army Combat Forces Journal*, published by the Association of the United States Army, and *Military Review*, published by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, both printed numerous articles concerning tactical and operational concepts for an atomic battlefield.³⁴

33. Study, James Johnson, "Tactical Organization for Atomic Warfare," (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 16 Apr 1954), Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC; Col. George C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1953); Lt. Col. Ferdinand O. Miksche, *Atomic Weapons and Armies* (New York: Praeger, 1955); James M. Gavin, "First Book on Atomic Tactics Lists Problems Facing American Planners," *Army Times*, 9 Jan 1954.

34. Col. E. L. Rowny, "Ground Tactics in an Atomic War," *United States Army Combat Forces Journal* 5 (Aug 1954): 18–22; Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch, "Reserves in Atomic Warfare,"

On 27 September 1954, the Army released Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations*, to replace the pre-Korean War 1949 version. This manual, prepared by the Command and General Staff College, provided new doctrine for the post-Korea Army with a hybrid of previous operational and tactical thought and new atomic considerations. The manual addressed recent Korean experience by calling for the Army to prepare for both general war and “wars of limited objective.”³⁵ However, it maintained the Army’s fundamental belief in an infantry-based war of movement with atomic weapons simply as another means of fire support.³⁶

Although the Army had experimented with atomic weapons employment to a limited extent in Exercise SNOWFALL in 1952, it had not yet made them the centerpiece of a major maneuver. The service took another step in that direction in 1954 with Exercise FLASHBURN. Scheduled 23 April to 5 May in the Carolina Maneuver Area stretching between Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to the north and Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in the south, the exercise featured expanded training objectives, including the coordinated tactical use of all available types of atomic weapons and a defense against their use by enemy forces. Although the maneuver elements, consisting primarily of the 82d Airborne Division, the 37th Infantry Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, seemed to validate most of the Army’s emerging doctrine of dispersion and maneuver, the exercise exposed conflicts between the Army and the Air Force over command and control of the weapons themselves.³⁷

Army leaders believed that the ground commander should have the authority to select the delivery system and retain operational control over the attack of a selected target. The Air Force, however, clung to its position that once the ground commander had requested a strike, only the air commander had the authority to designate the delivery means and to coordinate and control the attack. In his critique of the exercise, Army Field Forces Commander Lt. Gen. John E. Dahlquist concluded that an urgent need existed for a joint doctrine approved by both services. Army officials came away from the exercise even more convinced of their requirement for a wider range of ground-launched atomic munitions over which they could

United States Army Combat Forces Journal 4 (May 1954): 15–19; “Streamlining the Infantry Division,” *Military Review* 34 (May 1954): 89–94.

35. Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 27 Sep 1954).

36. Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations*, 27 Sep 1954; Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 168–71.

37. Jean R. Moenk, *A History of Large Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935–1964* (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1969), 195–200; “Flashburn Lessons: Disperse, Dig In,” *Army Times*, 1 May 1954.



A 5-ton truck pulls a 155-mm. gun out of a C-124 aircraft during the airlift of Battery C, 540th Field Artillery Battalion, at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, during Exercise FLASHBURN. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

retain full control. The postexercise critique also commented on the Air Force's inability, or unwillingness, to support extensive air movement, air assault, or aerial resupply missions, a concern frequently addressed by the Army chief of staff as well.³⁸

General Ridgway thus had two motivations in his desire to reorganize the Army's combat divisions. Secretary Wilson's Department of Defense pressed the chief of staff to reduce the size of the Army's divisions while not reducing the number of divisions. At the same time, Ridgway believed that the division structure that had served through World War II and the Korean War was poorly prepared and equipped to survive and win on a modern battlefield. In April 1954, he directed General Dahlquist to prepare a plan for

38. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 12 Apr 1954, sub: Policy for the Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons During Exercise Flashburn, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Paul C. Jussel, "Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956-1960" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2004), Historians Files, CMH.



General John E. Dahlquist (U.S. Army)

developing a new organization and the accompanying table of organization and equipment for the service's atomic-age battlefield divisions.³⁹

Ridgway's directive noted that, although current division organizations provided increased firepower and capabilities as compared to their World War II counterparts, they were also larger and less mobile. He wanted Army Field Forces to explore what he called more favorable combat-potential-to-manpower ratios, making combat units more mobile, flexible, and less vulnerable to atomic attack. This could be done, he believed, without sacrificing support capabilities. He encouraged Dahlquist to explore new technologies that would improve the Army's capacity for sustained operations in an atomic environment. He requested a study of both infantry

39. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 264–65; Jussel, "Intimidating the World"; Memo, Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Dep Ch Staff Plans and Research, for Ch Army Field Forces, 19 Apr 1954, sub: Organization Studies to Improve the Army Combat Potential-to-Manpower Ratio, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

and armored divisions, with the understanding that the airborne divisions would be similar enough to the infantry in most respects. The directive authorized Army Field Forces to reorganize one armored and one infantry division into provisional organizations for the purpose of testing new concepts. The final plan and new tables of organization and equipment were due to the assistant chief of staff by 1 November 1955.⁴⁰

In July, the Army announced that it was establishing two experimental divisions, for the purpose of testing the prototype organizations under simulated conditions of atomic combat. The two guinea-pig divisions, the press release claimed, would have more mobility, flexibility, and self-sufficiency in combat than ever before. Officially titled Atomic Field Army, or ATFA-1, the infantry and armored divisions were as similar as possible. The infantry division consisted of a separate headquarters battalion; signal, engineer, and tank battalions; seven infantry battalions; division artillery; and a support command. One 4.2-inch mortar battalion and two 105-mm. howitzer battalions made up the division artillery. The support command, a new organization, included medical, maintenance, supply and transport, and personnel service companies. The headquarters battalion included three separate command headquarters to serve as the command and control elements for the battalions, which could be organized into task forces as the situation warranted. Total strength of the division was about 13,500, a cut of almost 4,000 from the previous infantry division structure.⁴¹

The new armored division organization looked similar. It included headquarters, signal, engineer, and reconnaissance battalions; three medium and three heavy tank battalions; three armored infantry battalions; division artillery; and a support command. The division artillery was the same as the infantry division, except that the 105-mm. howitzers were self-propelled rather than towed. Like the infantry division, the headquarters element included three separate combat command headquarters. The strength of the division was approximately 12,000, a drop of almost 2,700 from the previous organization.⁴²

Both divisions introduced some significant changes to traditional models. Each consolidated all aircraft into an aviation company of some fifty aircraft in the headquarters battalion. The new organization placed antiaircraft guns within the field artillery battalions. Separate antiaircraft battalions and military police companies disappeared from both divisions. Neither division fielded atomic weapons, which the new organizations moved to the field

40. Memo, Lemnitzer for Ch Army Field Forces, 19 Apr 1954, sub: Organization Studies.

41. "Army to Organize Two Experimental A-War Divisions," *Army Times*, 17 Jul 1954; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 265–67.

42. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 267–69.

army level. The newly devised division support commands also introduced drastic changes that were discomfiting to many senior officers. Unlike in the old regiment, which was nearly self-contained, combat commanders had to turn to the division support commander for maintenance, supply, or administration needs that exceeded the capability within their battalions. The change created a unit with an extended span of control and additional responsibilities that were new to many service support officers.⁴³ (*See Charts 2 and 3.*)

Headquarters, Army Field Forces, quickly made plans to test the new concepts. On 8 September 1954, it issued two almost identical sets of guidance for creating prototypes of the new divisions and preparing for evaluations. It addressed each letter to commandants of Army branch schools and technical service chiefs. Exercise FOLLOW ME would evaluate the new infantry division. Army Field Forces tasked the commandant of the Infantry School to prepare a detailed plan for a field test of the provisional organization. The Third Army's commanding general received the responsibility for providing troops and logistical and administrative support. Exercise BLUE BOLT would assess the new armored division structure. The commandant of the Armored School had the responsibility of preparing the field test, and the commanding general of the Fourth Army provided required support.⁴⁴

The assumptions contained in the guidance gave clear indication of the intent behind the new organizations. The scenario would depict a conflict with atomic weapons available and prevalent on both sides. Corps and higher headquarters would provide atomic delivery means—including guns, guided missiles, rockets, and tactical air—down to the division level. Both sides also would prepare for chemical and biological weapons. All aspects of the exercise would emphasize the conditions of a battlefield dominated by atomic weapons. The first ten days of the maneuver would examine battalion and combat command-level operations; the final eighteen days would look at the division as a whole.⁴⁵


The guidance also provided periods before the formal testing to organize and prepare the provisional divisions and to conduct tactical and command post exercises at all levels within the force. The tasking did not identify a specific date for the tests to occur, but it requested a submission of the

43. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 267–69; Jussel, “Intimidating the World.”

44. Memo, Col. H. M. Rund, Adjutant Gen, for Ch Engs et al., 8 Sep 1954, sub: Guidance for Plan of Field Test, Exercise Blue Bolt; Memo, Col. H. M. Rund, Adjutant Gen, for Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, et al., 8 Sep 1954, sub: Guidance for Plan of Field Test, Exercise Follow Me; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

45. Memo, Rund for Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, et al., 8 Sep 1954, sub: Guidance for Plan of Field Test.


Chart 2—Atomic Field Army Infantry Division, 30 September 1954



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 266.

Chart 3—Atomic Field Army Armored Division, 30 September 1954



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 268.

detailed plan to Headquarters, Army Field Forces, by 15 November, roughly two months from the date of receipt.⁴⁶

Although the plans for the new divisions assumed that both sides would employ atomic weapons from the onset of any future conflict, some officers were not at all certain that would be the case. General Ridgway, in particular, feared that the new structures placed too much emphasis on atomic warfare and not enough on the ability to wage a conventional war. He directed General Dahlquist to have another look at his study with the idea of stressing a dual capability. Explaining the task to Dahlquist, General Gavin, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, wrote that previous studies had focused only on preparing for a two-sided atomic war. The chief of staff wanted a new study on the future organization of the Army for the period of 1960 to 1970. In that study, as well, he wanted to develop an organization capable of waging both an atomic and conventional war.⁴⁷

Although the goal was to provide a dual-capable force, the list of assumptions attached to Gavin's letter indicated a continued concern for the Army's role on an atomic battlefield. The object of the study was to develop doctrinal and organizational concepts applicable to sustained land combat on the Eurasian land mass for the foreseeable future. Clear, but unspoken, was the conviction that the Soviet Union and China remained the principal subjects of American military preparations. National survival depended upon the development and retention of both a nuclear and a nonnuclear military establishment. Ridgway assumed that both the United States and "the enemy" would operate in an era of nuclear plenty.⁴⁸ The Army would have available a new family of weapons, including surface-to-surface guided missiles with a nuclear capability; long-range rockets, also with a dual capability; and nuclear projectiles available for larger calibers of field artillery. Smaller calibers would employ high-fragmentation ammunition.⁴⁹

The rest of the G-3's concept guidance portrayed an evolving vision of the Army's future requirements. Because war involving atomic weapons could

46. Memo, Rund for Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, et al., 8 Sep 1954, sub: Guidance for Plan of Field Test.

47. "Army to Organize Two Experimental A-War Divisions"; Ltr, Gen. John E. Dahlquist, Ch Army Field Forces, to Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, Cdr, Seventh Army, 14 Feb 1955, File Unit: Entry 2000, Series: USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953-1955, RG 549: Records of U.S. Army, Europe, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Staff, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army During the Period 1960-1970, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

48. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Army Field Forces, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army During the Period FY 1960-1970, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

49. Memo, Gavin for Ch Army Field Forces, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army.

be over shortly after hostilities began, the nation must place its reliance on forces in being rather than those to be mobilized. Once the conflict began, mobility in an atomic environment would be virtually impossible without air superiority. Thus, the Army needed some form of aerial capability, both for tactical reconnaissance and for movement over the expanded area required by dispersed forces. For economy and flexibility, the organization should centralize all assets not habitually required by a unit at a higher level. The reorganization should eliminate all unnecessary “frills” (although it was unclear who would determine what constituted a frill).⁵⁰ Conversely, the greater dispersion of units would aggravate the problem of logistical support. Efforts to create more favorable combat-to-support ratios must not disregard essential service support requirements. Ultimately, in addition to expanded requirements for individual replacements, atomic warfare would demand the frequent replacement of entire units up to battalion size. By the end of the year, special study groups at the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the Combat Developments Section at Army Field Forces headquarters in Fort Monroe, Virginia, were hard at work on the continued study.⁵¹

EXPLORING OTHER NEW FORMS OF WARFARE

General Ridgway believed that creating an organization capable of fighting on an atomic battlefield would enable the Army to remain relevant within the framework of the New Look defense policies, but neither he nor many of his officers accepted the idea that the bomb had rendered more traditional combat obsolete. General Gavin emerged as one of the primary skeptics who believed that the Army could not abandon its embrace of basic military principles. In his analysis of Army operations in Korea, Gavin observed that mechanization had eliminated what he called the “mobility differential” between ground forces and those specialized units that performed the traditional missions of cavalry.⁵² This change, in turn, robbed ground commanders of the ability to gather intelligence, screen movements,

50. Memo, Gavin for Ch Army Field Forces, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army.

51. Memo, Gavin for Ch Army Field Forces, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army; Ltr, Dahlquist to McAuliffe, 14 Feb 1955.

52. Christopher C. S. Cheng, *Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 70.

provide advance scouting and security, or strike out quickly in advance of a main body.⁵³

In April, Gavin expounded on this observation in an article for *Harper's* magazine entitled "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses." In the piece, he highlighted the role of cavalry throughout history and, particularly, its lack of impact in Korea. Because of the extreme terrain in Korea and the rapid evolution of antitank weapons, the tank was no longer the dominant weapon on the battlefield. Gavin expressed his view that the Army must recover the lost mobility differential between cavalry and the supported ground force to be successful in future battle. An atomic battlefield, he believed, only accentuated the requirement because of the extended dispersion of units and the greater need for scouting and advanced warning. Although agreements with the Air Force prevented the Army from developing fixed-wing aircraft larger than basic observation and liaison models, fewer restrictions existed on rotary aircraft. The article only mentioned the helicopter in passing, but it seemed clear that helicopters possessed the potential to provide the speed and mobility that the general was seeking.⁵⁴

Gavin's article was, in fact, an unofficial summary of several staff studies the office of the G-3 had prepared under his guidance. Gavin's deputy, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, and the director of doctrine and combat development, Col. John J. Tolson, had already begun work on potential designs for cavalry-type organizations designed around the helicopter. In a short time, the Army was moving away from its visualization of the helicopter as a flying truck to a more flexible and tactical aircraft that might be used in a variety of roles. In a letter to the chief of Army Field Forces, Gavin urged him to pursue uses for the helicopter in the combat arms rather than relegating it to logistical support.⁵⁵

The increased interest in helicopters also propagated the demand for pilots to fly them and mechanics to maintain them. In a briefing for the deputy chief of staff for operations and administration, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Lt. Col. Robert R. Williams of the G-3 staff noted that since 1951, the Army had faced a shortage of aviators, caused by the increased demand for and

53. T. Michael Booth and Duncan Spencer, *Paratrooper: The Life of Gen. James M. Gavin* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 349–51; Cheng, *Air Mobility*, 68–70.

54. James M. Gavin, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," *Harper's Magazine*, Apr 1954, 54–60; "General Gavin, and We Don't Mean Slim Jim," *United States Army Combat Forces Journal* 5 (Aug 1954): 13–15.

55. John J. Tolson, *Airmobility, 1961–71* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), 4–5; Interv, Col. Irving Monclova and Lt. Col. Marlin Lang with Gen. Paul D. Adams, 7 May 1975; Interv, Col. Glenn A. Smith and Lt. Col. August M. Ciancolo with Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson III, 1977; both in Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI; Cheng, *Air Mobility*, 96–97.

greater use of helicopters. The Army had doubled the number of students in training, but that had not yet satisfied all of the requirements. Also, the turnover of officer pilots had been greater than the Army expected following the end of hostilities in Korea. The presence of a disproportionately large number of field grade pilots meant that senior officers had to fill assignments that normally would have gone to more junior grades. Finally, the shortages in pilots forced many aviators trained in branches such as field artillery to fill positions in other branches such as signal corps, engineers, or medical service corps.⁵⁶

The Army's need for aviation personnel had clearly outgrown the ad hoc training establishment that had developed during the Korean War. At the start of 1954, the U.S. Air Force conducted fixed-wing training, the initial stages of rotary training, and part of the maintenance training at Camp Gary in San Marcos, Texas. The Army conducted the remainder of the training for pilots and mechanics, as well as follow-on tactical training, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. By this time, however, Army leaders believed that they could train more efficiently if the entire package was under their control. Fort Sill, however, did not possess sufficient facilities to support any expansion of the existing program.⁵⁷

In February 1954, Maj. Gen. Charles E. Hart, commanding general of the Artillery Center at Fort Sill, reported to Army Field Forces that the division of training responsibilities between the Army and the Air Force had grown unwieldy and had outlived its usefulness. He recommended consolidation of Army Aviation training to provide a more effective program. General Dahlquist supported the request and forwarded the recommendation to the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff. By the end of 1954, however, the Army and the Air Force had not yet resolved this issue.⁵⁸

The Army had more success in consolidating its own portions of the training program. After a broad search for more suitable facilities, leaders settled on Camp Rucker, Alabama, as the place best suited to host the Army Aviation School. The airfield there had three 5,000-foot runways, suitable office and classroom space that the post had recently renovated, and larger buildings suitable for heliports and maintenance hangars. General Ridgway approved the transfer of the training program from Fort Sill to Camp Rucker

56. MFR, Lt. Col. Robert R. Williams, Gen Staff, 7 Dec 1953, sub: Briefing of Deputy Chief of Staff (O and A) on Army Aviation Personnel, 4 Dec 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

57. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, Sec Army, 8 Jul 1954, sub: Army Aviation Training, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

58. Richard P. Weinert Jr., *A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962* (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991), 98.

on 20 July 1954, with Brig. Gen. Carl I. Hutton as commandant. The first class began training there in October, and 120 officers graduated from the program in January 1955.⁵⁹

General Gavin reported in July 1954 that the Army had 3,243 aircraft in operation, but it anticipated an increase to nearly 4,000 by the end of 1956. These included a roughly equal mix of small, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Almost all Army helicopter pilots in 1954 flew one of two aircraft, either the H-13 Sioux, a light helicopter used for observation or medical evacuation, or the H-19 Chickasaw, a heavier model used for transport and light cargo hauls. Neither aircraft was particularly satisfactory, and the service greatly desired more dependable replacements. Based in part on limitations imposed by the 1952 agreements between the Army and the Air Force, the Army diverted a portion of its research and development funds to the Air Force or Navy so that their aeronautical experts could develop aircraft to meet Army specifications. Although Army researchers could work on separate components, such as communications or navigation systems, the other services coordinated the development of the aircraft as a whole. For 1954, aviation research for the Army focused upon development of an improved medium-sized helicopter, for medical evacuation and general utility, and a heavier model intended to carry five to seven tons of cargo, or roughly fifty combat-loaded troops. Contractors, working under Air Force direction, tested a few models, but, by the end of the year, none appeared particularly promising.⁶⁰

The Army's experiences in Korea had reaffirmed another form of warfare that would gain adherents during the Cold War. At the urging of then Secretary of the Army Frank C. Pace Jr., the Army had established the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in 1951, with Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure as its first chief. A year later, the service established the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The mission of the center, identified in the initial orders, was to conduct individual and unit training in psychological warfare and special forces operations; to develop and test doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; and to test and evaluate equipment employed in psychological warfare and special forces operations. At the same time, the Army activated its initial special forces group, the 10th Special Forces Group, under Col. Aaron Bank. Expanding

59. Weinert, *History of Army Aviation*, 100.

60. Memo, Gavin for Ch Staff, Sec Army, 8 Jul 1954, sub: Army Aviation Training; U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jan–30 Jun 1954, 122; Joseph Bykofsky, "The Support of Army Aviation, 1950–1954," in "Transportation Corps in the Current National Emergency," Historical Report No. 4, Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1955, Historians Files, CMH.



Col. Aaron Bank, 31 March 1953 (U.S. Army, National Archive Still Picture Branch)

on lessons learned by the Office of Strategic Services and Jedburgh units of World War II, the Army intended the new special forces units to act as infiltration or stay-behind elements to train, organize, and lead indigenous resistance movements. The 10th Group spent a year in development and training at Fort Bragg before deploying to Bad Tölz, Germany, late in 1953. A portion of the unit, however, remained behind at Fort Bragg to form the nucleus of a second group, the 77th Special Forces Group.⁶¹

Despite the deployment of the 10th Group, however, the Army's interest in 1954 was less on the special forces component of the center and more on the production of psychological warfare specialists. During World War II, President Eisenhower had become a firm believer in the usefulness of information and propaganda as weapons of war. Working with Special Advisor Charles D. Jackson, the former chief of psychological warfare at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force headquarters, the

61. Col. Alfred H. Paddock, "Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941–1952: Origins of a Special Warfare Capability for the U.S. Army," (Military Studies Program paper, U.S. Army War College, Nov 1979), Carlisle Barracks, PA; Col. Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 168–89.

president made such operations an integral part of his national security and foreign relations programs.⁶² In July, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare prepared guidance for research and planning at the Fort Bragg center. In broad terms, it defined psychological warfare as the planned use of propaganda and other actions for the purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy, neutral, or friendly groups in support of national aims and objectives. More specifically, it said that military psychological warfare was concerned directly with enemy military formations and the reduction of their will to resist efforts against them.⁶³

By mid-1954, the Army Troop Program authorized 1,083 spaces for psychological warfare activities, of which 924 were in operational units. The balance of 159 spaces were in staff and training agencies. The Far East Command maintained one loudspeaker and leaflet company in Korea and one radio broadcasting and leaflet group in Japan. Because of the ongoing personnel reductions, the U.S. European Command had inactivated its assigned radio broadcasting and leaflet group and had reduced the loudspeaker and leaflet company assigned to the Seventh Army to approximately 70 percent of its authorized strength. In the United States, one radio group and one loudspeaker company served at Fort Bragg, assisting with training there, testing new equipment and techniques, and providing replacements for the overseas units.⁶⁴

Officers assigned to psychological warfare units received eight weeks of individual training at Fort Bragg, whereas enlisted personnel went through a two-week indoctrination course. Selected officers also attended international relations and psychology courses at five major American universities. Some officers received additional on-the-job instruction with the United States Information Agency, a government unit that had been established in 1953 to promote national interests abroad. Within their units, enlisted personnel completed instruction in their individual military occupational specialties. During 1954, the Army sent 117 officers through the eight-week course at Fort Bragg, with 29 going on to civil school classes. Newly commissioned officers participated in two hours of indoctrination training as part of their

62. For an in-depth study of Eisenhower's use of psychological warfare and propaganda, see Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006).

63. Ofc Ch Psy Warfare, "Guidance for Military Psychological Warfare Research and Planning," 1 Jul 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 158, Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Special Warfare, Classified Correspondence, 1950–1954, RG 319, NACP.

64. Memo, Col. Joseph R. Groves, Ch Organization and Training Div, for Ch Training Br, 5 Mar 1954, sub: Information on the Army Psychological Warfare Program Requested by the Appropriations Committee of Congress, File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Special Warfare, 1950–1954, RG 319, NACP.

branch school training. Operational units throughout the Army conducted troop information classes exposing troops to the basic principles of psychological warfare.⁶⁵

The Army also maintained another 1,292 troop spaces for psychological warfare specialists in its reserve ranks. Units active in the reserve program included two radio broadcasting and leaflet groups, three loudspeaker and leaflet companies, and two mobilization designation detachments. These units constituted a base from which the Army could draw qualified individuals to reinforce active staff agencies, training installations, or operational units.⁶⁶

One aspect of President Eisenhower's New Look that did play to an Army strength was continental air defense. By 1954, the Army maintained seventy-nine anti-aircraft battalions in the continental United States, Alaska, and Greenland. In July of that year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Secretary Wilson the creation of a joint services air defense command to coordinate both planning and execution of continental air defense. Wilson approved the recommendation and, on 1 September, authorized the Continental Air Defense Command, with the Air Force as its executive agent and Air Force General Benjamin W. Chidlaw as its commanding general. The new organization, consisting of the U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command, the Army Anti-Aircraft Command, and a yet-to-be-established naval component composed of radar picket ships, established its headquarters at Ent Air Force Base near Colorado Springs, Colorado.⁶⁷

General Ridgway and his senior staff recognized that continental air defense was a high visibility mission within the administration's defense policy, and they took great pains to point out the personnel shortages among the air defense battalions as the result of the budgetary cutbacks. Most units in the Anti-Aircraft Command operated at a reduced strength of 70 percent or less of the allocation authorized in the table of organization and equipment. National guard officers and troops filled seven of the older 90-mm. gun battalions on a full-time basis. As the command continued to transition to 75-mm. Skysweeper radar-directed guns and the Nike missile system, Lt. Gen. John T. Lewis, the commanding general, pressed the

65. Memo, Groves for Ch Training Br, 5 Mar 1954, sub: Information on the Army Psychological Warfare Program.

66. Memo, Groves for Ch Training Br, 5 Mar 1954, sub: Information on the Army Psychological Warfare Program.

67. Notes, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Legislative Meeting, 13 Dec 1954, Ann Whitman Files (microfilm), Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, AHEC; Bolling W. Smith and William C. Gaines, "Coast Artillery Organization A Brief View," in *American Seacoast Defenses: A Reference Guide*, ed. Mark A. Berhow (McLean, VA: Coast Defense Study Group Press, 2015), 430; Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 113, 138.



A radar-guided 75-mm. anti-aircraft gun, the U.S. Army's Skysweeper (*Stadtarchiv Kiel, Schleswig-Holstein, Germany*)

Army Staff to increase the personnel strength of his battalions. Without an increase of troops, trained on the new systems, he said, he would be unable to maintain operational readiness throughout his command.⁶⁸

In addition to its interest in helicopters, the Army focused its research and development efforts upon several technologies aimed at adapting the force to its vision of atomic warfare. The service had just begun fielding the Corporal missile, the Honest John rocket, and the Nike anti-aircraft missile. Researchers continued to develop new missiles with greater range and payload. The other services, however, began to criticize the Army's plans to increase the range of its weapons. Citing the Key West Agreement of 1948, the Air Force complained that the Army was encroaching on the Air Force's responsibility to engage targets beyond the immediate depth of the battlefield. The Corporal missile, with a 75-mile range, and the Nike anti-aircraft missile, with a horizontal range of 25 miles, already seemed to exceed those boundaries. Many Air Force officers challenged the Army's interest in continental air defense, believing that also to be an exclusive Air

68. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 113; Memo, Lt. Gen. John T. Lewis for Asst Ch Staff, G-1, 16 Mar 1954, sub: Personnel Actions Required to Maintain Operational Effectiveness; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 14 Oct 1954, sub: Increase in Strength of the Anti-aircraft Command; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



A Corporal missile is elevated in firing position, 15 September 1961. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

Force interest. The Army's continued research and development efforts in these areas soon reignited bitter rivalries that had existed between the two services since their separation in 1947.⁶⁹

Other Army research efforts dealt with more traditional weapons and equipment. The recently fielded M47 and M48 Patton tanks had experienced numerous mechanical failures, and service efforts to provide product improvements were well underway. Likewise, development of the M59, a new armored personnel carrier designed to provide mobility and overhead cover for advancing infantry, was also in progress. Project VISTA, an analysis of combat requirements for a land war in Europe conducted by prominent physicists, researchers, and military officers at the California Institute of Technology in 1951, had emphasized a requirement for more cost-effective antitank weapons to offset the Soviet numerical advantage. To that end, Army researchers continued the ongoing development of

69. MFR, Col. Roy E. Moore, Gen Staff, 5 Mar 1954, sub: Status of Corporal and Honest John Programs; Memo, Maj. Gen. J. D. O'Donnell, Chair, Army Electronic Warfare Policy Council, 17 May 1954, sub: The Role of Land-Based Electronic Countermeasures in Air Defense and Its Employment; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 4 Jun 1954, sub: Briefing for Acting Secretary Milton, Ridgway Papers, MHI; Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 179-82.

two interdependent systems, the battalion antitank weapon—a 106-mm. recoilless rifle—and the Ontos, a relatively lightweight tracked vehicle mounting six of the weapons. Although initial testing revealed flaws in both components, General Ridgway and other supporters urged continued efforts to get the system into the field.⁷⁰

Emerging from the stalemate in Korea, Army leaders recognized that the nature of war was changing. Their experiments with doctrine and organization recognized the possibilities of atomic conflict. Their focus on peripheral missions and new approaches to combat reflected an understanding that, if it were to remain an integral component of national strategy and defense policy, the Army not only had to modernize but also to diversify. With the competition for a diminishing defense budget becoming a zero-sum game, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of defense openly questioning the relevance of conventional ground combat, many senior officers within the Army began to feel that their service was fighting for its very existence.

REORGANIZATION

The end of the war in Korea allowed the Army to resume the reorganization and downsizing efforts it had begun after World War II. In May 1954, the chief of staff approved a plan for the consolidation and elimination of excess depot and storage facilities throughout the continental United States. Of its existing seventy-three supply sites, the Army announced that it would close seventeen. The U.S. Air Force assumed ownership of seven of the depots, reducing their requirement to construct new warehouses. The General Services Administration and other government agencies assumed responsibility for several other sites.⁷¹

Meanwhile, proposals for Army Staff reorganization that had originated in the recommendations of the Davies Committee in 1953 had continued

70. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 27 Dec 1954, sub: Review of Requirements for m59 Type Vehicle, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 21 Dec 1953, sub: Memo of Conversation with Dr. Vannevar Bush, Ridgway Papers, MHI; Elliot V. Converse III, *Rearming for the Cold War, 1945-1960*, vol. 1, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2012), 165-70.

71. Memo, Maj. Gen. Edward J. O'Neill, Director of Supply Ops, for Ch Staff, 14 Sep 1954, sub: Improvements in Combat Potential of the Army Within Limited Resources, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Supply Shake-up Expected to Hit 17 Army Depots," *Army Times*, 14 Aug 1954.

to percolate. Progress had stalled, largely owing to disagreements between Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (Logistics), Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, over supervision and control of technical services personnel. On 14 June, the Army announced the "Secretary of the Army's Plan for Army Organization," known as the Slezak Plan after the new undersecretary of the Army, John Slezak. In general, the plan followed many of the recommendations of the Davies Plan, but it reflected General Palmer's views by rejecting the concept of a supply command and creating a more powerful deputy chief of staff for logistics with command authority over the technical services.⁷²

Three days later, on 17 June, the secretary of defense approved the reorganization plan. Wilson viewed the proposal as a positive effort to clarify lines of authority and accountability within the Department of the Army and allow the service secretary to delegate authority to principal civilian and military subordinates. At the secretarial level, the plan freed the undersecretary of the Army from logistics functions in order to serve solely as the alter ego and deputy to the secretary of the army. Consequently, the Army would create two new positions: an assistant secretary for logistics and an assistant secretary for civil-military affairs. These two positions combined with the existing assistant secretary for manpower and reserve forces and assistant secretary for financial management for a total of four assistant secretaries. The plan further visualized that each major function assigned to an assistant secretary of defense, an assistant to the secretary of defense, or the general counsel would find a specific corresponding executive within the Department of the Army.⁷³

The plan incorporated most of General Palmer's concerns regarding the consolidation of the technical services—including chemical, medical, engineers, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and transportation—under the direction of a newly created deputy chief of staff for logistics. The deputy chief would have command responsibility over the technical services along with staff supervision over logistical activities overseas. The logistics staff would be expanded to provide the career management, personnel administration, budgeting, allocation of funds, material research and development, procurement, supply, and legal functions of the technical services. The responsibility for the training activities and functions of the technical services would also shift to the deputy chief of staff for logistics, but

72. James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 228–32.

73. Rpt, 14 Jun 1954, "Secretary of the Army's Plan for Army Organization," File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

it would be subject to further study. Perhaps not completely coincidentally, General Palmer became the first deputy chief of staff for logistics on 13 September 1954.⁷⁴

The most sweeping change recommended by the plan and approved by Secretary Wilson was the establishment of the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC). Under the existing organization, the commanders of the six continental armies and the Military District of Washington reported directly to the chief of staff, bypassing Army Field Forces, the headquarters overseeing all active Army units in the continental United States. This former structure kept the chief involved in too many matters that could be dealt with better at a lower level. The new command would inherit all of the functions assigned to the Army Field Forces, but additionally, would exert command authority over all of the continental armies, developing and approving plans and budgets, supervising and evaluating training, and maintaining testing boards for the development of materiel. Finally, the reorganization delegated direction and control of Army service schools to CONARC.⁷⁵ (See Chart 4.)


Reaction to the approved plan across the Army was immediate and vocal. On 3 July, the *Army Times* published a front-page story entitled “Slezak Plan Shocks Army.” The article suggested that someone had imposed the plan upon the Army without consultation with the service’s own leaders. It quoted unnamed general officers predicting that the Army would fall flat on its face in the event of war, with one stating that the “plan could only mean the needless killing of thousands of young men.”⁷⁶ General Ridgway and Vice Chief of Staff General Charles L. Bolte fired back the next week. In separate interviews with the same reporters, both men expressed their complete and enthusiastic support for the reorganization. Both admitted that the plan presented some challenges for personnel management, but they asserted that the service’s senior leadership had already begun sorting out the issues. Both generals also made a point to endorse the new logistical setup that would, they believed, provide all necessary support should the nation once again find itself at war. Ridgway informed the Army Staff in no uncertain terms that they had had the opportunity to submit their comments and recommendations and that the committee had considered them. The

74. Rpt, 14 Jun 1954, “Secretary of the Army’s Plan for Army Organization.”

75. Rpt, 14 Jun 1954, “Secretary of the Army’s Plan for Army Organization”; Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 266–67.

76. John Gerrity, “Slezak Plan Shocks Army,” *Army Times*, 3 Jul 1954.

Chart 4—Secretary of the Army's (The Slezak) Plan, 14 June 1954



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Notes

1. General Management, Analysis, and Review
2. Panama, Alaska, Civil Functions, Politico-Military-Economic Affairs
3. Direct working relationships with civilian and military personnel elements of Army Staff
4. Additional direct responsibilities to Assistant Secretary (Civil-Military Affairs)

Source: James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 233.

administration and the secretary of defense had approved the plan, and the Army Staff would carry it out enthusiastically.⁷⁷

The issue that seemed to generate the most questions and concern was the establishment of CONARC. General Weible, the deputy chief of staff for operations and administration, explained that the purpose of the reorganization was to remove operating functions from the Army Staff as much as possible. The staff could then focus on its primary responsibilities of policymaking, general supervision, and coordination. The CONARC headquarters would function in a manner corresponding to an Army group headquarters, with fewer administrative duties, as these still would be handled at the Army area or installation level. Weible asserted that the implementation would be an evolutionary process and that various actions would be phased in over the next year.⁷⁸

In the months that followed, numerous general officers continued to vent their apprehensions over the proposed changes. The leaders of the technical services, in particular, expressed serious concern over the delegation of direction and control of Army service schools to CONARC. In October, General Ridgway sent a personal letter to each chief of a technical service emphasizing the benefits of consolidating direction of the schools. He reassured the officers that the changes would not impair their ability to influence the instruction within their own branches. Moreover, he instructed each chief to nominate a branch representative to serve on the CONARC staff. He concluded each letter with a peroration commending the addressees for displaying their personal leadership so conspicuously in the past. Perhaps with the understanding that this was the last polite request for their cooperation that they would receive, most of the Army's senior officers fell in line and went to work on the reorganization.⁷⁹

PERSONNEL ISSUES

The budget and personnel reductions imposed by the Eisenhower administration presented a paradox to leaders throughout the Army. On

77. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Ridgway, Bolte Back Reorganization Plan," *Army Times*, 10 Jul 1954; Memo, Col. George P. Welch, Acting Ch Info, for Sec Gen Staff, 29 Jun 1954, sub: Army Times Critique of the Army Reorganization Plan; MFR, Col. K. L. Davis, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 7 Jul 1954, sub: General Council Meeting, 1130 hours, 7 July 1954; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

78. MFR, Davis, 7 Jul 1954, sub: General Council Meeting, 1130 hours, 7 July 1954.

79. Ltr, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to Maj. Gen. George E. Armstrong, Surgeon Gen, et al., 25 Oct 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

the one hand, the mandated personnel cuts enabled them to reduce the numbers of soldiers and officers recruited into the service by a substantial amount. The Army would take advantage of the opportunity to remove from active duty thousands of soldiers who could not meet the sterner standards of a modern technological force. On the other hand, even with lower force strength levels, recruiters faced increasing difficulty in bringing enough new blood into the Army. Military service remained unpopular with many in the civilian community, because the Army could not provide the pay, benefits, and stability that the flourishing economy offered.

For some time, Army leaders had expressed concerns about the problem of illiterate and semi-illiterate soldiers throughout the ranks. A growing number of soldiers who passed through basic and initial training eventually failed higher-level training because they could not master the increasingly complex weapons, vehicles, and equipment of the modern Army. Through its military occupational classification project in 1949, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had established intellectual requirements for military service. This action created four separate mental groups based on tests and evaluations of inprocessing recruits. It also mandated that the services could not reject induction of any individual who met the minimum mental acuity standards. In 1953 and again in 1954, the services recommended raising the minimum intellectual standards for acceptance into the military and reducing the number of recruits coming in from the lowest of the four groups.⁸⁰

With the newly assigned personnel ceilings, in 1954, the Army announced programs for separating some officers and enlisted personnel from active service. It accelerated the release of about 4,000 officers, moving their discharge dates from 30 June or after to February through May, thus getting them off the books before the end of the fiscal year. In the enlisted area, the Army released about 20,000 soldiers whose mental qualification score was at the lower end of the minimally acceptable group. At the same time, several commanders expressed their concerns to the chief of staff over the large number of field grade officers who remained on active service despite a lack of advanced civilian and military education. The personnel cutbacks and the decrease in available funds had made it difficult for those officers to receive the education and training they needed to remain qualified for their

80. Memo, Sec Def George C. Marshall for Service Secs, 2 Apr 1951, sub: Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower; Memo, Asst Sec Army Fred Korth for Ch Staff, 8 Jan 1953, sub: Basic Education of Troops; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–30 Jun 1954, 83–84.

positions. The implied message to the chief of staff was that the Army could not use any minimally acceptable officers either.⁸¹

In April 1954, however, General Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, reported that he had instituted an intensive recruiting campaign to offset the sharp decline in reenlistment rates. Factors adversely affecting reenlistment included negative publicity regarding military life; lack of command emphasis on retaining good soldiers, particularly among officers who themselves desired to return to civilian status; and the ready availability of civilian employment. He also noted that the Army's decision in 1953 to require higher mental scores for reenlistment had reduced the number of soldiers eligible to reenlist. General Young observed that passage of legislation before Congress to improve military housing, increase reenlistment bonuses, improve dependent health care, and provide concurrent travel for families of troops going overseas would go a long way toward improving the rates of both recruitment and reenlistment.⁸²

By the end of the year, efforts toward improving military benefits achieved only mixed success. Under pressure from officials in the Departments of Defense and the Treasury, Congress tabled discussions of a military pay raise for at least another year. However, it did agree to set up a committee to discuss a new survivor benefits plan that would equalize benefits provided to families of regular and reserve soldiers. The Department of Defense also approved funding of several thousand new housing units at Army bases across the United States. General Ridgway announced plans for a program to rotate troops overseas as part of entire divisions. Dubbed Operation GYROSCOPE, the exercise would exchange entire divisions between the United States and Europe, keeping those units together for extended periods and allowing families to accompany their soldiers as they moved overseas. The chief of staff hoped that the scheme would alleviate many of the morale issues that had developed from soldiers spending long tours away from their families. Planners expected that by rotating entire units, personnel turbulence would be less of a problem. Soldiers could remain with their same unit for longer periods, helping to build greater cohesion and esprit de corps.⁸³

81. Memo, Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 16 Mar 1954, sub: Military Education of Officers, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified Correspondence, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. See also Brian M. Linn, *Elvis's Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

82. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Asst Ch Staff, G-1, for Ch Staff, 30 Apr 1954, sub: Re-enlistment Rates, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

83. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Pay Raise Dead," *Army Times*, 26 Jun 1954; "New Survivor Benefits Plan Under Study in Pentagon," *Army Times*, 11 Sep 1954; "7000 Housing Units Planned," *Army Times*, 11 Dec 1954; Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Sec Def, 10 Sep 1954,

One personnel action that the service pointed to with a measure of pride was the elimination of racially segregated units throughout the Army. In November 1953, Assistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hannah had forecast that Army integration virtually would be completed by the end of June 1954. On 10 July, the service announced that 98 percent of Black soldiers in the Army were now serving in integrated units that previously had been regarded as “White” units. Only fifteen small, company-sized units were still segregated, and these units would be integrated through normal personnel rotation by the end of the year. In November, the Army announced that, because of integration, the number of Black officers and enlisted soldiers attending service schools had more than doubled. Personnel officers cited tangible increases in Black officer promotions and an increasing supply of technically trained Black specialists. The service’s public information office promoted reports that the Justice Department, in prosecuting cases before the Supreme Court to end racial segregation in public schools, relied heavily on Army experiences to prove that integration could occur without provoking needless tensions.⁸⁴

Far less successful were Army efforts to improve the readiness of the reserve forces on which it depended in the case of a national emergency. The end of the Korean War had prompted numerous studies of reserve issues, and many of these continued into 1954. In January, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Preparedness, chaired by Senator Leverett M. Saltonstall of Massachusetts, released a report identifying many of the problems limiting reserve participation, but offering few solutions. The report asserted that the budgeted strength figure of 835,000 for June 1954 was completely unrealistic and “utterly incapable of being reached.”⁸⁵ The national guard units were able to maintain something close to their

sub: Measures to Improve Combat Effectiveness and Career Attractiveness of the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. For further information on Operation GYROSCOPE, see Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 222–30.

84. “Army Reports Integration Program is 98% Complete,” *Army Times*, 10 Jul 1954; “Services Abolish All Negro Units,” *Army Times*, 6 Nov 1954; Memo, Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin, Adjutant Gen, for Cmdg Gens, Continental Armies, 4 Feb 1954, sub: Elimination of Segregation in On-Post Public Schools, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. For more information on the integration of the U.S. Army, see Morris J. MacGregor Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*, Defense Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981) and Bernard C. Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor Jr., eds., *Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981).

85. Memo, Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, Special Asst for Reserve Components, for Ch Staff, 30 Jan 1954, sub: Report of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness (Saltonstall), File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP

authorized strength, largely because of the draft deferment allocated to certain individuals who joined Guard units, but Army Reserve participation offered no such inducement, and its enrollment continued to suffer. The committee also noted that much of the reserve training involved classroom lectures and films. With so many units well understrength, the Army could not justify the issue of major items of equipment to support more substantial training. When the committee observed that reserve commanders spent a large portion of their time recruiting, Army witnesses responded that, because participation in the program was purely voluntary, unit commanders would not have units to command if they did not recruit.⁸⁶

The only major step the Army was able to take toward reforming its reserve component was to focus more of its recruiting efforts on individuals who had no prior service. In a change to its established procedures, the Army agreed to provide recruits who had no prior service with the same initial training provided to recruits for the active force. Department of Defense regulations stipulated, however, that only those individuals who enlisted to serve for four years on active duty would receive veterans' benefits. Although the Army attempted to reduce that requirement to three years, it was unsuccessful.⁸⁷

More serious reform would have to wait for further legislation. Most reserve units continued to lack full complements of personnel, equipment, and facilities to conduct realistic training. Nor did they have dedicated time for training that unit commanders could enforce. As the number of combat veterans began to decline, the problem of maintaining an experienced reserve force would only get worse. Even as the service debated the preparation, training, roles, and missions to be assigned to its reserve forces, it continued to struggle to recruit a force anywhere near adequate for the task.⁸⁸

86. Memo, Milburn for Ch Staff, 30 Jan 1954, sub: Report of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness (Saltonstall).

87. Memo, Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, Special Asst for Reserve Components, for Ch Staff, 18 May 1954, sub: Reserve Mobilization Requirements, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

88. Col. (Ret.) Jon T. Hoffman and Col. (Ret.) Forrest L. Marion, *Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 47; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1983* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 115–20.

PEERING INTO THE FUTURE

In September 1950, the first contingent of officers and enlisted soldiers making up the newly authorized U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina, had arrived in Saigon. U.S. observers in Vietnam had grown concerned with French efforts to subdue the independence movement spearheaded by the anticolonialist Viet Minh and had recommended that the United States establish a military group to monitor the situation in Vietnam and to assist with the requisitioning, procurement, and receipt of U.S. equipment and weapons. By the end of 1950, the group had grown to about seventy, but even this number proved completely unable to monitor the distribution and use of U.S. equipment throughout Vietnam. As a result, inspection teams frequently had to rely on French reports of field operations rather than their own direct observation. For the moment, however, U.S. involvement in Korea prevented any expansion of efforts in Vietnam.⁸⁹

By late 1953, the French situation in Vietnam had deteriorated even further. Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, a member of the Joint Staff who accompanied Vice President Richard M. Nixon on a fact-finding mission to Southeast Asia, reported that French efforts to disperse the Viet Minh and to create a national Vietnamese army had failed completely. The Viet Minh, he reported, controlled 60 percent of the Red River Delta, and the French were struggling to maintain communications with their outlying forces. At night, the French held only Hanoi and Hải Phòng in the north. French-Vietnamese relations were strained, and rumors were spreading that the French had already proposed terms to the Viet Minh for a conference to negotiate the ending of the war.⁹⁰

In May 1953, French Lt. Gen. Henri E. Navarre assumed command of French forces in Vietnam. Navarre pledged to initiate aggressive operations against the Viet Minh to regain the initiative, highlighted by a major offensive to begin that autumn. True to his word, on 20 November, Navarre launched 3,000 French paratroopers into a broad valley close to the Laotian border near a small village called Điện Biên Phủ. Whether to serve as the base of operations for smaller thrusts against the enemy or, as some believed, an attempt to lure the Viet Minh into a decisive battle, the enterprise was doomed to failure. The Communists soon captured the high ground surrounding the small French garrison and brought more than 200 artillery pieces and heavy

89. Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960*, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 111–16.

90. Spector, *Advice and Support*, 181; MS, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “U.S. Army Policy Towards Vietnam, 1945–1954,” Historians Files, CMH.

mortars to bear on the troops below. The battle for Điện Biên Phủ became a siege that would last for almost six months.⁹¹

In March, with the battle raging, the chief of the French armed forces' general staff, General Paul H. R. Ély, arrived in Washington, D.C., to consult with the American leadership and to request that U.S. air support intervene to break the siege. Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly supported such intervention and took up the cause with President Eisenhower and the other Joint Chiefs. For perhaps the first time, American military and political leaders began a serious consideration of what it might mean to intervene in Vietnam.⁹²

Eisenhower himself was not particularly inclined to intervene. He was willing to provide some additional aircraft for French use in the conflict, but he was loath to consider any option that involved the introduction of any additional U.S. troops into the theater. In a letter to his close friend General Alfred M. Gruenther, then serving as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the president wrote that no Western power could go into Asia militarily except as part of a coalition, which must also include Asian nations. He was particularly critical of the French effort in Vietnam, especially France's unwillingness to grant some degree of autonomy and independence to the Vietnamese people. Eisenhower told General Ély that any American intervention would be dependent upon the approval of the U.S. Congress, full British participation in the effort, French recognition of Vietnamese independence, and French recognition of American leadership in any circumstance in which they intervened. As desperate as the French were for assistance, this was a poison pill they could not swallow.⁹³

On 2 April, apparently on his own authority, Admiral Radford called the service chiefs together to collect their views regarding the desirability of providing U.S. naval and air support to the French in their defense of Điện Biên Phủ. General Ridgway was adamant and emphatic in his response. He told Radford that unless the question originated with the president or the secretary of defense, it was clearly outside the proper scope of authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This body, he said, was not charged with formulating foreign policy nor advocating for it, unless its advice was sought by higher authority. More specifically, he continued, whatever happened at Điện Biên

91. Spector, *Advice and Support*, 182–90. The single best work on the battle for Điện Biên Phủ remains Bernard Fall's *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1967).

92. Spector, *Advice and Support*, 191–94; Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 175–83; Jurika, *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam*, 400–5.

93. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 177; Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, 26 Apr 1954; Diary, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 Feb 1954; both in Ann Whitman Files (microfilm), Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, AHEC.

Phủ would not itself decisively affect the military situation in Vietnam. If the United States were to intervene, he concluded, it would greatly increase the risk of general war, a war that the United States was, at this time, not prepared to fight.⁹⁴

As the battle for Điện Biên Phủ entered its final phase, French political resolve began to crumble. In February, at a foreign ministers' conference in Berlin, French and American diplomats agreed to include the issue of Indochina in a planned conference in Geneva, Switzerland, to open on 26 April. Emboldened by the prospect of a negotiated settlement, the Viet Minh commander, Võ Nguyên Giáp, launched an all-out assault on the French garrison. On 8 May, just as negotiations regarding Vietnam began in Geneva, Điện Biên Phủ fell, yielding more than 10,000 French and Vietnamese prisoners.⁹⁵

While the negotiations in Geneva dragged on, military leaders and politicians in the United States debated the nation's response to the anticipated French withdrawal from Southeast Asia. In the National Security Council, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, among others, presented plans to save Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff worked on various options for U.S. military intervention. In the Congress, senators and representatives lined up on both sides of the issue, debating whether they should save the French and, separately, if they should intervene unilaterally and go it alone.⁹⁶

General Ridgway continued to oppose American intervention. In addition to his fears that the commitment of U.S. troops to Vietnam would spark a greater war, he also pointed out the logistical difficulties of supporting a major military effort in a country that lacked the most basic infrastructure requirements. In a briefing the Army Staff had prepared for Secretary Wilson and President Eisenhower, Ridgway pointed out that the two principal ports, Saigon and Hải Phòng, constituted a combined daily capacity of just over 15,000 tons and required considerable dredging before they could reach full capacity. Because of the inadequate road and rail system, almost no capacity existed for moving supplies inland from the ports. Only three airfields in the country could handle heavy bombers, and only eight could accommodate C-119 supply aircraft. Almost all were unusable during the rainy season. The climate itself would prove to be unhealthy for Western troops. The adverse conditions, he said, combined all of those that confronted U.S.

94. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Adm. Radford et al., 2 Apr 1954, Ridgway Papers, MHI; Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 252–54.

95. MS, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., "U.S. Army Policy Towards Vietnam, 1945–1954"; Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place*, 420; Martin Windrow, *The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2004), 624.

96. Spector, *Advice and Support*, 198–208.

forces in the South Pacific and Eastern Asia during World War II and Korea, with the additional complication of a large native population, in thousands of villages, evenly divided between friendly and hostile. General Gavin, the Army G-3, estimated that it would require the equivalent of seven U.S. divisions to replace the French forces.⁹⁷

On 21 July, in Geneva, representatives of France and the Viet Minh signed a cease-fire ending hostilities in Vietnam. Under the terms of the agreement, both sides agreed to partition Vietnam along the 17th Parallel. Armed forces of the Viet Minh were to withdraw north of the parallel, French forces to the south. Representatives from India, Canada, and Poland would form the International Control Commission to monitor the terms of the cease-fire and to supervise general elections throughout Vietnam to occur no later than July 1956. Neither the United States nor representatives of what would become South Vietnam signed the agreement, although the United States pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements. Somewhat paradoxically, President Eisenhower announced during a news conference on the same day that the United States was not itself a party to the agreement and was not bound by the decisions made in it.⁹⁸

Later that month, in a paper discussing the military implications of the cease-fire, General Gavin wrote that the armistice marked a failure of U.S. efforts to support the French in Vietnam and required a reexamination of American policy in Southeast Asia. Although French forces would remain in Vietnam for the foreseeable future, their presence was problematic for the South Vietnamese government, and intelligence suggested that ultimately they would withdraw. Gavin believed that the treaty would be regarded by many in the region as a military, political, and psychological victory for communism and a blow to U.S. influence and prestige in the region. The Viet Minh undoubtedly would use the cease-fire as an opportunity to replenish their forces for future efforts. The Army G-3 warned that if the United States was not prepared to “undertake a program of the scale required to produce decisive results within a short period of time, then it should diminish its efforts in Indochina.”⁹⁹

97. Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Sec Def, 19 May 1954, sub: Indo-China, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 17 May 1954; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, Mar 1954, sub: Military Consequences of Various Courses of Action With Respect to Application of U.S. Military Forces in Indochina; both in Ridgway Papers, MHI.

98. Spector, *Advice and Support*, 219; MS, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “U.S. Army Policy Towards Vietnam, 1945-1954”; Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 209.

99. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 22 Jul 1954, sub: Military Implications of the Cease-fire Agreements in Indochina; Memo, Maj. Gen.

In November 1954, U.S. Senator Michael J. Mansfield led a group of politicians visiting Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In his report to the president, Mansfield wrote that the French had lost in Vietnam largely because they had failed to grant sovereignty to the Vietnamese. The United States, he said, shared some of the blame because it had misjudged the military and political situation and had overestimated the effectiveness of material aid. He noted that the political situation in Vietnam had not improved. Although the new South Vietnamese president, Ngô Đình Diệm, was known for his nationalism and integrity, he had little support from the various political factions within his country. Mansfield warned there was every likelihood that the Viet Minh would win the general election scheduled for 1956.¹⁰⁰

THE YEAR ENDS

As 1954 came to a close, the failure of the French effort in Vietnam and the unresolved question of American policy there loomed before U.S. military and political leaders. Although President Eisenhower had just begun to implement his defense policies based upon the deterrence of nuclear weapons, the conflict in Indochina suggested that more conventional capabilities might not yet be obsolete. Although the United States had avoided direct involvement in Vietnam, Senate Republicans of the “Old Guard” whispered in the president’s ear in support of intervention. In an April news conference, Eisenhower had defined Communist expansion in Southeast Asia in terms of falling dominoes, an image that would endure. For the Army’s part, General Ridgway remained convinced that intervention in Vietnam would mean provoking a war for which his service was not prepared. He remained committed to holding the line against an administration that was determined to starve the Army of the personnel and materiel it needed, and he pushed his commanders and staff to reform and reorganize to meet the requirements of modern warfare.

John M. Willems, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G-2, 25 Jun 1954, sub: Indochina Situation Entering New Phase; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

100. Memo, Maj. Gen. William F. Marquat, Ch Civil Affairs, for Asst Sec Army et al., 4 Nov 1954, sub: Report of Senator Mansfield on Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948-1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

3

Year of “Stabilization”

In July 1955, the new secretary of the Army, Wilber M. Brucker, wrote that, for the Army, 1955 was a year of stabilization and adjustment. It certainly would prove to be a period of adjustment, and any suggestion of stabilization came with a healthy dose of irony. Though the Army had begun to reallocate its resources within the scope of current national military policy, in most other respects, the service continued to respond to buffeting currents produced both by its own leadership and by outside forces competing for influence within American military policy. As a result, Army leaders continued to develop technology, organizations, and doctrine to show that their service could adapt to the requirements of the modern battlefield while still meeting constraints imposed by the political and economic concerns of the Eisenhower administration.¹

CHANGING OF THE GUARD

In his memoirs and later interviews, General Matthew B. Ridgway maintained that he had always planned to retire upon completion of his first tour as chief of staff in June 1955. Nonetheless, it was clear throughout the administration, the Department of Defense, and even the Army Staff that President Dwight D. Eisenhower would not retain him for a second term. The general announced his retirement early in June 1955. As if to reinforce

1. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1955* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 79.

his point, the president also replaced the chief of naval operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, who had also clashed at times with the precepts of the New Look. Hanson W. Baldwin, who regularly covered the Pentagon for the *New York Times*, noted that the departures lent credence to the viewpoint that the administration expected senior military officers to support the party line. He predicted that many officers in the future would “govern their actions by the code of required conformity.”²

Before his departure, Ridgway prepared papers for both the secretary of the Army and the secretary of defense, describing his thoughts on national security and the Army’s role in the country’s defense. To the secretary of the Army, he emphasized the continued threat of the Soviet Union, a “secret, murderous conspiracy,” which was “bent on our ultimate destruction.”³ He wrote that the United States government must arouse the spiritual determination of the people to counter the threat, and that Americans would support such a course only if the national leadership provided them with a clear understanding of what the situation required and why. Any approach, he continued, that had as its primary objective the reduction of dollar costs of the nation’s military program was faulty and should be rejected. In a direct jab at the president’s core philosophy, the general concluded that national fiscal bankruptcy was far preferable to national spiritual bankruptcy.⁴

More infamous was a letter that General Ridgway presented to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson on 27 June. Prepared with the assistance of Maj. Gen. Paul W. Caraway and Brig. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett of the G-3 (Operations) section, the memo spelled out most of Ridgway’s objections to the New Look philosophy. He pointed out that the time was rapidly approaching when neither side would have an advantage in nuclear weapons. Under those conditions, he questioned whether the United States really had the freedom to rely preponderantly on nuclear weapons to exert its military power. Present U.S. military forces, he continued, were inadequate and improperly proportioned to meet all of the nation’s overseas commitments. An overemphasis on airpower had impaired the nation’s overall military

2. Interv, Col. John M. Blair with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 24 Mar 1972; Interv, Col. John J. Ridgway and Lt. Col. Paul B. Walter with Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Mar 1976; both in Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI); Hanson W. Baldwin, “Changes in Joint Chiefs,” *New York Times*, 1 Jun 1955.

3. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Sec Army, 21 Jun 1955, sub: Observations on Basic National Policy, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1947–1964 (hereinafter SCGC 1947–1964), Record Group (RG) 335: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

4. Memo, Ridgway for Sec Army, 21 Jun 1955, sub: Observations on Basic National Policy.

potential. The general concluded with his now familiar belief that it had been his role as chief of staff to confine his advice and testimony to military implications and capabilities, and to leave political and economic considerations to elected leaders.⁵

Upon receiving and reading the letter, Wilson forwarded it to Secretary Robert T. Stevens noting that Ridgway undoubtedly drew its "thought content and philosophy" from classified planning papers and high policy council deliberations.⁶ He directed Stevens to ensure that Ridgway's letter be given an appropriate classification and that the Army limit its distribution. Although the Army G-2 (Intelligence) testified that the document as submitted by General Ridgway was not classified, the Army acceded to Secretary Wilson's wishes and brought all copies of the letter under classified control. Nonetheless, the documents leaked, and an almost verbatim transcript of the letter appeared in the September issue of the *U.S. Army Combat Forces Journal*, a monthly amalgamation of the *Field Artillery Journal* and the *Infantry Journal* published by the Association of the U.S. Army.⁷

Ridgway had one more message to relay to his soldiers before his departure. On 29 June, the Department of the Army published Army Pamphlet 21-70, *The Role of the Army*. With a targeted distribution to every serving officer, warrant officer, and advanced senior ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) cadet, the pamphlet was a distillation of all the principles for which Ridgway had fought during his tour as chief of staff. Although he acknowledged the power of atomic weapons, he warned that "skilled and brave men are still the vital ingredient of military strength, whether they fight in the air, in ships on and beneath the sea, or in the vehicles of the land forces—including those old and tested vehicles called combat boots."⁸ In a message no doubt aimed at President Eisenhower, former Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe, the old paratrooper concluded, "The decisive element of victory in war is

5. Interv, Ridgway and Walter with Hamlett, Mar 1976; Ltr, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to Sec Def Charles E. Wilson, 27 Jun 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: Security Classified Correspondence, 1955 (hereinafter SCC 1955), Subgroup: Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations (hereinafter G-3 Ops), RG 319: Records of the Army Staff, NACP.

6. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert A. Schow, Dep Asst Ch Staff, G-2, for Ch Staff, 23 Jul 1955, sub: Interim Report on General Ridgway's Letter to Mr. Wilson, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955-1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955-1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), RG 319, NACP.

7. Memo, Schow for Ch Staff, 23 Jul 1955, sub: Interim Report on General Ridgway's Letter to Mr. Wilson; "The Communist Threat and the Proper U.S. Strategy," *United States Army Combat Forces Journal* 6 (Sep 1955): 20-24.

8. Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Pamphlet 21-70, *The Role of the Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 29 Jun 1955).

still the trained fighting man who, with his feet on the ground, defeats the enemy's ground fighters, seizes his land, and holds it."⁹

Ridgway's successor was General Maxwell D. Taylor, World War II commander of the 101st Airborne Division and most recently commanding general of the Eighth Army in Korea and the Far East Command. Described in one news editorial as "linguist, diplomat, and tactician of a high order," Taylor had held several quasi-diplomatic positions that seemed to make him a worthy heir apparent. He had served as U.S. Commander, Berlin, shortly after the end of the blockade and, as the Eighth Army commander, had supervised the initial stages of a recovery program that would help to launch South Korea and its armed forces into the modern world. Many senior officers harbored the hope that replacing the forthright-to-the-point-of-bluntness Ridgway with the more diplomatic and politically savvy Taylor would help to elevate the Army's standing with the Eisenhower administration.¹⁰

Taylor himself frequently used two anecdotes to describe his reception into his new role. Describing his initial interviews with Secretary Wilson and the president, Taylor noted that questions posed to him had less to do with his views on world strategy and more to do with his willingness to carry out the orders of civilian leaders even when contrary to his own views. After thirty-seven years of service, he observed, he had no "difficulty of conscience" in reassuring them, but he expressed a bit of surprise at Eisenhower and Wilson subjecting him to such a loyalty test.¹¹ He also frequently had cause to remember the words of departing Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carney, who told him, "You're one of the good new Chiefs now, but you'll be surprised how soon you will become one of the bad old Chiefs."¹² In fact, Taylor would recall in his memoirs that although he never particularly minded the conflicts with his Pentagon peers, he felt keenly the increasing coolness in his relations with President Eisenhower and could not escape the sense that he had let down his former commander.¹³

On 30 June, in his first meeting with key staff officers, Taylor reminded them that he was aware of the battle that they had been waging for the past two years and the reasons for it. Nonetheless, he continued, he was anxious to get the Army out of the doghouse with the commander in chief and the Department of Defense. He wanted to get rid of the reputation for always

9. Ridgway, Army Pamphlet 21-70, *The Role of the Army*.

10. "Soldier's Soldiers," *Army Times*, 21 May 1955. For the most recent biography of Maxwell Taylor, see Ingo W. Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019).

11. Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 170-71.

12. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, 170-71.

13. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959), 28; Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, 170-71.



Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens (*right*) congratulates General Maxwell D. Taylor (*left*) on being sworn in as the new chief of staff of the U.S. Army. Taylor succeeded General Matthew B. Ridgway (*center*) in this role. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

being out of step and to reassure the secretary of defense and the president that the Army was a member of the team. Taylor would return to this theme frequently throughout his tenure as the chief of staff. With teamwork in mind, he emphasized the need for the best-qualified personnel the Army could find to staff the Legislative Liaison and Public Information offices. That was essential, he noted, to reforming and maintaining the reputation of the Army.¹⁴

The new chief of staff expanded upon his philosophy to his vice chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer. The Army should establish in the minds of the public, the Congress, and the Department of Defense that it was an

14. MFR, Col. Alexander D. Surles, Dep Sec Gen Staff, 1 Jul 1955, sub: General Taylor's Meeting with Key Staff Officers, 30 June 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

indispensable member of the first line defense team. Those institutions must regard the Army, Taylor wrote, as open-minded and progressive, constantly looking forward and not back. His most frequently repeated mantra was that the Army is a loyal member of the defense team, quick to defend its own legitimate interests, but scrupulous in not trespassing on those of the other services. He expected Army leaders to express their honest opinions, but once the proper superior authority had made a decision, they must accept it without grumbling and make the best of it.¹⁵

At virtually the same time that General Ridgway was turning over the reins to Taylor, Secretary of the Army Stevens decided to return to private life. After several weeks of rumors following his experience during the McCarthy hearings, Stevens announced his resignation on 22 June. He returned to his position with his family textile company, saying only that “compelling personal considerations” made it necessary for him to leave the Eisenhower administration.¹⁶ On the same morning that he accepted Stevens’s resignation, President Eisenhower announced his nomination of Wilber M. Brucker, general counsel of the Department of Defense and former governor of Michigan, to be the next secretary of the Army.¹⁷

Governor Brucker, a World War I veteran of the 42d Infantry Division (also known as the Rainbow Division) with General Douglas MacArthur, brought many of the same insights to his new position that General Taylor had expressed to his fellow officers. In his initial briefings with the Army Staff, Brucker stated that he considered his position to be that of a salesman, with his main task being selling the Army to Congress. In talking to reporters, the new Secretary said that he was most concerned with the apologetic and defensive attitude taken by Army officers in their joint work with the other services. The Army had a great future, he believed, and he was going to make it his business to restore a positive approach in the ground service’s attitude. After his retirement, General Taylor would remember Brucker as intensely loyal to the Army, so much so, he said, that he became “more royalist than the king.”¹⁸ The chief of staff would have to moderate the secretary’s eloquence and enthusiasm as he used his platform to promote the Army.¹⁹

Shortly after assuming his position as chief of staff, Taylor began work on

15. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for Vice Ch Staff, 25 Jul 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS RG 319, NACP.

16. Anthony Leviero, “Stevens Resigns; Brucker Named Army Secretary,” *New York Times*, 23 Jun 1955.

17. Leviero, “Stevens Resigns; Brucker Named Army Secretary.”

18. Interv, Col. Richard Manion with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 8 Dec 1972, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.

19. Memo, Lt. Col. H. D. Thomte, Asst Sec Gen Staff, for Ch Staff, 9 Jul 1955, sub: Highlights of Briefings for Governor Brucker, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC



Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

an intellectual framework that would support the Army's renewed efforts to expand its role within Eisenhower's defense strategy. The document summarized many of the ideas Taylor had developed over the course of his military career. It emphasized that although the primary purpose of the national military program was to deter general war, the program also required the capability to prevent or defeat local aggression. Because unchecked local aggressions could expand into general war, it was vital for the United States to maintain the ability to prevent or quickly suppress them. The hydrogen bomb, which played an essential role in general war plans, was not an appropriate weapon to deal with border intrusions, jungle and mountain operations, guerrilla warfare, or a coup d'état. Ironically, although nuclear weapons had little role to play in such localized conflicts,

1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Interv, Manion with Taylor, 8 Dec 1972; "Army on the Defensive," *Army Times*, 17 Sep 1955.

those forces designed for limited war could just as easily be deployed in a larger war. Taylor acknowledged the requirement for air and naval forces large enough to deter Communist aggression and to deliver a nuclear riposte if so required. He stressed, however, that the air and sea services needed to provide sufficient resources to transport the ground force to whatever flash points might develop. In summary, the general concluded that a politically acceptable military program might fall somewhat short of meeting all his stated requirements, but it should meet the requirements of deterring both general and local war and for winning the smaller conflicts. Our national military program, he believed, must not be dependent on any single weapon or strategy, but must be prepared for flexible application to unforeseen situations.²⁰

General Taylor then assembled a group of colonels from across the Army Staff to review the outline and suggest how the Army could implement its ideas across the force. In October, the ad hoc committee returned its analysis, which included an examination of specific actions the Army could take to increase its capabilities and an extensive list of organizations and functions it could eliminate to make the service more efficient. The examination supported the idea that the Army needed to embrace a new philosophy of war. Although not yet sharply defined, Taylor's concepts of a more flexible response capability were acceptable enough, and he concluded that, for public purposes, they need not be perfect. These ideas would form the basis for the strategic policy of "Flexible Response," which Taylor would champion for the remainder of his career.²¹

Perhaps with an eye to the former automobile executive currently sitting as secretary of defense, the committee recommended a campaign that translated the chief of staff's ideas into simple, appealing terms that could compete with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps propaganda. "We need slogans and catchwords that people will like," it proclaimed.²² The committee also urged the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff to meet with the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, congressional leaders, and the president to discuss the Army's "new" outlook. The committee also expressed the hope that the new Army leaders were in a

20. "Army on the Defensive"; Kenneth W. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956*, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff Historical Office, 1992), 39–40.

21. Memo, Col. Donovan P. Yeuell Jr., Sec Ad Hoc Committee, for Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, attention Col. George I. Forsythe, 11 Oct 1955, sub: Analysis by Ad Hoc Committee of Chief of Staff's Outline for a National Military Program, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

22. Memo, Yeuell for Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, 11 Oct 1955, sub: Analysis by Ad Hoc Committee.

better position to undertake these heart-to-heart exchanges in view of their relatively "less strained relationships with their superiors than those enjoyed by their predecessors."²³ Most important, the officers noted, was for the Army to speak as one voice in addressing its concerns. The service needed to coordinate the substance of all public and private statements that related to its positions within the national security structure. The committee recommended a concerted effort to "colonize the Office of the Secretary of Defense," making a deliberate effort to select highly qualified officers for assignments to that agency and other joint projects. Those candidates, warned the committee members, should be instructed that their first duty was to serve the Army.²⁴

ARMY ORGANIZATION CONTINUES TO EVOLVE

Despite the secretary of the Army's description of 1955 as a year of stabilization, the service's organization continued to evolve as leaders implemented recommendations offered by the Davies and Slezak plans of the previous two years. In the field of logistics, civilian scientists had complained repeatedly about the subordination of research and development to procurement and production. The vice chief of staff, General Palmer, warned that in order to keep the Army current in the atomic age, research and development needed rank and prestige commensurate with that accorded in the other services. In September, Secretary Brucker created the position of Director of Research and Development and made the post the organizational equivalent to the four existing assistant secretaries. He appointed William H. Martin, then the deputy assistant secretary of defense for applications engineering, to be the first director. The same month, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, now serving as the deputy chief of staff for plans and research, recommended that the Army separate the position of chief of research and development from his office and establish the position as equivalent to the three existing deputy chiefs of staff. Secretary Brucker approved that change as well and, in October, Gavin moved laterally into the new position on the Army Staff, becoming the first independent chief of research and development.²⁵

23. Memo, Yeuell for Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, 11 Oct 1955, sub: Analysis by Ad Hoc Committee.

24. Memo, Yeuell for Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, 11 Oct 1955, sub: Analysis by Ad Hoc Committee.

25. Memo, Wilber M. Brucker, Sec Army, for Ch Staff, 13 Oct 1955, sub: Establishment of the Position of Director of Research and Development, File Unit: Entry A1-2B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963*, Special Studies

In November, Secretary Brucker and General Taylor approved another reorganization of the Army Staff. This change eliminated the existing structure of five deputy chiefs of staff and three assistant chiefs of staff below them and replaced them with three deputy chiefs of staff (for personnel, operations, and logistics), a chief of research and development, a comptroller, and the assistant chief of staff for intelligence. In addition to supervising the G-1 (Personnel) section, the deputy chief of staff for personnel absorbed the functions of the deputy chief of staff for operations and administration. This position also inherited direct supervision and control over the adjutant general's office, the chief of chaplains, the provost marshal general, and the chief of information and education. In addition to overseeing the G-3 section, the deputy chief of staff for military operations assumed the functions of the deputy chief of staff for plans. This position also controlled the chief of civil affairs and military government, the chief of psychological warfare, and the chief of military history. The deputy chief of staff for logistics retained control over the technical service chiefs: the quartermaster general, the chief of engineers, the chief of ordnance, the surgeon general, the chief signal officer, the chief chemical officer, and the chief of transportation.²⁶

The reorganization had the effect of removing the chief of staff from many of the day-to-day functions of the Army. Instead, Taylor created two new agencies to assist with long-range planning within the secretariat of the General Staff. The Coordinating Group would assist the chief of staff in the development and evaluation of long-range strategic plans and act as a liaison with other Army and defense committees. The chief of staff immediately put them to work on a pamphlet explicitly describing his philosophy regarding the Army's role in national defense. The new Programs and Analysis Group coordinated the balancing of Army programs with available money, personnel, and other resources. Most of the changes went into effect the first week of January 1956, after which the staff organization would remain intact for the remainder of the Eisenhower administration.²⁷

On 1 February 1955, the Army redesignated the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, as Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), with command over the six continental armies, the Military

(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 238–39; Elliott V. Converse III, *Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960*, vol. 1, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2012), 606–7.

26. Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Nov 1955, sub: Organizational Changes, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Steve Tillman, “G-2 Will be Only ‘G’ Under Army Headquarters Plan,” *Army Times*, 8 Dec 1955; Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 238.

27. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 238–41.

District of Washington, the five service test boards, an arctic test branch, and three human resources research units. The new command assumed the responsibilities for plans and execution of operations for ground defense of the United States as well as for assisting civil authorities in disaster relief and control of domestic disturbances. The headquarters inherited final approval authority for most tables of authorization and equipment for Army units in the field. Although the CONARC commander was now responsible for the administrative and logistical support of the continental armies, the Department of the Army continued to provide guidance in the suballocation of funds.²⁸

General John E. Dahlquist, the new organization's first commanding general, soon found that the changes had not resolved completely the complicated chains of command and responsibility. In July, Dahlquist wrote to Vice Chief of Staff General Palmer that the Army Staff was interfering in matters that were clearly within his power of decision. He cited a major logistics exercise during which he had asked the assistant chief of staff, G-2, for a security check and instead had been subjected to a review and critique of the entire exercise scenario. Service leaders also continued a contentious debate over whether CONARC should exercise jurisdiction over the Army's technical and administrative service schools. The secretary of the Army tabled that discussion for six to twelve months of further study. General Walter L. Weible, the deputy chief of staff for operations and administration, tried to diffuse the conflicts, saying that a lot of the issues were the result of petty troubles exaggerated at lower levels, both on the Army Staff and at CONARC.²⁹

Although the ongoing personnel and budget reductions and the expectation of more cuts to come had rendered the Army in flux, for most of 1955 the roster of posts, corps, and divisions remained remarkably stable. At the start of the year, the force numbered six corps headquarters and twenty-five active divisions of various types. These included five divisions in Europe, three in the Far East, nine in the continental United States, and

28. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 267; Ofc Ch Mil History, "A Brief History of the Evolution of the Missions of Army Ground Forces Command from 1942 through the Present Continental Army Command," 6 Jan 1966, Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC.

29. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 28 Feb 1955, sub: Training Responsibilities of Continental Army Command; MFR, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, 23 May 1955, sub: Training Responsibilities for Continental Army Command with Respect to T&A Schools; Ltr, Gen. John E. Dahlquist to Gen. Williston B. Palmer, 8 Jul 1955; MFR, Maj. Gen. John S. Upham, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 23 Jul 1955, sub: Meeting in General Weible's Office, 1030 Hours, 23 July 1955; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

three in Hawai'i, Alaska, and the Caribbean. Overseas, the Army had V and VII Corps in Europe and I and IX Corps in the Far East. Five additional divisions served in the United States as training cadre only, used to prepare new recruits for assignments to overseas or deployable units. By the end of the year, all of the divisions remained at the same locations except for the 1st and 10th Infantry Divisions, which had swapped places during the summer as part of Operation GYROSCOPE.³⁰

With the looming threat of continued budget cuts and force reductions, Army planners began to question the utility of established division definitions for the service's force structure. To facilitate planning and simplify understanding of its organization, the Army had employed three distinct definitions to describe its divisions. It defined mobile divisions as General Reserve or overseas units that were staffed, trained, and equipped to a degree that would permit immediate conduct of land combat. Static divisions, which also were organized and equipped as combat divisions, were dispersed to widely separate stations and unable to train as a unit. They were less likely candidates for assembly and deployment. The third classification, the General Reserve training divisions, were organized as mobile divisions, but lacked most of the associated weapons and equipment. They consisted only of cadre assigned the mission of training new recruits and replacements. The Army did not consider this third category as deployable for combat without at least six months of preparation and training.³¹

The Army had adapted division designations for its replacement training centers in 1947 as a way to recognize and maintain on the active rolls units that had distinguished themselves in combat during World War II. By 1955, however, the practice had become counterproductive. In a December study for the chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Sherburne, the acting assistant chief of staff, G-1, wrote that the unit designations had not instilled in the trainees the high morale and unit esprit de corps that the service had anticipated. More important, he continued, the designation of training centers as divisions presented a false impression in Congress and among the public as to the actual strength of the Army. Sherburne recommended that the Army discontinue the use of division designations to identify training centers and retire those designations not assigned to active forces.³²

30. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin for Ch Staff, 24 Mar 1955, sub: Definition of Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Sherburne, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G-1, for Ch Staff, 15 Dec 1955, sub: Training Center Designations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

31. Memo, Gavin for Ch Staff, 24 Mar 1955, sub: Definition of Divisions.

32. Memo, Sherburne for Ch Staff, 15 Dec 1955, sub: Training Center Designations.

In December, acting on those recommendations, the Army presented to President Eisenhower a plan for a nineteen-division force. The proposal eliminated the five training divisions, returning to those posts the designation of Army training centers. The reorganization thus eliminated the 6th and the 69th Infantry Divisions and the 5th and 6th Armored Divisions from the active rolls. The Army announced its intent to transfer the designation of the 101st Airborne Division to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where it would become a tactical division. At the same time, the Army announced the elimination of the two static units, the 23d and 71st Infantry Divisions. The 4th Infantry Division would replace the 71st in Alaska when it returned from Germany. The Army would not replace the 23d Infantry Division in the Caribbean, leaving only the 20th Infantry Regiment and some supporting elements in the Panama Canal Zone. The president approved the Army proposal on 17 December.³³

The personnel and budget reductions also had begun to have an impact on U.S. plans to provide emergency reinforcements to Europe as part of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) agreements. By early 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that the Army would be unable to meet its goal of sending seventeen divisions to Europe within six months of the start of an emergency. Given the current active force structure, the best Army planners could foresee was the availability of thirteen divisions within the given time constraints. In June, the G-3 plans staff presented a proposal to incorporate four divisions from the Army Reserve or the Army National Guard. The plan assumed that the Army could preselect obligated reservists for deployment and prepare mobilization and replacement training stations at least thirty days before the start of hostilities. Logistical appraisals had indicated that sufficient equipment existed to provide initial issue from depot stocks with some shortages in tanks, aircraft, and artillery ammunition. The active force would have to provide cadre to fill out some reserve positions, including more than 200 officers and 600 enlisted personnel per division. Obviously, the plan observed, the combat effectiveness of those active divisions from which the cadres came would decline accordingly. The analysis also noted that most national guard and reserve divisions were at less than 50 percent of authorized strength and would have to add personnel upon mobilization. Despite the risks and shortcomings inherent in the proposal, General Taylor presented the concept to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Army's best option for meeting U.S. commitments to NATO.³⁴

33. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Centers Back in Army," *Army Times*, 17 Dec 1955.

34. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 134-35; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 21 Jun 1955, sub: Plan to Meet NATO Force

Although the NATO reinforcements remained high on the Army's list of strategic requirements, Taylor and the General Staff frequently found themselves at odds. In September, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III, chair of a National Security Council working group considering options for countering Communist expansion, recommended to the Army Staff that the service develop an "initial action deterrent force" capable of deploying to overseas trouble spots on short notice.³⁵ Bonesteel's recommendation noted that such a force would require elements of all military services, but if properly supported, the possibility that it would have to fight would decrease. General Taylor enthusiastically supported the idea and presented it to the Joint Chiefs as a formal proposal. Predictably, the Navy and Air Force balked at the idea. Admiral Arthur W. Radford protested that it violated the secretary of defense's policies on simplifying subordinate commands. Nonetheless, the chairman referred the concept to the Joint Staff for study. The Army Staff moved forward with the concept and urged General Taylor to designate the XVIII Airborne Corps and four deployable D-Day-ready divisions as the Army Strategic Task Force. The public acknowledgment of such a contingent, they noted, would serve as a deterrent to Communist aggression overseas, allow for continued planning, and establish for Congress and the other services the requirement for the necessary sea- and airlift. Although the year ended without any firm commitment from the Joint Chiefs, Taylor provided the new commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, an early warning order that he should begin planning for the new tasking.³⁶

BUILDING AN ATOMIC ARMY

By the end of 1954, the Army had selected two divisions, the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, to participate in the testing of the Atomic Field Army, or

Goals by 1 July 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955 (hereinafter SCGC 1955), Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

35. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 30 Sep 1955, sub: Implementation of Paragraph 32 of NSC 5501, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

36. Memo, Harkins for Ch Staff, 30 Sep 1955, sub: Implementation of Paragraph 32 of NSC 5501; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Plans, for Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Cmdg Gen, XVIII Abn Corps, 18 Oct 1955; File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins for Ch Staff, 29 Dec 1955, sub: Organization and Designation of the Army Strategic Task Force, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



Sfc. Charles W. Stover, platoon sergeant of 3d Platoon, Company A, 6th Battalion, from an unidentified regiment of the 3d Infantry Division, giving the signal to advance and attack near Baker Hill, Alabama, 15 February 1955. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

ATFA-1. At the direction of the Third and Fourth Army headquarters, each division reorganized under the tentative ATFA-1 table of organization and equipment, completed preliminary training, and field-tested the new concept of doctrine and organization. By February 1955, each division was ready to undergo initial testing of the new concept.³⁷

Exercise FOLLOW ME, the field test of the 3d Infantry Division, began on 11 February in a maneuver area that extended 30 miles wide and 100 miles deep between Fort Benning and Camp Rucker, Alabama. For the next sixteen days, the division executed a series of phased maneuvers that tested all aspects of its potential mission during an atomic conflict. Beginning

37. MS, Ops Research Ofc, Johns Hopkins University, Oct 1956, "Evaluation of Procedures Employed in Tests of the 1956 Field Army (ATFA-1)," Historians Files, CMH.



General John E. Dahlquist questions a field artillery private participating in Exercise FOLLOW ME. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

from a division assembly area, troops conducted a reconnaissance and a movement to contact. After a sustained attack on a fortified enemy position, the division fell back into a defensive posture and prepared to emplace and employ atomic weapons. Finally, it conducted a mobile defense across a front measuring 32,000 yards, the equivalent of more than thirty grid squares on a military map.³⁸

At the same time, at Fort Hood, the elements of the 1st Armored Division began Exercise BLUE BOLT. Combat Command C began the evaluation by itself, but most of the division joined them two days later. Evaluators pushed the division through a series of maneuvers appropriate to its organization, including attack, withdrawal, mobile defense, river crossing,

38. MS, Ops Research Ofc, Johns Hopkins University, Oct 1956, "Evaluation of Procedures Employed in Tests of the 1956 Field Army (ATFA-1)"; "Atom-Div Size Unchanged," *Army Times*, 19 Feb 1955. For more details on the organization and scope of U.S. Army maneuvers during this period, see Jean R. Moenk, *A History of Large Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964* (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1969).

and envelopments. The test concluded on 1 March as umpires and evaluators immediately began to compile their notes and observations for CONARC headquarters and the Army Staff.³⁹

First impressions were not favorable. In one of his final memos before retirement, General Ridgway wrote that he was aware of the great amount of effort that staffs and leaders at all levels had put into solving the problems of atomic warfare. However, he doubted that the solutions as proposed gained any more flexibility than one could find under good leadership in the existing infantry division. General Adams, the G-3 at the time, observed that neither exercise had validated the new organizations that they had tested. Although the combat command concept produced greater flexibility, the reorganization had produced no appreciable gain in mobility. The support units were smaller, but the basic infantry and armored battalions were no smaller than their Korean War and World War II counterparts. The new divisions required better combat potential-to-manpower ratios than those displayed, and both combat and combat support units needed to be smaller and more mobile than those tested. Adams conceded that much of the improved transportation and communications equipment required to make the doctrine work was not yet available, but he concluded that it warranted further testing.⁴⁰

The test director for Exercise FOLLOW ME reported that the combat potential-to-manpower ratio and the overall mobility of the infantry division remained about the same as the present division. Although the new organization was more flexible, it lacked the capability for sustained combat. It was woefully inadequate in field artillery, antiaircraft defense, and antitank defense capabilities. The reconnaissance capabilities were also inadequate for the ground the dispersed division would have to cover and control. The support command seemed to be viable, and the communications and command control capability of the organization was adequate. The evaluators recommended adding a third artillery battalion and an antiaircraft battalion to the division artillery, increasing the reconnaissance company to a battalion, and adding a second tank battalion and an eighth infantry battalion to the overall division strength. They also suggested increasing the infantry rifle squads from nine soldiers to ten with two automatic rifles.⁴¹

39. Moenk, *History of Large Scale Maneuvers*, 202–19.

40. MFR, CWO William McCleary, 21 Jun 1955; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 15 Jul 1955, sub: Experimental Combat Organization of the Infantry and Armored Divisions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

41. Memo, Col. C. Z. Shugart, Adjutant Gen, Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 13 May 1955, sub: Report of Field Test of the ATFA Infantry Division, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Upon receiving the exercise report, CONARC headquarters made several changes to the ATFA-1 Infantry Division. It concurred with many of the test director's recommendations, adding a tank battalion and an infantry battalion and replacing the reconnaissance company with a battalion. It made wholesale changes to the division artillery, eliminating the composite battalions and including one 155-mm. and three 105-mm. howitzer battalions. It chose not to include an antiaircraft battalion headquarters, but it attached an antiaircraft battery to each field artillery battalion. Because it deemed the range and characteristics of the 4.2-inch mortars to be only marginally better than those of the 81-mm. mortars, CONARC eliminated the former from the division's table of organization and equipment. Moving a step further from the evaluator's recommendations, CONARC also eliminated the division headquarters battalion and created separate combat command headquarters with their own organic motor transport, security, mess, and communications elements. Although it declined the recommendation to expand the rifle squads to ten soldiers, CONARC did authorize a second automatic rifle per squad. The command directed the 3d Infantry Division to begin training and retesting under the revised organization by 1 September, with the understanding that it would participate in the multidivision Exercise SAGE BRUSH soon after that date.⁴²

The evaluators for Exercise BLUE BOLT were noncommittal. In their estimation, the new organization was not particularly better suited to atomic combat than the existing model. Although the new organization held some promise, the evaluators believed that it required large amounts of new equipment—especially more powerful radios and armored personnel carriers. They did note that the use of the same command posts for combat commands and the tank battalions increased the division's vulnerability to air attack, as did the lack of an organic antiaircraft battalion.⁴³

Both the incoming and outgoing chiefs of staff weighed in on the results of the two tests. General Ridgway overruled the CONARC decision to shelve the 4.2-inch mortar in both the armored and infantry divisions. He cited requirements for perimeter defense and the need for supplementary indirect fires and directed CONARC to reevaluate the use of the mortars as part of upcoming exercises and to include at least one platoon of four

42. Memo, Shugart for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 13 May 1955, sub: Report of Field Test of the ATFA Infantry Division; John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 265–67.

43. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 267; Paul C. Jussel, "Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956–1960" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2004), 57–64, Historians Files, CMH.

mortars in each infantry battalion. Ridgway also expressed his support for expanding the size of the rifle squad and directed the divisions to employ twelve-man rifle squads in further testing. In his initial comments following the ATFA-1 tests, General Taylor cited some of his experiences with new division organizations in Korea. He believed that a division should have no equipment that it did not require for use every day. He suggested the pooling of trucks and personnel carriers into a general purpose transportation battalion within the infantry division. With that in mind, he also suggested further study regarding the required and anticipated mobility of the infantry. How much of the infantry division, he wanted to know, could be transported using only its organic vehicles? He suggested that the mobility of the infantry division should be that of the foot soldier, with a differential for those elements that must leapfrog or move forward to support. In other words, the infantry should walk, supplemented by trucks when necessary. In the interest of increasing available firepower, Taylor also suggested that it might be time to consider adding an 8-inch piece to the division artillery.⁴⁴

As the Army took time to evaluate the performance of its atomic-age divisions, it also escalated the tests and training on troop exposure to live atomic blasts that it had been conducting since 1951. The force had established Camp Desert Rock as an adjunct to the Atomic Energy Commission's test site in Nevada. Up until 1955, the Army had sent limited numbers of troops to witness live atomic test shots from a safe distance and had evaluated their psychological responses to the experience. In April, however, in Exercise DESERT ROCK VI, Lt. Col. John C. Wheelock and the 723d Tank Battalion experienced the blast from less than 2 miles away, before moving forward with reinforcing infantry and combat support into the blast area in a simulated attack. After the exercise, radiological teams tested the troops for exposure, and ordnance crews examined vehicles and equipment to determine how well they had stood up to the blast and subsequent maneuver. After the test, observers expressed some level of surprise that most of the equipment had

44. Memo, Adams for Ch Staff, 15 Jul 1955, sub: Experimental Combat Organization of the Infantry and Armored Divisions; MFR, initialed by Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 29 Jun 1955, sub: General Taylor's Briefing on the ATFA Tests, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, 25 Jul 1955, sub: Visit to CONARC with General Taylor, Monday, 18 July 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



A mannequin known as "Priscilla," intentionally exposed to an atomic blast during Exercise DESERT ROCK, shows troops the extent to which their equipment would survive such blasts. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

come through relatively unscathed. Notably, the effects of radiation exposure on the troops participating in the test had not yet become a major concern.⁴⁵

Although none of the exercises the Army had held so far had been entirely satisfactory, they served to maintain a momentum pointing to its most significant effort of the year, Exercise SAGE BRUSH. BLUE BOLT and FOLLOW ME had been relatively small, single-division affairs that the Army had not even scheduled as part of its formal exercise program for 1955. SAGE BRUSH, however, would be a major joint exercise with the Air Force and would involve more than 140,000 soldiers and airmen. The expansive scale

45. "GIs to Test Armor as Atomic Protection," *Army Times*, 26 Mar 1955; "Nevada Tests Prove Army Tanks Can Take A-Blast Punishment," *Army Times*, 16 Apr 1955; "Tank Force Crosses Desert For Atomic Warfare Tests," *Army Times*, 23 Apr 1955; "Troops and the Bomb," *Army Times*, 14 May 1955; Anthony Leviero, "Task Force Razor Shaves Big Apple 2," *United States Army Combat Forces Journal* 5 (Jun 1955): 38–43.

of the maneuver would allow the Army to test combat and service support elements at the field-army and corps levels and would provide another look at the organization and doctrine of the two ATFA-1 divisions. The joint exercise also would allow the Army and the Air Force to examine air-ground coordination and to develop further procedures for processing air support missions in an atomic environment.⁴⁶

Plans for the exercise hit a snag late in 1954 when ranchers and landowners in the Fort Hood vicinity complained to the secretary of the Army and demanded increased compensation for use of their land included in the proposed maneuver area. Their complaints regarding Army payments for damages done in previous maneuvers and the adverse attitudes among the public—spurred by some unfavorable local news coverage—had prevented full division maneuvers during Exercise BLUE BOLT and had threatened to curtail SAGE BRUSH even further. In January 1955, after several nonproductive meetings between Army officials and representatives of the landowners, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs Frederick A. Seaton directed the Army to discontinue negotiations and consider acquiring additional maneuver land surrounding the inactive Camp Polk, Louisiana. Despite some serious backtracking by Texas politicians and officials, Army officials reached an agreement with the governor and the state of Louisiana. In exchange for maneuver rights to more than 5.5 million acres surrounding Camp Polk, the Army agreed to reopen the post as a permanent installation and, ultimately, stationed a division there.⁴⁷

Exercise SAGE BRUSH ran 31 October–4 December in the newly acquired Louisiana Maneuver Area. U.S. forces included the 1st Armored Division, the 3d Infantry Division, and the 77th Special Forces Group, operating under the III Corps headquarters. Two Air Force fighter-bomber wings, a bomb group, a tactical reconnaissance wing, and a tactical missile flight provided support. The 4th Armored Division, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment portrayed the aggressor forces, operating under the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, XVIII Airborne Corps. Similar Air Force units supported the aggressor side. After moving into initial positions, U.S. forces responded to an enemy surprise

46. Jussell, "Intimidating the World," 57–58; Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 3 Nov 1955, sub: Task Force to Accumulate Information Concerning Decision to Activate Camp Polk as a Permanent Station and to Deploy Troops From Fort Hood, Texas, to Camp Polk, Louisiana, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

47. Memo, Westmoreland for Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 3 Nov 1955, sub: Task Force to Accumulate Information Concerning Decision to Activate Camp Polk; Moenk, *History of Large Scale Maneuvers*, 205–6; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "130,000-Man Maneuver is Set for Polk," *Army Times*, 18 Jun 1955.

attack before launching their own extensive counterattack. Throughout the entire maneuver phase, both sides employed a total of 254 notional atomic weapons, delivered by aircraft, missiles, and 280-mm. atomic artillery.⁴⁸

For several reasons, the results of the exercise were less compelling than the Army desired. Despite the fact that the Army had obtained extensive maneuver area in Louisiana, much of the area consisted of heavy vegetation, swamps, bayous, and quicksand. The region lacked sufficient roads capable of handling heavy military equipment and even fewer bridges capable of supporting armored vehicles. As a result, movement for such large military formations was constrained to the relatively few trafficable routes. Unrealistic safety and administrative requirements rendered the two airborne assaults so predictable that defending forces were able to determine and reach drop zones before the arrival of the attacking troops. Weather conditions in the area also limited the availability of supporting aircraft, which was particularly problematic for an exercise designed to evaluate Army–Air Force coordination.⁴⁹

The joint critique for the exercise, held on 10 December, identified additional concerns that brought into question the validity of any lessons. General Dahlquist, of CONARC, pointed out that the shortage in trained soldiers and equipment had forced the Army to piece together units just weeks before beginning the exercise. Many officers and personnel had little if any experience in the positions they held during the training. In many cases, troops did not have proficiency in basic military skills, let alone the knowledge and training in the advanced concepts of organization and doctrine that were the subject of the evaluation. Across the board, many units also displayed a lack of discipline, as evidenced by bumper-to-bumper congestion during road movement and a failure to carry out basic instructions. Most participants seemed to feel that the Army was testing units and commanders on their job performance, rather than evaluating the effectiveness of a new concept and organization.⁵⁰

Despite such shortcomings, some comments during the subsequent critiques reflected thoughtful consideration of the implications of the new organization and doctrine. Maj. Gen. Charles D. W. Canham, commander of the friendly ground forces during the exercise, observed that the maneuver

48. Moenk, *History of Large Scale Maneuvers*, 211–12; “Sage Brush Opens,” *Army Times*, 5 Nov 1955; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Old, New Clash As Troops Meet in Sage Brush,” *Army Times*, 19 Nov 1955.

49. Moenk, *History of Large Scale Maneuvers*, 212–16.

50. Joint Critique, HQ, CONARC, 10 Dec 1955, sub: Exercise SAGE BRUSH; Final Rpt of Army Tests, HQ, CONARC, n.d., sub: Exercise SAGE BRUSH, Annex CC, Factors Adversely Affecting Tests; both in File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, Series: CONARC Exercise Files, 1954–1962, RG 319, NACP.

demonstrated that frontline troops would need a smaller-yield close support atomic weapon in combat. Existing weapons such as the Honest John rocket and the 280-mm. gun were too big to follow immediately behind an assault unit. Using the current weapons, he said, would end up killing as many of our own troops as the enemy. Canham also noted that the jet aircraft used by the Air Force were poorly suited for close air support because they could only remain on station for a brief period, and their high speeds diminished the accuracy of rockets, napalm, and other types of ordnance. The Army, he believed, needed to develop its own organic close air support, which would be under the control of the ground commander at all times. Predictably, Army and Air Force participants bickered throughout the critique concerning the necessity, effectiveness, and especially the overall control of close air support. Many Air Force representatives contended that they should reserve atomic weapons for strategic targets and that such munitions had no role in close support for the Army in any case. General Dahlquist summed up his observations by questioning whether the participants had grasped fully the implications of an atomic war. "We have become too interested in how many people we can kill," he said, "but we still don't understand how to integrate the atomic fires into an overall scheme for the battle."⁵¹

At the same time that the Army was examining the results of SAGE BRUSH and its implementation of ATFA-1 division concepts, the U.S. Army War College completed its own study entitled "Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army during the Period 1960-1970." Given the short title PENTANA—a combined abbreviation of "pentagonal" (because the units would have five basic tactical components) and "atomic-nonatomic"—the study envisioned completely air-transportable 8,600-person divisions to replace current infantry, armored, and airborne divisions. The Army would build the new divisions around five small self-sufficient "battle groups" that would include their own artillery.⁵²

In the initial CONARC briefing on the new division to General Taylor, General Dahlquist highlighted the divergences of opinion that the PENTANA concept had generated. He noted that many of the negative reactions to the concept bore a direct relation to the impact of the new organization on the division elements associated with their own branches. Those perceiving a decline in strength and responsibility expressed violent opposition to the concepts. The chief of engineers had gone so far as to say that he found

51. Joint Critique, HQ, CONARC, 10 Dec 1955, sub: Exercise SAGE BRUSH; Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles D. W. Canham for Maneuver Director, 16 Dec 1955, sub: Final report, Ninth Field Army (Provisional), Exercise SAGE BRUSH, File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, Series: CONARC Exercise Files, 1954-1962, RG 319, NACP.

52. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 270-71.

the entire concept “unacceptable intellectually and scientifically.”⁵³ Taylor expressed considerable interest in the concept, particularly in light of the relatively disappointing results of Exercise SAGE BRUSH, of which he noted, “We in the Army have a long way to go before we understand the problems of using these weapons.”⁵⁴

Taylor might well have had in mind another exercise, in Europe, that had raised similar questions for senior U.S. and NATO commanders. CARTE BLANCHE, an air defense and communications exercise held in June, had dropped more than 350 notional atomic bombs in a mock defense of Germany and Western Europe. Reports on the maneuver ignited a furious response throughout Europe considering the consequences of an atomic war on the continent. With their homeland exploited as the principal battleground, many Europeans justly questioned what would be left after such a defense. Even as the Army prepared to reorganize for atomic combat, important voices were beginning to question the relevance of the entire concept.⁵⁵

ARMY VERSUS AIR FORCE

Exercise SAGE BRUSH proved noteworthy in a different respect as it provided still another demonstration of the sometimes bitter infighting between the Army and the Air Force. Although the military described the maneuver as a joint endeavor, and the exercise staff was a mix of officers from both services, conflicts arose between the two from the very beginning. In February, CONARC had issued a joint directive for the event, including a series of tests that would be administered jointly to participating forces. When the exercise headquarters requested information from Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, on their participation in joint tests, that organization responded that it had no interest in the joint tests proposed by CONARC

53. MFR, Maj. Gen. John S. Upham, Dep Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 14 Dec 1955, sub: CONARC Briefing for Chief of Staff on PENTANA Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

54. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Ch Army Field Forces, 28 Dec 1953, sub: Organization of the Army During the Period FY 1960-1970, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Upham, 14 Dec 1955, sub: CONARC Briefing for Chief of Staff on PENTANA Army; Ltr, Gen. John E. Dahlquist to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 12 Dec 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

55. Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 240-41; Drew Middleton, “Soviet Peace Drive: Impact on West Europe,” *New York Times*, 10 Jul 1955.

and that it could evaluate service missions better unilaterally. Although the CONARC representatives disagreed with that position, they informed General Taylor that they saw little to gain by pursuing the matter and that the forced participation of Tactical Air Command would not yield good test results.⁵⁶

Of greater concern was Air Force reluctance to allow the Army to carry on with one of its principal experiments during the exercise. In a test of concept encouraged by General Gavin, the Army organized, within the 82d Airborne Division, a provisional "sky cavalry" troop to employ during the maneuver. The unit consisted of a mix of helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, a platoon of light tanks, and a platoon of infantry. In addition to conducting more traditional scouting and reconnaissance missions, the troop would exploit the capabilities of the helicopter to seek out targets for special weapons strikes and to obtain accurate damage assessment after the strikes had been completed. However, when the Army's plans came to the attention of Air Force officers in the Tactical Air Command, they protested to their commander, General Otto P. Weyand, who also happened to be the Exercise SAGE BRUSH maneuver director. In November, as units were beginning to deploy to Louisiana for the training, General Weyand informed the Army representatives that the sky cavalry tests violated Army–Air Force agreements on roles and missions. He notified Lt. Gen. John H. Collier, the deputy maneuver director and senior Army officer on the staff, that any lift of Army troops into hostile territory came under the assault role that was inherently an Air Force mission and would only be carried out by Air Force rotary-wing aircraft.⁵⁷

After a personal protest from Secretary Brucker, Secretary of the Air Force Donald A. Quarles cabled General Weyand to direct him to allow the Army exercises. He told Weyand that, although he fully agreed with his interpretation of the situation, they should allow the Army to take advantage of the opportunity to carry out their experiments. Once the exercise was

56. Memo, Col. L. H. Walker, Asst Adjutant Gen, for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 12 Aug 1955, sub: Joint Tests, Exercise SAGE BRUSH; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 10 Sep 1955, sub: Refusal of the Tactical Air Command to Participate in Joint Tests on Exercise SAGE BRUSH; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

57. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 9 Mar 1955, sub: Provisional Reconnaissance Troop, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Gen. O. P. Weyand, U.S. Air Force, for Dep Maneuver Director (Army), 11 Nov 1955, sub: Use of Army Helicopters for "Sky Cav" and Patrols in Exercise SAGE BRUSH, File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, Series: CONARC Exercise Files, 1954–1962, RG 319, NACP. See also John Schligh, *Help From Above: Air Force Close Air Support of the Army, 1946–1973* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2003), 208–10.

completed, Quarles assured Weyand, he would see that the Army brought air assault and aerial reconnaissance missions back into accord with the provisions of the Key West Agreement.⁵⁸

Army supporters used the sky cavalry conflict to air grievances that had been steadily building under the fiscal limits of the Eisenhower administration. Editorials in the *Army Times* noted that the service had learned that it would have to fight every inch of the way for any concession it must obtain from the Air Force. Moreover, another noted, it had long been apparent that the Air Force had little or no interest in helping the Army solve any problems to its immediate front. The Air Force much preferred the deep interdiction fight, miles beyond the front lines.⁵⁹

The debate over air assault and sky cavalry was not the only point of contention between the two services. For both Army chiefs of staff for this period, but particularly for General Ridgway, strategic airlift was an even greater concern. In January 1955, during a revision of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Ridgway had proposed that the Air Force provide 350 C-124 aircraft for the movement of one infantry and one airborne division, plus cargo and replacements for overseas units during the first thirty days after D-Day. A G-3 estimate presented to the chief of staff in March established a requirement for 348 heavy transport aircraft to move one complete division. An even more fanciful request existed for 1,307 C-119 or C-123 aircraft to support an airborne assault of two and one-third divisions.⁶⁰

Behind the requests for quite extraordinary numbers of aircraft lay a disquieting reality. Although large portions of the Army remained forward deployed, in Korea and Europe, they remained vulnerable and would require immediate reinforcement if attacked. The service was, by 1955, already committed to reducing the size and weight of its vehicles and equipment in an attempt to make its divisions more readily deployable. Although most units regularly incorporated air transportability drills into their training schedules, many of their vehicles were too large and heavy for air transport.⁶¹

For its part, the Air Force had included the modernization of its transport fleet as part of its overall budget. At the end of June 1955, the secretary of

58. Msg, Sec Air Force Donald A. Quarles to Gen. Otto P. Weyand, 15 Nov 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, CONARC Exercise Files, 1954-1962, RG 319, NACP.

59. Tony March, "Skycav Hassle Highlights Final Week of Sage Brush," *Army Times*, 10 Dec 1955; "The Army's Month," *United States Army Combat Forces Journal* 6 (Jan 1956): 8.

60. Memo, Brig. Gen. Louis V. Hightower, Ch Organization and Training Div, G-3, for Ch Organization and Training, 13 Apr 1955, sub: Items for Army Commanders Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

61. MFR, Col. Cecil H. Strong, Ch Doctrines Section, 5 Apr 1955, sub: Briefing for the Chief of Staff, USA on Army Airlift Requirements; Memo, Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, Ch

the Air Force announced that a new strategic transport, the turboprop C-130, would begin replacing existing transport within the next year. He also announced, however, that the Air Force had cut the number of air transport squadrons from forty-seven to twenty-eight, and he conceded that the service would be unable to produce the required increase in airlift projected over the next five to ten years. Air Force leaders remained firmly focused on expanding the force from 115 to 137 wings, but with an emphasis on the strategic bomber force and the interceptors of the Continental Air Defense Command.⁶²

Army and Air Force officers also continued their long-running battle over close air support and control of air defense assets over the primary battle area. Because of its inherent capabilities, the Air Force considered air defense its responsibility and felt that other participating service forces should place their assets under its control. Army leaders were equally as adamant that ground commanders must not lose overall control of their own air defense means. The Army's commanders also argued that the ground commander should have some general control over the interdiction and close air support operations in the immediate battlefield area. Staff analysis noted, however, that the Air Force would never agree to any system that permitted ground officers to control Air Force operations. They counseled that the Army would have to rely upon its guided missiles and developments in Army aviation to meet its close support needs.⁶³

In a briefing for the chief of staff on the service's fledgling aviation program, Brig. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, the first Chief, Army Aviation Division, G-3, highlighted the Army's concerns. General Howze, commissioned in the cavalry in 1930, served in the 1st Armored Division in North Africa and Italy during World War II. Despite the fact that Howze was not a pilot, General Gavin had selected him to be the Army's proponent for its growing aviation fleet, because of his reputation as an innovator in mobility for ground warfare. As modern aircraft grew faster and more complex to meet the requirements of their primary Air Force missions, and as control over Air Force fighter and reconnaissance aircraft became more centralized,

Plans Div, for Ch Organization and Training Div, 28 Feb 1955, sub: Optimal Air Mobility for the Army; both in File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

62. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1955* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 215-27.

63. MFR, Gen. Williston B. Palmer, Vice Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1955, sub: USAF-Army Disagreements on (1) Control of Tactical Air Forces in Support of Ground Forces, and (2) Control of the Air Space Over the Army Battle Zone, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

a sort of vacuum was forming in the area of close air support for ground forces. No one would wonder, he said, at the Army's growing concern for such an imperative component of ground combat.⁶⁴

The Air Force's own official histories reflect its diminishing interest in the concept of ground support. "The development of tactical air power became keyed to the use of nuclear weapons as atomic thinking dominated fighter design. Although some conventional air wings to support the Army continued to exist during these years, after 1954 these wings were seen only as subordinate to the primary strike force."⁶⁵ By the time of Exercise SAGE BRUSH, atomic delivery had become the primary mission for most fighter-bomber units, with only "familiarization" with conventional weapons required of aircrews. Although some senior Air Force officers, General Weyand among them, remained proponents of tactical air support, most embraced the tenants of air power expressed by the Italian theorist Giulio Douhet and Eisenhower. Because air forces alone could secure the victory, it no longer seemed appropriate to place them in support of ground operations.⁶⁶

Perhaps the conflict of greatest interest to senior Army officials was the growing Air Force resistance to Army advances in surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. In the development of antiaircraft missiles, the Army's Nike missile was in direct competition with the Air Force's Bomarc B. In late 1954, under pressure from Donald A. Quarles, then the assistant secretary of defense for research and development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had limited the range of Army air-defense missiles to 50 nautical miles and specified them for point defense of cities and military facilities. In an effort to forestall a decision by civilian authorities, whom few Army officers expected to be in their favor, the Army accepted the limitation, but grew even more apprehensive that the Air Force was grasping for complete control of the continental air defense mission. They also feared growing Air Force interference with surface-to-surface missile development. By the end of 1955, however, neither the Defense Department nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had placed any range limitations on Army surface-to-surface missile development. In a view shared by many Army officers, General Taylor suggested that because Army Air Corps pilots had once provided tactical

64. MFR, Brig. Gen. Hamilton Howze, Ch Army Avn Div, G-3, 16 Jul 1955, sub: Briefing for the Chief of Staff on Army Aviation, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 72-75; Hamilton H. Howze, *A Cavalryman's Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth Century Army General* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 179-181.

65. Schligh, *Help From Above*, 183. Weyand had made his name providing air cover for General George S. Patton's Third Army.

66. Schligh, *Help From Above*, 189.

air support for the ground forces in engaging targets beyond the reach of conventional artillery, Air Force leaders would reason that all such targets were properly theirs. Army commanders had grown increasingly skeptical of the Air Force's willingness to divert resources from strategic missions to support ground operations.⁶⁷

In January 1955, General Ridgway had warned officers on the Army Staff against making statements, public or private, that might be regarded as derogatory toward the other services. When appropriate, he said, they should pay tribute to the gallant deeds, high standards, and traditions of their sister services.⁶⁸ By the end of the year, staff officers were finding it difficult to remember that comradeship. In one memo, Col. Harold K. Johnson wrote that the image of a vast inferiority in force strength on the part of the United States had become "part and parcel of the Air Force propaganda."⁶⁹ The logical conclusion became that the United States must employ atomic weapons to win any war. In December, a study conducted by the G-3 plans and policy branch concluded that the Air Force's aggressive public information policy, combined with the Army's reluctance to dispute, publicly, the Air Force's claims concerning the dominant role of air power, had created the popular belief that air power was omnipotent and had rendered the Army obsolete. The study urged a more aggressive public information campaign to restore the Army's prestige and to encourage public acceptance of Army personnel as respected and influential citizens in their civilian communities.⁷⁰

Ultimately, much of the Army-Air Force conflict might be understood as the newly created independent service exercising and expressing its sovereignty in the face of its former parent organization. Certainly, this could be seen in the words and actions of many Air Force officers who had embraced the air power theories of Giulio Douhet and had chafed under the

67. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 31 Aug 1955, sub: Inter-Service Divergencies for Discussion by the Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, Ch Research and Development, for Gen. Eddleman, 31 Oct 1955, sub: Record of Meeting, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Converse, *Rearming for the Cold War*, 599.

68. Ltr, Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Vice Ch Staff, to Maj. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 31 Jan 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

69. Memo, Col. Harold K. Johnson, Asst Ch Plans Div, for Ch Organization and Training Div, 4 Apr 1955, sub: Combat Developments Objectives, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

70. Memo, Johnson for Ch Organization and Training Div, 4 Apr 1955, sub: Combat Developments Objectives; Memo, Maj. Gen. John S. Upham Jr., Dep Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 10 Dec 1955, sub: A More Aggressive Army Public Relations Policy, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

control of the “ground-pounders.” At the same time, one cannot escape the impact of New Look budgetary constraints. All four services engaged in a virtual zero-sum competition for a diminishing pool of resources. Air Force leaders would have been foolish not to recognize the advantage they held under a strategic doctrine that emphasized air power and atomic weapons. They waged their bureaucratic battles accordingly.

ADAPTING TO THE NEW LOOK

The process of adapting the U.S. military posture to the requirements of the New Look continued throughout 1955. Both President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson encouraged the services to accelerate reductions in personnel levels and to limit their budget requests accordingly. Meanwhile, Congress considered the Pentagon’s recommendations for personnel and budget authorizations for fiscal years 1956 and 1957. Generals Ridgway and Taylor appeared, in turn, before appropriations and armed services committees to persuade members to resist more wholesale cuts in the Army’s force structure.

Throughout their own testimony, Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford adamantly supported their proposed contraction of Army personnel strength from 1,173,000 to 1,027,000 by June of 1956. This loss of nearly 150,000, they argued, would be more than offset by the tremendously increased firepower provided by missiles and atomic weapons. Several legislators, however, balked at the idea of continued reductions, especially with conflicts unfolding in East Asia over control of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Strait.⁷¹ They questioned the force reductions, particularly those of the Army and the Marine Corps, at a time when the military power of Communist China seemed to be rising and other allied forces had not yet developed as an effective counterweight.⁷²

Sensing an opportunity to recoup some of their losses, on 6 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a memorandum to the secretary of defense recommending increases to the tentatively approved personnel ceilings for the upcoming years. They cited the Communist Chinese threat to Formosa (present-day Taiwan) and the continuing tension in French Indochina as justification for boosting the force totals. The Army requested an additional

71. Quemoy was the common English-language name for the group of islands known as Kinmen.

72. “Wilson, Radford Adamant on Plan to Cut Manpower,” *New York Times*, 5 Apr 1955; “Pentagon is Firm on Cutting Army,” *New York Times*, 3 May 1955; Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 48.

20,000 troops, primarily for trainers for the reserves and for engineer and logistical support in the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line of advanced radar stations across northern Canada. The Navy and Marine Corps asked for similar marginal increments, while the Air Force expressed satisfaction with its approved force levels. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, conceded the perilous nature of the world situation, but recommended disapproval of the requested increases. He indicated that such negligible additions would have little practical effect and were not worth challenging the desires of the president.⁷³

President Eisenhower made the final decision on force levels for 1957 on 5 December 1955. He approved the original force levels authorized earlier in the year but added an additional 7,500 spaces to the Army authorization to account for a shift back to Army control of airfield construction engineers who previously had been carried under an Air Force authorization. Even accounting for the additional spaces, the Army's authorized personnel ceiling would be reduced to 1,034,500 for the coming fiscal year.⁷⁴

The continued reductions in both the Army's personnel strength and its share of the military budget forced its leadership into another round of soul-searching. One common theme that emerged on several fronts was that the Army was still losing badly to the other services in a battle for public opinion. The *Army Times* noted in March that what the service lacked was "advertiseability."⁷⁵ The Air Force, it said, could send a squadron of jet bombers flashing over an American town. Representing the Navy, an aircraft carrier or battleship visiting a foreign port made a lasting impression. For the Army, showing off its paratroops only seemed to illustrate its dependence upon the Air Force. Nor could the Army match the Marines, who had long cultivated an image of toughness, special skill, and glamor. The Army's chief of information, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, expressed the same idea when he told the secretary of the Army that the complexity of the Army and its numerous missions made it difficult to express a clear and understandable statement of purpose such as "Keep the sea lanes clear," or "To gain and maintain air supremacy."⁷⁶

Even popular culture seemed to work in the favor of the other services. The 1949 motion picture *Sands of Iwo Jima* had helped to propel John

73. Memo, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker for Sec Def, 6 Oct 1955, sub: Force Levels and Personnel Strengths for Fiscal Year 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

74. Memo, Brucker for Sec Def, 6 Oct 1955, sub: Force Levels and Personnel Strengths for Fiscal Year 1957; Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 49.

75. "Advertiseability," *Army Times*, 19 Mar 1955.

76. "Advertiseability"; Memo, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, Ch Information and Education, for Sec Army, 4 Aug 1955, sub: The Army's Troop and Public Information



Actor Phil Silvers (left) as "Sergeant Bilko" with Paul Ford (right) as "Colonel Hall" on the set of the CBS television production *The Phil Silvers Show*, later known as *Sergeant Bilko* (Wikimedia Commons)

Wayne to stardom and captured an image for the Marine Corps that they took pains to embellish. In 1955, the motion picture *Strategic Air Command* with Jimmy Stewart provided enormous positive publicity for the Air Force. Army-oriented movies such as 1949's *Battleground* and Audie L. Murphy's autobiographical *To Hell and Back* in 1955 were popular enough, but they failed to capture the same level of public support for that service. In the comic books and newspapers, Americans could follow the swashbuckling Air Force exploits of *Steve Canyon* and *Terry and the Pirates*. In contrast,

they could also read *The Sad Sack* and *Beetle Bailey*, portraying a somewhat less positive image of Army life. Perhaps the final indignity was the debut in September 1955 on the CBS television network of the *Phil Silvers Show*, starring the well-known comedian as Army master sergeant Ernie Bilko, whose scheming and mischief routinely kept him one step ahead of his hapless superiors. The fact that this was neither the most positive nor accurate depiction of the Army did not prevent the series from winning three consecutive Emmy Awards.⁷⁷

Throughout the year, the Army toiled resolutely to improve the public outreach programs it had initiated under General Ridgway. In November, Secretary Brucker proclaimed that he accepted as one of his major responsibilities an effort to bring proper recognition to the Army's achievements and to the capability and dedication of its personnel. At CONARC's direction, each of the six subordinate field army commanders established public affairs indoctrination courses for reserve units in their region. In a separate action, General Palmer recognized that the Army had no mechanism for influence among the public to correspond to the Navy League or the U.S. Air Force Association. He supported the idea of utilizing the Association of the United States Army as a vehicle for mobilizing civilian influence. To do so, however, he noted that officers such as himself, General Weible, and General Gavin would have to withdraw from the association's executive committee. General Taylor drafted personal letters for dozens of senior retired Army general officers, informing them of service positions on a number of issues and encouraging them to become active spokesmen for the Army in their communities, explaining the service's roles and missions to the public.⁷⁸

An August briefing by the chief of information for General Taylor reflected the scope of the effort the Army had undertaken to get out its message. In fiscal year 1955 alone, the Army had produced almost 30,000 news releases and 10,000 photo releases. Department of the Army representatives had appeared at almost 250 speaking engagements, and officers and soldiers in the field had appeared before the public 1,400 times. Most impressive were the 15,700 television programs, commercials, and announcements that had aired on both national and local networks. As further indication of the

77. Lawrence H. Suid, *Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002), 117–35, 220; "In New Comedy," *Army Times*, 20 Aug 1955.

78. Steve Tillman, "Dynamic Revamping of Army Public Relations Setup Seen," *Army Times*, 12 Nov 1955; Memo, Gen. Williston B. Palmer for Lt. Gen. Weible, 12 Jul 1955, sub: Organizing the Army's Friends; Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to Gen. (Ret.) John L. DeWitt et al., 28 Nov 1955; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Army's extensive effort to present its message to the public, briefers noted that the service had liaised with sixty-eight active division associations with a potential strength of 300,000 members. Maintaining close relationships with veterans in this way offered the Army another way to raise public perception of the service.⁷⁹

Improving the public image of the Army served goals beyond supporting its battle for a larger share of the budget. One of those goals, maintaining personnel strength, presented a complex equation. Even though force strength authorizations had declined steadily, the Army still required a reliable source of new recruits. Also, because it was more cost effective to retain experienced soldiers than to train and develop new ones, reenlistment was another top priority. Balanced against this was the reality that many serving officers and senior enlisted soldiers lacked the education, skills, or motivation to master increasingly complex military skills. Their elimination from the service proved to be a sensitive and troublesome challenge. Finally, leaders needed to find more efficient ways to match the skills of individual soldiers with the wide range of technical and operational requirements of the modern Army.⁸⁰

As the total enlisted strength of the Army fell, the number of career service personnel declined in roughly the same proportion. All of the services looked to Congress to make military service more attractive, both to existing personnel and to potential recruits. Increases in reenlistment bonuses and the establishment of various incentive payments through the Career Incentive Act helped to improve retention rates. An amendment to the National Housing Act of 1955 extended loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration to active duty personnel under terms comparable to those available for veterans. Finally, Army leaders hoped that the prospect of a new uniform would contribute to a more modern image for the service. Although many of the efforts to make military service more attractive showed promise, the Army in particular continued to rely upon the draft to replace those departing from service.⁸¹

General Taylor faced pressure from Congress to stem the steady flow of young officers leaving the service. In the same manner as with the enlisted soldiers, the replacement of departing junior leaders was more expensive

79. Memo, Brig. Gen. Theodore S. Riggs, Dep Ch Information and Education, for Ch Staff, 23 Aug 1955, sub: Answers to Questions Asked at CINFOE Briefing, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

80. See Brian M. Linn, *Elvis's Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

81. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jan–30 Jun 1955, 99–100.

and time consuming than the retention of those whom the Army already had trained and developed. A study conducted by the Army Staff showed that long overseas tours without dependents, poor promotion rates, and lack of opportunities for civil and military schooling were frequently expressed reasons for dissatisfaction. Surprisingly, only a few officers noted inadequate compensation as a primary cause for concern.⁸²

At the same time that the Army was looking to make the service more attractive for new recruits and potential reenlistees, it also carried on with efforts to eliminate both officers and enlisted personnel who it believed could not adapt to the more advanced technical challenges of the modern military. In November, the Department of Defense lowered the minimum percent of recruits from the lower ranges of mental ability it required the services to accept. Underlining its own determination to improve the mental acuity of its force, the Army issued orders for the involuntary release of soldiers who had scored in the lower percentiles on their Armed Forces Qualification Tests. The guidance directed commanders of major installations to get rid of "professional privates" after they had served their three-year enlistment.⁸³

The Army also was revising its policies regarding the retention of officers on active duty. The assistant chief of staff, G-1, Maj. Gen. Donald P. Booth, sent out a confidential message to all senior commanders directing them to develop and to supervise an effective continuing elimination program. The retention of so many officers who either lacked the necessary education or whom the Army had passed over for promotion blocked the path for the advancement of more qualified and promising individuals. Although much of the focus was upon reserve officers whom the Army had retained on active duty, the service engaged in a heated debate over policies that allowed the elimination of reserve officers while also allowing less competent active duty counterparts to remain. Although the system for considering officer eliminations remained a work in progress, the vice chief of staff, General Palmer, and the assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve forces, Hugh M. Milton, directed the staff to begin planning for inevitable reductions in force and to prepare a plausible approach that would be acceptable to all, including the public.⁸⁴

Some observers began to complain that the Army was going too far in its attempts to sell itself to potential recruits. One national guard commander wrote to the Army's inspector general that part of the reason for the lack of

82. Ltr, Senator Richard B. Russell to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 28 Oct 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

83. "IQ Sights are Raised," *Army Times*, 26 Nov 1955.

84. SS, Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Sherburne, Dep G-1, 2 Aug 1955, sub: Elimination of the Substandard Officer; MFR, Lt. Col. James O. Jones, Personnel Actions Br, 23 Aug 1955,

interest in Army careers was the service's misplaced emphasis on recruiting soldiers to learn skills related to civilian trades. Such advertising, he said, "practically invites young men to learn a civilian trade with the strongly implied suggestion that they get out of the Army to enjoy the benefits of the trade."⁸⁵ More important, he believed, was the basic fact that the Army existed to fight or to deter aggressors from fighting. He strongly recommended that the service reorient its recruiting campaigns in that direction.⁸⁶

Despite the Army's focus on the myriad of challenges that it was facing on a daily basis, factions within the service were also looking forward, sometimes with remarkable clarity. In January 1955, General Gavin distributed throughout the senior Army Staff a study entitled "Volunteer Peacetime Army." Anticipating the time when the draft would no longer be an acceptable means for filling the force, he explored the parameters of what an all-volunteer Army might look like. The factors he believed would shape volunteer enlistments included public attitudes toward the military, the national economy, competition from other services, peacetime deployments, compensation, and the increased participation of women. Under anticipated conditions, in a period beyond 1960, he believed the pool of available personnel would support a volunteer Army of 600,000. Interestingly, although Gavin foresaw that the all-volunteer force would rely increasingly on female soldiers to fill its ranks, he did not mention anywhere in the study a corresponding need to increase the percentage of racial minorities serving in such a military organization.⁸⁷

THE RESERVE FORCES ACT OF 1955

On 13 January 1955, President Eisenhower presented to Congress his plan for increasing participation in the reserve forces of the United States and improving the force's overall readiness. Despite the failure of Congress to approve any measure of universal military training, the president clung to the belief that a strong and well-maintained reserve force could offset the cuts he continued to make, particularly in the active duty Army. To

sub: Officer Elimination Policies; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

85. Ltr, Brig. Gen. Richard J. Werner, Georgia Mil District, to Col. Maurice D. Stratta, Ofc Inspector Gen, 9 Nov 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

86. Ltr, Werner to Stratta, 9 Nov 1955.

87. Memo, Col. M. G. Pohl, Ch Mobilization Br, for Distribution, 17 Jan 1955, sub: Volunteer Peacetime Army, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

some extent, military and civilian leaders alike retained a perception of the reserves as they had functioned in both world wars, that is, providing the base for a full-scale mobilization and furnishing the bulk of the nation's deployed land force. The United States' commitment to NATO also relied on a full mobilization of the reserves to deploy the number of divisions the nation had promised the alliance in the event of Soviet attack. Inspections of reserve and national guard units had revealed, however, that most units were woefully understrength, lacked essential equipment, and required extensive training before they could deploy.⁸⁸

The president's proposal, which he had dubbed the National Reserve Plan, was based largely upon a study conducted by Arthur S. Fleming, the director of defense mobilization, a year earlier. In his plan, Eisenhower emphasized the nation's requirement to mobilize sufficient forces to reinforce forward-deployed troops in Europe and the Far East in the event of hostilities there. Such forces, he said, had to be trained and equipped sufficiently to be ready for deployment within six months. He proposed that men between the ages of seventeen and nineteen be permitted to volunteer for six months of basic training, to be followed by nine-and-one-half years of service in the reserves. He suggested that the nation might require a draft to fill up the reserves if not enough volunteers signed up. Enlistees in the National Guard also would have to undergo six months of basic training. Because no real sanctions for enforcing reserve commitments existed, the president recommended that those who failed to complete their reserve requirements receive less than honorable discharges. Finally, he requested that states be allowed to organize separate militia forces so that someone could assume local security missions when the National Guard was federalized.⁸⁹

Both the House and the Senate began extensive hearings on the administration's proposal. Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, and representatives from all four services testified, mostly in favor of the program. General Ridgway, in particular, spoke to the inadequacy and lack of readiness in the existing reserves. He noted that, at present, most of the reserves would be unable to reach combat readiness within any amount of time likely to be useful to the United States. He reminded the politicians that the early disasters in Korea had occurred because Army units at that time were

88. Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G-3, "Plan to Meet NATO Force Goals by 1 July 1955," n.d., File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

89. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1955*, 20-21; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 120-21.

understrength and spread too thin around the globe. The service's inability to provide timely reinforcements exacerbated the situation. This forced the nation to recommit to battle reservists with recent combat experience while leaving a vast number of those eligible for service, but untrained, at home. Admiral Radford also warned that future conflicts likely would not allow time to develop and train large reserves. National survival might depend, he concluded, on ready and sufficient forces in being, prepared for deployment on very short notice. Both Ridgway and Radford stressed that the greater need was for trained units rather than mere pools of replacements.⁹⁰

As the hearings and deliberations continued, General Ridgway grew concerned that the discussions perhaps had placed too much emphasis on reserve issues. In a statement prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee, the general reiterated his support for reserve reform and again acknowledged the unacceptable level of readiness endemic throughout the current reserve force. He forcefully returned, however, to his familiar resistance to the continued diminution of the active force. Active Army forces, he said, provided the only means with which to counter enemy actions in the first critical stages of a war. "Reserve forces augment the active forces; they cannot substitute for them."⁹¹ It was a dangerous proposition, he concluded, to believe that proportionately increasing the reserve could reduce active forces safely.⁹²

President Eisenhower signed the Reserve Forces Act on 9 August 1955. The legislation had several key components that directly affected the Army. It raised the ceiling on the Ready Reserve from 1.5 million to 2.9 million, 1,692,235 of which it allocated to the Army. The new law authorized the president to mobilize up to one million reservists in a declared national emergency without congressional action. All those who entered the armed forces after 9 August 1955 would be required to participate in reserve training following the completion of their active service. For those who agreed to spend two years on active duty and four years in the reserves, the act reduced the total military commitment from eight to six years. The law also allowed direct enlistments into the reserve components for non-prior service individuals as an alternative to the draft. Until 1 August 1959, recruits

90. Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen*, 120–21; "Wilson Promotes U.S. Reserve Plan," *New York Times*, 9 Feb 1955; Anthony Leviero, "Four Arms Chiefs Ask Reserve Build-Up," *New York Times*, 20 Feb 1955.

91. Memo, Brig. Gen. Frank W. Moorman, Sec Gen Staff, for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 11 May 1955, sub: Statement in Support of the National Reserve Plan by the Chief of Staff to Senate Armed Services Committee, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

92. Memo, Moorman for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 11 May 1955, sub: Statement in Support of the National Reserve Plan.

could enlist directly into a unit of the Ready Reserve. After a six-month period of active duty for training, they would return to civilian status. As long as they met all of their reserve obligations during their eight-year term, they remained exempt from the draft.⁹³

The inability of the armed forces to enforce compliance with reserve obligations had long plagued the system. The new legislation attempted to remedy this by clarifying sanctions available to military commanders. It allowed them to order to active duty for a period of forty-five days those reservists with obligations to the Ready Reserve who failed to take part in required training. Failure to comply with that order risked disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Those who had enlisted directly into the reserves and failed to take part in training risked immediate induction into the active Army through their local draft boards.⁹⁴ None of these provisions applied to members of the National Guard who remained under state authority.⁹⁵

Perhaps most significant were the things that the new legislation did not do. Despite the hopes of most senior Army leaders, the law did not authorize universal military training, nor did it make participation in reserve activities mandatory for all male citizens. It also did not mandate basic training for national guard enlistees. The National Guard, in fact, had been excluded from many of the act's provisions, largely because of disputes over whether to enforce racial desegregation of the state forces. Although the service now could enforce sanctions once an individual had enlisted, it still bore the responsibility for recruitment. As Secretary Brucker wrote to Secretary Wilson, removal of those compulsory features that the services had supported denied the Army a known source of trainees and had imposed greater requirements upon recruiting and publicity to sell the program to

93. Memo, Wilber M. Brucker, Sec Army, for Sec Def, 25 Oct 1955, sub: Implementation of Reserve Forces Act of 1955; MFR, Lt. Col. Richard G. Ciccolella, Reserve Components Br, G-3, 28 Jul 1955, sub: Chief of Staff Briefing on Reserve Forces; Memo, Lt. Col. William A. McKee, Dep Ch Troop Information and Education Div, for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 1 Nov 1955, sub: Review of Manuscript, "The Reserve Forces Act of 1955"; all in File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 48.

94. Memo, McKee for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 1 Nov 1955, sub: Review of Manuscript, "The Reserve Forces Act of 1955."

95. Many state national guard organizations, particularly those in the South, resisted closer affiliation with the reserves and the active Army because of federal efforts to integrate the armed forces. Closer cooperation between federal and state forces would require further civil rights legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. See Morris J. MacGregor Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965*, Defense Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981) and Bernard C. Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor Jr., eds., *Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981).

the public. Early reports indicated that the number of new trainees was far fewer than Brucker had hoped. He did acknowledge that the very smallness of the number would permit an unusually high standard of instruction and individual attention than would be possible normally.⁹⁶

The service took a series of steps to align the readiness and availability of reserve and national guard units more closely with the mobilization requirements according to NATO planning documents and national strategic plans. The Army Strategic Objectives Plan for 1957 required thirty-seven divisions other than active Army to deploy within seventeen months after hostilities beginning. Although the plan called for nine of those divisions to be armored, only two existed at the time. After some detailed negotiations between Army leaders and state governors, the National Guard agreed to convert four of its divisions from infantry to armored. Those were the 27th in New York, the 30th in Tennessee, the 40th in California, and the 48th in Florida and Georgia. By late summer in 1955, the 27th, 30th, and 40th had completed the required conversions, and the 48th was scheduled to complete its transition in 1956. Because the logisticians did not believe they could support more than six armored divisions in the reserves, the Army revised the reserve troop basis to include thirty-one infantry divisions and six armored divisions.⁹⁷

Reinforcement plans for Europe also drove prioritization of support for units in the Army Reserve. Reserve units that the Army designated for deployment during the first thirty days of mobilization included four antiaircraft battalions, three radar maintenance detachments, and four ordnance detachments related to artillery fire control systems repair. Units designated for overseas deployment within the first ninety days of mobilization included four more antiaircraft battalions, four more fire control repair detachments, and four signal detachments dealing with radar repair. The Army required units scheduled for deployment after thirty days to maintain at least 85 percent of authorized strength at all times. Units scheduled to arrive overseas by water during the first ninety days had to maintain 100 percent of authorized equipment.⁹⁸

In August, the Army took further steps to prioritize deployment of its reserve forces. With the Eisenhower administration emphasizing the Army's

96. Memo, Brucker for Sec Def, 25 Oct 1955, sub: Implementation of Reserve Forces Act of 1955; Col. (Ret.) Jon T. Hoffman and Col. (Ret.) Forrest L. Marion, *Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 49.

97. MFR, Ciccolella, 28 Jul 1955, sub: Chief of Staff Briefing on Reserve Forces.

98. Memo, Maj. Gen. John A. Klein, Adjutant Gen, for Cdrs and Staff, 7 Jul 1955, sub: High Priority Units in the General Reserve, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319. NACP.

civil defense responsibilities, General Ridgway felt it necessary to remind the state governors that many of their national guard divisions retained the mission to deploy overseas with the active Army in the event of mobilization. To that end, the Army devised what it called the 6×6 Program in which it designated six national guard divisions to deploy as NATO reinforcements within six months of notification. The concept provided approximately two weeks for assembly and movement to mobilization stations, up to thirteen weeks for training, four weeks for preparation for overseas movement, and six weeks for transport overseas. On 5 August, the secretary of the Army approved the selection of six divisions to receive priority treatment as early deployment units. They were the 51st Infantry Division (South Carolina and Florida) with a mobilization station at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; the 30th Infantry Division (North Carolina) with a mobilization station at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the 38th Infantry Division (Indiana) with a mobilization station at Camp Atterbury, Indiana; the 39th Infantry Division (Arkansas and Louisiana) with a mobilization station at Camp Polk, Louisiana; the 49th Armored Division (Texas) with a mobilization station at Fort Hood, Texas; and the 41st Infantry Division (Oregon and Washington) with a mobilization station at Fort Lewis, Washington. As much as possible, planners selected units from areas that did not contain primary targets for nuclear attack and that were located near suitable mobilization stations, transportation, and storage facilities.⁹⁹

All together, the Army's actions to reform its reserve force and to prioritize units for support and deployment reflected a shift in the military's concept of mobilization. The potential use of atomic weapons seemed to imply a short, violent conflict that would not allow time for the full mobilization that the United States had relied upon during World War I and World War II. Instead, Army leaders looked to provide critical elements as quickly as possible, which they hoped would arrive overseas before hostilities actually began.

THE ARMY AND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

In October 1949, President Harry S. Truman had signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which authorized the allocation of \$1 billion to NATO members for the purchase of military equipment, materials, and services

99. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 13 Aug 1955, sub: Designation of Priority Reserve Units for Early Deployment, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

to strengthen their capabilities for individual or collective defense. By 1955, this program had expanded and had become an integral part of U.S. defense policy. In a paper labeled "Basic National Security Policy, (NSC 5501)," U.S. military and political leaders spelled out the implications for the program. Its primary purpose was to support and to maintain the cooperation of appropriate major allies and other free world countries, encouraging them to furnish bases for U.S. military units and to provide their share of military forces. In countries vulnerable to subversion, it said, the United States should assist in the development of adequate internal security forces. An Army analysis of its Mutual Defense Assistance Program responsibilities also noted that the production of military goods for disbursement through the program also helped the United States retain a larger production base than it could have maintained through procurement for U.S. forces alone.¹⁰⁰

In 1955, the United States provided assistance to thirty-three countries around the world through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. In addition to helping the member nations of NATO, the United States had established military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) and had provided aid to partners in the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America. As part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, almost 4,200 foreign military students attended formal instruction in Army service schools. During the year, the number of Army mobile training teams, which conducted on-the-job instruction in the use and maintenance of American military equipment, increased from thirty-six to seventy-eight. Army materiel deliveries to Mutual Defense Assistance Program countries reached almost \$1.2 billion.¹⁰¹

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program had begun in Europe, and that region remained the most visible recipient of American military aid. Throughout the early 1950s, the United States had donated almost all of its World War II surplus vehicles, equipment, and weapons to its allies in Europe. The European Command's training centers and mobile Army training teams worked with foreign military students learning how to maintain and operate the donated equipment. In 1955, the alliance welcomed the Federal Republic of Germany as a full-fledged member. Soldiers from the U.S. European Command, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the Seventh Army worked with their German counterparts to rebuild West German armed forces and to integrate them into NATO defense plans. In December, after the new German government had ratified a formal military assistance

100. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 6 Apr 1955, sub: Relationship of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program to the National Security, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

101. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jan-30 Jun 1955, 92, 119.

agreement with the United States, U.S. military personnel established the MAAG, Germany.¹⁰²

Closer to home, the United States signed several mutual security pacts with nations in South and Central America. MAAGs and Army training teams deployed to many of those areas to assist those governments. Some advisory group commanders considered the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in Latin America to be based more upon political considerations than military one, and they placed more emphasis on improving internal security than on opposing foreign intervention. In many cases, the commanders expressed concern over the perceived instability of the host government. Typically, Latin American government leaders requested more military aid than the United States was willing to provide, and U.S. military attachés reported that many were beginning to look elsewhere for assistance. They reported that many Latin American countries expressed concern over the obsolescent equipment they had received. Military mission leaders also noted that the inability of their training teams to communicate with their counterparts hampered their efforts in many cases. Too much time had been lost, they said, in training members who were not fluent in the native language.¹⁰³

The war in Korea had opened up the Far East as an important theater in the U.S. effort to halt the spread of communism. Army teams worked to develop the armed forces of Japan, South Korea, and Formosa as they faced challenges from Communist China. In Japan, 308 officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians of the MAAG had as their primary responsibility the training and development of a six-division ground self-defense force along with smaller air and maritime components. In Formosa, the departing chief of the MAAG, Maj. Gen. William C. Chase, reported that his section had completed the training of fourteen infantry divisions. Seven additional divisions, located on offshore islands and under threat of Communist attack, had not yet been able to conduct significant combat training. The general noted that although large amounts of Mutual Defense Assistance Program equipment had brought most units up to full allowance, the units would not

102. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Dep Asst Ch Staff, G-3 for International Affairs, for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 2 May 1955, sub: Visit to Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 185-86. See also Andrew J. Birtle, *Rearming the Phoenix: U.S. Military Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950-1960* (New York: Garland, 1991).

103. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army Caribbean Cmd, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1955; Memo, Col. Neil M. Wallace, Ch Latin America Br, for Ch Ops Div, 14 Nov 1955, sub: Report of Visit to Certain Latin American Countries (6 Oct-1 Nov 1955); both in File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

become fully combat effective until the government had properly distributed the equipment and had overcome the propensity of local commanders to hoard their largesse.¹⁰⁴

The Republic of Korea, at the outbreak of hostilities in 1950, maintained an army of eight understrength divisions and two separate regiments. As the war progressed, the United States agreed to support twenty divisions. Subsequent negotiations and agreements produced a force of 661,000, organized into twenty divisions, making it, by 1955, the fourth largest army in the world. By then, the Korean MAAG had completed most of its work with the active combat divisions. Its mission continued, however, with much of the logistical infrastructure and with the training and development of ten reserve divisions.¹⁰⁵

The fall of Điện Biên Phủ and the subsequent conference in Geneva had raised the profile of the U.S. MAAG, Indochina, dramatically. In November of 1954, General (Ret.) J. Lawton Collins had traveled to Vietnam as President Eisenhower's special representative, to determine what military steps the United States might take to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam. After lengthy discussions between Collins and General Paul Ély, the chief of the French armed forces staff, the two men signed an agreement in December turning over responsibility for the training and organization of the South Vietnamese armed forces to Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, Chief, U.S. MAAG, Indochina. Although Ély would retain nominal control over the operation, and French instructors and advisers would continue their efforts under O'Daniel's direction, both sides understood that the French had already begun a phased withdrawal from Indochina.¹⁰⁶

O'Daniel's first action was to create a new organization combining the advisory efforts of both the French and the Americans. The Training Relations and Instruction Mission integrated U.S. and French personnel at the level of headquarters staff. Below that, French and U.S. advisers would work independently of each other. The French assumed initial responsibility

104. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ops Div, G-3, 28 Oct 1955, sub: Information Book and Briefing for Major General Strickler, J5, FCS Designate; Msg, Paul W. Meyer, First Sec American Embassy, Taipei, to State Dept., 16 Aug, 1955, sub: Final report of Chief MAAG; both in File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

105. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Dep Ch Staff for Plans and Ops, 8 Feb 1955, sub: Development of Republic of Korea Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Bfg, HQ, Eighth Army, for Sec Army Robert T. Stevens, 30 Mar 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

106. Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960*, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 232-40.

for schools at Đà Lạt, Thủ Đức, and Camp Chanson, plus territorial headquarters and units. The Americans assumed responsibility for basic training centers, schools other than those assigned to the French, field force units—light divisions, airborne regimental combat teams, and General Reserve—and logistical installations.¹⁰⁷

Although O'Daniel preached cooperation and mutual respect between the two factions of his organization, it was difficult to conceal a growing American contempt for the French efforts. On an inspection tour, then-Eighth Army Commander General Taylor commented that it was hard to see how long it took French instructors to teach American tactics to Vietnamese soldiers in French. A Defense Department position paper opined that the French had demonstrated a lack of ability to develop indigenous forces in Indochina. Administration, through the French, of a U.S. military aid program would produce only negligible results. Another Army Staff paper noted that an exclusive American responsibility for training the South Vietnamese would be more effective because of the superiority of U.S. methods and the differences between French and American doctrine.¹⁰⁸

Perhaps further evidence of the American overconfidence was the slowly dawning realization that the imminent withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam left the responsibility for security solely with the United States. In March, the Army Staff prepared an outline plan summarizing the forces it would need to provide for the internal security of South Vietnam while it developed its own indigenous armed forces. The analysis estimated that a U.S. Army force of three armored cavalry regiments and one airborne regimental combat team, plus engineer support stationed in South Vietnam, could provide adequate internal security. A reinforcing corps of one airborne division and three infantry divisions stationed in the Philippines and Korea would provide the necessary reinforcing and deterrent capability, if sufficient air- and sealift were available.¹⁰⁹ The G-3, General Gavin, warned that there

107. HQ Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina Dir, Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, Ch MAAG Indochina, 27 Feb 1955, Establishing the Training Relations and Instruction Mission to the Armed Forces of Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

108. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Cmdg Gen, Eighth Army, to Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Ch Staff, 19 Mar 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for G-3 Plans, 30 Mar 1955, sub: Defense Position Papers for Franco-US Bipartite Discussions with Respect to Indochina, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops; both in RG 319, NACP; Spector, *Advice and Support*, 255.

109. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 23 Feb 1955, sub: Outline Plan for Security of South Vietnam; Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Dep Ch Staff, Logistics, 7 Sep 1955, sub: Cost of Small Wars; both in File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

were serious implications to this plan. Its implementation required an immediate decision on mobilization, for any delay until after the outbreak of hostilities would result in piecemeal commitment of forces. Also, he warned, U.S. intervention on the scale envisioned carried with it the risk of initiating World War III. The Army would need at least six months, Gavin said, before it could replace deployed units through mobilization and buildup of the General Reserve. More realistically, he suggested that in order for the Army to maintain its other worldwide commitments, it must expand to twenty-six divisions with an end strength of 1,572,000. The service must also recall six national guard divisions and three armored cavalry regiments to active duty. Given all of that, he concluded, once initiated, U.S. intervention in South Vietnam must be successful, or the entire U.S. position in the Far East and perhaps the rest of the world would suffer.¹¹⁰

Having inherited the challenges in Indochina, some in the Army looked to a more unconventional approach toward building a South Vietnamese army. Col. Edward G. Lansdale, the chief of the military mission in Saigon, suggested parallels between the situation in Vietnam and the recent completion of the Filipino campaign suppressing the Hukbalahap insurgency. Lansdale's experiences, first as an operative with the Office of Strategic Services and later with the MAAG, Philippines, had given him the opportunity to observe guerrilla operations as part of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. The colonel believed that the Vietnamese had much they could learn from the Filipino experience.¹¹¹

Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, the chief of psychological warfare, also made the case for the inclusion of special forces personnel within military assistance groups of nations on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Indochina was one of several locations, he believed, where the introduction of a guerrilla warfare capability could serve as a deterrent to aggressive action on the part of Communist countries. Bullock's comments, however, envisioned the training of indigenous forces in guerrilla activities, particularly as part of a stay-behind force after a hostile occupation, and not necessarily in developing the government armed forces themselves. Still, the idea of including special forces personnel as part of the MAAG package appealed to many on the Army Staff.¹¹²

110. Memo, Taylor for Dep Ch Staff, Logistics, 7 Sep 1955, sub: Cost of Small Wars.

111. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 9 Jun 1955, sub: Comment on Mr. Allen Dulles' Memorandum to Admiral Radford, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

112. Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, Ch Psy Warfare, for Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 2 Sep 1955, sub: Employment of Special Forces Units During a Cold War, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.

The growing interest in special forces and unconventional warfare was not universal. The USAREUR commander, General Anthony C. McAuliffe, had recommended the elimination of the 10th Special Forces Group in favor of another regular infantry battalion. Many of the senior officers in Europe had long viewed the 10th Group with suspicion, largely because the group reported directly to USAREUR and not to the Seventh Army commander. The special forces leaders, for their part, were equally concerned that conventional commanders would view their organization as a sort of super-commando force, rather than as the organizers of a stay-behind resistance operation.¹¹³

COMING TO TERMS WITH THE LEGACY OF KOREA

For several years, the Army had reexamined its policies related to the conduct of prisoners of war (POWs) in the light of the perceived misconduct of Korean War captives. In February 1955, the Department of the Army published a draft regulation entitled "Standards of Conduct of Military Personnel Liable to and After Capture." The paper identified the responsibilities of soldiers under circumstances of peril. If isolated from friendly lines and no longer able to inflict casualties on the enemy, soldiers had a duty to evade capture and return to their units. If captured, they were still members of the U.S. Army. They could reveal only their name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. Any more information could assist the enemy and risk the lives of comrades. Soldiers who became prisoners were at no point relieved from risking their lives to defend their fellow soldiers and their country. The policy made no allowances for giving in to harsh interrogation methods. It also remained the duty of all prisoners to try to escape. Even if the attempt failed, the enemy still had to devote additional resources to recapturing and detaining them. The proposed regulation emphasized the need for positive indoctrination and training in resisting capture, escape and evasion, and conduct if captured. It linked success in these efforts to strengthening the will of "American fighting men" through the "thorough inculcation of the principles of American democracy, as opposed to the false ideology of Communism."¹¹⁴

113. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for G-3 Ops, 31 Dec 1955, sub: 10th Special Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Col. Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 192–200.

114. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, for Ch Staff, 16 Feb 1955, sub: Proposed AR on "Standards of Conduct of Military Personnel Liable to and After

In framing the regulation, Army leaders noted that all members of the United States armed forces, regardless of service, must have the same responsibilities and standards of conduct. They urged the Defense Department to standardize requirements across the services. They commented that members of the public would be justifiably critical of a military authority that permitted variations in standards. Any policy more lenient on other services would result in increased pressure on Army personnel.¹¹⁵

With this in mind, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson took the final steps toward creating a unified code of conduct for the armed forces. On 17 May, he appointed a committee, chaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense Carter L. Burgess, to study and to make recommendations toward a unified code and a program of indoctrination and training to prepare military personnel for future combat. Wilson asked the committee members to consider appropriate disciplinary action for those repatriated POWs who had collaborated with the enemy in Korea. The committee consisted of one retired senior officer from each of the four services and one senior civilian from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Department of Defense. Retired Lt. Gen. Frank W. Milburn and Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Forces) Hugh Milton represented the Army. Retired Army General John E. Hull also served on the committee as its vice chair.¹¹⁶

Two months later, on 29 July, the committee presented its findings and recommendations to Secretary Wilson. In doing so, it reminded Wilson that out of 4,428 Americans who survived Communist imprisonment, at most 192 were chargeable with serious offenses against comrades or the United States. In other words, only one out of twenty-three American POWs was suspected of serious misconduct. The committee also concluded that, if adopting this code of conduct, America must always stand behind every soldier, sailor, airman, or marine who might become a prisoner, and spare no reasonable effort to gain their earliest possible release.¹¹⁷

After President Eisenhower approved the Armed Forces Code of Conduct on 17 August, Secretary Wilson ordered an extensive program of orientation

Capture,” File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

115. Memo, Gavin for Ch Staff, 16 Feb 1955, sub: Proposed AR on “Standards of Conduct of Military Personnel Liable to and After Capture.”

116. Memo, Charles E. Wilson, Sec Def, for Chairman, Def Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, 17 May 1955, sub: Terms of Reference, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series: SCGC 1947–1964, RG 335, NACP.

117. Rpt, Def Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, to Sec Def, 29 Jul 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series: SCGC 1947–1964, RG 335, NACP.

and discussion, to ensure that each member of the armed forces understood and embraced its content. In its entirety, the Code read:

I. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces, which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

II. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

III. If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

IV. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

V. When questioned, should I become prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

VI. I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.¹¹⁸

Amended in 1988 with gender-neutral language, the code remains the standard for American soldiers to this day. Although the ideals the code expressed were lofty, its framers believed that its success would depend upon strengthening the will of each soldier with an inculcation of the principles of American democracy. American service members were to be fortified with the weapons of religious faith and courage in the struggle against communism. Left unanswered was any question whether the nation had the

118. Memo, Charles E. Wilson, for Sec Army, 22 Aug 1955, sub: Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G-3 Ops, RG 319, NACP. The Code of Conduct, cited here as it appeared in 1955, was amended in 1977 and 1988 to make it gender-neutral.

right to expect that level of devotion from a fighting force consisting largely of draftees or recalled reservists.¹¹⁹

MOVING TOWARD STABILITY?

By the end of the year, the Army had made significant strides in its efforts to conform to the parameters of the New Look. The service's experiments with an organization and doctrine designed for an atomic battlefield reflected the administration's firm conviction that the next war would be fought with nuclear weapons.

Reorganization of the Army Staff and the creation of CONARC had moved the service away from its World War II-era configuration and toward a structure better suited to command and control a force deployed across the globe. Still, interservice conflicts, particularly between the Army and the Air Force, revealed the competitive dynamic between services that prevented them from reaching a level of "jointness" the president so desperately wanted. Throughout 1955, the Army had succeeded to a great degree in portraying itself as a progressive, forward-looking force. To say it had achieved stability in the sense that Secretary Brucker had described it, however, seemed a bit premature.

119. Memo, Gavin for Ch Staff, 16 Feb 1955, sub: Proposed AR on "Standards of Conduct of Military Personnel Liable to and After Capture."

4

The U.S. Army: Proud of Its Past, In Search of a Future?

On 1 July 1956, at the urging of his chief of information, Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor signed a general order establishing the official Army slogan. The phrase, “The U.S. Army—Proud of Its Past—Alert to Its Future,” was intended to impress the public and soldiers alike with the Army’s past accomplishments and, simultaneously, its readiness to meet the challenges of the future. The Army’s public information staff compared the slogan to the General Electric Company’s: “Progress is Our Most Important Product.” The new slogan would convey to the public a sense of quality and a portrayal of the Army as a forward-looking organization. The staff recommended a comprehensive campaign through multiple media to stamp the phrase into the public consciousness.¹

A more apt conclusion to the motto might have been “In Search of a Future,” for in 1956, the final year of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s first term in office, the Army continued to grapple with its relevance within the parameters of the New Look. Experiments with organization, doctrine, and new technologies proliferated as service leaders renewed their efforts to

1. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Ch Staff, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Army Slogan, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

adapt the Army to the atomic age. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker attempted to identify the magnitude of challenges facing his service. In his annual report to Congress he wrote, "In the long history of warfare and armies, probably no period can reflect changes in combat concepts so fundamental and significant as those brought into clear focus by the Army in the past twelve months."²

IKE'S CHALLENGES

At the *New York Times*, columnist James B. Reston summed up the changes that had occurred in the world during the president's first four years. At the start of Eisenhower's administration, two major wars were in progress, one in Korea and one in Indochina. The administration claimed a victory in each case by restoring the demarcation line in Korea and by forcing the Communists to settle for half of Indochina instead of the entire peninsula. Reston noted, however, that the military power and capital development in the Communist world had increased far beyond the administration's expectations. At the same time, the power and influence of two of the United States' major allies, France and Britain, had declined. Among world leaders, Joseph Stalin was dead, Winston Churchill had retired, and a revolution in Egypt had brought to power a new nationalist firebrand, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who aimed to lead the developing world in reordering global affairs.³

The president faced a number of mounting concerns. In Germany, the training and rearmament of the new West German army raised predictable responses from the Communist bloc. Although the Soviets announced a force reduction of 1.2 million in their armed forces in May, U.S. intelligence analysts warned that the move would not affect greatly their offensive capabilities in the Western European theater. Of further concern in Europe, a worsening insurrection in Algeria had begun to draw French forces out of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). By the end of the year, uprisings in Poland and Hungary had demonstrated both an American inability to influence events in Eastern Europe and a Soviet willingness to employ ruthless force to restore order in its satellite states. An arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia seemed to open the door to increased Communist influence in the Middle East. In the Far East, although the possibility of conflict over the offshore islands of Quemoy and

2. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 75.

3. James Reston, "Eisenhower's Four Years," *New York Times*, 22 Jul 1956.

Matsu had declined, the armed forces of Communist China remained a potential threat.⁴

A challenge to the administration's military policies came from retired Army General Matthew B. Ridgway. Ridgway's memoirs, first serialized in January issues of the *Saturday Evening Post*, were published in full by Harper & Brothers in April. They laid out in detail the former chief of staff's grievances with the New Look, especially the introduction of political and economic considerations into the preparation of the military budget. Later historians would describe Ridgway as naive and ill-suited to a job requiring political skills, but his criticisms received considerable interest in Congress and by the American public. Army leaders testifying before Congress pressed Ridgway's point that missions had been added to the service's responsibilities without corresponding increases in capabilities or funding. Although he made no public comment on Ridgway's statements, Eisenhower never forgave his former wartime compatriot. Despite his outwardly affable demeanor, the president nursed grudges with legendary skill. When the subject of Ridgway came up in a 1959 meeting of the National Security Council, Eisenhower feigned ignorance and asked the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Nathan F. Twining, if he could remember the name of the officer who had caused so much trouble, "that general, that Army fellow."⁵

Ridgway's articles and book raised the issue of whether the service chiefs and other senior military leaders should be allowed to voice their disagreements with the administration's policy. The president expressed his

4. Memo, Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, Dir Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 5 Jan 1956, sub: Chief of Staff Press Conferences; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army Cmdg Gen, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Ch Staff, 20 Aug 1956; Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, for Asst Ch Staff Intel, 25 May 1956, sub: Announced Reduction in Soviet Armed Forces of 1,200,000; Staff Study, Ops Planning Staff, 27 Feb 1956, sub: Plausibility of Large-Scale Conflict with Communist China without USSR; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Sec Army, 15 Nov 1956, sub: Interim US Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1947-1964 (hereinafter SCGC 1947-1964), RG 335: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, NACP.

5. S. L. A. Marshall, "General Ridgway Speaks His Mind," *New York Times*, 15 Apr 1956; Memo, Brig. Gen. Lyal C. Metheny, Ch Coordination Gp, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 21 Jan 1956, sub: The Ridgway Articles, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Daun van Ee, "From New Look to Flexible Response," in *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present*, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 329; "Random Notes in Washington: Eisenhower Forgets His Critic," *New York Times*, 14 Dec 1959.

displeasure to Admiral Arthur W. Radford, suggesting that perhaps they could strengthen the positions of the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reducing the service chiefs to more operational roles. Eisenhower spoke of making the service chiefs subordinate to the chairman, giving the latter the power to select and reassign them. The chiefs would then have the duty of implementing policy within their own services—not of developing overall policy. As he had four years earlier, Eisenhower emphasized that the chiefs had to subordinate their positions as champions of their individual services to their roles as overall military advisers.⁶

For his part, Admiral Radford remained the most stalwart disciple of Eisenhower's New Look military philosophy. In July 1956, he proposed a plan to cut another 800,000 personnel from the U.S. armed forces. With the president committed to the use of atomic weapons in the event of war with the Soviet Union, Radford believed he could cut the Army by almost half, from slightly more than one million troops to around 550,000. The Army's primary missions would be civil defense and maintaining order at home in the event of a Soviet atomic strike. The service's only contribution to combat might be small mobile teams built around atomic rockets or missiles. When *New York Times* reporter Anthony H. Leviero revealed the proposal, referred to as the Radford Plan, the resultant publicity kept it from going farther. The episode reminded Army leaders, nonetheless, that within the context of the president's New Look, they were still engaged in a struggle for their service's survival.⁷

Although he had returned to civilian life in 1954, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger M. Kyes met with Army leaders in October 1956 to discuss the Army's role in national defense. Kyes told the assembled officers that the Army had assumed a negative and defensive approach in presenting its case to the public and to Congress. It had focused its efforts too much on preparations for small wars. Even the Army's efforts in Europe were overrated, he believed. The service needed to develop a concept that it could sell to the public in a positive, dynamic fashion. Kyes told the officers that the Army had to stop contending that thermonuclear war was unlikely to

6. Edward L. Katzenbach Jr., "Should Our Military Leaders Speak Up?," *New York Times*, 15 Apr 1956; Memo of Conf with President, 30 Mar 1956; Memo of Conf with President, 14 May 1956; both in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957* (hereinafter cited as *FRUS 1955–1957*), vol. 19, *National Security Policy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 280–83, 301–3.

7. Anthony Leviero, "Radford's Views Pose Basic National Security Issue," *New York Times*, 15 Jul 1956; MFR, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Dep Ch Staff Ops, 5 Jun 1956, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret, 1956–1962 (hereinafter *DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962*), RG 319, NACP; Memo of Conf with President, 18 Apr 1956, in *FRUS 1955–1957*, vol. 19, 296–98.

occur and acknowledge that it could occur. It should then prepare itself and sell itself accordingly.⁸

For his part, President Eisenhower continued to focus on those principles that had formed the basis of the New Look four years earlier. He tasked the service chiefs with producing another paper to recommend further cuts to the defense budget. He questioned the number of flying hours allocated to aircraft pilots and asked again, why it was not possible to cut personnel strength further, particularly in the Army and the Marines. He expressed his frustration with the U.S. Army divisions in Europe, noting that U.S. leadership had considered their original deployment a temporary expedient to be discontinued once the European nations could build up their own strength. U.S. security, he summarized, depended upon the ability of aircraft to deliver the atomic bomb. In all other areas, he believed that the United States could reduce expenditures if the three services could get together and determine to do so in a spirit of mutual understanding.⁹

ARMY VERSUS AIR FORCE

Despite some superficial efforts to portray the United States' defense establishment as a unified team, the reality was quite the opposite. Although each of the services often staked out competing positions on issues, the most frequent confrontations occurred between the Army and the Air Force. By 1956, conflicts between the two services had reached the level of undeclared war. This friction had its roots in the evolution of two defense policies. First, many of the Air Force's senior leaders had been activists in the campaign of the U.S. Army Air Forces to gain independent status. Having achieved that goal, they zealously guarded all perceived prerogatives and regarded any encroachment by the Army as counterrevolutionary. Quite a few also were committed disciples of strategic bombing and tended to regard as excessive any expenditures on ground combat weapons beyond those required for air base defense. The two services might have weathered the split with minimal hard feelings had defense spending remained at the levels seen during World War II and the Korean War. Postwar budgets, however, particularly as

8. MFR, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, 10 Oct 1956, sub: Conference With Mr. Roger M. Kyes, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

9. Memo of Conf with President, 13 Mar 1956, in *FRUS 1955-1957*, vol. 19, 238-41; Memo of Discussion at 280th Mtg of National Security Council, 22 Mar 1956, in *FRUS 1955-1957*, vol. 19, 268-74; Kenneth W. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956*, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff Historical Office 1992), 51-53.

enforced under President Eisenhower's New Look, forced the armed services into a zero-sum game where any gain in appropriations by one service was linked directly to losses incurred by the others. With the Air Force as the principal beneficiary in the Eisenhower budget, and the Army seeing its share steadily decrease, cooperation between the two services disappeared. An already contentious interservice relationship degenerated into outright hostility.¹⁰

Conflict between the two services centered around four main issues. The longest standing was strategic airlift. The Army depended upon Air Force support to transport its forces based in the United States to potential trouble spots overseas. Although the Air Force paid lip service to the mission, its prestige, public support, and dominance within U.S. military policy resided in its fighter-interceptor squadrons and the Strategic Air Command. The second major issue involved support for Army Ground Forces. Although Army and Air Force leaders had made significant strides in coordinating close air support for troops on the ground, the Air Force remained reluctant to develop and procure aircraft optimized for that mission. As the Army began to experiment with rockets and missiles to provide its own fire support for long-range targets, Air Force officers objected that such targeting represented deep interdiction missions, which were their responsibility. The two services also tangled over the continental air defense mission. The Army viewed the protection of the American homeland from incoming aircraft and missiles as an outgrowth of its traditional antiaircraft mission and an opportunity to demonstrate its relevance as part of atomic-age warfare. The Air Force considered continental air defense to be an integral part of its overall air defense mission and viewed Army and Navy efforts to develop surface-to-air missiles as unnecessary and a waste of defense dollars. Finally, the Air Force looked askance at the growing inventory of Army aircraft, both fixed-wing and rotary. Although it did not contest Army development of helicopters for limited tactical use, it loudly contested Army proposals to develop an organic air assault or aerial resupply capability.¹¹

The development and acquisition of transport aircraft remained a hotly contested issue between the two services. As former commanders of airborne divisions during World War II, Generals Ridgway and Taylor both had expressed concern over the availability of aircraft to deliver Army forces into an overseas theater. Strategic movement of troops and the delivery

10. Steven L. Rearden, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984); Richard M. Leighton, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy, Money, and the New Look* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2001).

11. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 61–76.

of paratroops as part of an airborne assault were two distinct missions and required different types of aircraft. The Air Force acknowledged its responsibility for strategic transport but contended that strategic bombardment was in itself the decisive way to wage war. Air Force leaders argued before Congress that increasing the number of bomber wings and fighter squadrons was of far more value to the American public than the procurement of additional transport aircraft. Although the Air Force began to procure C-130 turboprop four-engine medium transport aircraft in 1956, the overwhelming majority of its transport fleet consisted of two-engine, propeller-driven aircraft, many of World War II vintage. Most of those did not belong to the Air Force but operated as part of the Military Air Transport Service, a joint agency of the Department of Defense and under Air Force direction. Despite frequent Army protests, the Department of Defense maintained that the nation possessed sufficient strategic airlift to meet that service's requirements.¹²

As the Army's discontent over strategic airlift remained at a low simmer, the Air Force's concern over the Army's expanding surface-to-surface missile program was rapidly coming to a boil. Army leaders had traditionally viewed rockets and missiles as extensions of traditional artillery. With the assistance of a group of former German scientists led by Wernher von Braun, they had moved forward rapidly with a family of long-range weapons. By 1956, the service had deployed the Honest John rocket with a range of approximately 15 miles and the Corporal missile with a range of 75–100 miles. The Redstone missile, with a range of 200 miles, was under development. Air Force officers began to suspect an Army intent to use the increased range of its missiles to attack strategic targets. Alarmed by what his officers considered an encroachment on their mission, Secretary of the Air Force Donald A. Quarles submitted a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson identifying his service's disagreements with the Army missile program and recommending that further research and development be limited to weapons with a range of no more than 200 miles. Even that

12. "Excerpts From Wilson's Closing Testimony at Senate Hearing on Military Strength," *New York Times*, 4 Jul 1956; Memo, Col. Fred C. Weyand, Executive Ofcr Sec Army, for Sec Gen Staff, 11 Dec 1956, sub: Adequacy of Airlift and Tactical Air Support for the Army; Memo, Brig. Gen. C. J. Hauck Jr. for Ch Staff, 29 May 1956, sub: Congressional Interest in Roles and Missions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 266–69.

range allowance, he explained, was only to take into account requirements to position missile launchers up to 100 miles behind front lines.¹³

A similar interservice rivalry and competition had arisen in the development of antiaircraft missiles. In 1949, the Armed Forces Policy Council had assigned specific surface-to-air missile responsibilities to each of the services, all of which had extensive research and development programs. The Army would develop missiles to replace traditional antiaircraft artillery; the Air Force would produce missiles that could supplant interceptor aircraft; and the Navy would design missiles to protect the fleet at sea. The Air Force concentrated on the Bomarc, a long-range guided missile, which was essentially a pilotless interceptor. The Navy produced a short-range missile, the Terrier, for defense of ships at sea and was working on a longer-range version called the Talos. The Army's Nike Ajax missile had a range of 25 miles and was the only air-defense missile actually deployed by the beginning of 1956. At that time, the service was also working on an improved version, the Nike Hercules, with a potential range of about 75 miles.¹⁴

In 1954, the Air Force chief of staff, General Twining, had proposed that his service assume responsibility for all air-defense missiles. He argued that the competition between the services to develop similar systems was wasteful. Twining reiterated his service's belief that airpower, including continental air defense, was indivisible and must be under centralized control. Secretary Wilson did not concede to the Air Force all of its claims. In November 1954, he assigned the responsibility for point defense of cities and vital installations to the Army, with a range limitation on its missiles of 50 miles. The Air Force would assume the responsibility for intercepting enemy aircraft beyond that range.¹⁵

With the Army's development of its longer-range Nike Hercules well underway, the Air Force reopened the debate over air defense responsibilities. In 1955, the Air Force had assumed the responsibility for developing and financing a land-based version of the Talos missile and, in March 1956,

13. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 65; Elliott V. Converse III, *Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960*, vol. 1, *History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2012), 599; Memo, Hauck for Ch Staff, 29 May 1956, sub: Congressional Interest in Roles and Missions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

14. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 61.

15. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 61; Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, 29 May 1956, sub: Staff Study—Clarification of Service Roles and Missions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Major Areas of Divergence Among Military Services, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

announced its intention to deploy these missiles in the point defense of its Strategic Air Command bases. A few months later, excerpts from a classified Air Force study appeared in the press condemning the Army's Nike missile as inadequately tested and incapable of intercepting manned bombers or missiles. Only the Air Force, the report concluded, could provide adequate air defense through a system of early-warning radars, interceptor aircraft, and Bomarc and Talos missiles.¹⁶

The final area of conflict between the Army and the Air Force involved the Army's rapidly expanding aviation program. In a review of the entire program submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff late in 1955, General Taylor identified the statutory authorities who would implement the program as well as the functions and responsibilities he expected them to perform. Taylor's paper described six functions—observation, airlift for small unit movement in the combat zone, airlift for small amounts of critical supplies within the combat zone, aerial reconnaissance, command and liaison, and medical evacuation from the battlefield. At the time of the general's report, the Army maintained 3,931 aircraft, including 2,619 airplanes and 1,312 helicopters. By July 1958, the Army planned to receive an additional 1,583 aircraft. Taylor insisted that the aircraft would supplement, rather than replace, Air Force missions and that they did not encroach upon Air Force prerogatives.¹⁷

With significant research, development, and procurement funding at stake, the two services continued to debate respective roles and missions. In 1952, Secretary of the Army Frank C. Pace and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter had agreed to a limitation of 5,000 pounds for the empty weight of Army fixed-wing aircraft. However, by 1956, the weight limit had become overly restrictive in the development of new prototypes. In September, Secretary Brucker approached Secretary Wilson about removing the restriction. General Twining objected to the proposal as well as to the number of aircraft the Army had programmed for procurement. The Air Force declared that, because the 1952 agreements had been bilateral between the two services, they were subject to varying interpretations. The Air Force requested a new directive from the secretary of defense clarifying the role of

16. Anthony Leviero, "Air Force Calls Army Nike Unfit To Guard Nation," *New York Times*, 21 May 1956; John G. Norris, "Army Fights Air Force Missile Base Plans," *New York Times*, 21 Mar 1956; Elie Abel, "Wilson Marshals Service's Chiefs to Decry Rivalry," *New York Times*, 22 May 1956; Memo, Lt. Col. [no first name given] Mease, Missiles and Air Defense Division, for Staff, 19 July 1956, sub: Public Release of Information on Nike, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

17. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 74.

the Army's organic aviation and identifying specific Air Force functions that would support the Army.¹⁸

As Wilson tried to sort out the conflicts between the two services, both sides continued the battle in the court of public opinion. In addition to leaking its evaluation of the Army's Nike missile, the Air Force continued its aggressive campaign to sell the nation on the concept of dominance through airpower. In testimony before Congress and through various speeches and publications, Air Force officers concentrated their efforts to reinforce the image of their service as the cornerstone of national defense. Always, they emphasized the requirement for additional air wings to maintain the peace. Often, when the Army tried to counterattack, the press accused the service of "sulking."¹⁹ General Guy S. Meloy Jr., the chief of public information, urged General Taylor to keep the Army's communications positive. The Army should continue to spread its message of finding ways to do its job better, with better equipment and less money. Meloy wanted leaders within Army Aviation, the Guided Missile Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, and the Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, to speak out more frequently about advances in their respective organizations.²⁰

Secretary Wilson delivered his response to the members of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 26 November. As a preface, he declared that earlier allocations of roles and missions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at previous meetings in Key West, Florida, and Newport, Rhode Island, had proven to be sound and had effectively implemented the intent of Congress. He noted, however, that the development of new weapons and new strategic concepts had created the need for clearer interpretation of the roles and missions of the armed forces.²¹

Wilson attempted to resolve the major issues that had confounded leaders of the Army and Air Force. He first addressed the Army Aviation program.

18. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 76; Richard P. Weinert Jr., *A History of Army Aviation, 1950–1962* (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991), 110; Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Major Areas of Divergence Among Military Services, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

19. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Ch Staff, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Assessment of Article in TIME, 4 June 1956, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

20. Memo, Meloy for Ch Staff, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Assessment of Article in TIME; Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy for Ch Staff, 6 Aug 1956, sub: Accenting the Positive, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Jay M. Parker, "The Colonels' Revolt: Eisenhower, the Army, and the Politics of National Security" (Paper, Naval War College, 1994), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=447086>.

21. Memo, Sec Def Charles E. Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of

Wilson defined the combat zone in which he would allow Army aircraft to operate as no more than 100 miles forward of the line of contact with the enemy. The field commander would define its rearward extension, but it normally would extend up to 100 miles to the rear as well. This was a significant change from earlier agreements, which had not specifically defined the zone. Wilson affirmed most of the traditional functions for Army Aviation. The service could continue to perform command, liaison, and communications; observation, fire adjustment, and photographic reconnaissance; airlift of personnel and materiel; and aeromedical evacuation. Wilson specifically prohibited the Army from providing aircraft for strategic and tactical airlift, which he defined as movement from exterior points into the combat zone. Although he had allowed medical evacuation by Army Aviation within the combat zone, only the Air Force would perform evacuation outside of the combat zone or from airheads or airborne objective areas where Air Force aircraft had provided the primary support. The order also reserved for the Air Force the missions of close combat air support, interdiction, and tactical reconnaissance beyond the combat zone. In an important clarification, Deputy Defense Secretary Reuben H. Robertson Jr. told reporters that nothing in the ruling prevented the Army from continuing its development of sky cavalry units nor from using its aircraft to acquire targets and direct the fire of its short-range missiles.²²

Moving on to specifications for the aircraft themselves, Wilson maintained the established limit of 5,000 pounds for Army fixed-wing aircraft and added a limitation of 20,000 pounds for helicopters. He said he would consider exceptions to weight limitations for specific aircraft developed for particular Army requirements. Noting the proposed increase in the number of aircraft maintained by the Army, the secretary commented that he expected corresponding declines in the numbers of trucks and other forms of transportation requested by the service. As a final note on the subject, Wilson forbade the Army from maintaining its own aviation research facilities, directing the service to make maximum use of Air Force and Navy aircraft research.²³

The secretary also expounded on his philosophy for continental air defense. Area- and point-defense systems, he said, could not be defined

Operation of the Department of Defense, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

22. Memo, Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Army Mission is Curbed,” *Army Times*, 1 Dec 1956.

23. Memo, Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense.

with precision. Nonetheless, the defense of key installations, cities, and specified geographic areas would remain primarily an Army mission. He directed that no service could plan unilaterally for additional missile bases of either type unless and until the commander in chief of the Continental Air Defense Command recommended this action and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it. To the Army, Wilson assigned responsibility for the continued development of Nike and Talos missile systems. He limited the horizontal range of the point-defense missiles to 100 nautical miles. He directed the Air Force to continue its development of the Bomarc area-defense missile system, and the Navy retained responsibility for the development of ship-based air-defense weapons.²⁴

The secretary also took steps to limit the Army's surface-to-surface missile program. The service could use such systems against tactical targets within the zone of operations, defined as extending no more than 100 miles forward of the front lines. Allowing for a deployment of up to 100 miles behind the front lines placed a limitation of 200 miles on the development and fielding of any future systems. The attack of targets beyond that range remained the responsibility of the Air Force. With that in mind, the secretary continued, the employment of land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) would be the sole responsibility of the Air Force. He stated that, beginning in July 1958, he would transfer budget support for the development of the Army's Jupiter IRBM to the Air Force. At the same time, support for the Air Force's Talos antiaircraft missile would become an Army responsibility.²⁵

Finally, on the adequacy of strategic airlift, Wilson was far more succinct. In a brief paragraph he stated, "The current composition of the Air Force structure has been carefully examined, and it appears that it presently provides adequate airborne lift in the light of currently approved strategic concepts."²⁶ He did not want to talk about it anymore.

For the most part, reaction in the news media to the defense secretary's announcement was positive. Most commenting on the subject agreed that the competition with the Air Force had forced the secretary to make a decision and that it was a realistic compromise. Some noted, however, that this outcome was unlikely to resolve the interservice arguments that plagued

24. Memo, Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense.

25. Memo, Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense.

26. Memo, Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense.

the defense establishment. An editorial in the *Army Times* opined that the service had been overmatched by the “five-sided ring across the Potomac” and should continue the fight on Capitol Hill.²⁷

General Taylor and officers on the Army Staff were more circumspect in their analysis of the memorandum. To Secretary Brucker, Taylor wrote that the Army had not suffered any substantive loss of mission because of the ruling. He believed that the Army should limit its response to “an expression of loyal support.”²⁸ Most officers on the Army Staff reacted similarly, feeling that the memorandum had not altered substantially many of the provisions of the earlier Pace-Finletter agreements. More important, they believed, had been the expressed validation of the sky cavalry experiments. Also, the defense secretary’s statements seemed to strengthen the Army position that air defense was not the responsibility of a single service, but rather a joint function. On the question of strategic airlift, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman noted that the issue was not directly related to the question of roles and missions, but rather whether “currently approved strategic concepts” fully supported national security policy.²⁹ General Taylor’s Coordinating Group, an informal collection of colonels he had assembled to study and to advise him on policy issues, recommended that the service emphasize its requirement to move two divisions within thirty days of alert. They noted, however, that only the Air Force could make a definitive estimate of its own capabilities.³⁰

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: THINKING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE BOX

Perhaps in no other way was the Army as “alert to its future,” as in the context of its research and development programs. The period after the Korean War

27. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Ch Staff, 7 Dec 1956, sub: Analysis of Press and Commentator’s Reaction to Secretary Wilson’s Missile Directive, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Settling for a Sop,” *Army Times*, 8 Dec 1956.

28. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Sec Army, 14 Feb 1957, sub: Army Position on the Secretary of Defense’s 26 November Memorandum on Roles and Missions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

29. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Sec Army, 8 Dec 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

30. Memo, Taylor for Sec Army, 14 Feb 1957, sub: Army Position on the Secretary of Defense’s 26 November Memorandum; Memo, Eddleman for Sec Army, 8 Dec 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions; Memo, Coordination Gp for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 11 Dec 1956, sub: Analysis by DCSOPS of Secretary of Defense Memorandum

was one of the most dynamic in the Army's history, as leaders attempted to harness rapidly evolving technology. Although President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson were reluctant to spend money on replacing aging stocks of World War II and Korean War weapons and equipment, they encouraged Army leaders to embrace new technology and, in particular, atomic weapons as the means of modernizing the force. In his memoir, General Taylor recalled how Secretary Wilson once kicked back an Army budget for revision, instructing Taylor to substitute requests for "newfangled items with public appeal," instead of those more prosaic items needed by the everyday foot soldier.³¹ With research funds relatively plentiful, Army leaders explored the potential offered by science and technology. Ultimately, the results were mixed. Some ideas evolved into equipment that would become the backbone of the Army for the next twenty years. Others, thankfully, were discarded.

The crown jewel of the Army's research and development program was the Jupiter IRBM. In 1955, the Killian Committee—formally known as the Technological Capabilities Panel and chaired by James R. Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Eisenhower's science and technology adviser—had recommended a program that would lead to the development of a small, artificial satellite and an IRBM with a range of 1,500 miles. Army leaders recognized that their Redstone missile program already had achieved many of the milestones involved in the development of an IRBM. The facilities at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, were well-suited to take on the new project. Von Braun, the Army's lead scientist, met with Secretary Wilson and convinced him that the Jupiter project was a logical extension of the Redstone program. Although Wilson had designated the new missile as a joint Army-Navy venture, the Army took the lead in the testing and development of the Jupiter missile. In February 1956, the service activated the Army Ballistic Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal and named Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris as its first commanding general. Although the Navy would soon lose interest in the project as it pursued its submarine-launched Polaris missile system, the Army and the Air Force would spar over control of the Jupiter program for the next several years.³²

General Medaris had urged other Army leaders to concentrate on more advanced weapon systems. He had told the chief of ordnance in 1955 that

dated 26 November Clarifying Roles and Missions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

31. Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 171.

32. James M. Grimwood and Frances Strowd, "History of the Jupiter Missile System" (Huntsville, AL: U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command, 1962), 11–13, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) Library, CMH, Washington, DC; John B. Medaris, *Countdown for Decision* (New York: Putnam, 1961), 66–70.



Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris (U.S. Army)

the Army was fighting a losing game. If it continued to expend its energy fighting for conventional weapons and ammunition, even though it needed them urgently, the service would get little money of any kind. It would be far easier, he had said, to justify a budget with the more popular, modern items. He recommended that the Army increase the amount in its budget for guided missiles and limit itself to modest quantities of conventional items.³³

In October 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to form an ad hoc committee of

senior military representatives from each service to consider all aspects of continental air defense. Increasing Soviet capabilities, along with innovations and improvements in weapons and delivery systems, had raised dramatically the importance of protecting North America from enemy air attack. The secretary of defense appointed Air Force General Carl A. Spaatz, Army General Thomas T. Handy, Admiral John J. Ballentine, and Albert C. Hill from the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to study the associated problems and developments, and to recommend appropriate countermeasures.³⁴

A great deal of the Army's research and development budget was already devoted to air-defense missiles. By 1956, the Nike I, or Ajax, was the backbone of the Army's continental air defense system. The Ajax greatly extended the altitude and range of traditional air defense artillery and carried a more lethal warhead. The Nike B, or Hercules, an improvement on the original model, was just entering production. The Hercules extended both the range and altitude of the Ajax and had the capability of mounting an atomic warhead. With it, Army planners envisioned knocking out whole

33. Medaris, *Countdown for Decision*, 65.

34. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, to Ellis A. Johnson, Dir, Ops Research Ofc, 26 Oct 1956; Memo, Gen. (Ret.) Thomas T. Handy for Ch Staff, 5 Dec 1956, sub: Ad Hoc Committee on the Air Defense of North America, both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

formations of enemy aircraft. Because of anticipated advances in technology, the ultimate goal for continental air defense was to develop the ability to intercept and destroy incoming enemy missiles. The Army had completed initial studies on an antimissile missile and had begun development of the Nike Zeus to meet that requirement. Also undergoing final testing was the Army's Hawk antiaircraft missile, designed for employment by troops in the field against low-flying enemy aircraft.³⁵

In recognition of the prominent role that guided missiles had come to play in the Army's research and development program, the vice chief of staff ordered the creation of the Guided Missiles Directorate, appointing Brig. Gen. Dwight E. Beach as its first director. The appointment made Beach a member of the Joint Board on Future Storage of Atomic Weapons and on the Coordinating Committee on Atomic Energy. In his position, he also became the principal assistant to the deputy chief of staff for operations in all matters related to rockets, missiles, and atomic warheads. Secretary Brucker, not to be outdone, suggested to General Taylor that the Army create a separate missiles branch within the Army. After due consideration, Taylor decided against creating a separate branch, but he directed his staff to conduct a study to consider amending the field artillery insignia to incorporate a reference to the Army missile program.³⁶

The Army also increasingly looked to helicopters as another way to adapt to modern warfare. Because, in 1950, the Army had designated its initial helicopter companies as transport, the Army Transportation Corps had become the technical service with the primary interest in Army Aviation. By 1956, however, some farsighted officers began to question that affiliation. A fact sheet prepared for the chief of staff noted that air activity in the combat zone required an "intimate coordination of effort."³⁷ The paper noted that the Army needed aircraft designed specifically for its needs and missions. In May, the director of Army Aviation, Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, expanded on that idea before an audience of the American Helicopter Society. Howze

35. Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, "Missiles on the Firing Line," *Army Information Digest* 11 (Dec 1956): 36; U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1957* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 109–11.

36. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Vice Ch Staff, 5 Sep 1956, sub: Title and Responsibilities of Brigadier General Dwight E. Beach, ODCSOPS; Memo, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker for Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1956, sub: Proposal to Create Missiles Branch; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

37. 1956 Fact Sheet, n.d., sub: Army Aviation: Future Role, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



An H-19 Chickasaw carrying an external load, 19 July 1962 (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

told his listeners that the Army needed simpler, more reliable helicopters that were versatile enough to perform a variety of missions. He insisted that future prototypes must have guidance and instrument systems to facilitate operations at night and in bad weather. He predicted that the speed and mobility provided by helicopters would require the Army to rewrite its tactical manuals.³⁸

With helicopters becoming an important part of the modern Army, the service devoted more resources toward the development of new prototypes. Although they had performed serviceably, the Army's two primary helicopters, the H-19 Chickasaw and the H-34 Choctaw had been designed, respectively, for the Air Force and the Navy. In the mid-1950s, the Army submitted its requirements for a relatively small, high-performance utility helicopter for a variety of roles in the combat zone. By 1956, it had accepted a bid from Bell Helicopter to build prototypes for testing. The XH-40 Iroquois was an all-metal, closed-cabin design and the first to have a gas turbine engine. As the year ended, the Army had three of these helicopters

38. 1956 Fact Sheet, n.d., sub: Army Aviation: Future Role; "Howze Asks for Improvement in Copters," *Army Times*, 12 May 1956.

undergoing tests, with another six ordered for further tests the following year. Research and development also continued in 1956 on a larger helicopter, dubbed the Flying Crane, which could carry loads up to 12 tons over short distances under combat conditions. Although much work remained on the project, the Army had received several contractor studies that appeared to be promising.³⁹

In addition to its encouraging research on helicopters, the Army continued its development of fixed-wing aircraft. In his “roles and missions” decree of 26 November, Secretary Wilson had approved an exception to the 5,000-pound weight limit to allow the Army to purchase five de Havilland DHC-4 Caribou cargo aircraft for testing. With an empty weight of 12,500 pounds, the Caribou was designed to transport moderate to heavy payloads of troops or equipment while using short or improvised landing strips. In a slight headwind, the aircraft could become airborne with a takeoff run of less than 350 feet. Fitted with troop seats, the Caribou could transport twenty-eight soldiers. Alternatively, the units could modify it to accommodate twenty-two wounded, stretcher-borne troops.⁴⁰

In attempting to come to grips with a concept for atomic warfare, Army leaders revisited some older technologies with an eye toward adopting them to modern combat. A requirement to neutralize enemy troops that were deeply entrenched to withstand atomic attacks seemed to some to call for a new look at chemical weapons. Although the World War I experience had attached some stigma to their use, such weapons, argued Chief Chemical Officer Maj. Gen. William A. Creasy, were still useful for their ability to inflict casualties with a minimum of damage to the surrounding area. Creasy insisted that chemical weapons were not horror weapons. He noted that only 2 percent of those incapacitated by gas in World War I had died. Certainly, the firebombing employed during World War II was more horrific than that. Research and development for chemical weapons projects continued in 1956. Although chemical warheads for the Honest John rocket and the Corporal

39. Marvin L. Worley Jr., *New Developments in Army Weapons, Tactics, Organization, and Equipment* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1958), 127–36; U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–30 Jun 1957, 111.

40. Worley, *New Developments*, 125–27; Memo, Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense.



Troops deploy from an H-34 Choctaw helicopter in a simulated battle exercise, 17 July 1962. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

missile were already under development, Creasy also recommended the study of projectiles for smaller mortars, rockets, and artillery.⁴¹

Finally, the Army looked to improve upon the basic instruments of the common infantryman. In 1956, the Army completed testing on two new weapons and prepared to approve them as standard issue. A soldier could fire the M14 rifle in either semi- or fully-automatic mode, and it weighed 8.7 pounds—less than the M1, which it replaced. When modified with a bipod and heavier barrel, it became the M15 and replaced the venerable Browning automatic rifle. The M60 general-purpose machine gun replaced three different infantry weapons. It could be fired from a tripod, with a bipod, or from the shoulder or hip. It came with a quick-change barrel that a user could replace in a matter of seconds. All three weapons fired the same 7.62 NATO cartridge, thus simplifying ammunition resupply.⁴²

41. Memo, Maj. Gen. William M. Creasy, Ch Chem Ofcr, for Asst Sec Army (Logistics), 3 Jan 1956, sub: Information on Chemical Warfare and Discussion of the Minimum Destruction Concept of Warfare; Fact Sheet, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 15 Nov 1956, sub: Army Requirements for Continued Development of CW Munitions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

42. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–30 Jun 1957, 110.



The Army's "flying platform," developed by Hiller Helicopters Inc., 1956 (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

Not all of the Army's research and development programs bore fruit. Some, in fact, seemed to come from the pages of the latest pulp science fiction magazines. For several years, the service experimented with a flying platform, or "aerocycle," designed to lift individual soldiers into the air and move them short distances. Engineers envisioned the device less as a means of transport and more as a tool for reconnaissance, area surveillance, and adjustment of artillery fires. During the year, engineers tested two prototypes, but found that neither met all of their requirements.⁴³

General Medaris described an even more fanciful project at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army in November 1956. In discussions concerning the Army's modern logistics system, Medaris introduced the concept of a troop- and supply-carrying rocket that would move 500 miles in thirty-five minutes and, at the end of its trajectory, gently float to the earth beneath a massive parachute. At that point, either the soldiers would exit the transport rocket or troops on the receiving end would unload needed supplies. Artists' depictions of the concept published

43. Worley, *New Developments*, 144–46; "Infantry May Fly in Future," *Army Times*, 7 Jan 1956; "Army Lets New Contract For Flying Platforms," *Army Times*, 24 Nov 1956.



At Fort Eustis, Virginia, test engineer Harold M. Graham demonstrates a new twin-jet rocket-propulsion system, developed by the Bell Aerosystem Company. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

in Army magazines showed up to twenty soldiers exiting from the delivery vehicle as it rested beneath a collapsed parachute.⁴⁴

Despite these occasional misfires, by the end of the year, the Army's research and development programs seemed to be on track. Although the Army continued to experience difficulties replenishing its stocks of conventional vehicles, weapons, and equipment, it was moving forward in its effort to present itself as a modern, atomic-age force.

BUILDING AN ATOMIC ARMY

The Army and the Air Force had conducted Exercise SAGE BRUSH in the Louisiana Maneuver Area between 31 October and 4 December 1955. The critiques had revealed that both services had seen little to move them away from the preconceived notions they held regarding proponentcy over air defense, close air support, and control over atomic munitions. Moreover,

44. "Army Eyes Future," *Army Times*, 3 Nov 1956; "Missiles—Troop Vehicles of the Future," *Army Information Digest* 11 (Dec 1956): 124.

Army observers had confirmed that their own units had shown little of the discipline and training that would have generated useful feedback regarding the organization and doctrine they were testing. Instead of identifying solutions to problems of atomic warfare, reported General John E. Dahlquist, the commanding general of U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), SAGE BRUSH merely emphasized that the Army had many more problems to consider.⁴⁵

The commanders of the two Atomic Field Army (ATFA-1) prototype divisions, Maj. Gen. George E. Lynch of the 3d Infantry Division and Maj. Gen. Robert L. Howze of the 1st Armored Division, submitted different conclusions regarding the performance of their units and their recommendations for reorganization. Neither officer was completely satisfied with the new organization, and each suggested adding additional increments. The resulting modification recommendations for each division would exceed the personnel strengths of those unit types, which still operated according to their previous Korean War models. Clearly, General Ridgway's original goal to develop more austere divisions, which he felt would be better suited to atomic-era warfare, had become lost in the effort.⁴⁶

On 12 December, the CONARC Combat Developments Group briefed General Maxwell Taylor on a potential alternative to the Atomic Field Army. CONARC's "Study on the 1960–1970 PENTANA Army" was a repackaging of the Army War College's PENTANA (pentagonal atomic-nonatomic), a study that called for a completely air-transportable 8,600-person division to replace all three existing divisions—infantry, armored, and airborne. At the end of December, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), wrote to Dahlquist that CONARC's PENTANA study reflected a great amount of imaginative thought and would serve as the basis for future study on mid- and long-range objectives for organization, doctrine, and weapons development. He noted that the Army Staff would present its own recommendations to the chief of staff by March 1956. In the meantime, General Eddleman, the deputy chief of staff for plans, reminded General Taylor that CONARC had already been working on a study for a modified airborne division. A combination of this effort with the PENTANA study

45. Joint Critique, HQ Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), 10 Dec 1955, sub: Exercise SAGE BRUSH, File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, Series: CONARC Exercise Files, 1954–1962, RG 546: Records of the U.S. Army Continental Command, NACP.

46. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 269–70; John J. Midgely Jr., *Deadly Illusions: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 51–57.

would provide an early opportunity to evaluate many of the organizational concepts under consideration.⁴⁷

The airborne division proposed by CONARC incorporated many features of the ATFA-1 concept and the two PENTANA studies. It included five battle groups, each consisting of four infantry companies, a 4.2-inch mortar battery, and a headquarters and service company composed of engineer, signal, maintenance, reconnaissance, heavy weapons, and medical resources. A divisional support group included a maintenance battalion and administrative, medical, supply, and transportation companies. The divisional command and control battalion included the division headquarters, a headquarters and service company, an aviation company, and a reconnaissance troop. A signal battalion and a small engineer battalion provided support across the division. The division artillery included three 105-mm. howitzer batteries for direct support and a battery of two Honest John rocket launchers for nuclear support to the division as a whole (*Chart 5*).⁴⁸

General Taylor approved the concept for testing in February, with a few modifications. He added a fifth infantry company to each battle group and increased the number of howitzer batteries to five, but he reduced the artillery batteries from eight guns to five. He also ordered the inclusion of a band. The resulting division numbered 11,486 troops, considerably larger than the original PENTANA model, but still 6,000 less than the Korean War-version of the airborne division. The 101st Airborne Division, newly redesignated from a training division, reorganized under the experimental concept, now known as ROTAD (Reorganization of the Airborne Division), and began training and evaluations.⁴⁹


In the meantime, Taylor directed CONARC to begin development of an infantry division along similar lines and to work with the Army Staff to develop future organizational and operational concepts based on the PENTANA model. Along with that study, the chief of staff provided additional guidance for charting the Army's future course. Although he

47. MFR, Maj. Gen. John S. Upham, Dep Asst Ch Staff, G-3, 14 Dec 1955, sub: CONARC Briefing for Chief of Staff on PENTANA Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G-3, to Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 28 Dec 1955; Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Plans, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 14 Dec 1955, sub: CONARC Study on the 1960-1970 PENTANA Army; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Midgley, *Deadly Illusions*, 57-63.

48. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 273.

49. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 273; "101st Fits for A-War," *Army Times*, 31 Mar 1956; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "101st AB to be Battle-Ready in Six Months," *Army Times*, 29 Sep 1956.

Chart 5—Airborne Division (ROTAD), 10 August 1956



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Note
1. Includes the division band.

Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*. Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998). 275.

believed that it was increasingly difficult to visualize a general war without the use of tactical atomic weapons, he also considered it likely that some form of “ground rules” would evolve. Flexibility for the Army’s combat forces was a must. Taylor suggested rigorous consideration of all elements included at the division level and wondered what units could be pooled at higher levels and attached as needed. He embraced the pentagonal structure, pointing out that it was excellent for dispersion and for the conduct of all-around defense. Although PENTANA applied best to infantry-based divisions, the chief of staff suggested exploring the possibilities of mechanized divisions—larger and more expensive than the others—employing lighter and smaller versions of tanks and armored vehicles.⁵⁰

On 23 August, Taylor sent General Dahlquist additional guidance on the reorganization of the current infantry division. He again specified that the new division should develop along pentagonal lines, and he set a deadline of 15 October for CONARC to submit manning charts and proposed tables of organization and equipment. The new division, Taylor directed, must contain only the minimum number of vehicles to accomplish its mission. A study of how to pool vehicles within a divisional transportation battalion most efficiently was a matter of deep concern to the chief of staff. He also directed special focus upon the engineer and signal units of the new organization. Atomic warfare, he noted, would generate greater requirements for combat engineers, but the planners could not allow the proposed battalion to become unnecessarily large. Likewise, the division signal units must emphasize support of radio, as wire communications would have diminished utility on the more mobile battlefield. General Taylor also requested a schedule for the reorganization of the Army’s active divisions during the coming fiscal year. He suggested beginning with one division each from the continental United States, Europe, and the Far East, so that he could study the effects of the reorganization across a wide range of environments.⁵¹

CONARC forwarded the requested manning charts and its vision for the new infantry division to the Army Staff on 15 October. Although it followed Taylor’s basic guidance, the proposal suggested a slightly larger organization that included divisional tank and engineer battalions with five companies each. The division artillery included two battalions, one with five batteries of 105-mm. howitzers and one with two 155-mm. howitzer batteries, an

50. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Army Organization, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

51. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 23 Aug 1956, sub: Reorganization of Current Infantry Division, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

8-inch howitzer battery, and an Honest John battery. After examining the plan, the Army Staff recommended its approval, but identified a few points of concern. They noted that no intermediate point in the chain of command existed between the company commander, a captain, and the regimental commander, a colonel. That presented a serious problem in the development of infantry field grade officers qualified to command at higher levels. The designation of the basic tactical element also presented a problem. Although many within the service wished to retain traditional regimental affiliations, identifying the five basic combat components of each division as regiments would require more than 350 official regimental designations in total. The Army had only 250 currently on its rolls. Ultimately, the service decided to retain the term battle group, which had been used in the field tests, using it nominally and affiliating it with traditional regiments, as in 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry (*Chart 6*).⁵²

Nonetheless, the Army planned to implement the changes to the infantry division. In moving the proposal forward, General Eddleman relied upon reports from the Office of the Chief of Military History to study how the service had gone about restructuring its divisions in the past. He warned that field commanders typically had wanted all types of units, weapons, and equipment available for use in any possible contingency. He then observed that if all proposed changes submitted to Army Ground Forces for the triangular divisions of World War II had been approved, those units would have had an approximate strength of 30,000 soldiers. Such size would have rendered those units completely unwieldy and prevented the United States from mobilizing as many divisions as it had. To him, that indicated a need for the Army Staff to screen any further proposals carefully for additions to the table of organization and equipment. He noted, however, that history had shown that the reorganizations could take place in a relatively short time.⁵³


As the Army's chief of information, General Meloy also weighed in on the pending reorganization. The conversion offered, he said, "excellent opportunity to demonstrate to the American public the Army's modern long-range concept and potentials."⁵⁴ He proposed a broad and integrated

52. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 24 Nov 1956, sub: New Infantry Division Organization (Manning Charts), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

53. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 15 Dec 1956, sub: Divisional Reorganization, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

54. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Army Staff, 11 Dec 1956, sub: Reorganization of Army Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Chart 6—Infantry Division (ROCID), 21 December 1956



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 278.

publicity campaign with an introductory press conference, feature stories in various publications, and productions for the Army's *Big Picture* television show and *The Army Hour* radio broadcast that highlighted the new, modern Army. Meloy urged consideration of a new, descriptive, sales-appealing title to describe the new divisions. Potential designations included Pentana, Star, Astral, Hurricane, and Mars. General Taylor wisely noted that he preferred the newly coined term "Pentomic" as the designation.⁵⁵


Army planners had generally avoided experimenting with the armored division because they believed that it already was well-suited for the atomic battlefield. Its structure, employing combat command headquarters, and the protection and mobility offered by its tanks and other organic vehicles offset its somewhat larger size. Nonetheless, General Eddleman directed CONARC to modernize the armored division by adding atomic weapons, increasing target acquisition capabilities, and reducing the number of overall vehicles. In response, CONARC added a surveillance platoon to the reconnaissance company, provided additional aircraft within the aviation company, and replaced one battery in the 155-mm. howitzer general support battalion with a battery of nuclear capable 8-inch howitzers. After some discussion, the Army Staff added an Honest John battery to the general support battalion and dispersed the resources of the command and control battalion to other elements within the division. The resulting division, named ROCAD (Reorganization of the Current Armored Division), included 14,617 soldiers, 360 tanks, and roughly the same number of vehicles as the original structure. Acting as the chief of staff, Vice Chief of Staff General Williston B. Palmer approved the new organization on 5 November, and in December, the Army published the tables and manning charts reflecting the changes (*Chart 7*).⁵⁶

In order to reinforce the narrative that this was a new Army for the atomic age, the service planned programs for Congress to demonstrate materiel in development, concepts under consideration, and newly accepted doctrine. Maj. Gen. John H. Michaelis, the chief of legislative liaison, recommended two shows in early 1957, one at the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, and one at the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky. In the Army's advertisements for the events, General Michaelis suggested a tagline that

55. Memo, Meloy for Army Staff, 11 Dec 1956, sub: Reorganization of Army Divisions; Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 14 Dec 1956, sub: Various Code Names Which Refer to New Organizations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

56. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 277; Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 17 Oct 1956, sub: Future Armor Organizations; Memo, Gen. Williston B. Palmer, Acting Ch Staff, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 5 Nov 1956, sub: Revised Armored Division; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Chart 7—Armored Division (ROCAD), 1956



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 280.

would reinforce the service's message—"Pentomic Organization, Weapons and Equipment Review—POWER!"⁵⁷

As the transformation began to take shape, General Taylor took the opportunity to brief President Eisenhower on the pending changes to Army organization. During a meeting with the president and Secretary Brucker, Taylor identified the four principles that had guided the reorganizations: adapt divisions for operations on an atomic battlefield; eliminate nonessential vehicles and equipment or pool them at a higher level; improve communications systems to allow expanded spans of control; and create new organizations to take advantage of new technology, some of which the service had not yet fully developed. Eisenhower embraced the concept of smaller divisions, although he indicated a preference for units cut to a strength of around 10,000. Eisenhower acknowledged the need to notify NATO allies, but he discouraged the idea of a campaign publicly announcing the transition. He also accepted the Army chief of staff's proposed schedule, calling for the reorganizations to begin early in 1957 and proceed for the next two years.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, the kaleidoscope that had been the Army's active force structure had begun to stabilize. Now a nineteen-division force, the Army retained two corps and five divisions in Europe, two corps and four divisions in the Far East and Hawai'i, and two corps and ten divisions in the continental United States. During the year, the service conducted three GYROSCOPE rotations, with the 8th Infantry, 3d Armored, and 11th Airborne Divisions going to Germany, and the 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry Divisions returning to the United States. The Army gained control of two additional posts from the Air Force in 1956 with the transfer of Wolters Air Force Base (which became Camp Wolters) in Mineral Wells, Texas, in July and Camp Gary in San Marcos, Texas, in December. Camp Wolters and Camp Gary became primary training sites for Army helicopter and fixed-wing pilots.⁵⁹

Despite his consistent opposition to most aspects of the New Look, General Taylor was pragmatic enough to recognize an opening when he saw one and to move the Army in a direction where it could expand its influence. During the summer of 1956, the *New York Times* had reported on Admiral Radford's proposal to reduce the armed forces by another 800,000 troops. At the same time, the most recent version of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, the outline war plan for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed the president's

57. Memo, Maj. Gen. John H. Michaelis, Ch Legislative Liaison, for Ch Staff, 21 Dec 1956, sub: Congressional Demonstrations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

58. Memo of Conf with President, 11 Oct 1956, in *FRUS 1955–1957*, vol. 19, 369–70.

59. Weinert, *History of Army Aviation*, 226–31.

guidance that the United States would use atomic weapons at the outset of a general war, and would employ them as necessary in operations short of general war to achieve military objectives. Taylor understood the implication of those strategic concepts to be a requirement for small, self-contained, atomic task forces that the Army could preposition in strategic locations and that were mobile enough to deploy to trouble spots on short notice. The reduction in Army divisions, he believed, could help fund the creation of these units.⁶⁰

In June 1956, Taylor tasked the deputy chief of staff for military operations with developing a concept and organization for an atomic task force. In its subsequent briefing, the Army Staff noted four major strategic considerations. First, atomic weapons in the form of Little John rocket battalions would be organic to all U.S. divisions. (The Little John was the smaller, more portable version of the Honest John rocket.) Second, the United States would provide the bulk of atomic fire support for all allied ground forces. Third, higher headquarters normally would allocate air defense for the atomic task forces. Finally, by the end of 1960, four Redstone missile battalions, thirteen Corporal missile battalions, twenty-three Honest John battalions, and thirty-eight Little John battalions would be available as components of the task forces.⁶¹

In construction of the task force organization, the staff identified several tactical considerations. The task force must contain a liaison element capable of coordinating with the supported force. Target analysis and target acquisition would be key elements in providing effective atomic fire support. Taylor himself reemphasized that point, suggesting that the organization might include both ground and air reconnaissance elements, making it, perhaps, a suitable venue for further tests on the sky cavalry concept. Given the anticipated dispersion between fire units and supported forces, signal communications were another important concern. As they had with the pentomic organization, the planners considered radio communications to be the only practical means of overcoming dispersion and distance. Finally, although the new organization would require some integral elements for

60. Anthony Leviero, "The Paradox That is Admiral Radford," *New York Times*, 5 Aug 1956; Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to Gen. Henry I. Hodes, Cdr in Ch, U.S. Army, Europe, 5 Jul 1956, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

61. MFR, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 5 Jul 1956, sub: Atomic Task Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

local defense and logistical support, the supported force would have to supply almost all of those requirements.⁶²

After the briefing, General Taylor directed CONARC to develop detailed organization plans for three types of atomic task forces—an airborne version to be built around an Honest John battalion with the launchers modified so that the unit could be air-transported more easily, a medium version to be built around a Corporal missile battalion, and a heavy version to be built around a Redstone missile battalion. The general delayed further action on the heavy version of the task force until the Redstone missiles, still under development, were ready for deployment. Work went forward in both U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the Far East Command, testing the airborne version of the organization. Commanders noted that, despite the best efforts of logistics and research and development staffs, they had not yet developed acceptable modifications of the Honest John launchers that would enable them to be fully air-transportable.⁶³

Despite his well-documented efforts to adapt the Army to an atomic warfare environment, Maxwell Taylor already had begun to fashion his strategic philosophy of “Flexible Response” for which he would gain much more notoriety later in his career. An outline plan for guiding the development of the future Army noted that the United States should reevaluate the extent to which atomic weapons played a role in its war planning. “As the U.S. and the USSR arrive at a point of atomic stand-off and mutual atomic deterrence, the possibility that war will be non-atomic will increase,” Taylor surmised, and “as the possibility increases that war will be non-atomic, conventional strength will have to be increased.”⁶⁴ General Taylor presented his views to President Eisenhower in a meeting with Admiral Radford at the White House in May. All of the attention and resources the nation had devoted to nuclear forces, Taylor argued, had frozen out all other types of military forces, particularly those needed to handle a small war situation. Using atomic weapons in a local conflict would make escalation to full nuclear war more likely. Eisenhower countered that the use of tactical atomic weapons against military targets would be no more likely to trigger a larger war than the use of 20-ton Blockbuster bombs had been during World War II. The carnage of

62. MFR, Harkins, 5 Jul 1956, sub: Atomic Task Forces.

63. MFR, Harkins, 5 Jul 1956, sub: Atomic Task Forces; Ltr, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Cdr in Ch, Far East Cmd, to Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, Ch Research and Development, 17 Mar 1956, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

64. Memo, Col. P. R. Walters, Ch Plans and Programs Div, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 27 Jan 1956, sub: Coordination of Outline Concept for ARDP–68, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP; Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959).

that war and the seemingly futile bloodletting in Korea had convinced the president that conventional ground forces could no longer play a decisive role in warfare and might only prolong it. He concluded the meeting by expressing his understanding of the Army's position and assuring Taylor that, in the event of conflict, his service would play an important role in maintaining public order in the United States if it were bombed.⁶⁵

MAKING THE ARMY RELEVANT AGAIN

Its ongoing conflict with the Air Force had placed the Army in a position where many believed the service was fighting for its very existence, but the proverbial "last straw" had been the leak, in July 1956, of Admiral Radford's proposal for the further reduction of U.S. conventional forces by some 800,000 military personnel. More than half of them would come from the Army, and the admiral had recommended the return to the United States of most overseas deployments, including the divisions in Europe. To Army leaders, most of whom had served during World War II and the Korean War, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's suggestion that the remnants of the Army might serve best as some form of home guard to maintain order in a postapocalyptic United States was more than ludicrous. It was downright insulting.⁶⁶

As a preemptive strike, the plans section of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations prepared a blueprint for the chief of staff, illustrating what an Army operating under the constraints of the Radford Plan might look like. Perhaps overly stark in an effort to make the Army's case before Congress, the paper pulled no punches when identifying the implications of such a force reduction.⁶⁷ The immediate impact of Radford's proposal would be an automatic reduction or elimination of most overseas deployments. The paper warned of the political implications of the nation's inability to meet certain commitments specified in the Baghdad Pact and in partnerships with NATO, Japan, and Korea. In Europe, withdrawal of U.S. forces would remove the cement from the NATO alliance. Under such

65. Memo of Conf with President, 24 May 1956, in *FRUS 1955-1957*, vol. 19, 311-15.

66. Leviero, "Radford's Views Pose Basic National Security Issue"; Interv, Lt. Col. James Shelton and Lt. Col. Edward Smith with Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., 27 Jan 1976, 374, Senior Ofc Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

67. Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 20 Jun 1956, sub: Minimum Reorganization of Army Based on Budgetary Limitations Which May Require a Reduction in Personnel Strength, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956-1962, RG 319, NACP.

personnel limitations, the only remaining forward deployments would be one division in Hawai'i and elements of another in Alaska.⁶⁸

The study predicted a reduction in the number of divisions from nineteen in 1956 to eight by the end of 1960. In addition to the two divisions stationed in Hawai'i and Alaska, the remaining six would be stationed in the continental United States. In accordance with the administration's strategic vision, the Army's predominant striking power would lie in the formation of up to twenty atomic task forces. With an average strength of 6,000, these units would be organized around combinations of Honest John rocket and Corporal missile battalions. The service might station as many as ten of these task forces overseas, replacing the withdrawn divisions. The number of supporting engineer and artillery battalions throughout the Army would decrease considerably, although air defense units might see some increase.⁶⁹

The concluding paragraphs of the study brought home important points for members of Congress, who were probably the target audience for the effort. Obviously, such dramatic force reductions would result in a considerable contraction in the Army's base structure, both at home and overseas. Also, the reductions would require a reexamination of the reserve force structure, as the smaller size of the active Army would not justify the maintenance of such a large reserve force. Lastly, ongoing research and development efforts at military and scientific installations across the United States would have to be reexamined.⁷⁰

The Army got some sense of its potential future in July when it participated in a government-wide exercise portraying a national response to an atomic strike. Operation ALERT involved approximately sixteen government agencies in a test of emergency procedures in the event of an enemy attack. Although Army participants indicated that they had the required plans in place, they complained that most participants demonstrated little cooperation or understanding of the requirements and implications of such an attack. They reported that the number of requests they had received from civil authorities was insignificant as compared with those the Army had received for actual natural disasters of much smaller scale and intensity. As a result, Army participants had few opportunities to test their plans and emergency capabilities.⁷¹

As the Army grappled with its diminished national security role, not all of its public relations efforts could be described as sober reflection. Although

68. Memo, Wheeler for Ch Staff, 20 Jun 1956, sub: Minimum Reorganization of Army.

69. Memo, Wheeler for Ch Staff, 20 Jun 1956, sub: Minimum Reorganization of Army.

70. Memo, Wheeler for Ch Staff, 20 Jun 1956, sub: Minimum Reorganization of Army.

71. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Asst Sec Army, 19 Sep 1956, sub: Final Evaluation Report of Operation Alert 1956, File Unit: Entry A1

service leaders engaged in honest reappraisals of organization, doctrine, and military technology, other attempts to bolster the image of the Army, particularly in the eyes of the populace, seemed a little like grasping at straws.

Late in 1955, Army Staff officers visiting the National War College noticed four flags displayed with the national colors. Alongside flags representing the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy, stood the CONARC flag. The War College could not display a flag representing the entirety of the U.S. Army because there was none. Throughout its long history, the U.S. Army never had adopted a distinguishing flag. After that visit, at the request of Secretary Brucker, the Heraldic Branch of the Office of the Quartermaster General presented a design that featured the seal of the War Department in blue on a white background, accompanied by a red scroll bearing the inscription "U.S. Army." Separate streamers, denoting the major engagements of the U.S. Army, would be attached to the top of the flagstaff. Most staff sections concurred with the basic design of the flag, although the Office of the Chief of Military History opposed the use of streamers. Maj. Gen. Donald P. Booth, the assistant chief of staff, G-1 (Personnel), agreed, noting that the intent of the flag was to build esprit de corps in the Army as a whole. Using streamers earned by individual units might prevent the flag from representing the entire service. Booth also suggested that a flag festooned by multiple streamers might seem ostentatious when displayed with the flags of the other services. The entire matter of streamers, General Booth concluded, would have to be settled after the flag had been approved. President Eisenhower approved the Army flag, with its streamers, by executive order on 12 June 1956. Then, on 14 June, an Army color guard unfurled the flag for the first time at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, commemorating the 181st anniversary of the establishment of the Army by the Continental Congress.⁷²

Perhaps not entirely by coincidence, 1956 also saw the culmination of an effort of several years to designate an official song for the Army. The service already had adopted the melody of "The Caisson Song," composed in 1908 by then Lt. Edmund L. Gruber, as the tune of its official song. Then, after sifting through 140 contributions from various individuals and Army commands, the Adjutant General's Office selected the song's official lyrics. Secretary Brucker directed that the new, official Army song, now known as "The Army Goes Rolling Along," would be dedicated at all U.S. Army

2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

72. MFR, Maj. W. J. Dwyer, 17 Nov 1955, sub: Distinguishing Flag for the U.S. Army; Memo, Maj. Gen. John Michaelis, Ch Legislative Liaison, for Sec Army, 28 Dec 1956, sub: Presentation of Army Flags to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



The new U.S. Army flag, bearing campaign streamers dating back to 1775, waves in the breeze in the Garden of the Gods recreation area near Fort Carson, Colorado, 1956. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

installations around the world on 11 November—Veterans Day—and that subsequently it would be featured at all appropriate occasions throughout the service.⁷³

The growing popularity of television had not escaped the Army's attention. The service continued to lean upon its own production, *The Big Picture*, to highlight its importance as a member of the larger defense community. In October, the chief of information notified General Taylor of an upcoming Christmas special featuring both the Army Field Band and the Army

73. "The Army Keeps Rolling Along—New Official Army Song," *Army Information Digest* 12 (Jan 1957): 13–14; "Army Announces Choice of Official Song," *Army Times*, 15 Sep 1956.

Chorus. The chief of staff would use the opportunity to deliver a brief holiday greeting to the nation and to the men and women of the Army. However, not every television program was deemed suitable for the Army leadership. In a synopsis of current program opportunities, the Army's Radio-Television Branch suggested that *Meet the Press* and *College Press Conference* were most appropriate, especially because Lawrence Spivak, the host of *Meet the Press* noted for his sharp and incisive questioning, appeared to be mellowing. *Face the Nation* and *Youth Wants to Know* were deemed less appealing because Taylor recently had made appearances there. The branch approved of Taylor appearing on any of the major network morning talk shows, such as NBC's *Today* show with Dave Garroway, but strongly discouraged appearances on quiz shows like *The \$64,000 Question* and *What's My Line?* or "surprise" documentary shows like *This Is Your Life*.⁷⁴

To an increasing extent throughout 1956, General Taylor and members of the Army Staff emphasized to the field the importance of selling the Army to the public and especially to Congress. In November, General Eddleman directed the Operations and Training Branch to produce a series of training films that the Army could show to members of Congress and at meetings of various civic organizations. He asked that the films highlight new developments in Army weapons, equipment, and doctrine. Helicopters and sky cavalry were worthy subjects, he suggested, as were shots of new weapons firing. Secretary Brucker made similar points at the 21 November Army Commanders' Conference. He expected all senior leaders to establish a rapport between their commands and members of Congress representing their state and local areas. He explained to the assembled general officers, "In the Army we have a magnificent product, and it is our responsibility to sell it."⁷⁵ Further, Brucker told the chief of legislative liaison that every member of his team must be able to promote the Army—enthusiastically—as an aggressive, visionary force. They also must be prepared to present succinct and forceful explanations of Army issues to members of Congress at any time.⁷⁶

74. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Ch Staff, 22 Oct 1956, sub: Special Big Picture Television Program; Memo, Capt. William T. Ellington, Radio-Television Br, for Col. [no first name given] Clifton, 6 Dec 1956, sub: Radio-Television Programs Suitable for Appearance by Chief of Staff, both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

75. Memo, Brig. Gen. John H. Michaelis, Ch Legislative Liaison, for Sec Army, 16 Nov 1956, sub: Army Commanders' Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

76. Memo, Michaelis for Sec Army, 16 Nov 1956, sub: Army Commanders' Conference; Memo, Maj. Gen. John E. Theimer, Asst Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Dir Ops and Training, 1 Nov 1956, sub: Training Film on New Concepts of Weapons, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Since the start of the Eisenhower administration, Army leaders had come to perceive much of the service's struggle to remain relevant as a public relations problem. If they just could get their message out to Congress and to the greater American public, the Army might regain its rightful position as the cornerstone of American military policy. By the end of 1956, however, events around the world would begin to raise suspicions that the senior service was not obsolete after all.

THE ARMY GETS A "SWAGGER STICK"

In his memoir, President Eisenhower described the period beginning 20 October 1956 as "the most crowded and demanding three weeks of my entire presidency."⁷⁷ That day, political leaders in Poland forced a showdown with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev over the retention of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky in the Polish government. Although the Communists were able to resolve that crisis without coming to blows, Polish defiance inspired a similar insurrection in Hungary. This time, the Soviets responded with ruthless force, and on 4 November, 200,000 Soviet troops moved on Budapest. Despite pleas for assistance from resistance leaders within Hungary, Eisenhower chose not to intervene. Given Hungary's proximity to the Soviet Union and the inability of Western forces to intervene without traversing neutral or Communist countries, the president believed he had no military options.⁷⁸

Amid the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the president received intelligence that the armed forces of Israel were mobilizing. State Department reports revealed difficulties between Britain, France, and Egypt concerning access to the Suez Canal. Then, on 31 October, French and British military forces began a joint operation to seize the canal and to cooperate with Israeli military operations against Egypt. After rapid Israeli advances into the Sinai and the rout of defending Egyptian military forces, a U.S. cease-fire resolution, passed by the United Nations General Assembly, brought a

77. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 58–87.

78. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 58–87; Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 250. More detailed accounts of the Hungarian uprising can be found in Noel Barber, *Seven Days of Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising 1956* (New York: Stein and Day, 1956).

halt to the hostilities on 7 November. United Nations peacekeeping troops entered the area a day later.⁷⁹

Although Eisenhower had not considered seriously intervention by U.S. forces into either of these crises, the Army had begun developing a package of contingency plans for such international situations. In January, the deputy chief of staff for operations, General Eddleman, had assigned to the newly established CONARC the responsibility of formulating a family of emergency movement plans that would support contingencies short of general war. The Army Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1956 designated the XVIII Airborne Corps as the primary element of the Strategic Army Force and named it as the principal planning and command headquarters under the direction of the CONARC commanding general. Eddleman directed CONARC to coordinate with the Navy's Logistics Plans Division, the Air Force's Tactical Air Command, and the Defense Department's Military Air Transport Command to develop plans for air- and sealift of the designated forces.⁸⁰

Guidance attached to the directive identified two contingencies as the subjects for initial plans. The first, to be submitted by 1 June 1956, included one airborne division and one infantry division with appropriate combat support to be delivered by sealift and airlift to the Middle East. The proposed mission of that force was to stabilize a volatile situation anywhere in the Middle East or to intervene in a conflict between Iran and Iraq. The second mission proposed a force of one airborne and two infantry divisions as an initial combat force to stabilize the situation in Vietnam or to enter combat operations against the Viet Minh. An alternative to that plan proposed the possible reinforcement of Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan.⁸¹

In March, General Taylor expressed his concerns over the potential for conflict in the Middle East and directed CONARC to develop additional plans for airlift of one airborne regimental combat team in minimum time, with provisions for the remainder of the division to follow. One month later, CONARC's commander, General Willard G. Wyman, provided the chief of

79. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 78–84; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 347–75. More detailed accounts of the Suez Crisis and the response of the Eisenhower administration can be found in Hugh Thomas, *Suez* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) and Cole Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995).

80. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 25 Jan 1956, sub: Movement of a Strategic Army Force from CONUS in Implementation of Paragraph 32 of NSC 5501, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

81. Memo, Eddleman for Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 25 Jan 1956, sub: Movement of a Strategic Army Force from CONUS.

staff with the initial details of Operation Plan SWAGGERSTICK along with the initial problems associated with its development. The Air Force estimated that it could begin airlifting the force from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, three days after the initial alert, with all elements delivered to Wheelus Air Base in Libya nine days after the alert. Navy planners estimated that they could complete movement to the Middle East in approximately thirty days. General Wyman indicated that the primary logistical concern was the prestocking of deployable ammunition, food, and equipment at home installations and ports of embarkation. Shortages in personnel for the deployable divisions also concerned the general. None of the divisions of the XVIII Airborne Corps was at full strength, and most contained sizable numbers of troops who had not completed initial training or who had less than ninety days of service remaining. Wyman recommended boosting the 82d Airborne Division to 100 percent strength and giving it the same priority for replacements as overseas commands.⁸²

The deputy chief of staff for operations added a new variant to the operation in April, when he tasked the U.S. European Command with preparing plans for the airlift of one regimental combat team from USAREUR to the Middle East. He informed General Alfred M. Gruenther, commanding general of the U.S. European Command, that potential missions for the unit included the evacuation of U.S. nationals, the protection of U.S. installations, and the provision of an independent force to terminate hostilities between Arabs and Israelis and to restore a United Nations demarcation line. Significant components of the additional guidance incorporated a directive that the force would include an Honest John rocket battery and that coordination with France, Britain, or the United Nations might be required.⁸³

At the same time that CONARC and the U.S. European Command were drawing up plans to deploy units to the Middle East, the Army Staff began developing its own analysis of what an international peacekeeping operation there might entail. The assistant chief of staff for intelligence prepared an estimate of potential military contributions from member states in the event that the United Nations Security Council directed intervention in Arab-Israeli hostilities. At best, he believed that contributions from Europe

82. Ltr, Gen. Willard G. Wyman, Cmdg Gen, CONARC, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 23 Apr 1956; Memo, Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, Dir Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 7 May 1956, sub: CONARC Plan for Movement of an Airborne Division Force to the Middle East; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

83. Msg, Dep Ch Staff Ops to U.S. Cdr in Ch, Europe, 13 Apr 1956; Memo, Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, Dir Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, n.d., sub: Status of USAREUR Planning for Deployment of an RCT to the Middle East; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

and the Middle East would total approximately 12,000 troops. Also, he warned that the Soviet Union would be likely to match or exceed Western contributions. Such an act would give them a foothold in the region, outflanking the Baghdad Pact; would give increased publicity to the Soviet theme of peaceful coexistence; and would prevent a crushing defeat of the Soviet-equipped Egyptian forces. Assuming that the United Nations' action led to the cessation of hostilities, the Soviet Union then would insist on playing a leading role in subsequent negotiations. All of those outcomes, the intelligence officer noted, were counter to the United States' overall interest of preventing the expansion of Communist influence in the Middle East.⁸⁴

Although the president rejected the use of American military forces in the Suez Crisis, behind the scenes U.S. military leaders ensured that those options were available. On 30 October, the Joint Chiefs issued orders to the U.S. European Command to alert USAREUR for possible movement of a regimental task force to the Middle East. Additional orders went to CONARC to prepare one regimental combat team for movement and to alert key personnel required to assist in the effort. Two days later, on 1 November, the deputy chief of staff for logistics ordered CONARC to bring two regimental combat teams to full strength, to reconcile all equipment shortages, and to begin stockpiling at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and other posts the supplies required for the execution of SWAGGERSTICK.⁸⁵

Preparations for Army deployments continued, even as it became apparent that their actual execution was unlikely. Army and Air Force teams at the departure airfields submitted requisitions for crating, chocking, and blocking materials as they prepared to load equipment. The Army carried on with its efforts to bring supporting elements up to full personnel strength. The Army Staff dispatched liaison officers to CONARC and to Fort Bragg to assist with ongoing planning for the operation. Other representatives traveled to Europe to coordinate and plan with the Seventh Army and the 11th Airborne Division there.⁸⁶

As the Suez Crisis abated and United Nations peacekeeping forces began moving into their designated buffer zones, Army leaders conducted a series of reviews to examine how effectively SWAGGERSTICK plans supported potential American deployments to the Middle East. The assessments

84. Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 17 Apr 1956, sub: Outline Plan for Security of Arab-Israeli Frontiers, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956-1962, RG 319, NACP.

85. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 13 Nov 1956, sub: Measures Taken by the Army to Meet a Middle East Situation, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series: SCGC 1947-1964, RG 335, NACP.

86. Memo, Eddleman for Ch Staff, 13 Nov 1956, sub: Measures Taken by the Army to Meet a Middle East Situation.

affirmed that the 82d Airborne Division was the logical choice to support the emergency deployment mission. The operations staff noted that the early deployment mission was feasible, but further planning and modifications to the division's strength were required. In order to send the division out at near 100 percent strength, they said, the Army must authorize an overstrength to compensate for the approximately 15 percent of the division's personnel who would be ineligible for deployment for a variety of reasons. At the same time, they noted that a shortage of airborne-qualified personnel throughout the Army meant that additions to the 82d might adversely affect support for the 11th Airborne Division in Europe. Another possibility, they offered, was to fill one regiment of the 82d with nonairborne-qualified troops, who could participate in air landings as opposed to parachute assaults.⁸⁷

The staff analysis also concluded that the Army must transfer any mission that did not assist the division materially in achieving and maintaining a high degree of combat readiness to another unit or installation. Deviation from that rule would reduce the effectiveness of the division as an emergency striking force. With that in mind, the deputy chief of staff for operations recommended that the Army relieve the division of its mission of airborne replacement training and also its responsibility for preparing GYROSCOPE packets for the 11th Airborne Division in Europe. He also suggested that the division should be exempted from participation in major exercises. Finally, the analysis recommended temporarily suspending the reorganization of the 82d to the pentomic model until another division was prepared to take over the mission of emergency strike force.⁸⁸

OWNING VIETNAM

By 1956, French interest and influence in Vietnam had declined to virtually nothing. In February, fewer than 15,000 French soldiers remained in country, and by March, not a single French officer participated in the joint Training Relations and Instruction Mission established the previous year.

87. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1956, sub: Emergency Deployment of Army Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

88. Memo, Eddleman for Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1956, sub: Emergency Deployment of Army Divisions; Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 21 Dec 1956, sub: Reorganization of the 82d Airborne Division, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

The eyes of the French government and the French military were solely on North Africa. Vietnam was now an American problem.⁸⁹

In late 1955, Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams replaced Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel as head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina. Because the United States had established a separate advisory group for Cambodia, Williams's group dropped Indochina from its name and became the MAAG, Vietnam.⁹⁰

Williams's immediate task upon taking over the MAAG was to gain some level of accountability over the vast quantities of ammunition and equipment that the United

States had supplied to the French over the previous ten years. Although the French retained the best of the remaining equipment and proceeded to take it with them as they departed, they dumped thousands of tons they did not want, much of it unserviceable, on the primitive South Vietnamese logistical system. The 342 soldiers that composed the MAAG at the start of 1956 were unable to deal with the flood of material while also trying to maintain a training and advisory program for the new South Vietnamese Army. To assist in the identification and processing of the mountains of equipment, the United States dispatched a team of 350 soldiers to form a Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission. In addition, the Army added forty-eight permanent spaces to the MAAG to assist with the increased workload. In reality, the assistance group leaders diverted most of the arriving personnel to assist with other training missions. More than anything else, the equipment

89. Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960*, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 252–54.

90. Spector, *Advice and Support*, 256; Richard W. Stewart, *Deepening Involvement, 1945–1965*, The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2012), 19.

recovery mission served as a clandestine means of expanding the advisory group without overtly violating terms of the Geneva Accords.⁹¹

For the remainder of 1956, the subject of Vietnam remained a topic of conversation among the various sections of the Army Staff. It was never the highest priority, but it was always there. In January, General Taylor sent General O'Daniel a list of questions, developed by the Defense Department's Office of Foreign Military Affairs, relating to his experiences in South Vietnam. In particular, the staff wanted to understand the stability of the Diệm government and its relationship with the South Vietnamese armed forces. They also desired a detailed report concerning the condition and progress of the various branches of those forces. Specific questions also addressed applications of psychological and guerrilla warfare tactics, both by the South Vietnamese and the Viet Minh.⁹²

Later that year, in a memo titled "Preparations for Small War," Taylor asked the deputy chief of staff for military operations to develop plans for reinforcing those countries in which the United States had established a military mission in the event of imminent foreign aggression. He suggested that, following augmentation of the MAAG, the Army consider insertion of one or more small atomic task forces. Subsequent correspondence specified that detailed studies should be conducted for Vietnam, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. The first study Taylor wanted, by 11 July, was an estimate of reinforcements required for the MAAG, Vietnam.⁹³

Many ensuing discussions dealt with the logistical infrastructure in Vietnam and the ability of the country to support military operations. In May, Maj. Gen. Edward J. O'Neill, the acting deputy chief of staff for logistics, requested information regarding the availability of engineer construction equipment that the Army could provide to Vietnam and the Philippines through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. He anticipated a requirement to construct extensive networks of gravel roads throughout both countries over the course of the coming five years. He recommended that equipment for ten heavy construction battalions be made available to

91. Stewart, *Deepening Involvement*, 19; Memo, Charles C. Finucane, Under Sec Army, for Vice Ch Staff, 23 Feb 1956, sub: Additional U.S. Personnel for Military Aid Functions in Viet Nam; Memo, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 8 Mar 1956, sub: Additional U.S. Personnel for Military Aid Functions in Viet Nam; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

92. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, 10 Jan 1956, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

93. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 17 May 1956, sub: Preparations for Small War; Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, 26 Jun 1956, sub: Reinforcement of MAAGS; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

each country as part of future aid packages. Taylor also tasked the deputy chief of staff for logistics with preparing a study on the logistical support the United States would have to provide to the South Vietnamese in the event of renewed Communist aggression and the effect this would have on materiel reserves in the United States. In October, the logistics deputy responded that the South Vietnamese lacked the capability to support the level of logistical buildup required to defend against a determined Viet Minh attack from the north. In the event that the United States did attempt to provide logistical support, such an effort would reduce substantially its already unsatisfactory materiel readiness. The study concluded that, even with logistical assistance, South Vietnamese forces lacked the capability to avert total collapse within three months without substantial allied ground support.⁹⁴

THE ARMY IN 1956: TRUE TO ITS MOTTO

For the year, at least, the Army seemed to remain true to its newly acquired motto. The service showed that it was proud of its past as it tried to remain relevant in the national security discussions. In its weekly television and radio presentations, through public appearances of its leadership, and in its recruiting, the Army impressed upon the public its longtime service to the nation. At the same time, the Army clearly was focused on its future as it worked to fashion a force and a doctrine appropriate for the modern age. In many ways, those efforts transcended the idea of being alert to the organization's future and reflected an almost desperate search for a future that was defined more clearly. Beyond the obsession with developing an atomic Army, however, events in Southeast Asia already were conspiring to pull the Army and the United States in that direction.

94. Memo, Maj. Gen. Edward J. O'Neill, Acting Dep Ch Staff Logistics, for Vice Ch Staff, 20 Jun 1956, sub: Engineer Construction Equipment for MDAP; Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 19 Oct 1956, sub: Logistical Capability to Support Allies in Small Wars; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

5

1957: The Year of the Missile

In January 1957, the Army announced the pending court-martial investigation of Col. John C. Nickerson Jr., chief of the Field Coordination Office of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. The Army had accused Nickerson of passing to various media reporters three classified documents describing the Army–Air Force conflict over control of ballistic missiles. The colonel had been particularly incensed at Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson’s decision to limit Army missiles to a range of 200 miles and to give operational control of the Jupiter missile to the Air Force. Columnists dubbed the trial another Billy Mitchell case, accusing the Army of scapegoating an officer for criticizing the administration’s military policy. Despite the theatrics, the court found Nickerson guilty and sentenced him to a one-year suspension in rank, a substantial fine, and an official reprimand for mishandling classified information. Although the case never caught the public’s eye as much as Mitchell’s case had, it did serve as a reminder of the extent to which the technology of the missile age had come to dominate military policy.¹

Developments in the field of missile technology dominated 1957 more than any other year during the Eisenhower administration. Despite Secretary

1. Jack Raymond, “Clash of Services on Missiles Looms,” *New York Times*, 24 Feb 1957; Ben Isaacs, “Nickerson Suspended in Rank for Year, Fined,” *Washington Post*, 30 Jun 1957; Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 1 Jul 1957, sub: Press reaction to Nickerson Case Verdict, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS),

Wilson's efforts to settle interservice differences the previous year, the Army and the Air Force maintained their competition to develop intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Army's Jupiter program and the Air Force's Thor program both moved toward operational status by the end of the decade. In addition, Air Force scientists had begun work on Atlas, an intercontinental ballistic missile, and the Navy's Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile program also was well underway. In the field of surface-to-air missiles, the Army's Nike Hercules neared deployment as the service continued work on its antimissile version, the Nike Zeus. Air Force efforts to develop and deploy their Bomarc air interceptor missile also moved forward.²

On 4 October, the Soviets provided a stark reminder that they, too, were participants in the missile race when they launched the first artificial satellite into orbit. The successful deployment of Sputnik also demonstrated the Soviets' clear capability to produce a ballistic missile with intercontinental range. Although the Eisenhower administration tried to play down the significance of the launch, its implications were clear. The news media and the American public soon seized upon the perception of a "missile gap" between the two superpowers. The launch of Sputnik and the public outcry it raised helped to initiate a reappraisal of many of the assumptions upon which New Look had been based. While 1957 was truly a year of the missile, events would suggest that it also was time to consider strategic alternatives.³

THE NEW LOOK ENTERS A SECOND TERM

As he began his second term as president, Dwight D. Eisenhower remained firmly committed to the principles for national defense that he had established during his first term. In a 1 January 1957 diary entry, he noted, "Unless there is some technical or political development that I do not foresee—or a marked inflationary trend in the economy (which I will battle to the death)—I will not approve any obligational or expenditure authorities for the Defense Department that exceed something on the order of the \$38.5 billion mark."⁴

Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

2. Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960*, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2000), 43.

3. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 43; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 205–7.

4. Diary, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1 Jan 1957, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Louis Galambos, 21 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001), vol. 17, 2471.

The administration rallied around that figure as the services began budget estimates for the upcoming three years. Initially, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, had each service chief list the minimum forces he considered necessary to perform essential tasks. This resulted in a projected budget of \$52–55 billion per year, clearly unacceptable to the president. Radford then had each service prepare an estimate based upon Eisenhower's stated ceiling and an assumption that each service would receive the same percentage of the total that it had received in the previous budget. That effort also failed because, in Radford's opinion, it did not support the strategic goals of the administration.⁵

In his comments to the secretary of defense, Radford complained that the Army had persisted in basing its estimates upon the large-scale use of U.S. ground forces in peripheral wars. He asked Wilson to reassert to the chiefs that the United States would employ atomic weapons at the outset of any general war and would use them as necessary in peripheral wars to achieve military objectives. Radford also reaffirmed his understanding that it was U.S. national policy to reduce U.S. overseas deployments, particularly those in Europe, as soon as possible. In April, the admiral recommended to the secretary a reduction of Army personnel from just under one million troops in 1957 to 700,000 by 1961. Its eighteen divisions could be reduced to eleven, and its air defense battalions from one hundred to eighty. He suggested reductions in the other services as well, but on a smaller scale.⁶

In July, Radford presented his recommendations again to the secretary. Although his proposed personnel numbers remained virtually the same as those he had presented in April, he expounded at length on his interpretations of the administration's defense policies. Given the fixed ceiling Eisenhower had approved for future budgets, the admiral believed that it was more important to modernize forces than to maintain high levels of personnel. He pointed out that the use of atomic weapons in the initial stages of general war negated the need for a large strategic reserve of ground forces in the United States. He also questioned the reliance on continental air defense against atomic attacks. He suggested instead that the money should be spent on early-warning and retaliatory forces. Although the reductions in Army strength were not quite as stark as the proposed cut to 550,000 that the

5. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 31–33.

6. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 31–33; Memo, Chairman's Study Gp for Adm. [Arthur W.] Radford, 23 Apr 1957, sub: JSOP-61; Memo, Adm. [Arthur W.] Radford for Sec Def, 25 Apr 1957, sub: Formulation of Joint Strategic Objectives Plan; both in File Unit: Entry UD 50, Series: Chairman's Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup: Records of the Chairman, RG 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, NACP.

media had reported the previous year, Radford's proposals mirrored quite closely the major points of the Radford Plan of 1956.⁷

Later that month, Secretary Wilson presented the president and the National Security Council with his recommendations for the defense program for the next three fiscal years. He adopted most of Radford's proposals, and his personnel numbers closely resembled those of the chairman's earlier submission. The total defense budget came in under the president's \$38 billion ceiling. Eisenhower approved the budget proposals for both 1958 and 1959 and warned that Congress and the American public might require even greater reductions in the future.⁸

It did not take long for all three services to begin protesting what they considered draconian defense cuts. Each service had friendly media contacts who were only too happy to help air grievances. In August, the *New York Times* reported that military leaders had grown particularly incensed at the administration's assertions that the economy measures had not adversely affected the country's military power. Initial Army reductions would include an infantry division, eighteen antiaircraft battalions, sixteen depots, and 15,000 civilian jobs. One unnamed Army official indicated that talks were underway to close posts such as Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Gordon, Georgia; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; and Fort Carson, Colorado. Army Secretary Wilber M. Brucker gave Secretary Wilson a list of the actions the Army would have to take to meet the 1958 expenditure limits. This included eliminating one division, two out of six missile commands, and thirty-six air defense battalions, along with cutbacks in two divisions. In order to preserve combat units, the Army would have to make sharp reductions in administrative, logistical, and other special activities.⁹

President Eisenhower's second term of office brought on some significant turnover in the leadership of the American military establishment. In March, the president had nominated Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan F. Twining to replace Admiral Radford as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Radford had announced his retirement upon the expiration of his second term in August 1957. When he was sworn in on 15 August, General Twining brought a thoroughly Air Force interpretation to most

7. Memo, Adm. [Arthur W.] Radford for Sec Def, 16 Jul 1957, sub: Force Tabs for JSOP 61, File Unit: Entry UD 50, Series: Chairman's Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup: Records of the Chairman, RG 218, NACP.

8. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 35–36.

9. Jack Raymond, "Defense Cuts Stir Service Protests," *New York Times*, 25 Aug 1957; Memo, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker for Sec Def, 23 Sep 1957, sub: Actions Necessary to Remain Within an Expenditure Level of \$8.95 Billion for FY 1958 and Military Personnel Reductions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



General Nathan F. Twining (U.S. Air Force, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

of the issues facing the Joint Chiefs, but he proved to be less confrontational and more collegial than his predecessor in his dealings with his fellow chiefs. Far more than Radford, Twining was willing to include dissenting arguments and discussions as part of deliberations and papers the Joint Chiefs sent forward to the secretary of defense. General Thomas D. White replaced Twining as Air Force Chief of Staff. White had served in the Pacific theater during World War II and had been the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff since 1953.¹⁰

The biggest change in the defense establishment came in August when Secretary Wilson submitted his letter

of resignation to the president. Almost immediately, Eisenhower nominated Neil H. McElroy to be the next secretary of defense. The president of the Procter & Gamble Company, McElroy had earned praise while serving as chairman of the White House Conference on Education in 1956. Although he briefly faced questions regarding a financial portfolio heavy in defense industry stocks, the nominee had little difficulty obtaining congressional confirmation. He proved to be a quick study, particularly in the intricate details of the various missile programs under development. Although he had little patience for General Maxwell D. Taylor's ideas regarding limited war, the new secretary did agree to reassess limitations put on the Army's missile program by his predecessor.¹¹

10. Jack Raymond, "Twining to Replace Radford as Chairman of Joint Chiefs," *New York Times*, 27 Mar 1957; "Twining Becomes First Airman to Head Joint Chiefs," *New York Times*, 16 Aug 1957; Donald A. Carter, "Eisenhower Versus the Generals," *Journal of Military History* 71, no. 4 (Oct 2007): 1192.

11. Jack Raymond, "McElroy is Named to Wilson's Post," *New York Times*, 8 Aug 1957; James Reston, "McElroy: The Man Who . . .," *New York Times*, 21 Nov 1957; Jack Raymond, "U.S. Reconsiders its 200-Mile Limit on Army Missiles," *New York Times*, 1 Dec 1957.

The Soviet launch of Sputnik 1 on 4 October, followed by the launch of a second satellite on 3 November, prompted second thoughts about the administration's New Look defense policies and, in particular, the doctrine of massive retaliation. The launch of the first satellite raised an immediate uproar in the media and in Congress. California Senator William F. Knowland appeared on the CBS television program *Face the Nation*, where he called for a bipartisan defense review that would assess responsibility for the American failure and begin plans for the future. Representative Earl Wilson from Indiana renewed an earlier proposal to establish a "West Point of the sciences," to develop scientists and engineers.¹² An editorial in the *Army Times* blamed outgoing Secretary Wilson for years of underfunded military budgets and suggested he had left town just in the nick of time to avoid having to answer to his critics.¹³

The second Sputnik launch deepened public concern. Secretary McElroy met with senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to reassure them that U.S. missile programs were moving forward as rapidly as possible. Eisenhower himself sent a note to McElroy suggesting that he would rescind an earlier ban on overtime work in missile production if that might help speed up production of an American satellite. Defense Department officials accelerated both the Navy's Vanguard and the Army's Jupiter missile programs in hopes of matching the Soviet feat before the end of the year.¹⁴

Others considered the implications of the Soviet missile launches from a different perspective. The ability to place a satellite into orbit clearly demonstrated that the Soviets could deliver a warhead to any target in the continental United States. The publication of Henry A. Kissinger's book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* in the autumn of 1957 suggested that the rise of nuclear parity between the two superpowers would degrade the effectiveness of massive retaliation as a deterrent to lesser aggressions and provocations by the Soviet Union. An article by Edward Teller in an October edition of *This Week* magazine, though intended to support reliance upon atomic weapons, proposed a system of underground shelters so that an atomic exchange would not kill everyone. The discussion of mitigating casualties—later satirized in Stanley Kubrick's motion picture *Dr.*

12. Allen Drury, "President Calls McElroy for Talk on Missiles Lag," *New York Times*, 14 Oct 1957.

13. Drury, "President Calls McElroy for Talk"; "Sign in the Sky," *Army Times*, 12 Oct 1957.

14. John W. Finney, "It's No Surprise," *New York Times*, 4 Nov 1957; Ltr, President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower to Sec Def Neil H. McElroy, 17 Oct 1957, in Galambos, *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, vol. 18, 496.

Strangelove (1964)—raised uncomfortable questions about military strategy dependent upon atomic weapons.¹⁵

The stark analysis of atomic war once more raised discussions regarding the concept of limited war. In July 1956, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Alfred M. Gruenther had briefed Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford that a successful defense of Western Europe had come to depend “irreversibly” on the use of atomic weapons.¹⁶ Without them, he advised, Soviet forces might advance to the English Channel in a matter of weeks. He added a warning, however, that U.S. allies in Europe had been slow to accept the “atomic concept.”¹⁷ In September 1957, a detailed study prepared by the Plans Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations noted that atomic weapons had not prevented brutal Soviet suppression of uprisings in Hungary and would be unlikely to deter similar interventions in East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Only a strong American military presence, they concluded, might prevent the Soviets from such interventions. They also suggested that U.S. covert operations might be useful in aiding Eastern European uprisings, although that would make a decision to intervene easier for the Soviets. The publication of another seminal work from the academic community, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* by Robert E. Osgood, contributed to a resurgence in the debate. In his book, Osgood asked how a nation could employ military force in the pursuit of its national goals when the price of nuclear conflict was so high. The answer, he believed, lay in the development of a strategic policy of limited war.¹⁸

The turnover in the leadership within the Defense Department and the launch of the Soviet satellites helped to perpetuate challenges to Eisenhower’s New Look. Although still staunch supporters of the president’s policies,

15. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 17–18; Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957); Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 6 Jun 1957, sub: Army Position on the “Force Concept” of Organization; Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 21 Oct 1957, sub: Article by Dr. Edward Teller, *This Week Magazine*, 13 October 1957; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

16. Msg, Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther to Sec Def, 2 Jul 1956, File Unit: Entry UD 50, Series, Chairman’s Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup: Records of the Chairman, RG 218, NACP.

17. Memo, Director, Plans Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 23 Sep 1957, sub: Implications of Military Operations in Germany and Czechoslovakia, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret, 1956–1962 (hereinafter DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962), RG 319, NACP.

18. “U.S. Strategy Cited,” *New York Times*, 13 Nov 1957; Msg, Gruenther to Sec Def, 2 Jul 1956; Memo, Director, Plans Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 23 Sep 1957, sub: Implications of Military Operations in Germany and Czechoslovakia; Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

both General Twining and Secretary McElroy proved to be less dogmatic than their predecessors and without their apparent dislike for the Army leadership. The satellites dispelled notions of American technical superiority and initiated animated discussions on the perceived missile gap. In the wake of Sputnik, President Eisenhower agreed to support some limited budget increases. The possibility of an approaching nuclear parity between the superpowers prompted more serious consideration of conflict below the level of general war. As one historian noted, 1957 marked the apogee of the New Look.¹⁹


IMPLEMENTING THE PENTOMIC ARMY

In accordance with the president's mandated force reductions, the Army had planned to cut its total strength to 950,000 by the end of 1957 and to 900,000 by the middle of 1958. Under pressure for even deeper cuts before the end of the year, the service lowered the manpower ceiling to 929,000 by the end of December 1957. Because of the early release of many enlisted soldiers before the Christmas holidays, the service reached a total of 918,000 by December 31. The reduced personnel levels allowed the Army to discharge 44,200 low aptitude soldiers, but also required the involuntary separation of 2,130 officers.²⁰

Inevitably, the drastic cuts in personnel required the Army to realign its force structure. In the Far East, the United States agreed to withdraw all ground combat troops from Japan. While the Army reassigned most of the troops in Japan, the colors of the 1st Cavalry Division moved to Korea, where they replaced those of the 24th Infantry Division. Rather than being inactivated, the flag of the 24th Infantry moved to Germany, where that organization would replace the 11th Airborne Division later in the following year. In the United States, the Army inactivated the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, and reduced the 1st Armored Division to one combat command at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the 2d Infantry Division to two battle groups in Alaska. The Army conducted only one GYROSCOPE rotation in 1957, with the 4th Armored Division moving from Fort Hood, Texas, to Germany and exchanging places with the 2d Armored Division. By the end of the year, the Army was left with fifteen divisions: V and VII Corps with the 3d and 4th Armored, the 8th and 10th Infantry, and the 11th Airborne

19. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 15–17.

20. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31, 1957* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 23.



Map 4



Map 5

Divisions in Germany; I Corps with the 1st Cavalry and the 7th Infantry Divisions in Korea and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i; and the III and XVIII Corps with the 2d Armored, the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 9th Infantry,

and the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions in the continental United States.²¹ (See *Maps 4, 5, and 6.*)

In addition to reducing the number of active divisions, the Army also took a hard look at its infrastructure, considering what installations it could most readily afford to close down. Director of Installations Maj. Gen. Keith R. Barney recommended that the service inactivate the major troop posts of Forts Chaffee, Jackson, and Gordon, as well as Camp Wolters in Texas. He also suggested phasing down Fort Carson to provide support for only one battle group. Both General Taylor and Secretary Brucker balked at closing so many of the Army's major training facilities. After some consideration, they agreed to limit operations at each of those locations as well as at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Although that would generate an estimated annual savings of \$18 million, it also would retain all of those installations in the active inventory and available when the need for mobilization arose. At the same time, the secretary agreed to a program that would inactivate sixteen separate depots, storage activities, arsenals, plants, and hospitals.²²

After the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) completed the tables of organization for the new pentomic infantry and armored divisions, the Army announced, in January 1957, that it would begin reorganization within the next three months and complete the process for all of its divisions within the next eighteen months. On 28 February, General Taylor met with Army school commandants to sell them on the new organization and doctrine. He observed that the modern Army had to be prepared to fight both a conventional and a nuclear war and expressed his belief that the new divisions could meet both challenges.²³

Despite some objections from unit commanders, the conversion proceeded quickly. Although the president and the Department of Defense had prohibited the Army from publicly identifying which units would be the first to transform, news reports correctly speculated that the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i would be the most likely candidates. In Europe, the 11th Airborne was the

21. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jul–31 Dec 1957, 23; John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 279; "Indianhead to Drop From Rolls November 8," *Army Times*, 5 Oct 1957; Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Under Sec Army, 20 Aug 1957, sub: U.S. Army Forces in Alaska, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

22. Memo, Maj. Gen. Keith R. Barney, Director of Installations, for Sec Gen Staff, 20 Aug 1957, sub: Information for Report to General Taylor, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

23. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 279.



Map 6

first to convert, followed by the 8th and 10th Infantry Divisions and the 3d Armored Division. The 2d and 4th Armored Divisions had completed most of their transformation before they began their GYROSCOPE rotation in November. In the United States, the 1st Armored Division and the 4th Infantry Division were next to reorganize, followed by the 3d and 9th Infantry and the 82d Airborne Divisions. In Korea, the 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division completed their transformation as part of the unit transfer with the 24th Infantry Division. By the end of 1957, all of the

Army's fifteen divisions had completed or were in the final stages of the conversion to the pentomic model.²⁴

As the Army reorganized, it adopted the Combat Arms Regimental System for the infantry, armor, cavalry, and artillery branches' unit lineages. Regiments with long histories of battles and campaigns traditionally had been the basic elements of the branches and essential to unit esprit de corps. The new pentomic structure with battle groups in place of regiments and battalions threatened to destroy these traditions. Secretary Brucker solved this issue on 24 January 1957 when he approved the Combat Arms Regimental System. Under this system, most regiments would no longer exist as tactical units but only as tradition-maintaining "parent" elements of battle groups, battalions, or company-sized units that shared the parent regiment's honored past.²⁵

The Army had begun testing the pentomic organization as soon as the prototype unit, the 101st Airborne Division, had completed its activation late in 1956. Exercise JUMP LIGHT, which had begun in October 1956 and ran through March 1957, provided commanders with the opportunity to evaluate company-sized elements and then battle groups, before conducting field training with the entire division. Then, beginning in late March, the 101st, along with the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions, participated in Exercise KING COLE, a command post exercise intended to test the ability of commanders and staffs to control and coordinate actions of the widely dispersed elements of a pentomic organization. Almost one third of the troops participating in the exercise were signal troops, as testing the complex communications network was another important goal of the maneuver. The participants experimented with ultrahigh frequency and microwave radio-telephone networks because the dispersion and wide-ranging maneuvers of the pentomic units made conventional wire communications obsolete. Staff sections also employed closed-circuit television to broadcast activities in the operations room of the exercise headquarters to other commanders and staff sections participating in the exercise. From KING COLE, the 1st Armored Division swung right into Exercise SLEDGE HAMMER, where it continued

24. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Three Divisions to Re-Form," *Army Times*, 5 Jan 1957; Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 271–73; Ingo W. Trauschweizer, *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 92; "Additional Divisions Reorganized for Atomic Capability," *Army Information Digest* 12 (Jun 1957): 10.

25. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 281.

combat-readiness evaluations as well as additional tests of the sky cavalry concept and tactical resupply.²⁶

In Europe, the divisions of the Seventh Army also took to the field to experiment with the new organization and the tactics and doctrine that went along with it. Right away, commanders noted the lack of support elements that they had always associated with the division level. Armor officers in the separate tank battalions of the infantry divisions reported that the division lacked the ammunition and fuel-hauling capacity that their units required. Unit commanders also complained that much of the communications equipment and improved personnel carriers necessary to coordinate the dispersed battle groups in an atomic environment were not yet available. From their point of view, the pentomic reorganization appeared to present more problems than it solved.²⁷

Many of the concerns Army leaders had regarding the new concepts and organizations seemed apparent during the early tests. In response to General Taylor's worries about the advanced communications equipment necessary to link the dispersed battle groups and divisions, Deputy Chief of Research and Development Maj. Gen. Robert J. Wood reported that new transistorized vehicular and portable equipment would soon be available for command net radios. He noted, however, that transistors currently in production were still of relatively low power. Although the development of newer equipment was ahead of schedule, he did not expect test models until 1958 and the capacity for troop issue until 1960. On a trip to Europe in September, General Taylor observed that the infantry divisions seemed to lack personnel with some of the special skills the new equipment and division structures would require. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations reported that the pentomic infantry division required forty-six military occupational specialties that had not appeared in the older formation. Of these, nineteen required school training, including instruction for helicopter pilots, aviation mechanics, radar and infrared equipment operators, and Honest John personnel. The remaining twenty-seven specialties, although new to the infantry division, could be learned on the job.²⁸

26. Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Sherburne, "Reorganizing the 101st Airborne," *Army Information Digest* 12 (Jun 1957): 13–23; *Screaming Eagles: 101st Airborne* (Nashville, TN: Benson Printing Company, 1957), 140–41; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Atom War Games End 2d Phase; New Concepts are Being Tested," *New York Times*, 4 Apr 1957; "Exercise King Cole to Test Latest Communications Gear," *Army Times*, 28 Mar 1957; "Mobile TV to Speed King Cole Map Play," *Army Times*, 23 Mar 1957; "1st Armored Division Starts Exercise Sledge Hammer," *Army Times*, 27 Apr 1957.

27. Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 271–74; Trauschweizer, *Cold War U.S. Army*, 89–96.

28. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert J. Wood, Dep Ch Research and Development, for Sec Gen Staff, 20 Nov 1957, sub: Development of Tactical Communications Equipment; Memo, Col.

Even while staffing the original concepts for the pentomic divisions, many officers had noted the lack of balance in the rank structure. In the infantry and airborne divisions, company commanders, normally captains, reported directly to battle group commanders, who were full colonels. This created a sizable gap between the two command levels, eliminated a significant amount of experience and expertise from the leadership chain, and left no command opportunities for infantry lieutenant colonels. In considering the problem, CONARC recommended that majors command infantry rifle companies and eight-piece artillery batteries, with captains serving as executives. Infantry lieutenant colonels would serve as battle group executives and, in that position, would receive many opportunities to exercise command. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth suggested offering command positions in noninfantry combat arms battalions to infantry lieutenant colonels, but that possibility was contested strongly by both CONARC and the deputy chief of staff for operations. All involved agreed that the issue required further study and, in the meantime, division reorganizations should proceed on schedule.²⁹

Although almost all of the attention regarding the transition to the pentomic organization had focused on the active force, some Army leaders addressed the issue of keeping reserve component units up to date. In October, CONARC directed commanders of reserve component units to initiate training in pentomic doctrine and concepts, based upon the most recent releases of the Army Training Plan. Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components Maj. Gen. Phillip D. Ginder responded that reserve component units would begin training to the extent that their facilities, personnel, and equipment would permit. Although armored units would be able to comply with the new guidance to a great extent, training within infantry units would be limited until they could reorganize and receive equipment necessary for the pentomic conversion. Ginder noted that reserve service schools and ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) instruction also would incorporate the doctrines and techniques of the pentomic concept.³⁰

With the effort to implement the pentomic concept barely underway, the Army also initiated a program to conceptualize a force of a more distant

Stephen O. Fuqua Jr., Dep Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 20 Sep 1957, sub: New Specialists for the Pentomic Infantry Division; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

29. Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 27 Feb 1957, sub: Rank Structure in New Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

30. Training Memo 17, Maj. Gen. Stanhope B. Mason, Ch Staff, Continental Army Cmd, 7 Oct 1957, sub: Reserve Component Training—Pentomic Doctrine and Concepts; Memo, Maj. Gen. Phillip D. Ginder, Asst Ch Staff Reserve Components, for Vice Ch Staff, 5 Dec

future. At the end of 1956, CONARC established the U.S. Army Combat Development Experimentation Center at Fort Ord with a staff of forty-four officers, ten enlisted soldiers, and fifteen civilian scientists. The center had the run of a quarter of a million acres, spanning the Fort Ord–Camp Roberts–Fort Hunter Liggett military reservation, to test and evaluate concepts, organizations, and doctrine for future combat. The 10th Infantry, of the 5th Infantry Division, served as experimental troops for a wide range of tests. General Willard G. Wyman, the CONARC commander, enthusiastically proclaimed to General Taylor that experiments there would build upon the pentomic organization to produce a rapid deployment and quick reaction force for the 1960s. Central to the center's mission would be the continued reduction of personnel and expansion of weaponry. A pet project was the "Mobile Forces" concept, a 190-soldier mini-battle group that included a tank platoon, a rifle platoon, a weapons platoon, a mortar platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon. Leading this organization was a group of ten officers, all lieutenants, with the rifle platoon leader acting as the force commander.³¹

THE ARMY EMBRACES THE MISSILE AGE

Throughout the first half of 1957, the Army and the Air Force continued their parallel development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles as if Secretary Wilson had never intervened. Although Army leaders acquiesced to Wilson's redefinition of service roles and missions, they continued to chafe over range limitations the secretary had placed upon missiles he allowed them to develop and employ. In testimony before a House Appropriations subcommittee in May, the Army's chief of research and development, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, called the limitations inhibitory and unrealistic. Wilson responded in August by directing the two services to merge the competing Thor and Jupiter missile programs into a single weapon system. He appointed a panel of three, including Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris from the Army, Maj. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever from the Air Force, and William H. Holaday from his own office, to combine the best features of each system. The announcement from the secretary's office gave no indication of a name

1957, sub: Modernization of Reserve Component Training Programs; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

31. Ltrs, Gen. Willard G. Wyman, to Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 1 May 1957 and 18 Jul 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Brig. Gen. Frederick W. Gibb, "Developing Tomorrow's Army Today," *Army Information Digest* 12 (Jun 1957): 24–33.

for the composite missile-to-be, but many in the Pentagon had already dubbed the project the “Thupiter.”³²

After two months of testing, the committee was no closer to selecting a prototype than it had been at the start. Although both missiles had flown at least one successful test launch, civilian defense officials opted for the Army approach of testing each component individually, rather than basing a contract upon test flight results only. In October, Holaday recommended to new Defense Secretary McElroy that he delay a decision until further testing established “a better technical basis.”³³

The successful launch of two Soviet satellites in October and November settled the debate. Immediately following a closed-door session with the Senate Preparedness Committee in which Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen W. Dulles had proclaimed the Soviet lead over the Americans in missile technology a “sad and shocking story,” McElroy authorized production of both missiles. Although neither was fully developed, the authorization would permit installing the systems in Britain by the end of 1958 and elsewhere in Europe soon afterward. In December, General Medaris informed General Taylor that the Army Ballistic Missile Command had received firm orders to launch American satellites using modified Redstone missiles in 1958.³⁴

Throughout 1957, the Army and Air Force also continued their competition over the development of surface-to-air missiles for the defense of the continental United States. At that time, only the Army had deployed its Nike Ajax missile system, defending cities, Strategic Air Command airbases, and Atomic Energy Commission sites from twenty-four separate locations. The Ajax system was limited in range, however, and lacked the capability to defend against missiles or supersonic bombers. All three services had more advanced systems under development, most notably the Army Nike Hercules, scheduled for deployment in 1958, and the Air Force’s Bomarc, scheduled for deployment in 1960. Both offered full coverage against subsonic bombers and limited coverage against supersonic aircraft, although the Bomarc possessed a slightly greater range. The two services continued to snipe at each other throughout the year, before Congress and in the press.

32. “Army Complains on Limited Role,” *New York Times*, 3 May 1957; John G. Norris, “Wilson Orders Quick Merger of Jupiter and Thor Missiles,” *Washington Post*, 14 Aug 1957.

33. “McElroy Puts Off Missiles Choice,” *New York Times*, 11 Oct 1957; “Jupiter vs. Thor Tests to Continue,” *Army Times*, 19 Oct 1957.

34. Jack Raymond, “McElroy Orders Thor and Jupiter Into Production,” *New York Times*, 28 Nov 1957; Memo, Col. Bruce Palmer Jr., Dep Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Dec 1957, sub: Report of the Chief of Staff’s Trip, 5–10 December 1957; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



Hercules missiles in Homestead, Florida, belonging to Battery D, 2d Missile Battalion, 52d Artillery (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

Development continued on both systems, however, as they came closer to deployment.³⁵

The looming threat of Soviet intercontinental missiles provided General Taylor with the opportunity to publicize the Army's work on an antimissile missile, the Nike Zeus. With a projected speed twice that of the existing surface-to-air missiles and a capability to mount a thermonuclear warhead, the Zeus seemed to offer a realistic possibility for countering the enemy missile threat. Taylor urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of defense, and President Eisenhower to make an all-out effort to expedite this developing system. He asked for a three-year commitment of \$6–7 billion. Predictably, the Air Force quickly mounted a counter campaign, questioning not only the cost of the program, but also its susceptibility to countermeasures such as jamming or spoofing. Conflicts over the missile's development raised

35. MFR, Lt. Col. Richard Irvin Jr., Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops Surface-to-Air Missile Div, 6 Nov 1957, sub: Briefing for Chief of Staff on Effectiveness of BOMARC and Air Force Reclama for a BOMARC Site at Fort Dix; Memo, Maj. [no first name given] Everett, Ofc Sec Gen Staff, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 8 Nov 1957, sub: BOMARC Fact Sheet; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jul–31 Dec 1957, 92.



The Army's newest test model, the Nike Zeus, launches successfully at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

anew all of the old arguments regarding roles and missions that Defense Department officials thought they had resolved the previous year.³⁶

Other Army research and development projects continued with varying degrees of success. The Hawk surface-to-air missile, which the Army had designed to supplement the Nike system with coverage against low-flying aircraft, neared completion of its testing and seemed to be on track to be ready for deployment sometime within 1958. Once deployed, Hawk battalions would also serve as field army assets, providing air defense coverage in the battle area. The development of surface-to-surface rockets was proving to be somewhat less successful. The Honest John, which the Army had deployed

36. James Reston, "Army Plan Seeks 6 Billion to Make A Missile Killer," *New York Times*, 20 Nov 1957.



Soldiers of Battery C, 6th Missile Battalion, 65th Artillery, work on a Hawk missile and launcher in Key West, Florida. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

to the field since 1954, had proven to be highly inaccurate, particularly with regard to height of burst. It was bulky and had limited air transportability. The Army was close to deploying a successor, the Little John, which was smaller and more transportable, but it, too, was wildly inaccurate in testing. More accurate was the Lacrosse, but it was still a year or two away from deployment.³⁷

Perhaps the Army's least productive efforts were those devoted to developing an effective antitank weapon for use by the infantry. The service had spent several years on a wire-guided missile labeled the Dart. Even though its warhead could penetrate almost all known armor plating, it was inaccurate and difficult to control. The assistant commandant of the Infantry School, Brig. Gen. Stanley R. Larsen, told General Taylor that the Dart was simply no good. As an alternative, the Army had begun to consider purchase of a French missile, the SS10, as an interim replacement.³⁸

37. "Mobile Hawk to Give Army New Low Altitude AA Weapon," *Army Times*, 15 Jun 1957; Memo, Palmer for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Dec 1957, sub: Report of the Chief of Staff's Trip; National Military Program Fact Book, *Surface-to-Surface Missiles*, n.d., File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

38. Memo, Palmer for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Dec 1957, sub: Report of the Chief of Staff's Trip; National Military Program Fact Book, *Surface-to-Surface Missiles*, n.d.

Even as the Army continued with plans to develop and field its intermediate-range ballistic missiles, it had already begun deploying new formations featuring some of its existing atomic inventory. General Taylor had embraced the president's and Admiral Radford's concept of atomic "fire brigades" to support allied or indigenous forces in the field. By law, the United States could not furnish foreign powers with atomic weapons, but the deployed missile commands assured allies of timely atomic support even though the weapons remained under U.S. control. In the Southern European Task Force, organized in Italy in 1955, the Army established a prototype for its new formation. In 1957, the disparate elements of the Southern European Task Force came together as the 1st U.S. Army Missile Command. The new organization included two Honest John battalions and two Corporal missile battalions, along with some infantry, engineer, and signal elements to provide security and a target-acquisition capability. Later that year, the service activated the 2d U.S. Army Missile Command, organized in much the same manner, at Fort Hood, Texas.³⁹

The Army's growing dependence upon rockets and missiles soon raised concerns about the manner in which it trained and prepared its officers to lead the new units. Army Vice Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer met with select members of the Army Staff, the chief of the Artillery Section at CONARC, and artillery officers on duty at West Point to determine better ways to prepare young officers for such assignments. Lemnitzer concluded that the current approach of splitting incoming classes of lieutenants in two, to attend either the field artillery course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or the missiles course at Fort Bliss, Texas, was unsatisfactory. He directed that all new officers commissioned into the artillery would attend both courses before reporting to their initial duty stations. Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Defense Command, raised a related issue when he complained that officers were arriving at units under his command without an adequate understanding of the weapons and equipment under their direct control. He suggested to General Taylor that the artillery could not continue as it currently existed. The Army needed to integrate the artillery from top to bottom or establish a separate guided

39. Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 232–33; Janice E. McKenney, *The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775–2003*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), 220–21; Memo, Brig. Gen. Theodore F. Bogart for Ch Staff, 14 Feb 1957, sub: Address for School Commandants, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Ops, to Gen. Courtland V. R. Schuyler, Supreme HQ, Allied Powers, Europe, Ch Staff, 10 May 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

missile branch, with the current arm retaining conventional artillery and rockets.⁴⁰

SELLING LIMITED WAR

In an address on 14 June, General Taylor presented his *Blueprint of the Army in the Period 1958–1961*. In essence, he said, the justification for the Army, as well as any armed force, was its ability to contribute to the deterrence of war, especially general atomic war. One way to deter the big war, he concluded, was to deter or quickly win any little war. That statement encapsulated Taylor's strategic vision and served as his guiding principle for the future.⁴¹

An Army presentation before the Army Policy Council in October dealt at length with General Taylor's limited war philosophy. The briefing officer described the recent books by Henry Kissinger and Robert Osgood as having "a profound influence" at the State Department and within the Department of Defense. He presented Kissinger's book as posing a single dilemma: was there a middle ground between inaction on one hand and total war on the other? Taylor asserted it was wrong to assume that all wars would be total wars with the complete destruction of the enemy as the objective of the armed forces. Even the goal of unconditional surrender was, he believed, incompatible with the concept of limited war. The nation's fundamental interest was to prevent the balance of power from swinging against the United States to the point at which war became a matter of national survival. Paraphrasing military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, the briefer concluded that America's overall strategy must be shaped to prepare the nation to fight the kinds of war most likely to occur.⁴²

Taylor recognized that the Army was poorly prepared to engage in the kind of limited conflict he anticipated. After the Suez Crisis the previous year, he had noted that the two divisions scheduled to carry out Army contingency plans in that area, the 82d Airborne and the 1st Infantry, only could deploy with less than two-thirds of their authorized strength. The

40. MFR, Lt. Col. Richard P. Scott, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 3 Dec 1957, sub: Training and Assignment of Artillery Officers; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen, Cmdg Gen, U.S. Army Air Def Cmd, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 5 Jun 1957; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

41. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 20 Aug 1957, sub: Unclassified Version of the Chief of Staff's Address at the 1957 Secretaries Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

42. Bfg, Lt. Col. D. S. Bussey to the Army Policy Council, 9 Oct 1957, sub: The Philosophy of Limited War, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

general warned his primary staff, "We must never again find the Army in a situation wherein we cannot deploy at least a division at full strength within the time that the necessary lift can be made available."⁴³

At the same time, the Army began to reduce some of the diverse and overlapping categories it had used to classify the elements of the strategic reserve. The variety of titles—the 30-Day Ready Force, the Western Hemisphere Reserve, the European Reinforcement Troop List—hindered the development of a satisfactory priority system under which the Army could allocate personnel and equipment. What the Army needed, Taylor believed, was a versatile force that could deploy rapidly to meet a wide range of contingencies. In March 1957, the term "Strategic Army Forces" (STRAF) replaced the various terms for the strategic reserve and was defined as "that part of the Army normally located in the continental United States which is trained, equipped, and maintained for employment at national level in accordance with current Army plans or approved emergency deployment schedules."⁴⁴ The part of the force that had been known as the Strategic Army Force now became known as the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) to avoid confusion with the newly named STRAF. Planners envisioned a balanced four-division force that would include those additional units needed to meet thirty-day NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) requirements.⁴⁵

With these definitions clarified, Taylor directed that one division be prepared to move at any time at 100 percent strength. In recognition of the difficulties involved in overcoming normal personnel turbulence, he suggested the automatic discharge or reassignment of individuals having less than three months to serve. He also recommended that the division maintain whatever overstrength it required to guarantee its deployment at 100 percent. A second division, he continued, would be prepared to move, along with requisite corps support units, no later than thirty days after notification. The general conceded that this division could deploy at less than 100 percent strength as long as the Army could make available replacements in the objective area within a reasonable amount of time.⁴⁶

43. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., "The Development of the STRAF," Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC; Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 30 Apr 1957, sub: Readiness of the Strategic Army Corps, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

44. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., "Development of the STRAF"

45. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., "Development of the STRAF"

46. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 30 Apr 1957, sub: Readiness of the Strategic Army Corps; MFR, Maj. Thomas J. MacDonald, Gen Staff, 29 Apr 1957, sub: Briefing for Chief of Staff—Readiness of the Strategic Army Corps; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman (*left*) and Brig. Gen. Francis H. Boland Jr. (*right*) visit with Maj. Gen. William M. Breckinridge at Fort Ord, California, on 29 August 1957. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

In September, the chief of staff approved the designation of the 101st Airborne Division and the 4th Infantry Division as the initial STRAC divisions. He advised the Army planning staffs to begin revisions of existing contingency plans accordingly. By December, it was evident that the directed reductions in the strength of the Army over the next several years precluded the maintenance of an eight-division STRAF or a four-division STRAC. With an anticipated strength of 870,000 by the end of 1959, the Army would retain a force of fourteen divisions, only six of which would be stationed in the continental United States. Subsequent guidance from the Army Staff identified the 1st Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Division as the third and fourth division forces in the STRAC. The adjutant general directed the service to maintain the 1st Infantry Division at 90 percent of authorized strength, with the expectation that it would be able to deploy with a minimum

of 80 percent. The 82d's strength would depend on overall Army strength and would include, of necessity, a substantial number of trainees.⁴⁷

With the basic concept in place and the initial divisions identified, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, prepared a plan to exercise and test the ability of the STRAC units to respond rapidly to an overseas crisis. He recommended an airlift of a reinforced company-sized force to Germany sometime in 1957 as a test of the concept. Larger deployments would follow if the Air Force and Navy could provide the required aircraft and sealift. He also proposed a series of alerts, rehearsals, and command post exercises for STRAC units under the control of CONARC or the chiefs of appropriate administrative and technical services. General Eddleman noted that the Army could accomplish the proposed program by obtaining approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an annual strategic mobility exercise, thus ensuring Air Force and Navy participation. He recommended to General Taylor, however, that the Army delay such a request until discussions regarding the formation of a unified command or joint task force to oversee STRAC deployments had concluded.⁴⁸

The first opportunity to test the Army's ability to deploy part of its STRAC division arose from an unexpected source. Violence erupted on 23 September in Little Rock, Arkansas, when nine Black students attempted to attend Central High School in accordance with a district court order. A crowd of around 1,000 had gathered and threatened to storm the school and attack the Black students. After negotiations between President Eisenhower and Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus broke down, the president ordered General Taylor and the Army to intervene. After receiving the order just after noon on 24 September, 500 paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division arrived in Little Rock that afternoon. Another 500 moved in later that day.⁴⁹

Active Army forces deployed to Little Rock included the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 327th Infantry, from Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the 720th Military Police Battalion from Fort Hood, Texas; the 53d and 54th Signal

47. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., "Development of the STRAF"; MFR, Lt. Col. George A. Clayton, Dep Ch Staff Ops Bfg Ofcr, 24 Sep 1957, sub: Consolidation of Ready Force A with STRAC and Readiness of STRAC; Memo, Maj Gen. Herbert M. Jones, Adjutant Gen, for Distribution, 31 Dec 1957, sub: Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) Readiness Policies; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

48. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 7 Jun 1957, sub: Joint Mobility Exercise Program; Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Sec Army, 20 Jun 1957, sub: Joint Mobility Exercise Program; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

49. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 170; Robert W. Coakley, Paul J. Scheips, and Vincent H. Demma, *Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances Since World War II, 1945–1965* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1971), 52–54.

Battalions from Fort Hood; and the 163d Transportation Company from Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The president also federalized a number of Arkansas National Guard units. Governor Faubus had used some of the units from around Little Rock to prevent entry of the Black students, but Eisenhower ordered those units to stand down. He ordered units from elsewhere around the state to back up the federal troops. The Air Force's 314th Troop Carrier Wing transported the contingent from Fort Campbell to Little Rock.⁵⁰

Upon their arrival, the Army troops set up a cordon around the high school. They transported the nine students to and from school for the next several weeks, dispersing crowds as they arose, controlling traffic along the streets around the school, and maintaining surveillance throughout the immediate area. Gradually, as a sense of calm returned to the surrounding area, the Army began recalling active elements and replacing them with national guard troops. By 27 November, the Army had withdrawn all of its forces with the exception of a small, eighteen-man detachment to assist with communications and liaison duties.⁵¹

By the end of the operation, interested observers had formed two different impressions from the Army's performance. General Taylor and Secretary Brucker could take some satisfaction in the outcome of the first exercise involving their rapid-response STRAC. Limited in scope and duration as it was, the event proved that the system worked; the Army's emergency deployment plans were feasible. Meanwhile, the president and his staff—still thinking of the Army as a civil-defense force—could derive some comfort from the Army's demonstrated ability to handle crowd control and civil unrest.⁵²

The Army's interest in limited war did not preclude its cooperation with the other services. Although the Army had continued its fierce competition with the Air Force in the areas of the budget, procurement, and missile development, the two services were able to come to some agreement over battle management issues that had plagued them both for years. In September, CONARC and the Air Force Tactical Air Command published the *Joint Air-Ground Operations Manual*, which attempted to resolve longstanding issues regarding air-ground support doctrine. General Eddleman noted that, although many differences remained, particularly in airspace management, the agreement had resolved many conflicts such as the allocation of tactical air assets and a relaxation of restrictions on the

50. Coakley, Scheips, and Demma, *Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances*, 58–59.

51. Coakley, Scheips, and Demma, *Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances*, 58–59.

52. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 175–76; Ltr, Wilber M. Brucker, Sec Army, to Senator Richard B. Russell, 3 Oct 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Army's employment of its own atomic weapons. Significantly, the agreement acknowledged the right of the ground commander to defend the airspace above his position. The ground commander could consider all aircraft not positively identified as friendly to be hostile. The responsibility for adhering to air traffic control and aircraft identification rules rested with the pilots. Nonadherence would result in identification as hostile. In perhaps not too great a concession, commanders could automatically consider all incoming missiles and artillery projectiles to be hostile.⁵³

The Army's focus on limited war prompted some leaders to consider other contingencies. To many, the idea of limited warfare seemed to suggest counterinsurgencies and unconventional warfare. This was precisely the domain of the special operations organizations the Army had begun to develop. In June, it had activated the 1st Special Forces Group in Japan, joining the 10th Special Forces Group at Bad Tölz, Germany, and the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. To some extent, however, leaders within the special operations community were still looking to justify their existence.⁵⁴

In an appendix to the 1959 Army Strategic Objectives Plan, published in 1957, the deputy chief of staff for military operations described the Army's unconventional warfare objectives. Foremost was the establishment of an unconventional warfare force of sufficient magnitude to become a substantial deterrent to limited or general war. Many regular officers envisioned using special forces units in a role similar to that of the British commandos of World War II. However, the plan specified their mission to be the infiltration by air, sea, or land of areas within an enemy's sphere of influence, and the organization and training of the local population in unconventional warfare techniques for tactical and strategic exploitation in support of conventional warfare. In the event of general war, the Army expected special warfare teams to perform subsidiary activities such as reconnaissance, target acquisition, and surveillance behind enemy lines. The paper noted that, as the war progressed, the political significance of unconventional warfare might well surpass its military significance, and that national policy would dictate its ultimate objectives.⁵⁵

53. Ltr, Gen. Willard G. Wyman to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 30 Jul 1957; Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for Ch Staff U.S. Air Force, 27 Dec 1957, sub: USCONARC-TAC Joint Air-Ground Operations Manual; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

54. Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, "Unconventional Warfare," app. 11 to an. A, in *Army Strategic Objectives Plan, FY 1959* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, n.d.), 1-8, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956-1962, RG 319, NACP.

55. Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, "Unconventional Warfare," 1-8.

The strategic objectives plan also described a civil affairs component of the special warfare mission. As hostilities ended, the task confronting the United States would be the establishment or restoration of a government friendly to the United States. Because unconventional warfare forces would have intimate and influential contact with the local population during the conflict, those forces would be in an excellent position to assist in accomplishing that goal.⁵⁶

Despite the Army's preoccupation with a few of the more esoteric aspects of its limited war agenda, some remained concerned with the service's traditional functions. In February, Secretary Brucker announced that the Army had placed an order for 800 M48A3 90-mm. gun medium tanks for the coming year. When questioned by senators of the Preparedness Committee about the usefulness of such weapons in an atomic war, Brucker replied that the tanks would be of great value in either atomic or nonatomic conflict. Perhaps more to the point, he continued, the order would continue the development and improvement of the Army's equipment and would keep open at least one production line during the coming fiscal year.⁵⁷

Finally, a focus upon limited war inevitably meant improving the training of the basic infantry soldier as well. In June, the Army marked the passing of another of its venerable institutions when it announced that an automated popup target system known as Trainfire would replace the known-distance ranges traditionally used for marksmanship training. The idea, one observer said, was to "teach men to shoot by letting them shoot."⁵⁸ Instead of directing their fire against targets at one known distance, the new system presented random targets that popped up at distances between 50 and 300 meters. Army leaders hoped that the training would replicate field conditions better by forcing the shooters to identify and engage each target during the short time in which it was exposed. Service leaders hoped to have Trainfire installed at all Army training centers and the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, by the end of 1959.⁵⁹

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

By 1957, the Seventh Army was well established as the nation's most potent forward-deployed force in the path of potential Soviet aggression. With almost one fourth of the Army's total personnel stationed in Europe, in

56. Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, "Unconventional Warfare," 1-8.

57. "Army to Order 900 Tanks," *Washington Post*, 28 Feb 1957.

58. "Hope Trainfire Makes GI's Shoot," *New York Times*, 8 Jun 1957.

59. "Hope Trainfire Makes GI's Shoot."

many ways the troops there had become the public face of the United States Army. Almost all of the Army's organizational, doctrinal, and technological development during this period involved preparing to fight the Soviet Union in Western Europe.⁶⁰

In particular, much of the Army's missile development had taken place with an eye toward engaging the Soviets in Europe. In 1957, briefing officers from U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), tried to make the case that limiting the range of Army missiles would put U.S. forces there at a tremendous disadvantage. Their analysis of Soviet capabilities and doctrine indicated a rapid advance toward the English Channel. U.S. forces, particularly airfields and supporting atomic artillery positions, faced the possibility of quickly being overrun. The Army required longer-range missiles, they argued, to be able to deliver continuous support fires from secure rearward positions, despite such fast-moving Soviet offensives. Officers within the Army Staff circulated a proposed plan to begin an early counteroffensive within thirty days of initial hostilities. Although it was unclear what resources might be available for an offensive at that point, they argued that a counterattack was imperative to exploit the potential for unrest in the satellite nations and to assist any emerging resistance movements. The newly designed Army divisions were not equipped well for prolonged defensive operations, and, perhaps most important, a counteroffensive offered the possibility of moving the atomic battlefield away from Western Europe.⁶¹

USAREUR commanders questioned their ability to carry out their defensive mission given the personnel on hand and the requirements to assist allied nations. The Army Strategic Capabilities Plan envisioned supplying ground atomic artillery systems to NATO allies, the Southern European Task Force, and the Turkey-Greece area. With so many of his atomic-capable units earmarked for other missions, the USAREUR commander, General Henry I. Hodes, expressed concerns over the relatively small number of weapons remaining for his own support. He also noted the existing shortage, throughout his command, of critical personnel trained in atomic weapons specialties. Further, he suggested that the personnel turbulence inherent in the GYROSCOPE rotation plan had exacerbated that situation.⁶²

60. See Carter, *Forging the Shield*.

61. Staff Study, Dep Ch Staff Ops, n.d., "The Army's Concept of Employment of a 200 to 500 Nautical Mile Missile System in Europe"; Memo, Col. Samuel M. Goodwin, Army War Plans Div, for Director of Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 1 Apr 1957, sub: Outline Plan—Central Europe; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

62. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 7 Jan 1957, sub: Annual Training Inspection of USAREUR; Memo, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. H. Trapnell,

The integration of West German forces into NATO's defensive planning also introduced complications into the Army's emerging atomic doctrine. After Exercise LION NOIR, held in March 1957, the Germans complained bitterly about what they considered an excessive use of atomic weapons throughout the scenario. They asked why the Americans were planning to use so many throughout West German territory when they had encouraged the local populations to remain in their homes. For their part, American officers sometimes expressed a certain callous disregard for the destruction that might result from defensive efforts in West Germany. However, with German armed forces preparing to take over a considerable portion of NATO's positions, the American and allied leaders could no longer afford to ignore the question. The extent to which atomic weapons played a part in the defensive effort would continue to provoke debate in several NATO capital cities.⁶³

The rotation of personnel between the United States and Europe also had become problematic. As General Hodes had indicated, the rotation of complete divisions created far more turbulence in both locations than planners had considered. A unit in the United States preparing to move overseas had to attain much more than 100 percent of its authorized personnel strength to ensure that it would retain sufficient personnel strength throughout the movement process. Units in Europe had to exchange large numbers of troops with other units to make sure that troops returning to the United States had served a complete tour in Europe. More than two years into the experiment, some locations still lacked family housing facilities to accommodate the large number of families to whom the Army had promised the opportunity to accompany their soldiers. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic had begun to consider reasonable alternatives.⁶⁴

The impending GYROSCOPE move of the 2d Armored Division from Europe to Fort Hood, Texas, highlighted another potential personnel crisis. By 1957, the Army had completed the process of racial integration first ordered by President Harry S. Truman in 1948. Most Black troops in Europe had enjoyed an environment relatively free of the segregation and Jim Crow legislation still common in the American South. Enough of them had married German women while overseas to raise a particularly thorny problem regarding their rotation. Texas law forbade interracial marriage

Asst Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 9 Jul 1957, sub: Briefing Team Visit to Europe; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

63. Annual Historical Rpt, HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, 1 Jul 1956-30 Jun 1957, n.d., 195, Historians Files, CMH; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 270-71.

64. M. Sgt. William J. Keegan, "Let's Stabilize Gyro," *Army Times*, 2 Nov 1957; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 327-29.

and refused to recognize such marriages performed elsewhere. With racial tensions in the United States on the rise and the service already involved in enforcing school integrations, Army officials feared that they had “a political tiger by the tail.”⁶⁵ Officials within the 2d Armored Division encouraged all of their personnel affected by the law to transfer to other units in Germany or the northern United States before the upcoming move. Ultimately, the Army reassigned thirty-one Black soldiers to military bases in the North in order to ensure their physical safety.⁶⁶

Despite these challenges, the United States’ commitment to NATO and the forward deployment of the Seventh Army remained firm. Meanwhile, U.S. Army forces on the other side of the world were experiencing their own turbulence. In 1957, the Department of Defense inactivated the Far East Command, with U.S. Forces in Korea becoming a subordinate unified command of the Navy-led Pacific Command. The four-star former commander of U.S. Forces, Korea, remained commander of the United Nations Command and became the commander of the Eighth Army, its Army component. At the same time, the Army inactivated U.S. Army Forces, Far East, leaving U.S. Army, Japan, to become part of U.S. Forces, Japan, a subordinate unified command under Pacific Command with an Air Force officer as commander. Additionally, the IX Corps moved to Japan and merged with the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Command, with the former IX Corps commander becoming the high commissioner.⁶⁷

Amidst all of these changes, Secretary Wilson had directed a 60 percent reduction in the U.S. military population in Japan, and he expected most of the reductions to come from the Army. The math, unfortunately, did not support the secretary’s goals; out of slightly more than 100,000 American personnel stationed in Japan, only 28,300 were soldiers. Even if all Army personnel withdrew from Japan, most of the military personnel reductions would have to come from the other services. Nonetheless, removing the 1st Cavalry Division and most of the logistical support elements from Japan reduced the Army presence in country to roughly 10,000 troops. By

65. Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 106.

66. Harry S. Truman, EO 9981, “Establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,” 26 Jul 1948, in Bernard C. Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor Jr., eds., *Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), 239–40; “Army Wary on Advice Given Married Negroes,” *Army Times*, 14 Sep 1957; Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 106. For more on the subject of Black soldiers in Europe, see Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke, *A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany* (New York: MacMillan, 2010).

67. James C. McNaughton, *The Army in the Pacific: A Century of Engagement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2012), 58–60.

mid-1958, all that remained was a military intelligence group, two military police companies, some ordnance disposal detachments, petroleum service detachments, and assorted headquarters elements.⁶⁸

General Isaac D. White, the first four-star commander in chief of U.S. Army, Pacific, warned the vice chief of staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, about the consequences of these reductions. Withdrawing Army units from Japan required the other services remaining there to provide their own logistical support. In addition, the phasedown in Japan left the Army with no logistical base in the Pacific Command capable of supporting contingency operations beyond the initial days of combat. Although the forces in Korea retained a substantial logistics capability, they consisted largely of Korean augmentees to the U.S. Army, who could not readily transfer to another theater. General White also reminded Lemnitzer that plans for the defense of Vietnam, by both the commander in chief of the Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relied upon withdrawing troops from Korea, even though tensions remained high in that area. Finally, White noted that the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i was the strategic reserve for the Pacific Command; and, he warned, designating the division as a STRAC unit for possible diversion to other missions would send mixed signals to Pacific allies about the American commitment to their support.⁶⁹

Despite General White's concerns, the further reduction of the Army's deployment in Korea was already under consideration. In anticipation of additional personnel cuts, the Plans Section of the Army Staff proposed withdrawing two battle groups in 1959 and one division in 1960, leaving only one battle group of infantry. In place of the two infantry divisions, the staff proposed to deploy two missile commands, one medium command based around a Corporal battalion and one air-transportable command based around a Little John battalion. In addition, the Army would send two Lacrosse battalions and a battalion of 280-mm. atomic-capable guns to provide additional atomic fire support. Planners hoped that the provision of such a robust atomic capability would placate South Korean President Syngman Rhee enough to prevent him from pulling his armed forces out of the United Nations Command. Recognizing the political implications of

68. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 17 Jun 1957, sub: Reduction of U.S. Forces in Japan; Memo, Lt. Gen. [Clyde D.] Eddleman for Vice Ch Staff, 25 Nov 1957, sub: Draft of Personal Letter from Vice Chief of Staff to General I. D. White; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, DCSOPS Top Secret, 1956-1962, RG 319, NACP.

69. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White, Pacific Cmd Cdr, to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice Ch Staff, 1 Nov 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956-1962, RG 319, NACP.

such a proposal, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, General Eddleman, approved it only as a basis for continued study.⁷⁰

According to the inspector general of the Army, things in Vietnam were going well. After a special inspection in June 1957, Lt. Gen. David A. D. Ogden reported that the chief and members of the U.S. Army element of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, were performing their assigned missions in a manner deserving special commendation. Privately to General Taylor he noted that the Vietnamese army, unlike other American allies, was likely to face combat on a moment's notice. He believed that U.S. assistance had pulled the South Vietnamese back from the brink of disaster, but that the advisory team was working at a disadvantage. The Geneva Accords had limited, artificially, the size of the U.S. military mission in Vietnam and had authorized so-called neutral nations to inspect U.S. training efforts and report to their Communist masters. Based upon his observations in Vietnam, Ogden expressed his opinion that the U.S. Army had not yet placed enough emphasis upon unconventional warfare. "We seem to have staked everything," he said, "upon our ability to defeat the enemy in the field of conventional warfare."⁷¹ The Army needed to make the necessary changes in its service schools and in its training to call attention to the unconventional warfare threat.⁷²

Other than a few small MAAGs, the Army had no forward deployments in the Middle East. Nevertheless, on 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower announced his intention to employ the armed forces of the United States to protect the independence and territorial integrity of any nation in the Middle East requesting aid against Communist-inspired aggression. This formed the basis of what would become known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. The president also affirmed his authority to establish a military assistance program for any country in the area that requested one. He cited the region's wealth in petroleum resources and the geopolitical significance of the Suez Canal. He argued that Russia's rulers had long sought dominance in the region, not for economic gain but solely for political exploitation.⁷³

70. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 27 Sep 1957, sub: Objectives Plan for the Phased Reduction of US Army Forces in Korea, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret, 1956-1962, RG 319, NACP.

71. Ltr, Lt. Gen. [David A. D.] Ogden to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, 25 Oct 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

72. Memo, Lt. Gen. David A. D. Ogden, Inspector Gen, for Ch Staff, 5 Jul 1957, sub: Special Inspection of the United States Army Element, MAAG, Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Ogden to Taylor, 25 Oct 1957.

73. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East," 5 Jan 1957, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower*,

In studying the announced policy, the Army Staff prepared a strategic appraisal of the Middle East and the implications for the U. S. Army. They acknowledged the president's recognition of the importance of the Middle East as a communications hub. They pointed out, however, that the Egyptians already had demonstrated how easily and relatively quickly they could block access to the Suez Canal. Of far more importance for the West were the area's petroleum reserves. For at least the next several years, the economies of Western Europe would require access to the oil of the Middle East. That plus the geographic location made this a major area of potential Cold War conflict. The staff identified three possible confrontations that easily could draw in the larger powers. These were Israel versus neighboring Arab states; Syria and/or Egypt versus neighboring Arab states; and Afghanistan versus Pakistan. The Eisenhower Doctrine implied the possibility of U.S. intervention into any of these limited war scenarios. The staff recommended to General Taylor that the Army develop new contingency plans for these and other potential flashpoints in the region. Without a realistic approach to limited war planning in the area, it concluded, promises made under the Eisenhower Doctrine, as well as guarantees made to support the nations of the Baghdad Pact, were a sham.⁷⁴

RECRUITING AND TRAINING ATOMIC SOLDIERS

An article in the 13 April issue of the *Army Times* argued that the Army was not training soldiers fit for modern atomic warfare. It suggested that, on an atomic battlefield, soldiers would face a greater strain and mental shock than ever before. Coping with that stress required a mental flexibility and toughness and, above all, better training. The article reported that, with training centers run by overworked junior officers and acting noncommissioned officers, the Army's best intentions were failing in execution.⁷⁵

Secretary Brucker summarized the problem in his semiannual report to the secretary of defense. He began by noting that the complexity of modern weapons and electronic equipment was greater than at any time in the service's history. The modern Army required personnel proficient

1957 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Service, 1957), 6–16; Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 136–41.

74. Staff Study, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, n.d., "A Strategic Appraisal of the Middle East Problem," 1–8, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

75. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "We're Not Training Soldiers Fit for Atomic Battle," *Army Times*, 13 Apr 1957.

in communications, aviation maintenance, guided missiles, radar, infrared technology, surveillance equipment, television, and new fire control systems. Challenges facing service leaders included a shortage of personnel with technical aptitude, a need for expanded technical training facilities, the long lead times needed to train soldiers in many skills, and the fact that relatively few people remained in the Army once their enlistments were up. The Army needed more personnel, it needed smarter personnel, and it needed to retain them once it had invested so much time and money in training them.⁷⁶

The service had already taken steps to eliminate some of its lowest quality recruits. Having determined that it had accepted too many enlistees who had scored in the lowest quarter (Mental Group IV) on the entrance intelligence tests, the Army had raised its requirements from a score of ten on the Armed Forces Qualification Test to a score of twenty-one. Although it still accepted draftees with the lower score, the Department of the Army had proposed higher requirements to the Department of Defense. More recently, the service had raised the level of aptitude scores required for soldiers to be considered for reenlistment. The deputy chief of staff for personnel, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth, announced in April that the Army would apply higher physical standards as well. He observed that the Army was still using the same physical standards it had been using in 1945 when it was scraping the bottom of the personnel barrel. As part of this effort, the service published a revised Field Manual 21-20, *Physical Training*, and included a new Physical Achievement Test designed to assess combat-related skills.⁷⁷

Under the direction of Vice Chief of Staff General Williston B. Palmer, the Army also began to eliminate loopholes that allowed the enlistment of soldiers with inadequate or insufficient civilian schooling. In March, Palmer noted that, during the previous year, 874 candidates for enlistment had failed to achieve fourth-grade scores on entry tests but only 231 had been prevented from enlisting. Existing policy did not require elimination unless they also failed in the military portion of the training. Palmer pointed out that such loopholes allowed unqualified personnel to hang around the service and

76. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1957* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 124.

77. Memo, Col. [no first name given] Corbett, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 16 Apr 1957, sub: Fitting Soldiers for Atomic Warfare, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Elite Army Planned," *Army Times*, 6 Apr 1957; Whitfield B. East, *A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 123-24.

remain a constant source of trouble. He directed General Booth to establish tougher standards throughout the Army's recruiting and training centers.⁷⁸

General Taylor weighed in on similar issues in June when he directed Booth to develop additional screening methods to identify Mental Group IV personnel before their induction. He also told the personnel chief to work with the major commanders to identify problems with the Mental Group IV soldiers, which would demonstrate to the Department of Defense that the Army was overloaded with illiterate soldiers that it could not accommodate.⁷⁹

The Army also carried on with efforts to cut the size of the officer corps, although this was less a matter of eliminating unsatisfactory performers and more a matter of trimming the leadership to meet the needs of a reduced force structure. The service had lowered the number of officers by 6,250 the previous year through a combination of attrition, elimination, and a decrease in commissions. It projected slightly larger losses for 1957, based on the continued personnel limits imposed by the Eisenhower administration. Assistant Secretary of the Army Hugh M. Milton warned, however, that reductions in officer strength already had undone years of work in developing career incentives and increasing the attractiveness of military service. Continuing them would do long-term damage to national defense by undermining service morale, public relations, and Congressional support.⁸⁰

The involuntary elimination of so many officers, almost all of them reserves serving on active duty status, soon attracted the attention of congressional leaders. Both Senator John C. Stennis and Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, complained to General Taylor and Secretary Brucker that the Army was discharging qualified reserve officers while retaining incompetent regular officers in uniform. Senator Stennis threatened to open an investigation into the Army's conduct of the reduction in force. Secretary Brucker responded to both men, explaining that, by law, reductions in force required elimination of the reservists. He pointed out that regular officers whom the Army eliminated in such a manner lost all military status and that, under the wording of the

78. MFR, Col. John T. English, Ch Organization and Services Div, 8 Mar 1957, sub: Transitional Training Policy; Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Vice Ch Staff, 3 May 1957, sub: Transitional Training Policy; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

79. MFR, Lt. Col. C. P. Keiser, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 1 Jul 1957, sub: Conference Between Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 1655 Hours, 28 June 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

80. Memo, Asst Sec Army Hugh M. Milton for Asst Sec Def (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve), 22 Oct 1957, sub: Analysis of Officer Reductions-in-Force Actions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

elimination provisions, the stigma of incompetence was inherent. Retirement and postretirement benefits favored reservists, and the law assured their tenure as part of the reserve component. Nevertheless, Brucker agreed that the reductions had eliminated many fine reserve officers and had caused well-founded resentment. He informed the lawmakers that he had directed the deputy chief of staff for personnel to convene a board of general officers to examine regular officers' records to ensure the elimination of those who had not met the expected standards of efficiency and effectiveness.⁸¹

At the same time as the reductions in force attempted to resolve an overstrength of field grade officers in the Army, commanders experienced a different problem involving the retention of junior grade officers. Growing numbers of senior lieutenants and captains were leaving the service as soon as they had completed their initial service obligations. Attributing the attrition to a morale problem, General Taylor assumed at least part of it was because of oversupervision and overcontrol of junior leaders by their chains of command. He canvassed all of his senior leaders to determine the extent of the problem. Few of the respondents took the bait, with most of them claiming that oversupervision was not a problem within their commands. Nonetheless, they acknowledged that the problem might exist in other units because of excessive requirements from higher-level staffs and commands. Most claimed that mission-type orders and the delegation of authority down to the lowest possible echelon were the key to developing successful junior leaders.⁸²

In September, after several junior officers from Fort Polk, Louisiana, had written letters to President Eisenhower expressing their dissatisfaction with military service, Taylor sent a delegation to that facility to take a sample of responses from young officers to current Army policies. They discovered that the ongoing reductions in force and the lack of overall information regarding the process had created a great sense of insecurity and had discouraged several younger officers from pursuing their military careers. Although oversupervision was a concern, a greater irritant was the weight of administrative requirements and regulations that started at the

81. Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Sec Army, 3 Oct 1957, sub: Letter to Senator Stennis; Ltr, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker to the Honorable Carl Vinson, House of Representatives, 26 Oct 1957; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

82. Ltr, Lt. Gen. W. H. Arnold, Cmdg Gen, Fifth Army, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 6 Dec 1957; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey, Cmdg Gen, Third Army, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 9 Nov 1957; Ltr, Lt. Gen. J. H. Collier, Cmdg Gen, Fourth Army, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 5 Nov 1957; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson, Cmdg Gen, Sixth Army, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 12 Nov 1957; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

top. All officers interviewed indicated that reports and other administrative requirements burdened them so much that they could not devote the proper amount of time to command, training, maintenance, and other important unit activities. Extended family separation and the poor quality of military housing—when it was available—constituted the third consistent gripe. Booth reminded Taylor that Fort Polk was a special case and that it already was scheduled for extensive building projects, but both men recognized that the conditions sparking the complaints at Fort Polk existed throughout the Army.⁸³

In March 1956, the Department of Defense had commissioned a study to examine the retention problem across all of the armed services. Chaired by Ralph J. Cordiner, the president of General Electric, the panel spent most of the next year examining the pay structures of both officer and enlisted ranks, and the relationship between pay and retention. In its preliminary report, issued in February 1957, the panel identified a set of basic conclusions that would guide its analysis of the problem. The strategy, tactics, and machinery of modern war had become ever more complex, the committee stated, but the practices and principles that guided military recruitment, motivation, and compensation had not changed appreciably. The services needed to modify compensation packages to retain personnel in those skills and those levels that were most critical for their success. The committee asserted that the military's antiquated longevity-based pay system was the primary cause of its poor personnel retention.⁸⁴

As the year progressed, the committee released some detailed proposals. At the enlisted level, a primary concern was the elimination of the longevity-based pay scale. Cordiner noted that under the current system, 18,000 corporals or their equivalent received more pay than 122,000 sergeants. His new pay scale introduced pay-grade steps, in which the highest step in each pay grade remained less than the lowest step of the next higher grade. He also proposed adding two new pay grades at the top of the enlisted scale. Pay grades for E-8 and E-9 relieved some of the compression at the top of the scale and offered higher pay for the achievement of higher rank and responsibility. More controversial was the committee's recommendation of "proficiency pay," or bonus payments, to be granted to individuals in critical skilled positions who demonstrated particular skill or achievement. The

83. Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth for Ch Staff, 24 Sep 1957, sub: Junior Officers Reaction to Current Department of the Army Personnel Policies, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

84. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 6 Feb 1957, sub: Preliminary Report of Cordiner Committee Studies, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Pentagon Pushes Pay Studies," *Army Times*, 25 Aug 1957.

intent was to award these bonuses to about 15 percent of the total enlisted strength, with the eligibility and qualifications set by each service.⁸⁵

The committee made similar recommendations regarding the officers' pay scale. In addition to creating steps within pay grades, they proposed adding increased pay at higher levels, under the impression that a higher standard of living offered to senior officers would provide junior personnel greater incentive to succeed and move up in the ranks. Additionally, the revised pay scale separated the pay rates for lieutenant generals and generals.⁸⁶

Although the Department of Defense embraced most of the committee's recommendations, the Army objected that it could not implement the Cordiner proposals without additional funding. Congress, the services, and the White House debated potential legislation for the rest of 1957. The discussions crystalized some of the basic issues of the New Look. The security and flexibility provided by maintaining a substantial peacetime military force had to be weighed against the costs of doing so. With military technology becoming more complex, attracting and retaining soldiers with the skills modern warfare demanded had become more expensive. Although the president eliminated some of the pay increases attached to the legislation, the bill that passed in May 1958 included many of the proposed changes to the officer and enlisted pay structures, as well as the addition of the two senior enlisted ranks and the separation of the general officer pay scales.⁸⁷

Despite the Army's serious concerns about maintaining its most experienced and professional soldiers, sometimes its efforts seemed a little hard to explain. In an attempt to improve the morale and prestige of his leaders, Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Powell, commander at the Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, announced that he had approved the carrying of swagger sticks by officers and noncommissioned officers of the top three grades. The announcement noted that, when carried under the left arm, the "jaunty appendage" complemented the "serviceman's military appearance."⁸⁸ The standard model was made of pliable wood and bound with hand-stitched English cowhide. More deluxe models were made of hickory, walnut, or rosewood with a metal cap, and could be engraved, at an

85. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Taylor, 6 Feb 1957, sub: Preliminary Report of Cordiner Committee Studies.

86. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Taylor, 6 Feb 1957, sub: Preliminary Report of Cordiner Committee Studies.

87. Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth for Ch Staff, 23 Oct 1957, sub: Review of D/A Position on Cordiner Proposals, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31, 1957*, 7.

88. "Swagger Sticks Come Back to Benning Infantry Center," *Army Times*, 2 Mar 1957.

additional charge, with name, rank, and insignia such as the Ranger tab or airborne wings.⁸⁹

COPING WITH THE MISSILE

The Soviet launch of Sputnik had brought home to the American public, more than anything else up until that time, the precarious nature of the Cold War. Although Soviet bombers had presented a sort of vague, hypothetical threat for which the United States already possessed countermeasures, intercontinental ballistic missiles presented a new challenge. No longer protected by the vast ocean expanses, Americans experienced a sense of vulnerability.⁹⁰

The president's belief that atomic weapons offered a way to preserve national security without expanding the national budget caused all of the services to reassess their roles in America's defense policy. The rapid evolution of atomic weapons technology had forced the Army to incorporate new weapons into its organization and doctrine. However, even as Army units adapted to the new pentomic organization and began to explore its possibilities and limitations, some were already beginning to question the wisdom of such a complete reliance upon an atomic response.

In the 1950s, the threat of spreading communism, though sometimes vague, seemed real to most Americans, and this threat instilled real fear. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy had capitalized on those fears during his rise in the early 1950s, and now Soviet successes in the budding space race had raised them to a new level. Upon leaving his position as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Radford passed along to the secretary of defense his recommendation that the armed services embrace a program for national education developed by John C. Broger, the president of the Far East Broadcasting Company, and a consultant to the Joint Staff. Dubbed *MILITANT LIBERTY*, the program assumed that members of the United States military, and, indeed, the citizens of the nation at large, required education and motivation on the benefits and responsibilities of capitalism and democracy if they were to withstand the attacks of Communist ideology. Although the military services generally rejected the program in favor of their own troop information and education efforts, it did reflect the deep concerns

89. "Swagger Sticks Come Back to Benning Infantry Center."

90. Memo, Brig. Gen. Richard Collins, Dep Director Intel, Joint Staff, for Chairman, Joint Chs Staff, 30 Oct 1957, sub: Memorandum on Soviet Capabilities, File Unit: Entry UD 53, Series: Chairman's Files, Twining, 1957–1960, Subgroup: Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NACP.

of a nation engaged in a protracted struggle. Atomic weapons and ballistic missiles had forced warfare into a new dimension, and the U.S. Army, along with the other services was just beginning to explore the consequences.⁹¹

91. Memo, Adm. Arthur W. Radford for Sec Defense, 14 Aug 1957, sub: Cold War Planning, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. For more information on the Pentagon's embrace of MILITANT LIBERTY, see Lori Lyn Bogle, *The Pentagon's Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004).

6

Evolution

By 1958, it was clear that the United States Army was in the process of a dramatic transition. It had been less than five years since the end of the Korean War. Now, almost every aspect of the force that had served in Korea was obsolete, and Army leaders struggled to shape the evolution of the Army's organization, weapons, equipment, training, doctrine, and personnel for the future. Around them, the political environment also was changing as President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the rest of the defense establishment continued to remake American security policy. What role the Army was to play in national security remained uncertain, and it was not yet clear how the Army would contribute to the nation's next conflict.

REORGANIZING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

By the end of his first term in office, President Eisenhower had grown weary of his efforts to tame the unruly defense establishment. He had expected former Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson to take charge of the vast defense enterprise as he had at General Motors, but Eisenhower had become frustrated at how often he had to intervene personally in enforcing his vision upon the military services. With his new secretary of defense, Neil H. McElroy, experiencing the same difficulties in getting service leaders to toe the administration line, the president resolved to reshape the department to

streamline the chain of command and to give the secretary of defense even greater control over the military services.¹

As 1958 began, Eisenhower spoke with congressional leaders about his desire to reorganize the defense establishment. Revolutionary advances in military technology, he said, had underscored the need for a more direct and responsive chain of command. The recent reaction to Sputnik and the continued interservice feuding had, in his mind, undermined public confidence in military leadership. He proposed an authority more centralized in the secretary of defense with an enhanced planning staff at the Defense Department level. He would make the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the senior military adviser to the secretary of defense and would assign to the secretary more complete control over the allocation of the military budget.²

On 25 January, the president traveled to the Pentagon to meet with senior military and civilian officials. Many of the assembled leaders, led by the recently retired Admiral Arthur W. Radford, argued that the existing structure of joint committees was too cumbersome to deal with more complicated issues. They favored replacing the committee system with an integrated staff. Eisenhower expressed his belief that the service chiefs should be removed from their roles as executive agents for strategic control, that is, they should be taken out of the direct chain of command. The Joint Chiefs must be supreme, he said, if the United States was to respond quickly to foreign aggression before its own forces were destroyed.³

On 3 April, Eisenhower formally presented his proposal to Congress. In summarizing the underlying principle of his plan, he stated, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."⁴

The president intended to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff clear-cut planning and operational control over global military forces. Likewise, he would give the secretary of defense full authority over the spending of appropriations by Congress, including the right to transfer funds from one service to another.

1. Donald A. Carter, "Eisenhower Versus the Generals," *Journal of Military History* 71, no. 4 (Oct 2007): 1169–99.

2. Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960*, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2000), 5; Jack Raymond, "President to Take Charge in Defense Reorganization," *New York Times*, 10 Jan 1958.

3. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 5; Jack Raymond, "Eisenhower Visits Pentagon to Aid in Reorganizing," *New York Times*, 26 Jan 1958.

4. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Service Fight Looms on New Ike Changes," *Army Times*, 12 Apr 1958.



Admiral Arleigh A. Burke (U.S. Navy, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

He proposed to relieve the service secretaries of operational responsibilities and to downgrade the traditional military departments to administrative agencies of a centralized and fortified Department of Defense.⁵

In support of these goals, Eisenhower made other specific proposals. He wanted to organize all operational forces into unified commands, separate from the service departments, with each commander exercising complete authority during peace and war. To strengthen the role of the Joint Chiefs, he would create a larger, integrated Joint Staff, replacing the existing joint service planning committees. As further reinforcement of the preeminence of the secretary of defense, he would assign to the secretary the authority

5. Jack Raymond, "Eisenhower Asks Drastic Revision of Defense Set-up," *New York Times*, 4 Apr 1958; Memo, President Eisenhower for Andrew J. Goodpaster Jr., 30 Mar 1958, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Louis Galambos, 21 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001), vol. 19, 807.

for promotion of all service officers to the rank of major general and above. Reflecting his frustration with the ongoing interservice rivalries, he directed drastic reductions in service publicity offices and the transfer of many of their responsibilities to the Department of Defense.⁶

Congressional hearings on the proposed reorganization began almost immediately. All four service chiefs supported the legislation, although Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke expressed concerns that the enlarged Joint Staff might grow into a national general staff, leading to a merger of the services. Marine Corps Commandant General Randolph M. Pate opposed those parts of the proposals leading to unified commands, fearing a possible rationalization for the elimination of the Marine Corps.⁷

Burke's testimony provided the only real controversy throughout the hearings. In April, Secretary McElroy pointedly had warned military officers in general, and the Navy in particular, that, if they could not support the president's own requests for reorganization, they ought to retire. He could see no reason for military or civilian members of the defense organization to make, in their official capacities, public speeches in opposition to the programs their commander in chief desired. When Admiral Burke expressed his concerns before Congress regarding the reorganization bill, McElroy made a point of expressing his regret and disappointment. He noted in an interview that although he had no plans to discipline Admiral Burke, he was not the only one responsible for the admiral's future. Senator Richard B. Russell, the head of the Armed Services Committee, pushed back hard. Because it seemed obvious to him that the senior officers only could appear before him under duress, he suspended scheduled appearances for the rest of the day and threatened to delay them indefinitely until he could be assured that the service chiefs could testify without being threatened overtly or covertly. McElroy met with the senator to assure him of the admiral's security. Russell noted, however, that the incident was proof enough that the language the president wanted in the bill—repealing an officer's right to appear before Congress on his or her own initiative—could not, and would not, be approved.⁸

After some debate, both houses passed the legislation, and President Eisenhower signed it into law on 6 August 1958. Observers noted that the bill's passage continued a trend toward limiting the range of advice

6. Memo, Eisenhower for Goodpastor, 30 Mar 1958; Bourjaily, "Service Fight Looms on New Ike Changes."

7. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 6.

8. John W. Finney, "McElroy Advises Military to Back Revisions or Quit," *New York Times*, 11 Apr 1958; Jack Raymond, "McElroy Rebukes Burke for Stand on Pentagon Bill," *New*

available to the president, rather than a strategy based upon the canvassing of all available sources. Somewhat ominously, *New York Times* columnist Hanson W. Baldwin observed that the president's decision, in July, to send troops into Lebanon to quell political unrest had been based upon the advice of the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He had not consulted with the Joint Chiefs, either individually or as a body.⁹

Most within the Army viewed the reorganization as a victory and as acceptance of many of the views they had championed. The increased size and influence of the Joint Staff was a necessary development, but wording in the legislation specifically precluded its operation as an overall armed forces general staff and granted it no executive authority. Military departments remained under the control of their secretaries, although the secretaries and the service chiefs now were removed from the direct chain of command. Service component commands would henceforth come under the full operational control of the senior officer of the unified combatant command. The unified commands would receive their orders from the secretary of defense, passed through the Joint Chiefs. Army leaders particularly applauded this as a move toward increased unity of command and efficiency in strategic planning. Perhaps believing in the promise of their own developing missile systems, they also approved of the increased ability of the secretary of defense to reassign weapons development and operational use of new weapons to a particular service.¹⁰

One month later, in September, the Department of Defense announced the eight unified commands to be established worldwide. Only one, the U.S. Caribbean Command, would be under the command of an Army general, Lt. Gen. Ridgely Gaither. Four organizations—U.S. European Command, Continental Air Defense Command, Strategic Air Command, and Alaskan Command—would be under the command of Air Force generals. The remaining three—Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, and Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command—would be commanded by Navy admirals. Other than components of the Continental Air Defense Command, no Army units based in the United States were included in unified commands. However, any units stationed there, such as elements of

York Times, 22 Jun 1958; "Russell Demands McElroy Bar Reprisals for Officers," *New York Times*, 24 Jun 1958.

9. Hanson W. Baldwin, "The New Pentagon Bill," *New York Times*, 24 Jul 1958.

10. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 17 May 1958, sub: House Armed Services Committee Bill on Reorganization of the Department of Defense, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), could be assigned to a unified command where they might be needed.¹¹

AN ARMY IN TRANSITION

Although the Senate approved a \$1.4 billion emergency appropriations bill for the armed services in February 1958, the Army's battle with the administration over the military budget continued throughout the year. Of the supplemental funding, the Army received \$40 million for research and development, \$10 million of which was designated for outer-space research. Meanwhile, the four services sparred over the president's fiscal year 1959 defense budget, which was more than \$40 billion. Even though they reluctantly had endorsed the president's numbers in January, by March all four service chiefs were expressing their reservations before Congress. General Maxwell D. Taylor was most vehement in his comments, expressing his view that personnel resources were inadequate to meet in full the requirements of their assigned missions. Personnel cuts concurrent with the president's budget would reduce the Army from 918,111 in December 1957 to 870,000 by the middle of 1959. Taylor particularly noted his service's recruiting of foreign nationals in Korea and Europe to fill out combat and support units. Such dependence, he believed, could have serious consequences in an emergency.¹²

Placing an exclamation point on the Army's dissatisfaction with its share of the military budget was General James M. Gavin's sudden announcement in January of his intent to retire. Gavin had told a Senate subcommittee on military preparedness that he saw his Army deteriorating while the Soviet Army grew stronger. He told reporters that he felt he could contribute more to national defense from the outside than from within. Gavin's announcement prompted Democratic senators to threaten investigations to determine if the administration's "rubber hose tactics" in silencing the general's criticisms had figured into his retirement.¹³ Gavin would publish his own critique of

11. "Army Gets 1 of 8 Unified Commands," *Army Times*, 6 Sep 1958.

12. Allen Drury, "Senate Approves 1.4 Billion to Aid Defense Program," *New York Times*, 4 Feb 1958; Jack Raymond, "4 Military Chiefs List Objections to Budget Limits," *New York Times*, 9 Mar 1958; U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1958* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959) 146–48.

13. Jack Bell, "Senate to Air Gavin Retiring," *New York Times*, 6 Jan 1958.



Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

administration defense policies, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, shortly after his retirement in March.¹⁴

Readiness reports from around the force began to give some indication of the toll the steady budget and personnel cuts had taken on the Army. Although Army leaders continued to declare that all commands were in a satisfactory state of operational readiness, individual command reports revealed some concerns. The U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) commander, General Henry I. Hodes, stated in September that requirements to divert two battalions each of Honest John rockets, Corporal missiles, and 280-mm. artillery to support NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization's)

14. Rpt, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Gen. Taylor, n.d., sub: Gavin's Resignation, Box 15, Messages Sent by General Lemnitzer, 1958, Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University, Washington, DC; Bell, "Senate to Air Gavin Retiring"; James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York: Harper, 1958).

Army Group North seriously depleted atomic fire support assets available to his command. Outmoded equipment, particularly communications and target acquisition sets, was also a major concern. Hodes's most significant qualms lay in the area of personnel. The USAREUR Communications Zone, the command's logistical lifeline, was composed of 52 percent indigenous personnel. The reliability of those individuals after the outbreak of hostilities, he reported, was a major problem. Under the Army's 1959 troop ceiling, he could see no way to alleviate the problem. In a top secret message to the chief of staff, Hodes wrote that, despite his assertion of mission readiness, "We have reached a point of calculated risk, one beyond which I do not recommend proceeding without complete reevaluation of the mission and purpose of the command."¹⁵

From the headquarters of the U.S. Army, Pacific, General Isaac D. White reported that his command, which he rated as only marginally satisfactory, was short more than 10,000 personnel. Combat units in Korea contained up to 25 percent Korean soldiers, who were participants in the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) Program. Service units in Korea were diluted by up to 50 percent. Unit organizations in Korea had begun to resemble those in the area before the Korean War had broken out. Rifle companies maintained only two of four platoons. Tank companies maintained only two of three platoons. Mortar and artillery batteries operated at reduced strength as well, with up to half of their assigned tubes remaining unmanned. The Army virtually had eliminated the logistical base in Japan, and the support base in Korea was no longer adequate to sustain combat operations. Training throughout the command had been hampered by the requirement to divert more than 3,000 soldiers to administrative and security tasks as well as by the language problems caused by the integration of so many KATUSA soldiers.¹⁶

Units in the United States were in little better shape. Of the four STRAC divisions, only one, the 82d Airborne Division, was at authorized strength and fully deployable. The second priority division, the 4th Infantry Division, reported 87 percent authorized strength, with only 76 percent deployable. The other two STRAC divisions, the 101st Airborne and the 1st Infantry, reported 106 percent and 95 percent authorized strength, respectively. The

15. Memo, Maj. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Gen. Moore, 6 Nov 1958, sub: Presentations for the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret, 1956-1962 (hereinafter DCSOPS Top Secret 1956-1962), RG 319, NACP.

16. Memo, Pachler for Moore, 6 Nov 1958, sub: Presentations for the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin (*right*) confers with General Henry I. Hodes (*left*). (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

Army considered neither to be fully deployable because many troops had joined recently and required additional training.¹⁷

The readiness of the three Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) divisions was significantly lower than their STRAC counterparts. The 2d Armored Division had recently returned to Fort Hood, Texas, from Germany as part of a GYROSCOPE rotation. The 2d Infantry Division had reconstituted as a full division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, was preparing to inactivate later in the year. Although the Army assessed that each of the units had sufficient equipment on hand to enable them to become combat ready within the time limits assigned

17. Memo, Pachler for Moore, 6 Nov 1958, sub: Presentations for the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

by mobilization plans, each lacked some important equipment, was understrength, and required a great deal of training.¹⁸

Some of the Army's most senior officers weighed in with the Army Staff, expressing their concern over the deteriorating status of the Army. Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey, Commanding General of the Third U.S. Army, wrote that inadequate supporting forces and personnel shortages had made the Army a hollow shell, not capable of the performance that would normally be attributed to its number of active divisions. The Army's goal of maintaining a stated number of divisions without full supporting forces risked misleading Congress regarding the force's full capability and might cause future funding requests to be denied as unnecessary. He suggested that the service present its Troop Program on the basis of a "world-wide division slice," in which the full complement of supporting forces would be submitted as part of a division package.¹⁹ General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the vice chief of staff, responded that, although the idea was sound, it would not be acceptable to Congress or to the Department of Defense, and it would cause the Army to suffer in comparison to the leaner (though less self-sufficient) Marine Corps.²⁰

As he prepared for his upcoming retirement, General Willard G. Wyman presented General Taylor with his own parting impressions of the military organization he had served for more than forty years. Repeated compromise, he said, had diminished the Army in stature as compared to the other services. He believed that there had been a steady reduction in the emphasis placed upon the combat arms, yet requirements for combat support and administrative troops had increased steadily. Sadly, he noted that the entire U.S. Infantry could now sit comfortably in the Rose Bowl.²¹

The composition of the Army continued to evolve, even as the reductions continued. Although the service had reported racial integration to be complete several years earlier, indications remained that this was not necessarily the case. In October, Senator Paul H. Douglas complained to Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker that an overseas levy, specifying "Caucasian Only," had been posted on a bulletin board at Fitzsimons Army Hospital in Colorado. Brucker rejected a reply drafted by the Army Staff

18. Memo, Pachler for Moore, 6 Nov 1958, sub: Presentations for the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

19. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey to Gen. Willard G. Wyman, 30 Apr 1958; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

20. Ltr, Hickey to Wyman, 30 Apr 1958; Ltr, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Gen. Willard G. Wyman, 21 Jul 1958; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

21. Ltr, Gen. Willard G. Wyman to Gen. Taylor, 26 Jul 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

which tried to explain the faux pas as a by-product of the Army's need to balance the racial makeup of units across several commands. He directed the Army Staff to conduct a "quiet, open-minded, creative" study to determine whether there remained any need for racial identification in any Army personnel actions.²²

The study, completed early in January 1959, provided a clear indication that racial integration throughout the Army remained a work in progress. Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, reported that it had been the unanimous opinion of the major commanders that the present system of racial identification and proportionate distribution should continue. Experience gained in Korea, he wrote, indicated that although small units such as squads could contain up to 33 percent Black soldiers without any adverse effect on combat operations, they should limit the number of Black soldiers in larger units such as battle groups and combat commands to approximately 12 percent. There was still a need, he concluded, for a system of distributing personnel proportionately by race. Elimination of the existing system would generate an equal, or even greater number of complaints of segregation.²³

Not surprisingly for a force in transition, the role of women in the Army was also coming under scrutiny. Late in 1957, the director of the Women's Army Corps, Col. Mary L. Milligan, asked the deputy chief of staff for personnel to identify additional military jobs that women could perform in peacetime and during periods of mobilization. Up until that time, few women in the Army operated anything heavier than a light truck. The resultant study, completed in August 1958, identified 116 out of 400 military occupational specialties that women could not perform because the jobs involved combat, isolated duty posts, or extraordinary physical strength or stamina. The research team concluded that women could realistically fill 25 percent of military enlisted positions in a 700,000-person Army. With that in mind, it recommended that regulations limiting the strength of the Women's Army Corps to 2 percent of the Regular Army's strength should be lifted.²⁴

Despite the turmoil created by the recurring budget debates and personnel reductions, efforts to improve the image of the Army and the

22. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 15 Dec 1958, sub: Designation of Negro Personnel in Reports and Directives, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

23. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Under Sec Army, 22 Jan 1959, sub: Staff study on Racial Identification in Army Reports, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

24. Bettie J. Morden, *The Women's Army Corps, 1945-1978*, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), 166.



Col. Mary L. Milligan (center) is sworn in as the director of the Women's Army Corps by Maj. Gen. Herbert M. Jones (right) on 3 January 1957. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker (left) looks on. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

conditions of military service seemed to be bearing fruit. In May, President Eisenhower signed a bill that substantially increased military pay rates for all active, reserve, and retired personnel. The legislation also included many of the previous year's Cordiner committee proposals, including provisions for two new pay grades for senior enlisted (E-8 and E-9) and authorization to provide for proficiency pay for certain technical military specialties. The Army tried to address complaints raised by many of its junior officers and noncommissioned officers regarding oversupervision by higher headquarters. The Office of the Inspector General made the issue a subject for special attention during its 1958 inspection. Maj. Gen. Albert Pierson, the inspector general, reported to General Taylor that, in the combat arms, more

than 50 percent of the company or battery commander's time was taken up by administrative duties. The largest contributing factor to this was excessive reporting requirements placed upon company-sized units by higher staffs and headquarters. In response, Taylor ordered senior commanders and staff to reassess their reporting requirements and to accept verbal reports from lower headquarters wherever possible.²⁵

Reports released toward the end of 1958 seemed to indicate that the Army's efforts to recruit and retain more qualified soldiers seemed to be paying off. Statistics in August indicated that more nonprior-service members were enlisting for three or more years of service than at any time since the Korean War. Reenlistment rates were up, and resignation rates among regular officers were dropping. Recruiting offices had begun to exceed their quotas regularly. Although the number of draftees inducted into the Army in 1958 had increased slightly, from 138,504 to 142,246, the overall trend had been in decline for the previous four years. Even the rush of West Point graduates to resign upon completion of their five-year commitment had begun to drop off. A higher rate of resignation by ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) distinguished military graduates who had been appointed to the Regular Army remained a singular dark spot amid otherwise positive personnel news.²⁶

By the end of the year, the strength of the U.S. Army was below 900,000 and on its way to 870,000 by the middle of 1959. This was lower than at any time since before the start of the Korean War. Coping with postwar demobilization, the president's strategic policies, and the integration of atomic weapons into its organization and doctrine had begun to turn the Army in several different directions. It remained to be seen how the service's recent embrace of an organization based upon atomic weapons would stand up under the stress of the Cold War environment.

25. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Supergrade Opens Soon," *Army Times*, 17 May 1958; "Pro Pay Next Month," *Army Times*, 11 Oct 1958; Rpt, Maj. Gen. Albert Pierson, 4 Aug 1958, sub: Report on Special Subjects for Inspection, Fiscal Year 1958; Draft Cir No. 20, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, n.d., sub: Elimination of Unessential Requirements Imposed on Company-Sized Unit Commanders; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

26. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "More Men Are Staying in Army," *Army Times*, 27 Sep 1958. Draft statistics are from the Ofc of Selective Service, Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC.

REVISING THE PENTOMIC STRUCTURE

By the end of June 1958, all of the Army's fifteen combat divisions had completed their reorganization. Meanwhile, the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) continued tests and evaluations of the new organizations. The command issued guidance to field commanders concerning procedures to use in evaluating the effectiveness of the new infantry divisions, both overseas and in the continental United States. Specific objectives of the evaluation program included an appraisal of pentomic doctrine, tactics, techniques, organization, suitability of equipment, capacity of personnel and units to accomplish assigned duties and missions, and the adequacy of communications. CONARC tasked the field commands to identify major strengths and weaknesses in the new organization and to recommend where further evaluation might be required.²⁷

The command received reports from commanders of all active Army divisions and two separate battle groups in Alaska. In summarizing the responses, CONARC announced that, with certain exceptions, the Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division (ROCID) organization and equipment appeared adequate to accomplish missions under conditions of atomic or nonatomic warfare. The general structure was sound and possessed the flexibility, unity of command, and decisive combat power to succeed in both environments.²⁸

Despite this seemingly glowing review, field commanders had recommended numerous significant changes before the organization could be considered ready for combat. They strongly suggested that the number of rifle companies in the battle group be increased from four to five. The additional company would allow for greater dispersion in the battle area. It also would provide greater flexibility and staying power, better capacity for all-around security, and an increased capacity for an adequate reserve. Unit commanders had also noted that the organization lacked an adequate surveillance and target acquisition capability. They recommended the addition to each battle group of an organic eighteen-man radar section

27. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 281–83; Memo, Col. T. J. Marnane, Adjutant Gen, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 28 Aug 1958, sub: Evaluation of ROCID, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

28. Memo, Marnane for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 28 Aug 1958, sub: Evaluation of ROCID.

composed of one AN/TPS21 medium-range radar and five AN/PPS4 short-range radars.²⁹

The most significant and consistent criticism of the new organization from almost all the commanders was the inadequacy of the indirect fire support available to the ROCID division. In place of one 105-mm. howitzer battalion with five batteries, one of which provided direct support to each of the battle groups, commanders asked for five direct-support battalions, each composed of one 105-mm. howitzer battery and one 155-mm. howitzer battery. Additionally, the composite general-support battalion would be changed from one Honest John battery, one 155-mm. howitzer battery, and one 8-inch howitzer battery to one Honest John battery and two 8-inch howitzer batteries. The commanders also requested that at least two of the direct-support battalions be equipped with self-propelled howitzers, with the rest to be converted once sufficient self-propelled weapons were available.³⁰

No organization in the U.S. Army was better prepared to test the new organization and doctrine than the Seventh Army in Europe. Under the command of Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, the Seventh Army was positioned in Europe precisely to fight the kind of war that the new division was designed to facilitate. In February, General Clarke sent his divisions to the field for ten days as part of Exercise SABRE HAWK. Including both the V and VII Corps and approximately 125,000 soldiers, the maneuver was the largest ever held by the Seventh Army. In addition to the critiques already noted, Clarke and his staff identified a number of important flaws in the new organization. Although the division theoretically relied upon its atomic weapons for its most significant striking power, its transportation and support elements lacked sufficient personnel, vehicles, and equipment to ensure timely delivery of atomic weapons to forward artillery units. Additionally, combat units had to divert troops that already were engaged to protect atomic weapons support and delivery operations. Clarke's analysis also noted that his corps were not prepared to evacuate the 2,000 or more casualties per day that CONARC had included as part of the scenario.³¹

At Fort Ord, California, the Combat Development Experimentation Center also was taking a look at the functionality of the pentomic organization. The center ran a series of exercises at the company level, posing completely mechanized forces against one another and allowing for the free use of

29. Memo, Marnane for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 28 Aug 1958, sub: Evaluation of ROCID.

30. Memo, Marnane for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 28 Aug 1958, sub: Evaluation of ROCID.

31. Annual Historical Rpt, HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, n.d., 171, Historians Files, CMH; Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015) 301–3.



General Bruce C. Clarke (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

tactical atomic weapons. Their initial conclusions established 6,000 to 8,000 yards as the proper frontage for a company-sized unit, which was roughly ten times the frontage similarly sized units had covered during World War II. They noted that, because of the distance and dispersion, the effects of small arms, mortars, and conventional artillery were practically negligible. Atomic weapons and tank-antitank weapons caused, by far, the most casualties on the battlefield. When General Taylor visited the center in July, he posed a few questions on which to base future experiments. He told the assembled staff that he expected them to develop insight regarding the Army of the next two decades. He wanted more feedback on the adequacy and effectiveness of the pentomic division. He also wanted more information on the survivability of the helicopter on the atomic battlefield. Most important, he wanted the center to focus more on weapons development. What was the proper role for the Davy Crockett weapon system, a small-yield nuclear projectile launched from a tube similar to a recoilless rifle, then under development? How could the Army justify the high costs of its various missile programs?

Finally, he wanted to know the proper rate at which the Army should phase out conventional weapons, considering the availability of more modern weapons and the trend toward further personnel reduction.³²

Meanwhile, some of the deficiencies of the new organization had become fodder for public comment. As early as January, an unattributed letter in the *Army Times* had warned readers that the Army was no longer as powerful as it had been even a few years ago. Most of the new weapons that the service had been boasting about really did not exist yet. There was a big difference, the writer complained, between a plan for a 200-mile field artillery rocket and actually having them in the hands of the troops. A few months later, an article in the *New York World Telegram and Sun* proclaimed that the Army had rushed into the reorganization with unacceptable deficiencies in communications, weapons, and mobility. The pentomic structure lacked sufficient antitank weapons and artillery to support the frontline troops effectively. It also lacked adequate means of spotting enemy troop targets. There was growing evidence, the article announced, that the Army had reorganized itself into a state of dangerous weakness.³³

Although General Taylor recognized the need to modify some of the original pentomic organization, he soon grew impatient with the torrent of requests to increase the number of units, personnel, or equipment within the division. The question remained, he said, of “how to combine our net resources in personnel and equipment in order to produce the greatest aggregate of combat effectiveness.”³⁴ This had to be done, he continued, while remaining within a fixed ceiling of dollars and personnel. Speaking directly to requests for increases in artillery, he told the CONARC commander that he could not consider any increases in the artillery component of the division without some indication of where, within the current force structure, the required personnel could be found.³⁵

By the end of the year, the new deputy chief of staff for military operations, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, approved many of the recommendations for modifying the new pentomic infantry division. For the most part, he held to the chief of staff’s guidance. Additions to the division organization were

32. MFR, Col. John V. Roddy, Ch Ops Research Div, 16 Jul 1958, sub: Visit of the Chief of Staff to Combat Development Experimentation Center, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

33. R. A. Field, “The Great Charade,” *Army Times*, 25 Jan 1958; Msg, Col. Stephen O. Fuqua Jr., Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, to Cmdg Gen, Continental Army Cmd, 10 Jul 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

34. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell Taylor to Gen. Willard G. Wyman, 24 Feb 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

35. Ltr, Taylor to Wyman, 24 Feb 1958.

offset by reductions in other parts of the unit. The inclusion of another rifle company to each battle group was accomplished by deleting one rifle platoon from each company, removing one 3.5-inch rocket-launcher team from the rifle platoon weapons squad, and eliminating one rifleman per squad. Reorganizing the division artillery into one composite Honest John/8-inch howitzer battalion and five 105-mm./155-mm. howitzer battalions required the removal of separate 4.2-inch mortar batteries from each battle group. Ultimately, the addition of 2,109 spaces to the infantry division was offset by the elimination of a matching number.³⁶

Even as the revision of the pentomic structure was underway, some officers warned that it was not evolving fast enough. As he prepared to retire, General Wyman noted that organizational change lagged seriously behind technological progress. The division, he believed, needed a greater integration of “aero-vehicles,” and more emphasis on armor and armored vehicles. Battle groups should become even smaller and wield even more firepower.³⁷ At the same time, the Army Staff reminded General Taylor that the division had to be prepared to fight both general and limited conflicts. A force that had been optimized for conduct of a general war in Eurasia might not be the best construct for a limited conventional fight in the Far East.³⁸

SECOND THOUGHTS ON ATOMIC WAR

As the Army was revising the design of the division it had developed specifically for the purpose of fighting an atomic war, the architects of massive retaliation and the New Look had begun to rethink many of their basic assumptions. In a meeting with Secretary McElroy in April, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reflected that the conditions under which he had supported the concept of massive retaliation had changed. The expansive development of the Soviet nuclear weapons program meant that the capacity for a large-scale nuclear response was no longer a deterrent which the United States alone possessed. The prospect was now one of mutual suicide if these weapons were used. In another meeting with McElroy a few months later, Dulles wondered whether the United States might be putting too much emphasis on the nuclear deterrent. Anything beyond the capacity to destroy

36. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 281–82; Memo, Marnane for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 28 Aug 1958, sub: Evaluation of ROCID.

37. Ltr, Wyman to Taylor, 26 Jul 1958.

38. Memo, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 30 Jul 1958, sub: Gyroscope, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

the enemy was excessive and unnecessary. Although McElroy and others in the room demurred that there had not been too much emphasis on the nuclear deterrent, they acknowledged that more emphasis should be placed on limited war capabilities. Dulles concluded with his opinion that ground forces had an important role to play in limited operations and that the Army should not be reduced any further. Belatedly—and perhaps too late, as he would die of cancer in less than six months—John Foster Dulles had become an advocate for the U.S. Army.³⁹

Meanwhile, advocates for the Army continued to hammer at some of what they considered to be misperceptions regarding atomic warfare. General Matthew B. Ridgway had been one of the first to argue that fighting a war with atomic weapons would require more soldiers on the battlefield, not fewer as the air power advocates had proclaimed. Now the Army published some of the results from Exercise SABRE HAWK, which showed that neither side in the mock war had been prepared for the enormous number of casualties inflicted nor the requirements not only to replace them but also to recover them and remove them from the battlefield. In October, the service released to the public portions of a study summarizing the results of combat exercises in the United States and overseas. The report indicated that the range of modern atomic weapons had made even the rear echelons of deployed forces vulnerable to devastating attack. Moreover, the dispersal inherent in modern organization and doctrine required increased transportation and logistical support. Units had to deploy far enough apart to avoid presenting a lucrative atomic target, but mobile enough to mass quickly to conduct an attack. The complexity of modern weapons and equipment also implied a need for increases in training time and additional personnel to conduct the instruction. In light of these findings, the chief of staff and others argued that further cuts to the force were shortsighted and dangerous.⁴⁰

General Taylor also noted that the development of a rough nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union had raised a level of concern among the NATO allies. The situation had caused some allies to question whether the United States would risk the use of nuclear weapons for anything other than its own survival. Taylor mused that other nations might consider the question from a different point of view, wondering whether

39. MFR, Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, 7 Apr 1958, sub: Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; MFR, Sec State John Foster Dulles, 8 Nov 1958, sub: Memorandum of Meeting; both in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, vol. 3, *National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 62–65, 145–47.

40. “Battle Lesson,” *Army Times*, 22 Mar 1958; Jack Raymond, “Army Study Cites Manpower Needs,” *New York Times*, 27 Oct 1958.



A 68th Armored tank guards the Main River bridge near Wertheim, Germany, during Exercise SABRE HAWK, 15 February 1958. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

a trigger-happy United States might launch its nuclear weapons without regard to the concerns of its allies. The West Germans, in particular, already had raised concerns over the excessive use of such weapons in various NATO exercises. Taylor pointed out that even the so-called tactical weapons were small only in comparison to the megaton yields of the larger strategic weapons. Clearly, any level of atomic warfare would be devastating. In considering the evolving impasse created by two sides armed with ultimate weapons, one officer observed hopefully that the two nations might choose not to destroy each other. “History shows,” he observed, “that the duel at two paces was never a very popular pastime.”⁴¹

41. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (speech, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 3 July 1958); Memo, Gen. Maxwell Taylor for Sec Gen Staff, 7 Apr 1958, sub: Review of U.S. Strategy; Memo, Col. Cyril A. Millson, Ch War Plans Br, Plans Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Logistics, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 10 Feb 1958, sub: Logistics Briefing-Army Strategic Capabilities Plan

Even within the Army's research and developments, attempts to come to grips with atomic warfare had begun to take on an almost whimsical appearance. Speakers at the annual Armor Conference at Fort Knox, Kentucky, predicted that the service was only a small step from developing helicopter-launched guided missiles with atomic capability. Funds for the fiscal year 1959 research and development budget included money for a feasibility study on the application of nuclear power to combat vehicles. Although not necessarily in favor of the development of a nuclear-powered main battle tank, the Army Staff supported investigation into the concept of an atomic power plant for a 150-ton cross-country logistical carrier.⁴²

Despite growing concerns regarding the nuclear balance, or perhaps because of them, the Army's efforts to legitimize the concept of limited war as a national strategic priority began to bear fruit. In April, Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, the commandant of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, told Taylor that the service's emphasis on limited war in its public statements appeared to be increasingly effective. He identified news reports that challenged both Air Force doctrine and that service's perception as the dominant player in American defense policy. McGarr stated that there was growing public understanding that national security could not rest on a single service or single concept of operations. In September, the Defense Science Board, under the direction of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, published a report on limited war in which it stated that the United States could not hope to deal with important limited-area situations if it only had forces designed for big war situations. In certain cases, such as guerrilla-type conflicts, there was almost no basis for expecting atomic weapons to be effective. More important, the study concluded, a requirement for the United States to employ nuclear weapons in response to lesser challenges would reduce the deterrent value of those forces to an entirely unacceptable status. Maxwell Taylor was beginning to win his argument.⁴³

Obscured by the loud and lengthy debates regarding atomic weapons and limited war, the United States quietly changed its policy regarding other

FY 1959; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

42. "Tanks to Team with A-Armed Copters," *Army Times*, 10 May 1958; Memo, Bonesteel for Dep Chs Staff, 30 July 1958, sub: Gyroscope; Rpt, Def Science Board, Ofc of Under Sec Def for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Sep 1958, Report on Limited War Volume 3, Historians Files, CMH.

43. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, to General Maxwell D. Taylor, 21 April 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Rpt, Def Science Board, Ofc of Under Sec Def for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Sep 1958, Report on Limited War Volume 1, Historians Files, CMH.

aspects of general combat. In May 1958, the president announced that the United States would be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that the military effectiveness of its armed forces would be enhanced by their use. This use would not be restricted to limited or general war, nor dependent upon first use by an enemy combatant.⁴⁴

The announcement prompted considerable discussion throughout the Army, as service leaders tried to match procedures, doctrine, and capabilities with the adjustment in national policy. Their studies noted that, during World War I, mustard gas had proven to be five times more efficient than high explosive shells as a casualty producer. They warned, however, that the effectiveness of chemical weapons varied considerably depending on weather, terrain, and other target conditions. Still, they concluded that the inclusion of toxic chemical ammunition as a standard type for Army weapons would result in a substantial increase in military effectiveness, firepower, and flexibility at a comparatively small cost.⁴⁵

More complicated were discussions concerning the political implications of using chemical and biological weapons. Officers on the Army Staff opined that the nature of warfare had changed markedly since the first quarter of the twentieth century when toxic warfare had been condemned as inhumane. Given the effects of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, the repercussions for using chemical weapons seemed inconsequential. Nonetheless, they continued, many nations, both allied and opposition, would not approve of the use of chemical and biological weapons. In a conclusion both ironic and cynical, they proposed that the United States might lose more friends by failing to take a strong and positive stand than by moralizing some of the segments of the world population against the use of toxic agents.⁴⁶

The discussion of biological weapons proved to be even less optimistic. Scientists working for the Army's Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and the Operations Research Center at the Army Chemical Center concluded that biological weapons offered a relatively low potential for success so long as a nuclear capability existed. Even more so than with chemical weapons, the weight of world opinion would be against their use. Further, the effectiveness of such weapons was limited because of the degrading effects of weather and personal protective measures. They did note that against agricultural

44. Info Book Item, Ofc Ch Chem Ofcr, 9 Dec 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955–1962, RG 319, NACP.

45. Study, Atomic-CBR [Chemical Biological Radiological] Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 1 Nov 1958, The Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents in Limited War, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

46. Study, Atomic-CBR Div, 1 Nov 1958, Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents in Limited War.

countries, anticrop warfare would provide a temporary dislocation, but that success depended upon so many factors that it was difficult to assess what the value of such an attack might be.⁴⁷

In summarizing its position, the Army Staff concluded that the use of chemical and biological weapons had the potential to increase the Army's firepower and flexibility. Moreover, an increased stockpile of such weapons would help to deter an enemy from initiating their employment. However, the Army Staff also suggested that the loss of public support because of an unprovoked first use of chemical weapons would be at least as great as that which would result from a U.S. initiation of atomic warfare. The staff recommended an extensive public information program to explain the characteristics of toxic warfare and the results to be expected if such weapons were to be used against the United States. Lastly, the staff encouraged a more robust research and development program aimed toward the creation of a quick-acting, nonlethal, incapacitating agent that the Army could employ at all levels of warfare.⁴⁸

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMY CORPS

By the end of 1957, it was evident that the directed reductions in the strength of the Army over the next several years would not permit the maintenance of an eight-division STRAF or a four-division STRAC. The cutback, from approximately one million personnel in 1957 to 900,000 in 1958, was to be followed by a further drop to 870,000 by the end of 1959. The entire Army force structure for 1959, approved by the chief of staff on 28 December 1957, reflected the decline in manpower by providing for only fourteen active divisions, six of which remained in the United States.⁴⁹

The reduction in the number of divisions available to the active Army placed additional requirements on those remaining to assume training responsibilities and other administrative burdens. In March, the deputy chief of staff for operations informed General Taylor that the 1st Infantry Division, because of its increased responsibility for preparing recruits and

47. MFR, George H. Milly, Ops Research Gp, Army Chem Center, 24 Jul 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955–1962, RG 319, NACP.

48. Study, Atomic-CBR Div, 1 Nov 1958, Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents in Limited War.

49. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., "The Development of the STRAF" Historians Files, CMH.

cadres for future assignments, could no longer meet the requirement for deployment overseas within thirty days.⁵⁰

In October, Taylor directed the Army Staff to conduct a conference to determine the best use of available resources for support of the STRAC concept. The conference, held 12–14 November, included representatives of the deputy chief of staff for logistics, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, the deputy chief of staff for operations, the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, the assistant chief of staff for reserve components, the comptroller of the Army, the chief of information, CONARC, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 1st Logistical Command. With an assumed end strength of 870,000, the conferees agreed that three divisions (the 82d and 101st Airborne and the 4th Infantry) were the maximum that the Army could sustain in a ready status. Attendees also considered, but ultimately failed to reach agreement on, the provision of a battle group on the West Coast to be earmarked for the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i in lieu of providing reinforcements directly from STRAC.⁵¹

Attendees at the conference also devoted considerable discussion to the implications of deploying STRAC forces in a conflict short of general war. They concluded that there was no sense in including an armored division in the STRAC force because it was too heavy for rapid deployment and too large for sustained aerial resupply. All the old issues regarding strategic transport came up, with no firm resolution as usual. The discussions noted that all planning for deployment of the STRAC was on a unilateral Army basis. Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor any of the other services had yet committed to formal plans for its employment.⁵²

Independent of the conference, other senior officers already had begun to consider establishing STRAC within a more formal structure in the national defense chain of command. Maj. Gen. Robert F. Sink, the XVIII Airborne Corps commanding general, proposed to General Taylor the establishment of a Joint Ready Force, for which the STRAC would provide the ground component. Uniting the STRAC with ground and air components under a single commander and identifying it as a unified command would place the force on a more secure footing within the defense establishment, provide various forms of strategic transport as an organic part of the command,

50. Memo, Col. Stephen O. Fuqua Jr., Dep Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 14 Mar 1958, sub: Assignment of High Priority Missions to STRAF Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955–1962, RG 319, NACP.

51. Memo, Brig. Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., Dep Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 20 Oct 1958, sub: Problem Areas of the STRAC, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

52. Memo, Palmer for Dep Chs Staff, 20 Oct 1958, sub: Problem Areas of the STRAC.

and facilitate planning up to the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such a command would have as its primary mission preparing for limited war and would be the nation's first response to challenges short of atomic warfare.⁵³

General Sink routed his letter through Lt. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, the Third U.S. Army commander, and General Willard G. Wyman, commanding general of CONARC. Both men strongly endorsed the concept, although both also pointed out issues that had to be resolved before the concept could become a reality. They considered the formation of the new command to be a commendable effort along lines proposed by President Eisenhower as part of his recent action reorganizing the Defense Department. Although Taylor's response was not immediately forthcoming, the suggestion for a Joint Ready Force devoted to limited war challenges did start the ball rolling toward further adaptations within the Department of Defense.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the Army made its own efforts to reform the command and control over the STRAC. During periods of alert, the commanding general of CONARC exercised operational control over the STRAC divisions. The chiefs of the technical and administrative services were equally responsible for the development of doctrine, standards, and procedures of those units under their command that were also part of STRAC. Although the Department of the Army would not take the technical service chiefs completely out of the chain of command, it did pass to the CONARC commander both the authority to test readiness within the STRAC support units and the operational control over them in the event of a real-world deployment.⁵⁵

Despite the many competing priorities, the Army tried to provide the three remaining STRAC divisions with as many training opportunities as possible. In July, the 101st Airborne Division sent a task force of 1,200 soldiers to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida to give the unit practice in conducting a strategic airlift. In November, the 101st conducted Exercise WHITE CLOUD, a maneuver of several days, which culminated in an airdrop of 3,000 troops and almost 200 vehicles along several Fort Bragg, North Carolina, drop zones. Also in November, the 4th Infantry Division participated in Exercise ROCKY SHOALS, a ten-day maneuver that featured an amphibious landing of two battle groups along the California coast.⁵⁶

53. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Robert F. Sink to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 15 May 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

54. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 28 May 1958; Ltr, Gen. Willard G. Wyman to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 10 Jun 1958; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

55. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., "Development of the STRAF"

56. "Eagle Goes to Florida: Airborne Troops Practice Quick Overseas Movements," *Army Times*, 19 Jul 1958; "Paratroopers Attack Bragg" and "Rocky Shoals: Troops Hit California as Exercise Begins," *Army Times*, 1 Nov 1958.

Realizing that more extensive training was necessary, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman proposed to General Taylor a full-scale deployment exercise for both the 101st and 4th Divisions for the coming fiscal year. Eddleman wished to test the existing SWAGGERSTICK contingency plans by moving both divisions to deployment airfields and load points and having designated units conduct a complete load-out of their troops, equipment, and vehicles. Representative elements of both divisions and the XVIII Airborne Corps would then deploy to Germany to participate in a field exercise there. An analysis of funds available, however, reduced the number of units who could participate in the load-out and limited the amount of equipment that they actually could pack. Limitations on air transport restricted the movement group to less than 250 soldiers and three C-124 aircraft.⁵⁷

In July, political unrest in Lebanon provided an opportunity to exercise exactly the type of limited force contingency operation envisioned for the Army's STRAC. The previous year, President Eisenhower had declared his intention to intervene in the Middle East if he believed Communist-inspired insurgencies threatened Middle Eastern nations aligned with the West. When rebel leaders seemed likely to overthrow the pro-Western government in Lebanon, Eisenhower directed U.S. forces to deploy there to provide stability and a peaceful government transition. The Army had not coordinated its STRAC force planning with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, nor did it have approval for the use of strategic lift provided by the other services. In contrast, the commander in chief of U.S. European Command, at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had developed a joint operations plan for intervention in the Middle East. As a result, USAREUR deployed a battle group from the 24th Infantry Division, along with other supporting elements, to Lebanon on 19 July, where they remained until the end of October. Another battle group remained on standby in Europe throughout the deployment. Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, commanding general of the Northern Area Command in Germany, served as the joint ground force commander for more than 10,000 soldiers and marines involved in the operation (*Map 7*).⁵⁸

Although the overall operation was a success, subsequent review and analysis indicated that many portions of the contingency and deployment

57. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman for Ch Staff, 19 Feb 1958, sub: FY 1959 STRAC Mobility Exercise, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

58. Roger J. Spiller, "*Not War But Like War*": *The American Intervention in Lebanon*, Leavenworth Papers, no. 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981); Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 341-58.



Map 7

plans needed to be revised. Both General Eddleman, the new Seventh Army commander, and the USAREUR commander, General Henry I. Hodes, complained that the commitment of two battle groups from the 24th Infantry Division had deprived that unit of almost half of its infantry strength and a large portion of its support force. Additionally, the remaining three battle groups had to be stripped of airborne-qualified personnel to provide fillers for the deploying elements. The U.S. European Command and NATO commander, U.S. Air Force General Lauris Norstad, complained to

the Department of the Army and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that one of only five American divisions under his command had been rendered combat ineffective for the duration of the deployment. All three senior officers questioned the wisdom of committing USAREUR forces to a Middle Eastern deployment when that was exactly the mission of STRAC.⁵⁹

Despite the apparent success of the ad hoc headquarters and staff established under General Adams, an analysis of the operation by the deputy chief of staff for operations concluded that the contingency plan needed a predetermined, existing ground force headquarters. Further, the headquarters already provided for in current plans, the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, should be utilized for this purpose. Other observations included the by-now obligatory requirement for sufficient airlift to ensure mission success. To facilitate coordination with the Air Force, the deputy chief of staff for operations recommended establishing a joint command post at the departure airfields, particularly to clear load plans and avoid confusion before departure. On the positive side, observers had hailed the value of the USNS *Comet*, a roll-on/roll-off cargo ship that had transported seventy tanks along with other vehicles from Bremerhaven, Germany, to Beirut, Lebanon. The staff analysis strongly encouraged the acquisition of five more vessels of exactly that type.⁶⁰

MISSILES AND MORE MISSILES

The successful Soviet satellite launch in 1957 continued to influence U.S. military policy in 1958. In January, the president requested, and the Congress approved, a \$1.2 billion emergency appropriation to accelerate work on missiles and to otherwise strengthen the nation's retaliatory power. The House Appropriations Committee earmarked a large portion of the additional funding for advancing the development of second-generation versions of the Army's Lacrosse, Little John, and Sergeant missiles. As part of the discussion regarding the new money, Secretary McElroy announced that he had lifted the 200-mile limitation on Army missiles. With that in mind,

59. Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles K. Gailey, Ch Civil Affairs, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Os, 19 Dec 1958, sub: Lessons Learned in Lebanon Operation; Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 15 Oct 1958, sub: Lessons Learned From Lebanon Operations; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 356-58.

60. Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 356-58; Memo, Maj. Gen. C. K. Gailey, Ch Civil Affairs, for Vice Ch Staff, 19 Dec 1958, sub: Lessons Learned in Lebanon Operation, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

he then directed the Army to hasten the development of its new Pershing, solid-fuel ballistic missile, designated to replace the older Redstone.⁶¹

In an operation designated Project AMMO, the Army staged a massive two-day field demonstration of its missile firepower from 30 June to 1 July at Fort Bliss, Texas. Before a gallery of 500 military, government, and industrial observers, and with news stations broadcasting from coast to coast, the service hosted a program of lectures, maneuvers, and live firings, showcasing its full repertoire of missiles. The launches included the Hawk and Nike Hercules air-defense missiles, the Honest John rocket, and the Corporal missile. In addition to the missile shots, the program also demonstrated the Army's various helicopters, most armed with machine guns and rockets, illustrating the new air cavalry tactics under development at the aviation school. Media accounts speculated about whom the Army show had been designed to impress, with most assuming that the Army was directing the display at potential allies and enemies. One "informed source," however, reported that the demonstration intended to counter the recent blitz of publicity surrounding the Air Force's development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.⁶²

That view received further support toward the end of the year as officials rushed to declassify and release a film highlighting the service's commitment to modern weapons and tactics. In *The Sharper Sword and the Stronger Shield*, the Army's Public Information Office again highlighted the various Army missiles, but also introduced weapons still on the drawing board, such as the Davy Crockett atomic projectile and the Redeye low-level air defense weapon. The Army vice chief of staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, cautioned the filmmakers to eliminate any unduly pessimistic views or statements that reflected a "can't-do" attitude.⁶³ Any focus or overemphasis on the Army's shortcomings, he said, would have an adverse effect on the morale and confidence within the service.⁶⁴

Throughout the year, the Army and the Air Force continued their ongoing blood feud over the continental air defense mission. After Sputnik, the

61. John D. Morris, "House Unit Votes 1.2 Billion Fund to Speed Missiles," *New York Times*, 22 Jan 1958; "200-Mile Limit Off Tactical Missiles, *Army Times*, 15 Feb 1958.

62. Monte Bourjaily Jr. "Army Kicks Off Project Ammo," *Army Times*, 28 Jun 1958; Gladwin Hill, "Army Shows Off Its Rocket Might," *New York Times*, 1 Jul 1958; "Army Missiles Awe Crowd at Big Shoot," *Army Times*, 12 Jul 1958; Capt. Charles G. Wellborn Jr., "Project AMMO," *Army Information Digest* 13 (Sep 1958): 32-43.

63. MFR, Maj. Gen. Harry P. Storke, Ch Info, 10 Dec 1958, sub: Meeting With the Vice Chief of Staff on *The Sharper Sword and the Stronger Shield*; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

64. Memo, Brig. Gen. Richard Collins, Director of Plans and Programs, for Sec Gen Staff, 4 Dec 1958; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,

competition had shifted from defending against oncoming enemy aircraft to deciding which service was best positioned to develop a system capable of shooting down incoming missiles. On 13 January, the secretary of defense outlined before Congress plans for the creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency within the Department of Defense. To that agency, he would assign the responsibility for the direction of space projects and antimissile missile programs. Three days later, on 16 January, McElroy assigned to the Army the authority to proceed with the development of its Nike Zeus antimissile program. To the Air Force, he assigned the responsibility for the development of long-range radar detection in this field.⁶⁵

The Air Force responded with its usual vehemence. Testifying before a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee, Air Force Lt. Gen. Donald L. Pruitt accused the secretary of being premature in his decision. Pruitt expressed his “grave” concerns over the costs involved in the Army’s project and stated that the Air Force was not convinced that the Army’s approach was the best.⁶⁶ Instead, the Air Force general touted the potential of its own Wizard antimissile project, which the secretary had ordered shelved.⁶⁷

In June, Secretary of the Army Brucker fired back in testimony before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Brucker described the intense effort his service had devoted to development of the antimissile system. He noted that the project was being administered by the same Army-Industry team that had produced both the Nike Ajax and the Nike Hercules air-defense missiles. Under the supervision of the Army Ordnance Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, the Western Electric Company acted as the single systems manager with the Bell Telephone Laboratories as the research and development agency and the Douglas Aircraft Company as the principal subcontractor. Other supporting industry leaders included RCA (Radio Corporation of America), Goodyear Aircraft Company, Sperry Gyroscope Company, and the Stanford Research Institute. Brucker offered his opinion that this was the best qualified team in the western world for the development of surface-to-air missiles. Left unmentioned, but obvious

NACP; MFR, Storke, 10 Dec 1958, sub: Meeting With the Vice Chief of Staff on The Sharper Sword and the Stronger Shield.

65. Exec Sess., *Review of National Defense Before the House Armed Services Committee*, 85th Cong. (21 Jan 1958), File Unit: Entry A1 1709, Series: Congressional Hearings, 1958–1962, Subgroup: Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, RG 319, NACP; Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 48–49.

66. Jack Raymond, “Air Force Scores McElroy Over Army’s Missile Role,” *New York Times*, 22 Feb 1958.

67. Raymond, “Air Force Scores McElroy Over Army’s Missile Role.”

to his congressional audience, were the large number and wide range of constituencies involved in supporting the effort.⁶⁸

Research and development continued through the end of the year, but the interservice sniping did not seem to have abated. In a discussion with the secretary of defense over the Office of the Secretary of Defense markup of the Army budget for fiscal year 1960, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles pointed out that, although the Army had been given the green light to develop the Nike Zeus, it had no priority for production, employment, or fielding. When General Taylor expressed his belief in the importance of fielding the system as soon as possible, Quarles, who had served as secretary of the Air Force until 1957, repeated his assertion that the project had no national priority when it came to production. Secretary McElroy intervened and agreed with Taylor, saying that the Defense Department should establish a priority for the system's production as soon as all the components had been approved. General Taylor predicted that, with full support, the Army could begin operational deployment by 1963.⁶⁹

The Army missile program's finest hour came late one evening in January 1958. On 8 November 1957, the Department of Defense had directed the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, under Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, to prepare a Jupiter-C missile for a satellite launch. Medaris and his director of operations, Wernher von Braun, promised to have a missile ready for launch in ninety days. Then, in early December, the Navy's Vanguard satellite failed to leave the launch pad, and all eyes turned to Medaris and his team. Their modified Jupiter-C missile rose off the launch pad at Cape Canaveral and boosted the Explorer 1 satellite into orbit on 31 January 1958, six days ahead of their ninety-day promise.⁷⁰

In recognition of this success—and to shorten the chain of command between the general's headquarters and the service leadership—in March, the Army established the Ordnance Missile Command and named Medaris as its first commander. In that position, he exercised direct control over the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, his old command; the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at

68. Statement, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker, *Before the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations*, 85th Cong. (9 Jun 1958), File Unit: Entry A1 87, Series: Security Classified Records Regarding Congressional Bills, 1955–1964, Subgroup: Chief, Legislative Liaison, RG 335: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, NACP.

69. MFR, Col. Willis D. Crittenberger Jr., Sec, Program Advisory Committee, 2 Dec 1958, sub: 24 November Discussion with the Secretary of Defense on the OSD Markup of the Army Budget, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

70. "Explorer in Orbit," *Army Information Digest* 13 (Apr 1958): 5–7; Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, "The Explorer Satellites and How We Launched Them," *Army Information Digest* 13 (Oct 1958): 4–16.



Explorer 1, boosted by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency's Jupiter-C missile, nears launching time from the agency's firing laboratory, located at the Florida Missile Test Range in Cape Canaveral, Florida. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

Pasadena, California; the proving ground at White Sands, New Mexico; and the Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama. Redstone would then be designated as the Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency. The new alignment gave Medaris direct access to the Army secretary and the chief of staff. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency would continue to be responsible for weapons development of the Jupiter, Redstone, and Pershing missiles as well as any space projects assigned to the Army using components of those systems.⁷¹

71. "Medaris Heads New Unit as Army Cuts Red Tape," *Washington Post*, 21 Mar 1958; "U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command Established," *Army Information Digest* 13 (Jul 1958): 41–43.

Based upon the successful launch of Explorer 1 in January and a second satellite, Explorer 3, in March, President Eisenhower directed the Department of Defense to begin preparing missiles for exploratory probes to the moon as well as for additional Earth satellites. To that end, the Advanced Research Projects Agency allocated \$8 million to the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Guidance from the secretary of defense and the director of Advanced Research Projects Agency, Roy W. Johnson, authorized the Air Force to launch up to three lunar probes using the first stage of its Thor missile, the second stage of the Navy's Vanguard, and a third stage yet to be developed. The two men directed the Army to prepare for two possible lunar launches using its existing Jupiter-C missile. They also expected the Army to provide the launch platform for up to three additional Earth satellites. Navy research would focus on ground scanning systems for future use in lunar exploration vehicles.⁷²

Army exuberance over its preeminent role in space exploration proved to be short-lived. At the same time that the president had directed and authorized service missions to probe the lunar surface, he was reconsidering the proper role for the military in the exploration of outer space. He held the opinion that information acquired by scientific exploration should be made freely available throughout the world. By its very nature, however, military research would require secrecy. Because national morale and prestige could be boosted by a successful space program, he concluded that it should be administered by a civilian agency. On 2 April, he asked Congress to establish NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration). The new agency began operations on 1 October under the direction of Thomas Keith Glennan.⁷³

Almost immediately, the new agency and the Army came to loggerheads. By executive order, President Eisenhower transferred all functions of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology from Army direction to NASA. Only work specifically related to the development of the Army's Sergeant missile would remain under service control. NASA presented a plan to the Department of Defense in which the space agency would take over large segments of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency and the facilities at Redstone Arsenal.⁷⁴

72. Edward Gamarekian, "Ike Orders Moon Area Exploration," *Washington Post*, 28 Mar 1958; "New Moon Missions Cheer Technicians," *Army Times*, 5 Apr 1958.

73. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 256-59.

74. Draft EO, U.S. Dept. of Def, 24 Nov 1958, Transferring Certain Functions from the Department of Defense to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Memo, Dep Sec Def Donald A. Quarles for Sec Brucker, 20 Nov 1958; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Two of the Army's leading authorities on the service's missile program wasted no time in contesting the proposed action. At the 1958 Association of the United States Army conference in October, General Medaris told reporters that such a move would be disastrous and perhaps even fatal to the nation's missile progress. Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, the Army's chief of research and development, added that he could not believe that anyone would do away with the capability of the most experienced element in the nation to explore space. Both generals strongly suggested that Air Force infighting had more than a little to do with the proposed breakup of the Army program.⁷⁵

Despite this opposition, the Army and the Department of Defense agreed to transfer to NASA the facilities at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory along with Army research and development funds, amounting to slightly more than \$4 million, for support of planned research at the lab in the coming year. They also agreed to phase out Army military projects at the lab gradually, with the exception of continued development of the Sergeant missile. The Department of Defense, however, supported Army objections to the transfer of any part of the Ballistic Missile Agency. Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles informed NASA that the Army team was essential to high-priority defense programs and could not be spared. He did allow that portions of the agency could be made available for the space agency's use and that a NASA technical operations group could be located at the Ballistic Missile Agency headquarters to maintain direct communication with personnel working on NASA projects.⁷⁶

By the end of the year, it was clear that the Army was on the losing end of this proposition. The president firmly believed in having a civilian agency in charge of the nation's space exploration program. It was equally clear that the nation's brightest and most experienced scientists and researchers in the field were currently employed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. Eisenhower had worked closely with Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson to shepherd the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 through Congress in accordance with his vision. It was only a matter of time before both the Army and the Defense Department would have to cede preponderance in this area to NASA.⁷⁷

75. Albon B. Hailey, "Army Fights Proposal to Transfer Its Space Experts to Civilian Agency," *Washington Post*, 23 Oct 1958; Jack Raymond, "2 Generals Fight Move to Break Up Army Space Team," *New York Times*, 23 Oct 1958.

76. Memo, Wilber M. Brucker, Sec Army, for Dep Sec Def, 24 Nov 1958, sub: Transfer of Army Facilities to NASA, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Quarles for Brucker, 20 Nov 1958.

77. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 257.

By the end of 1958, the Army again seemed to be a service in search of a mission. It had staked its claim to the atomic battlefield with the pentomic division, but leaders throughout the service already were calling that reorganization into question. The Army had invested considerable effort and funding into expanding its role in continental air defense, but seemingly endless bureaucratic battles with the other services had blunted its successes in this area, and its most ambitious project, the Nike Zeus antimissile missile, had encountered technical obstacles that now threatened its path forward. Before the service could even savor its successful contributions to the space effort, that mission was also in peril. Once again, Army leaders felt compelled to seek a more substantial role in Eisenhower's concept for national defense.

THE SPECIAL WARFARE DEBATE

In January 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested a new direction when they asked each of the services to review their worldwide unconventional warfare capabilities to determine whether adequate emphasis had been placed on that type of warfare. In developing a response, the chief of Army special warfare, Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel Jr., observed that nuclear parity had reduced the deterrent value of strategic air power. The United States could offset some of that loss by maintaining a capability to exploit internal instabilities and resistance within the states of the Soviet Bloc. The existence of a large-scale U.S. unconventional warfare capability would undoubtedly be known to the Soviets through their intelligence system and would act as a deterrent to their aggression. It would create in the Soviets a continuing concern over the reliability of satellite support and their armed forces. Units left in place to operate behind an advancing Soviet front posed an additional threat. U.S. Army Special Forces, he concluded, were the most appropriate instrument for exploiting potential resistance in the Soviet satellites and periphery.⁷⁸

The Joint Services Capabilities Plan had defined unconventional warfare as being composed of three interrelated activities: guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, and subversion against hostile states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had assigned to the Army the primary responsibility for guerrilla warfare. This responsibility included the development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment, and the training of U.S. personnel in guerrilla

78. Memo, Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel, Ch Special Warfare, for Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 5 Feb 1958, sub: Review of World-wide U.S. Army Unconventional Warfare Capabilities, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955– 1962, RG 319, NACP.

warfare. The Joint Chiefs' guidance had not directed the Army to provide a specific number of special forces billets but left it to subordinate commanders to establish these numbers based upon their perceived unconventional warfare requirements.⁷⁹

The number of appropriate units and personnel available to the Army in 1958 did not match anticipated requirements. Some senior commanders could not justify retaining large numbers of troops for a mission they did not fully understand or support when they were already taking such drastic cuts in the number of combat troops at their disposal. In 1956, at the recommendation of the USAREUR commander, General Anthony C. McAuliffe, the Army had reduced the 10th Special Forces Group in Germany from 872 to an authorized strength of 279. A year later, it had reduced the strength of the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg from 1,404 to 969. In Okinawa, Japan, the recently activated 1st Special Forces Group was the smallest of all with a strength of 115. In his report to the chief of staff, General Troxel recommended that allocation of Army personnel spaces designated for special forces should be more than doubled, from 1,363 to 3,545 for the coming fiscal year.⁸⁰

Other leaders throughout the Army already had begun to grasp the potential for expanding the Army's special forces. While serving as the deputy commander in chief of U.S. European Command, General George H. Decker had written to the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointing out the need for an increase in unconventional warfare capabilities in Europe. He asked the chiefs to reassess the usefulness of those forces as both a cold war and hot war weapon. The deputy chief of staff for operations, General Eddleman, also directed his staff to develop a program that would provide a capability for guerrilla warfare in the event of a limited conflict in the Middle East.⁸¹

At the highest level, however, the Army's senior leadership could not endorse the campaign to bolster unconventional warfare capabilities. When staff officers briefed the deputy chief of staff for operations, General Lemnitzer, on their recommendation to increase the number of special forces personnel by more than 2,000, the general indicated that the request was just another requirement that could not be filled. He also intimated

79. Memo, Troxel for Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 5 Feb 1958, sub: Review of World-wide U.S. Army Unconventional Warfare Capabilities.

80. Memo, Troxel for Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 5 Feb 1958, sub: Review of World-wide U.S. Army Unconventional Warfare Capabilities.

81. MFR, Col. Page E. Smith, Ch United Nations Plans and Policy Br, 9 Jan 1958, sub: Development of Requirements and a Capability to Meet These Requirements in a Limited War Situation in the Middle East, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955-1962, RG 319, NACP.

that requirements such as this came at the expense of the fighting forces and would lead to the deterioration of the Army's overall combat strength. Lemnitzer suggested that requirements for additional special forces would have to be met with reserve elements, or possibly even indigenous troops. General Taylor also questioned the rationale for increasing special forces units. He supported conclusions from the deputy chief of staff for operations that the Army's doctrine, tactics, and preparations for guerrilla warfare were adequate and that the scope of training programs throughout the Army was in balance with other training objectives. He suggested that the concept of special forces had been extended beyond its original intent. At any rate, he concluded, he could not spare any additional spaces at this time.⁸²

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Notwithstanding Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's brinksmanship over continued Allied occupation in Berlin, by 1958 much of the Army's attention overseas had begun to shift toward Southeast Asia.⁸³ The increasing commitment to South Vietnam, obligations incurred through the 1954 Manila Pact (which established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), and the simmering conflict with China over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu had dramatically raised the importance of military assistance efforts throughout the region. In each of these, the Army played a major role.

On 23 August, without warning, Chinese Communists initiated an artillery bombardment of more than 55,000 rounds, lasting more than two hours, against the Chinese Nationalist-controlled islands in the Taiwan Strait. Although President Eisenhower was loathe to intervene directly, various agencies within the U.S. Department of Defense took steps to reinforce Chinese Nationalist forces and to persuade the Communists that the costs of attacking Nationalist-controlled territory would be prohibitively high.⁸⁴

On 3 September, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, announced new command relationships in Taiwan that would enable

82. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. Lemnitzer, 9 Sep 1958; sub: U.S. Army Guerilla [sic] Warfare Activities; Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. Taylor, 10 Sep 1958, sub: U.S. Army Guerilla [sic] Warfare Activities; MFR, Brig Gen S. E. Gee, 6 Oct 1958, sub: U.S. Army Guerilla [sic] Warfare Activities; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

83. This topic is covered in much greater detail in Carter, *Forging the Shield*.

84. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 292-304.

U.S. military headquarters there to transition from a primary function of coordination to that of conducting military operations. A week later, Admiral Felt established the Taiwan Defense Command with three subordinate service elements. The chief of the military assistance advisory group (MAAG) on Taiwan, Brig. Gen. Lester S. Bork, was designated as the commanding general of U.S. Army Forces, Taiwan. In addition to the Army advisory personnel already on Taiwan, Bork's command included the 2d Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Nike Hercules), which decamped to the island as part of the fiscal year 1959 military assistance program, as well as various signal and engineer units that accompanied it. By October, the organization had grown from its normal complement of roughly 135 advisory personnel to more than 1,800. The Army also began actions to bring the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i to its full authorized strength and reviewed plans to augment the division with one or more battle groups from the continental United States.⁸⁵

Although the Army forces saw no combat action, the advisory personnel worked around the clock to familiarize Nationalist troops with U.S. equipment and doctrine. The Army shipped sixty-six M41 light tanks with 76-mm. guns from the United States to replace outdated M5 Stuart light tanks that mounted 37-mm. guns. To provide counterbattery fire against the incoming Communist artillery barrages, the United States also shipped thirty-six 155-mm. guns, twelve 8-inch howitzers, and twelve 240-mm. howitzers from various stocks around the world to Taiwan. Artillery advisory teams provided additional training on current counterbattery techniques and accompanied Nationalist gun crews to the embattled islands to observe operations on-site. As the crisis abated, an analysis from the deputy chief of staff for operations indicated that, although the military assistance programming for Taiwan had been adequate for peacetime operations, it was neither adequate nor adaptable to support a tactical or combat operation logistically.⁸⁶

Across the rest of Southeast Asia, U.S. Army military advisers experienced various degrees of success as they attempted to spread the gospel of collective defense. In September 1954, after the French disaster at Điện Biên Phủ and the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, the United States had entered into another collective defense treaty. Along with Britain, France, Australia,

85. Memo, Gen. I. D. White, Cdr, U.S. Army, Pacific, for Ch Staff, 20 Nov 1958, sub: Special Report-Taiwan Emergency, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

86. Memo, White for Ch Staff, 20 Nov 1958, sub: Special Report-Taiwan Emergency; Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 30 Oct 1958, sub: Lessons Learned from Quemoy (Chinmen) Operations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, the United States had signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Unlike NATO's treaty, this treaty called for no standing military forces and entailed no firm obligations on the part of the signatories. It did, however, open the door for increased U.S. military aid to member nations. At the same time, a separate protocol extended the treaty's security provisions to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam if those countries requested assistance.⁸⁷

Early in 1958, a visit by U.S. Army, Pacific, commander, General Isaac D. White, provided some indication of the progress of U.S. military assistance programs in countries throughout Southeast Asia. White noted, primarily, the excellent relationships between the various assistance groups and their host countries, with the exception of Cambodia. There, he observed that French military personnel retained an active role in military assistance and training and seemed particularly interested in perpetuating a colonial administration over the country. Across most of the other locations, he reported that more emphasis seemed to be placed on rebuilding military equipment instead of training operators to maintain it properly. He expressed doubts over the advisability of providing more modern equipment to most of the supported nations, suggesting instead that a better course would be to standardize a minimum number of models of the simplest types of equipment. Although the U.S. Army's ultimate goal was to develop trained ground combat forces, primarily infantry, it had to take into account the inherent capabilities and limitations of the nations concerned. U.S. advisers, he concluded, should not necessarily attempt to pattern indigenous forces too closely on U.S. models.⁸⁸

In Laos, a guerrilla insurgency threatened to overthrow the monarchy there and to tip another domino toward the region's fall to communism. In November, the U.S. Department of Defense decided to upgrade an existing covert Programs Evaluation Office there to a full-scale MAAG-type of organization. The U.S. Army, Pacific, sent an initial group of seven officers in November to begin planning and observing operator use of American-supplied equipment. A larger group, under the direction of Brig. Gen. John A. Heintges, prepared to deploy to the capitol city of Vientiane in January 1959 to establish the new headquarters.⁸⁹

87. Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960*, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 229.

88. Memo, Gen. I. D. White, Cdr, U.S. Army, Pacific, for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 18 Mar 1958, sub: Report of Visit by CINCUSARPAC to Southeast Asian Countries, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

89. Memo, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Acting Ch Staff, for Gen. C. B. Erskine, 20 Oct 1958, sub: Proposed Cold War Planning Team for Laos; Memo, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice Ch Staff, for Adm. Burke, 19 Dec 1958, sub: The Establishment of a MAAG in Vientiane,

The linchpin for Army planning in Southeast Asia, however, remained South Vietnam. In addition to the ongoing activities of the MAAG, the Army spent much of 1958 developing contingency plans for the introduction of U.S. combat troops there. Following Pacific Command's requests for Army calculations regarding the airlift of troops from Korea to Vietnam, General White exchanged a series of letters with General Taylor discussing the ability of his command to support such contingencies. He reminded the chief of staff that, because of continued troop reductions, U.S. divisions in Korea consisted of up to 25 percent KATUSA soldiers. The percentage of KATUSA soldiers in service units was considerably higher. White believed that those divisions could not be deployed elsewhere without a significant number of U.S. replacements.⁹⁰

Later discussions identified the 25th Infantry Division, stationed in Hawai'i, to be the initial source for U.S. Army combat troops to deploy to Vietnam. When the Department of the Army tasked U.S. Army, Pacific, to establish a forward depot in the Philippines to support potential operations in Southeast Asia, White again had to remind Taylor that the force reductions had eliminated almost all of the stockage in Japan to the point that any further reduction threatened his own mission in Korea. Support for contingency operations in Vietnam, he said, would have to come from the 25th Division, or from STRAC forces based in the United States.⁹¹

General White had taken care to maintain the 4th U.S. Army Missile Command and two helicopter companies at full strength, with the expectation that they deploy where needed and provide atomic firepower to other Army combat units. Taylor informed him, however, that the missile command had been stationed in Korea to support United Nations Command forces, and that any movement away from Korea would require approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nonetheless, Taylor told White, that restriction should not preclude him from planning for its later deployment.⁹²

Meanwhile, Army advisers as well as American political and diplomatic representatives were learning to deal with South Vietnam's president, Ngô Đình Diệm. After four years in office, Diệm enjoyed support in the United States, being hailed as the potential savior of Southeast Asia. Members of the

Laos; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

90. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 19 Feb 1958; Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Adm. Felix B. Stump, Cdr in Ch, Pacific Cmd, 12 Mar 1958; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955-1962, RG 319, NACP.

91. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 15 Jul 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955-1962, RG 319, NACP.

92. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to Gen. I. D. White, 2 Sep 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955-1962, RG 319, NACP.

U.S. country team in Saigon, however, were beginning to paint a different picture. The Vietnamese president's obsession with security, coupled with his neglect for many of the economic and agrarian reforms U.S. advisers believed necessary, seemed to provide fertile ground for continued social and political unrest. In October, General Taylor and General Samuel T. Williams, commander of the MAAG in Vietnam, met with President Diệm. Diệm maintained that even though the South Vietnamese Army was making great strides, the Viet Minh were also redoubling their efforts. He asked the U.S. military representatives to provide him with all the help they could, for, in his words, Vietnam was the bastion of Southeast Asia.⁹³

CONTINUING THE SEARCH FOR AN IDENTITY

By the end of 1958, the Army seemed no closer to identifying its path forward than it had been at the beginning of the year. Its enthusiastic embrace of atomic weapons and the pentomic organization had raised more questions than the changes had answered. The service's success in the field of ballistic missiles had won it some acclaim in the dawning exploration of outer space, but even that had been overcome quickly by the impending loss of those assets to the newly founded national space administration. Research and development of other missiles, particularly in the field of air defense, seemed promising, but were also prohibitively expensive and came at the cost of investment in more basic military technology. Now, only unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, esoteric as they were, offered hope as causes the Army could champion as part of the modern defense establishment.

93. Spector, *Advice and Support*, 304–5; Memo of Conversation, President Diệm, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III, Howard Elting Jr., 29 Oct 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

7

Moving Forward

The year 1959 promised to be a very busy one for President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Political events in the penultimate year of his second administration presented challenges and possibilities with respect to his New Look strategic policy. In November 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had notified the Western Allies of his intent to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, thereby terminating their rights in West Berlin. Alarmed by the implications of the announcement, U.S. and Allied military and political leaders began examining their options in the event the East Germans challenged their access to the city. Both sides seemed to look for ways to step back when, in July 1959, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Moscow to help open a U.S. trade and cultural exhibition there. At the same time, Khrushchev began dropping hints that he might like to travel to the United States. The Soviet leader's subsequent visit in September included a state dinner at the White House and two days of meetings with President Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland. The exchange of visits seemed to generate a sense of good will and, for the moment, overshadowed the imminent threats surrounding Berlin. It was against this political backdrop that the United States Army continued to reassess its organization, technology, and doctrine as it prepared for a new decade.¹

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 434–49; Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 15 Jan 1959, sub: Status of Actions Relating to the Berlin Crisis, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC

RESHUFFLING THE DECK

As had been the case for several previous years, 1959 brought with it extensive turnover in many of the key leadership positions in the American national security establishment. None of these was more significant than the passing of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Eisenhower's close friend and confidant died of colon cancer in May. Although Dulles had been staunchly anti-Communist and one of the earliest apostles of massive retaliation, he had, near the end of his life, begun to question the utility of the nation's nuclear stockpile. He had come to support forward-deployed conventional forces in what he considered to be important overseas areas and had even proposed a national sales tax to help pay for additional funding for limited warfare capabilities. The new secretary of state, Christian A. Herter, brought solid credentials to the position. Like Dulles, he was ardently anti-Communist, but he lacked the close personal connection with Eisenhower that Dulles had enjoyed.²

Toward the end of the year, Eisenhower would also lose his secretary of defense, Neil H. McElroy. McElroy had announced his intention to retire early in the year, but he stayed on for several months in light of Dulles's imminent death. The sudden heart attack and death in May of Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles further complicated the transition. Quarles had been the logical successor to McElroy, and his loss, coupled with that of Dulles, left gaping holes in the national security establishment that took time to repair. McElroy eventually retired at the end of November, to be replaced by the new deputy secretary, Thomas S. Gates Jr. Gates had served as a naval officer in the Mediterranean and the Pacific during World War II and had held the positions of undersecretary and, later, secretary of the Navy throughout the Eisenhower administration.³

Gates took office amid renewed budget debates and with a divided Joint Chiefs of Staff, who still were unable to reach consensus on roles, missions,

1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP); Memo, Foy D. Kohler for the Sec [unspecified], 29 Oct 1959, sub: Report on Khrushchev's Visit to the United States, File Unit: Entry UD 53, Series: Chairman's Files, Twining, 1957–1960, RG 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, NACP.

2. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 361–69; Memo of Conversation, President Eisenhower and Sec State John Foster Dulles, 30 Nov 1958; Memo of Discussion at the 384th Meeting of the National Security Council, 30 Oct 1958; both in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960* (hereinafter *FRUS 1958–1960*), vol. 3, *National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 139–45, 153.

3. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Now Pentagon Faces a Crisis of Leadership," *New York Times*, 17 May 1959; Jack Raymond, "New Chief of Defense Faces Large Problems," *New York Times*, 6 Dec 1959.



Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

and an equitable division of available defense funds. Although Gates was a firm supporter of most naval programs, particularly the service's emerging Polaris missile program, he made a stronger effort than his predecessors to resolve differences between the services and reach some sort of agreement. He frequently would insert himself into the service chiefs' discussions and, when necessary, make timely decisions to resolve split positions. Although Gates was never completely successful, his presence would go a long way toward easing some of the tension that existed between the service chiefs.⁴

For the Army, the most significant change occurred at the end of July when General Maxwell D. Taylor retired after completing his second two-year term as chief of staff. Replacing Taylor was General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who had

4. Donald A. Carter, "Eisenhower Versus the Generals," *Journal of Military History* 71, no. 4 (Oct 2007): 1196.



Thomas S. Gates Jr. (*second from left*) is sworn in as secretary of defense by Frank K. Sanderson (*right*) as President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Millicent A. Gates look on. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

been the vice chief of staff for the previous two years. Lemnitzer had served as an antiaircraft brigade commander early in World War II before becoming the assistant chief of staff for Allied Forces headquarters and, later, the deputy chief of staff for Fifth Army in Italy. He was most noted for accompanying General Mark W. Clark on a secret submarine mission to North Africa in 1942 to coordinate with French leaders before the North Africa invasion. He also had been active in negotiations with Italian representatives before their surrender in 1943. He had managed Allied discussions with the German High Command in Switzerland in 1945, resulting in the surrender of Axis forces in northern Italy and Austria at the end of the war. Although noted as a diplomat and administrator, Lemnitzer also had commanded the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 7th Infantry Division in Korea during the peak years of fighting there. After serving as the vice chief of staff for two years, Lemnitzer was well acquainted with Defense Department staff machinery and, to a greater extent than his two



Maj. Gen. Robert V. Lee (*right*) administers the oath of office to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer (*left*), the new chief of staff, as Secretary Wilber M. Brucker (*center*) looks on. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

predecessors, was firm in his belief that dissent should be registered only through proper channels and terminated once a decision had been made.⁵

General George H. Decker replaced Lemnitzer as vice chief of staff. Decker had served under General Walter Krueger as chief of staff of the Sixth Army in the Pacific during World War II. He had been the comptroller of the Army from 1952 to 1955 before moving first to Europe to command VII Corps and then to Korea to command the Eighth Army. Like Lemnitzer's, Decker's experience with the Army Staff and particularly as the comptroller had given him a first-hand look at the Army's struggle for relevance under President Eisenhower. Now, although the service's senior officers lacked the renown for combat leadership of their predecessors, they perhaps possessed

5. Carter, "Eisenhower Versus the Generals," 1196; "New Chief is a Diplomat," *Army Times*, 28 Mar 1959; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Three of Joint Chiefs Will Be Renamed," *New York Times*, 13 Mar 1959; *Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Joint Chiefs of Staff Nominations*, 86th Cong. (23 Apr 1959), File Unit: Entry A1 1704, Series: Congressional Hearings, 1958–1962, Subgroup: Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, RG 319, NACP.

a greater understanding of the bureaucratic infighting required to move the Army forward in the missile age.⁶

In pursuing that end, one of the principal tasks for 1959 was coming to terms with organizational and operational changes required as part of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The establishment of a new chain of command running from the president to the secretary of defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands had altered many traditional Army methods and procedures. The expanded Joint Staff had taken on additional operational tasks and had assumed greater planning responsibilities. The Army Staff had to adjust its planning scope and responsibilities accordingly. Although Army leaders saw no need for major organizational changes within the Department of the Army Staff, they continued to review the current structure so that it would remain fully responsive to the demands of higher authorities and staffs.⁷

Despite the flurry of memos and directives that had disseminated the details of the legislation, some officers remained confused regarding how their status might have changed under the new organization. General Isaac D. White, the U.S. Army, Pacific, commander, expressed his concerns to General Taylor early in the year. As commander of the Army component serving in the Pacific Command, a unified command under a Navy admiral, White requested clarification of the role he and his staff were to play in the service of the unified commander. He considered his position to be an essential adviser to the unified commander, but he wondered whether the admiral ever would seek his advice. Taylor wrote back to White that although the Joint Chiefs had not expected the act to produce any significant changes in the internal procedures of the commands, the legislation already was producing unintended consequences, which remained to be addressed. Taylor promised to keep the U.S. Army, Pacific, commander informed. A later clarification to the legislation directed unified commanders to exercise command through the service component commanders, thus making them also part of the chain.⁸

With an election year in sight, both Congress and the news media renewed their discussion and analysis of the defense budget and the

6. MFR, Lt. Col. Ace L. Waters Jr., Gen Ops Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 11 Aug 1959, sub: Orientation Briefings for General Decker, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

7. Memo, Col. H. A. Twitchell, Ch Coordination Gp, for Ch Legislative Liaison, 2 Dec 1959, sub: Army Organizational Changes Made Pursuant to the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

8. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White, Cdr, U.S. Army, Pacific, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 9 Jan 1959; Ltr, Taylor to White, 5 Feb 1959; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962,

administration's defense policies. Ever since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, politicians, correspondents, and political commentators had played up the notion of a growing missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union. Congress had entered the fray with Senators Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas and William S. "Stuart" Symington of Missouri, both Democrats and potential presidential candidates, publicly challenging administration defense policies and demanding an "honest count" of U.S. missile capabilities versus the Soviets.⁹ Early releases of the 1961 defense budget prompted several statements by senators and representatives that the administration was overly concerned with thrift. As campaigns began to ramp up for the 1960 presidential election, the military budget and the missile gap received even greater levels of publicity.¹⁰

The Army benefited from the increased scrutiny as more news stories echoed some of the complaints that Army leaders had been making for years. In an editorial broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System, correspondent A. Eric Sevareid noted that members of Congress were "tired of forwarding General Taylor's requests to the Pentagon and then receiving word that the Joint Chiefs of Staff disapprove."¹¹ The pattern of the other services padding their budgets at the expense of the Army had become all too familiar, he said. Sevareid closed by reminding his listeners that if the nation's conventional forces proved to be inadequate, then the country may have no choice but to resort to nuclear weapons.¹²

Budget negotiations during 1959 covered appropriations and expenditures for the 1961 fiscal year and followed a predictable pattern. As always, the president implored the Joint Chiefs to take a truly corporate approach and to eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending. Each service prepared estimates that emphasized its own capabilities and resource requirements and minimized the percentage of defense funds that should be devoted to its competitors. At the end of the year, Congress approved a defense budget of just over \$40.5 billion. Of that, the Army received a little less than \$10 billion, roughly the same amount it had received the previous two years. In a statement prepared for a House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker declared that the budget provided

Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

9. Jack Raymond, "Johnson to Open a Broad Inquiry on Arms Dispute," *New York Times*, 18 Jan 1959.

10. Raymond, "Johnson to Open a Broad Inquiry on Arms Dispute."

11. Eric Sevareid, "Army at Low Point," reprinted from CBS broadcast in *Army Times*, 4 Apr 1959.

12. Sevareid, "Army at Low Point."

for an active Army of 870,000, a reserve component paid drill strength of 630,000, and the necessary support for those forces.¹³

As the negotiations over the budget ended, General Lemnitzer directed the Army Staff to prepare a study for Congress breaking down the allocation of military personnel throughout the Army. He wanted to explain in detail how the Army used its assigned strength to meet its responsibilities. More to the point, he wanted to emphasize the large number of soldiers assigned to tasks that were not directly combat related. Some 69,000 soldiers worked for allies or other U.S. government agencies that did not support the Army's combat mission directly. These included those working for military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs), those supporting joint headquarters such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and those directly supporting the Department of Defense or other U.S. government departments or services. Nearly 150,000 personnel at any given time were involved directly in the Army training program, as students and instructors at Army schools and training centers and as advisers in reserve component units. Subtracting another 36,000 troops assigned to the Continental Air Defense Command left the Army with around 615,000 soldiers to fill out the combat divisions and support units deployed around the world.¹⁴

In March, the Army released its Manpower Program for the coming fiscal year and the projected strengths of its deployed units. It would maintain the five divisions in Europe at full strength. However, the service would be unable to keep combat support and combat service support forces at the level required for combat. Early reinforcement of troops in Europe in the event of an emergency would be essential if the Army was to conduct sustained combat there. The two divisions in Korea also would remain at reduced strength, and they would be diluted with indigenous personnel. Support units there would be austere and consist of more than 50 percent South Korean augmentees. In the United States, the Army would retain three divisions with minimum essential combat support and combat service support forces to form the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC). The III Corps headquarters at Fort Hood, Texas, would be inactivated, and the four remaining divisions

13. Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957-1960*, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2000), 40; Draft Statement for the Secretary of the Army, *Hearing Before the Department of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations*, 86th Cong. (23 Dec 1959), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

14. Memo, Col. H. A. Twitchell, Ch Coordination Gp, for Army Staff Action Ofcrs, 12 Nov 1959, sub: Formulation of a Presentation to Explain Relation Between Number of U.S. Army Divisions and Total Army Strength, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

in the continental United States would remain at minimal strength and be engaged heavily in replacement training. One division minus a battle group would stay in Hawai'i, two battle groups in Alaska, and one battle group in the Caribbean.¹⁵

As the Army prepared to reach its mandated personnel limit of 870,000, its leaders debated over the number of divisions and major installations the force could afford to maintain. Few on the Army Staff believed the service could deploy more than fourteen divisions without hollowing out support elements to a dangerous degree. With fewer major units to maintain, there seemed to be less of a requirement for large-scale military installations as well. When political leaders from the states of Louisiana and Arkansas learned that the Army had proposed closing Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, they arranged a meeting with General Lemnitzer. Senator Russell B. Long of Louisiana warned Lemnitzer that if the Army closed Fort Polk, it also would lose access to the entire Louisiana Maneuver Area. Certainly, the Louisiana political representation would not look kindly upon any future Army attempts to regain access to the land. Perhaps in a bit of overkill, Senator Allen J. Ellender, also of Louisiana, added that if the Army was so concerned about saving money, then the Senate could easily accommodate that concern by cutting its funding in other areas.¹⁶

After General Lemnitzer met with Secretary Brucker to discuss the political implications of the base closings, the Army announced that it would take no position with respect to the closing of specific installations based upon future changes in force levels. Instead, the announcement concluded, the service would attempt to maintain the best, most efficient, and most economical force and installation structure under the authorized personnel strength of the time.¹⁷

The Army Staff had conducted similar debates about closing Fort Carson, Colorado, and inactivating the 9th Infantry Division, which was stationed there. Fearing similar political repercussions, Secretary Brucker recommended delaying or canceling the proposed inactivation. Instead, the staff elected to reduce the division to less than half of its authorized

15. HQ, Dept. of the Army, *FY 1960 Manpower Program*, 6 Mar 1959, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

16. Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 3 Jun 1959, sub: Army Position on Fort Polk, Louisiana and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; MFR, Brig. Gen. Charles G. Dodge, Dep Ch Legislative Liaison, 21 May 1959, sub: Meeting of the Louisiana Delegation with the Acting Chief of Staff; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

17. Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 18 Jun 1959, sub: Army Position on Fort Polk, Louisiana and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

strength. The reduced-strength division would continue its assigned mission of receiving packets of soldiers who had completed advanced individual training and preparing them for deployment. As a result of this decision, for the first time in several years, the number of active divisions and their locations remained the same throughout the entire year.¹⁸

The steady reduction in Army force strength had other implications that began to raise concerns in public forums in 1959. Editorials and features in daily newspapers around the country began to question the Army's reliance upon foreign nationals to fill the ranks of its units deployed overseas. One editorial in the *Louisville Courier Journal* likened the practice to the French Foreign Legion or, even worse, the British use of Hessian mercenaries during the American Revolution. In its response to the allegations, the Army acknowledged that more than 15,000 soldiers of the Korean Army were integrated as combatants into American Army units as of January 1959. Almost 8,000 more Korean nationals served as noncombatant labor forces on contract hire from the Korean government. In Germany and France, the Army employed more than 15,000 individuals encompassing almost all European nationalities to provide internal security and to augment Army service troops performing noncombatant technical duties. The response also mentioned the almost 2,000 foreign nationals who, having enlisted in the Army under the Lodge Act, intended to become U.S. citizens. Many of those had been refugees from Eastern Europe who now served in the 10th Special Forces Group in Germany.¹⁹

The requirement for increasing numbers of technical support contractors highlighted another challenge that the atomic-age Army now faced. Army Staff papers noted that although modernization was essential, it increased requirements for materiel, personnel, and logistical support. More mechanics were needed for helicopters and other aircraft than for trucks, and they took longer to train. Three battalions of helicopters could substitute for four transportation truck battalions, but they required 800 maintenance personnel instead of 108. In addition to the growing complexity of the equipment, the dispersion of units inherent in the Army's modern battle

18. Memo, Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel Jr., Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 22 Jun 1959, sub: Issues Unresolved by Secretary of the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Army to Cut 16 Units," *Army Times*, 11 Apr 1959.

19. Fact Sheet, Col. E. N. Rowell, Ch Procurement Div, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 27 Mar 1959, sub: Use of Foreign Manpower by the United States Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

doctrine added to support requirements because of increased ammunition and fuel consumption.²⁰

MANPOWER FOR THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

One positive aspect of the reduced personnel authorizations for the Army was its increased success in meeting recruiting and reenlistment goals. Because the service required fewer soldiers, it could be more selective in considering whom it recruited as well as whom it accepted into the ranks. Although the peacetime draft continued and was supported strongly by service leadership as a critical tool for filling the force, in 1959, the number of draftees inducted into the Army dropped below 100,000 for the first time since before the Korean War. The Army was creeping closer and closer toward becoming an all-professional force.

At the beginning of the year, 537,728 soldiers, more than two-thirds of the Army's enlisted personnel, were regulars. The remaining 230,000 were either draftees or reservists on active duty. Positive trends in recruiting and reenlistment rates indicated that within a year or two, three-quarters of the enlisted force would consist of regulars. In January, the Army reported that more individuals had signed up for initial enlistments in the previous six months than at any time since the early months of the Korean War. Reenlistments also had steadily increased during the same period. Along with the Army's increased emphasis on recruiting and retention, Army officials attributed this success to better career and training opportunities throughout the service, public acceptance of the Army as technologically advanced, and a general belief in a positive future in the military.²¹

The improved reenlistment rates, however, brought with them unintended consequences. In April, the Department of the Army reported that, because so many more soldiers were staying in the service, they could expect fewer promotions in the coming year. Promotion quotas for fiscal year 1959 in the top five enlisted ranks declined in every grade but the highest level, E-9 or sergeant major. Well aware that their positive trends could spiral downward quickly, Army officials announced that they would reexamine strength

20. Memo, Twitchell for Army Staff Action Ofcrs, 12 Nov 1959, sub: Formulation of a Presentation to Explain Relation Between Number of U.S. Army Divisions and Total Army Strength.

21. "First Enlistment Rate is Running High," *Army Times*, 24 Jan 1959; "Army Nearing Goal of All-Pro Force," *Army Times*, 18 Apr 1959.

and grade figures in the coming months with the possibility of expanding promotion quotas for the year.²²

Despite the Army's success in recruiting and reenlistment, service leaders argued strongly in favor of extension of the Selective Service Act. Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee in January, General Taylor testified that experience gained before the Korean War, as well as current studies on the subject, had convinced him that it would be impossible to support the Army's required strength without the draft. Although recent legislation such as the new pay bill had proven beneficial, it was no replacement for selective service. The chief of staff added that the draft provided the Army with additional supplementary benefits. Practically all of the service's officer procurement programs benefited from the stimulus of induction. Many college students who enrolled in ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) had been prompted by their draft status to seek the opportunity to discharge their military obligation as officers. Taylor added that the draft law also stimulated enlistments in the reserve components. Without the draft, he concluded, the mobilization readiness of the reserves could be seriously impaired.²³

Despite the progress the service had made selling itself to the public, General Taylor and others worried constantly about how they could improve the image that the Army and its soldiers projected. At the Fort Jackson Training Center in South Carolina, Maj. Gen. Christian H. Clarke Jr., the commanding general, instituted a family-friendly program to help the new recruits adjust to their transition to military life. To offset the "exaggerations and distortions" frequently contained in letters home, General Clarke had his regimental and company commanders send letters home to families advising them of their trainee's arrival and informing them of opportunities to visit the post and its guest facilities.²⁴ Leaders regularly advised trainees that they could invite their families to Fort Jackson. Unit commanders invited all trainees' families to attend graduation ceremonies and the open house sponsored by unit members afterward. The command provided a "handsome album, commercially produced," to the high schools or colleges that outstanding trainees had attended.²⁵ General Clarke concluded that his

22. "Stripes Drought Looms," *Army Times*, 18 Apr 1959.

23. Testimony, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, *Hearing Before the House Armed Services Committee*, 86th Cong. (27 Jan 1959), File Unit: Entry A1 1709, Series: Congressional Hearings, 1958–1962, Subgroup: Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, RG 319, NACP.

24. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Christian H. Clarke to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 3 Apr 1959, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

25. Ltr, Clarke to Taylor, 3 Apr 1959.

system reached important objectives over a wide geographic area and was effective at selling the Army to the public.²⁶

In the U.S. Army, Pacific, General White took a somewhat different approach. He believed that the Army needed to place more emphasis on convincing soldiers of the important roles they had to play in the defense of their country. His command promoted the theme “A Tough Job—A Man to Do a Man’s Work.” Leaders would provide positive direction and firm but just treatment. The Army could not match the glamor of flying jet aircraft or furnish the relative comfort normally found aboard ships. It should not try to hide the fact that soldiers would have to live in the mud and, at times, perform many dangerous and unpleasant duties. It was up to commanders, White concluded, to make each soldier feel that his service had been appreciated and that he had made a worthwhile contribution to his country.²⁷

With recruiting and retention holding relatively stable, General Taylor and Secretary Brucker devoted considerable attention to what had become one of their most passionate interests, the Noncommissioned Officer Corps. In guidance prepared for the major commanders, the Army’s leaders noted that the dispersion, mobility, and lethality of the atomic battlefield required a greater reliance upon the leadership of the service’s noncommissioned officers. The primary task of commanders in peacetime, they said, was to train their subordinate leaders to make decisions. Through this freedom of action, subordinate leaders would develop initiative and gain experience. Commanders need not lower standards in any way, but they had to expect and even tolerate honest errors. Most important, senior personnel must not usurp the responsibilities so sorely needed in the development of junior leaders.²⁸

Taylor pointed to several recent personnel actions related to the Noncommissioned Officer Corps that would assist in their development and to promote their prestige within the service. During the previous year, the Army had initiated both an enlisted evaluation system, upon which to base promotion qualification, and proficiency pay bonuses, which rewarded enlisted soldiers rated highest in their field. The recent establishment of the enlisted grades E-8 and E-9 for those noncommissioned officers holding positions of the greatest responsibility already was helping to relieve the rank compression that had existed in grade E-7. Other senior officers had

26. Ltr, Clarke to Taylor, 3 Apr 1959.

27. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 19 Jan 1959, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

28. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert V. Lee, Adjutant Gen, for Cmdg Gens, 16 Apr 1959, sub: NCO Corps, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

suggested utilization of some senior enlisted personnel in positions formerly filled by warrant officers. This action, they said, would provide positions of increased authority and responsibility for the noncommissioned officers while also helping to alleviate existing warrant officer shortages in some critical areas.²⁹

The service's interest in developing its junior leaders was not limited to the Noncommissioned Officer Corps. Perhaps a greater personnel challenge facing the Army leadership during this period was the retention of junior officers. The unexpected rigor of military life coupled with the attraction of flourishing job markets in the civilian world caused many to leave the Army as soon as their service commitment had expired. General Taylor canvassed his senior commanders requesting comments and recommendations for increasing the attractiveness of military service. Most respondents commented on the length of the training week, with one senior officer opining that the Army must accept the five-day work week as an established concept if the organization were to compete with civilian industry. Others frequently mentioned unrealistic administrative requirements and insufficient numbers of officers in training centers to permit rotation of duties. In reviewing the recommendations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lt. Gen. James F. Collins observed that a more realistic balance between training time and other unit functions was a reasonable goal. However, given the constraints on personnel and the amount of work to be accomplished, reductions in requirements might not be feasible.³⁰

Of all the personnel concerns facing the service, none troubled the secretary of the Army more than the friction that had developed between the active force and the reserves. In October, Secretary Brucker called for a conference to which he invited senior officers and noncommissioned officers from the Active Army, the Ready Reserve, and the National Guard. Calling his concept "One Army," the secretary aimed to resolve some of the mistrust that had grown between the components. In an interview discussing his goals, he said, "Previous assumptions that the Army, National Guard, and Reserves were separate and apart should be analyzed and faced frankly.

29. Memo, Lee for Cmdg Gens, 16 Apr 1959, sub: NCO Corps; Memo, Col. Thomas W. Otto, Adjutant Gen, for Adjutant Gen, 7 Oct 1959, sub: NCO Corps, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1960* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 149-50.

30. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 20 Feb 1959, sub: Increasing Army Attractiveness for Young Career Officers, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

The time has come for all elements to recognize and practice the concept of One Army.”³¹

Brucker convened the conference for three days beginning on 19 October. Perhaps its most memorable moments occurred on the second day, when Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Milton A. Reckord addressed the attendees. Born in 1879 and the current adjutant general of Maryland, Reckord had enlisted in the National Guard in 1901 and had been mobilized during both World War I and World War II. He had begun the latter as the commander of the 29th Infantry Division before assuming command of the III Corps area in the United States. He later served as the theater provost marshal in the European Theater of Operations. Reckord wasted no time before lighting into the Army Staff for what he considered to be its deliberate actions to denigrate or even destroy the National Guard. Despite federal laws, which placed national guard divisions in higher priority for mobilization, Reckord accused the Army Staff of a deliberate campaign to replace them with elements of the Army Reserve. He directly addressed General Lemnitzer, suggesting that Lemnitzer had to reorient the thinking toward the National Guard and its dual status. If nothing else, Reckord’s address provided clear evidence that Secretary Brucker was on to something.³²

When the conference ended, the Adjutant General’s Office submitted to the deputy chief of staff for personnel a list of recommendations to heal the rift between the components and to reinforce the concept that they were all on the same team. The first prerequisite, it said, was to ensure that all career officers recognize that in any war or national emergency, the officers and enlisted personnel of the reserve components would compose the bulk of the Army. After some discussion, other recommendations included selecting higher quality officers to serve in reserve and national guard advisory positions; selecting a greater number of other-than-Regular-Army officers for attendance at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College; and developing universal criteria for the procurement, training, utilization, promotion, relief from active duty, and retirement of all officers regardless of component. As the year ended, reserve component officers felt that they had won at least some small victories while Secretary

31. Jack Vincent, “Brucker Will Call Conference to Push One Army Concept,” *Army Times*, 25 Jul 1959; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “One Army Concept,” *Army Times*, 25 Jul 1959.

32. Memo, Maj. Gen. Phillip D. Ginder for Sec Army, 22 Oct 1959, sub: Report on the One Army Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Brucker, General Lemnitzer, and the Army Staff worked through how much change they actually could implement.³³

Secretary Brucker expressed his satisfaction in several developments that reflected a rise in the quality of soldiers that the Army was recruiting. Although he acknowledged that combat readiness was the ultimate test of quality, he pointed to the general reduction in disciplinary problems as another mark of progress. He pointed out that, in the previous seven years, the Army had closed four of its five disciplinary barracks. The ratio of prisoners in confinement had dropped from 11.1 per 1,000 in 1953 to 4.5 in the current year. Absences without leave also had dropped considerably.³⁴

Brucker attributed much of this success to his decision to raise the minimum scores acceptable on the armed forces aptitude qualification test. The service had accepted fewer people who could not meet the standards. That particular issue remained a sore point, however, as the Army still had to accept a higher percentage of personnel from Mental Group IV (the lowest intelligence rating) than the other services as part of their annual accession. Because it was the only service receiving recruits through the draft, the Army received a higher percentage of lower quality inductees. Raising standards to keep out the influx of Mental Group IV personnel would result in a higher rejection rate for selective service, which would subject the service to public and congressional criticism.³⁵

The Army secretary also pushed the senior Army leadership to continue with its programs to eliminate officers whose performance was subpar or who were guilty of misconduct. After revising its criteria for promotion and adopting a policy of "best qualified," the service had initiated another reduction in force in 1958, reviewing the records of 283 regular officers. Of these, it ordered fifty-nine to show cause for retention and eventually eliminated thirty.³⁶

33. Memo, Col. N. A. Skinrood, Executive Ofcr, Adjutant Gen Ofc, for Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 9 Dec 1959, sub: Recommendation of One Army Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 1839, Series: MILPERCEN Subject Files, 1959–1962, RG 319, NACP.

34. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jul 1959–30 Jun 1960, 145.

35. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jul 1959–30 Jun 1960, 145; Fact Sheet, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 5 Oct 1959, sub: Recent Enlistment Personnel Trends, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

36. MFR, Maj. Gen. James L. Richardson, Asst Ch Staff Personnel, 17 Nov 1959, sub: Elimination Actions on Officers; Fact Sheet, Col. Walter F. Winton Jr., Ch Promotion and Retention Div, 28 Jul 1959, sub: Progress in the Elimination of Substandard Officers; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Army Plan to Oust Dullards Approved," *Army Times*, 2 Aug 1959.

REDEFINING GROUND COMBAT AND LIMITED WARFARE

By 1959, any enthusiasm that remained for the pentomic division was beginning to subside. In his final days as Army chief of staff, General Taylor seemed to be the concept's sole remaining cheerleader. While visiting the Seventh Army in Europe, Taylor urged General Frank W. Farrell, the Seventh Army commanding general, to continue his evaluation of the five-sided divisional organization and the techniques and doctrine associated with it. Farrell noted that the new five-company battle group, and other recent modifications, had provided the organization with additional flexibility and versatility. He added, however, that his units still lacked adequate acquisition assets to identify long-range targets and that they experienced excessive delays in bringing atomic fires to bear on anything other than preplanned targets.³⁷

War games conducted by the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) seemed to bear out the experiences units had encountered in the field. Its evaluation concluded that the organization was not suitable for combat in a situation involving a high level of atomic use. Under those conditions, atomic weapons were decisive to such a degree that elements that did not support the atomic delivery systems or target acquisition were relatively unimportant and "their presence on the battlefield merely invite[d] increased casualties without a corresponding increase in combat effectiveness."³⁸ Further, the study concluded that atomic weapons used in sufficient quantities in any given area made the conduct of ground operations impracticable. Another study, this one from the Army War College, concluded that troop organizations could not survive as effective fighting forces on a nuclear battlefield subjected to uninhibited nuclear fires.³⁹

In January 1959, the new CONARC commanding general, General Bruce C. Clarke, put his staff to work in preparing the blueprint for a new divisional organization. Clarke recently had arrived from his tour as Seventh Army commander in Europe and had his own definitive ideas about how to organize the modern Army. Like most of the Army's senior officers, he believed that the force of the future had to be capable of operating effectively on both nuclear and nonnuclear battlefields. Units had to be prepared to take independent action or to combine with others to form more powerful

37. Memo, Col. Bruce Palmer Jr., Dep Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 28 May 1959, sub: Report of the Chief of Staff's Trip to Europe, 24 April-14 May, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

38. Memo, Lt. Gen. Gordon B. Rogers for Gen. [Bruce C.] Clarke, 24 Nov 1959, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

39. Memo, Rogers for Clarke, 24 Nov 1959.

combat teams. His experience with the pentomic model had convinced him that the new divisions needed additional conventional firepower as well as greater tactical mobility. Both would come, he decided, through increased reliance upon armor-protected vehicles and aircraft.⁴⁰ (See *Charts 8 and 9*.)


The division structure that the CONARC staff conceived closely resembled General Clarke's vision for war on an atomic battlefield. To streamline the chain of command, it had eliminated the corps headquarters and had divisions reporting directly to a field army headquarters. The study produced models for two types of divisions: the first heavy with a preponderance of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, and the second a medium division with fewer heavy assets and more emphasis on motorized infantry. Like pentomic divisions, each division consisted of five battle groups, but unlike its predecessor, the battle groups each contained three task force headquarters, so that commanders could group tank, infantry, and support companies according to mission requirements. Perhaps the key attribute of the new organizations, which Clarke dubbed the Modern Mobile Army, was their mobility. Every soldier and each piece of equipment in both types of divisions would ride in or on a vehicle.⁴¹

As the Army Staff and CONARC struggled to reshape the atomic Army, the rest of the force went on with its assigned missions. General Clarke reported in July that the XVIII Airborne Corps and the three STRAC divisions had made considerable progress in the area of joint planning. In coordination with the Military Air Transport Service, STRAC had produced working-level plans to provide airlift for one high priority division. Although the plans had no official status, they provided a basis for rapid movement once the Joint Chiefs had assigned the appropriate priorities. Likewise, the Joint Chiefs also had conducted a detailed analysis of U.S. ocean shipping requirements versus controlled shipping availability. The study concluded that U.S.-controlled shipping was adequate to meet military requirements during a six-month mobilization period leading up to a general war. The

40. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 291–92; Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 440–41; Maj. Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76*, Leavenworth Papers, no. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 19–20.

41. Doughty, *Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine*, 19–20; Glen R. Hawkins and James Jay Carafano, *Prelude to Army XXI: U.S. Army Division Design Initiatives and Experiments, 1917–1995* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1997).


Chart 8—Medium Division (MOMAR), 1960



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 295.
Note: The medium division chart referenced here appears under the title “Heavy Division (MOMAR), 1960.”

Chart 9—Heavy Division (MOMAR), 1960



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 294. Note: The heavy division chart referenced here appears under the title "Medium Division (MOMAR), 1960."

United States required an additional 480 ships, possibly from NATO allies, however, if a general war broke out without sufficient lead time to mobilize.⁴²

The STRAC divisions had every opportunity to show what they could do in 1959 as they conducted several well-publicized exercises. Exercise CARIBOU CREEK had begun late in 1958, when 128 officers and noncommissioned officers from the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, of the 82d Airborne Division, traveled to Fort Greely, Alaska, where they received three weeks of indoctrination and training in Arctic operations. They then returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where they passed on the cold weather instruction to the rest of the unit. The entire battle group traveled to Fort Richardson, Alaska, early in January, where it underwent another four weeks of intensive training. On 9 February, the unit began a ten-day free maneuver with the 1st Battle Group, 23d Infantry, acting as the opposition. In his evaluation, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, asserted that the maneuver demonstrated that well-trained troops could make the adjustment to hostile terrain and environment with only a minimal amount of indoctrination.⁴³

On 15 and 16 February, fifty C-123 transport aircraft departed Fort Bragg loaded with nearly 1,500 personnel of the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 501st Infantry. After a brief stop at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, the group conducted a combined parachute assault and air landing at Río Hato, Panama. Code-named Exercise BANYAN TREE, the maneuver demonstrated the division's ability to deploy rapidly over a great distance and to conduct an airborne assault against a hostile landing zone. Although planners had incorporated atomic weapons into the scenarios of both exercises, they played little part in the maneuver. Helicopters, on the other hand, proved decisive in their capability to transport small groups of troops around the battlefield and to provide rapid logistic or reconnaissance support. General Howze made particular note of the vital role the helicopter had played when he prepared his report.⁴⁴

Over in the 101st Airborne Division, Maj. Gen. William C. Westmoreland had focused much of his training upon developing his unit's junior leaders.

42. Ltr, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 23 Jul 1959; Memo, Col. D. F. Slaughter, Acting Ch Plans Div, for Vice Ch Staff, 20 Apr 1959, sub: Deployment of Army Troops in a General War; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

43. "4th Infantry Division to Fight in Eight Maneuvers," *Army Times*, 5 Sep 1959; U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), 128; Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, "STRAC Flexes Its Muscles," *Army Information Digest* 14 (Jul 1959): 14-23.

44. Howze, "STRAC Flexes Its Muscles," 14-23.

He noted that the dispersion and isolation of the atomic battlefield had placed a premium on small-unit leadership. With that in mind, Westmoreland had created the division-wide Recondo School to improve the quality of small-unit tactics and the proficiency of small-unit leaders. Modeled loosely on training conducted at the U.S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia, the two-week Recondo (reconnaissance and commando) course emphasized scouting and patrolling at the fire-team and squad levels. The school director, Maj. Lewis H. Millett, was a veteran of the British Commando and U.S. Army Ranger schools and had received the Medal of Honor for leading a bayonet charge against a fortified enemy position in Korea. In its first eight months, the school had graduated nearly 500 junior leaders.⁴⁵

The STRAC divisions were beginning to achieve some level of proficiency, but that progress did not go unchallenged. In November, a Marine Corps demonstration team presented a program on vertical envelopment for assembled journalists in the Pentagon. The team presented the concept as "Marine Doctrine," and highlighted its Spartan approach. Although the presenter refused to say that it was cheaper than STRAC, as one observer noted, "We all know who we are talking about, don't we?"⁴⁶ Army observers interpreted the briefing's message to be an assertion that the Marine Corps, with its 225,000 marines, supported by the Navy, could perform all of the Army's contingency missions.⁴⁷

The challenge to the Army's role in contingency operations reflected an evolving perception of limited warfare throughout the U.S. defense establishment. Even in the White House, some of the president's senior advisers urged reconsideration of New Look policies. Secretary Gates told Eisenhower that the increase in nuclear capability on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States made conflicts limited to the use of conventional forces more likely. Secretary of State Christian Herter added that many U.S. allies were beginning to question whether the United States actually would risk all out general war by employing nuclear weapons in their defense. In order to rebuild the free world's confidence that it could deter or defeat local Communists, the United States needed an evident, adequate, and flexible military capability for operations short of general war.⁴⁸

45. "Meet the Eagle leader: A Great Believer in Challenges"; "Recondo Training Rugged"; both in *Army Times*, 3 Oct 1959.

46. Memo, Brig. Gen. Chester V. Clifton, Acting Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 17 Nov 1959, sub: Presentation by Marine Corps Re "Vertical Envelopment," File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

47. Memo, Clifton for Ch Staff, 17 Nov 1959, sub: Presentation by Marine Corps Re "Vertical Envelopment."

48. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 23; Memo of Conf with President, 2 Jul 1959, in *FRUS 1958-1960*, vol. 3, 228-35.

Some of the secretary of state's fears were reflected in a conversation between General Lemnitzer and General Adolf Heusinger, Chief of German Armed Forces, in December. Heusinger stressed to the U.S. Army chief of staff his belief that NATO forces must be prepared to fight a limited war. He thanked Lemnitzer for the American assistance in rebuilding German armed forces but urged the Americans not to cut their strength in Europe. Heusinger noted that the United States had had time to prepare before the last two world wars. That would not be the case, he warned, if the Soviets chose to attack. Both generals discussed requirements for new and improved conventional weapons, but also agreed that smaller, tactical atomic weapons could play a role in both fighting a limited war and preventing it from escalating to a larger general conflict.⁴⁹

Perhaps understanding that some of the underpinnings of the New Look defense policies were beginning to weaken, the Army Staff attempted to provide some structure in support of General Taylor's belief in Flexible Response. In a paper labeled "Background Studies on Army Objectives," the staff traced the evolution of the doctrine of massive retaliation and, in particular, the influence of the Air Force upon the preparation of defense policy. Overlooked, they said, were the political disadvantages of nuclear weapons and the obvious fact that they were inappropriate in lesser conflicts. A philosophy of limited war, originating in the Army, offered an alternative. Because the concept offered no quick, easy, or cheap solution to problems facing the United States, the administration and the other services had, for the most part, rejected it as an attempt by the Army to justify its existence. That the idea survived and gained acceptance outside strictly Army circles seemed proof of its basic soundness.⁵⁰

The launch of Sputnik had demonstrated the Soviet capability to target the continental United States with nuclear weapons. The study cited one foreign affairs analysis in saying that Sputnik had made it certain that no U.S. president was going to risk the wholesale destruction of U.S. cities except as a last resort. The United States required a wider range of options to respond to Soviet provocations. The philosophy of limited warfare, analysts believed, was a misnomer, and might be labeled more correctly as "fully ready," or "ready for anything."⁵¹ Moreover, they concluded, the two concepts

49. MFR, Col. E. T. Ashworth, 17 Dec 1959, sub: Protocol Call on General Lemnitzer by General Heusinger, Chief of German Armed Forces, at 1500 Hours, 3 Nov 1959, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 19, NACP.

50. Ofc Ch Staff, "Background Studies on Army Objectives: Volume 1," 1959, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret, 1956-1962 (hereinafter DCSOPS Top Secret 1956-1962), RG 319, NACP.

51. Ofc Ch Staff, "Background Studies on Army Objectives: Volume 1," 1959.

were not incompatible. Massive retaliation simply stood at the far end of a spectrum that began with more limited military responses. Recognition of that relationship would provide the United States with greater flexibility in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.⁵²

In support of that assessment, the operations staff prepared an analysis of potential conventional war between the United States and the Soviet Union. In Europe, in particular, the United States and the West were in a favorable position. Even the most feasible avenue for a Soviet attack, across the North German Plain, was cut by a “most excellent obstacle,” the Rhine River.⁵³ Because the Soviet forces lacked superior mobility, their potential advantage of interior lines was merely a euphemism for “surrounded.” Analysts also noted that, in a conventional conflict, the United States stood a better chance of retaining its allies than the Soviet Union. If the West could blunt an initial Communist surge, they doubted that the Soviets would be willing to escalate to the point of risking a nuclear exchange. By their most recent actions in Korea and Eastern Europe and around Taiwan, both the Soviet Union and China had indicated a willingness to accept tactical setbacks rather than risk expanding a conflict “illogically and unprofitably.”⁵⁴

By the end of 1959, even though General Taylor, the apostle of limited warfare and Flexible Response, had departed, the Army finally was beginning to chip away at the dominance of massive retaliation and atomic weapons. Increasingly, policymakers looked for a wider range of military options to facilitate a more flexible approach to diplomacy and strategic policy.

ARMY VERSUS AIR FORCE

In many ways, the bureaucratic infighting between the Army and the Air Force constituted some of the most bitter conflicts of the Cold War. Twelve years after the designation of the Air Force as an independent service, the strained and often contentious relationship between the two branches remained as heated as ever.

In the U.S. Senate, one of the Air Force’s most ardent supporters continued his part of the fight. In June, Senator Symington delivered a withering and highly partisan critique against the Army. He suggested that the Army’s

52. Ofc Ch Staff, “Background Studies on Army Objectives: Volume 1,” 1959.

53. Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 30 May 1959, sub: Study on Conventional War Between the U.S. and USSR, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

54. Memo, Moore for Ch Staff, 30 May 1959, sub: Study on Conventional War Between the U.S. and USSR.

inferiority in troop numbers as compared to the Soviets was matched by an inferiority of mobility and firepower. Its tanks, guns, and rifles were obsolete. The reason for this, he said, was the service's insistence on funding programs that were not part of its primary mission. All the money that the Army was devoting to continental air defense, he concluded, rightfully should be spent on modernizing its inventory of conventional weapons. The Army's combat readiness was being hamstrung by service rivalry and poor decisions. Left unsaid, but clearly understood by all in attendance, was the senator's conviction that the responsibility for air defense, and the portion of the budget allocated to it, properly belonged to the United States Air Force.⁵⁵

Symington's mischief was not limited to his jabs at the Army. He also led the Democratic attack against the Eisenhower administration's defense policies. In January, he accused Secretary McElroy of adjusting intelligence estimates to support the administration's budget reductions. Symington suggested that the defense secretary was ignoring evidence that the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles ready for launch. Despite repeated assertions by the president and his representatives that no missile gap existed, the issue would come to plague the Republican Party throughout the coming presidential campaign and elections. Although the missile gap would prove illusory, it would open a door to national military policies that relied less on the concept of massive retaliation.⁵⁶

Despite Symington's attempted intercession, the Army–Air Force competition over continental air defense continued to rage. Air Force officials sent numerous communications to Congress and the secretary of defense denigrating the capabilities of the Nike Hercules and touting the potential of their service's Bomarc system. Army officials retorted that they, at least, had a system in service and that, to date, the Air Force had yet to deploy the Bomarc. In May, the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed its own irritation over the competition when it cut funding for both programs. Committee members told the Defense Department that they would appropriate no more money for either system until it completed testing on both systems and indicated which it preferred. Some senators expressed greater concerns that neither system provided any real defense against incoming ballistic missiles, which they regarded as a more relevant threat. In a related news story, the U.S. Army commander of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, Maj. Gen. Holger N. Toftoy, announced during

55. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. Lemnitzer, 27 Jul 1959, sub: Observations of Senator Symington, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

56. Jack Raymond, "Symington Chides McElroy on ICBM: Sees U.S. Lagging," *New York Times*, 24 Jan 1959; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 389–90.

a May press conference that the Army would test launch a Nike Zeus missile sometime during the next calendar year.⁵⁷

As 1959 progressed, the Air Force did give ground in one important area of contention. In December, officers from the Army's CONARC and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command held a conference at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, to discuss measures for improving Air Force support for Army ground operations. Air Force briefers expressed their support for investment in high-performance aircraft capable of air defense, interdiction, and close air support. They suggested that rather than developing aircraft specifically for close air support, the Army should have its own aerial weapons for covering the areas within the limits of its own target acquisition capability. Army leaders quickly picked up on the hint that the Air Force no longer would object to the Army moving into the gap being created by the current stress on the Air Force's high-performance aircraft.⁵⁸

The Army, in fact, had been moving steadily in that direction. In May, a new Training Circular 20-1 announced the concept of *airmobility*. According to this new doctrine, Army forces would use Army aircraft to move troops, equipment, and supplies into, around, and out of the combat zone. The circular directed that all combat elements would be trained in airmobile operations. It also called for armed helicopters—mounted with machine guns, rockets, and missiles—to provide aerial fire support for troops conducting helicopter-mounted assaults. The service also announced in December that it was testing helicopters mounting the French SS11 wire-guided antitank missile. Putting the whole concept together, the Army's Combat Developments Office indicated that two commands, the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning and the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood would activate aerial combat reconnaissance companies in the coming year. The new units would consist of about thirty helicopters, including a weapons platoon of six helicopters armed with rockets and machine guns.⁵⁹

At the 1959 Army Commanders' Conference, the director of Army Aviation, Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann, presented a briefing on the growing

57. Memo, Maj. Gen. Dwight E. Beach, Director of Air Def and Special Weapons, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 5 Jun 1959, sub: Air Force Attacks on the Army's Air Defense Program, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Nike Site Funds Wiped Out," *Army Times*, 23 May 1959; Jack Raymond, "Pentagon Drafts a Master Plan for Air Defense," *New York Times*, 24 May 1959; "Toftoy Says Zeus Will Be Fired in 1960," *Army Times*, 30 May 1959.

58. MFR, Lt. Col. George C. Viney, 29 Dec 1959, sub: CONARC-TAC and DAF-DA Planning Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

59. Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Training to Stress Airmobility," *Army Times*, 23 May 1959; "Army Testing Copter that Can Kill Tank," *Army Times*, 28 Nov 1959; Gene Famiglietti, "Two



Designed exclusively for the U.S. Army, the Bell XH-40 Iroquois helicopter, later redesignated the HU-1, became better known to U.S. troops as the "Huey." (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

family of Army air assets. In addition to the by-now familiar AO-1 Mohawk and AC-1 Caribou airplanes, he showed off photos of the HU-1 Iroquois utility helicopter that had recently entered production. In discussing the requirements for battlefield transport, he mentioned the HC-1B Chinook helicopter and also described work underway to develop a new aircraft, a flying crane, for moving heavy items across relatively short distances. This, he concluded, was the fleet of aircraft that would carry the Army into the 1970s.⁶⁰

Even as the Army was beginning to make some headway in placing its aviation program on a path toward sustained growth, its pioneering space and satellite program continued to flounder. Having ceded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) the previous year and dedicating most of its missile development team to supporting the space agency, the service fared poorly in the bureaucratic

Divisions to Get Air Recon Units," *Army Times*, 24 Oct 1959.

60. Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops (presentation, Army Commanders Conf, 2 Dec 1959), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. The Army later revised the nomenclatures to UH-1 and CH-47.



An HU-1 helicopter firing an SS11 missile (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

battles surrounding missile development. The director of NASA, Thomas K. Glennan, lobbied Congress effectively in his efforts to increase his agency's control over the Army's missile development team. Glennan told a Senate committee investigating missile and space activities that the nation's space effort would work better only if the entire team were united under NASA's leadership. By the end of the year, both the Army and NASA had developed a plan, which would transfer the Army's missile development team, a major component of its Ballistic Missile Command, to NASA.⁶¹

In losing its highly successful ballistic missile program, the Army fell victim to the same missile race propaganda that was beginning to fuel the 1960 presidential election. Both NASA scientists and Air Force generals persisted in arguments that the Soviet Union had forged ahead in the development of long-range missile technology. Collectively, they pushed for increased investment in technologies that would promote both intercontinental ballistic missiles and more powerful booster rockets to launch satellites and

61. Memo, Col. Roland P. Carlson for Sec Gen Staff, 2 Feb 1959, sub: Senate Preparedness Sub-Committee and Aeronautics and Space Committee Hearings; Memo, Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, Ch Ordnance, for Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 22 Dec 1959, sub: Long Range plan for Reorganization of USAOMC; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Where We Stand in Missile Race: Administration and Critics Debate," *New York Times*, 8 Feb 1959.



During its initial demonstration, this Chinook helicopter transport stops off at Davidson Army Airfield at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, en route to the heliport at the Pentagon. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

eventually people into space. Even the Army's foremost missile scientist, Wernher von Braun, contributed to the campaign when, while lobbying for additional funding, he told reporters that if the United States did not hurry up, it would have to pass Soviet customs when it finally reached the moon.⁶²

MANAGING THE BUREAUCRACY

In 1958, the service had initiated the Army Management Improvement Plan with the intent of developing better, faster, and more economical ways of doing its daily business. Although the roots of this effort were clearly in coping with the drastic budget reductions the service faced during the Eisenhower administration, leaders also got caught up in some of the fascination with management efficiency that had permeated American industry after World War II. Some of this emphasis originated in the Office of the Comptroller of

62. Jerry Landauer, "Ike Acts in Missiles Dispute," *Washington Post*, 21 Oct 1959.

the Army, and the spirit of economy and efficiency inspired numerous new programs throughout the Army during this period.⁶³

The dramatic reductions in personnel strength over the decade and the postwar spirit of efficiency led Army leaders to eliminate offices and positions they deemed redundant or unnecessary. In one example, the Army Staff eliminated the Special Warfare Office in June 1958, moving its functions to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and doing away with nineteen military and twenty-four civilian positions.

Such initiatives lacked consistency, however, as at virtually the same time, the staff created the Army Research Office as a component of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development. The purpose of this new office was to manage research activities and to provide a link between scientists of the Army and those of the civilian community. Elements of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency that remained after its key components moved to NASA reorganized into the new Army Ordnance Missile Command. Finally, in the operational units, divisions continued to refine their organizations under various versions of the pentomic concept, seeking to make the best use of the human resources allocated to their units. Many of these actions originated in 1958 or earlier, but most were not completed until the following year when they were then recognized as part of the Army's Management Improvement Program.⁶⁴

The service designed other reforms to improve recordkeeping and communications. Based upon a 1955 report that had indicated that government letters were unduly long and hard to understand, the Department of the Army, in 1957, had inaugurated a training program on plain letter writing. After a positive response from all commands, the Adjutant General's School prepared a special text, *Effective Army Writing*, for all the school's resident and nonresident training courses to use. The chief of staff directed all service schools to teach effective writing skills, and the staff subsequently published Department of the Army Pamphlet 1-10, *Improve Your Writing*.⁶⁵

The service also took steps to make its records administration more efficient. The Adjutant General's Office noted that it had destroyed almost one million linear feet of its administrative and historical documents that had been housed in Federal Records Centers or contracted holding areas. This action, it proudly declared, made available 122,885 four-drawer file cabinets, and opened up more than one million square feet of floor space.

63. Memo, Lt. Gen. William S. Lawton, Comptroller of the Army, for Ch Staff, 2 Mar 1959, sub: Army Management Improvements, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

64. Memo, Lawton for Ch Staff, 2 Mar 1959, sub: Army Management Improvements.

65. Memo, Lawton for Ch Staff, 2 Mar 1959, sub: Army Management Improvements.

Finally, after several years of testing, the Army announced in December 1958 the adoption of the Army Functional Files System. The new system replaced the old War Department Decimal File System, which many clerks and records personnel had found difficult to learn and to retain. Presumably, the new system would simplify the recordkeeping process and help clerks and unit commanders identify which of their files required permanent retention by the Army.⁶⁶

The Department of the Army attempted to apply scientific management tools toward the development of the service's civilian work force as well. During fiscal year 1960, more than 10,000 supervisors attended instruction on the preparation of work distribution charts, flow process charts, motion economy, and layout studies. The secretary of the Army's annual report noted these new management processes had saved the service more than \$5 million. This would not be the last time that the military looked to business for managerial techniques. Already, however, some wondered whether that approach would be appropriate in combat.⁶⁷

The Army also looked to its lower ranks for help in improving efficiency and cost-savings. In September, General Lemnitzer directed an Army-wide campaign, dubbed Operation SEARCHLIGHT, to encourage suggestions from civilian and military personnel. The objective, the chief of staff said, was to encourage ideas for improving efficiency or equipment. He directed a major effort to publicize the campaign and to provide awards for noteworthy contributions to management efficiency. All publicity in connection with the program, he said, should emphasize the idea that "the Army is modern" and that it was making the most economical use of available resources.⁶⁸

In an administration that proclaimed that its foremost goal was to promote the American economy, the Comptroller General's Office raised some troubling issues in 1959. It noted that during the previous fiscal year, the deficit in the national balance of international payments amounted to approximately \$4 billion. For a nation that, in 1959, remained on a gold standard—meaning the value of its currency was tied to actual specie in its vaults—this flow of payments overseas was particularly troubling. The Army's share of those overseas expenditures amounted to \$1.5 billion. The comptroller calculated that the U.S. Army in Germany expended

66. Memo, Lawton for Ch Staff, 2 Mar 1959, sub: Army Management Improvements.

67. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jul 1959–30 Jun 1960, 214–15.

68. Memo, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer for Cdrs in Ch, 15 Oct 1959, sub: Operation Searchlight; Memo, Maj. Gen. William W. Quinn, Ch Info, for Distribution, 29 Sep 1959, sub: Information Plan for Operation Searchlight; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

approximately \$3,600 per person per year. A reduction of one division in Europe, the office estimated, would decrease the payments deficit by some \$50 million per year.⁶⁹

The Army responded with its own calculations showing that the additional expenditures of bringing home and repositioning troops would overshadow any savings. Neither would reductions in troops in Korea provide significant savings. Despite this proactive response, the gold-flow issue remained a particular concern for President Eisenhower, one that he was still pondering as 1959 came to a close.⁷⁰

A TICKING BOMB

On 8 July 1959, a squad of National Liberation Front fighters, known to the Republic of Vietnam's government and its American allies as the Viet Cong, attacked the quarters of an American detachment advising the South Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division at Biên Hòa, just north of Saigon. Three men with automatic weapons sprayed a dining hall where members of the detachment sat watching a movie. Two men, Maj. Dale R. Buis and M. Sgt. Chester M. Ovnand, died in the attack, becoming the first American advisers to die by enemy action in Vietnam.⁷¹

Throughout 1959, Viet Cong strategy became more aggressive. Kidnappings and assassinations increased to all-time highs and Communist-staged uprisings broke out at various points throughout South Vietnam. A series of disappointing performances by South Vietnamese Army units convinced General Samuel T. Williams, commander of the MAAG, Vietnam, to revoke the long-standing practice of forbidding American advisers from accompanying their South Vietnamese units into combat. On 25 May, the commander in chief of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral

69. Fact Sheet, E. K. Shultz, Asst Comptroller, Foreign Financial Affairs, 23 Oct 1959, sub: Dollar Outflow Overseas, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

70. Fact Sheet, Col. [no first name given] Kennedy, 23 Oct 1959, sub: Limited Reductions in the Budget Which Would Accrue from the Inactivation or Movement to CONUS of Army Units, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Interv, Col. Francis B. Kish with Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, 1982, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI). The details of the gold-flow issue are exceedingly technical, but the essential concern was that U.S. personnel were spending too much money overseas. Placing that much U.S. currency into the hands of foreign governments gave them too much claim to the gold bullion, stored at Fort Knox, that the specie represented.

71. Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960*, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 329.



Map 8

Harry D. Felt, approved General Williams's request, authorizing American advisers assigned to regiments and separate battalions to accompany those units on operational missions as long as they did not become involved in actual combat.⁷² (*See Map 8.*)

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the political situation was growing more unstable. In Laos, Pathet Lao Communists, backed by the North Vietnamese, worked to undermine a centrist and western leaning government under the prime minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma. Viewing the situation with increasing alarm, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Army, Pacific, warned the Army Staff that the 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan, lacked the resources to support contingency plans programmed in its area of responsibility.⁷³

That warning was reinforced by a report from Brig. Gen. John A. Heintges, the newly appointed chief of the Programs Evaluation Office in Laos. Acting as a de facto military assistance advisory team, the Programs Evaluation Office helped to coordinate U.S. military assistance to the embattled Laotian government. Because the operation was attached to the U.S. embassy and theoretically not connected to the military, Heintges went as a civilian. After a brief period to survey the situation, he reported back to the Army Staff. Although the French sustained a minimal military assistance program in the country, Heintges warned his superiors that the existing government would fall without additional U.S. military support.⁷⁴

In response to the looming crisis and in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Army initiated Project MOLECULAR, also referred to as Project HOTFOOT. In July, the United States sent twelve special forces mobile training teams, along with one control team, to Laos to assist with training the Laotian national army. These service members also traveled as civilians and, by agreement with the French, could conduct only training related to the weapons and equipment supplied by the Americans. An additional 17 U.S. military personnel—7 Army and 10 Air Force—joined 103 Filipino contractor technicians at the end of the year to furnish advice to the Laotian logistical system. General Heintges made several urgent requests to the secretary of defense and to the Army for immediate delivery

72. Spector, *Advice and Support*, 329–32.

73. Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 293–94; Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 19 Jan 1959, sub: Personnel Increase of 1st Special Forces Group, File Unit: Entry A1 68, DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

74. Jared M. Tracy, "Shoot and Salute: U.S. Army Special Warfare in Laos," *Veritas* 14 (Spring 2018): 42–49; Interv, Maj. Jack A. Pellicci with Lt. Gen. John A. Heintges, 1974, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.

of programmed aircraft, military equipment, and weapons to support an additional 8,000 Laotian “volunteers.”⁷⁵

In response to these concerns, the Department of the Army authorized an increase of 133 spaces for the 1st Special Forces Group and an increase of 310 spaces for the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg. The authorization would also move the 107 spaces allocated for Project MOLECULAR from the 77th Group to the 1st once the service and the Central Intelligence Agency discontinued that program.⁷⁶

Despite the developments in Laos, most of the Army’s focus in Southeast Asia remained on Vietnam. In May, responding to a request from General White at U.S. Army, Pacific, the Army Staff prepared an analysis of deployment options for a limited war in Vietnam. This analysis lacked the rigor of the study General Matthew B. Ridgway had prepared five years earlier. It did, however, compare available air- and sealift resources to the forces that might be available for a deployment to Saigon or to Bangkok, Thailand. The study concluded that one STRAC airborne division could close on one of those two ports of entry by air movement within sixteen days of notification. A second STRAC division, presumably the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai’i, would complete its movement by a combination of sea- and airlift no sooner than sixty days after notification.⁷⁷

Beyond identifying deployable divisions, however, the contingency plan became a bit problematic. The units on the deployment list included most of the logistical support elements normally associated with the division slice. Not included on the list were elements of a field army headquarters that might normally be associated with such an expeditionary force. The Army Staff indicated that the earliest such a unit might arrive would be between 90 and 120 days. In lieu of that option, the staff suggested that General White employ an advanced echelon of his own headquarters or an augmented XVIII Airborne Corps staff. The Department of the Army also advised White that no surface-to-air missile units were available for inclusion in the initial deployment. The message suggested that the Army Staff would

75. Fact Sheet, Brig. Gen. James K. Woolnough, Director of Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 19 Jun 1959, sub: Project Molecular; Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, Director of Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 27 Aug 1959, sub: Extraordinary Military Aid for Laos; Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, 25 Aug 1959, sub: Improvement of Laos Armed Forces; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

76. Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 29 Jul 1959, sub: Strengths of Special Forces Groups, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

77. Memo, Maj. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, Director of Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Cdr in Ch, U.S. Army, Pacific, 7 May 1959, sub: USARPAC Limited War Planning for Southeast Asia, File Unit: Entry A1 68, DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

consider one of a few Nike or Hawk battalions currently engaged in stateside school support, but it failed to address exactly what targets such units might be employed to defend against.⁷⁸

SAYING FAREWELL TO THE NEW LOOK

The year 1960 would be the final year of Dwight Eisenhower's presidency. Although his emphasis on nuclear weapons and the threat of massive retaliation had allowed him to maintain national security while keeping the economy strong, it had not prevented the instabilities and small wars that plagued allies and potential allies around the peripheries. Nor had Eisenhower's policies prevented his political opponents from using his attempts to hold the line on defense expenditures to support their accusations that the United States was falling behind its Soviet adversaries in strategic missile technology.

Meanwhile, the Army's experiments with an organization and a doctrine based upon nuclear weapons had, so far, proven unwieldly. Exercises involving the pentomic organization and extensive employment of atomic weapons led many observers to question the validity of the entire concept. Particularly in Europe, allies wondered what the point was of blowing up everything they were intending to defend. Army leaders at CONARC and on the Army Staff were already at work on still more revisions.

All of these uncertainties set the stage for some serious discussions that would be held during the coming year. An election year, 1960 would see both major political parties debate the utility of atomic weapons as a means of achieving national security and supporting foreign policy goals. In politics, in public discussions, and throughout the Pentagon, military and civilian leaders considered alternatives to strategies based on atomic weapons. As many sought to develop a military policy that would provide enough options to respond to the full range of impending strategic challenges, they honed in on the idea of a flexible response, words which soon would come to define the new military doctrine.

78. Memo, Pachler for Cdr in Ch, U.S. Army, Pacific, 7 May 1959, sub: USARPAC Limited War Planning for Southeast Asia.

8

Turning the Page

In November 1960, Americans went to the polls to elect a new president. The Republicans had nominated the former vice president, Richard M. Nixon. Throughout the presidential campaign, Nixon staunchly had supported the strategic views and policies of his mentor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower. To oppose him, the Democrats had nominated Massachusetts' Senator John F. Kennedy. Kennedy's views on national defense stood in stark contrast to those of the Eisenhower administration. He had embraced the concept of Flexible Response that General Maxwell D. Taylor had featured in his speeches and written critiques of the New Look. To a great extent, therefore, the 1960 presidential election became a referendum on the national security structure as it had evolved over eight years of Republican control. While minor conflicts around the globe threatened to disturb the fragile Cold War balance, the political debate in the United States challenged many of the strategic concepts that had shaped American defense policy for the previous eight years. Whoever won the election would determine the path forward for the U.S. Army as well as the other military services.

TWILIGHT OF THE NEW LOOK

President Eisenhower remained true to his convictions right through to the end of his term. In February, the consideration of force levels and of the defense budget for 1963 remained every bit as contentious as it had been at the start of his presidency. He continued to rail at the parochial viewpoints

expressed by his military leaders. He told reporters that what he wanted was a deterrent that was adequate. "A deterrent has no added power," he said, "once it has become completely adequate."¹

Two Army chiefs of staff, General Taylor and General Matthew B. Ridgway, had faced a solid block of opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for years, but this was beginning to break down. Now, Navy leaders joined their Army counterparts in opposing the president's overemphasis on missiles and atomic weapons. Secretary of the Navy William B. Franke told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the nation had to guard against an overabundance of deterrent forces if that prevented it from maintaining sufficient forces for other tasks. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke added that "limited war, rather than general war, [was] the most likely future combat condition."²

The Air Force joined in with vocal attacks against the president, but from the opposite perspective. Senator W. Stuart Symington continued his campaign railing against the perceived missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite growing evidence that the gap was narrowing, if not completely illusory, Symington used the issue as a club with which to beat administration officials throughout the election year. He charged the administration with misleading the American public on the relative missile strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. Senior Air Force officers joined the offensive. General Thomas S. Power, head of the Strategic Air Command, estimated that with a force of only 300 missiles, the Soviets could knock out the U.S. deterrent force completely in thirty minutes. Lt. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, Director of the U.S. Air Force Research and Development Command, testified that, although the two nations were about even in missile strength, in the next few years, the Soviet Union would open up a commanding lead that the United States would be unable to match.³

The president drew additional fire from Democrats and numerous veterans associations when he declined to support an extension of the benefits of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, commonly known as the G.I. Bill, to veterans who had served during the Cold War. "Those who serve in peacetime," he said, "undergo fewer rigors and hazards than their combat comrades." He maintained that the peacetime veterans had received superior pay and benefits compared to their World War II and Korea counterparts and returned to civilian life under more favorable conditions after receiving valuable training in the military service. To many in the military, the

1. "The Great Debate Over the Adequacy of Our Defense," *New York Times*, 7 Feb 1960.

2. Jack Raymond, "Navy Chiefs Voice Defense Warning," *New York Times*, 23 Jan 1960.

3. "President Holds Secret Parley," *New York Times*, 6 Feb 1960; John W. Finney, "Defense Critics Assailed by G.O.P.," *New York Times*, 24 Feb 1960.

president's words indicated an unwillingness to recognize the variety and severity of the threats facing service members in the Cold War environment. Although most of the members of the House Veterans Affairs Committee supported extending education benefits to post-Korea veterans, Congress was unable to overcome the president's opposition.⁴

Even as the rest of the United States military establishment ratcheted up its confrontation with the administration, the Army appeared to move in the opposite direction. With Generals Ridgway and Taylor now long retired, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer burnished his reputation as a soldier-diplomat. In June, he sent a personal letter to each of his senior commanders and staff in which he admonished them to stop complaining about the shortage of resources available to the Army. Such comments, he said, created the erroneous impression that the Army lacked the capability and confidence to accomplish its missions. He encouraged them to project the impression of a can-do service, which maintained the ability to execute all of its missions in the most effective manner possible commensurate with the available resources.⁵

In August, the president and Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. nominated Lemnitzer to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs, replacing retiring Air Force General Nathan F. Twining. To replace Lemnitzer as Army chief of staff, they nominated General George H. Decker, then serving as the vice chief of staff. Almost every news item on the nomination noted that Decker would be the first non-West Point graduate to hold the position since General George C. Marshall had retired in 1945. Most stories also included Decker's background in finance and his service as comptroller of the Army. More astute accounts remembered that Decker also had served ably as General Walter Kreuger's chief of staff in New Guinea during World War II. There, Decker had won grudging praise from his commander for being imperturbable under pressure and quietly able to get the job done.⁶

The comparatively low profile that General Lemnitzer chose to adopt during the final year of the New Look only served to accentuate the outsized role that General Taylor was continuing to play, even in retirement.

4. Larry Carney, "Ike on GI Bill Draws Fire," *Army Times*, 23 Jan 1960; Larry Carney, "Majority of House Group Seen Favoring New GI Bill," *Army Times*, 19 Mar 1960.

5. Ltr, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Gen. Eddleman et al., 3 Jun 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955-1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955-1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

6. "Top Military Planner: Lyman Louis Lemnitzer," *New York Times*, 16 Aug 1960; "Low Pressure Soldier: George Henry Decker," *New York Times*, 19 Aug 1960; "Non-West Pointer Named Army Chief," *Army Times*, 27 Aug 1960.



U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker (left) with Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

Taylor's book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, captured all of his disagreement and frustration with Eisenhower's defense policies in one convenient volume. Instead of relying singularly upon nuclear weapons to keep the peace, Taylor emphasized his now familiar alternative of a flexible military policy, with the United States maintaining a range of military capabilities allowing a broader spectrum of responses. That the book became widely read and publicized surely vexed Eisenhower, who only commented that the retired general was entitled to his opinion.⁷

The book and Taylor's familiar criticisms of Republican military policy also caught the attention of the Democratic presidential candidate. Kennedy and the Democrats adopted many of the recommendations proposed by Taylor as part of their foreign policy and national security platform throughout the campaign. In Congress, General Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

7. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959); Maxwell Taylor, "We Must Dispose of the Great Atomic Fallacy," *Army Times*, 27 Feb 1960; Ltr, James C. Oliver, Member of Congress, to Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker, 30 Jan 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Lemnitzer Stands Firm," *New York Times*, 15 Jan 1960.

of Staff, found himself responding to a barrage of questions from mostly Democratic representatives regarding passages in Taylor's book.⁸

Together, General Taylor and Senator Symington supported a radical reorganization of the Defense Department that essentially merged the separate branches of military service into one. Symington headed a committee tasked by Kennedy with developing an alternative defense establishment. In December, the committee presented the president-elect a plan for centralization of defense powers under a single civilian secretary aided by a single military chief of staff. The plan abolished the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments and eliminated all service secretaries and their assistants. It retained the military service chiefs who would report directly to the secretary of defense. The current structure of unified and specified commands would be replaced by four major components. The Strategic Command would encompass all forces designed for all-out nuclear war. Tactical Command would include forces specifically designed for limited war. Defense Command would have all of those forces required for the defense of the continental United States, and the National Guard-Reserve Command would be in charge of all reserve forces and responsible for civil defense. Symington believed that his reorganization streamlined the chain of command, strengthened the role and authorities of the secretary of defense, and eliminated much of the interservice rivalry that had come to plague military planning and budgeting.⁹

Taylor's successors in the Army leadership had taken a less confrontational approach toward the administration's defense policy and organization. The chief of staff, General Lemnitzer, favored the continuation of the current system and did not believe that a single chief of staff for all of the armed services was a necessary step. The chairman of the joint chiefs, he felt, had all the authority he required. The Army followed Lemnitzer's lead, and when he moved on to be the chairman, his successor as chief of staff, General Decker, expressed similar thoughts. Through the end of the year, Army leaders contended that any radical reorganization of the defense establishment should wait until the new administration was in place and had a chance to express its views.¹⁰

8. Memo, Capt. L. P. Gray, U.S. Navy, Mil Asst to the Chairman of the Joint Chs, for Asst Sec Def (Comptroller), 28 Jan 1960, sub: Questions from the Mahon Subcommittee, File Unit: Entry UD 53, Series: Chairman's Files, Twining, 1957-1960, RG 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, NACP.

9. Jack Raymond, "Symington Defense Plan Stirs Opposition by Army and Navy," *New York Times*, 7 Dec 1960; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Top-Level Remake in Plan," *Army Times*, 10 Dec 1960.

10. Baldwin, "Lemnitzer Stands Firm"; MFR, Col. Lloyd B. Ramsey, Ofc Ch Legislative Liaison, 7 Dec 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Brig. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs

The various oppositions to Eisenhower's defense policies, coupled with the heat of the political campaign, produced a number of thoughtful and articulate discussions regarding nuclear weapons and the concepts of general and limited war. In testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, General Lemnitzer described how both the United States and the Soviet Union had acquired a virtually indestructible nuclear capability. Although he did not use the specific terminology, he depicted an emerging condition of mutual assured destruction. Beneath that balance, he continued, existed a spectrum of conflict that could be labeled limited war. Although those sorts of wars would not be fought with intercontinental ballistic missiles, they might, at some level, include smaller-yield tactical nuclear weapons. The general expanded on those thoughts in comments prepared for a variety of newspapers and periodicals. There, he stressed the importance of the foot soldier in an environment of strategic nuclear stalemate.¹¹

A study conducted by the National Security Council in September 1960 examined U.S. limited warfare capabilities in several scenarios. It concluded that U.S. capabilities, in conjunction with those of its allies, would be adequate as long as the nation took prompt action to initiate partial mobilization, augmented existing military airlift, expanded the war production base, and waived financial limitations on military spending as it prepared to engage in such a conflict. In some of its detailed comments linked to specific scenarios, the study noted that neither the United States nor its allies possessed adequate capability for counter guerrilla-type limited military operations. More ominously, the analysis concluded that existing communications and logistical support facilities in Southeast Asia would be unable to support any sustained U.S. or allied military operation.¹²

For the Army Staff, however, the vision of future land combat remained focused upon a conflict against the Soviet Union on a European battleground. In a series of briefings prepared for public dissemination, the Doctrine and Concepts Division of the Operations Staff described potential enemies

Staff et al., 22 Dec 1960, sub: Development of Army Views on Defense Reorganization, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

11. Selected Extracts of Testimony, *Hearing Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee*, 86th Cong. (4 Feb 1960); Memo, Maj. Gen. William W. Quinn, Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 8 Nov 1960, sub: Interview with U.S. News and World Report; Memo, Maj. Gen. William W. Quinn, for Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 13 May 1960, sub: Request for Magazine Interview; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

12. Interagency Study, National Security Council, 28 Sep 1960, "United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960* (hereinafter cited as *FRUS 1958–1960*), vol. 3, *National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 474–76.

ranging from highly trained mechanized forces, such as the Soviet Army, to lightly armed guerrilla forces. Army forces, they continued, must be capable of fighting in either a nuclear or nonnuclear war. From that point, however, the discussion returned to the Army's vision of a war in Europe against a highly mechanized, nuclear-capable enemy. It stressed the mobility, dispersion, and firepower already inherent in the service's pentomic organization and doctrine. It proclaimed the potential firepower advantage provided by the Davy Crockett atomic projectile and the versatility of the helicopter. The study concluded that the tempo of future wars would far exceed what the Army had experienced in previous conflicts. Beyond brief lip service, the analysis omitted any serious consideration of conflict outside of or beneath the level of full-scale combat in Europe.¹³

Because its budget was now sufficient, the Army finally began making some headway in its program to modernize the weapons, vehicles, and equipment required to fight both limited and general war. In February, the director of the Army budget, Maj. Gen. David W. Traub, sent to the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations a detailed and prioritized list of those major items his service required. The list included everything from new small arms and the appropriate ammunition to major-end items like new helicopters, armored personnel carriers, long-range artillery, and main battle tanks. Altogether, the cost for the items on the list came to \$928 million. At the end of the year, when the Defense Department announced the budget for fiscal year 1962, it included an increase of a billion dollars over the previous year's budget, most of which was earmarked for the Army.¹⁴

President Eisenhower, however, had one more concern to present to the Army before he ended his term of office. The balance-of-payments issue that had begun to trouble him the previous year had worsened. Despite a continuing export surplus, the net outflow of capital payments was increasing. In the president's words, American dollars were cascading overseas. Despite government efforts to stem the tide, by the third quarter of 1960, the deficit of payments reached an annual rate of more than \$4 billion. The developing

13. Memo, Brig. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff et al., 29 Nov 1960, sub: Basic Army Briefings: #5 Nature of Future Land Warfare, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

14. Ltr, Maj. Gen. David W. Traub, Director of Army Budget, to Honorable George H. Mahon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Dept. of Def Appropriations, 9 Feb 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 1709, Series: Congressional Hearings, 1958-1962, Subgroup: Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, RG 319, NACP; "Budget Up Billion for Army," *Army Times*, 17 Dec 1960.

possibility that the United States might have to devalue its currency spurred investors to cash in their dollars for gold, further exacerbating the crisis.¹⁵

Convinced that he had to act, Eisenhower announced in mid-November drastic steps to reduce military expenditures overseas. The most significant aspect of this reduction was an order to cut the number of military dependents outside of the United States to less than half their current number. Additionally, he directed the Defense Department to eliminate all nonessential foreign purchases. With more than 250,000 family members accompanying deployed soldiers, the Army had by far the most dependents affected by the order. The actual number probably was increased significantly by an unknown number of individuals who had joined their service members overseas without official military sponsorship.¹⁶

As Secretary Gates had warned the president, the response throughout the military community was immediate and vocal. As one unnamed soldier expressed in his outrage, "We in the military service have pledged our lives for the preservation of the security of our country. . . . We have not, however, pledged our lives for the security of gold reserves."¹⁷ Dependents throughout Europe and other U.S. military outposts wondered how soon the presidential order would require them to come home. Army officials expressed their concerns that the president's announcement would cripple both recruiting and reenlistment rates. The commanding general of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), General Bruce C. Clarke, telephoned Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker to express his outrage that he had not been consulted about the decision. As a fitting postscript to the year's end, the *Army Times* noted that shortly after the edict was scheduled to go into effect on 1 January, Eisenhower no longer would be president. His successor would have to make the final determination on its implementation.¹⁸

15. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1951-1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 604.

16. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 604; Memo, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Logistics, for Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 13 Nov 1960, sub: Special Staff Studies, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Rash Move," Editorial, *Army Times*, 26 Nov 1960.

17. Jack Vincent, "Order to Return Dependents Stirs Bitter Replies," *Army Times*, 26 Nov 1960.

18. Jack Vincent, "Oversea Moves Stay Normal," *Army Times*, 26 Nov 1960; Vincent, "Order to Return Dependents Stirs Bitter Replies."

BUILDING AN ARMY FOR THE 1960s

For the Army, the new decade brought with it the hope of more generous budgets and perhaps a greater voice in the formation of national defense policy. It seemed that the service would finally begin to receive some of the funding it had long sought to modernize its aging equipment. At the same time, advancing technology had created even more interesting possibilities on which it could spend its money.

After the bitter infighting between the Army and Air Force over long-range missiles, strategic airlift, and antiaircraft responsibilities, the two services had reached an almost peaceful coexistence regarding the continued advancement of the Army's helicopter program. Army experiments at Fort Stewart, Georgia, testing an aerial reconnaissance troop, proceeded early in 1960 with minimal protest or resistance from the junior service. After fifteen weeks of training, the 150-man unit had participated in a series of exercises, acting first under direct control of the infantry division headquarters and later as a component of a division cavalry squadron. The aerial troop extended the range of division reconnaissance assets and acted as a covering force for movements of other maneuver elements. Upon completion of the testing, Third U.S. Army headquarters authorized the 2d Infantry Division to retain the provisional troop within its organization until the Department of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) made a final determination on whether to accept the unit as a permanent part of the division's structure.¹⁹

The Air Force also seemed to acquiesce a little in the issue of close air support. In defending his service's approach to acquiring and producing aircraft capable of performing a wide range of air combat missions, Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White appeared to yield some ground to the Army in its development of armed helicopters. Although General White maintained that the Air Force's high-speed fighters could perform all of the close support missions carried out by their World War II counterparts, he offered no resistance to General Decker's response that Army requirements might exceed the capabilities of aircraft not specifically designed for that mission. By the end of 1960, the Army had moved well along on its development of machines and doctrine utilizing armed helicopters in a ground support role.²⁰

19. "2d Division Recon Unit Finishing Stewart Test," *Army Times*, 30 Jan 1960; "2d Division to Keep Provisional ARS Unit," *Army Times*, 20 Feb 1960.

20. Ltr, Gen. Thomas D. White, Ch Staff, U.S. Air Force, to Gen. George H. Decker, Ch Staff, U.S. Army, 21 Dec 1960; Ltr, Decker to White, 30 Dec 1960; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

By 1960, the Army also had begun to explore the use of data processing equipment in a wider range of roles. The service already had employed computers to manage some logistical and personnel functions. Now, CONARC began to explore how the service could use the machines to support tactical commanders. Earlier studies had suggested that automatic data processing systems could assist field commanders in handling and processing tactical information in a more efficient and nonredundant manner. Although the deputy chief of staff for operations maintained overall control of the project, he delegated the responsibility for specific tasks to those staff agencies with the appropriate interests while retaining responsibilities for developments concerning fire support and operations centers. The assistant chief of staff for intelligence, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, and the deputy chief of staff for logistics retained oversight for projects in their respective areas.²¹

Many of the experiments involved improving the flow of tactical information within the operations centers at field army, corps, and division levels. At those locations, commanders needed to be able to consolidate incoming information to make timely decisions and recommendations. Data systems and computers needed to be able to display such elements as friendly and enemy situations, fire support, air traffic, communications, terrain effects, and chemical and biological activity in a manner to facilitate quick recognition and transfer. Additionally, machines required for the fire support system had to process data collected by target acquisition and intelligence gathering assets and forward that information to other machines that would prepare targeting instructions for planned artillery or air attacks. Ultimately, the flow of information throughout the entire command and control system would be integrated and available to users at all levels.²²

Automation of the Army's logistical and personnel systems already was well underway. The Seventh Army in Europe had employed a communications and automated data processing network to support the experimental Modern Army Supply System, known as Project MASS. The program allowed forward units to stock minimum levels of supplies locally while relying upon the automated network to forward additional resources as they were needed. Computers employed in the personnel systems had begun tracking the movement of soldiers, identifying where to send replacements and calculating how many troops were already in the pipeline. That program remained in its early stages, however, as the Army required newer and more complex machines to update worldwide rosters and to

21. Staff Paper, n.d., sub: USACGSC Project: Command Control Information Systems, 1970, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

22. Staff Paper, n.d., sub: USACGSC Project.

predict in advance where shortages would occur. Additionally, the service needed to automate casualty reporting systems and integrate them into the command information networks as well as personnel functions.²³

The rapid pace of technological growth in so many diverse areas prompted the secretary of the Army to examine the service's organization and approach to basic research and development. In December 1959, Secretary Brucker established the Army Research and Development Board, chaired by George H. Roderick, the assistant secretary of the Army for finance and comptroller, to study and to propose a realignment of the Army's research and development structure. The board met throughout early 1960 and, in March, submitted a proposal to Secretary Brucker and the chief of staff recommending the creation of the Research and Development Command. Current Army organization, the report said, had divided the authority and responsibility for research and development between the assistant secretary of the Army for logistics and the director of research and development on the civilian side and between the chief of research and development and the deputy chief of staff for logistics on the Army Staff. The single, unified Research and Development Command, the study concluded, would improve the overall effectiveness of the Army program, shorten lead times, improve long-range planning, and increase the prestige of the Army's research effort, enabling the service to attract and retain key scientific and military personnel.²⁴

The proposal prompted immediate conflict within the Army Staff. The most vocal opposition came from the Army's chiefs of technical services, who stood to lose authority over resources, personnel, and funding for the research and development process. Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, the Army's chief of research and development, countered that the technical service chiefs seldom had cooperated with his office and that he must have a key voice in the selection, assignment, relief, and replacement of military and civilian personnel playing important roles in research and development. Although Trudeau regarded the creation of a separate command to be too drastic a response to the problem, he lobbied extensively for additional control over the Army's research and development effort.²⁵

23. Staff Paper, n.d., sub: USACGSC Project; Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 282–84.

24. Dept. Army, Ofc Research and Development, 23 Mar 1960, "A Proposed Organization for Army Research and Development"; Ltr, Clifford C. Furnas to Sec Brucker, 15 Apr 1960; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

25. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. Lemnitzer, 13 May 1960, sub: Proposed Organization for Army R&D, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG

Secretary Brucker endorsed Trudeau's approach. In July, he directed the chief of staff to establish a line of authority from the chief of research and development to the chiefs of the technical services similar to that which already existed between the deputy chief of staff for logistics and the technical services. Brucker laid out in extensive detail the specific responsibilities and authorities assigned to the chief of research and development. In a subsequent meeting with all of the technical service chiefs, General Lemnitzer made clear his personal interest in the reform. He informed the chiefs that they would provide their "whole-hearted support" for the decision and that he would tolerate no bickering, foot-dragging, or prolonged argument over its implementation.²⁶

The prospect of additional funding also prompted Army leaders to consider reorganization of the service's operational forces. After several years of tests and experimentation, they began to consider seriously a replacement for the pentomic division. Efforts to tinker around the edges of the organization, expanding its artillery support and providing an additional rifle company to the battle groups, had not improved significantly the division's staying power and survivability on the battlefield. At CONARC, General Clarke's proposals for a modern mobile Army (MOMAR) had initiated a new wave of suggestions for discarding pentomic models and coming up with an entirely new division structure.²⁷

After Clarke moved to Europe to take over as the commanding general of USAREUR, his replacement at CONARC, General Herbert B. Powell, again brought the issue of division restructuring to the attention of the Army Staff. He noted that the Army Command and General Staff College and various CONARC agencies had conducted more than 300 separate studies related to the MOMAR concept. Those studies and related commentaries had identified numerous controversies connected with the concept. The proposed divisions lacked adequate artillery and logistical support, possessed inadequate staff support, and had eliminated much of the command and control elements required at multiple levels throughout the organization. In light of these concerns, along with reservations expressed by the new chief of staff, Powell proposed that the Army Staff view MOMAR not as an ultimate solution

319, NACP.

26. Memo, Sec Brucker for Ch Staff, 30 Jul 1960, sub: Army R&D Organization and Procedures; MFR, Lt. Col. Louis F. Felder, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 9 Aug 1960, sub: Army Organization for Research and Development, both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

27. Ken Thompson, "New Light Army on the Way," *Army Times*, 13 Aug 1960; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 440-41; Memo, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke for Ch Staff, 10 Feb 1960, sub: Concept, Modern Mobile Army 1965-70, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

but as a point of departure in the Army's long-term search for a successor organization to the pentomic division.²⁸

General Clyde D. Eddleman, now the vice chief of staff, ordered Powell and CONARC to reexamine the entire concept. The MOMAR proposal, he wrote, "does not provide the simplicity, homogeneity, versatility, and flexibility required by the Army for its diverse, world-wide tasks in the coming decade."²⁹ The Army would pursue it no further. Eddleman directed Powell to determine the optimum infantry, armored, and mechanized division organizations for the 1961–1965 period. His proposals would include details for all organizational elements, operational implications, and major equipment requirements.³⁰

Eddleman's guidance for the reorganization seemed directed toward avoiding some of the shortcomings observed in both the pentomic and MOMAR experiments. The new divisions, he advised, must be capable of adapting to the full range of nuclear and nonnuclear environments that the Army might encounter in the coming decade. Planners also should consider the development of a mechanized infantry division, particularly for deployment to Europe. Although corps and field army organizations would remain, the study would carefully compare the retention of the battle group formation as opposed to a reversion to the traditional battalion structure. Eddleman also directed CONARC to consider the desirability of interchangeable battalion-size infantry, armor, and artillery elements between the mechanized, infantry, and armored divisions. The new organizations had to be adaptable by tailoring to varying environments, degrees of mechanization, and mobility characteristics. Additional guidance specified that planners should design the organizations with an eye toward air-transportability and with some consideration of officer and senior enlisted career patterns.³¹

Meanwhile, senior officers in Europe were attempting to mitigate some of the perceived shortcomings of the pentomic division. In October 1959, USAREUR forwarded a proposal to the deputy chief of staff for operations requesting approval of a plan to mechanize two battle groups

28. Memo, Gen. Herbert B. Powell for Vice Ch Staff, 22 Nov 1960, sub: MOMAR, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

29. Memo, Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman for Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 16 Dec 1960, sub: Reorganization of Infantry and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized Division, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

30. Memo, Eddleman for Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 16 Dec 1960, sub: Reorganization of Infantry and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized Division.

31. Memo, Eddleman for Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 16 Dec 1960, sub: Reorganization of Infantry and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized Division.

in each of the command's infantry divisions. If the chief of staff approved the plan, USAREUR would assign the armored personnel carriers directly to squads and platoons, rather than pooling them at the division level in accordance with pentomic doctrine. The USAREUR staff estimated that the reorganization would require 876 new tracked vehicles. It also called for 242 new wheeled vehicles to replace smaller vehicles turned in by the mechanized units and to satisfy additional logistical requirements imposed by the new organization. To implement these changes, USAREUR requested an addition of 1,571 personnel to provide drivers, assistant drivers, and necessary maintenance personnel.³²

The Army Staff considered the USAREUR request, routing it through the various staff sections during early March 1960. All sections concurred in the proposal. The deputy chief of staff for military operations, Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, wrote that the proposal was in consonance with organizational studies currently underway and that increasing the mobility of infantry units was a vital step in the modernization of the Army. He pointed out that the program had favorable public relations implications, which the service could exploit upon its implementation.³³

For the moment, however, neither the money nor the support was available at the highest levels. Ironically, Vice Chief of Staff General Eddleman, who had authorized the initial proposal while still the USAREUR commander, initialed the document sent back to the Army Staff indicating that the chief of staff had disapproved the measure. Despite this disappointment, the issue remained in circulation, waiting for the arrival of the new administration.³⁴


KEEPING BUSY

After nearly a decade of the Army shuffling a diminishing number of active divisions around, by 1960, its organization and disposition began to stabilize. For the second consecutive year, the number of divisions and the locations of their headquarters remained the same as they had been the previous year. In Europe, the V and VII Corps with the 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions and the 3d and 4th Armored Divisions remained the

32. Memo, Gen. Eddleman, Cmdg Gen, U.S. Army, Europe, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 29 Oct 1959, sub: Mechanization of Two Battle Groups in Each Division, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

33. Memo, Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 16 Mar 1960, sub: Mechanization of USAREUR Infantry Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

34. Memo, Oakes for Ch Staff, 16 Mar 1960, sub: Mechanization of USAREUR Infantry Divisions.



Map 9



Map 10

core of the Seventh Army. Although understrength, the 7th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry Divisions of I Corps continued their forward deployment missions in Korea, backstopped by the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i. In the continental United States, the 4th Infantry Division and the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions made up the XVIII Airborne Corps, the nation's Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) reaction force. The 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division stood at a lower level of readiness, served as training cadres for new recruits, and supported the rotation of personnel overseas. Two battle groups in Alaska and one in the Caribbean



Map 11

rounded out the combat elements of the active Army.³⁵ (See Maps 9, 10, and 11.)

The pause in the steady reduction of Army units and personnel gave the service's leaders an opportunity to reconsider base requirements for the now diminished force of just more than 870,000. In a study conducted

35. Memo, Dewey Short, Asst Sec Army Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces, for Asst Sec Def (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces), 25 Feb 1960, sub: Request of Chairman Price, House Armed Services Subcommittee for Unclassified Document Outlining Allocation of Military Personnel; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

early in January 1960, the deputy chief of staff for logistics reported that the Army currently maintained fifty-four active Class I installations within the continental United States. Of these, he considered eleven to be the hard core of the Army's requirements and of too high a priority to consider closing. Another twenty-nine he thought too small in acreage, assigned personnel, and operating cost to justify the costs of shutdown. The remaining fourteen merited additional study as potential candidates for closure.³⁶

The fourteen installations under consideration included some of the service's oldest and most prestigious locations. The Army Staff narrowed down the list according to the needs of the service. Fort Dix, New Jersey, would remain because it housed a major reception and training area in the most populous region of the United States. Fort Campbell, Kentucky, provided the only location other than Fort Bragg, North Carolina, capable of supporting the training and operational facilities required by an airborne division. Fort Stewart, Georgia, supported the only tank-firing ranges on the east coast capable of accommodating both active and reserve force training exercises. Ultimately, the staff recommended three primary installations for closure—Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Gordon, Georgia; and Fort Carson, Colorado. The recommendation also included several smaller depots and installations as candidates for closure.³⁷

General Decker, the vice chief of staff, agreed with most of the study's recommendations, but objected strenuously to the listing of Fort Jackson as a higher priority for closure than Fort Gordon. He pointed out that the former was the only major Army installation in South Carolina, while Georgia retained Forts Benning, Stewart, and Gordon, as well as the Atlanta General Depot. Closing one of a state's five locations certainly would have less of an impact on public relations than closing a state's sole facility. In his opinion, that was the most important consideration.³⁸

Army air defense sites in the United States also were coming under fire. In May, the commanding general of NORAD (North American Air Defense Command), Air Force General Laurence S. Kuter, recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Nike Hercules bases located near seven Strategic Air Command bases and one Atomic Energy Commission site be relocated to support the air defenses surrounding several major metropolitan areas. He based his recommendation upon anticipated reductions in NORAD forces

36. Memo, Maj. Gen. George O. N. Lodoen, Acting Dep Ch Staff Logistics, for Ch Staff, 18 Jan 1960, sub: Priority of Closure of Installations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

37. Memo, Lodoen for Ch Staff, 18 Jan 1960, sub: Priority of Closure of Installations.

38. Memo, Gen. Decker for Ch Staff, 22 Jan 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

in coming years. The Joint Chiefs approved the general's recommendations, which resulted in the cancellation of construction at the eight locations, several of which already were nearing completion. Following that decision, Army leaders prepared to redeploy Nike Hercules batteries intended for those sites to areas around New York; the Washington, D.C.–Baltimore, Maryland area; Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and other cities, where they would replace aging Nike Ajax units.³⁹

At the same time that the Army Staff wrestled with matching the service's facilities and infrastructure with its evolving strength and mission, the units in the active force carried on with training exercises designed to highlight their evolving capabilities. In Europe and Korea, the forward-deployed divisions continued preparations to meet potential Communist threats in those locations. In the United States, divisions assigned to STRAC participated in a series of training events intended to test their response to different situations and environments and their ability to move quickly to far-flung trouble spots.⁴⁰

In LITTLE BEAR, the first exercise in 1960, the 1st Battle Group, 12th Infantry, led by Col. George C. Fogle, flew from Fort Lewis, Washington, to team up with elements of U.S. Army, Alaska. After arriving in Alaska, the unit prepared to move out with supplies and heavy equipment already stockpiled in depots there. According to Maj. Gen. John H. Michaelis, the U.S. Army, Alaska, commander, the participating units were able to test various weapons and items of equipment under harsh arctic conditions. Michaelis noted that the intense training developed "men with the tough hide and cold nerve essential for combat readiness, especially in a climate of this kind where we may someday have to fight."⁴¹

In March, the Army participated in two major exercises in the Caribbean to test strategic airlift coordination between the Army and the Air Force, to assess the ability of U.S. Army units to cooperate in joint exercises with military units from Latin American nations, and, perhaps, to send a message to the revolutionary leaders in Cuba. Exercise BANYAN TREE II began late in December 1959, when representatives from the U.S. Army Caribbean Command and CONARC visited Colombia, Peru, and Brazil to meet with military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) there and to discuss the

39. MFR, Col. Phillip R. Smith, Asst Ch Air Def Plans Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 26 May 1960, sub: Discussion of JCS 1899/577 with ADDR&E (Air Defense); Fact Sheet, Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, Dep Ch Staff Ops, 2 Jun 1960, sub: Change in Deployment of Nike Hercules in CONUS; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

40. For information about U.S. Army, Europe, training events, see Carter, *Forging the Shield*.

41. "2 Battle Groups End Little Bear," *Army Times*, 27 Feb 1960.



Soldiers participating in Exercise LITTLE BEAR read magazines during a lull in the training. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

participation of military units from those nations in a joint exercise. The operations plan called for the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry, of the 82d Airborne Division, to make an airborne assault into Panama, where it would join an airborne infantry company from Brazil, one company from the Panamanian National Guard, and an advanced planning detachment provided by Colombia. The allied forces would then unite to combat aggressors provided by the 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry, from Fort Kobbe, Panama Canal Zone. The Air Force provided twenty-five C-130 and fifty C-123 aircraft to move the troops from Fort Bragg to the Canal Zone and to conduct the airborne assault. The maneuver continued from 8 to 16 March and involved a variety of missions against the aggressor force. Observers of the maneuver were satisfied with the cooperation between the allied forces and observed that further such training would be beneficial to all concerned. For once, Army observers even expressed satisfaction with the level of Air Force support and voiced their appreciation for the close teamwork between Army and Air Force elements throughout the exercise.⁴²

That cooperation and teamwork met an even bigger test almost immediately on the heels of the BANYAN TREE II deployment. Between

42. Final Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Caribbean, 8-16 Mar 1960, sub: Exercise BANYAN TREE II, Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, DC; Karl Sprinkle, "82d Jumps in Panama War" *Army Times*, 12 Mar 1960.

14 and 28 March, CONARC and the U.S. Air Force Military Air Transport Service conducted Joint Exercise BIG SLAM/PUERTO PINE, the largest test yet conducted of the surge capability of U.S. strategic airlift. During BIG SLAM, the Air Force component of the exercise, 447 aircraft from the Military Air Transport Service, transported some 21,000 troops and 11,000 tons of supplies from the United States to Puerto Rico. The aircraft, a mix of C-118, C-121, C-133, and C-124 transport planes, flew from nineteen separate air bases in the United States.⁴³

The Army designated its part of the exercise as PUERTO PINE. Seventy-eight separate units participated in the training, which included the marshalling at home stations, the movement to airfield staging areas, and the loading of troops and equipment onto aircraft. Most of the participating units came from the XVIII Airborne Corps, with six battle groups from the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. Although the lift included few heavy vehicles, the exercise did involve two field artillery battalions: the 2d Battalion, 222d Field Artillery, from the Utah National Guard and the 3d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, of the 79th Infantry Division, U.S. Army Reserve. The exercise concluded without any further tactical operations once the units had landed in Puerto Rico, but they received excellent training in movement, air loading, and transport procedures.⁴⁴

Although the exercise proved successful, it also identified the limits of the nation's current strategic airlift capability. Observers noted that all aircraft except the C-133s rapidly were becoming obsolete. The operation demonstrated the need for further tests and exercises of this type. Others reviewing the maneuver suggested that contrary to current policy, civilian aircraft were not appropriate for the movement of STRAC or other combat forces. Instead, military officials should consider increased use of civilian aircraft for routine peacetime missions, allowing the Military Air Transport Command to focus exclusively on its wartime mission.⁴⁵

In April, the services delivered a full report on the airlift exercises to a subgroup of the House Armed Services Committee that Congress had established to study the nation's strategic airlift requirements. Army leaders

43. Joint Rpt, Headquarters, Continental Army Command and Military Air Transport Service, 14-28 March 1960, Joint Report on the Operational and Internal Aspects With Lessons Learned and Conclusions; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Test of Airlift Capabilities," *Army Information Digest* 15 (Oct 1960): 39-43.

44. "Test of Airlift Capabilities," 39-43.

45. "Test of Airlift Capabilities," 39-43; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Airlift Iffy, Chiefs Admit," *Army Times*, 12 Mar 1960; Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. James K. Woolnough, 3 Feb 1960, sub: The Role of MATS in Peace and War, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

appeared before the assembled group, hopeful that they might be able to provide new impetus to the service's efforts to increase acquisition of long-range military transport aircraft. Defense Department officials maintained their position that, in asking for sufficient aircraft to move a division anywhere in the world within seven days, the Army was asking for too much. General Lemnitzer argued that, to the contrary, the lift of a two-division force anywhere in the world within a period of four weeks was a necessary, reasonable, and attainable goal.⁴⁶

In making his case, the Army chief of staff noted that he had selected Southeast Asia as the most realistic scenario on which to base the Army's strategic airlift requirements. He noted that Vietnam represented a typical destination, which might require a sustained movement over a long line of communications into an area that would not have the logistic and command facilities that were available in Korea. He concluded that a deployment into Southeast Asia should remain the standard for measuring the adequacy of airlift to meet the Army's needs.⁴⁷

PROJECT MAN

In March, Secretary Brucker approved plans for a troop and equipment demonstration to take place at Fort Benning during the first week in May. Army leadership intended the demonstration, dubbed Project MAN (for Modern Army Needs), to reflect the service's concentration on its most important role, sustained land combat. The chief of staff assigned primary responsibility for the project to the deputy chief of staff for logistics and directed all other staff and field agencies to provide any requested assistance and to consider the project one of his highest priorities.⁴⁸

In a detailed description of the project's purpose and goals, the Army Staff referred to General Twining's complaint that the service had become too "missile happy" and had lost sight of its primary mission.⁴⁹ In language that resounded with the philosophies and verbiage of Maxwell Taylor, the paper declared an intent to convince the American people that the Army

46. "Airlift Report," *Army Times*, 16 Apr 1960.

47. Statement, Army Ch Staff Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, *Before the Special Subcommittee on Airlift Requirements, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives*, 86th Cong. (22 Apr 1960), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

48. Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 9 Mar 1960, sub: Project MAN Demonstration at Fort Benning, Georgia, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

49. Memo, Bonesteel for Dep Chs Staff, 9 Mar 1960, sub: Project MAN Demonstration.

had its mind on its mission of sustained land combat in general or limited war. The demonstration also would provide the media with an opportunity to “fill their files” with photographs and written materials supporting the Army’s objectives.⁵⁰ Additionally, it would orient senior officers within the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve and bring them up to date so that they would speak as one voice regarding the Army’s role in national security.⁵¹

A series of articles in Army publications identified a second theme the service intended to emphasize. Under Secretary of the Army Hugh M. Milton III wrote in *Army Information Digest* that the service was returning to a focus upon the individual soldier as the ultimate weapon in land combat. No computer could match the wizardry of a soldier’s brain for judgment, discernment, and decision. Milton referred to General Lemnitzer’s statement that “man is and will remain the essential element in war,” but it must have been difficult for readers not to hear the voice of Matthew Ridgway praising “the trained fighting man” as the “decisive element of victory in war” as they read Lemnitzer’s words. Articles in subsequent publications referred to similar themes, praising the contributions of soldiers and identifying them as the real source of the Army’s and the nation’s strength.⁵²

The guest list for Project MAN was impressive. In addition to almost all of the Army’s most senior officers and civilian leaders, attendees included retired chiefs of staff Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, and Matthew B. Ridgway. Other senior military representatives in attendance were the secretary of defense, Thomas Gates, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Nathan Twining, and the director of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, V. Adm. John H. Sides. Other attendees included members of Congress and representatives from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) headquarters as well as delegates from many of the member nations making up those organizations. Both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon attended the opening ceremonies, with the president delivering a few remarks at the initial press conference.⁵³

50. Memo, Bonesteel for Dep Chs Staff, 9 Mar 1960, sub: Project MAN Demonstration.

51. Memo, Bonesteel for Dep Chs Staff, 9 Mar 1960, sub: Project MAN Demonstration.

52. Hugh M. Milton III, “Modern Army Needs MAN, MAN Needs Modern Army,” *Army Information Digest* 15 (May 1960): 2–3; “Soldier, American, Model 1960: The Ultimate and Indispensable Weapon,” *Army Information Digest* 15 (Aug 1960): 2–15; Lt. Col. John E. Lance, “Man: The Essential Element,” *Army Information Digest* 15 (May 1960): 5–13.

53. “Soldier, American, Model 1960: The Ultimate and Indispensable Weapon,” 2–15; “Department of the Army: Project MAN,” *Army Times*, 30 Apr 1960.



The presidential party arrives at Fort Benning, Georgia. *On the ground, from left to right: Thomas S. Gates Jr., President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Maj. Gen. Hugh P. Harris, Wilber M. Brucker, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General Bruce C. Clarke, and Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Powell (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)*

Also named as special attendees on the guest list were representatives from thirty-two commercial companies that acted as sponsors, helping the Army make Project MAN possible. The list included some of the biggest names in American industry, among them Chrysler, General Electric, Grumman Aircraft Engineering, U.S. Steel, and RCA (Radio Corporation of America). Secretary Brucker highlighted the cooperation between the Army and its industrial partners, pointing out that without the full support of industry and the American public, the Army would find it even more difficult to fulfill its missions.⁵⁴

All of the attendees were in place on 2 May. Project MAN lasted for three days, during which the Army treated its audience to a tremendous show. The first demonstration featured a night attack against a reinforced infantry rifle company, highlighting the variety of supporting weapons and Army aircraft available to the ground commander. Subsequent demonstrations spotlighted the service's vehicles and equipment and its arsenal of nuclear-capable

54. "Department of the Army: Project MAN."

artillery. Demonstrations and discussions also featured the Army's evolving aviation assets and their capabilities. Additional conferences and displays provided information on airborne operations, river crossings, and Army Rangers. Each branch within the Army had its opportunity to trumpet its accomplishments and to justify its role as part of a modern, ground-combat force. Despite the service's stated goal of returning its focus to the individual soldier, it was hard for observers not to notice the spotlights placed upon new technologies.⁵⁵

In his remarks, President Eisenhower had praised the cooperation between industry and the armed forces, describing the pleasure he felt as American businesses produced such tremendous weapons and then turned them over to soldiers who learned to use them so expertly. The sight of such close cooperation between the Army and national industry had a powerful effect on the president, however. Less than a year later, in his farewell speech to the country delivered over a national television broadcast, Eisenhower warned the nation of the upcoming undue influence that would be exerted by the military-industrial complex, an influence he must have observed as an integral component of Project MAN.⁵⁶

General Isaac D. White, commander of the U.S. Army, Pacific, tried to summarize the Army's fortunes in a letter to the Army's chief of staff. He told his friend, General Lemnitzer, that he sensed a certain amount of public astonishment in the new and advanced concepts that the Army had demonstrated. He only hoped that no one got the impression that the Army actually had all of the marvelous weapons and equipment that were part of the splendid demonstration the Army had held at Fort Benning.⁵⁷

For some Army officials and for Secretary Brucker in particular, the Project MAN demonstrations had another purpose. They hoped to use the event to reinforce the secretary's message that the active force, the reserves, and the National Guard should speak with one voice, as one Army. Various committees formed during a conference convened by the secretary in October the previous year had generated forty-nine separate recommendations for changes to policy. Many of these were more cosmetic or symbolic than substantive. However, a few seemed to make a genuine attempt to raise the status of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard within the overall hierarchy of the Army. One required the Department of

55. "Department of the Army: Project MAN."

56. "Soldier, American, Model 1960: The Ultimate and Indispensable Weapon," 2-15; James Ledbetter, *Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).

57. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 14 May 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

the Army to include appropriate reserve and national guard representatives in presenting the objectives of the Army before Congress. Another directed the Army Staff to establish the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and Reserve Officers' Training Corps Affairs on the same organizational level as the National Guard Bureau, with direct access to the chief of staff and the secretary of the Army. In February, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, General Oakes, informed the undersecretary of the Army that the staff had forwarded thirty-eight of the recommendations to the chief of staff, with eleven remaining at the staff level for further consideration.⁵⁸

RETENTION ISSUES: KEEPING THE RIGHT PEOPLE IN

Despite some successes, many of the Army's perennial personnel issues continued to bedevil its leaders. On the bright side, the outlook for retaining junior officers appeared to be improving, with the retention rate in the second half of 1960 showing a growth of 8.5 percent over the previous year. Maj. Gen. Robert W. Porter Jr., the Army's director of military personnel management, reported that retention rates were rising simply because the service was doing a better job of selling the Army's appeal than it had done in the past. Others in the personnel business gave the lion's share of the credit to unit commanders. Brig. Gen. Reuben H. Tucker III, the chief of the Infantry Officers Division in the Personnel Assignment Directorate, also noted that assignment officers were doing a better job matching up the needs of the service with the strengths and career requirements of individual officers.⁵⁹

The retention of more senior officers, however, seemed to be trending in a different direction. Anecdotal evidence, at least, indicated that an increasing number of field grade officers, particularly senior colonels, were leaving the service. Army leaders attributed this, to some extent, to financial pressures. Despite recent pay increases, many officers believed that retirement after thirty years would leave them unable to take proper care of their families, particularly with children entering the college-age years. Many believed that

58. Memo, Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes for Under Sec Army, 2 Mar 1960, sub: One Army Conference Committees' Recommendations; Ltr, Under Sec Army Hugh M. Milton III to Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 12 Feb 1960; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

59. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1960 to June 30, 1961* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 100; Ken Thompson, "Officer Retention Outlook Improving," *Army Times*, 14 May 1960; "Unit Commanders Get Credit for Officer Retention Rise," *Army Times*, 15 Oct 1960.

by leaving the service earlier, they would stand a better chance of finding good jobs in the civilian sector than they would if they remained in the Army until full retirement.⁶⁰

Others, however, pointed out a rising level of dissatisfaction among senior officers over other issues within the Army. They noted that most of the Army's officers now spent a great deal of time within civilian communities, exposed to a wider range of attitudes toward the military than they traditionally had experienced. The perception that other services, particularly the Air Force, enjoyed greater public and political support than the Army rankled many. Additional issues that troubled Army leaders included the over-centralization of authority that hindered the development of junior officers and restrictions within the Uniform Code of Military Justice that limited the authority of unit commanders to discipline their subordinates. Finally, both Congress and the secretary of defense noted that disparities had arisen in the way the military services administered their officer personnel programs. The secretary called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to study the laws and regulations that applied to personnel management and to recommend new legislation to bring the basic policies of each service into alignment.⁶¹

When the Army's leadership turned its attention to the attitudes, morale, and physical condition of its soldiers, the news was somewhat better. In response to queries from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, major commanders reported that the general attitude of recruits toward military service was positive and that disciplinary problems were not a major concern. Draftees and volunteers were willing to accept the hardships of military service when they viewed them as necessary and when they applied to the whole unit. Leaders pointed toward the revised military pay bill, increased survivors' benefits, improved medical care for dependents, and other recent beneficial legislation as contributing to the more positive outlook. They also noted that the elimination of many lower-aptitude soldiers from the service and the imposition of higher admission and reenlistment standards had had a positive effect.⁶²

Senior commanders took special note of the physical fitness of their soldiers. For the most part, they agreed that the medical condition of new

60. "Officer Shortage Looks Hopeless," *Army Times*, 20 Aug 1960; Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Decker, 16 Nov 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

61. Ltr, White to Decker, 16 Nov 1960; Memo, James H. Douglas, Dep Sec Def, for Sec Army et al., 23 May 1960, sub: Study and Revision of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

62. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Gen. Lemnitzer, 28 Mar 1960, sub: Morale and Physical Fitness of U.S. Military Personnel; Ltr,

recruits was excellent, but that in many cases their physical fitness and stamina left something to be desired. The physical demands of basic training and subsequent unit fitness programs were sufficient to correct these deficiencies. Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, added his belief that a more significant problem was the deterioration of fitness with older, upper-grade soldiers. Although their condition usually did not merit elimination or discharge, it was of concern for promotions and potential overseas assignments. Collins suggested reorienting the Army's physical training test toward such combat skills as jumping, climbing, crawling, and throwing as a way to identify soldiers who might no longer be deployable.⁶³

By the end of 1960 and the end of the Eisenhower administration, the Army was quite different from what it had been during World War II and the Korean conflict. The men and women who now made up the Army took on a new image. Although the service still relied upon the draft to maintain its numbers, recent legislation had improved the quality of both enlistees and draftees that it had to induct. Troops had to have the intellectual capacity to absorb the more complex technologies associated with their weapons, vehicles, and equipment. Efforts to improve the public image of military service in general and the Army in particular also had proven effective. A poll conducted within the Army's Pacific Command showed that 58 percent of inductees indicated a genuine desire to serve while only 5 percent resented military service. Morale within the Army had improved, reflecting this more positive perception. Although World War II and Korean War veterans still pervaded the senior levels of both the enlisted and officer corps, few in the junior ranks could boast of combat experience. After eight years of struggling to survive the fiscal constraints and philosophical strait jacket of the New Look, the force was beginning to look toward the future with a rising air of confidence.⁶⁴

Charles C. Finucane, Asst Sec Def, to Gordon Gray, Special Asst to the President for National Security Affairs, 3 Jun 1960; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

63. Ltr, Finucane to Gray, 3 Jun 1960; Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Vice Ch Staff, 16 Jun 1960, sub: Distribution of Personnel Based on Physical Capabilities, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

64. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Gen. Lemnitzer, 28 Mar 1960, sub: Morale and Physical Condition of U.S. Military Personnel, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. A more detailed description of the mostly positive results of Army efforts to improve the quality of both recruits and reenlistees can be found in Brian M. Linn, *Elvis's Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 132–64.



Col. Edward G. Lansdale at the Pentagon in 1955. *Left to right: Allen W. Dulles, Colonel Lansdale, General Nathan F. Twining, and Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell (U.S. Air Force Archive)*

THE LURE AND THE DANGER

In March 1960, U.S. Air Force Col. Edward G. Lansdale, deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for special operations, prepared an assessment of the security situation in Vietnam. Lansdale had served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II and had gained a reputation for expertise in the areas of special warfare and counterinsurgency from his experiences in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Lansdale reported that the Communist Viet Cong had been strengthening their guerrilla efforts in South Vietnam for some time. Larger bands were now operating throughout the country despite the efforts of the South Vietnamese Army and local home-guard units to contain them. Lansdale claimed that almost half of the Vietnamese infantry regiments the government used against the insurgents lacked fundamental individual and small-unit training. Yet, Lansdale concluded, the United States needed to construct a sound political basis in Vietnam

before any military solution could take hold. He warned that this would take a special effort, by both South Vietnam and the United States.⁶⁵

Lansdale prepared another assessment in August, this time for Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, who just had been designated the successor to General Samuel T. Williams as the commander of the U.S. MAAG, Vietnam. In answer to questions that the general had posed, Lansdale asserted that one of the primary problems he would face in Vietnam was the ability of the guerrillas to seek refuge across the border in Cambodia. He warned of a growing influence of Soviet and Chinese elements in Cambodia who were actively supporting guerrilla activities in Vietnam. Lansdale was a supporter of President Ngô Đình Diệm, and he told McGarr that reports of popular dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese leader were based largely upon the wishful thinking of certain groups with particular reasons for advancing those views. He also warned the incoming MAAG commander that many of the top officers in the Vietnamese Army previously had been agents “in the pay and control of the French intelligence and clandestine services.”⁶⁶ Many U.S. officials remained naive, he concluded, regarding alliances that had formed between those agencies and the security services of the Viet Minh and Communist China.⁶⁷

On the ground in Vietnam, the U.S. Army presence continued to expand. In May, a contingent of thirty special forces personnel arrived in Vietnam to increase and improve counter guerrilla training for the South Vietnamese Army. They were accompanied by three intelligence officers, two civil affairs officers, and three psychological warfare specialists tasked to assist with the instruction. In supporting the deployment, General Oakes, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, noted the growing importance of antiguerrilla activities in the Cold War environment. He wondered whether the Army was devoting enough of its resources to meet possible requirements of that type in the future.⁶⁸

65. Memo, Col. Edward G. Lansdale, U.S. Air Force, for Dep Sec Douglas, 17 Mar 1960, sub: Security Situation in Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. For more on Lansdale, see Max Boot, *The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam* (New York: Liveright, 2018) and Cecil B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1988).

66. Memo, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale for Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, 11 Aug 1960, sub: Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

67. Memo, Lansdale for McGarr, 11 Aug 1960, sub: Vietnam.

68. Fact Sheet, Brig. Gen. John W. Keating, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 22 Jul 1960, sub: Special U.S. Army Assistance to South Vietnam; Memo, Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 19 May 1960, sub: Counter-Insurgency Operations

Equally troubling was the situation in Laos, where a series of coups and counter coups had left the nation reeling. A Western-leaning government there remained in control of the capital, Vientiane. An opposition party, however, had aligned with the insurrectionist Pathet Lao and received backing from the Soviet Union, China, and India. By the end of 1960, Laos appeared to be teetering on the brink of Communist takeover. Primarily because of State Department objections to its expansion, the U.S. Army representation in Laos had been relatively small. Although the country remained an important consideration for President Eisenhower, he feared the consequences of a unilateral American intervention. He had hoped that the British and French would bring their influence to bear through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. As a result, Army planning for operations in Laos lagged behind similar preparations for potential activity in Vietnam.⁶⁹

The situation in Southeast Asia was troublesome enough to drive much of the conversation as Army leaders discussed the operational readiness of their forces throughout 1960. In November, the U.S. Army, Pacific, commander, General White, reported on the condition of the various elements under his command. In Korea, the personnel posture of the two divisions in the Eighth Army had improved considerably. Increased authorizations had allowed commanders there to reduce the number of Korean augmentees. The 25th Infantry Division had been improved materially by the deployment of the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, to Okinawa, Japan, although the rest of the division in Hawai'i remained at reduced strength. General White observed that the activation of the 9th Logistical Command, also in Okinawa, had improved his ability to support contingency operations in the region.⁷⁰

White's command continued to deal with deficiencies in many other areas. He had reported monthly to the Department of the Army a lack of critical personnel in areas of electronics, maintenance, intelligence, and some combat specialties. In the Eighth Army, where most of the shortages occurred, attempts to reduce them through on-the-job training and unit schools had been ineffective because of the brief tour of duty in Korea. White's report also noted that the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) on Okinawa

in South Vietnam and Laos; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

69. Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 294–95; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 162–63.

70. Memo, Gen. I. D. White for Adjutant Gen, 16 Nov 1960, sub: Readiness of U.S. Army Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

did not have many of the skilled linguists it would require to perform its missions. His command lacked adequate training areas in some cases and had insufficient ammunition reserves to support some field artillery training. Although the establishment of the 9th Logistical Command was significant, White noted that it was only a nucleus around which he might be able to build an adequate support force for the region. His reserve stocks, scattered in depots in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines, remained inadequate to support a major operation, and he lacked sufficient air and sea transport to deploy them expeditiously. He concluded with an overall assessment that, while his command was prepared to engage successfully in the initial stages of a major combat operation, its readiness to conduct sustained combat was less than satisfactory.⁷¹

Through other channels, General White reminded Vice Chief of Staff General Decker that any widening conflict in Southeast Asia carried important logistical implications for the United States. Much like the case had been in Korea, indigenous forces in Laos and Vietnam would be almost totally dependent upon the United States for support because the Americans had supplied them exclusively with U.S. equipment. Those countries could not turn anywhere else for maintenance support or for resupply of parts and ammunition. Additionally, other members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization would look to the United States to provide port facilities and the logistical infrastructure needed to support any participation of their forces in a local conflict (*Map 12*).⁷²

Earlier in the year, the Army Logistics Staff had provided the secretary of the Army with an updated assessment of the facilities in Vietnam necessary to support military operations. It noted that, while port facilities were adequate to support the force envisioned for intervention in Vietnam, the limited capacities of most ports would funnel incoming shipping into Saigon. Only two airfields, those in Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang, were capable of receiving large, cargo-type aircraft, and neither was suited for sustained operations. Existing airfields in Laos and Thailand, however, could help to offset these limitations. A national highway improvement program had developed the coastal highway into an all-weather road stretching the length of the eastern coastline and had completed another six-lane paved road between Saigon and Biên Hòa. In summary, although there had been several superficial improvements in the transportation infrastructure since

71. Memo, White for Adjutant Gen, 16 Nov 1960, sub: Readiness of U.S. Army Forces.

72. Msg, USARPAC to Department of the Army, 30 March 1960, sub: For Gen Decker From Gen White, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.



Map 12

the analysis conducted by General Ridgway five years earlier, many of the shortcomings, particularly in the country's interior, remained.⁷³

For the Army, then, Southeast Asia, and particularly Vietnam, had created a strange mix of apprehension and anticipation. The escalating conflict between the South Vietnamese government and the Viet Cong guerrillas seemed to offer a tailor-made testing ground for the service to deploy and exploit the resources and expertise it had begun to develop in the areas of counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, and counter guerrilla warfare. The growing number of U.S. observers in the region later would cause General Taylor to refer to Vietnam as a laboratory for the study of insurgency. He ultimately would become one of the greatest advocates for U.S. military intervention there. As national leaders expressed their concern and interest in the region, the Army could flex its muscle as the military service most prepared to intervene. At the same time, many Army officers expressed the same concerns that General Ridgway, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, and others had raised over the previous several years. Vietnam was still a primitive environment in which to fight a war, especially against an enemy they had not yet defined clearly and behind a South Vietnamese government that enjoyed dubious political support at home.⁷⁴

SIZING UP THE NEW PRESIDENT

On 8 November 1960, in one of the closest presidential races on record, Americans elected John F. Kennedy to be their new president. It was the first national election to include fifty states, after the addition of Hawai'i and Alaska in 1959. It was also the first in which the limit established by the Twenty-Second Amendment prevented the reelection of a sitting president to a third term.

Even before the results were recorded, the Army Staff had been at work preparing an analysis of the president-elect's views on defense issues. In doing so, they synopsized thoughts he had expressed in his latest book, *Strategy of Peace*, in his most recent speeches before Congress and on the

73. Fact Sheet, Col. M. L. DeGuire, Asst Director of Plans and Material, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 21 Jan 1960, sub: Facilities in Vietnam for Support of Military Operations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

74. Ingo W. Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam* (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky), 110–12.

campaign trail, and within many of the newspaper and periodical stories treating the subject.⁷⁵

The analysis began with a general assessment underlining the image of youthful vigor that the new administration intended to portray. It noted Kennedy's professed belief that Americans must awaken from their acquiescence and complacency to a new national mood in which tough thinking and a sense of resolute action were the keys to solving the nation's problems.⁷⁶

Kennedy already had directed some of his closest allies within the defense establishment to begin studies of what he considered to be the most difficult issues facing the United States. Senator Henry M. Jackson and Adlai E. Stevenson II—the former Illinois governor who had lost the presidential election to Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956—chaired one group investigating the most pressing foreign policy problems. Paul H. Nitze, a diplomat and scholar who had helped shape U.S. defense policy during the Truman administration, headed a second group studying foreign policy and defense matters. A third group, headed by Senator Symington, was concerned with defense organization. Kennedy and his staff had directed the leaders of each group to present him with their findings no later than the end of the year.⁷⁷

The paper also noted that Kennedy appeared to be more than familiar with the views of both General Taylor and General Gavin, having cited their opinions on missiles and limited war frequently. Although he supported increased strategic missile development and particularly a hardening of missile sites, he had reserved much of his criticism of his predecessor's defense policies for their lack of attention to limited warfare. He supported General Taylor's vision of Flexible Response and called for an increase in strength for all conventional ground forces, including the Marines. He wished to continue modernization programs for the Army's and Navy's limited war forces and questioned the adequacy of strategic airlift available to support overseas deployment. The analysis concluded with Kennedy's belief that he could streamline the Defense Department, but it expressed

75. Staff Reading Paper, Ofc Ch Staff, 30 Nov 1960, sub: President-Elect Kennedy's Views on Defense, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

76. Staff Reading Paper, Ofc Ch Staff, 30 Nov 1960, sub: President-Elect Kennedy's Views on Defense.

77. Staff Reading Paper, Ofc Ch Staff, 30 Nov 1960, sub: President-Elect Kennedy's Views on Defense.

some doubt that he would accept some of the more extreme proposals being considered by the Symington Committee.⁷⁸

That prediction seemed to be borne out when, at the end of the year, Kennedy announced that he would nominate Robert S. McNamara, president of the Ford Motor Company, to be the next secretary of defense. McNamara also declared an intention to forego the dramatic reforms of the Defense Department being recommended by the Symington committee. After listening to advice by his predecessor, Secretary Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Lemnitzer, McNamara indicated that he would give the changes effected by the 1958 Pentagon reorganization a chance to take hold.⁷⁹

Both Kennedy and McNamara would face a wide range of national security issues once they took office. As it had been for the United States since the end of World War II, most concerns began with its relationship with the Soviet Union. To an enormous extent, the U.S. interaction with the Soviets revolved around Berlin. In January 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had repeated his intention to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He had used this threat for the previous few years to goad the West into concessions he desired in other areas. With a summit meeting scheduled in May with President Eisenhower and other Western leaders in Paris, the Soviet leader no doubt intended the renewed threat over Berlin to strengthen his hand. That advantage proved to be unnecessary. On 1 May, the Soviets shot down an American U-2 surveillance aircraft following a flight plan deep inside Soviet territory. Although the Americans initially claimed the aircraft had been on a routine weather mission, their arguments evaporated when Khrushchev produced both the pilot, who had survived the crash, and telltale evidence the Soviets had found in the wreckage. After opening statements in which he raged against American espionage, the Soviet leader walked out of the Paris summit. U.S.-Soviet relations would remain at a low ebb throughout the election.⁸⁰

Closer to home were developments in Cuba, where Fidel Castro's Communist-supported insurgency had overthrown the government of President Fulgencio Batista and had begun to consolidate its power. During the summer of 1960, Castro nationalized all U.S.-owned businesses and property in Cuba. President Eisenhower retaliated by freezing all Cuban

78. Staff Reading Paper, Ofc Ch Staff, 30 Nov 1960, sub: President-Elect Kennedy's Views on Defense.

79. Jack Raymond, "McNamara is Cool to Pentagon Shift," *New York Times*, 28 Dec 1960.

80. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 543–60; Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960*, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2000), 70–71.

assets in the United States and tightening embargoes on Cuban exports. Prompted primarily by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised the secretary of defense as early as 1959 that the emerging Communist-dominated state in Cuba posed a direct threat to the security of the United States. Throughout the spring of 1960, the State Department and the National Security Council discussed plans for multilateral or unilateral intervention in Cuba. Emerging from those discussions was a tentative plan for training a paramilitary group of Cuban exiles to reenter that country and lead resistance forces. Although President Eisenhower had endorsed the project, it would remain for the new Kennedy administration to bring it to execution.⁸¹

Another potential trouble spot had flared in July when the Republic of Congo gained independence from Belgium. Subsequent rioting and a mutiny among some of the Congolese military prompted an exodus of Europeans and other Westerners from the region. Although a member of the new government requested U.S. assistance and approximately 2,000 U.S. nationals resided in the area, President Eisenhower elected to limit U.S. involvement in the region. He dispatched the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS *Wasp* to waters off the East African coast, and the Army initially provided a few helicopters and light aircraft to assist the U.S. ambassador. The Air Force deployed more than one hundred aircraft of varying sizes to help with evacuation efforts and to bring in humanitarian supplies. Failing to acquire substantial American support, Congolese Prime Minister Patrice É. Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union for military aid. The region quickly descended into political chaos with Soviet and Western blocs aligning with various competing African factions.⁸²

The proxy conflicts between East and West continued to brew in Southeast Asia as well. Pathet Lao insurrectionists remained a constant threat to the Laotian government. Despite recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a MAAG there, objections from the State Department and President Eisenhower's own reluctance to increase American involvement forced Army advisers in Laos to operate under the covert guise of a Programs Evaluation Office. However, early in 1961, President Eisenhower would warn his incoming successor that the loss of Laos would be the beginning of the loss of most of the Far East.⁸³

81. Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 180–82.

82. Sitreps, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 30 Jun–30 Jul 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 94, Series: Studies and Reports, 1958–1965, Subgroup: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, RG 319, NACP; Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 187–93.

83. Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. F. T. Pachler, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 21 Jan 1960, sub: Situation in Laos, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:

Although the situation in Laos garnered more headlines in 1960, the U.S. position in Vietnam also raised concerns for U.S. policymakers. In March, Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow reported to the State Department that recent Viet Cong activity had become more aggressive and that the government of South Vietnam was having difficulty controlling its internal security situation. Assassination and kidnap rates had risen in recent months, and military ambushes and attacks on South Vietnamese military positions had increased in size and intensity. Durbrow suggested that the security situation was unlikely to improve until the South Vietnamese government could gain greater support and cooperation from the rural population.⁸⁴

Army leaders pushed to increase the size of the MAAG in South Vietnam. The Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, a contingent of 350 personnel who had been in-country since the French withdrawal in 1956, was scheduled to conclude its activities at the end of 1960. The United States and Vietnam notified the International Control Commission, which was responsible for enforcing the provisions of the Geneva Treaty, that they would allocate those spaces to the MAAG. This was primarily a paper exercise, however, because the temporary mission personnel had long since abandoned their recovery efforts and had operated as *de facto* members of the MAAG for many months.⁸⁵

General Lemnitzer attributed the deterioration in the situation in South Vietnam to the inability of that nation to engage in the protracted, guerrilla-style struggle, which the conflict had become. He called for increased U.S. support in the areas of psychological warfare, civil affairs, intelligence, counterintelligence, and counter guerrilla military operations. Based upon those recommendations, the Joint Chiefs agreed to send three more special forces training teams of ten men each, along with several intelligence and psychological warfare officers, to Vietnam to supplement the efforts of the MAAG there. During the period of June to September, the training teams, which had deployed from the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, conducted classes in counter guerrilla operations and activities for selected members of the Vietnamese Army.⁸⁶

OCS, RG 319, NACP; Fairchild and Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 223–24.

84. Dispatch, Ambassador Durbrow, Vietnam, to Dept. of State, 7 Mar 1960, in *FRUS 1958–1960*, vol. 1, *Vietnam* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 300–11.

85. Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. F. T. Pachler, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 20 Jan 1960, sub: Increased Strength in MAAG Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

86. Memo, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer for Joint Chs Staff, 24 Mar 1960, sub: Anti-Guerrilla Training for Vietnam, in *FRUS 1958–1960*, vol. 1, 345–48; Fact Sheet, Brig. Gen. George T. Duncan, Director Ops and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 23 Nov 1960, sub:

Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, sent similar communications to the Joint Chiefs of Staff warning them of the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Neither the United States nor the governments of Vietnam and Laos, he said, could afford to support both large defense forces and large internal security forces in those countries. The task in Laos and Vietnam, he continued, would be more difficult and time-consuming than operations in the Philippines and Malaysia because of the enemy's contiguous secure rear base in North Vietnam. Gaining control over the local populace on a continuing basis would be the primary objective of both sides in this protracted struggle. Any successful program would have to provide rural populations with the means, the training, and the will to defend themselves. Felt recommended that the U.S. government increase its efforts to develop civil affairs and counterinsurgency capabilities in both Laos and Vietnam. He concluded that no quick, easy, inexpensive solution existed for the Communist insurgency problem in Southeast Asia. The Communists would continue to wage protracted war, in the Maoist sense, for the foreseeable future.⁸⁷

As the year ended and the president-elect prepared for the inauguration, he reflected upon these and other national security challenges he would face. He planned to work to minimize the threats connected with atomic weapons, but he found special forces and counterinsurgency fascinating and believed that they represented the future way of war. One of the first questions he was reported to have asked as he prepared his new team was, "What are we doing about guerrilla warfare?"⁸⁸

LOOKING FORWARD

In many ways, the Army viewed the passing of the Eisenhower administration with a sense of relief. Many service leaders envisioned an end to the budgetary and personnel restrictions of the New Look and a military policy that would embrace many of the capabilities the Army could provide. At the same time, no one could define clearly what policies the new administration would promote. The military's traditional responsibilities in Europe and Korea remained as important as ever. However, the success of Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Cuba posed additional challenges for the

Counter-Guerrilla Training, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

87. Ltr, Adm. Harry D. Felt, Cdr in Ch, U.S. Pacific Cmd, to Joint Chs Staff, 27 Apr 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

88. Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 297.

Army as well as for the incoming Kennedy administration. For the first time in eight years, the service prepared to welcome a new administration and to secure its position within a new national security policy.

9

Playing a Part in McNamara's Band

The year 1961 would prove to be the watershed in the Army's transition between Korea and Vietnam. The new administration under President John F. Kennedy would move American defense policy rapidly in a different direction. Throughout the presidential campaign, Kennedy had expressed his admiration for many of the concepts incorporated in Maxwell D. Taylor's Flexible Response theories. Once in office, he began reshaping the U.S. military establishment toward that end. After so many years of languishing under Dwight D. Eisenhower's New Look, in 1961, the Army began to reemerge as a more consequential element of America's national defense policy.

At the same time, Kennedy's selection for secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, brought business acumen and a belief in systems analysis to his position, along with a cadre of young, like-minded acolytes who became known as the Whiz Kids. The new administration's style and infrastructure for dealing with defense issues soon reflected enormous changes from the way things had been done under President Eisenhower. A series of crises would highlight Kennedy's first year in office. They would shape his approach to defense policy and would move the Army further along in its transition to the force that would ultimately fight in Vietnam.



The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment rolls along in the inaugural parade. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

INTRODUCING A NEW TEAM

To many observers, the 1961 presidential inauguration parade appeared to be one of the grandest ever, with the U.S. Army playing a stellar role. Accompanying the presidential party was the United States Army Band and an honor escort provided by the 1st Battle Group, 3d Infantry—the famed “Old Guard.” A contingent from the U.S. Military Academy Corps of Cadets also played a prominent role, marching in their traditional full-dress uniforms. Also participating were elements from the 2d Battle Group, 504th Airborne Infantry, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Artillery detachments placed on public display some of the service’s latest hardware, including the Little John rocket and the Hawk, Lacrosse, and Pershing missiles, as well as both versions of the Nike missile, the Hercules and the Zeus.¹

The new president wasted little time before moving to put his own stamp on American military policy. Just one week after his inauguration, Kennedy

1. “The Army Goes to an Inaugural,” *Army Information Digest* 16 (Mar 1961): 32–35.

met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss his thoughts on the relationship between his office and the military leadership of the nation. He expressed a firm desire to maintain close contact with the chiefs and to meet regularly with the chairman, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. The men discussed a wide range of topics, including the nation's capability for conducting a limited war, the emerging situations in Laos and Vietnam, and the ongoing gold-flow problem in Europe. At the end of the meeting, Kennedy thanked and praised Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, President Eisenhower's personal liaison with the military community, for his work and assistance during the presidential transition. He introduced Brig. Gen. Chester V. "Ted" Clifton who would serve in that capacity in the new administration.²

During the early months of his administration, Kennedy honored his pledge to meet regularly with his military leaders. He met with the assembled chiefs at least once and sometimes twice a month. He spoke frequently with General Lemnitzer as part of National Security Council meetings as well as on an individual basis. Discussions focused on the many potential flash points around the world that could threaten American interests. As a group, the officers made their case for increasing the defense budget and broadening the nation's military capabilities.³

Despite his support for a more balanced national military strategy, President Kennedy had used the perceived missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union as a valuable weapon against his political opponent. Soon after he entered the White House, another study sponsored by his administration confirmed that, in fact, no missile gap existed in favor of the Soviets. In its place, the president's Democratic supporters soon posited a "guerrilla gap," arguing the Army's neglect in that area had allowed the Communists to outpace U.S. efforts dramatically.⁴ In July, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota declared that, while the U.S. Army possessed only 1,500 troops trained in guerrilla warfare, the Reds had been training hundreds of thousands in such tactics over the past twenty years.⁵

The president also had grown an appreciation for the potential political power of the nationalism emerging in various developing countries around the globe that were throwing off colonial shackles. As a senator, Kennedy had espoused a foreign policy aimed not necessarily at lining up those

2. Memo of Conf with President Kennedy, 25 Jan 1961, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963* (hereinafter cited as *FRUS 1961-1963*), vol. 8, *National Security Policy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 11-14.

3. Memo of Confs with President Kennedy, 25 Jan, 6 Feb, and 23 Feb 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. 8, 11-14, 27-30, 48-54.

4. "US Guerrilla Gap Scored as a Result of Bad Planning," *Army Times*, 8 Jul 1961.

5. Jack Raymond, "Kennedy Defense Study Finds No Evidence of a Missile Gap," *New York Times*, 7 Feb 1961; "US Guerrilla Gap Scored as a Result of Bad Planning."

countries behind an American banner, but rather at ensuring that they did not align with the Communists. He expressed more concern for countering Soviet political overtures and sponsorship of brushfire wars than he did for matching their buildup of strategic arms. With that interest in mind, in February, he directed the Army to expand substantially its capability to deal with “unconventional war by unconventional means.”⁶

The U.S. Army’s special forces units possessed exactly the types of capabilities that Kennedy sought. The increased publicity these units now received caused one *Army Times* columnist to observe that in their case “a glamor outfit was at hand.”⁷ That prediction soon came to fruition when, after viewing demonstrations at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, President Kennedy overruled many senior Army leaders—who long had opposed adopting distinguishing headgear for the special forces—by formally authorizing the wearing of the green beret as a symbol of their expertise and excellence.⁸

The president’s appointees to the Defense Department reflected both his youth and his educational background. Robert S. McNamara, the new secretary of defense, had graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, and Harvard Business School before serving in the Army Air Corps during World War II. During that time, he had developed efficiency and statistical analysis methods that would become his trademark during his tenure at the Ford Motor Company, where he rose from the position of comptroller in 1949 to president in 1960. Now 45 years old, McNamara brought to the Pentagon a wealth of business and leadership experience and at least a passing knowledge of the U.S. military. Perhaps in recognition of his relative youth, he emphasized to his new subordinates that although he welcomed honest differences of opinion, he expected swift and unquestioning execution of his orders once he had made his decision. Other new members of the Defense Department included Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric, who was 54 years old and a Yale University graduate; Paul H. Nitze, also 54 and a Harvard University graduate; and General Counsel Cyrus R. Vance, 44, another Yale graduate. The youngest member of the new team, at age 33, was

6. Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 32–41.

7. Max A. Schaible, “Nine-Year-Old Special Warfare Center Grows in Importance,” *Army Times*, 22 Apr 1961; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Glamor Outfit is at Hand,” *Army Times*, 11 Mar 1961.

8. Interv, Col. John R. Meese and Lt. Col. Parks Houser with Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, 21 Apr 1975, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI).



President John F. Kennedy (center) is accompanied by Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze (left) and Capt. Kaplan (first name unknown) at the Ranger and special warfare portion of the Army's combat-readiness demonstration. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

Harold Brown, who had graduated from Columbia University and would serve as the Defense Department's director of research and engineering.⁹

The new members of the Army leadership team also reflected the president's youth, if not his Ivy League roots. In January, Elvis J. Stahr Jr., president of West Virginia University, replaced Wilber M. Brucker as secretary of the Army. Like McNamara, Stahr had reached the rank of lieutenant colonel during World War II. As an infantryman, he had earned two Bronze Stars in the China-Burma-India theater. Stephen Ailes took over as the undersecretary of the Army. Color blindness had prevented Ailes from serving in the military during World War II, but he had worked in the War Department's Office of Price Administration during that time. Altogether, the average age of the Army's new leadership team was 50, while that of

9. "The President's Defense Team," *Army Times*, 22 Apr 1961; Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961–1965*, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2006), 4–6.



Left to right: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Paul L. Freeman Jr., and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor in Stuttgart, Germany (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

their Defense Department counterparts was 47.¹⁰ Although other defense secretaries and their staffs had attended Ivy League colleges and similarly renowned institutions, McNamara and his Whiz Kids brought an academic tilt to defense policymaking. They created a sort of military-academic complex, which stood as a counterpoint to the previous administration's military-industrial complex.

Within the Army's senior military leadership, many officers greeted McNamara and his assistants with a mixture of curiosity and bemusement. Although the term Whiz Kids had first gained traction describing the secretary's associates at Ford Motor Company, the press soon revived the term to describe the incoming defense executives and their rather brash and self-assured approach to dealing with senior military officers. The Army chief of staff, General George H. Decker, ruefully remembered his first encounter with one individual whom McNamara had sent over to analyze the utility and structure of the Army division: "The gentleman he designated came down to see me to talk about this analysis, and his first question to me was, what is a division?"¹¹ The vice chief of staff, General Clyde D. Eddleman, had

10. Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 4–6.

11. Henry L. Trehwhitt, *McNamara: His Ordeal in the Pentagon* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 12–13; H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara,*



During an inspection trip of Army facilities in the Washington area, Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. prepares to climb into an Army helicopter at the Pentagon heliport. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

a more positive impression. He told a friend that he had been quite impressed with the new secretary of defense, and that, as a whole, the administration was a pleasant change from the previous one, whose executives had come in with the belief that they knew how to run the place and the officers did not. Eddleman said that the group seemed receptive to new ideas and the whole atmosphere in the Pentagon was more businesslike. He hoped that things would remain that way.¹²

McNamara, however, soon began to reshape Pentagon operations and procedures in a manner more to his liking. Although he tolerated internal discussions of policies, he detested any leak of those discussions to the public. His attempts to clamp down on the release of information to the press, particularly before his office had approved it, soon raised a chorus of protest from reporters as well as from the public affairs and information officers of the various services. Additionally, McNamara interposed himself between

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 19; Interv. Lt. Col. Dan H. Rawls with Gen. George H. Decker, 18 Dec 1972, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.

12. Ltr, Gen. [Clyde D.] Eddleman to Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, 25 Jan 1961, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Personal Correspondence 1961, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the president. Kennedy's regular meetings with the officers grew more infrequent and almost all communications between them moved through the Office of the Secretary of Defense.¹³

Soon after taking office, the new secretary and some of his deputies initiated discussions regarding a significant departure from the traditional thinking about nuclear war. Up to this point, most consideration of strategic nuclear weapons had focused on their role as a deterrent to their use by the Soviets. The belief was that the Soviets, or any other potential enemy, would be unwilling to risk the devastation of their cities by attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. For that reason, America aimed a large portion of its strategic arsenal at Soviet cities. McNamara and his associates, however, began to think in terms of winning a nuclear war. Much like the Army had considered its atomic-based strategy in Europe during the previous decade, strategists in the Defense Department began to calculate how best to target Soviet nuclear facilities and war-making capabilities for destruction before they could bring them into play. These discussions included consideration of a first-strike option as well as calculations of how much American capability would survive to retaliate after an initial enemy strike. These discussions evolved into a philosophy that strategists called "counterforce" as opposed to the traditional view of deterrence, referred to as "countervalue." The growing potential of U.S. Army theater-level nuclear weapons, including the new Pershing missile, that could hit Soviet military targets ensured that the service would be able to participate in such strategic discussions to a far greater degree than it had been under previous philosophies.¹⁴

The new defense secretary's highest priority, however, was an examination of his own department with an eye toward increased efficiency as well as effectiveness. He quickly lost patience with the parochialism and squabbling among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His solution to both the inefficiency and

13. "The Right to Know," *Army Times*, 29 Apr 1961; "The Soft Sell in Press Control," *Army Times*, 3 Jun 1961; Memo, Sec Defense McNamara for President Kennedy, 10 May 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. 8, 79-81.

14. Memo, President's Special Asst for National Security Affairs (Bundy) for President Kennedy, 30 Jan 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. 8, 18-19; Memo, Maj. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Acting Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 17 Jan 1961, sub: "100 Million Lives" by Richard Fryklund, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955-1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955-1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP); Memo, Maj. Gen. B. F. Evans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, 24 May 1961, sub: General War Strategy and Posture, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret, 1956-1962 (hereinafter DCSOPS Top Secret 1956-1962), RG 319, NACP. See also Trehwhitt, *McNamara*, 122-23, and Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 13.

disagreements was an increased centralization of responsibilities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.¹⁵

Senator W. Stuart Symington's committee on the defense establishment had released its report in November of the previous year. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric had been a prominent member of that committee, and McNamara now took the time to examine carefully its findings. The committee had recommended the elimination of the civilian service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs elevated to the position of principal military adviser to the secretary of defense and the president. Additionally, the committee had recommended the reorganization of the defense establishment into four primary unified commands, representing strategic, tactical, continental air defense, and reserve responsibilities.¹⁶

McNamara rejected most of the Symington committee recommendations as unworkable. He believed that the 1958 reorganization of the Defense Department had given the office all the authority and power it required. Pressure from congressional leaders reluctant to support any further unification of the armed services prevented any serious consideration. He worked instead to eliminate some of the defense bureaucracy's lower-level committees, which he blamed for the excessive time required to make decisions and to move projects forward. He began to centralize authority, particularly regarding budgetary issues, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As part of this overall review, he directed the Army to conduct its own internal study to streamline functions, organization, and procedures within its department.¹⁷

Early in February, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric provided the Army leadership with detailed guidelines for a thorough reexamination of the structure of the Department of the Army. He observed the absence of any significant study of the overall configuration of the Army since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Gilpatric believed that it was important to analyze the major components of the Department of the Army, particularly the Office of the Secretary of the Army, the Army General Staff, the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), and the technical services on a more frequent basis. General Decker and Secretary Stahr selected the Army's

15. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 18.

16. Memo, L. W. Hoelscher, Dep Comptroller Army, for Gen. [George H.] Decker, 1 Feb 1961, sub: Report to Senator Kennedy from the Committee on the defense Establishment (Symington Report), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

17. John F. Loosbrock, "United States Armed Forces: Why Not?," *Air Force Magazine* 44, no. 2 (1 Feb 1961); James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 304-5.

deputy comptroller, Leonard W. Hoelscher as director of the study, which the Army designated as Project 80. For the remainder of 1961, Hoelscher, the Army Staff, the technical service chiefs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense would pose, debate, and reject a wide range of proposals to reform the organization of the Department of the Army and particularly the Army logistics system. The discussions ultimately would result in dramatic changes, but not until the following year.¹⁸

The new administration attempted in all ways to portray an image of vigor and vitality, emphasizing a contrast between it and the previous presidency. Under Robert McNamara, the Department of Defense took the lead as it embarked upon innovations and renovations aimed at curbing the defense bureaucracy. Its goals would have been ambitious under the calmest of conditions. Unfortunately, the year 1961 would prove to be anything but calm.

A TROUBLING YEAR

John F. Kennedy probably deserved better. Few presidents in American history, during their initial year in office, have experienced the variety and depth of foreign policy challenges that he encountered in 1961. The Eisenhower administration had bequeathed to him potential trouble spots in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean. Unfortunately, for a new president who had promised during his inauguration speech to pay any price and to bear any burden, these areas and others seemed ready to explode.

The first trouble spot to erupt was Cuba. The Eisenhower administration had made no secret of its disdain for the new government that emerged after Fidel Castro had overthrown Fulgencio Batista's regime. Early in 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency had begun assembling and training a paramilitary force, made up largely of Cuban exiles, first with an eye toward conducting guerrilla operations in Cuba, but ultimately evolving into a full-scale amphibious assault against the island. Although military leaders expressed some skepticism of the chances for success, Eisenhower had thrown his support behind the plan, and it moved forward. Central Intelligence Agency director Allen W. Dulles had briefed then candidate Kennedy in July 1960, and by the time the new administration came into

18. Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for Dep Chs Staff, 17 Feb 1961, sub: Study of Organization of the Department of the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 344-53.

office, the Cuba operation had achieved such momentum that it had become almost too powerful to dismiss.¹⁹

On the night of 17–18 April, a force of about 1,400 paramilitary troops landed at the head of a deepwater estuary on the southern coast of Cuba, an area known locally as the Bay of Pigs. Although the original plan had called for U.S. air support of some forty sorties over the assault area, only eight flew in an attack against Cuban airfields two days earlier. The attack had raised such an international uproar that leaders within the Kennedy administration, particularly Secretary of State D. Dean Rusk and Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai E. Stevenson II, persuaded the president to cancel any further air support. The assault force foundered on the beach with many of its troops run aground on offshore reefs and most of its ammunition and supplies destroyed by Cuban air attacks. The operation lasted less than three days. Ultimately, Cuban government forces captured more than 1,100 of the original assault force. Another 140 died during the fight. The rest melted into the surrounding mountains and swamps.²⁰

Public response to the aborted invasion was mixed. Predictably, the United Nations and most world capitals condemned the operation. Governments in Latin America and those allied with the Communist bloc howled against what they called Yankee imperialism. Some friendly nations quietly questioned American resolve in light of Kennedy's failure to reinforce the beleaguered attackers. The failure had little effect on Kennedy's popular support, however. Most found nothing intrinsically wrong with an attempt to overthrow the Cuban dictator. In fact, the president's approval rating rose ten points to 83 percent. It seemed, Kennedy observed, that "the worse you do, the better they like you."²¹

Some leaders in Congress, looking to assign blame, settled upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, particularly, the chairman, General Lemnitzer. Senators Russell B. Long of Louisiana and Albert A. Gore of Tennessee, both Democrats, publicly called for the relief of Lemnitzer and an overall shakeup of the Joint Chiefs. Long suggested that the housecleaning should include the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles. Publicly, both the president and Secretary McNamara stood by their military advisers. McNamara affirmed to the press that any Pentagon role in the operation was his responsibility and that, if any errors had been committed, they were his alone. In a gesture clearly interpreted as a public expression of support

19. Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 124–28.

20. Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 140–45. For a detailed discussion of the operation, see Howard Jones, *The Bay of Pigs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

21. Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 145–47.

for the Joint Chiefs, Kennedy invited news photographers into his office to record his meeting with them.²²

With somewhat less fanfare, Kennedy turned to the military officer he most trusted to try to make some sense of the failed operation in Cuba. That officer was Maxwell Taylor. The president appointed Taylor to chair a committee named the Cuba Study Group, the purpose of which was to identify lessons from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. To the task force, Kennedy named his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Allen Dulles, and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke. The president instructed Taylor to take a close look at all aspects of U.S. programs for military, paramilitary, guerrilla, and antiguerrilla activity, which fell short of general war. Kennedy concluded that he wanted Taylor, in his report, to chart a path toward the future.²³

In this report, submitted to President Kennedy on 13 June, the Cuba Study Group identified four primary issues that had led directly to the failure of the operation. The first two, inadequacy of air support and the inability of the attacking forces to break out into separate guerrilla bands, the committee attributed to the poor execution of the operation. The latter two points, dealing with the planning phase, were more distressing: The Joint Chiefs had failed to point out military deficiencies, and there was a systemic lack of communication at all levels—between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs, between the outgoing and incoming presidential administrations, and between the Joint Chiefs and the president himself.²⁴

The Bay of Pigs had consequences beyond the mere failure of a military operation. Despite his public display of support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kennedy never again truly trusted them for important military counsel. Moreover, the postmortem of the Bay of Pigs affair marked the introduction of General Taylor into the president's inner circle. The retired general and Robert Kennedy soon became close friends. In May, the president appointed Taylor to a new position in the White House, that of military representative of the president. Although Taylor would retain a generally cordial relationship with General Lemnitzer, as a group the Joint Chiefs resented what they

22. Jack Raymond, "Gore Would Oust the Joint Chiefs," *New York Times*, 20 May 1961; "Would Oust Lemnitzer," *New York Times*, 5 Jun 1961; Jack Raymond, "McNamara Backs the Joint Chiefs," *New York Times*, 27 May 1961; "President Poses with Joint Chiefs," *New York Times*, 28 May 1961.

23. Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 145–46; Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 184–85.

24. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, 184–85.

regarded as Taylor's usurpation of their role as the primary military advisers to the White House.²⁵

Taylor's appointment to a position specially created for him by the president raised new questions regarding the proper role for military officers in politics. To many observers, the president's action reflected his growing tendency to surround himself with only a few trusted advisers—at the expense of relying on the broader expertise and experience of the larger bureaucracy. The obvious effort by the president to circumvent at least some of the influence of the Joint Chiefs and other traditional sources of military expertise raised eyebrows among members of Congress as well as experienced members of the media.²⁶

At the same time, the Army had been dealing with the political fallout created by the commander of the 24th Infantry Division in Germany, Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker. Walker's extreme anti-Communist views had led him to make derogatory statements about several prominent politicians, and service leaders had accused him of attempting to influence the votes of his troops. When the Army relieved Walker of his command and brought him back to the United States in disgrace, several leaders in Congress complained that the Army's most senior leadership was attempting to limit the rights of its officers to speak openly. During a series of hearings on the Walker case before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary McNamara defended the Army's position and denied any attempt to muzzle military leaders. Ultimately, however, neither Taylor's rise in status nor Walker's relief placed the Army in a comfortable position within the Kennedy administration.²⁷

Recriminations over the Bay of Pigs fiasco still were resounding as President Kennedy prepared for his first major conference with his

25. Ingo W. Tauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019), 100–103; Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 135–39; Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, 195–98; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 296–67; James Reston, "Kennedy Weighs Choice of Taylor as Military Aide," *New York Times*, 20 Jun 1961.

26. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Kennedy Shapes Pentagon Ties," *New York Times*, 2 Jul 1961; Waldemar N. Nielsen, "Soldier in Politics: A Growing Issue," *New York Times*, 22 Oct 1961. Taylor's rise in status within the Kennedy administration is covered in depth in David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972), 162–63. Halberstam wrote that Taylor, cool, correct, handsome, and athletic, seemed almost invented for the Kennedy years.

27. Staff Study, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA), 19 Sep 1961, "To Determine the Responsibilities and Capabilities of the Military to Speak and Write Concerning the Nature of the Current Threat to National Security," File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Baldwin, "Kennedy Shapes Pentagon Ties"; Nielsen, "Soldier in Politics: A Growing Issue." For more on the Edwin Walker case, see Donald A.

Soviet counterpart, Nikita Khrushchev, in Vienna, Austria, in early June. Khrushchev had walked out of the summit in Paris a year earlier, largely in response to the U-2 spy plane incident. After the Kennedy inauguration, however, Khrushchev had released two U.S. airmen whose reconnaissance aircraft the Soviets had shot down the previous summer after it had strayed into Soviet airspace. Both leaders came to the conference hoping for some progress on sticking points between the two nations. Kennedy wanted to move forward with discussions about arms control and nuclear disarmament. Khrushchev wanted to resolve what he referred to as the “bone in the throat” of Soviet-American relations—Berlin.²⁸

During the first meeting between the two on 4 June, the Soviet leader presented Kennedy with an aide-mémoire accusing the United States and its allies of saber-rattling over their continued presence in Berlin. The Soviets resolved to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany and thus terminate Western occupation rights in the city. Khrushchev told Kennedy that if the United States wished to wage war over Berlin, it should do so now, before both sides developed even more terrible weapons. As he departed the conference, Kennedy concluded the conversation by observing that it would be a cold winter.²⁹

Khrushchev waited only a short time before raising the stakes in the East-West tug-of-war over Berlin. The rising exodus of refugees from Eastern Europe to the West through the porous borders of the city had become too much for the Soviets and the East Germans to bear. In the early morning hours of 13 August, East German police began closing all access points to the western portion of the city as workers began construction of a physical barrier to separate the two enclaves. Following so closely on the heels of Khrushchev's threats to Kennedy at the Vienna Conference, the erection of the Berlin Wall compounded the serious challenges to an administration still learning the ropes of foreign policy and national defense.³⁰

Although Berlin and the confrontation with the Soviets remained Kennedy's primary concerns in Europe, the old problem with U.S. balance

Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 459–61.

28. Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 51; Telg, U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union to Dept. of State, 10 Mar 1961, in *FRUS 1961–1963*, vol. 14, *Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 18–20.

29. Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 407–8; William R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 153; Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2005), 176–77.

30. Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 410–26; Frederick Kempe, *Berlin 1961* (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), 323–62; Memo, President's Special Asst for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

of payments remained a thorn in the side of the American economy. Army efforts to limit spending by its overseas troops and their dependents had proven successful but had not eliminated the deficit. The U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), commander, General Bruce C. Clarke, had discontinued large-scale unit maneuvers in Germany to reduce the dollar outflow arising from payment of maneuver damages. Army leaders in Europe also contemplated further restricting the number of dependents allowed in the theater and began working on another plan for the rotation of battalion-sized units between the United States and Europe—ROTAPLAN. Unlike in the earlier Operation GYROSCOPE exercises, rotating units would move without dependents.³¹

By September, the situation in Southeast Asia also had reached the point at which the president believed he had to consider some new approach. Viet Cong advances during the year had led Kennedy to question whether Vietnamese nationalism had turned irrevocably against the United States, or whether the nation might still serve as a base for the fight against communism. Early in October, Kennedy tasked General Taylor and Walt W. Rostow, formerly the deputy national security advisor and recently appointed to the State Department Policy Planning Staff, to lead a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam. He asked Taylor to appraise not only the military and internal security situation there, but also the political, economic, and social elements, which would help determine its fate.³²

By the end of 1961, the United States thus faced potential threats from several different trouble spots. None of these—the abortive invasion of Cuba, the rising tension in Berlin leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall, or the burgeoning crises in Southeast Asia—lent itself to a quick or straightforward remedy. Each of these events would have an immediate effect on the growth and further development of the organization and doctrine of the United States Army. The Kennedy administration would prove itself far more willing than its predecessor to include the Army in its plans to meet expanding foreign policy and national security challenges.³³

for President Kennedy, 14 August 1961, in *FRUS 1961–1963*, vol. 14, 330–31; “Berlin Threat Sparks Buildup,” *Army Times*, 30 Dec 1961.

31. Memo, Elvis J. Stahr Jr., Sec Army, for Sec Def, 1 Dec 1961, sub: Balance of Payments; MFR, Lt. Col. G. R. Allen, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 7 Dec 1961, sub: VCofS Instructions with Respect to Balance of Payments Actions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 463.

32. Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, 14 Aug 1964, “Review of U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation in Southeast Asia, 1961–1964,” Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC; Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, 225–26; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 544–45.

33. A summary of national security challenges facing President Kennedy during his first year can be found in Robert W. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, 1961–1962* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1963), I-1–I-6.

THE ARMY MOVES FROM PENTOMIC TO ROAD

The Army was already well on its way toward shedding some of the trappings of its atomic battlefield orientation. Following the guidance he had received the previous December, General Herbert B. Powell, the CONARC commander, presented to General Decker a study entitled *Reorganization Objective Army Division (1961–1965)*. Unlike the pentomic model or the modern mobile Army proposals, ROAD (the Army's shorthand for Powell's study) did not address a general reorganization of the Army. Instead, it focused on the three common division structures—infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored. Each division would include a common base and three brigade headquarters to which commanders could assign from an independent pool of units varying numbers of maneuver battalions—infantry, mechanized infantry, and tank. The predominant maneuver element would determine the division's classification as infantry, mechanized infantry, or armored. The airborne divisions also would reorganize with a three-brigade structure but would be filled with specialized parachute and airborne infantry battalions.³⁴


Each division base would start with a headquarters element that included a division commander and two assistant division commanders, one for maneuver elements and one for administration and support. Support units in the base would include a military police company; aviation, engineer, and signal battalions; a reconnaissance squadron with one air and three ground troops; division artillery; and a support command. In the initial concept, the division artillery included three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, an Honest John rocket battalion, and a composite battalion of one 8-inch and three 155-mm. howitzer batteries. All of the artillery in the mechanized and armored divisions would be self-propelled. The support command consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, an administrative company, a band, and medical, supply and transport, and maintenance battalions. In addition, ROAD called for organizing several separate brigades under the command of a brigadier general. These would be units composed of two to five maneuver battalions with a corresponding slice of supporting units similar to World War II and Korean War regimental combat teams (*Chart 10*).³⁵

General Decker approved the overall concept but supported several modifications. He believed that the divisions themselves should remain

34. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 296; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Division Revamp Planned," *Army Times*, 27 May 1961.

35. Bourjaily Jr., "Division Revamp Planned."

Chart 10—ROAD Division Base, 1961



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Notes

1. Strength will vary depending on the combination of maneuver elements assigned.
2. Includes one 8-inch HOW BTRY

Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 299.

relatively stable. The Army lacked sufficient resources to maintain a separate reserve pool of unattached battalions. The divisions would each have enough flexibility for tailoring assigned battalions without having to resort to an external source of maneuver elements. The chief of staff also believed that the infantry divisions contained excessive amounts of vehicles and equipment. Much of the heavier equipment might not be suitable for such likely environments as Southeast Asia. In addition, he asked CONARC to reexamine the types and amount of artillery assigned to the divisions. Decker concluded his comments by prioritizing the development of doctrine and training literature to support the new organization.³⁶

By the end of April, the Army Staff briefed Secretary McNamara on the proposed reorganization. During the presentation, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett Jr., argued that the ability to tailor the make-up of divisions allowed the Army to match mobility with the requirements of the operational environment. Units in Germany required mechanized, armored mobility and extreme concentrations of firepower. By contrast, formations going to areas such as Southeast Asia could deploy with vehicles and equipment more appropriate to that environment. The changing world situation, they continued, required improved conventional firepower. The new division designs offered more artillery, machine guns, and antitank weapons than the pentomic model.³⁷

The service proposed beginning the transition during fiscal year 1963, unless the Defense Department could find supplemental funding sooner. The Army presentation emphasized that the service had considered the pentomic organization to be only an interim solution and that the ROAD concept was a positive step forward in an ongoing process. Aware that General Taylor, the primary advocate of the pentomic concept, was now serving on the White House staff, General Decker and the Army Staff recognized that the new plan might require an extensive publicity and public information component. General Powell also acknowledged that the reserve community was likely to object to renewed turbulence so soon after completing the most recent transition.³⁸

36. Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 13 Apr 1961, sub: Reorganization of Army Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

37. Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett for Ch Staff, 10 May 1961, sub: Appraisal of Improvements in ROAD-65 Mobility and Firepower, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

38. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 303; Ltr, Elvis J. Stahr to Sec Def, 28 Apr 1961; Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Vice Ch Staff, 28 Apr 1961, sub: Memorandum for Secretary of Defense on ROAD-65; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

The proposed reorganization received a variety of responses in Europe. The commander of the Seventh Army in Germany, Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, welcomed the upgrade, noting in his April readiness report that the infantry divisions under his command were not organized to permit their most effective employment on a European battlefield. They badly needed, he said, more mechanization in the form of armored personnel carriers. Any delays in modernization of Seventh Army's equipment, he concluded, would be an embarrassment to his command. In contrast to General Davidson's enthusiasm for the new organization, West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss expressed some misgivings over the potential changes. Along with many other German politicians, Strauss questioned whether the improved conventional capabilities indicated a movement away from a reliance upon nuclear weapons. Although they loathed the prospect of their homeland as an atomic battlefield, most Germans recognized that NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) could not defend Western Europe against Soviet assault without nuclear weapons. More to the point, they were suspicious of any change in policy that might indicate an uncoupling of Europe from the American strategic umbrella.³⁹

In August, General Decker approved a schedule for reorganizing the active divisions in the Army. Conversions would start early in 1962, beginning with units in U.S. Army, Pacific, and separate brigades in U.S. Army, Alaska, and U.S. Army, Caribbean. Selected units in the United States also would begin their transition in 1962, with the remainder following in 1963. Units in Europe would begin conversion in 1963 or as soon as the international situation would permit. In response to queries from the president, Decker noted that under the ROAD concept, at the Army's current strength, it could maintain only two of the reconstituted divisions at optimal maneuver battalion strength. With an increase of some 50,000 in personnel strength, he continued, almost all of the Army's fourteen divisions could have the best possible balance of infantry and armored battalions.⁴⁰

39. Memo, Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson for Adjutant Gen, Dept. Army, 29 Apr 1961, sub: Operational Readiness Report; File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Paul R. Ignatius, Asst Sec Army Installations and Logistics, for Asst Sec Def, 3 Jul 1961, sub: Alleged Superiority of West German Over United States Conventional Equipment, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

40. Memo, Brig. Gen. John A Heintges, Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Under Sec Army, 18 Aug 1961, sub: Progress Report: Reorganization of the Army's Divisions; Memo, Maj. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 9 Oct 1961, sub: Reorganization of Army Divisions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

EXPANSION AND RESPONSE TO THE BERLIN CRISIS

Amid Army efforts to gain presidential approval for their new concepts, the administration was at work recasting its approach to national security. Late in March, President Kennedy had submitted a special message to Congress requesting an increase of \$2.274 billion over the original Eisenhower defense budget. In May, he made another request, this time for an additional \$237 million. Although the Defense Department had earmarked much of the additional funding for improvements to strategic weaponry, it also had aimed a significant portion at increasing the pace of modernization for conventional forces and increasing strategic sea- and airlift. It devoted very little funding to personnel increases, but it did allow for a small increment in Army strength from 870,000 to 875,000. This addition would allow spaces for 3,000 more special forces troops and would fill some of the obvious gaps in the U.S. Army, Pacific, and U.S. Army, Caribbean, commands.⁴¹

By late June, pressure was mounting in the United States and Europe for further improvements in both U.S. and NATO conventional forces. While they continued to acknowledge that nuclear weapons would remain the backbone of western military strategy in Europe, senior military and political leaders embraced the notion that improved conventional capabilities could raise the threshold at which a nuclear response might be necessary. To that end, Secretary McNamara requested a study from the Joint Chiefs to determine what improvements to force structure would be best to increase the flexibility of the nation's military response and, at the same time, reestablish the credibility of its nuclear deterrent.⁴²

The ongoing stalemate over Berlin provided additional justification for the administration's desire to upgrade its military capabilities. The conference in Vienna with Khrushchev early in June presented the new president with further evidence of Soviet intransigence. The Soviet premier had used the opportunity to harangue Kennedy with the full force of Communist dogma. At the same time, he had presented the American delegation with the aide-mémoire, which had threatened to create a separate peace deal with East Germany and which would deny Western access to the city of Berlin. By his tone and by his actions, the Soviet leader virtually dared the Americans to oppose Soviet intentions. A month later, Khrushchev announced that he

41. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, I-13–I-14.

42. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, II-1; Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson, Director, Ops Research Ofc, to Gen. Decker, 1 Apr 1961; Ltr. Gen. Decker to Ellis Johnson, 12 Apr 1961; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

was suspending a previously planned reduction in Soviet armed forces and instead proclaimed a 33 percent increase in the Soviet military budget.⁴³

On 25 July, in a speech broadcast on television and radio from the Oval Office, President Kennedy announced a series of steps he was taking to increase military readiness. First, he would request from Congress an immediate defense appropriation of \$3.2 billion, about half of which would go to the modernization and procurement of conventional ammunition, weapons, and equipment. Next, he requested across-the-board increases in the total authorized strengths of the armed services, with the Army growing from 875,000 to 1 million personnel. To support the increases, the president asked to double and triple the draft calls in the coming months, activating certain Ready Reserve units and some individual reservists, and extending the tours of duty for soldiers, sailors, and airmen scheduled to leave the service in the near future. Additionally, he announced delays in the retirement and mothballing of older ships and aircraft and in the inactivation of the B-47 bomber and aerial refueling wings.⁴⁴

Congress quickly approved the president's requests for the additional funding, including that required to finance mobilization of selected reserves. In so doing, however, it expressed a preference for expansion of the regular forces rather than extensive reserve mobilization. In expanding each of the services, Secretary McNamara promised that the priority of sources would be volunteer enlistment, recruitment, draft, and reserve call-up.⁴⁵

The president's message and subsequent legislation provided the Army with an additional 133,000 spaces to allocate across the force. By the end of July, the service developed an initial plan that devoted 52,247 of these slots to expanding the strategic reserve to a six-division, combat-ready force. Included in this were sufficient troops to relieve the three Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) divisions of their training mission and to bring them to full strength, to fill the STRAF and Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) nondivisional units to full strength, and to create minimum essential nondivisional units to support a six-division continental United States reserve. The Army plan allocated an additional 38,063 spaces to strengthen USAREUR by bringing its units to full authorized strength and by developing additional

43. Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 374; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 407.

44. John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis" (speech, White House, 25 Jul 1961), in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962); Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 409; Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up.

45. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, II-15.

nondivisional support units. The plan applied the final 42,690 personnel spaces toward supporting the training base by providing cadre for training centers and establishing additional spaces for trainees. On 2 August, Secretary McNamara approved most of the allocations for the STRAF and STRAC units and for increases in the training base.⁴⁶

The secretary expressed some skepticism however, over USAREUR requirements based upon additional requests he had received from USAREUR Commander General Clarke and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Lauris Norstad. Both had stressed the need for an advance shipment of service and support organizations for port operations totaling 5,656 personnel, to arrive well before the arrival of any other additional forces. McNamara also used the opportunity to add 3,000 spaces to the USAREUR allocation for the purpose of mechanizing the three infantry divisions in Europe as soon as the Army had received sufficient armored personnel carriers to carry out the transition. On 7 August, he approved the allocations for USAREUR, including the additions of the port package and the troops supporting mechanization.⁴⁷

The defense secretary directed the appropriate support units from the reserve component to mobilize to fill USAREUR requirements. As further guidance, he instructed the Army to bring those units to full strength and accelerate their training immediately. McNamara wanted them available for deployment no later than 15 December, but he also wanted to defer the actual call-up as long as possible and to occur no earlier than 1 October. In approving the allocations, the secretary noted that even though he regarded the additions to STRAC and STRAF to be permanent increases in Army strength, the USAREUR increases should be considered a temporary measure. That distinction explained the priority given to reserve units as reinforcements to Europe.⁴⁸

In the early morning hours of 13 August 1961, East German military and government personnel began construction of a barrier sealing the border between East and West Berlin. That action accelerated rearmament efforts in the United States, most notably by prompting Secretary McNamara to accept a larger proportion of Ready Reserve elements and to move up mobilization dates for selected units. On 16 August, he announced the designation of 113 reserve component combat, combat support, and port units with an authorized strength of 23,626 as priority units for recall to active duty. The Army alerted those units the same day and authorized increased training

46. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, II-19; Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up.

47. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, II-21–II-22.

48. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, II-23.

periods to prepare them for deployment. In a 25 August press release, McNamara announced the additional mobilization of individual reservists to fill out STRAF nondivisional units and to support an Army training center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The Army designated reporting dates of 25 September for the Fort Polk reservists and 1 October for all of the others.⁴⁹

The construction of the Berlin Wall prompted a variety of responses as the Kennedy administration worked to project an image of strength and resolve. On 18 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Army should prepare additional divisions to send to Europe should General Norstad request them. After a series of discussions, the Army vice chief of staff recommended the mobilization of the 32d Infantry Division from Wisconsin and Michigan to Fort Lewis, Washington; and the 49th Armored Division from Texas to Fort Polk. The two call-ups amounted to a total mobilization of 75,000 additional reservists. On 11 October, Secretary McNamara also approved the deployment of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment from Fort Meade, Maryland, to Germany. General Clarke had requested the regiment's deployment to provide rear-area security in the Seventh Army area and an additional reserve of tanks for his combat forces.⁵⁰

The Berlin emergency highlighted for most planners the difficulties the United States would face in attempting to provide reinforcements, particularly heavy armored units, to Europe. With that in mind, in October, Secretary McNamara ordered the Army to pre-position all of the vehicles and heavy equipment in Europe to support one armored and one infantry division. A few days later, he added a requirement to pre-position additional vehicles and equipment to outfit ten selected combat support units, mostly artillery battalions, to support the two-division force. Headquarters, USAREUR, established storage sites at selected cities throughout West Germany, and McNamara allotted another 400 personnel slots for the Army to provide caretaker and maintenance personnel and to provide security. Also, as a result of the crisis, on 1 December 1961, General Clarke reorganized U.S. Army units in Berlin, creating the Berlin Brigade around the 2d and 3d Battle Groups, 6th Infantry, already present there.⁵¹

At the start of 1961, the Army had planned to conduct Exercise LONG THRUST from 1–15 May. A strategic mobility exercise, LONG THRUST would involve transporting three battle groups of the 101st Airborne Division to

49. Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up; "Army Will Need 110,000," *Army Times*, 26 Aug 1961.

50. Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up; Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, II-39.

51. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, II-39; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 427–29.

Germany, where they would participate in a series of major field exercises. However, the Army canceled the exercise because of the tense political situation in Europe and possible requirements for the United States to provide Army forces to support Southeast Asia Treaty Organization interests in Laos. General Norstad nevertheless recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States needed to demonstrate its ability to reinforce rapidly its deployed forces overseas. He urged the chiefs not to let the planning that had gone into preparing LONG THRUST go to waste. After some deliberation, Secretary McNamara in October directed a renewal of planning for the deployment exercise. To preserve the airborne capability of the strategic reserve, he asked that units of the 4th Infantry Division be substituted for those of the 101st Airborne Division. He also noted that the infantry battle groups would be more appropriate for the operational requirements of the force in Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army leaders revised the existing LONG THRUST plan toward an execution date sometime early the following year.⁵²

By the end of 1961, most of the actions to provide additional strength to the Army, both at home and overseas, were well underway. Not all operations went smoothly. In particular, the mobilization of reserve units presented numerous challenges to the Army's logistical system. Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps, reported that many of the units reporting to Fort Bragg for mobilization lacked much of the critical equipment required for their training and deployment. Some units reported losing many of their trucks and heavy equipment to the levy for overseas pre-position sites before they themselves had begun training. One unit, the 3d Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, reported shortages of seventeen of eighteen authorized 10-ton trucks and seven of seventeen authorized 8-inch howitzers. General Howze noted that shortages had forced units training at Fort Bragg to share equipment, leading to decreased training effectiveness. Additionally, a lack of authorized tools and spare parts had complicated efforts to maintain vehicles and equipment and to bring them up to deployable standards. Filling those shortages had depleted stockpiles reserved for STRAC units.⁵³

The activation and mobilization of the two reserve divisions had presented even more of a challenge. General Powell, commanding general

52. Memo, Roswell L. Gilpatric, Dep Sec Def, for Joint Chs Staff, 29 May 1961, sub: Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up.

53. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze to Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, 6 Nov 1961; Ltr, Thomas J. H. Trapnell, Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, to Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army

of CONARC, informed the vice chief of staff that both the 32d Infantry Division and the 49th Armored Division had reported to mobilization stations without sufficient equipment to accomplish the required training programs. Like General Howze, he reminded the Army leaders that his command already had furnished much of the stockage the Army had sent to Europe for pre-positioning. The most serious shortages included trucks, tool sets, communications equipment, self-propelled weapons, and mortars. Powell also reported that the recall of individual reservists to provide filler personnel had been slower and more cumbersome than anyone had anticipated. Some 400 recalled soldiers needed to attend Army service schools to bring their specialty training up to date while another 900 had reported without any prior training and had to be sent off to complete their basic and advanced individual training.⁵⁴

To complicate matters, more than 1,000 of the mobilized reservists had complained in writing to their congressional leaders or to the secretary of the Army, reporting shortages of clothing and equipment, poor living conditions, idleness, and an inequity in the manner in which the Army had recalled individual replacements. Inspector General teams from the Fourth and Sixth U.S. Armies, accompanied by members of the CONARC staff, visited both mobilization sites at the end of November to investigate the complaints. The teams found that, although many of the complaints were valid in isolated cases, leadership had addressed the most critical shortcomings at the mobilization stations and within the units themselves. Equipment shortages initially had hampered extensive field training, but the Army resolved most of those by the time of the inspection. Enough problems remained, however, for General Powell to inform the chief of staff that the two divisions would not meet their projected training readiness date of 15 February. Both needed additional weeks of unit training that would push their deployment date to the end of March at the earliest. Even then, he conceded, they would lack the desired combat posture.⁵⁵

Throughout 1961, Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Army leadership had debated over the appropriate end strength of the Army and the number of divisions that a reasonable personnel strength could support. Although the Army continued to argue for a final strength in excess

Cmd, 13 Nov 1961; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

54. Ltr, Gen. Herbert B. Powell to Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, 16 Nov 1961; Ltr, Gen. Powell to Gen. George H. Decker, 19 Dec 1961; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

55. Ltr, Powell to Decker, 19 Dec 1961; Statement, Sec Army, 4 Dec 1961, sub: Letters of Complaint, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

of one million, McNamara informed Secretary Stahr in November that the authorized strength for the service in the 1963 budget would increase to 960,000. At the same time, he acknowledged that, even if they deployed, the two reserve divisions could remain on active duty for only a limited time. With that in mind, he announced that he would include sufficient funding in the budget to permit activation as rapidly as possible of two additional Regular Army divisions.⁵⁶

The Army Staff's rapid preparation of plans for the activation of the III Corps headquarters and two additional regular divisions indicates that the decision did not come as a surprise. On 2 December, the deputy chief of staff for military operations submitted a concept of operations to the secretary of the Army, who forwarded it to Secretary McNamara a week later. The Army planned to reconstitute the 1st Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division. The 1st Armored Division would reform around the nucleus of its Combat Command A, which had served as a training cadre at Fort Hood, Texas. At Fort Carson, Colorado, the 5th Infantry Division would assemble around the nucleus of the 2d Infantry Brigade, then a separate unit stationed at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Both divisions would implement ROAD organization. Replacements assigned to the two new divisions would begin training as soon as possible, with the 1st Armored Division beginning in January 1962 and the 5th Infantry Division beginning in April. Both divisions would complete advanced unit training by the end of October 1962. Hidden in a small subsection of the plan were instructions for the Army to begin to release reservists who had been called up for the 32d Infantry and 49th Armored Divisions in March and May, respectively.⁵⁷

MAINTAINING READINESS

Buoyed by the news that reinforcements were on the way, the Army in the field kept up a steady regimen of training and deployment exercises. In mid-August, in the largest peacetime military exercise since the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers, 25,000 soldiers from the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions joined 10,000 airmen from the U.S. Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard for Exercise SWIFT STRIKE in North and South Carolina.

56. Coakley et al., *U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness*, VIII-25.

57. Memo, Under Sec Army Stephen Ailes for Sec Defense, 8 Dec 1961, sub: Plan for Reactivating Two Additional Active Army Divisions; Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Distribution, 2 Dec 1961, sub: Activation of Two Additional Active Army Divisions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Over the course of fifteen days, almost 12,000 paratroopers dropped in four separate aerial assaults, nearing the total number of Allied soldiers who had parachuted into Operation MARKET GARDEN in World War II. In addition to ferrying the paratroopers, aircraft from the 19th Air Force and the Military Air Transport Service dropped 826 tons of supplies and equipment and air-landed another 3,462 tons.⁵⁸

Although SWIFT STRIKE demonstrated the ability of the United States to deploy large numbers of soldiers on relatively short notice, Secretary McNamara already had been working to streamline command channels. Earlier reforms in the Department of Defense had created unified commands, placing units from different services under the direction of one commander in chief. The commander of the U.S. European Command, for example, had control over USAREUR; the U.S. Navy, Europe; and the U.S. Air Force, Europe. Oddly, none of the earlier reforms had addressed a unified command over units deploying directly from the continental United States.⁵⁹

In March, McNamara had instructed General Lemnitzer to begin preparing a plan to merge the Army's STRAC with the Air Force's Tactical Air Command. Placed under the command of an Army general, the unit would restore to the Army combat forces a measure of control over their strategic deployment as well as the control and direction of close air support for ground operations. In September, the Department of Defense announced the creation of U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM), formally combining the two organizations. McNamara selected Army General Paul D. Adams to command the new unit. Adams had served with distinction in both World War II and Korea and had commanded U.S. land forces in the Middle East during the 1958 intervention in Lebanon. Most recently, he had served as commanding general of the Third U.S. Army in the United States. The new command set up a temporary headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, but because that location was scheduled to close, the search continued for a permanent home.⁶⁰

The secretary assigned to the new command the primary mission of providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces for U.S. overseas commands. STRICOM would conduct planning for and supervise execution of contingency operations. Its leadership would develop doctrine and

58. "Exercise Swift Strike Sets Record for Airborne Training," *Army Times*, 26 Aug 1961; "STRAC Demonstrates Readiness in Far-Ranging Exercises," *Army Information Digest* 16 (Nov 1961): 23.

59. Trewhitt, *McNamara*, 85.

60. Trewhitt, *McNamara*, 85; Jack Raymond, "Pentagon Plans Joint Unit to Use in Limited War," *New York Times*, 27 Mar 1961; "Strike Command Set Up at McDill," *Army Times*, 21 Oct 1961.



Gen. Paul D. Adams (center) inspects a loaded aircraft before its departure for DEEP FURROW, a recurring NATO exercise. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

conduct training for joint force operations. The commanding general of CONARC also would serve as Army component commander of STRICOM. Army forces available to the STRICOM commander included the III Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters; the 1st, 2d, and 4th Infantry Divisions; the 2d Armored Division; and the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. Air units committed to the new command included tactical fighter, reconnaissance, troop carrier, and refueling wings from the active Air Force as well as the Air National Guard.⁶¹

To minimize interservice friction, Adams organized his staff so that whatever the branch of a staff section's senior officer, the most immediate subordinate had to be of another service. As his own chief of staff and deputy commander, Adams selected U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Bruce K. Holloway. Other key officers on the joint command staff included Army Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann as the assistant chief of staff for operations, Army Brig. Gen. Robert B. Neely as the assistant chief of staff for logistics, and Air Force Brig. Gen. Clyde Box as the assistant chief of staff for plans. U.S. Navy leaders fiercely resisted participation in STRICOM on the grounds that their

61. Fact Sheet, 1 Mar 1962, sub: HQs, United States Strike Command, Historians Files, CMH; Jean R. Moenk, *A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental United States, 1919-1971* (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1972), 38.

service, with the Marines, was better qualified to plan and execute strike operations on its own. However, to the extent that the Department of the Navy made U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officers available, Adams went out of his way to include them in prominent positions on his staff.⁶²

Meanwhile, in Europe, Army leaders had begun to incorporate the reinforcements and modernizations launched by the Kennedy administration while attempting to minimize disruptions to combat readiness. As USAREUR prepared to implement the mechanization of its infantry divisions, General Clarke reminded Department of Defense officials that shortages of equipment, trained personnel, and adequate facilities would extend the length of time required to reorganize or reequip. In particular, he noted that the Seventh Army would require an additional 2,700 tracked vehicle mechanics and drivers to accommodate the addition of armored personnel carriers. Clarke also sent the chief of staff his recommendation that the Seventh Army not begin its conversion to a ROAD organization until the infantry divisions had completed their mechanization. By the end of the year, USAREUR had received 3,000 filler personnel to support the new personnel carriers. The command had received sufficient carriers to complete the conversion of the 3d Infantry Division and two battle groups of the 8th Infantry Division.⁶³

Throughout the Army, an influx of new equipment prompted new ways of thinking about how the service would fight in future wars, particularly in discussions of the future of aviation. Secretary Stahr proved to be an effective advocate for the potential employment of helicopters. In response to a proposed reduction in aircraft procurement, he pointed out the restrictions under which the Army had labored during the previous ten years. The service's current inventory of 5,500 aircraft included seventeen separate fixed- and rotary-wing models. He pressed for a modernized fleet of only eight aircraft types, designed to accomplish specific organic service missions, including observation, troop movement, resupply, reconnaissance, command and control, and medical evacuation. Stahr was careful to promote the use of helicopters not only in a European battlefield, but also as an essential element in combat against guerrilla fighters in more austere environments.⁶⁴

62. "Strike Command Set Up at MacDill"; Interv, Col. Irving Monclova and Lt. Col. Marlin Lang with Gen. Paul D. Adams, 8 May 1975, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.

63. Msg, Cdr in Ch, U.S. Army, Europe, for U.S. Cdr in Ch, European Cmd, 24 Jul 1961; Memo, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke for Ch Staff, 22 Aug 1961, sub: Implementation of ROAD-65 by USAREUR; Ltr, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke to Gen. George H. Decker, 7 Nov 1961; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

64. Memo, Sec Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. for Sec Def, 1 Nov 1961, sub: Army Aircraft Requirements, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,

In his pitch to the defense secretary, Stahr also described the ongoing studies and development of various weapon systems for use by helicopters. By the end of the year, Army experiments with mounting the SS11 wire-guided missile or twin .30-caliber machine guns had seemed promising. The General Electric Company had developed a rapid-firing "minigun," patterned after a similar Air Force design but adapted for helicopters. At Fort Lewis, elements of the 4th Infantry Division conducted tests of the air cavalry concept, using helicopters mounted with some of the experimental weapons. Pilots practiced flying just above treetop level, looking for ways to make their aircraft more survivable on a mid- to high-intensity battlefield.⁶⁵

Another branch that seemed to be in the midst of a technological revolution was the field artillery. Throughout 1961, artillery units began to receive new weapons and equipment that would change the manner in which they provided their support to the maneuver units. In July, the service demonstrated a new self-propelled 8-inch howitzer, the M110. With the ability to travel at speeds up to 34 miles an hour and possessing twice the cruising range of earlier models, the new weapon was better suited to serving with mobile armored units. At twenty-six tons, it could be transported anywhere in the world by larger cargo aircraft. Also on the drawing board was a much lighter towed 105-mm. howitzer, the M102, which could be sling-loaded under the service's more modern helicopters. Perhaps most revolutionary was the field testing of the new field artillery data computer. The digital computer greatly increased the speeds at which artillerymen could generate firing data or resolve complicated meteorological problems. A solid-state electronic device without vacuum tubes, the field artillery data computer would propel the artillery into the computer age.⁶⁶

Other new weapons were also in various stages of development, testing, and fielding. The M14 rifle, the M60 machine gun, and the M79 grenade launcher were all in production and slowly working their way into the field army. The service also had introduced its new M60 tank to units throughout Europe. Unfortunately, adequate supplies of 105-mm. tank ammunition had not yet reached the command, nor had the Seventh Army yet developed the maintenance and logistical infrastructure to support large numbers of the new tank. Still a bit further back in the production pipeline were the

NACP.

65. "Armed Copters Undergoing Test in 4th Div. Recon Squadron," *Army Times*, 6 May 1961; Tom Scanlon, "Group Promotes Copter as Weapon," *Army Times*, 13 May 1961; "New Weapons Considered for Use on Copters," *Army Times*, 18 Nov 1961.

66. "Army Demonstrates Eight Inch Howitzer," *Army Times*, 22 Jul 1961; Gene Famiglietti, "Army Developing 2 New Light 105s," *Army Times*, 21 Oct 1961; "Computer Increases Artillery Accuracy," *Army Times*, 21 Oct 1961.



The M60A1 tank is tested on the dry-wash course at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

Pershing missile, a replacement for the antiquated Redstone, and the Redeye shoulder-launched air defense weapon.⁶⁷

The increases in range, lethality, and mobility of the Army's new weapons and equipment prompted other concerns among the service's senior leaders. General Powell warned General Decker that the growing urbanization of the United States posed limitations for future military training. Various outside interests had begun clamoring for the release of much of the land controlled by the federal government. The availability of open land on which to hold large-scale maneuvers, long an issue in Europe, was becoming a concern at home as well. Increased congestion of air space posed additional concerns for Army Aviation. Powell suggested that future success in preparing military units for battle might lie in the miniaturization of training—using terrain boards, equipment simulators, and subcaliber weapon simulators. The Army, he said, needed to foster new approaches to training.⁶⁸

67. Tom Scanlon, "New Weapons on the Way, But Delivery is Slow," *Army Times*, 25 Feb 1961; "Pershing, Redeye Production Seen," *Army Times*, 30 Dec 1961; Memo, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke for Adjutant Gen, 19 May 1961, sub: Operational Readiness Report, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

68. Ltr, Gen. Herbert B. Powell to Gen. George H. Decker, 18 Dec 1961; Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 28 Dec 1961, sub: Problem Areas for Future Training; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

None of the innovations in weapons, equipment, or training methods would make a difference, however, if the Army failed to recruit and retain sufficient soldiers to fill the force. For the most part, reports throughout 1961 indicated that efforts to improve personnel statistics were paying off. In March, service leaders announced that reenlistments for the fiscal year ending 31 July would total between 76,000 and 78,000, establishing a new record. Although personnel increases to support the Berlin response expanded the number of inducted draftees from just more than 86,000 to almost 119,000, the number would drop back to around 82,000 the following year. Of note was an increase of more than 50 percent in the enlistment of Women's Army Corps recruits. In August, Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, announced that President Kennedy's televised message to the nation on 25 July had boosted enlistments and reenlistments by 20 percent above the Army's most optimistic estimates. Vittrup warned, however, that the extensions in overseas tours and the terms of enlistment that the president had approved in conjunction with his rearmament package could have a less favorable effect on recruiting and retention in the long term.⁶⁹

One area in which personnel specialists began to look with alarm was the ballooning surplus of senior noncommissioned officers in several branches and career fields. Large numbers of promotions during the Korean War, followed by the inactivation of units but the retention of personnel, created long delays for promotions and fewer opportunities to attend required service schools. In many cases, senior noncommissioned officers faced a choice of reclassification into a completely alien skill field or an early release from the service. An increasing resignation rate among senior enlisted ranks caused some to recognize that, within a few years, most of those soldiers with World War II or Korean War combat experience would be gone. With leaders devoting so much attention to recruitment and initial reenlistment rates, the Army had no immediate remedy for this looming concern.⁷⁰

The new administration soon began poking at another personnel issue that had simmered beneath the surface for several years. Secretary McNamara approached the issue of racial integration less from a pursuit of social justice than from a desire to increase military efficiency. Soon after taking over the position, McNamara asked his staff to gather information regarding the status of Black personnel within the Department of Defense. Although he initially addressed his concerns toward civilians serving

69. "Regular Army Reenlistment Rate Points to New Record," *Army Times*, 11 Mar 1961; Memo, Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup for Under Sec Army, 22 Aug 1961, sub: Significant Developments in Personnel Procurement, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

70. Sfc. Frank B. Hastie Jr., "The Surplus Nightmare," *Army Times*, 13 May 1961.

within the department, they soon spread to the availability of opportunities throughout the military ranks. The president himself intervened when he observed few if any Black service members participating in military ceremonial units around the White House.⁷¹

In direct response to prodding from the assistant secretary of defense (manpower), the Army directed commanders at all levels to increase their emphasis on the participation of qualified Black personnel in existing officer procurement and training programs. Unit commanders were to encourage, counsel, and assist talented Black personnel to apply for appointment to the U.S. Military Academy or officer candidate school. In 1961, the Army drew the majority of its Black officers from a small number of historically Black colleges and universities. The guidance tasked professors of military science in all educational institutions to assist qualified Black students and to encourage them to participate in the ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) program. It also directed that a prominent Black educator be appointed to the ROTC Advisory Panel within the Department of the Army. The adjutant general ordered updates to assignment policies to ensure that Black officers would serve in positions worthy of their capabilities.⁷²

Although the active services had made considerable progress in the integration of their organizations since President Harry S. Truman's original desegregation order in 1948, the same could not be said for their reserve counterparts. The successful integration of some state national guard units had set a positive example for the integration of other military units and civilian agencies, but other state national guard units remained starkly racist. By 1961, ten states with large Black populations and understaffed guard units steadfastly resisted integration. Numerous civil rights organizations and veterans groups urged the administration to withdraw federal recognition of these states' National Guards as a means of forcing those states to integrate, but President Kennedy demurred. For the time being, he chose to pursue persuasion and diplomacy over a more coercive approach.⁷³

71. Morris J. MacGregor Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*, Defense Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981), 504–9.

72. Memo, Dep Under Sec (Manpower) Alfred B. Pitt for Asst Sec Defense (Manpower), 5 Dec 1961, sub: Minority Representation in Officer Procurement and Training; Memo, Maj. Gen. Joe C. Lambert, Adjutant Gen, for Major ZI [Zone of the Interior] and Overseas Cdrs, n.d., sub: Minority Representation in Officer Procurement and Training; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

73. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, 518–19.

VIETNAM, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE ARMY'S EMBRACE OF SUB-LIMITED WARFARE

General Taylor and Walt Rostow returned from their fact-finding tour of Vietnam at the end of October and submitted a report to the president on 3 November. The Taylor-Rostow Mission, as it came to be called, marked an important turning point in the way the United States approached the advancing Communist insurgency in Vietnam. Although they had different sources of information and had developed their views individually, almost all of the members of the mission had reached a similar conclusion. The situation in Southeast Asia had become serious, but no one believed that it was lost. In the final report to President Kennedy, the team recommended the insertion of American administrators into all aspects of the South Vietnamese government that President Ngô Đình Diệm was willing to accept. Although only the Vietnamese could beat the Viet Cong finally, one adviser argued, Americans at all levels could show them how to do the job. The report urged a renewed effort to train and develop local self-defense forces to aid in the effort against the Communist guerrillas. It suggested that the United States deploy specialized forces to assist in such efforts as aerial reconnaissance and photography, airlift, intelligence, and air support. Taylor also recommended the insertion of a logistical task force to provide an American military presence on the ground and to prepare to receive any additional U.S. or Southeast Asia Treaty Organization forces that might follow. At the end of the report, Taylor expressed his view that the time might come when the United States would have to attack the source of the guerrilla aggression in North Vietnam.⁷⁴

Even before the Taylor-Rostow Mission to Southeast Asia, the Army had begun preparations to increase its presence in Vietnam. At the end of May, General Decker sent a letter to Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, asking what his firm requirements were to guarantee the security of South Vietnam. In response, McGarr recommended U.S. approval of President Diệm's request for a Republic of Vietnam force of 280,000, of which 257,000 would be Army. To develop such a force, McGarr requested an additional 10,000 U.S. trainers for the MAAG. In addition, he asked for the deployment of a 6,000-man U.S. brigade task force to provide additional security and to assist with the development of a logistical support base. President Kennedy directed General Taylor to review the request, and Secretary McNamara forwarded the issue to the Joint Chiefs for their views on the subject. McNamara gave

74. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, 240–44; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 545–46.

initial approval for a phased increase of South Vietnamese forces from 150,000 to 170,000 but deferred further authorizations until he received more guidance regarding how they would be funded.⁷⁵

In the meantime, somewhat under the radar, the U.S. Army commitment to South Vietnam continued to expand. In actions approved by the president in April and May, the service provided an additional eighty-eight personnel to the MAAG, two senior colonels to assist in the development of a combat development and test center, a civil affairs mobile training team, and ninety-three Army Security Agency personnel to assist Vietnamese Army units in communications intercept and direction finding. The Department of the Army also approved the deployment of an additional 400 special forces or Ranger-trained personnel to assist in the training of Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces.⁷⁶

Other developments in Southeast Asia pointed toward an ever-increasing level of U.S. involvement in the area. In September, senior Army commanders in the Pacific presented to the chief of staff a plan for the pre-positioning of 584 tons of ammunition in Thailand for use by U.S. Army troops in support of contingency plans in Southeast Asia. The proposal identified the prestock as part of a military assistance program for Thailand in order to avoid the appearance of providing additional support for South Vietnam. Items selected for the stockpile would provide adequate ammunition for up to fifteen days of operations for the air echelons of six airborne battle groups. The planners noted that the pre-positioning would make a significant reduction in the airlift requirement to support the initial phase of deployment to an objective area in Southeast Asia.⁷⁷

In Laos, however, prospects for increased Army involvement were beginning to fade. Although the president initially had directed planning for U.S. intervention there, the potential for escalation and reinforcement by either the Chinese or North Vietnamese appeared ominous. General Lemnitzer warned Kennedy that the United States would be unlikely to match the numbers of troops those nations could insert into the theater. Even though bringing American soldiers into the fight in Laos presented few problems, Lemnitzer worried about his nation's ability to get them out if

75. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr to Gen. George H. Decker, 15 Jun 1961; Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 11 Jul 1961, sub: Letter from General McGarr; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

76. Memo, Brig. Gen. John W. Keating, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 12 Jun 1961, sub: South Vietnam Fact Sheet, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

77. Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 12 Sep 1961, sub: Prepositioning Army Ammunition-Thailand, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

the situation exploded. Ultimately, Kennedy decided that the risks involved in intervention in Laos were too great, and he turned his attention back to Vietnam.⁷⁸

In December, the Army announced that it was sending two aviation units, the 8th Transportation Company from Fort Bragg and the 57th Transportation Company from Fort Lewis, to Vietnam. Each company included 200 soldiers and eighteen H-21 Shawnee helicopters. Officials indicated that the units had deployed to prepare and to operate U.S. Army helicopters for supply and reconnaissance missions against the Communists. U.S. aircrews also would transport Vietnamese ground troops into combat. The Army chief of staff then approved a request from the chief of the Vietnam MAAG to send a fixed-wing aircraft company (U-1A Otter) for use by the group. At the same time, General Decker began making an argument to the undersecretary of the Army that the service also should deploy armed helicopters to the theater. Such a deployment, he argued, would provide the Army of the Republic of Vietnam with a marked advantage in mobility and firepower over the Communists. Decker recognized that his position went against the current national policy and suggested further consideration within the Joint Chiefs of Staff before bringing the matter up in secretarial channels.⁷⁹

Within the Kennedy administration, senior officials discussed new ways in which military forces could be employed to support the struggling government in Vietnam. The president himself addressed his belief to the secretaries of state and defense that U.S. troops also could assist in the economic and social development in Vietnam and other less developed countries. He endorsed the phrase "civic action" to describe the use of military forces to help out in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and other areas helpful to economic development. Through National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk to notify him by the end of March 1962 of specific civic action projects they had integrated into their respective departments.⁸⁰

78. Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 295–99.

79. "U.S. Copter Unit Arrives in Saigon," *Army Times*, 16 Dec 1961; Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett for Ch Staff, 8 Dec 1961, sub: U.S. Army Aircraft for MAAG Vietnam; Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for Under Sec Army, 8 Nov 1961, sub: Armed Helicopters for Vietnam; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.

80. National Security Memo No. 119, McGeorge Bundy for Sec State and Sec Def, 18 Dec 1961, sub: Civic Action, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



Maintenance personnel of the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company assemble one of the newly arrived UH-1B helicopters at Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

For its part, the Army embraced its role in what its leadership had termed “sub-limited warfare.”⁸¹ In response to the president’s interest in civic action, Secretary of the Army Stahr suggested to McNamara that Army elements were available to help stem the growing insurgency and political instability in Latin America. He mentioned Colombia, in particular, as a worthwhile target for American intervention. The U.S. Army, he said, could participate in the broad fields of Western Hemisphere defense, nation building, internal security, counterinsurgency, and civic action.⁸²

Officials within the Department of Defense countered with other proposals. Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric argued that the tense political situation in Colombia made it unwise to send in a large sub-limited warfare activities group at that time. Although he saw no immediate opportunities for employing such organizations in Latin America, he suggested that the Army could tailor the concept to meet challenges in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. South Vietnam, he said, had a civic action program just getting underway, which needed support in every way possible. He suggested that it might be desirable for small civic action teams to train the civil guard and self-defense forces. General Decker and Secretary Stahr interpreted that

81. Memo, Sec Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. for Sec Def, 15 Dec 1961, sub: Sublimited Warfare Activities for Colombia, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

82. Memo, Stahr for Sec Def, 15 Dec 1961, sub: Sublimited Warfare Activities for Colombia.

message as support for Army intervention in any of those areas and reiterated the secretary's earlier position that the Army "stands ready to make specific proposals whenever you advise that there is a requirement."⁸³

In preparation for this increased emphasis on civic action and nation building, the Army had focused more attention on low-intensity conflict training and had begun tailoring part of its organization to deal with such contingencies. In June, the service proposed a structure of four basic counterinsurgency forces designed to operate, respectively, in Southeast Asia; Latin America; Africa, south of the Sahara; and Europe and the Middle East. Each task force would include a special forces group, a psychological warfare company, an Army Security Agency detachment, a civil affairs detachment, an engineer detachment, a military intelligence detachment, and a medical detachment, for a total of just more than 1,500 personnel. Although the concept was still under consideration by the end of the year, the service had initiated development of the Latin America task force with the expectation that it would move in 1962 to Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.⁸⁴

Central to the Army's plans for exploiting its sub-limited warfare and counterinsurgency capabilities was an expansion of its special forces. In his provision to the 1962 defense budget, President Kennedy had recommended an additional 3,000 spaces for counterinsurgency forces, 2,000 of which would go to Army special forces. In July, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Maj. Gen. Robert W. Porter Jr. reported that increased recruiting efforts successfully had procured almost 1,700 enlisted volunteers for special forces training. Vice Chief of Staff Eddleman reported that the Army would have no problem meeting the need for additional qualified officers. Near the end of the year, the total strength assigned to the four active special forces groups had nearly doubled from 1,800 in January to slightly more than 3,500, with an additional 500 assigned to the Special Warfare Training Center at Fort Bragg.⁸⁵

83. Memo, Roswell Gilpatric, Dep Sec Def, for Sec Army, 15 Dec 1961, sub: Sub-Limited Warfare Activities in Colombia; Memo, Howard E. Haugerud, Dep Under Sec Army, for Ch Staff, 18 Dec 1961, sub: Sub-Limited Warfare Activities; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1961, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

84. Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for Sec Army, 8 Dec 1961, sub: Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War, Dated 13 October 1961, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

85. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert W. Porter Jr. for Vice Ch Staff, 27 Jul 1961, sub: Special Forces Recruiting; Ltr, Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman to Gen. Herbert B. Powell, Cmdg Gen, U.S. Army Continental Army Cmd, 31 Jul 1961; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Despite the variety of potential trouble spots around the world and, especially, the continued turmoil surrounding Berlin, the growing conflict in Vietnam appeared to garner most of the attention of the American media. In a luncheon with reporters from the *Baltimore Sun* and the *Wall Street Journal*, General Decker answered questions regarding possible courses of action for the United States in Vietnam. He responded that he could see only two choices. The United States could continue along its current path, providing political, economic, and military advisory support, or it could intervene with the direct involvement of American combat troops. The latter, he said, would require a political decision at the highest level to take fully into account the possibility of escalation and direct involvement of the forces of North Vietnam and Communist China. He expressed his view that the United States should not undertake that course of action unless the people were prepared to “go all the way,” if necessary, to hold Southeast Asia.⁸⁶ That being said, he saw no reason to question the ability of the Army to win any war, any time, any place.

FROM FAMINE TO FEAST

The year 1961 ended with the Army in a vastly different place than it had been in just a few years earlier. The Kennedy administration had come into office already prepared to shift American defense policy in a new direction, putting a greater emphasis on conventional forces and the wider range of options they could provide. Now, after a year of foreign policy and national security challenges, the Army found itself at the center of a massive rearmament program. No longer the odd man out in a defense establishment reliant upon nuclear weapons and a retaliation-based deterrent, the service had reestablished itself as an essential element in the president's portfolio of military options.

However, the Army's transition was still underway. The service had yet to complete shifting its force structure away from the pentomic division model to the more flexible ROAD concept. Although many new weapons, vehicles, and items of equipment were already entering the system, important innovations were still on the way. Finally, while commitment to a new conflict in Southeast Asia seemed imminent, uncertainty lingered as to how the Army would have to fight that war. A bit of tinkering remained before the service would be ready to engage in its next great struggle.

86. Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles G. Dodge, Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 16 Nov 1961, sub: Luncheon with Press Representatives, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

10

Embracing a New Future

By the start of 1962, the Kennedy administration was well entrenched, and the Army's leadership was learning how to navigate the idiosyncrasies of Robert S. McNamara's Defense Department. The previous year's most significant challenges—Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia—remained at the forefront of concerns for the country's national security apparatus. President John F. Kennedy retained his conviction that soft power, civic action, and counterinsurgency represented America's most effective tools in dealing with the worldwide spread of communism.

For the Army, the president's expressed interests accelerated a shift in focus that already was well underway. Although the service's traditional role as the backbone of a Western European defense would remain constant, other concerns were becoming more pressing. After the failed Bay of Pigs expedition, the proximity of Communist Cuba to American soil posed a consistent irritant if not an existential threat. Likewise, civil unrest and unpopular rulers threatened to destabilize various locations throughout Central and South America.

To an ever-increasing extent, however, the Army's attention was turning toward the expanding insurgency in Vietnam. A frequently expressed belief that the United States could not allow this domino to fall to Communist expansion seemed to make this a fight worth engaging. More to the point, this appeared to Army leaders to be exactly the type of conflict suited to an application of the counterinsurgency infrastructure and doctrine they had

been developing and in which the president had expressed his most ardent interest. After years of settling for scraps in a defense policy infatuated with atomic weapons, this was a challenge that would move the Army to the head of the line in the competition for defense funding and for influence within the national security structure.

PRESENTING A NEW ARMY

On 20 January 1962, Brig. Gen. Chester V. “Ted” Clifton, the military aide to the president, forwarded to Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker a request from the president for a brief report on changes in the Army during 1961 and those projected for 1962. General Decker established a program advisory committee consisting of representatives of all the major staff offices. After several weeks of consultation and staff work, Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. forwarded the requested information to the president on 29 March.¹

The report noted the Army’s expansion over the course of the previous year. Its active strength had increased from eleven combat and three training divisions to sixteen combat-ready divisions. This growth was accompanied by substantial increases in other combat units of less-than-division size as well as supporting elements. Additionally, the report highlighted the augmentation of the Army’s special forces from three groups to four. Significant deliveries of new weapons and equipment for the two years included 500,000 modern rifles and 1,800 main battle tanks by the end of 1962.²

The report summarized in some detail the effects upon the Army of the 1961 rearmament and mobilization initiatives that the president had instituted. Increases to the Army’s personnel ceiling, coupled with the mobilization of various reserve and national guard units for the Berlin challenge, had boosted the service’s authorized strength to 1,081,000. Already at the start of 1962, many of the reserve and national guard units were returning to civilian status. Nonetheless, analysts projected that, by the end of the year, Army strength would remain near 960,000. The additions and

1. Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for Sec Army, 17 Feb 1962, sub: Changes in the Army—1961 and 1962; Memo, Col. Charles L. Jackson, Director, Progress and Statistical Reporting, for Dep Chs Staff, 2 Feb 1962, sub: Presidential Request for Brief Report on Changes in the Army; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

2. Ltr, Sec Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. to President John F. Kennedy, 29 Mar 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

improvements to the force, the report concluded, had added to the nation's ability to deter a conventional war through the creation of larger and more modern ground forces. Simultaneously, the Army had made progress in developing unconventional forces to meet the threat of Soviet-inspired wars of liberation. The addition of a fourth special forces group along with more psychological warfare and civil affairs units seemed to add considerably to the Army's counterinsurgency capabilities.³

The most visible sign of the Army's evolution was its progress in reorganizing its divisions. In January, President Kennedy approved a program for the activation of two new divisions, the 5th Infantry and the 1st Armored. On 3 February, the Army reactivated the 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, using elements of Combat Command A, the training cadre already stationed there. Two weeks later, the service activated the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, absorbing the personnel of the training center there as well as elements of the 2d Infantry Brigade then stationed at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Although Secretary McNamara approved the formation of the two new divisions under the Army's new Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) organization, he decided to delay the adaptation of the rest of the Army until fiscal year 1964 because of the ongoing crisis in Berlin.⁴

McNamara emphasized to Army leadership the importance of the two divisions achieving an early operational readiness. He established 25 August and 8 September as the dates on which the 1st Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division, respectively, should be combat-ready. On 11 September, the commander of the 1st Armored Division reported that all units of his division had achieved a state of combat readiness commensurate with equipment available. He acknowledged that he had not yet evaluated his unit's nuclear weapons capability because of shortages of equipment and technically qualified personnel. On 23 November, the 5th Infantry Division reported to the Army Staff that it had completed its Army Training Test under the ROAD concept and that most of its units had reached a satisfactory level of combat readiness. The division report noted that its aviation battalion, air cavalry troop, and brigade aviation platoons were not yet operationally

3. Ltr, Stahr to Kennedy, 29 Mar 1962; Memo, Jackson for Dep Chs Staff, 2 Feb 1962, sub: Presidential Request for Brief Report on Changes in the Army.

4. Monte Bourjaily Jr. "Two New Divisions First in ROAD," *Army Times*, 13 Jan 1962; John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 305–6.

ready because of shortages of personnel and aircraft. The report noted that the Army had diverted aircraft and personnel to higher priority missions.⁵

In light of Secretary McNamara's decision to postpone further ROAD reorganization, the Army published a new schedule in November 1962. It called for the five divisions in Europe to begin conversion in January 1963, with all modifications completed by the end of the year. In the Pacific, the divisions in Korea and Hawai'i would start their realignments in July with the goal of regaining combat readiness by the end of the year. Among the divisions stationed in the continental United States, the 2d Armored Division would begin its conversion in December 1962. The 1st, 2d, and 4th Infantry Divisions would begin their efforts in March, July, and October 1963, respectively. The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions would be the last to convert, not beginning until early 1964.⁶

Even as the first two ROAD divisions, the 1st Armored and 5th Infantry, began their initial field training, the new organization came under fire from several observers. General Paul D. Adams, the commander of U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM), complained that the new divisions contained too much excess equipment. As an example, he noted that the new infantry division contained 3,318 radios, or a radio for every 4.7 soldiers in the organization. From Korea, the I Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Harvey H. Fischer, echoed the complaints about excessive radios and observed that the Army had become too concerned about "nice-to-have" elements rather than focusing on what units required to perform their missions.⁷ General Maxwell D. Taylor, serving as the military representative of the president, also expressed his concerns, wondering why the Army could not have augmented his pentomic concept rather than throwing it out in favor of a completely new design. He did not believe that the service had allowed enough time to fully test and adjust to his pentomic concept.⁸

Along with the reorganization of its divisions, the Army also realigned the overall structure of the force in the continental United States. In March, the

5. Memo, Col. Francis J. Roberts, Mil Asst, for Sec Stahr, 26 Jan 1962, sub: Readiness Dates for New Army Divisions; Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 25 Oct 1962, sub: Status Report of Actions of 1st Armored Division; Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker for Sec Army, 26 Nov 1962, sub: 5th Infantry Division; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

6. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 306; Memo, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Ch Staff, for Sec Def, 30 Nov 1962, sub: Schedule for Conversion of Army Divisions to ROAD, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

7. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Harvey H. Fischer to Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Vice Ch Staff, 10 Jan 1963, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

8. "Divisions Too Heavy, Adams Tells AUSA," *Army Times*, 15 Oct 1962; Ltr, Fischer to Hamlett, 10 Jan 1963; MFR, Lt. Col. John H. Murphy, Organization Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff

service announced the activation of the III Corps at Fort Hood, joining the XVIII Airborne Corps stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The service assigned the 4th and 32d Infantry Divisions and the 2d and 49th Armored Divisions to the III Corps, with the understanding that once it had returned the two mobilized divisions to reserve status, they would be replaced by the newly activated 1st Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions. The III Corps would constitute the heavily armored Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) force prepared for movement overseas to Europe or to the Middle East. The XVIII Airborne Corps, which included the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions and the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, remained the air transportable element of the Army designed to deploy to any potential trouble spots overseas on a moment's notice.⁹

Also evolving was STRICOM, under the leadership of General Adams. In May, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs attempted to clarify the role of the command and its relationship with the combatant forces assigned to it. McNamara told members of Congress that the STRICOM commander retained operational control of those elements rather than having them assigned as organic to the organization. This interpretation attempted to mollify Air Force officers who rebelled against the concept of Air Force assets under the command of an Army general. Adams explained that his headquarters would plan for contingency operations and command and control emergency deployments. Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) would provide the commander and staff for the Army component of STRICOM. If STRICOM elements, either land or air, deployed as a reinforcement to an existing unified command, control would pass to the unified commander once the units were in place.¹⁰

Throughout 1962, as the Army's divisions in the United States realigned, evidence mounted that their readiness posture was not up to the standards the Army expected. In an investigation requested by the deputy chief of staff for military operations and conducted by the U.S. Army Audit Agency, inspectors reported that combat readiness in many of the STRAC divisions had declined to the extent that positive command action was required to maintain satisfactory ratings. Inspectors noted that readiness reports emanating from STRAC units and continental U.S. Army headquarters did

Ops, 2 Jan 1962, sub: Meeting With General Taylor on ROAD; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

9. "Army Realigns STRAC Force," *Army Times*, 3 Mar 1962.

10. "STRICOM's Role Told" and "Lean, Mean, Ready to Go," *Army Times*, 19 May 1962; "Continental Army is Reorganized," *Army Times*, 30 Jun 1962; Memo, Brig. Gen. John W. Keating, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 1 May 1962, sub: U.S. Strike Command, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

not reflect the posture of those units accurately. At many locations, STRAC-unit personnel performed post support functions instead of serving in their assigned operational positions. A shortage of trained maintenance personnel and the extreme age of some vehicles and equipment had contributed to an overall decline in maintenance programs across the force. Significant shortages in supplies and repair parts compounded the problem. Most concerning was the news that many unit commanders expressed a reluctance to report unfavorable data because doing so might diminish their performance ratings. The investigation concluded with recommendations across the Army Staff for increased scrutiny of personnel and logistics concerns that inspectors had identified at so many continental U.S. facilities and for the commanding general of CONARC to monitor the readiness reports coming out of STRAC units personally.¹¹

Meanwhile, another of the service's continental defense organizations, Army Air Defense Command, was beginning to feel the strain of maintaining a high state of readiness in the face of numerous Cold War challenges. Potential flash points in Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia, coupled with high-tension relationships with both the Soviet Union and Communist China, had forced the commander, Lt. Gen. William W. Dick, to maintain 75 percent of his firing units on advanced levels of alert. With all of his units at reduced strength, General Dick appealed to the chief of staff to restore his units to full strength and to increase Air Defense Command's priority for new accessions and replacements.¹²

As it was, 1962 seemed to mark a high tide in the status and influence of Army Air Defense Command. By then, the command included more than 200 Nike batteries committed to continental air defense. These included sixty-nine older model Nike Ajax batteries manned by Army national guard units, with the remainder consisting of newer Nike Hercules batteries manned by active Army units. Altogether, these defenses covered more than thirty vital areas encompassing 300 communities in thirty states.¹³

As a component that had embraced President Dwight D. Eisenhower's devotion to strategic missiles to expand the service's influence, Army Air Defense Command now faced greater technological challenges. Despite the significant funding and support the Army had received for the development

11. Audit Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Army Audit Agency, 1 Nov 1962, "Operational Readiness of Strategic Army Corps," File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

12. Ltr, Lt. Gen. William W. Dick to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Ch Staff, 1 Oct 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

13. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 136.

of its Nike Zeus antimissile missile, testing during 1962 indicated that the system was not yet capable of fulfilling its mission. To compound the technical failures, Air Force officials were careful to make sure that the national media fully documented each shortcoming. President Kennedy had become highly interested in the program, but both he and Secretary McNamara were growing impatient with the overall lack of progress. Although McNamara approved funding for further testing and development, he canceled plans for initial deployments until the Army could demonstrate more consistent success with the system.¹⁴

The defense secretary brought his interest in modern technology to bear in an even more dynamic manner when, in April, he sent a pair of memos to Secretary Stahr indicating his concerns for the future of Army Aviation. In his communications—largely the product of Col. Robert R. Williams, an Army aviator currently on his staff—McNamara directed the Army to take a bold new look at the possibilities for expanding its mobility. He emphasized that he wanted an atmosphere divorced from traditional viewpoints and that he was willing to consider new concepts and unorthodox ideas. In response, on 3 May, the Army established a board that included a virtual all-star team of Army advocates for its aviation branch. In addition to Williams, by that time a brigadier general, the board included Maj. Gen. Ben Harrell, Commanding General of the Army Infantry Center; Maj. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann, Assistant Chief of Staff and J-3 (Joint Staff Operations) for STRICOM; Maj. Gen. William B. Rosson, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Special Warfare; and Brig. Gen. Delk M. Oden, Director of Army Aviation. Overall, the board included 199 officers, 41 enlisted personnel, and 53 civilians. At McNamara's suggestion, the Army designated Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze as its president. Then serving as the commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps, General Howze, a qualified light aircraft and helicopter pilot, had served as the first chief of Army Aviation in 1955.¹⁵

Officially designated the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, the group soon became more commonly known as the Howze Board. Most of its work was carried out by seven committees—Reconnaissance, Security, and Target Acquisition; Tactical Mobility; Firepower; Logistical Operations and Support; Operations Research; Field Tests; and Programs, Policy, and Budget. A newly completed primary school at Fort Bragg

14. "Zeus Flops; Pershing Hits," *Army Times*, 24 Nov 1962.

15. J. A. Stockfisch, *The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994); Hamilton H. Howze, *A Cavalryman's Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth Century Army General* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 182–88, 236–37.



Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze (right) and Maj. Gen. Harry H. Critz troop the line during farewell ceremonies honoring General Howze. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

served as the group's headquarters, but most of the committee's work took place at whatever location the section's leader was assigned. Much of the consideration included the field-testing of concepts using elements of the 82d Airborne Division and an extended visit to Southeast Asia by a seven-person team to observe the employment of helicopters and small, fixed-wing aircraft.¹⁶

The Howze Board submitted its findings to the secretary of the Army on 20 August and then to the secretary of defense on 15 September. It recommended sweeping changes in the Army's use of aircraft, the types of aircraft it employed, and the organization and types of units it would deploy. Most significant was the proposal for an air assault division. Similar in structure to the ROAD organizations, the new units would have three brigade headquarters, eight airmobile infantry battalions, five artillery battalions, and one air cavalry squadron. The new division would reduce the number of ground vehicles from 3,452 to 1,113, replacing them with 459 aircraft. Supporting the air assault effort would be two other new organizations, the air cavalry combat brigade and the air transport brigade. The former would be a force of 316 aircraft, including 144 attack helicopters armed with antitank missiles. Its mix of aerial firepower and air-transportable infantry

16. Stockfish, *1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments*.

made it a flexible complement to the air assault division, but suitable for independent action in other fields. The air transport brigade included a mix of fixed-wing cargo aircraft and medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. In theory, one air transport brigade would provide limited logistical support for an air assault division out to a distance of 175 miles. The board recommended the inclusion of five air assault divisions, supported by three air cavalry combat brigades and five air transport brigades in the Army's overall sixteen-division force.¹⁷

Most of the aircraft included in the tables of organization for the new units were either recently deployed or under development. The fixed-wing AO-1 Mohawk (later designated OV-1) and the AC-1 Caribou were already in the field and suitable for the tasks required. Although the general utility helicopter UH-1—a light transport armed gunship—was already in production, anticipated light observation and heavy lift aircraft remained under development. The OH-6 Cayuse observation helicopter and the heavy lift CH-54 Sky Crane would not reach the field until 1966. Another heavy lift craft, the CH-1 (later CH-47) Chinook, although early in production, had been plagued with problems and the Howze Board did not yet regard it as suitable for deployment.¹⁸

The board's report prompted immediate reactions in several quarters. The Air Force responded by designating its own board, under Lt. Gen. Gabriel P. Disoway, to contest the Howze Board's recommendations on technical and doctrinal grounds. The Air Force group argued that its fighter-bombers were superior platforms for providing fire support to ground troops. It also contested the Army's usurpation of the close air support role, traditionally an Air Force mission. Army leaders, however, embraced the findings and initiated plans to introduce an air assault division into the Army structure by the end of 1964. Also pleased with the board's work was Secretary McNamara, who approved an increase of the Army's troop strength from 960,000 to 975,000 to accommodate the creation of a provisional air assault division and an air transport brigade for further testing.¹⁹

17. Stockfisch, 1962 *Howze Board and Army Combat Developments*; Interv, Lt. Col. Robert Reed with Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, n.d., Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI); Christopher C. H. Cheng, *Airmobility: The Development of a Doctrine* (London: Praeger, 1994), 179–80; Howze, *Cavalryman's Story*, 233–57.

18. Stockfisch, 1962 *Howze Board and Army Combat Developments*; Howze, *Cavalryman's Story*, 245–50.

19. Stockfisch, 1962 *Howze Board and Army Combat Developments*; Howze, *Cavalryman's Story*, 254–57; Memo, Maj. Gen. Vernon P. Mock, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Oct 1962, sub: Alternatives for Providing an Air Assault Division in the Active Army Prior to



An AC-1 Caribou plane taking off (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

Even as General Howze himself acknowledged the significance of the board's findings, he ruefully conceded that they had, perhaps, gone overboard in the documentation. In subsequent interviews, he noted that the entire final report filled a regulation-sized Army footlocker. Because the Army ultimately had generated more than 600 copies of the report, Howze suggested that the service might win the next war by dropping them on the Kremlin.²⁰

Secretary McNamara's enthusiastic support of the Howze Board's recommendations sounded the death knell for the decade-old Pace-Finletter accords. Despite numerous Air Force efforts to refute the board's findings, the Army had made its case successfully for the increased mobility and firepower that its embrace of helicopters could bring. Although the Air Force's primacy over jet aircraft would remain sacrosanct, any restrictions on arming the helicopters and limiting their use on the battlefield had ended.²¹

the End of FY 1964, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

20. Interv. Reed with Howze, n.d.

21. Jack Vincent, "Army Air Limits Near End," *Army Times*, 18 Aug 1962; "Army Air Expansion Expected in Howze Board Proposals," *Army Times*, 1 Sep 1962.



Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. (left) points out the worldwide commitments of the Army to his successor, Cyrus R. Vance. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

This success served as a fitting sendoff to the Army's senior leadership. On 5 July, Elvis J. Stahr left his position as secretary of the Army to return to civilian life. He was replaced by Cyrus R. Vance, who was serving as general counsel for the Department of Defense. Vance had deployed as a gunnery officer on a destroyer in the Pacific during World War II and had served the nation in several military and civilian positions before assuming this new role. Early in October, General Decker also retired, with General Earle G. "Bus" Wheeler succeeding him as chief of staff. General Wheeler had served in numerous line and staff positions in the United States during World War II before deploying to Europe in November 1944 as chief of staff for the newly formed 63d Infantry Division. In recent years, Wheeler had served as the commanding general of the 2d Armored Division, the secretary of the general staff, and the deputy commanding general of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR).

Shortly after returning to the Pentagon, Wheeler sent a letter to his senior commanders, noting the emergence of the new Army. Absorbing the newly authorized personnel and developing the new airmobile division would be his highest priorities. Accordingly, he directed the Army Staff to reexamine the ongoing division reorganization to ensure that the service



General Earle G. Wheeler
(U.S. Army)

retained only those units, activities, and installations essential to the Army's combat posture. Although the words were not explicit, the new chief of staff's message appeared to resonate. He was telling his senior leaders to get ready to go to war.²²

REORGANIZATION

After more than seventy-five formal briefings for administration officials, members of Congress, and senior military officers, the Army finally began to move forward with Project 80, the reorganization of the Department of the Army's headquarters, secretariat, and staff

that it had been studying for more than a year and a half. Impatient with the foot-dragging he perceived on the part of the Army Staff, Secretary McNamara issued an executive order on 10 January, abolishing the statutory positions of the technical service chiefs and transferring them to the secretary of the Army. At the same time, the Army logistical staff released to the public a formal summary of the Project 80 reorganization plan.²³ (See Chart 11.)

Central to the plan was the formation of a 200,000-person organization with "authoritative control" over Army development, testing, production, and supply of equipment.²⁴ Established as the Army Materiel Development and Logistic Command (MDLC), the new organization would assume control over all Army laboratories, arsenals, proving grounds, test stations, depots, supply

22. Ltr, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler to Gen. Herbert B. Powell, Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 26 Dec 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. Wheeler sent similar letters to almost all of his three and four-star generals.

23. James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 353-54; MFR, Col. Edward W. McGregor, Asst Project Director, Reorganization of the Dept. of the Army, 20 Feb 1962, sub: Weekly Meeting of Secretary of Defense on Significant Defense Projects, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

24. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 354.

control points, purchasing officers, and transportation terminals. The new organization provided an overall headquarters for several existing logistical commands, and the MDLC would now control the Missile Command, Munitions Command, Weapons and Mobility Command, Communications and Electronics Command, General Equipment Command, Supply and Maintenance Command, and the Test and Evaluation Agency. After some pushback from Michigan's political leaders over a proposed transfer of functions from Detroit, Michigan's Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command, Army leaders agreed to create separate Weapons and Mobility Commands. When many Pentagon officials began pronouncing the abbreviation MDLC as "Muddle," the Army quickly redesignated the new organization as Army Materiel Command.²⁵ (See Chart 12.)


The Army originally had named Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, the chief of ordnance, to be the first commander of the Army Materiel Command. However, General Hinrichs staunchly opposed the reorganization and accused the Army Staff of allowing the project to be steamrolled by the secretary of defense. He also earned the secretary's wrath by testifying before Congress regarding the overpayment of contractors involved in the Nike Zeus project. To virtually no one's surprise, Hinrichs announced his retirement in April, never having taken the command. Almost immediately, the Army promoted Chief of Transportation Maj. Gen. Frank S. Besson Jr. to lieutenant general and assigned him as the first commanding general of the Army Materiel Command. General Besson had served on the committee planning and overseeing the transformation and strongly endorsed the basic management concepts advanced by the reorganization.²⁶

Secretary McNamara continued to express dissatisfaction at the pace of the reforms. At the end of March, he directed Secretary Stahr to accelerate the reorganization so that the Army Materiel Command would become fully operational by July 1962, nine months ahead of the projected schedule. The secretary of the Army and the Army Staff objected, arguing that they had not yet selected any of the principal subordinate commanders, nor had the service selected sites for major headquarters. McNamara's continued impatience contributed to Stahr's decision to return to civilian life. General Besson, however, accepted the accelerated plan and, on 1 August 1962, the

25. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 354; "How MDLC Will Be Organized," *Army Times*, 27 Jan 1962; Gene Famiglietti, "HQ Command in New Moves," *Army Times*, 12 May 1962.

26. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 350–52; Interv. Col. Raymond L. Toole with Gen. Frank S. Besson Jr., 1973, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.

Chart 11—Hoelscher Committee Proposal for Reorganization of Department of the Army Headquarters, October 1961



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Notes


1. Chief of Public Information also serves as Chief of Information

2. No change contemplated in status of Army Audit Agency

3. General Staff Agency

Source: James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 325.

Chart '2—Hoelscher Committee Proposal for a Logistics Command, October 1961



Source: James F. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 334.

Army Materiel Command assumed responsibility for the service's wholesale logistics system.²⁷

Simultaneously with the activation of Army Materiel Command, albeit with somewhat less fanfare, the service established the Army Combat Developments Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The idea for an organization devoted to the development of future organization and doctrine had its roots in the Project VISTA study of 1952, addressing the future of land combat in Europe. That paper had recommended that the Army establish a combat developments group to study the newest tactics, ideas, and inventions. After further consideration, the Army established the Combat Development Experimentation Center at Fort Ord, California, in 1956. As part of the 1962 reorganization, the Army replaced that organization with the Combat Developments Command. The new headquarters, directed by Lt. Gen. John P. Daley, included directorates devoted to concepts and doctrine development, operations research, materiel requirements, and doctrinal and organizational media. The latter branch caused some consternation among the leadership at CONARC, where its commander, General Powell, claimed service prerogative for preparation and distribution of current doctrine. The two commanders would have to iron out the distinctions between current and future concepts.²⁸

Although the Army Staff escaped further changes, concurrent studies as part of the 1962 reorganization set into motion proposals to divide the responsibilities of the deputy chief of staff for military operations between those related to force development and those related to force utilization. In September, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, suggested creating two separate offices, one beneath a deputy chief of staff for plans and operations, and the other under a deputy chief of staff for forces. He forwarded this concept to General Wheeler, the new chief

27. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 358–59; Gene Famiglietti, “Materiel Command Begins Operations,” *Army Times*, 4 Aug 1962.

28. Maj. Hassan M. Kamara, *Army Combat Developments Command: A Way to Modernize Better and Faster than the Competition*, Land Warfare Paper No. 119 (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare, 2018); Annual History, U.S. Army Combat Developments Cmd, Aug 1963, sub: First Year: June 1962–July 1963, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, VA; Memo, Gen. Herbert B. Powell for Ch Staff, 26 Oct 1962, sub: Responsibility for Current Army Doctrine in the New Army Organization, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

of staff, who set the issue aside for further discussion. The Army leadership made no additional decisions regarding the issue before the end of the year.²⁹

Significant in the evolution of the Army in 1962, although not part of the Project 80 reorganization, was the establishment of an intelligence branch in the active Army. In June, General Decker warned the secretary of the Army that existing intelligence and Army Security Agency specialization programs had failed to attract Regular Army officers in the numbers and grades required. Many of those officers, he explained, were reluctant to place their military careers in jeopardy by specializing in functions that were outside the responsibility of their basic branch. The Army Staff recommended the establishment of the Army Intelligence and Security branch, and the secretary approved it on 2 July. The new component included some 5,000 officers serving in the Army Security Agency, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and in various combat intelligence positions around the service. As a symbol for the new branch, the service authorized an emblem featuring a dagger superimposed on a blazing sun; the sun represented the Greek god Helios who could see and hear everything, and the dagger signified the branch's clandestine capabilities. The new emblem replaced a sphinx insignia that had been in place since 1923.³⁰

KEEPING AN EYE ON EUROPE

By the end of 1961, the confrontation over the Berlin Wall had subsided somewhat, as the United States and the Soviet Union moderated their military activities near the border. The momentary faceoff between opposing platoons of main battle tanks at Checkpoint Charlie had brought both sides close enough to the abyss to recognize that war was in neither of their interests. Nonetheless, Berlin and Germany remained the central theater in the Cold War conflict. Although distractions in other worldwide trouble spots competed for the service's attention, it remained, to a great degree, focused upon Western Europe.³¹

29. Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker for Ch Staff, 20 Sep 1962, sub: Reorganization of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 364–65.

30. Memo, Maj. Gen. Phillip F. Lindeman, Acting Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 14 Jun 1962, sub: Establishment of an Intelligence Branch in the Active Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

31. A more detailed description of events surrounding the construction of the Berlin Wall and the confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie can be found in Donald A. Carter, *Forging the*

Despite the deprivations it suffered throughout the Eisenhower administration, the Army's force in Europe had remained relatively stable. In 1962, the two corps and five divisions of the Seventh Army still represented the bulwark of NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization's) defenses. Although the American infatuation with tactical atomic warfare had subsided to some degree, Soviet and Warsaw Pact numerical advantages required the Western nations to rely upon the threat of a nuclear response to backstop their conventional defenses. President Kennedy's actions in the face of the Soviet challenge in Berlin had strengthened the American position in Germany, but the reliance upon a mobilization of reserve units to supplement many of the reinforcements meant that the additional strength could only be temporary.³²

On 30 March, Secretary McNamara recommended to the president that the nation should release all reservists involuntarily recalled to active duty no later than August 1962. Regular personnel whose tours of duty the Army had involuntarily extended should be released by June. McNamara noted that the military posture of the United States had improved significantly because of increased personnel authorizations and equipment modernization. Additionally, McNamara worried that it was impractical to activate reserves to meet repeated Cold War crises. The nation should refrain from such mobilization, he concluded, until armed conflict was imminent.³³

The defense secretary noted that few, if any, of the recalled reservists had gone to Europe. Rather, they had backfilled regular units that had deployed there in response to the Berlin Crisis. Without those reservists, many Army units based in the United States now suffered critical shortages that limited their abilities to respond to other possible crises. Overriding protests from USAREUR leaders and some Allied nations, McNamara recommended that many of the support units that had reinforced USAREUR and the Seventh Army return to the United States beginning in October 1962. Although he did not set a specific date, he also suggested that the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and several tank and artillery battalions that had recently arrived in Germany return to the United States when the Berlin Crisis clearly had

Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 403–30.

32. Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, n.d., sub: USAREUR Force Structure Analysis as of 31 January 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

33. Memo, Paul H. Nitze, Asst Sec Def, for Service Secs, 30 Mar 1962, sub: Release of Reservists Involuntarily Recalled to Active Duty, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319 NACP; Col. (Ret.) Jon T. Hoffman and Col. (Ret.) Forrest L. Marion, *Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 53.

moderated. Once completed, the moves would reduce USAREUR personnel strength from its authorized level of 272,296 to 210,803.³⁴

To some extent, Army leaders in Europe still hoped to offset the drop in personnel strength with the introduction of new, more powerful weapon. In January, the *Army Times* reported that Seventh Army units were beginning to train using the new Davy Crockett atomic projectile. Special training personnel had arrived to begin instruction for every battle group equipped with the weapon. Unfortunately, as training got underway, it became apparent to local commanders that many of the trainers lacked expertise in several subjects that were critical to the successful operation of the weapon system. They reported that training regarding safety procedures, squad and section tactics, and nuclear weapons effects seemed to be substandard. Commanders emphatically concluded that course graduates did not receive sufficient tactical training to advise their leaders on the tactical employment of the section and its weapons.³⁵

Another scheme that had originated during the Berlin Crisis proved to be more successful. Early in October 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. commanders in Europe had proposed the pre-positioning of equipment to outfit up to four divisions, which the Army could transport to the continent on relatively short notice. Later that month, Secretary McNamara directed the Army to pre-position sufficient materiel to equip one infantry division, one armored division, and ten combat and service support units, mostly artillery and engineer battalions. Throughout the latter part of 1962, the Army gathered most of the required battle gear in Europe. Although a great deal of the supplies came from USAREUR theater stocks, the equipment for one infantry brigade and the support battalions came from units in the continental United States. Generally, USAREUR selected pre-position sites west of the Rhine River, far enough so that troops could receive and activate the equipment during the first fourteen days of a conflict without the sites being overrun by advancing Soviet columns. By the end of the year, most of the required equipment was in place, although USAREUR headquarters notified the Department of the Army that serious shortages of maintenance

34. Memo, Stephen Ailes, Under Sec Army, for Ch Staff, 26 Apr 1962, sub: Report of the Under Secretary of the Army's Study Group on Army Strength in Europe, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

35. "Davy's in Europe," *Army Times*, 20 Jan 1962; Memo, CWO Willis J. Coates, Asst Adjutant Gen, for Cmdg Gen, Continental Army Cmd, 14 May 1962, sub: Evaluation of Davy Crockett School-Trained Personnel, File Unit: Entry A1 92G, Series: Adjutant General Security Classified General Correspondence, 1956-1962 (hereinafter AG SCGC 1956-1962), RG 546: Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NACP.

tools and radio equipment continued to hamper full deployment of the pre-positioned sets.³⁶

The Army wasted little time before initiating its first test of the rapid deployment plan in January 1962. Although the service had canceled an earlier effort in 1961 because of a potential crisis in Laos, on 16 January it launched Operation LONG THRUST II, sending three infantry battle groups from the 4th Infantry Division in the United States to Europe. The three units, the 1st Battle Group, 22d Infantry; the 2d Battle Group, 47th Infantry; and the 2d Battle Group, 39th Infantry, flew from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Germany, where they received pre-positioned equipment at the Mannheim storage site. After an extended field training exercise, the 1st Battle Group, 22d Infantry, turned in its equipment and returned to home station. The 2d Battle Group, 47th Infantry, moved to Berlin to support the brigade-sized garrison there, and the 2d Battle Group, 39th Infantry, remained in Germany as a temporary reinforcement for the Seventh Army. The Army would conduct several LONG THRUST exercises over the next three years, each time exchanging U.S.-based units with those that previously had deployed. The rotations proved the viability of the pre-positioned equipment and rapid reinforcement, if only on a modest scale.³⁷

Even though the LONG THRUST exercises were valuable, by 1962, USAREUR commander General Bruce C. Clarke and Seventh Army commander Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson had begun to question the utility of larger training events. After observing Exercise WINTERSHIELD II the previous year, both officers objected to the tremendous logistical and financial burden the exercises imposed on units in exchange for training experience that might be achieved in smaller tests. Allies in Germany and France also had begun to question the benefit of the larger maneuvers that ran roughshod over local terrain and road networks. The economic recovery and expansion of West Germany had made maneuver space harder and harder to come by.³⁸

Although the pre-positioned equipment and the LONG THRUST exercises appeared to resolve some of the Army's challenge of reinforcing its forces in

36. Memo, Brig. Gen. Leonidas G. Gavalas, U.S. Army, Europe, Adjutant Gen, for Distribution, 2 Apr 1962, sub: After-Action Report on Prepositioning of Equipment for a Two Division Force; Memo, Col. Ray M. Bagley, Ch, Storage and Distribution Div, for Ch Staff, 25 Apr 1962, sub: Prepositioning of Equipment; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

37. Memo, Brig. Gen. John W. Keating, Director of Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 1 May 1962, sub: Exercise Long Thrust, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Two Ivy Units Will Aid Europe Force," *Army Times*, 6 Jan 1962; Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 428.

38. Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 454.

Europe, another long-term issue continued to plague service officials. The United States still struggled with its international balance of payments, an issue that many leaders attributed to the large military presence in Western Europe. Military and civilian officials blamed this gold-flow issue on large U.S. payments to foreign firms for the purchase of goods and services in support of the troops. Also to blame were the purchases made on the local economies by deployed soldiers and their dependents. Although the Army cut the deficit sharply in 1961, Secretary McNamara urged the services to continue to limit overseas spending.³⁹

In Europe, General Clarke had taken several steps to reduce the amount of money his troops spent on the economy. He initiated programs to encourage personal savings and promoted the use of on-base service clubs and recreation centers. He restricted the access of solicitors of non-U.S. goods in housing areas, post exchanges, and commissaries. He staunchly had resisted, however, President Eisenhower's restrictions on dependents accompanying soldiers overseas and pointed out the disastrous effects such a policy would have on his soldiers.⁴⁰

Early in the year, Secretary McNamara had directed the Army to develop a plan for the rotation of units to Germany without dependents. However, when the Army announced plans to reintroduce a limited unit-rotation plan in which battalion-sized elements would deploy to Europe for six months without dependents, General Clarke resisted, reminding the Army Staff that Operation GYROSCOPE had featured many of the same characteristics and had been unworkable. Nevertheless, in June, McNamara approved the service's concept, dubbed ROTAPLAN, to send three battle groups without dependents from the United States to Germany, exchanging them for three battle groups currently in Europe. Each overseas tour would last for six months, followed by a U.S. tour that would last a minimum of eighteen months. On 15 October, elements of the 1st Battle Group, 38th Infantry, part of the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, began their movement to Germany as part of the initial rotation. Troops from the 8th Infantry

39. Memo, Gen. [Clyde D.] Eddleman, Acting Ch Staff, for Asst Sec Army, 4 Jan 1962, sub: Balance of Payments; Memo, Roderick M. Gillies, Asst Comptroller, for Ch Staff, 2 May 1962, sub: Gold Outflow Problems; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

40. Memo, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke for Selected Cdrs and Chs, U.S. Army, Europe, Staff Divs, 14 Mar 1962, sub: Reduction in the Outflow of Gold; Ltr, Gen. [Bruce C.] Clarke to Gen. George H. Decker, Ch Staff, 15 Jan 1962; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

Division's 1st Battle Group, 26th Infantry, used the same aircraft for their flights back to the United States.⁴¹

As General Clarke had predicted, the concept was unpopular with the troops and ineffective almost from the start. Army officials had suggested that the initial rotation would return approximately 4,250 dependents from Europe to the United States. However, because the waiting time for overseas accommodations was more than nine months, the number of U.S. dependents in Europe was already curtailed. General Wheeler, then deputy commander of the U.S. European Command, suggested that rather than American dependents, who largely had observed limitations on expenditures, it was primarily U.S. tourists in Europe who were driving up the deficit in balance of payments through their extravagant travel spending. Given ROTAPLAN's unpopularity and its apparent lack of effectiveness, few Army leaders expected the program to survive for long.⁴²

RESETTING THE FORCE

By 1962, it was becoming clear that the United States Army was no longer the same post-World War II force that had deployed to Korea twelve years earlier. Eight years of deprivation under President Eisenhower, followed by a renaissance under President Kennedy, had moved the service in a few different directions. As American society had changed, so too had the Army, reflecting the individuals who made up the nation. As a result, some of the institution's basic structures were evolving in accommodation.

Unexpected challenges in the 1961 call-up of two national guard divisions prompted Army officials to reexamine the process and to reevaluate the efficiency of the entire reserve structure. In a February 1962 study of the mobilization, the Army Audit Agency noted that shortages in supplies and equipment constituted the major difficulty in preparing the divisions for deployment. Both divisions had reported to their respective mobilization sites with less than 50 percent of their authorized equipment. Erroneous or poorly maintained records also made it difficult to identify and recall the personnel required to fill out the divisions and supporting units. The large number of untrained or inexperienced personnel in the units increased the need for fillers. Of the 30,000 drilling reservists mobilized in 1961, one third

41. Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Sec Army, 19 Jul 1962, sub: Unit Rotation, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "ROTAPLAN Group Exchanges Begin," *Army Times*, 20 Oct 1962.

42. Ltr, Gen. [Earle G.] Wheeler to Gen. Barksdale Hamlett Jr., 25 Jul 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

occupied spaces for which they were not fully qualified. Finally, auditors noted that breakdowns in communication and failure to follow established procedures often had prevented timely funding throughout the operation.⁴³

This report, along with others generated during the 1961 mobilizations, reinforced Secretary McNamara's belief that the Army's reserve structure was unwieldy and in need of reorganization. He agreed with those service leaders who believed that the current structure was more oriented toward general mobilization than it was toward rapid reinforcement of the Army. In January, he established an ad hoc committee under the leadership of Utah's adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Maxwell E. Rich, to study plans for a proposed realignment of reserve units. Some of McNamara's guidance echoed previous efforts, including maintaining six divisions and supporting units ready to deploy in eight weeks. He suggested a reduction in paid drill strength from 700,000 to 670,000 and the elimination of eight reserve component divisions, from which the Army would form six ROAD brigades. As developed, the plan would cut roughly 650 company-sized units and more than 1,000 reserve personnel in twenty-one states.⁴⁴

The Army proposed to eliminate four infantry divisions from each of the two components. The reserve structure in 1962 included twenty-seven national guard divisions and ten reserve divisions. The national guard divisions selected for realignment included the 34th Infantry Division from Nebraska and Iowa; the 35th Infantry Division from Kansas and Missouri; the 43d Infantry Division from Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont; and the 51st Infantry Division from Florida and South Carolina. Reserve divisions selected for realignment included the 79th Infantry Division from Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland; the 94th Infantry Division from Massachusetts; the 96th Infantry Division from Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Idaho, and Montana; and the 103d Infantry Division from Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa. In making its decisions, the study group elected to prioritize the retention of those divisions designated for early deployment, armored divisions, and those originating from a single state. The realignment program envisioned the retention of the eight division headquarters with their existing personnel strength and grade structure,

43. Audit Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Army Audit Agency, 26 Feb 1962, "Circumstances Related to Call to Active Duty 32d Infantry Division and 49th Armored Division, Army National Guard, and Supporting Units," File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Hoffman and Marion, *Forging a Total Force*, 53.

44. Memo, Brig. Gen. Carl Darnell Jr., Asst Ch Staff Reserve Components, for Under Sec Army, 9 Jan 1962; Rpt, Ad Hoc Committee Appointed to Study the Reorganization of the Reserve Components of the Army, 15 Feb 1962; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Army Reorganization Effect on Guard, Reserve Studied," *Army Times*, 10 Feb 1962.

giving them the mission of training the six new brigades and other nondivisional units.⁴⁵

The proposal, endorsed by the Army and by Secretary McNamara, received some resistance from reserve and national guard leaders, state governors, and veterans of those divisions slated for elimination. Reserve leaders protested the projected cuts in both personnel and units, arguing that the nation needed more reserve strength, not less. Political leaders from states losing national guard units pointed out that the losses limited their ability to mobilize those forces to deal with local emergencies. The veterans submitted the most emotional protests, decrying the elimination of so many proud military organizations.⁴⁶

After considerable wrangling with Congress, Secretary McNamara was able to enact almost all of the changes that he had requested. On 4 December, he announced he was putting the reorganization of the reserves into immediate effect. As a result of these actions, the National Guard and Army Reserve eliminated 1,800 units that the Army had deemed no longer essential. At the same time, the service activated roughly 1,000 new units to absorb the excess personnel and to realign capabilities where they were most needed. The realignment included the elimination of the eight named divisions, but instead of six new separate brigades, the Army announced that it would form eight, all under the new ROAD organization. The eight realigned division headquarters would retain their unit designations, colors, and histories, and would assume responsibility for the training and administration of selected nondivisional units.⁴⁷

Along with the reorganization of the reserves, McNamara requested a reevaluation of the service's requirement for major troop installations. In April, his office identified forty-nine such locations in the United States, asking that the Army review its requirements for each and the capabilities and functions it provided. He wanted to know such details as the total acreage of each site, the amount of available barracks space, peak training loads, and the types of ranges available, particularly for larger artillery weapons. The projected reductions in reserve personnel implied similar reductions the Army could make in the number of spaces required at its training centers. Perhaps, thought the defense secretary, the military could use some of those

45. Memo, Col. George C. Fairbanks, Ch, Organization and Training Div, for Distribution, 5 Apr 1962, sub: Reorganization of the Reserve Components, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

46. "State AGs Protest Reserve Cut, Say More Guard Needed," *Army Times*, 19 May 1962; Ltr, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Robert W. Wilson to Sec Army, 5 Apr 1962; Ltr, Sec Army Cyrus R. Vance to F. Edward Hebert, 23 Nov 1962; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

47. Larry Carney, "Eight Reserve Division Equal Eight Brigades," *Army Times*, 8 Dec 1962.

troop spaces for other purposes. It might even be possible to close some of the Army's smaller facilities.⁴⁸

Three months later, in July 1962, the Defense Department announced that it was closing as surplus a total of eighty posts, bases, and installations in twenty-nine states. Although the order had not named any of the Army's major installations, some consolidation of functions had allowed the service to part with many smaller and outdated locations. Included in the list were World War II mobilization sites, such as Camp Kilmer, New Jersey; Camp Bowie, Texas; and Fort Douglas, Utah. The announcement also designated many smaller arsenals and ordnance facilities for closing or repurposing.⁴⁹

The consolidation of functions among the larger Army installations led the service to reconsider how it administered initial induction and training for its incoming soldiers. In September, General Decker directed the Army Staff to initiate a study to determine the feasibility of centralizing the in-processing of new recruits, basic combat training, and advanced individual training at one of the several Army training centers. Under the existing system, incoming personnel proceeded from a recruiting main station upon completion of processing, to a reception station for extensive aptitude testing, and then to an Army training center for basic combat training. Almost 20 percent then proceeded to a different training center for advanced individual training. The study concluded that the Army would incur substantial savings by eliminating one or more of these individual stages and conducting all initial processing and training at a single site. It noted, however, that such modifications would require a more advanced data-tracking system than the Army currently possessed to monitor each individual's progress as well as the allocation of trainees against unit personnel requirements. General Barksdale Hamlett Jr., the vice chief of staff, approved the recommendations of the study and directed the deputy chief of staff for personnel to further develop the concept.⁵⁰

More effective initial training also required improvements in the quality of the junior leaders administering that training. Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel Jr., the commanding general of the U.S. Army training center at Fort Ord, noted that higher recruiting standards had produced recruits with

48. Memo, Sec Def Robert S. McNamara for Sec Army, 3 Apr 1962, sub: Plan for Use of Major Active Army Troop Installations; Memo, Maj. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 13 Apr 1962, sub: Plan for Use of Major Active Army Troop Installations; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

49. "80 Military Bases Declared Surplus," *Army Times*, 21 Jul 1962.

50. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. [Barksdale] Hamlett, 18 Oct 1962, sub: A Concept and Study for Management of Replacement Training in 1965-1970 Time Frame, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

higher test scores and better physical development. He complained, however, that his young lieutenants and noncommissioned officers struggled to apply appropriate discipline without resorting to unauthorized punishment. It required several cycles of training, he said, before they gained the experience they needed to deal with their new soldiers.⁵¹

Legislation passed by Congress in September promised to give the Army's unit leaders additional tools for the administration of discipline within their units. After lengthy consideration, Congress passed a bill amending Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, giving battalion-level commanders the authority to punish military infractions to the same degree that previously had required a summary court-martial. The so-called field grade Article 15 allowed a commanding officer in the grade of major or higher to confine a soldier for up to thirty days in correctional custody, impose fines of one-half pay for up to two months, assign extra duties for up to forty-five days, restrict a soldier to limits for up to sixty days, and reduce an E-5 or higher by one grade and an E-4 or lower to the lowest grade. Unit commanders retained the authority to suspend punishments pending corrective action on the part of the soldier. Army leaders hoped that the measure would help to improve unit discipline by giving commanders more discretion regarding punishment without resorting to a lengthy court procedure or placing the stigma of a criminal conviction on the record of an inexperienced soldier.⁵²

Another factor that affected both discipline and morale within the Army was the continuing process of racial integration. The service had made considerable progress toward the integration of the active force, but by 1962, it had made little headway in the reserves. That year, more than 40 percent of all reserve units in the United States were exclusively White, and the Army retained six all-Black units as well. Also, 75 percent of the Black reservists in the Army were unassigned to specific units and did not participate in active duty training. Additionally, serving in a nonpay status denied them opportunities for credit toward promotion or retirement.⁵³

In April, Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric directed all of the services to reexamine their policies and to take positive steps to assure the equity of treatment for all service members. The Defense Department directed the Army to complete the integration of any remaining all-White or all-Black

51. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel Jr. to Gen. Herbert B. Powell, 31 Jan 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 92G, Series: AG SCGC 1956-1962, RG 546, NACP.

52. Ed Gates, "Article 15 Gives CO the Law," *Army Times*, 25 Aug 1962; Jack Vincent, "COs Given More Power," *Army Times*, 15 Sep 1962.

53. Morris J. MacGregor Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965*, Defense Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981), 519-20.

reserve units as soon as possible. Shortly thereafter, in June, President Kennedy announced the formation of the Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, chaired by Gerhard A. Gesell, a prominent Washington, D.C., attorney. Kennedy directed the committee to examine all aspects of treatment afforded to minority groups within the United States' armed forces, as well as the treatment of minorities off-base within local communities.⁵⁴

In a response to the committee, Under Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes summarized the Army's approach to problems involving minority groups. He suggested that, to date, the Army had handled most cases on an individual basis. Most of these appeared to involve discrimination regarding off-post housing, restrictions in public or commercial establishments, or in public conveyance such as taxis or buses. He noted several instances in which individual soldiers, both Black and White, had participated in racial protests such as picketing or sit-ins. He found no evidence, however, that these had evolved into massed protests by organized minority groups within the military. He pointed out that no military personnel had participated in the Freedom Ride demonstrations in Mississippi and Alabama during the previous year.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, in October, when riots broke out on the campus of the University of Mississippi over the enrollment of a Black student, elements of the Army once again received the call to restore the peace. Brig. Gen. Charles Billingslea, the commanding general of the 2d Infantry Division, led an initial intervention force composed of the 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry; the 503d, 716th, and 720th Military Police Battalions; the 31st Helicopter Company; and federalized Mississippi National Guard elements, which deployed to the university campus. As the situation escalated, General Howze, then the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, replaced General Billingslea. Ultimately, the Army's buildup around Oxford, Mississippi, numbered more than 30,000, including, at various times, elements of fourteen infantry and airborne battle groups. Mostly by its mere presence, the force gradually restored order, and after a few weeks, almost all troops redeployed to home stations. Some military police and national guard units remained behind,

54. Randall Shoemaker, "Racial Guard End Sought," *Army Times*, 21 Apr 1962; Randall Shoemaker, "Order Out to Blend Units," *Army Times*, 28 Apr 1962; MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965*, 518-19; Memo, Norman S. Paul, Asst Sec Def Legislative Affairs, for Under Sec Army, 13 Aug 1962, sub: President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

55. Memo, Under Sec Stephen Ailes for Asst Sec Def (Manpower), 30 Aug 1962, sub: President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

however, to maintain order and to conduct periodic patrols through nearby neighborhoods.⁵⁶

Even as the Army played a role in improving opportunities for minorities, the service also redoubled its efforts to promote its image as an integral part of American life. The Army Corps of Engineers provided frequent and timely examples of the service's accomplishments in the civilian community. In October, the chief of engineers summarized the assistance the corps was providing in construction of launch facilities for the Gemini and Apollo programs at the NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) facility at Cape Canaveral, Florida. Later, in December, the corps participated in the retrieval of four large tanks of liquid chlorine from the bottom of the Mississippi River after a transport barge had sunk a few miles below Natchez, Mississippi. The Army's director of military personnel also was pleased to share the news that two Army test pilots had met all of NASA's requirements and had volunteered for astronaut training.⁵⁷

Sometimes, however, concern for the service's image might have gone too far. In March, retired Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis wrote to Maj. Gen. Charles G. Dodge, the Army's public information officer, to complain about the "derogatory and despicable light" in which television programs depicted U.S. Cavalry officers on the western frontier.⁵⁸ Surely, he suggested, Secretary Stahr should be more interested in obtaining fair and honest portrayals for the Army. General Dodge replied to his old friend that because most of the television programs he mentioned were produced without Army assistance, the service had no control or veto power over their content. At any rate, he assured General Sturgis that, considering all types of programming currently being broadcast, he was quite satisfied with the overall image of the service.⁵⁹

Despite the good fortune and positive public support that the Army was beginning to enjoy under the new administration, some shadows hinted

56. Paul J. Scheips, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992*, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2012), 101–25; Interv, Reed with Howze, n.d.

57. Memo, Lt. Gen. Walter K. Wilson Jr. for Ch Staff, 31 Oct 1962, sub: Corps of Engineers Participation in Programs at the Atlantic Missile Range, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "Big Disaster Averted By Army Engineers," *Army Times*, 8 Dec 1962; Memo, Maj. Gen. Harvey J. Jablonsky, Director of Ofcs Assignments, for Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 29 May 1962, sub: U.S. Army Participation in the NASA Astronaut Program, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

58. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis Jr. to Maj. Gen. Charles G. Dodge, 22 Mar 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

59. Ltr, Sturgis to Dodge, 22 Mar 1962; Ltr, Gen. [Charles G.] Dodge to Gen. [Samuel D.] Sturgis, 7 Jul 1962; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

at darker days ahead. In July, Maj. Gen. Alvah R. Fitch, the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, warned the chief of staff about a series of pending demonstrations expected in the vicinity of the Pentagon. A group calling itself the Committee for Non-Violent Action had scheduled vigils and protests near the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency. Even more concerning was a declaration by Chief Information Officer Arthur Sylvester that the Defense Department was using the dissemination of information about its activities as a weapon and, further, that the Cold War fully justified its continuing manipulation. His statement raised eyebrows throughout the journalistic world, where one editorial declared that the manipulation of the news was the first weapon of a dictator. Sylvester's statement, coupled with increasing pressure from the Department of Defense to reduce contact between senior military leaders and members of the press, troubled many who saw in those actions a growing distrust of the uniformed leadership by the Defense Department's civilian hierarchy.⁶⁰

ARMY RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

On the evening of 22 October 1962, President Kennedy alerted the nation to an ominous buildup of Russian missiles in Cuba. Kennedy announced the establishment of a naval quarantine of the island nation to be effective on 24 October and added that the United States would take whatever steps were necessary to neutralize this Soviet threat so close to American shores. Along with the rest of the United States military, the Army began to prepare its forces for possible conflict, including the potential invasion of Cuba.⁶¹

Contingency planning for an operation in Cuba had begun in 1959 under the direction of Admiral Robert L. Dennison, the commander in chief of Atlantic Command. Dennison was joined in the initial planning by the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Robert F. Sink, acting in his role as planning agent for the commanding general of CONARC. From the outset, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps to be the Army ground force commander operating

60. Memo, Maj. Gen. Alvah R. Fitch for Ch Staff, 18 Jun 1962, sub: Scheduled Demonstrations at the Pentagon by Members of the Committee for Non-Violent Action, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; "The Dictat," *Army Times*, 10 Nov 1962; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "The Military Downgraded," *Army Times*, 10 Nov 1962.

61. Jean R. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962* (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1964), i.

under the commander of the U.S. Navy Second Fleet, whom Dennison had designated as the joint force commander.⁶²

At the beginning of October 1962, the commander in chief of Atlantic Command directed his subordinate commands to begin pre-positioning troops, aircraft, ships, equipment, and supplies in anticipation of executing one or more of his contingency plans for Cuba. At that point, General Powell, the commanding general of CONARC, directed the new XVIII Airborne Corps commander, General Howze, to make recommendations for increasing the readiness posture of his corps. Powell also ordered the Third U.S. Army to prepare to support the staging and emergency resupply operations for the Army Task Force (*Map 13*).⁶³


As planning continued for a potential invasion of Cuba, the Army Task Force began to take shape. The headquarters of the XVIII Airborne Corps would direct the operations of four separate elements. An air echelon would consist of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, three battle group task forces from the 1st Infantry Division, one company of light tanks, and elements of two separate artillery battalions. A surface echelon, to be delivered by amphibious assault, included two battle group task forces from the 2d Infantry Division, one armored battalion, the remainder of the two artillery battalions contained in the air echelon, plus the 54th Artillery Group. A floating reserve offshore consisted of one brigade from the 1st Armored Division and two battle group task forces from the 2d Infantry Division. The remainder of the 1st Armored Division and the 2d Infantry Division, plus the 52d Artillery Group, remained in the United States as oncall reserves.⁶⁴

To carry out his mission to provide administrative support of Army forces in the pending operation, General Powell established the Peninsula Base Command in Florida. Its major responsibilities would be to operate the Army staging area and terminal commands, to provide medical support, and to coordinate with other Army and Department of Defense logistical agencies in the forward zone. On 23 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General Powell to move support units into the recently activated Air Force base in Opa-locka, Florida. That same day, the Army alerted the 2d Logistical Command at Fort Lee, Virginia, which began its movement

62. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, 1.

63. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, 8–9.

64. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, 13; Memo, Col. John W. Paddock, Acting Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 15 Nov 1962, sub: Status of STRAF Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “New Command Set to Meet Cuba Crisis,” *Army Times*, 1 Dec 1962.



Map 13

on 25 October and officially established the Peninsula Base Command on 30 October.⁶⁵

On 23 October, General Powell directed the commanding general of Fourth Army to begin moving those elements of the 1st Armored Division assigned to the amphibious assault echelon from Fort Hood to Fort Stewart, Georgia. Division components assigned to the floating reserve would follow. Preparations for rail movement began immediately. The first increments of the division arrived at Fort Stewart on 26 October with all elements assigned to the amphibious task force having completed their movement by 30 October. Those units designated for the floating reserve closed on Fort Stewart by 2 November.⁶⁶

All other units assigned to the proposed assault force remained at their home stations. Troops of the two airborne divisions, along with those elements of the 1st Infantry Division assigned to the air echelon, would deploy directly from airfields at their locations. The 2d Infantry Division, located at Fort Benning, was close enough to designated staging areas and departure points to remain in place. Troops at all locations engaged in intensive training to prepare for the anticipated assault. After their arrival in Georgia, 1st Armored Division units continued their programs of small unit exercises, in addition to practicing amphibious assaults along the Florida coast. Because of their alert status and extremely short response time, the airborne troops were limited in the amount of training they could conduct. By the end of October, General Howze notified General Powell that he was having a hard time keeping “the lid on the pot” while the airborne troops waited for the go sign.⁶⁷ Powell recommended that the division commanders initiate local training exercises, as long as they could return to full alert status within six hours.⁶⁸

As the assault troops prepared for an impending invasion, Army officials considered the implications of a Cuban, or even Soviet, response. Early in October, White House officials requested information regarding Army air defense capabilities in the Florida area. On 19 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Army to expedite preparations to deploy the 6th Battalion (Hawk Missile), 65th Artillery, then in training at Fort Meade, Maryland. The unit began arriving at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, on 24 October. Because it was still in training status, the unit did not yet possess its basic

65. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, 73–74.

66. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, 81–82; “Armor Moved Fast,” *Army Times*, 1 Dec 1962.

67. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, 154.

68. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, 154; “1st Armored Ends Florida Training,” *Army Times*, 15 Dec 1962.

load of missiles, which officials had to ship from Letterkenney Army Depot in Pennsylvania some days later. Also on 24 October, the commanding general of Continental Air Defense Command requested the deployment of two additional air defense units to the Florida area. The 2d Battalion (Nike Hercules), 52d Artillery, and the 8th Battalion (Hawk), 15th Artillery, arrived to provide coverage at Patrick, MacDill, and Homestead Air Force Bases in Florida. With three of its battalions plus supporting elements now in Florida on 28 October, CONARC sent Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 13th Artillery Group (Air Defense), to Homestead Air Force Base to provide overall command and control for the Army air defense units.⁶⁹

Throughout the mobilization, General Howze and his staff continued to develop the ground plan for a possible invasion of Cuba. They planned to seize airfields southwest of Havana with an airborne assault and then move on toward the capital city. The airborne forces would link up with the amphibious components, including one division of U.S. Marines, before the final assault. Although Howze expected to suffer as many as 10,000 casualties, he had a great deal of faith in the readiness of his forces. Despite the presence of some Soviet tank and artillery units in country, the general expected much of the Cuban population to welcome the Americans once they appreciated the scope of the operation. In subsequent interviews, Howze seemed to invoke some of the same overconfidence and assumptions that had doomed the Bay of Pigs fiasco two years earlier. He expressed his belief that the readiness of his assembled force “equaled that of the cross-channel forces in OVERLORD” during World War II.⁷⁰

Despite the impressive military buildup in the southeastern United States, the Kennedy administration searched for alternatives to an invasion of Cuba. The president had overruled military plans for air strikes against the suspected missile sites in favor of a shipping quarantine enforced by the U.S. Navy. The naval blockade gave both sides time and space to reconsider before initiating more dramatic military alternatives. Back-channel diplomacy allowed the president and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to reach an agreement and avoid a military conflict. By the end of October,

69. MFR, Maj. William L. Lemnitzer, War Plans Div, 12 Oct 1962, sub: Army Air Defense Capabilities in Florida, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, 98–101.

70. Interv. Reed with Howze, n.d.

the crisis began to subside, and on 19 November, the Soviets announced that they were withdrawing their missiles from Cuba.⁷¹

Even though its units never entered battle, the Army and its leadership learned a great deal about the service's ability to mobilize in preparation for a major conflict. After two world wars and the conflict in Korea, the dynamic between the active force and the vast system of reserves had changed. Coming so soon after it had released those reservists activated for the Berlin mobilization, the Kennedy administration found it politically impossible to recall large numbers of reserves to active duty. This left the Army unable to employ many of the specialized units that existed only in the Army Reserve and National Guard. This reluctance to mobilize the nation's reserves established a precedent that would be difficult to break in later years.⁷²

Preparations for an invasion of Cuba laid bare how badly the Eisenhower years had hollowed out the U.S. Army. The priority for personnel and equipment afforded to overseas deployed forces had limited the service's ability to maintain a strong strategic reserve. Preparing just four divisions for combat in Cuba had stripped remaining stateside units of much of their equipment and personnel, and the demand for filler personnel had stripped most of the Army school system. Unlike the other services, the Army never received authority from the secretary of defense to extend enlistments.⁷³

The actual mobilization and planning for the operation exposed flaws in the way the services approached the massive undertaking. When equipment from the 1st Armored Division reached Fort Stewart, officials decided to leave most of it on the flatbed railcars, ready for transport to ports of embarkation. They quickly realized that the post lacked sufficient marshalling space to accommodate more than 660 loaded flatbed cars. Once deployed to Florida, CONARC leaders found that their two headquarters, one for operations and the other for logistics, strained the makeshift communications networks the Army had established there. After action reviews also indicated that the failure to name an overall joint task force commander for the invasion

71. Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 191–208; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 820–30. There are many fine books that tell the complete story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. See Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1966) and Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1969).

72. Jonathan R. House, "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Parameters* (Spring 1991): 92–102.

73. House, "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," 92–102.

ground forces would have led to chaos as the Army and Marines attempted to reconcile airspace management and fire support doctrines.⁷⁴

Perhaps the most disturbing lesson to come out of the Cuban experience was the indication that the Army in particular, and the U.S. military in general, was less than receptive to lessons learned from previous experiences. During the Lebanon deployment in 1958, the Army's chief of transportation identified a major flaw in the roll-on, roll-off naval transport the service had used during the deployment. Its lower decks lacked the headway to store many of the tanks and trucks the Army needed to transport. Units had to load tanks on the main deck, causing the ship to become so top-heavy that shipmasters considered them to be unseaworthy. Yet, during planning for the Cuban operation, logistical planners for CONARC did not become aware of the shortcomings until after loading operations already had begun. The fact that this lapse did not cause greater concern should have been more troubling to military leaders. General Powell, however, expressed his belief that the overall plan had been sound and that the crisis had provided an excellent opportunity for its rehearsal.⁷⁵

MAINSTREAMING COUNTERINSURGENCY

Despite the many military and diplomatic challenges facing the Kennedy administration in 1962, no subjects captured the attention and the imagination of the young president as much as the concepts of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Early in January, General Taylor passed to Secretary McNamara a lengthy list of the president's concerns in those areas. Kennedy asked that the Army expand the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, not only for training additional American instructors, but also to accept more foreign students. He suggested that the school should include courses about the political implications of guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency, and wars of liberation in its curriculum. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kennedy suggested to the Army vice chief of staff, General Clyde D. Eddleman, that the Army use South Vietnam as a training ground for officers whom it expected to groom for future leadership. As an active theater, Southeast Asia seemed to be an ideal place for rising military leaders to appreciate the president's focus upon unconventional warfare. Specifically, he wanted the service to send colonels who were apt

74. House, "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," 92–102.

75. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962*, iii–iv.

to be selected for brigadier general to Vietnam for appropriate training and orientation.⁷⁶

At the same time, Kennedy expressed some of his concerns directly to McNamara, telling the defense secretary that he was not satisfied with the amount of attention the military had paid to the threat of Communist-directed subversive insurgency and guerrilla warfare. As an immediate step, he requested that the Army designate a general officer, reporting directly to the chief of staff, to serve as the focal point for Army activities in this area. He also directed all services to provide additional training and orientation on guerrilla warfare and its political implications for those officers assigned to military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) in countries threatened by Communist subversion.⁷⁷

The Army responded quickly to the president's request, and on 26 January, appointed William B. Rosson, soon to be a major general, to the position of special assistant to the chief of staff for special warfare activities. Rosson had served as a battalion commander with the 3d Infantry Division during World War II and as a member of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina, from 1954 to 1955. The chief of staff directed General Rosson to take a broad view of special warfare as part of the Army's overall Cold War mission. In his new position, Rosson was to review the adequacy of Army doctrine and training literature, as well as the curricula of all U.S. Army schools with regard to all Cold War activities, placing particular emphasis on counterinsurgency operations.⁷⁸

Notwithstanding the president's concerns, the Army already had begun serious consideration of its role against Communist-inspired insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. In January, the Army Staff released a study titled *Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces in Paramilitary Operations*, in which it described how the service intended to support the administration's program. The staff expressed the Army view that its primary role in a counterinsurgency effort would be to optimize the capabilities of indigenous military forces to ensure the internal security of the afflicted nation. Army support to a threatened region would begin with a MAAG, possibly supplemented by "specialized counterinsurgency forces" to provide

76. Memo, Gen. (Ret.) Maxwell D. Taylor for Sec McNamara, 11 Jan 1962, sub: Progress Report on Guerrilla Warfare Matters Raised by the President, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

77. Memo, President John F. Kennedy for Sec Def, 11 Jan 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

78. Memo, Maj. Gen. John L. Throckmorton for Gen. [George H.] Decker, 26 Jan 1962, sub: Terms of Reference for Brigadier General Rosson, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

training advice and assistance.⁷⁹ Only in the direst of circumstances would U.S. combat units intervene in the contest. In fact, Army leaders warned, in a counterinsurgency situation where the support of the populace for its government might be wavering, the introduction of major U.S. forces may well be “the kiss of death.”⁸⁰ More to the point, the paper warned that positive action by the host government to publicize and implement its political and socioeconomic reforms was essential to a successful counterinsurgency operation. A military operation alone could not extinguish an insurgency.⁸¹

In February 1962, the Army published the new Field Manual 100–5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. In addition to recognizing the importance of post-Korean airmobile operations, this publication discussed unconventional warfare and operations against irregular forces. As a product of the Army Staff and its educational system, it explained the service’s strategic, operational, and tactical roles in atomic, conventional, and unconventional warfare.⁸²

In addition to its MAAG elements, by mid-1962, the Army had established the nuclei of four special operations support forces, which were nearing full strength. The Army concept highlighted the nation-building mission assigned to the support forces. Construction and civic improvements benefited both the military infrastructure and the relationship with the local population. From successful nation-building operations came success in psychological warfare, improved intelligence, and eventual military victory.⁸³

CONARC also weighed in on the Army’s role in unconventional warfare operations. In January, the command appointed a board to study all aspects of special warfare operations. This group, also chaired by General Howze, noted the previously published Army Staff paper on U.S. Army forces in paramilitary operations, but proposed that the study did not go far enough. The Howze Board held that the Army could not rely solely upon special operations forces and indigenous military operations. Additionally, it

79. Study, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, “Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces in Paramilitary Operations,” 2 Jan 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

80. Study, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, “Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces in Paramilitary Operations,” 2 Jan 1962.

81. Study, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, “Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces in Paramilitary Operations,” 2 Jan 1962.

82. Dept. of the Army Field Manual 100–5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Feb 1962); Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 180–87.

83. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine*, 180–87; Memo, Col. S. J. Mancuso, Acting Director of Special Forces, for Ch Staff, 30 Aug 1962, sub: Personnel Status of Special Forces Warfare Units, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.



Everyday objects become booby traps during a cross-training class conducted by members of a special forces team. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

concluded, regular Army units must prepare to intervene not only in counterinsurgency operations or to assist in the training effort, but also to conduct independent combat operations against the insurgents.⁸⁴

The Howze Board opined that the special forces groups had too many missions and that their counterinsurgency capabilities were inadequate. As a supplement, it proposed that the Army assign specific counterinsurgency missions to three divisions, the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i and the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions in the continental United States; and to three battle groups, one in Okinawa, Japan, and two in Panama. The Army also could give a lower priority counterinsurgency mission to the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions and the 4th Infantry Division, as well as to the two airborne battle groups in Europe, which were part of the 24th Infantry Division. Each division with a counterinsurgency mission would screen its own resources for required language, area, and other skills. It would then

84. Final Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 9 Feb 1962, sub: Special Warfare Board, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.



Special forces soldiers learn about insurgent assistance during a demonstration of special warfare techniques at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

organize, train, and maintain appropriately sized adviser teams or packets prepared to deploy into designated trouble spots.⁸⁵

By the end of the year, General Rosson reported to the chief of staff on the continued expansion of the special warfare program within the Army. Additional personnel allocations had raised the authorized special forces strength to 9,060. Those increases, he said, provided a reasonable capability for operations in Asia as well as an expanded training base. At the same time, Rosson noted deployments of special warfare teams to Latin America and to the Middle East. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, he added, was preparing a request for an additional 2,784 special forces spaces to help meet expanding requirements.⁸⁶

Not all senior Army leaders were as sanguine as Rosson regarding the progress of the Army's special warfare programs. In 1962, Brig. Gen. William P. Yarborough was the commander of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg. General Yarborough, who previously had

85. Final Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 9 Feb 1962, sub: Special Warfare Board.

86. Memo, Maj. Gen. William B. Rosson for Gen. [Earle G.] Wheeler, 19 Dec 1962, sub: Periodic Report on Items of Special Warfare Interest, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

served as the deputy commander of the MAAG in Cambodia, believed that the Army had oversimplified the concept of counterinsurgency. He argued that the process of changing the political and economic environment of a beleaguered nation was far more complicated and time-consuming than simply combatting guerrilla forces. Further, he said that civic action programs, which had the military building roads and infrastructure within that nation, led the natives to believe that such work was the normal job of the military. Counterinsurgency, he concluded, was not something the Army could define for its soldiers in a thirty-minute troop information film. Even though, institutionally, the Army had welcomed unconventional warfare as a means to restore its position within the defense establishment, many officers and soldiers within its ranks still struggled to understand its nuance.⁸⁷

Whether or not it had completely grasped the concept, by the end of 1962, the Army had embraced counterinsurgency and the broader idea of unconventional warfare as core components of its mission. Training and doctrinal literature included those as part of the overall spectrum of potential conflict associated with the Cold War. More important, they represented critical components of the Kennedy administration's national security program that the Army was uniquely qualified to address.⁸⁸

DRAWING THE LINE IN VIETNAM

By the end of 1961, Secretary McNamara and other Defense Department officials had digested the Taylor-Rostow report and had decided to deepen American engagement in Vietnam. On 17 February 1962, although they reiterated that the United States had not yet committed combat troops to the fight, department representatives announced that the administration had decided that the conflict in Vietnam was one that the United States could not afford to lose. On the same day, news reports related the downing of two American helicopters in action against the Viet Cong. American advisers had been demonstrating to South Vietnamese troops how to conduct a vertical envelopment. Although the Department of Defense confirmed no casualties from the action, a spokesperson from the Pentagon reminded

87. Interv, Col. John R. Meese and Lt. Col. Parks Houser with Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, 21 Apr 1975, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.

88. Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Sec Gen Staff, 12 Jan 1962, sub: Cold War Activities, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

reporters that “when you are training people down at the company level, you may lose some people.”⁸⁹

The U.S. Army had begun a dramatic expansion of its presence in South Vietnam. As of 31 December 1961, the chief of the MAAG in Vietnam had reported a strength of 989 personnel. Other Army units in country included two helicopter companies with supporting detachments, radio and signal units, contract technicians, and mobile training teams, yielding a total Army strength of nearly 2,100. In January 1962, three additional aviation units and a counterintelligence detachment added another 500 troops. That same month, the commander in chief of Pacific Command, Admiral Harry D. Felt, forwarded a request to the Army chief of staff from MAAG, Vietnam, for 600 additional advisers to assist in training the South Vietnamese Army and the Civil Guard/Self Defense Corps. Felt had also approved and passed forward MAAG requests for support units, including water purification teams, radio repair teams, and a large contingent of field medical support units. In light of the volume of calls for additional support elements, the deputy chief of staff for logistics recommended the deployment to Vietnam of a logistics support force of some 400 personnel to provide assistance for the increasing number of Army personnel not specifically part of the MAAG. By the end of 1962, U.S. military personnel strength in Vietnam had risen to more than 11,000, almost all of them U.S. Army.⁹⁰

On 8 February 1962, to deal with the expanding numbers and the growing complexity of the situation in Vietnam, the United States established the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), under the U.S. Army's General Paul D. Harkins. General Harkins had served during World War II as the deputy chief of staff under General George S. Patton, first with the Seventh Army in Sicily, Italy, and later with the Third Army in Europe. A joint service subordinate unified command that reported directly to Admiral Felt and the U.S. Pacific Command, MACV became the headquarters responsible for U.S. military policy, operations, and assistance in Vietnam, with Harkins as the primary military adviser to the South Vietnamese government. Because U.S. leaders intended the new command to be a temporary headquarters lasting

89. “New U.S. Moves in Vietnam Draw Line on Red Expansion” and “2 Army Copters Down in Vietnam,” *Army Times*, 17 Feb 1962.

90. Bfg, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Dep Ch Staff Ops, 15 Jan 1962, sub: Area Brief: Southeast Asia; Memo, Col. Walter E. Brinker for Ch Staff, 4 May 1962, sub: Monthly Report, Personnel Support of Vietnam; MFR, Col. Walton O. Threadgill, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 5 Apr 1962, sub: Support Organization, Vietnam; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, 14 Aug 1964, “Review of U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation in Southeast Asia, 1961–1964,” Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

only until it could subdue the Communist insurrection, they retained the MAAG as a separate headquarters.⁹¹

The creation of MACV presaged further evolution in the U.S. command structure in Southeast Asia. President Kennedy soon ordered the activation of a new headquarters in Thailand—the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand—and appointed General Harkins as its commander, a role he would fulfill in addition to his duties as the commander of MACV. By mid-1962, however, the president had come to view the insurgency in Laos as beyond the stage where the United States could effectively intervene. In April, he authorized the secretary of defense to begin withdrawing U.S. military assistance teams from forward positions there. This action drew little opposition from Army leaders, who never had invested the same level of interest in Laos as they had in neighboring Vietnam. Lacking access to the sea and without any developed airfields, Laos was even less hospitable than Vietnam for military operations. For the remainder of his presidency, Kennedy would rely upon diplomatic, rather than military, means to deal with the situation in Laos.⁹²

For the Army elements in Vietnam, that nation had become a laboratory in which the service could test and evaluate its evolving doctrine, weapons, and equipment. In October, the Joint Chiefs and Secretary McNamara approved the dispatch to Vietnam of a utility tactical transport company equipped with fifteen new UH-1 helicopters armed with machine guns and rockets to provide escort for troop-carrying helicopters. In November, U.S. Army, Pacific, noted that its forces were receiving realistic, on-the-job training in both hot and cold aspects of counterinsurgency operations. Also in November, the Office of the Adjutant General published procedures for administering Army troop tests in Vietnam. The objective of this program, the guidance stated, would be to evaluate new or improved operational concepts, doctrine, tactics, training, and procedures related to both U.S. forces operating in Vietnam and the Vietnamese units they were advising

91. Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, 14 Aug 1964, "Review of U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation in Southeast Asia, 1961–1964"; Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 11; Interv, Maj. Jacob B. Couch Jr. with Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Apr 1979, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI. A complete description of the formation and activities of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, can be found in Graham A. Cosmas, *MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967*, *The United States Army in Vietnam* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006).

92. Cosmas, *MACV 1962–1967*, 39; Memo, McGeorge Bundy for Sec Def, 19 Apr 1962, sub: Withdrawal of Certain Military Units from Forward Positions in Laos, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 340–50.

and training. At the next higher level, the commander in chief of U.S. Pacific Command informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his office was prepared to take maximum advantage of the present conflict in Vietnam toward increasing U.S. capabilities for that type of warfare. To that end, he endorsed programs that had begun sending copies of pertinent MAAG training materials to various Army schools and installations in the United States. Additionally, he said that the advisory group had sent two senior officers to Fort Bragg to help establish the curriculum and assist in conducting a four-week course for battalion-level advisers en route to Vietnam.⁹³

CONCLUSION

By the end of 1962, the Army was well on its way toward recovery from the deprivations of the New Look and restoration of what it regarded as its rightful place at the head of the national security establishment. Although the service stayed true to its commitment to remain on guard in Western Europe, it also embraced President Kennedy's vision of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare to combat the spread of Communist-inspired insurrection. While many of the Army's senior officers enthusiastically endorsed the change in focus, some, like General Yarborough, openly questioned the approach. New equipment, techniques, and doctrine required testing and verification. The president had not yet committed American combat troops to Vietnam, but Army leaders understood that the option was no longer off the table. To an increasing extent, active American participation in the Vietnam War no longer seemed to be a matter of if, but when.

93. Memo, Col. Robert H. Shell, U.S. Army, Pacific, Adjutant Gen, for Distribution, 2 Nov 1962, sub: USARPAC Counterinsurgency Summary Number 1; Memo, Maj. Gen. Joe C. Lambert, Adjutant Gen, for Distribution, 6 Nov 1962, sub: Army Troop Test Program in Vietnam; Memo, Cdr in Ch, Pacific Cmd, for Joint Chs, 20 Mar 1962, sub: Report on Value and Means for Taking Maximum Advantage of Present Conflict in South Vietnam Toward Increasing U.S. Capabilities for this Type of Warfare; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955-1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; John J. Tolson, *Airmobility, 1961-71* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), 27-30.

Entering the Morass

By 1963, the budget battles and flirtation with nuclear weapons and doctrine that had dominated the service's concerns during the previous decade had helped to eliminate the remnants of the World War II force that had entered the Korean conflict in 1950. The Army was well on its way toward replacing its pentomic organization with the new, more flexible ROAD configuration, named after General Herbert B. Powell's 1961 study, *Reorganization Objective Army Division (1961–1965)*. Increased funding allowed a modernization effort, which already had replaced almost all of the vehicles, weapons, and equipment that had seen service during those earlier wars. To an increasing extent, Army doctrine was beginning to rely upon new technology, like the helicopter, that had been in its infancy during World War II and the Korean War. Most importantly, although many senior officers and noncommissioned officers who had fought in those earlier conflicts remained on active duty, the vast majority of the Army's younger officers and soldiers had never seen combat.

In 1963, the Army remained significantly engaged in South Korea. On 30 January 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated, "The principal U.S. military effort in the Far East is still Korea, where we maintain two divisions and are helping to support a large Korean military establishment."¹ General Guy S. Meloy, as the commander in chief of United Nations Command, retained operational control of the military forces of the

1. Guy S. Meloy, "The Eighth Army Story," *Army Information Digest* 18 (Jun 1963): 2–13.

Republic of Korea (ROK). Simultaneously, he served as joint commander of U.S. Forces, Korea, and commanding general of the Eighth Army. In addition to the First ROK Army, which had some fourteen divisions to the east, Meloy had on the western approaches the largest deployed corps in the free world and one of the largest corps in U.S. history, I Corps (Group). Its combat forces included the 1st Cavalry and 7th Infantry Divisions, along with four ROK divisions, a marine brigade of the ROK VI Corps, and companies from the two United Nations countries still providing troops to Korea, Thailand, and Turkey.²

For the Army, though, a new war was on the horizon. The Communist insurgency that had ejected the French from Vietnam in 1954 never really had ended. From its inception as a military assistance advisory group (MAAG) shortly before the French departure, the American presence in South Vietnam would expand to more than 16,000 soldiers by the end of 1963. Many Americans perceived Vietnam as the place to stop the spread of communism in the Far East. With skeptics like Matthew B. Ridgway no longer in a position of influence, many senior Army leaders also looked to Vietnam as an opportunity both to advance service influence throughout national defense policy and to experiment with new organizations, equipment, and doctrine. Consequently, as political developments in the United States and Vietnam drew the United States deeper into the conflict, few voices in the Department of the Army questioned the road to war.

MOVING THE ARMY FORWARD

Three years after the end of the Eisenhower administration, the Army had begun to free itself from the trappings of the New Look. Its new combat organization laid to rest the service's obsession with atomic weapons and warfare. Leaders paid new attention to maintaining its commitment in Europe and stabilizing the forward-deployed troops there. They also pointed the service toward preparing for different kinds of combat and responding to crises in other parts of the world.

Following the activation and initial testing of the two prototype divisions, the 1st Armored and the 5th Infantry, under the ROAD organization in 1962, the Army moved forward with ROAD's implementation throughout the force. With Secretary McNamara's attention still focused on Berlin, the divisions in Europe were the next to reorganize. By the end of September 1963, both the 8th Infantry and 24th Infantry Divisions had not only converted

2. Meloy, "The Eighth Army Story," 2–13.

to ROAD, but also had received the personnel, vehicles, and equipment required for their transformation to mechanized divisions. The 3d Infantry Division also would complete its reorganization before the end of the year. In the United States, both the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, implemented the new unit structure by the end of 1963. The service scheduled reorganizations for the remaining nine divisions in the active force before the end of September 1964.³

Additionally, during 1962–1963, the Army activated several separate brigades under the ROAD structure for unique missions not requiring a division. These included the 171st and 172d Infantry Brigades in Alaska, the 173d Airborne Brigade in Okinawa, Japan, the 193d Infantry Brigade in Panama, the 194th Armored Brigade to test new material at Fort Ord, California, and the 197th Infantry Brigade for school support at Fort Benning. The service retained the Berlin Brigade, a unique structure formed in 1961 to continue the occupation of West Berlin.⁴

Even with the conversion well underway, some senior officers continued to second guess the new organization. General Bruce C. Clarke, now retired, continued to press for the adoption of his modern mobile Army brainchild. He complained to Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, his former chief of staff in Seventh Army and the current commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that the Army's leadership had ignored his views regarding the new organization. General Clarke particularly expressed his belief, as he had in his modern mobile Army concept, that the corps echelon had outlived its usefulness. General Johnson thanked Clarke for his ideas and expressed interest in further discussion. To other officers, however, Johnson noted that the time for reconsideration on ROAD had passed and that the Army was moving forward. In Europe, the commander of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), General Paul L. Freeman Jr., pointed out that the reorganization within the Seventh Army eliminated the 4th Armored Group, merging its assets within the newly reorganized ROAD divisions. The result, he noted, would reduce the number of line companies available to the Army commander from 182 to 156. He questioned whether

3. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 122; "4th Infantry Division Units Renamed in ROAD," *Army Times*, 16 Oct 1963.

4. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 309–12.

the improved mobility and firepower of the ROAD division would offset the decline in the number of maneuver elements.⁵

However, the continued excessive spending of American dollars in Europe threatened any increased stability for the Army. The gold-flow issue continued to plague U.S. defense policy and the national economy. By the beginning of 1963, President John F. Kennedy and Secretary McNamara had begun to consider seriously a reduction in U.S. forces stationed overseas. McNamara acknowledged that strenuous military efforts had helped to level off the international balance of payments, but he indicated that that was not good enough.⁶

The Army's attempt to mitigate gold-flow problems by rotating battle-group-sized formations between the United States and Europe as part of ROTAPLAN had not gone well. In a preliminary report issued in January 1963, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker, noted that all of the disadvantages the Army had foreseen with the program had come to pass. Savings in expenditures made by dependents nearly matched the additional costs incurred by the more frequent unit rotations. Reports from the first unit exchange in October 1962 indicated that high personnel turbulence and lowered morale because of family separations remained significant problems. Even with the exchange of like units, some difference in vehicles and equipment necessitated additional training and the complicated coordination of ammunition and repair parts turnover. Given these issues and the overall disruption of unit readiness for both units involved, General Parker recommended suspending the program.⁷

The failure of ROTAPLAN prompted the president and the secretary of defense to consider more drastic approaches to shoring up the international balance of payments. In March, Army Chief of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler

5. Ltr, Lt. Gen. John P. Daley, Cdr, U.S. Army Combat Developments Cmd, to Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, 22 Jan 1963; Ltr, Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson to Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, 31 Jan 1963; Ltr, Gen. (Ret.) Bruce C. Clarke to Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, 5 Feb 1963; all in Personal Correspondence, Harold K. Johnson Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA (hereinafter AHEC); Ltr, Gen. Paul L. Freeman to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Ch Staff, 30 Dec 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

6. MFR, Col. Warren K. Bennett, Ch, Staff Action Control Ofc, 2 Mar 1963, sub: CofS Guidance on Gold Flow and Related Matters, Official Correspondence, 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.

7. Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker for Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, 3 Jan 1963, sub: Initial Evaluation Report on ROTAPLAN; Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker for Sec Def, 27 Oct 1962, sub: Suspension of ROTAPLAN; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Monte Bourjaily Jr. "Army Drops ROTAPLAN," *Army Times*, 14 Aug 1963.

noted that the subject had arisen in conversations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Kennedy. The president was seriously considering a reduction in U.S. military forces in Europe as a means of reducing the gold-flow deficit. General Wheeler directed the Army Staff to study the possibility of pulling one division out of Korea and leaving its equipment behind in a pre-positioned mode. He also asserted that the Army had too many headquarters in Europe and recommended that the service eliminate at least one. He asked General Freeman to prepare a plan for shutting down Seventh Army headquarters. General Johnson, at this time serving as the assistant deputy chief of staff for military operations, suggested inactivating the V and VII Corps headquarters instead. The deputy chief of staff for logistics, Lt. Gen. Robert W. Colglazier, recommended that Wheeler also consider closing portions of the Communications Zone and USAREUR headquarters. Wheeler directed the staff to begin all of the appropriate studies at once, concluding that it would be better for the Army's leaders to make the decision rather than have the president and Secretary McNamara make it for them.⁸

In addition to considering reducing overseas deployments, McNamara told service leaders to place more emphasis on strategic mobility exercises as a means of returning withdrawn units in the event of a crisis. In June, he directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin work on a major deployment exercise, either to Europe or to Korea, within the next few months. He also asked the chiefs to consider incorporating the mobility tests into upcoming maneuvers, such as the Exercise SWIFT STRIKE III event scheduled for later that year.⁹

For several years, Army leaders had been considering a strategic mobility exercise testing their ability to deploy an entire division to Europe, where it would use the vehicles and heavy equipment pre-positioned there. In response to prodding from the secretary of defense, the Army submitted to the Joint Chiefs an outline for such an exercise. Although Wheeler suggested that the 4th Infantry Division might be a candidate for the operation, he concluded that a movement of the 2d Armored Division would be in the best interests of the Army.¹⁰

Operation BIG LIFT began on 21 October when 200 Air Force transport planes airlifted 14,500 Army troops of the 2d Armored Division, with some supporting elements, from airfields in Texas to Germany. There, the soldiers

8. MFR, Col. Warren K. Bennett, Ch, Staff Action Control Ofc, 5 Mar 1963, sub: CofS Guidance on Gold Flow and Related Matters, Official Correspondence, 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.

9. Msg, General Barksdale Hamlett to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, 22 Jun 1963, Official Correspondence 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.

10. Msg, Hamlett to Wheeler, 22 Jun 1963.



As part of Operation BIG LIFT, soldiers of the 502d Military Police Company of the 2d Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas, disembark from a C-124 in Frankfurt, Germany. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

moved to storage facilities along the French–West German border, where they received and put into operation the tanks, trucks, and heavy equipment that the Army had been storing to equip units sent to Europe to reinforce the Seventh Army. In many ways, the exercise mirrored the LONG THRUST exercise, which had taken place a year earlier, but this time, the maneuver involved a complete armored division.¹¹

Once deployed, the 2d Armored Division troops joined elements from the 3d Armored Division, the 8th Infantry Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment for a two-week field-training exercise. The drill concluded on 5 November, and critiques and after action reviews took place the following two days. Most soldiers of the 2d Armored Division returned to the United States before Thanksgiving, with a few remaining behind to return the pre-positioned equipment to storage sites and to perform required maintenance checks.¹²

11. Bob Horowitz, “2d Armored ‘Big Lifts’ to Europe FTX Site,” *Army Times*, 23 Oct 1963; Bob Horowitz, “Big Lift Has Lots of Zip,” *Army Times*, 30 Oct 1963.

12. Horowitz, “Big Lift Has Lots of Zip”; Bob Horowitz, “Big Lift Exceeds Hopes,” *Army Times*, 6 Nov 1963.



Pre-positioned tanks and ammunition await the arrival of the 2d Armored Division for Operation BIG LIFT near Spesbach, Germany. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

On its surface, the exercise seemed to be a great success. Many Pentagon officials expressed satisfaction that the services had demonstrated the ability to reinforce units in Europe rapidly and efficiently. The Air Force had delivered the entire division to Germany in less than three days and boasted that they could probably do it again in a day and a half. Army officials praised the condition of the pre-positioned equipment, reporting fewer serious maintenance problems than they normally experienced during similar stateside maneuvers. Army leaders praised the morale of the soldiers participating in the exercise, expressing their belief that reenlistment rates would go up as a result of the excellent training.¹³

Other senior officials, however, expressed some reservations about the implications of the maneuver. It would be unlikely, they said, for European airfields to remain clear once any hostilities had begun. They also pointed out that the pre-positioned equipment, although only in place for a few years, was already dated. The Army had not yet replaced the equipment originally positioned there with newer models of tanks and armored personnel carriers. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, by then serving as Supreme Allied

13. Bob Horowitz, "Big Lift Men Win Plaudits," *Army Times*, 18 Nov 1963.



Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

Commander in Europe, noted that as successful as it was, the maneuver was no substitute for a strong and well-armed frontline defense.¹⁴

Despite the attention that it received, BIG LIFT was not the Army's most consequential training event in 1963. In March, General Wheeler announced the formation of a provisional division, the 11th Air Assault, at Fort Benning to test airmobility and air assault concepts that had emerged during the Howze Board studies. The division had an initial cadre of 291 officers, 187 warrant officers, and 3,114 enlisted soldiers, and it employed equipment and aircraft the Army had stripped from units across the country. Wheeler instructed the newly designated division commander, Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, to "find out how far and fast the Army can go, and should go, in the direction of airmobility."¹⁵ The chief of staff further indicated his intent to request congressional authorization for a seventeenth division if the experiment proved to be worthwhile. Secretary McNamara voiced his support for the testing and said that he was convinced that these new types of units would significantly increase the Army's capabilities.¹⁶

14. Horowitz, "Big Lift Men Win Plaudits."

15. "New Air Assault Mission Defined," *Army Times*, 16 Feb 1963.

16. "First Air Assault Division Units Arriving at Benning," *Army Times*, 27 Mar 1963; "New Air Assault Mission Defined"; J. A. Stockfish, *The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994).

Early in 1963, the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) laid out the tables of organization and equipment for a ROAD-type air assault division. In theory, the organization would include three task force headquarters, eight infantry battalions, an air cavalry squadron, a division artillery, and an aviation group. The latter would include maintenance, surveillance, and assault support battalions, as well as sufficient assault helicopter battalions to lift one third of the division's infantry at one time. As proposed by the Howze Board, the Army also activated the 10th Air Transport Brigade, not organic to the division but providing direct support to transport troops, equipment, and supplies on the battlefield. Throughout the early testing period, the Army never completely filled out the division organization, limiting most tests to company, battalion, and brigade-sized maneuvers (*Chart 13*).¹⁷

The service conducted additional tests related to the air assault division at other locations. In April, the Army announced the activation of the 1st Aerial Artillery Battery (Provisional) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The test battery consisted of a headquarters element and three platoons of four helicopters each. The CH-34 Choctaw helicopters carried 4.5-inch rocket pods on both sides of the aircraft. The Field Artillery School at Fort Sill formed an aerial artillery test and evaluation committee to oversee the training and evaluation of the new battery.¹⁸

Even before the most strenuous portions of the testing of the air assault concept had started, support began to build within the service for full integration of the concept into the force structure. General Johnson, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, cautioned that even though the concept had much promise, it required more complete and comprehensive testing. However, many of the helicopters that would turn the concept into a viable doctrine were still under development. The Army required faster and better-armed platforms to increase the speed of maneuver and provide overwatch for the ground force. The service would need more time, Johnson concluded, to convince skeptics that the air assault division could continue fighting despite the losses it would absorb in personnel and equipment.¹⁹


By the end of the year, discussions throughout the Army Staff regarding the integration of an air assault organization into the force structure had begun in earnest. General Johnson thought that the Army's sixteen-division force structure could not support three special purpose divisions. Instead, he

17. "New Air Assault Mission Defined"; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 314–16.

18. "Aerial Artillery Battery Organized," *Army Times*, 17 Apr 1963; "Air Artillery Activated," *Army Times*, 3 May 1963.

19. Memo, Lt. Gen. Harold K. Johnson for Director Ops, 22 Nov 1963, sub: Air Assault Division; Memo, Lt. Gen. Harold K. Johnson for Ch Staff, 11 Nov 1963, sub: Air Assault Division; both in Official Correspondence, 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.

Chart 13—Howze Board—Air Assault Division, 1963



Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

suggested two alternatives for integrating an air assault organization into the force. The first was to substitute an air assault division for an existing infantry division. It made sense, he offered, to replace the 2d Infantry Division, because a substantial part of that unit already had been incorporated into the 11th Air Assault Division to test the concept. A second alternative was to substitute an air assault brigade for an existing brigade within an airborne division. He could not support replacing a complete airborne division because that would require throwing away an existing unit with a high state of readiness and replacing it with one requiring substantial training and reequipping to reach similar levels of readiness.²⁰

As the testing of the air assault concept continued, most of the scenarios committed the unit to a mid-intensity conflict. Although the Howze Board had based its study and recommendations on a conventional conflict in Europe, the report had included a section on counterinsurgency operations. Most of the senior officers involved in the testing claimed to have given little thought to the use of an air assault division in Vietnam. If anything, many believed that it might be too ponderous for such an environment. More than one observer noted, however, that many of the tactics and techniques involved in the air assault tests were being employed already by helicopter units in Vietnam.²¹

Even as the testing of the airmobility and air assault concepts went on, the rest of the service continued its own training, in many cases attempting to integrate aspects of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare into its more traditional operational doctrine. Many of these efforts came together in Exercise SWIFT STRIKE III, which the Army conducted across an expanded maneuver area of approximately 6 million acres in North and South Carolina from 21 July to 16 August. General Paul D. Adams, the commander in chief of U.S. Strike Command, served as the director for a maneuver that pitted the 2d and 5th Infantry Divisions against the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. The U.S. 9th and 12th Air Forces provided tactical air support and air transport for each side. Units from the Army's Special Warfare Center, controlled by Maj. Gen. William P. Yarborough, acted as guerrilla forces supporting the airborne divisions.²²

20. Memo, Johnson for Ch Staff, 11 Nov 1963, sub: Air Assault Division.

21. Interv. Col. Ralph J. Powell and Lt. Col. Phillip E. Courts with Lt. Gen. Robert R. Williams, 29 Mar 1978, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Too Hasty on Air Assault," *Army Times*, 9 Feb 1963.

22. Jean R. Moenk, *A History of Large Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964* (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1969), 292-93; "SWIFT STRIKE III," *Army Information Digest* 18 (Dec 1963): 5-7; "75,000 Set for SWIFT STRIKE; Air Battle to Begin July 21," *Army Times*, 16 Jul 1963.



A wave of paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division drop behind "enemy" lines to capture Red Team territory in Exercise SWIFT STRIKE III. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

The massive maneuver was unique in several respects. It marked the first time since Operation MARKET GARDEN during World War II that the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions had worked together as a team. It was also the first time since World War II that a complete airborne corps had operated against a comparable ground force of straight infantry. Because the 5th Infantry Division had only just completed its ROAD conversion, the exercise was also an opportunity to test the new divisional structure. The Military Air Transport Service had transported the division to the test site. As a result, the division had left behind its organic tank elements, its heavy engineer construction equipment, and its heavy artillery. Nonetheless, the test validated the building block concept of the new organization, allowing the commander to tailor available components of the division to best accomplish its assigned missions.²³

Although SWIFT STRIKE III accomplished most of its anticipated training objectives, its exorbitant costs once again raised questions regarding the value provided by large-scale maneuvers. The price tag of more than

23. Moenk, *History of Large Scale Maneuvers*, 300–5.



U.S. Army helicopters take off from Butts Army Airfield, Fort Carson, Colorado, to participate in Exercise SWIFT STRIKE III. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

\$11.5 million was double that of the previous year's SWIFT STRIKE II. Reviews of the exercise concluded that the Army was receiving a poor return for its training dollars and that smaller unit training and command post exercises would provide results equivalent to or better than the larger exercises.²⁴

A NEW LOOK FOR THE ARMY

Perhaps the most obvious aspect of the Army's transition in the ten years since the Korean War armistice was its physical appearance. Although the service's fascination with rockets, missiles, and atomic weapons had begun to wane, many of the byproducts of that interest remained in the Army inventory. More apparent, however, was the evolution of the vehicles, artillery, heavy weapons, and small arms borne by the soldiers. By 1963, the Army had replaced almost all of the standard-issue items of World War II and the Korean War with more modern gear.

24. Moenk, *History of Large Scale Maneuvers*, 308.

At the forefront of this evolution was the helicopter. Although the test of the air assault division concept continued throughout the year, the service already had embraced the helicopter as an integral part of its organization and doctrine. Each new ROAD division contained a total of 103 organic aircraft, approximately twice the number in pentomic divisions. This included one full aviation battalion along with an air troop in the reconnaissance squadron. During fiscal year 1963, the number of U.S. Army aircraft rose from 5,700 to 6,000, almost entirely from the addition of helicopters. This rise foreshadowed further helicopter additions that would be prompted by the recommendations of the Howze Board. Already, helicopter units were proving their worth in a variety of roles in Vietnam. Throughout the Army, both the Bell UH-1 Iroquois and the Boeing CH-47 Chinook had performed well during the early stages of their deployment.²⁵

Vehicles and equipment on the ground also had evolved. By 1963, the Army had equipped all of its active duty armored units with the M60 tank. A second generation, designated the M60A1, with increased frontal armor, an improved electronics package, and a larger basic load of main gun ammunition was in production. As an improved version of the M48 Patton tank, the M60 was not an original design, but it was a far cry from the M4 Sherman tank that the service had fielded throughout World War II and into the Korea conflict.

In place of the World War II half-tracks that had carried infantry into battle, the modern Army now employed the M113 armored personnel carrier. The new vehicle, a lighter version of the M59 and M75 carriers developed during the late 1950s, had begun entering the Army inventory in 1960. Of all the Army's primary vehicles, only two were recognizable to old-timers—the venerable “Deuce and a Half” M35 2½-ton truck and the M151 ¼-ton jeep. Both were relatively new variants on traditional models from World War II.

Another significant transition was occurring in the field artillery. Many division artilleries still featured towed versions of the 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers that had served the Army since World War II. The move toward mechanization of many of the infantry divisions, however, supported a complementary shift to tracked artillery weapons. The transition began with heavier weapons, as the M110 self-propelled 8-inch howitzer and the M107 175-mm. self-propelled gun entered the Army inventory in 1963. Limited numbers of the M109 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer also reached Army units in Germany near the end of the year. Some of the

25. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jul 1962–30 Jun 1963, 126; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 299.

corps artillery battalions in Europe still fielded the Sergeant missile and Honest John rockets, but newer replacements for those weapons were also under development.²⁶

Ironically, the new artillery sounded the death knell for the weapon that had come to symbolize the Army of the early 1960s, the Davy Crockett atomic projectile. Assigned to infantry battalions and reconnaissance squadrons, the weapon never had been particularly popular. Its short range exposed the firing crew to the blast and fallout effects of the explosion, and its deployment on the front line made atomic release procedures and command and control difficult. As the Army developed atomic projectiles for its 155-mm. and 8-inch artillery pieces, the controversial Davy Crockett became expendable.²⁷

In 1963, the basic weapon of the American infantry, the rifle, had become a raging point of contention. The Army had adopted the M14 as its standard-issue rifle in 1957, but the decision did not put to rest the many criticisms that weapon had engendered. Although it was sturdy and reliable, critics countered that it was simply an improved version of the M1 Garand that the Army had used in World War II and the Korean War. The M14 was heavy and required a bipod to deliver accurate automatic fire. It also had a rather dubious production record. Cost overruns had caused Senator Margaret Chase Smith to ask, in 1961, why it took the Army more time to produce a rifle than the Air Force needed to develop and deploy the B-52 bomber.²⁸

Secretary McNamara directed the Army to assess the overall effectiveness of the M14, the AK47, and the AR15, a more lightweight competitor produced by Armalite, a division of the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation. Tests conducted throughout the Army, but particularly by Combat Developments Command and Army Materiel Command, rated the M14 most acceptable for general use. Civilian officials, however, questioned the Army's objectivity in the effort. An investigation by the service's inspector general documented a significant bias on the part of many testers within the Army Materiel Command. As a rifle, the M14 was best suited for the service's traditional regard for long-range, single-shot marksmanship, and many Army ordnance personnel favored the heavier weapon for its accuracy at extended ranges. However, further investigation revealed that many of the Army's officers preferred the lighter weight of the AR15. The smaller caliber

26. "Big Guns Boom at Fort Sill," *Army Times*, 22 May 1963; "New Howitzer Coming," *Army Times*, 9 Oct 1963.

27. Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 342, 349.

28. Walter S. Poole, *Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960-1968* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 133-35.



Sp4c. Harry L. White of the 82d Airborne Division's military police takes position with a new M16 rifle at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

ammunition made the AR15 much easier to control when employed in a fully automatic mode and lightened the load of infantry soldiers. General Wheeler and Army Secretary Cyrus R. Vance made a provisional decision to procure AR15s for airborne, air assault, and special forces, but to retain the M14 with its standard NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) caliber for Army troops in Europe.²⁹

By the end of the year, McNamara had grown tired of the Army's procrastination. He wanted to establish one rifle as the standard for all the military services. Finally, after agreeing to a series of improvements to make the AR15 more reliable in damp and cold climates, the Department of Defense awarded a contract to Colt Firearms Company for 85,000 rifles—now designated the M16—for the Army and Marine Corps and an additional 19,000 for the Air Force. Although some within the Army continued their support for the M14, McNamara's decision ensured that Army would adopt the M16 as its primary infantry weapon in Vietnam. Despite further

29. Poole, *Adapting to Flexible Response*, 136–39; Thomas L. McNaugher, *The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 88–105. For further information on the controversy, see Edward C. Ezell, *The Great Rifle Controversy* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1984).



An infantry soldier prepares to fire a light antitank weapon (LAW) during training at the U.S. Army Infantry Center. (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

modifications, the redesignated M16A1 remained controversial throughout its service.³⁰

The Army had fielded other infantry weapons as standard-issue since the end of the Korean War. Chinese mass wave attacks in Korea had prompted several nations to develop antipersonnel mines to help protect infantry positions. During the early 1960s, the U.S. Army deployed the M18 Claymore antipersonnel mine. Once emplaced, the device could be detonated remotely by defending troops and was labeled conveniently to ensure that a soldier aimed the proper side toward the enemy. The M79 grenade launcher also had entered the inventory during the early 1960s. Resembling a sawed-off shotgun, the launcher allowed soldiers to project explosive grenades farther than they could throw them. In 1963, the Army was well underway in its development of a light antitank weapon (LAW) to supplement the larger, heavier recoilless rifles. The M72 LAW weighed less than five pounds and had proved promising against most types of armored vehicles.³¹

Perhaps the clearest sign of the Army's reorientation under the Kennedy administration was the fate of its Nike Zeus antimissile missile system.

30. Poole, *Adapting to Flexible Response*, 140.

31. "Every Soldier a Tank-Killer," *Army Information Digest* 18 (Jun 1963): 23.



A soldier from the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps demonstrates the new 40-mm. grenade launcher, a larger weapon to supplement the infantry's handgun arsenal by filling the gap in range between the hand grenade and the mortar. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

Throughout the Eisenhower years, the Army had pointed to that project as a symbol of its forward thinking and consistently had received funding to continue research and development on it. The new president, however, had grown skeptical of the antimissile concept and had become less willing to continue funding without quantifiable results. In 1963, the Army announced a reorientation of the project toward a new and improved version of the weapon dubbed Nike X. Although testing continued, many of the project's supporters had begun to lose interest in continued Army participation in long-range strategic air defense.³²

Finally, the look of the soldiers had changed since the end of the war in Korea. During the 1950s, the Army had replaced the familiar olive drab uniform (which was really a medium shade of brown) with a new, olive-green utility uniform known as fatigues. Also gone were the brown boots and gaiters familiar to World War II infantry. By the mid-1960s, troops wore a standard-issue, full-laced, black leather boot. Airborne and special forces

32. U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jul 1962–30 Jun 1963, 160.

soldiers often wore specially designed jump boots, which had reinforced seams and slightly higher tops. Although the design of the combat helmet had changed little since World War II, the Ridgway-model utility cap, with its stiffly molded sides, had given way, in 1963, to the hot weather field cap, which closely resembled an olive-green baseball cap. Uniforms and equipment would undergo even more dramatic changes once the Army began its deeper involvement in Vietnam.³³

REFLECTING SOCIAL CHANGE

History remembers the 1960s as a period of dramatic social upheaval in the United States. In several ways, the United States Army played a vital role in provoking that unrest during its prolonged participation in the Vietnam War. However, it also recognized the need for change and acted as an early agent of those advancements. As the decade began, the military moved ahead of society by promoting racial integration as well as improving some opportunities for women. Also, the Department of Defense and the Army had learned important lessons during the mobilization of reserve forces for the Berlin Crisis of 1961. As a result, the relationship between the active and reserve components faced impending changes. Finally, even as the war in Vietnam was beginning to heat up, several military and political leaders questioned both the efficiency of the draft in providing a source of military personnel and also the equity of a system that seemed to draw unevenly from the nation's minorities.

In June 1962, President Kennedy had announced the formation of the Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, popularly referred to as the Gesell Committee after its chair, Gerhard A. Gesell, a Washington, D.C., attorney who had served as assistant general counsel for the Democrats during the Pearl Harbor hearings. Although announced by Kennedy, the committee was primarily the brainchild of Secretary McNamara, who desired more detailed information regarding the treatment of racial minorities in the military. McNamara remained aloof from the investigation to avoid influencing its findings, but his special assistant, Adam Yarmolinsky, was instrumental in guiding the committee through its investigation. Gesell

33. General information on the changes in the U.S. Army uniforms during this period can be found in Antonio Arques, *Grunt: A Pictorial Report on the US Infantry's Gear and Life During the Vietnam War, 1965–1975* (Madrid: Andrea Press, 2014); Martin Windrow and Gerry Embleton, *Military Dress of North America, 1665–1970* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973); and John R. Elting and Michael McAfee, eds., *Military Uniforms in America*, vol. 4, *The Modern Era: From 1868* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988).

acknowledged Yarmolinsky's influence, noting that it was clear the defense aide was most interested in investigating off-base discrimination against minorities and wanted the committee to advance a solution.³⁴

The committee delivered an initial report to the White House on 13 June 1963. It concluded from its investigations that serious discrimination against Black service members and their families existed, both in the United States and overseas. It noted the disproportionately small number of Black officers and noncommissioned officers among the ranks. Gesell himself called the dearth of Black officers a "shocking condition" and expressed concern over the absence of Black officers on promotion boards.³⁵ Additionally, Black enlisted soldiers were overrepresented in certain supply and food service specialties. Most significant, however, were the committee's observations regarding conditions encountered by Black service members when they were off the military bases. The report found service efforts to relieve segregated housing, schooling, and public accommodations in local communities insufficient and ineffective.³⁶

In response to the recommendations of the Gesell Committee, Secretary McNamara on 26 July published a directive outlining new measures his department would take toward combatting racial discrimination. The secretary's order established the new deputy assistant secretary of defense (civil rights) to handle race problems in the military. He also delegated to the service secretaries the authority to declare "off limits" those off-base businesses and establishments that discriminated against Black soldiers. Although it was not supported specifically in the directive, McNamara reserved the right to consider closing military facilities near communities that continued to practice discrimination.³⁷

Public response to the directive was predictably mixed. Many critics complained that the secretary was assuming dictatorial powers and attempting to reinstate to communities in the South what they characterized as nonproductive policies of post-Civil War Reconstruction. Less strident analysts questioned the legal standing of McNamara's implied threats. In Congress, Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, introduced a bill making it a court-martial offense for unit or post commanders to place off-post establishments off limits for racial

34. Morris J. MacGregor Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*, Defense Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981), 535–36.

35. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, 341.

36. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, 338–41.

37. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, 348–49; Bob Schweitz, "Services Get Off-Limit Right," *Army Times*, 7 Aug 1963.

discrimination. McNamara also had to acknowledge that the order did not apply to national guard units while they remained under state control.³⁸

In the wake of McNamara's announcement, the Army initiated its own changes. The service established its own Equal Rights section as a separate contingent reporting to the deputy chief of staff for personnel, Lt. Gen. James L. Richardson Jr. The new section had as its areas of interest civil rights, racial policies, personnel surveys, and legislative matters of interest. The Army Materiel Command also established the Office of the Special Assistant for Intergroup Relations to investigate and enforce fair employment practices in contract work.³⁹

Some on the Army Staff wondered, however, if the service was moving too fast in its pursuit of civil rights. As the debate over the implications of McNamara's directive continued for the remainder of the year, the Army took another look at the impact of discrimination within the ranks. It acknowledged that, intuitively, discrimination appeared to have a harmful effect on the morale of Black soldiers, but it remained difficult to find a reliable and valid means of measuring that effect. One study suggested that the very act of collecting data to measure levels of discrimination would be discriminating in and of itself. It concluded that even though "the goal of equality of treatment and opportunity is meritorious, the Army must not be pressured into overzealous means of attaining it."⁴⁰ The Army must live and work in a real-world environment. It had devoted considerable effort to developing the best possible relations with the local communities in which it served. Aggressive actions on the part of local commanders could threaten the whole structure of established relationships. "In short, excessive efforts to achieve an unquestionably lofty goal could be interpreted as unwarranted and unwanted pressures for the benefit of a minority."⁴¹

At the same time, Army units deployed to various locations during periods of civil disturbance brought on by racial tensions. In the summer of 1963, the Army sent troops to Birmingham, Alabama, and Washington, D.C., to maintain order during demonstrations in those cities. As it had in previous years in Little Rock, Arkansas, and Oxford, Mississippi, the presence of the soldiers helped to relieve tensions during a time when rising emotions could have led to violence. Although some in the South resented

38. Tom Wuriu, "Vinson Asks Trial of CO's in Racial Off-Limits Cases," *Army Times*, 25 Sep 1963; "Race Order Clarified by Pentagon," *Army Times*, 2 Oct 1963.

39. "Equal Rights Section Established by Army," *Army Times*, 18 Sep 1963.

40. Memo, Col. James I. Muir Jr., Acting Director of Strategic Plans and Policies, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 26 Aug 1963, sub: Impact of Discrimination on Military Effectiveness, Official Correspondence 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.

41. Memo, Muir for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 26 Aug 1963, sub: Impact of Discrimination on Military Effectiveness.

federal intrusion into what they regarded as a local affair, for the most part the public continued to view the military as a neutral intermediary. It would not be until later in the Vietnam War that violent events—both antiwar and civil rights demonstrations—would shift public opinion to a more antimilitary stance.⁴²

The social dynamics of the period also focused attention on the role of women in the armed forces. By many accounts, the Army had made substantial progress in this area. Between January 1957 and July 1962, the strength of the Women's Army Corps had risen from 8,300 to 11,100. The Berlin Crisis of 1961—and, to a lesser extent, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963—had inspired increased enlistments of women. To generate further interest in military careers for women, newly appointed director of the Women's Army Corps, Col. Emily C. Gorman, allowed the corps to participate in a series of public relations programs about the service coordinated by the Army's chief of information. These mobile exhibits highlighted the service of women in the Army and the variety of jobs they performed. Colonel Gorman also made it a priority of her administration to improve housing conditions for female soldiers, particularly by providing increased privacy and security for women living in Army barracks.⁴³

Reserve mobilizations in response to the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis had indicated to Army leaders a need to realign the reserve structure as a base for rapid mobilization in an emergency. After the Army had agreed to convert national guard divisions to the ROAD organization, it received state-level support for the elimination of nearly 1,850 company- or detachment-sized units, with the activation of approximately 1,000 new ones. These actions left the National Guard with a drill strength of 400,000 while the Army Reserve retained 300,000. The reorganization eliminated four divisions each from the National Guard and the Army Reserve, replacing them with separate brigades. The service also revised the nomenclature referring to mobilization status. It designated those units needed most quickly for reinforcement of active units as the Immediate Reserve and it identified those of a lower priority as the Reinforcing Reserve. Both national guard and reserve organizations tried to channel personnel

42. Paul J. Scheips, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992*, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2012), 145–57.

43. Bettie J. Morden, *The Women's Army Corps, 1945–1978*, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), 186–96.

into the higher priority units so that those units most likely to deploy would be less likely to require large numbers of filler personnel.⁴⁴

On 2 January 1963, the Army created the Office of Reserve Components, bringing the responsibility for policy, direction, and control over the Army Reserve and the National Guard under a single three-star officer. This eliminated the situation in which the chief of the National Guard Bureau was essentially independent while the chief of the Army Reserve was a relatively minor official on the Army Staff. In February, the Army also transferred the ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) program to the Office of Reserve Components.⁴⁵

By 1963, the manner in which the Army obtained its soldiers was beginning to attract attention. The military draft, reinstated to support the Cold War armed forces by President Harry S. Truman in 1948, remained in effect. As requirements for military personnel declined, so did draft calls. At the same time, an increasing number of draft-eligible males received deferments for educational or occupational priorities. In 1962, President Kennedy had extended draft deferments to married men, even those who were not fathers. In the words of one critic, selective service had become more about deferring than drafting. The generous level of deferments began to raise politically sensitive questions regarding the pool of individuals left eligible for selection, most of whom were poor or minorities. In November 1963, even as American involvement in Vietnam began to loom larger, the director of selective service, General Lewis B. Hershey, answered questions before Congress, where interest was growing to study the feasibility of abolishing the draft in favor of an all-volunteer force. General Hershey maintained that an all-volunteer force would never work as long as the military needed more than one million personnel.⁴⁶

Finally, in the spirit of the 1960s, Army leaders began to notice some pushback on perceived levels of overmanagement and oversupervision by senior leaders and staffs within the Army. To a great extent, junior officers and noncommissioned officers had begun to chafe under the zero-defects and checklist-oriented leadership philosophies that had been personified

44. Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1983* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 160–61; Memo, Sec General Staff for Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, 9 Jan 1963, sub: ROAD Reorganization of Reserve Components, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.

45. Memo, Sec General Staff for Hamlett, 9 Jan 1963, sub: ROAD Reorganization of Reserve Components; U.S. Dept. of the Army, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," 1 Jul 1962–30 Jun 1963, 120.

46. Bernard Rostker, *I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 3, 28.

by the former USAREUR and CONARC commander, General Clarke. In October 1963, General Johnson, and Vice Chief of Staff General Barksdale Hamlett Jr. warned members of the Army Staff and senior commanders that excessive management and supervision were hampering the development of junior leaders throughout the Army. Johnson suggested a series of formal staff visits to investigate the seriousness of the problem and to assist in the development of a solution.⁴⁷

DEEPER INTO VIETNAM

By the end of 1962, the Army measured its success in Vietnam by what it termed "certain indicators," none of which, it said, were precise or wholly trustworthy.⁴⁸ The South Vietnamese government claimed control of 51 percent of the people, and its armed forces had launched more than 5,314 operations, of which 900 were battalion-sized or larger. During the second half of 1962, Viet Cong insurgents had suffered roughly four times the usual number of casualties, and the general trend of their attacks had decreased from 118 per week to 92. Some U.S. observers noted with concern, however, that only a very small percentage of South Vietnamese military operations actually made contact with the enemy, and that as many as 40 percent of the Viet Cong reported killed were not Viet Cong at all. Moreover, the hardcore Viet Cong seemed to maintain their strength of almost 25,000 despite their reported losses.⁴⁹

Nonetheless, the Army's chief of staff, General Wheeler, was optimistic when he reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding an investigative visit he had made to Vietnam during January 1963. He noted that the number of U.S. advisers serving with the Vietnamese military had risen from 900 to more than 3,000 during the previous year. More than 400 of those were serving at the battalion level or lower. Also, nearly 300 U.S. military aircraft had deployed to Vietnam, including 148 transport helicopters, 11 armed helicopters, 81 fixed-wing transport aircraft, 13 fighter-bombers, 9 light bombers, and 4 reconnaissance aircraft. The Army had developed an austere but effective logistic base in South Vietnam and installed an electronic

47. Memo, Lt. Gen. Harold K. Johnson for Vice Ch Staff, 3 Oct 1963, sub: Overmanagement and Overcontrol of Subordinate Commands, Official Correspondence, 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.

48. Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, 14 Aug 1964, "Review of U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation in Southeast Asia, 1961-1964," Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC.

49. Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, 14 Aug 1964, "Review of U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation in Southeast Asia, 1961-1964."



President Ngô Đình Diệm of South Vietnam arrives for the beginning of the National Day parade in Saigon. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)

detection system capable of locating and following Viet Cong radio transmitters. The “first team” he concluded, was in the game in Vietnam.⁵⁰

General Wheeler noted several encouraging developments. First, the South Vietnamese had completed more than 4,000 strategic hamlets and had brought an additional 500,000 people under government control. Additionally, more than 145,000 Montagnards had left their homelands in the hills to seek training and government support. They could be particularly helpful in the government’s efforts to gain and hold the plateau and mountain areas that controlled much of the South Vietnamese border. Wheeler described a positive relationship between the key leaders in South Vietnam and General Paul D. Harkins, the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.⁵¹

Wheeler decried the mutual distrust and dislike that had arisen between the Diệm government and the foreign press, particularly American

50. Rpt, Investigative Team Headed by Ch Staff (Wheeler) to Joint Chs Staff, Jan 1963, sub: JCS Team Report on South Vietnam, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963* (hereinafter cited as *FRUS 1961–1963*), vol. 3, *Vietnam, January–August 1963* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 71–95.

51. Rpt, Investigative Team Headed by Ch Staff (Wheeler) to Joint Chs Staff, Jan 1963, sub: JCS Team Report on South Vietnam.

journalists. Reporters had accused the regime of being unduly secretive, issuing deliberately false news bulletins, and attempting to use the press as involuntary propaganda tools. The Vietnamese government accused the press of reporting only the failures of its policies and armed forces and never their successes. Trần Lệ Xuân, commonly known as Madame Nhu, the wife of President Diệm's brother and principal adviser, led a campaign of resentment against the U.S. press. General Wheeler noted that, although the truth of the charges and countercharges certainly lay somewhere in the middle, the unfavorable press reports had undoubtedly influenced U.S. public and congressional opinion toward thinking that the war effort was misguided.⁵²

The Army chief of staff's conclusions were mixed. He noted that, in the space of the previous year, the situation in Vietnam had turned from desperation to a position where victory was now a hopeful prospect. American involvement, he recommended, should fall somewhere between complete disengagement and the overt commitment of U.S. forces with the United States directing the war effort. The current support effort, he concluded, was adequate and sustainable and fell within this spectrum. Wheeler objected, however, to the near invulnerability of Hồ Chí Minh and the opposing forces in North Vietnam. He recommended a full spectrum of actions, including covert operations and open attacks by U.S. air forces, against targets in North Vietnam. It would be necessary to make North Vietnam bleed, he said, before it would end the insurgency.⁵³

Many administration officials did not share the general's optimism. Some of the president's advisers had grown wary of what they considered to be the military's overly positive reports. When Michael V. Forrestal, an assistant to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, arranged the meeting between Kennedy and General Wheeler, he apologized to the president for wasting his time. Many on the presidential staff leaned more toward an estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency describing the situation in Vietnam as a "slowly escalating stalemate."⁵⁴ Victory, although still possible, would take longer than previously predicted.

Other military officials had begun to show skepticism toward the multiplicity of testing agencies the Army employed to evaluate equipment and doctrinal concepts in Vietnam. The commander in chief of the U.S.

52. Rpt, Investigative Team Headed by Ch Staff (Wheeler) to Joint Chs Staff, Jan 1963, sub: JCS Team Report on South Vietnam.

53. Rpt, Investigative Team Headed by Ch Staff (Wheeler) to Joint Chs Staff, Jan 1963, sub: JCS Team Report on South Vietnam.

54. Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 358.



Brig. Gen. Robert H. York (*left*), Lt. Col. John P. Vann (*center*), and Capt. William R. Johnston during an inspection tour of the South Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division area near Duc Hoa (U.S. Army, *National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

Pacific Command, Admiral Harry D. Felt, told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Army's desire to use South Vietnam as a test bed was hampering the primary objective of advising the South Vietnamese government and assisting them in winning the war. The Combat Development Test Center and the Advanced Research Projects Agency alone had some fifty projects underway, including the chemical defoliation of suspected Viet Cong hideouts, the employment of patrol dogs and ground surveillance radar, and the use of special grenades to splash fluorescent paint on guerrillas during engagements. Admiral Felt and General Harkins both lobbied the Joint Chiefs to unite all test efforts under the supervision of the Military Assistance Command to eliminate competing test efforts and to bring them under some type of local control.⁵⁵

Doubts about the capabilities of the South Vietnamese military had begun to spread among some American military advisers. Early in January, elements of an Army of Vietnam division had cornered a battalion-sized, main-force Viet Cong unit near the village of Ấp Bắc in the Mekong Delta. Despite their advantages in size, firepower, and position, the South Vietnamese had

55. Graham A. Cosmas, *MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967*, *The United States Army in Vietnam* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 50–51.

suffered a significant defeat and allowed the enemy to slip away. Although Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, attempted to put a positive spin on the operation, the Army could not contain pessimistic analysis coming from many of the unit advisers. At the forefront of these critics was Col. John Paul Vann, an experienced and charismatic senior adviser who had witnessed the battle. He was deeply critical of the corruption and ineptitude displayed by senior Vietnamese leaders at Ấp Bắc and elsewhere. As 1963 progressed, many U.S. advisers assigned directly to South Vietnamese units began to share some of Vann's misgivings.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army presence in South Vietnam continued to expand. Between January and October 1963, U.S. military strength in country jumped from 11,325 to 16,916. The number of Army Aviation units doubled from twelve to twenty-four, and the number of aircraft increased to 369. Sorties and flying hours tripled. In September, the service announced that it would reequip three helicopter companies currently operating in Vietnam with the new UH-1 Iroquois aircraft. In April 1963, approximately one hundred volunteers from the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i arrived in South Vietnam to serve as door gunners on U.S. aircraft supporting South Vietnamese military operations.⁵⁷

The increased activity came at a cost, however, and inevitably brought American soldiers into harm's way. Between January 1962 and October 1963, the Army lost forty-seven aircraft to enemy ground fire. The Army reported that eighteen U.S. service members had lost their lives in October and listed another four as missing. U.S. service deaths since the beginning of 1961 now numbered 132. Of those, seventy-three were the direct result of enemy action. During that same period, 380 soldiers had been wounded.⁵⁸

The United States Army, which gradually had edged deeper and deeper into the morass that was the Vietnam War, found itself even further mired on 2 November 1963 when a cabal of South Vietnamese military leaders launched a coup, arresting President Diệm and his brother, Ngô Đình Nhu, and later executing them. Although U.S. military and political leaders had grown weary of Diệm, they had, for the most part, stayed out of the political manipulations. However, by not expressly forbidding action against the South Vietnamese president, they inevitably contributed to his downfall.

56. Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 358; Cosmas, *MACV 1962-1967*, 86-87. Neil Sheehan, in *A Bright Shining Lie* (New York: Random House, 1988), describes the Battle of Ấp Bắc and John Paul Vann's influence on the U.S. Army.

57. Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, 14 Aug 1964, "Review of U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation in Southeast Asia, 1961-1964"; "Army Units in Vietnam to Get Newer Copters," *Army Times*, 4 Sep 1963; "100 Machine Gunners Volunteer in Vietnam," *Army Times*, 24 Apr 1963.

58. "18 US Advisors Lost Lives During October in Vietnam," *Army Times*, 20 Nov 1963.



Pfc. Glenn W. Rehkamp, the .30-caliber machine gunner for a CH-21 helicopter of the 57th Helicopter Company in Tan Son Nhut, on a routine flight over Vietnam (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

General Harkins quickly tried to establish a working relationship with the new regime, and the ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, expressed optimism regarding the prospects of the new government. American news reporters in Saigon, however, interpreted the coup as a defeat for American policy in Vietnam, and publicity continued to turn against the American effort there.⁵⁹

PASSING THE TORCH

On 22 November 1963, exactly three weeks after the assassination of President Diệm, Lee Harvey Oswald shot and killed President Kennedy in Dallas, Texas. Two days later, the nation buried the late president at Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors. During the lighting of an eternal flame, a contingent of U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers stood watch at the four corners of the gravesite. At the conclusion of the ceremony, one of the special forces troops, Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Francis J. Ruddy, removed the

59. Cosmas, *MACV 1962–1967*, 104–6.



A special forces beret is illuminated by the flame of the eternal light at the grave of President John F. Kennedy in Arlington National Cemetery. (*U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch*)

green beret from his head and placed it on the grave. The former president had done much to restore the stature and prestige of the entire U.S. Army, but the Green Berets would remember him with special affection because he had been particularly supportive of them.⁶⁰

As the Army mourned the loss of its commander in chief, it also moved forward quickly to assist his successor in taking up the reins. As service reporters noted, the new president, Lyndon Baines Johnson, was no novice. He had served in both houses of Congress and had been well-regarded as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. More recently, he had acted as the Senate majority leader and as chair of the Senate Democratic Caucus. As vice president, Johnson had attended all of Kennedy's cabinet meetings and had served as his personal emissary in meetings with foreign leaders around the world.⁶¹

Two weeks later, Secretary McNamara briefed the new president on his recommendations for the structure of U.S. Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces for the second half of the 1960s. Over the Army's objections,

60. "JFK and the Green Berets," *Soldier of Fortune*, 5 Oct 2021, <https://sofmag.com/happy-34th-anniversary-to-the-usarmy-special-forces-the-green-berets-jfk-and-the-green-berets/>, Historians Files, CMH.

61. "The Command Passes," *Army Times*, 4 Dec 1963.

the secretary of defense supported retaining the service's current structure of sixteen active divisions, seven separate brigades, and four armored cavalry regiments. McNamara approved continued testing of the air assault concept, but he described any proposal to deploy such a division actively as premature. He recommended the disapproval of Army proposals to increase the number of maneuver battalions within existing divisions, to add combat and support units to the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), and to activate two additional Hawk anti-aircraft missile battalions.⁶²

As part of his briefing, McNamara provided President Johnson with his department's latest assessment of the risk in Southeast Asia. The United States and its Southeast Asia Treaty Organization allies, he said, could successfully defend the region against a twenty-one-division Communist attack. The thirteen Thai and South Vietnamese divisions, reinforced by five U.S. divisions and one Commonwealth division, along with allied air superiority, could halt an advance along the general line of the 15th parallel and north of the Mekong River. It would require an additional four U.S. divisions, he concluded, to restore the situation. Although the purpose of the secretary's assessment had been to review conventional force requirements, he nonetheless concluded that the United States would continue to face local confrontations and guerrilla conflicts and that it should continue with its counterinsurgency programs.⁶³

The end of 1963 thus left the United States Army—and the nation—slowly moving deeper into the conflict in Southeast Asia. At the service's senior levels, most of those reluctant to fight a war in Vietnam had been replaced by leaders who, if not eager for a new conflict, at least possessed a greater sense of optimism about the capabilities of the reinvigorated force, some curiosity regarding the potential of its new equipment, and confidence in the revised doctrine against an enemy they did not regard highly. Although some frontline observers had begun to question the reliability of their chosen allies and the wisdom of the fight in general, their concerns had yet to hit home.

62. Draft Memo, Sec Robert S. McNamara for President Lyndon B. Johnson, 19 Dec 1963, in *FRUS 1961–1963*, vol. 8, *National Security Policy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 565–87.

63. Draft Memo, McNamara for Johnson, 19 Dec 1963, 578, 586.

CONCLUSION

According to an old adage tossed around by historians and social scientists, military organizations spend a great deal of their time preparing to fight the previous war. This maxim contains some truth. Tradition is a powerful force, one that helps to bind together members of a dangerous profession. Military leaders can be reluctant to abandon methods and resources that have proven to be successful in the past. Defeats often lead to efforts to fix what went wrong in that war rather than anticipating the challenges of the next war. Although wartime requirements usually accelerate change and drive new developments in organization, doctrine, and equipment, peacetime armies, at least through the mid-twentieth century, have tended to cling tenaciously to established norms.

Between 1953 and 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to base American national security on two primary components: a strong economy and atomic weapons. He believed that large, standing, conventional forces were too expensive and, for the most part, obsolete. The stalemate in Korea had convinced him that conventional warfare between major powers no longer could be decisive. The New Look posed a direct challenge to the Army, as the service struggled to establish a viable role and maintain sufficient budget and manpower resources to survive as an organization.

As a result, the ten-year period between the armistice in Korea and the early stages of commitment in Vietnam was an era of rapid change for the United States Army and was, perhaps, the most dynamic peacetime interval in its history. Service leaders devoted almost all of the organization's research and development funding to rockets, missiles, and other systems capable of delivering an atomic warhead, as they attempted to demonstrate the Army's ability to compete on a nuclear battlefield. At the same time, they experimented with a variety of organizational and doctrinal changes that might better satisfy the president's vision. By the late 1950s, however, the Army's brief flirtation with the pentomic division structure convinced most of its senior leaders that an organization and doctrine based primarily on atomic warfare would be a dead end.

The Army's research and development of rockets and guided missiles soon brought the service into direct conflict with the other services. Successful development of long-range surface-to-surface missiles provoked confrontations with Air Force officers who viewed Army efforts as a challenge

to their traditional role of air support. Army efforts to assume responsibility for continental air defense drew protests from both the Navy and the Air Force, whose leaders claimed primacy in that mission. By 1963, enthusiasm for the continental air defense mission had faded, and the Army abandoned its most ambitious experiment, the Nike Zeus.

Research and development for long-range missiles produced notable success in another area, however. On 31 January 1958, the United States' first successful satellite reached orbit atop a modified Jupiter-C missile launched by the U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency. The service's prosperity in this area was short-lived. After a series of successful launches in 1958 and 1959, President Eisenhower consolidated much of the nation's emerging space exploration infrastructure into a single civilian agency, the newly formed National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Despite these advances, the technology that probably had the greatest long-range impact on the Army was the helicopter. Service interest in rotary aircraft exploded after the Korean War, prompted by the Air Force's consistent opposition to any expansion of the Army's fixed-wing capabilities and by its perceived lack of interest in providing the Army with close air support. Throughout the 1950s, U.S. Army units operated a growing number of helicopters and employed them in a wide variety of roles. In 1962, the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, or the Howze Board, formalized the Army's approach to the use of helicopters in its future organization and doctrine. By 1963, aircraft in Vietnam featured mounted rockets and machine guns for use in ground support, foreshadowing a new kind of warfare. In the United States, the Army continued field-testing an airmobile division that emphasized the mobility and flexibility of the helicopter, which could function as troop transport, logistical support, command and control, and a weapons platform.

In their efforts to maintain their share of a diminishing defense budget, the services competed in the court of public opinion. The Army waged a considerable campaign to confirm its place as an important component of national defense. In both its national television production, *The Big Picture*, and its weekly radio show, *The Army Hour*, the service portrayed its historical legacy as the nation's defender as well as its contemporary efforts to succeed on a modern battlefield. The Army's recruiting efforts and advertisements also emphasized its new technology and forward thinking.

An up-to-date Army required soldiers who were capable of understanding and employing the new technology that the service had embraced. Like the other armed services, the Army began to raise the intelligence and literacy standards required for enlistment. By the 1960s, only the Army still relied

upon the draft to meet its personnel needs. As a result, it had accepted some less qualified individuals whom the other services could afford to reject. The Army worked to recruit better educated and more qualified soldiers and, at the same time, initiated programs to eliminate substandard performers and those who could not grasp or adapt to the new technology. As the conflict in Vietnam exposed inequities in the way the nation conducted its military conscription, an end to the draft emerged as a likely consequence.

Mobilization for the Korean War and later for the Berlin Crisis raised concerns among many military and political leaders that the traditional reserve structure no longer was capable of supporting the active force in wartime. Although many factors were beyond the Army's control, the service took what actions it could to improve reserve readiness. In responding to the Berlin Crisis, many smaller, specialized units had accomplished their assigned missions successfully, but combat divisions designated for deployment to Europe had been unprepared to do so. Spurred on by Secretary Robert S. McNamara, senior Army leaders took steps to streamline reserve organizations and to provide a more effective training program for those soldiers and units that were likely to deploy in the future. The most significant outcome of the Berlin experience, however, may have been a growing reluctance on the part of senior defense leaders to rely upon any large-scale mobilization of the reserve force.

Also, a rising level of social unrest throughout the country exposed the Army to the public in more challenging ways. Both President Eisenhower and President John F. Kennedy deployed soldiers to southern American cities to help control crowds protesting school integration. Although political leaders had sent the troops to help maintain order, some in the South began to perceive the soldiers as an unwarranted impediment to their freedoms. This sense of resentment would spread to other regions of the country as the soldiers themselves became a symbol for an unpopular war.

Throughout the turbulent ten years following the Korean War, the Army attempted to keep its focus on future combat operations. Initially, that meant preparing troops, weapons, and equipment to fight on an atomic battlefield. Service leaders designed and implemented a new organization, the pentomic division, specifically tailored for an atomic environment. However, by the end of the 1950s, apocalyptic combat in Europe appeared less likely. Instead, smaller, lower-intensity conflicts seemed to characterize modern warfare. U.S. service leaders began to study Communist-inspired insurrections in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia as they thought about what their forces should look like in the future. As the Army moved to develop a

more flexible posture, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) units replaced pentomic units.

The Army began to embrace counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare in its doctrine long before President Kennedy took office. The service's growing involvement in the protracted war in Vietnam provided ample motivation for increasing capabilities in those areas. By the early 1960s, the strength of U.S. Army Special Forces had expanded from a single group activated in 1952 to four groups totaling almost 10,000 soldiers. The Army incorporated instruction in unconventional warfare and guerrilla tactics into all of its service schools and into the yearly training programs of most of its operational units. Even large-scale maneuvers that involved two or more divisions included significant partisan and guerrilla activity as part of the exercise scenario.

The new president's interest in a more flexible approach to military capabilities thus reinforced a message the Army had tried to deliver throughout the Eisenhower administration. President Kennedy had adopted many of General Maxwell D. Taylor's beliefs regarding a wider range of military options. Army leaders were able to emphasize the steps they already had taken to develop their service's capabilities for lower-intensity conflicts. This, along with a decreased emphasis on strategic nuclear retaliation as a component of defense policy, allowed the Army to reemerge as a more relevant member of the national military team.

Following the Geneva Accords, the Army's involvement in the conflict in Vietnam grew slowly but steadily. The departure of French military forces left U.S. military leaders virtually alone to determine a western response to the Communist insurgency. As potential flashpoints in Europe and Korea began to stabilize, Army leaders devoted more attention to the deepening crisis in Southeast Asia. Rather than coming as a surprise, war in Vietnam had loomed as an ever-growing possibility. Although the ultimate nature of the American commitment would remain in doubt for a while longer, the Army already had given considerable thought to developing the organization, doctrine, and equipment it would need to engage in combat there. Although some aspects of the Vietnam War would expose shortcomings in the Army's understanding of the conflict, the service had anticipated that it would be a different kind of war and had undertaken significant change in an effort to prepare for it.

Contemporary military leaders might take some comfort in the Army's demonstrated ability to adapt to the evolutions and revolutions within the society it serves. In many ways, the circumstances facing the U.S. armed forces in the post-Korean War period mirror those faced by the Army in

the early twenty-first century. In both periods, emerging technologies and a wide range of potential contingencies challenged military leaders to prepare their organizations for a different type of conflict, one that they were unable to predict with any degree of certainty. Although contemporary political leaders have proven to be far more willing to support defense spending than those in the Eisenhower administration, hefty increases in costs for both personnel and technology ensure that the services cannot receive all that they desire.

The U.S. Army of the 1950s and early 1960s coped with a period of extraordinary challenge for many reasons, but two stand out as particularly important. First, its senior leadership proved to be equal to the challenge. Matthew B. Ridgway, James M. Gavin, Maxwell Taylor, Hamilton H. Howze, and Lyman L. Lemnitzer demonstrated a stewardship of service throughout the decade every bit as effective as the combat leadership they had provided during World War II and the Korean War. In doing so, they ably represented the Army in testimony before Congress and throughout adversarial relationships with the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A second important factor was the service's embrace of emerging technologies. Contrary to the aforementioned aphorism, the Army seized upon each advance as a means to reinforce its position within the defense establishment. Even though the emphasis upon rockets, missiles, atomic weapons, and the helicopter in the Army's research and development efforts often precluded the replenishment and improvement of more traditional hardware, such focus forced Army leaders to contemplate future warfare rather than dwell on past success. They recognized that new technology was changing the nature of warfare and welcomed opportunities to incorporate it into the service's organization and doctrine.

The social, political, and economic upheavals of the early 1960s reinforced the notion that military conflict was evolving. When the Kennedy administration entered office prepared to push the armed services toward an emphasis on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, the Army was well positioned to move in that direction. It most definitely had not spent the past decade preparing to fight the previous war.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ATFA-1	Atomic Field Army
CONARC	U.S. Continental Army Command
G-1	Army personnel
G-2	Army intelligence
G-3	Army operations
G-4	Army logistics
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
LAW	light antitank weapon
MAAG	military assistance advisory group
MACV	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAN	Modern Army Needs
MOMAR	modern mobile Army
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
PENTANA	pentagonal atomic-nonatomic
POW	prisoner of war
RCA	Radio Corporation of America
Recondo	reconnaissance and commando
ROAD	Reorganization Objective Army Division
ROCAD	Reorganization of the Current Armored Division
ROCID	Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROTAD	Reorganization of the Airborne Division
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
STRAC	Strategic Army Corps
STRAF	Strategic Army Forces
STRICOM	U.S. Strike Command
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe

CHART ABBREVIATIONS

ADMIN	administration
ARMD	armored
ARTY	artillery
ASA	assistant secretary of the Army
AVN	aviation
BDE	brigade
BN	battalion
BTRY	battery
CAV	cavalry
CMD	command
CO	company
COMP	composite
DCS	deputy chief of staff
DET	detachment
DIV	division
ENG	engineer
FA	field artillery
GEN	general
GP	group
HH & SV CO	headquarters, headquarters and service company
HHB	headquarters and headquarters battery
HHC	headquarters and headquarters company
HHd	headquarters and headquarters detachment
HOW	howitzer
HQ	headquarters
INF	infantry
MAINT	maintenance
MECH	mechanized
MED	medical
MOMAR	modern mobile Army
MP	military police
MTR	motorized
ORD	ordnance
PERS	personnel
QM	quartermaster
RECON	reconnaissance

ROAD	Reorganization Objective Army Division
ROCAD	Reorganization of the Current Armored Division
ROCID	Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division
ROTAD	Reorganization of the Airborne Division
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SIG	signal
SP	self-propelled
SPT	support
SQDN	squadron
SV	service
TRANS	transportation
TRP	troop

GENERAL MAP SYMBOLS

Forest	
Sand	
Swamp/Marsh	
Inundation/Flooding	
Country Capitol	
Provincial/State Capitol	
City/Town	
Built up Area	
Airport/Airbase	
Oil Well	
River	
Primary Road	
Secondary Road	
Tertiary Road	
Trail	
Railroad (single track)	
Railroad (multi-track)	
International Boundary	
Provincial/State Boundary	
District/County Boundary	

INDEX

Note: Page numbers in italics refer to graphics and captions.

\$64,000 Question, The, 179

Aberdeen Proving Ground, 297

Active Army, 42, 81, 130–33, 131n95,
176, 213, 244, 253, 280, 286, 325, 331,
374n57, 394, 397, 405, 405n30, 413n48

ACS. *See* assistant chief of staff.

Adams, General Paul D., 71, 106, 109,
256, 258, 375–77, 376, 392–93, 443.
See also assistant chief of staff, G–3
(operations).

Adjutant General's Office, 16, 32, 56, 102,
177, 212, 287, 302, 381, 411, 430. *See
also* Bergin, Maj. Gen. William E.;
Reckord, Maj. Gen. Milton A.; Rich,
Maj. Gen. Maxwell E.

Adjutant General's School, 302

Adler, Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs, 40, 42

Adler Committee. *See* National Security
Training Commission.

advanced individual training, 282, 373, 413

Advanced Research Projects Agency, 260,
263, 459

Advisory Committee on Army
Organization, 28

aerial artillery battery, 1st. *See* artillery
units.

aerial refueling wings, 369

aerocycle, 162

Afghanistan, 222

Africa, 119, 144, 180, 182–83, 185, 210,
221–22, 276, 345, 385–86, 467

Ailes, Stephen, 353, 415. *See also*
undersecretary of the Army.

air assault, 63, 118, 148, 396–97, 440–41,
442, 443, 446, 448, 463

air assault divisions. *See* divisions.

air bases, 147, 182, 257, 329

air cavalry, 259, 378, 391, 396–97, 441. *See
also* cavalry regiments and companies;
divisions; sky cavalry; U.S. Cavalry.

Air Corps. *See* U.S. Army Air Corps.

Air Defense Command. *See* Air Force
units, Air Def Cmd; commands,
U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air Def Cmd;
commands, unified, Continental
Air Def Cmd; North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD).

air defense units. *See* artillery units.

Air Force bases

Eglin, 255

Ent, 76

Gary. *See* camps, Gary.

Homestead, 421

Langley, 298

MacDill, 375, 421

Opa-locka, 418

Patrick, 421

Pope, 182

Wolters. *See* camps, Wolters.

Air Force chief of staff, 150, 192–93, 317.

See also Air Force vice chief of staff;
service chiefs; Twining, General
Nathan F.; Vandenberg, General Hoyt
S.; White, General Thomas D.

Air Force Tactical Air Command. *See* Air
Force units, Tactical Air Cmd.

Air Force units. *See also* U.S. Air Force.

9th Air Force, 443

12th Air Force, 443

19th Air Force, 375

314th Troop Carrier Wing, 214

Air Def Cmd, 76

Tactical Air Cmd, 116–17, 181, 214, 298,
375

Research and Development Cmd, 310,
319

Air Force vice chief of staff, 19, 193. *See
also* Air Force chief of staff.

air interceptor missiles. *See* missiles.

Air National Guard, 374, 376. *See also*
National Guard.

air transport, 115, 118–19, 164, 174, 208,
220, 256, 321, 393, 396, 397, 443.

See also commands, U.S. Army, Mil

Air Transport Cmd; Military Air

Transport Service; U.S. Air Force, Mil

Air Transport Service.

Air Transport Brigade, 10th, 441

airborne battle groups. *See* infantry
regiments and battle groups.

Airborne Brigade, 173d, 435

airborne divisions. *See* divisions.

airborne infantry regiments. *See* infantry
regiments and battle groups.

aircraft. *See also* aerial refueling wings;
aerocycle; fixed-wing aircraft; rotary-
wing aircraft.

AC–1 Caribou, 299, 397, 398

AO–1 Mohawk, 299, 397

B–47 bomber, 369

B–52 bomber, 447

aircraft—*Continued*

C-118, 329
 C-119, 90, 118
 C-121, 329
 C-123, 118, 293, 328
 C-124, 63, 118, 256, 329, 438
 C-130, 119, 149, 328
 C-133, 329
 CH-1 Chinook. *See* CH-47 Chinook.
 CH-21, 461
 CH-34 Choctaw, 441
 CH-47 Chinook, 299, 301, 397, 446
 CH-54 Sky Crane, 160, 299, 397
 DHC-4 Caribou, 160
 Flying Crane. *See* CH-54 Sky Crane.
 H-13 Sioux, 73
 H-19 Chickasaw, 73, 159, 159
 H-21 Shawnee, 384
 H-34 Choctaw, 159, 161
 H-40 Iroquois. *See* UH-1 Iroquois.
 HC-1B Chinook. *See* CH-47 Chinook.
 HU-1. *See* UH-1 Iroquois.
 OH-6 Cayuse, 397
 OV-1, 397
 U-1A Otter, 384
 U-2, 362
 UH-1 Iroquois, 159, 299, 299, 299n60, 300, 385, 397, 430, 446, 460
 UH-1B. *See* UH-1 Iroquois.
 XH-40 Iroquois. *See* UH-1 Iroquois.
 air-defense missiles. *See* missiles.
 airmobility, 298, 396, 399, 425, 440, 443, 466
 airplanes. *See* aircraft.
 Ajax missile. *See* artillery units, 202d Arty, 1st Missile Bn (Ajax); missiles, Ajax.
 AK47. *See* rifles, AK47.
 Alabama, 10, 72-73, 106-7, 107, 152, 156, 189, 260, 262-63, 415, 453
 Alaska, 8, 50, 59, 76, 82, 104-5, 176, 196, 235, 244, 281, 293, 324, 327, 342, 367, 435
 Alaskan Command. *See* commands, unified, Alaskan Cmd.
 Algeria, 144
 Allied Expeditionary Force, 75, 95
 Allied Forces, 1n1, 58, 267, 273, 276, 375
 American Helicopter Society, 158
 American Legion, 54
 American Ordnance Association, 28
 American Revolution. *See* Revolutionary War.
 ammunition. *See also* artillery pieces.
 7.62-mm. NATO cartridge, 161
 105-mm. tank ammunition, 378
 Anchor Hill, 6
 antiaircraft missiles. *See* missiles.

antimissile missiles. *See* missiles.
 antipersonnel mine. *See* mine, M18
 Claymore antipersonnel.
 antitank missiles. *See* missiles.
 Ấp Bắc, 459-60, 460n56
 Apollo program, 416
 AR15. *See* rifles, AR15.
 Archibald, Sgt. Gene L., 12
 area-defense missiles. *See* missiles.
 Arizona, 379, 411
 Arkansas, 10, 50, 60, 133, 192, 199, 213-14, 281, 453
 Arkansas National Guard, 214
 Arlington National Cemetery, 461, 462
 Armalite, 447
 Armed Forces Code of Conduct, 56, 140
 Armed Forces Information and Education.
 See Office of Armed Forces
 Information and Education.
 Armed Forces Policy Council, 36, 150, 152
 Armed Forces Qualification Test, 127, 223
 Armed Services Committee. *See* House
 Armed Services Committee; Senate
 Armed Services Committee.
 armies
 First Army, 9, 82
 Second Army, 9, 54, 82
 Third U.S. Army, 9, 82, 107, 120n65, 240, 255, 317, 375, 418, 429
 Fourth Army, 9, 66, 82, 107, 420
 Fifth Army, 9, 82, 276
 Sixth U.S. Army, 9, 20, 82, 277, 373
 Seventh Army, 2, 7, 12, 59, 75, 134, 139, 183, 202, 216, 219, 245, 257, 289, 318, 324, 367, 371, 377-78, 406-8, 429, 435, 437-38
 Eighth Army, 5-6, 8, 32, 96, 137, 219, 277, 339, 434
 Armor Center, 170
 Armor Conference, 251
 armored cavalry units. *See* cavalry
 regiments and companies. *See also*
 divisions; U.S. Cavalry.
 armored divisions. *See* divisions.
 armored personnel carriers. *See* personnel
 carriers.
 Armored School, 66
 armored units. *See also* divisions.
 4th Armd Gp, 435
 68th Armd, 250
 194th Armd Bde, 435
 Army Air Corps. *See* U.S. Army Air Corps.
 Army Atomic Weapons Center, 26
 Army Audit Agency. *See* U.S. Army Audit
 Agency.

- Army Aviation, 72, 119, 152–53, 158, 298, 379, 395, 460
 School, 72–73, 259
 Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 189, 261–64, 302, 466. *See also* commands, U.S. Army, Army Ballistic Missile Cmd.
 Army Ballistic Missile Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Army Ballistic Missile Cmd.
 Army Band. *See* United States Army Band. *See also* bands.
 Army Chemical Center, 252
 Army chief of staff. *See* chief of staff of the Army.
 Army Chorus, 178–79
 Army Command and General Staff College. *See* U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
 Army Commanders' Conference, 179, 298
 Army commands. *See* commands, U.S. Army.
 Army Corps of Engineers, 416
 Army Department. *See* Department of the Army.
 Army Field Band, 178. *See also* bands.
 Army Field Forces, 9, 26, 28, 62, 64–66, 69–72, 81, 102
 Combat Developments Section, 70
 HQ, 66, 69
 Army Functional Files System, 303
 Army General Staff. *See* General Staff.
 “Army Goes Rolling Along, The,” 177
 Army Ground Forces, 148, 168
 HQ, 29
 Army Group North, 237–38
Army Hour, The, 170, 466
 Army Infantry Center. *See* U.S. Army Infantry Center.
Army Information Digest, 331
 Army Intelligence and Security branch, 405
 Army Intelligence Staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G–2 (intelligence).
 Army Logistics Staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff (logistics).
 Army Management Improvement Plan, 301
 Army Materiel Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Army Materiel Cmd.
 Army National Guard, 3, 50, 105, 286, 331, 333, 394
 Army Operations Staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations).
 Army Ordnance Corps. *See* U.S. Army Ordnance Corps.
 Army Ordnance Missile Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Army Ordnance Missile Cmd.
 Army Personnel Staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G–1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff (personnel).
 Army Policy Council, 210
 Army Ranger School. *See* U.S. Army Ranger School.
 Army Rangers. *See* U.S. Army Rangers.
 Army Research and Development Board, 319
 Army Research Office, 302
 Army Reserve, 3, 12, 40–42, 50, 87, 105, 132, 287, 329, 331, 333, 334, 412, 422, 454–55. *See also* General Reserve; Immediate Reserve; Ready Reserve; Reinforcing Reserve; Retired Reserve; Standby Reserve
 Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency, 262
 Army Security Agency, 383, 386, 405
 Army Service Forces, 28
 Army Special Warfare Center and School. *See* U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School.
 Army Staff, 20, 23–24, 27–29, 39, 48, 53, 59, 77, 80–81, 82, 83, 90, 93, 98, 100–3, 106, 109, 121, 127–28, 137–38, 142, 155, 164–65, 167–68, 170, 173, 177, 179, 182–83, 186, 209, 212, 217, 220, 222, 240–41, 248, 251–54, 274, 277–78, 280–82, 287–88, 290, 295, 302, 306–8, 314, 319–20, 322, 326–27, 330, 334, 342, 358, 366, 374, 391, 394, 399–401, 402, 404–5, 409, 413, 424–25, 437, 441, 453, 455–56
 Army Strategic Capabilities Plan, 181, 217
 Army Strategic Objectives Plan
 1957, 132
 1959, 215
 Army Strategic Task Force, 106
 Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (Howze Board), 395–98, 425–26, 440–41, 442, 443, 446, 466
 Army Task Force, 418
 Army Test and Evaluation Agency, 401
Army Times, 36, 50, 60, 81, 118, 123, 155, 194, 222, 247, 316, 352, 407
 Army Training Plan, 203
 Army Training Test, 391
 Army Transportation Corps, 158
 Army Troop Program. *See* Troop Program.
 Army War College. *See* National War College; U.S. Army War College.
 Article 15. *See* Uniform Code of Military Justice.

artillery groups. *See* artillery units.

artillery pieces

155-mm., 63, 110, 167, 169, 170, 171,
245, 248, 268, 291–92, 364, 365,
446–47

240-mm., 268

280-mm., 25, 25–26, 114–15, 220, 237

8-inch, 111, 168–70, 171, 245, 248, 268,
364, 365, 372, 378, 446–47

M102, 378

M109, 446

M110, 378, 446

artillery units

1st Aerial Arty Btry (Provisional), 441

13th Arty Gp (Air Def)

HQ and HQ Btry, 421

15th Arty

8th Bn (Hawk), 421

15th Field Arty

3d Bn, 329

39th Field Arty Bn, 25

41st Field Arty

3d Bn, 372

52d Arty

2d Bn (Nike Hercules), 421

2d Missile Bn, 206

52d Arty Gp, 418

54th Arty Gp, 418

65th Arty

6th Bn (Hawk Missile), 420

6th Missile Bn, 208

71st Arty (Nike Hercules)

2d Missile Bn, 268

202d Arty

1st Missile Bn (Ajax), 12

222d Field Arty

2d Bn, 329

540th Field Arty Bn, 63

ASA. *See* assistant secretary of the Army.

assistant chief of staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G–1 (personnel); assistant chief of staff, G–2 (intelligence); assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics); assistant chief of staff (reserve components); assistant chief of staff and J–3 (Joint Staff operations) for STRICOM; assistant chief of staff for plans. *See also* chief of staff of the Army; deputy chief of staff.

assistant chief of staff (reserve components), 203, 254, 402

assistant chief of staff, G–1 (personnel), 16, 20n16, 37–39, 56, 80, 85, 102, 104, 127, 177. *See also* Booth, Lt. Gen. Donald P.; deputy chief of staff (personnel); Powell, General Herbert B.; Sherburne,

Maj. Gen. Thomas L.; Young, Maj.

Gen. Robert N.

assistant chief of staff, G–2 (intelligence), 16, 20n16, 35, 95, 102–3, 182, 254, 318, 402, 405, 417. *See also* deputy assistant chief of staff (intelligence); Fitch, Maj. Gen. Alvah R.; Partridge, Maj. Gen. Richard C.

assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations), 16, 20, 20n16, 30, 34, 41, 47, 52, 69–72, 91, 94, 102, 105, 109, 118–19, 121, 137, 164, 376. *See also* Adams, General Paul D.; Box, Brig. Gen. Clyde; deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); deputy chief of staff (operations and administration); deputy chief of staff (plans); deputy chief of staff (plans and operations); deputy chief of staff (plans and research); deputy chief of staff (plans, programs, and systems); deputy chief of staff (research and development); Eddleman, General Clyde D.; Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M.; Hamlett, General Barksdale, Jr.; Harkins, General Paul D.; von Kann, Maj. Gen. Clifton F.

assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics), 16, 20n16, 80–81, 376. *See also* deputy chief of staff (logistics); Neely, Brig. Gen. Robert B.; Palmer, General Williston B.

assistant chief of staff and J–3 (Joint Staff operations) for STRICOM, 395. *See also* von Kann, Maj. Gen. Clifton F.

assistant chief of staff for plans, 376. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations).

assistant secretary of the Army. *See also* Milton, Hugh M., III; Roderick, George H.; secretary of the Army; Slezak, John; undersecretary of the Army.

finance and comptroller, 319

logistics, 319

materiel, 48

manpower and reserve forces, 80, 127, 140, 224

assistant secretary of defense, 140. *See also* deputy assistant secretary of defense; deputy secretary of defense; secretary of defense; undersecretary of defense; U.S. Department of Defense.

legislative affairs, 113

manpower and personnel, 23, 57, 86, 101, 381

- research and development, 120. *See also* chief of research and development.
- Association of the United States Army, 61, 125, 162, 264
- ATFA-1. *See* Atomic Field Army (ATFA-1).
- ATFA-1 divisions. *See* divisions, ATFA-1 Inf Div.
- Atlanta General Depot, 326
- Atlantic Command. *See* commands, unified, Atlantic Cmd.
- Atlas missile. *See* missiles, Atlas.
- Atomic Energy Commission, 111, 205, 326, 417
- Atomic Field Army (ATFA-1), 65, 67, 68, 106-7, 110-11, 113, 115, 164-65. *See also* divisions, ATFA-1 Inf Div.
- atomic projectile. *See* Davy Crockett weapon system.
- AUSA. *See* Association of the United States Army.
- Australia, 268
- Austria, 276, 362, 368
- automatic rifles. *See* rifles.
- Axis forces, 276
- Bad Tölz, 74, 215
- Baghdad Pact, 175, 183, 222
- Baker Hill, 106
- Baldwin, Hanson W., 46, 94, 235
- Ballentine, Admiral John J., 157
- ballistic missiles. *See* missiles.
- Baltimore, 327
- Baltimore Sun*, 387
- bands, 165, 166, 169, 171, 364, 365
Army Field Band, 178
regimental bands, 38-39
United States Army Band, 350
- Bangkok, 307
- Bank, Col. Aaron, 74, 74
- Barney, Maj. Gen. Keith R., 199
- basic combat training, 413
- Batista, Fulgencio, 344, 358
- battalions. *See* artillery units; military police (MP) units; signal battalions; Tank Battalion, 723d.
- battle groups. *See* infantry regiments and battle groups.
- Bay of Pigs, 359-61, 389, 421
- Beach, Brig. Gen. Dwight E., 158
- Beirut, 258
- Belgium, 345
- Bell. *See also* aircraft.
Aerosystem Company, 163
Helicopter, 159
Telephone Laboratories, 260
- Bell helicopters. *See* aircraft.
- Bergin, Maj. Gen. William E., 32, 56. *See also* Adjutant General's Office.
- Berlin, 90, 96, 267, 273, 344, 362-63, 368, 371, 380, 389-91, 394, 405-6, 408, 422, 434, 467. *See also* Berlin Brigade; East Berlin; West Berlin.
Brigade, 371, 435
Crisis, 368-74, 387, 391, 406-7, 451, 454, 467
Wall, 362-63, 371, 405, 454
- Besson, Maj. Gen. Frank S., Jr., 401
- Biên Hòa, 304, 340
- Big Picture, The*, 27, 170, 178, 466
- Billingslea, Brig. Gen. Charles, 415
- Birmingham, 453
- Blueprint of the Army in the Period 1958-1961*, 210
- Boeing helicopters. *See* aircraft.
- Boland, Brig. Gen. Francis H., Jr., 212
- Bolte, General Charles L., 20, 54, 81. *See also* vice chief of staff of the Army.
- Bomarc missile. *See* missiles, Bomarc.
- bombers. *See* aircraft.
- Bonesteel, Maj. Gen. Charles H., III, 106
- Booth, Lt. Gen. Donald P., 127, 177, 203, 223-24, 226. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff (personnel)
- Bork, Brig. Gen. Lester S., 268
- Box, Brig. Gen. Clyde, 376. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations).
- Boy Scouts, 55, 57
- Bradley, General Omar N., 17, 18, 21, 23, 331, 332. *See also* chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; chief of staff of the Army; general of the Army.
- Brazil, 327-28
- Breckinridge, Maj. Gen. William M., 212
- Bremerhaven, 258
- Brigade, Berlin. *See* Berlin, Brigade.
- Britain, 144, 180, 182, 205, 268
- British Commando School, 294
- Broger, John C., 228
- Bronze Star, 353
- Brown, Harold, 352-53
- Browning automatic rifle. *See* rifles, Browning automatic.
- Brucker, Wilber M., 93, 98, 99, 101-2, 117, 125, 131-32, 142, 144, 151, 155, 158, 172, 177, 179, 192, 199, 201, 214, 216, 222, 224-25, 240, 242, 260, 277, 279, 281, 285-88, 312, 316, 319-20, 330, 332, 332-33, 353. *See also* general counsel; secretary of the Army.
- Buis, Maj. Dale R., 304
- Bullock, Brig. Gen. William C., 33, 138

- Bundy, McGeorge, 384, 458. *See also* national security adviser.
- Bunker Hill, 6
- Burgess, Carter L., 140. *See also* assistant secretary of defense.
- Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., 233, 234, 310, 345, 360
- Burma, 353
- Business Advisory Council, 20
- Butts Army Airfield, 445
- “Caisson Song, The,” 177
- California, 59, 132, 194, 196, 204, 212, 245, 255, 262–63, 327, 352, 404, 413, 435
- Institute of Technology, 79, 263
- Cambodia, 92, 185, 269, 338, 428
- camps
- Atterbury, 10, 133
 - Bowie, 413
 - Chaffee, 50, 60. *See also* forts, Chaffee.
 - Chanson, 137
 - David, 273
 - Desert Rock, 111
 - Gary, 72, 172
 - Kilmer, 50, 413
 - Mackall, 63
 - Polk, 113, 133. *See also* forts, Polk.
 - Roberts, 204
 - Rucker, 10, 72–73, 107
 - Wolters, 172, 199
- Canal Zone. *See* Panama Canal Zone.
- Canham, Maj. Gen. Charles D. W., 114–15
- cannons. *See* artillery pieces.
- Cape Canaveral, 261, 262, 416
- Caraway, Maj. Gen. Paul W., 88, 94
- Career Incentive Act, 126
- Caribbean, 50, 104–5, 281, 324, 327, 358
- Caribbean Command. *See* commands, unified, U.S. Caribbean Cmd.
- Caribou. *See* aircraft, AC–1 Caribou; aircraft, DHC–4 Caribou.
- Carney, Admiral Robert B., 19, 21, 94, 96
- Carolina Maneuver Area, 62
- cartridges. *See* ammunition.
- Castro, Fidel, 344, 358
- cavalry divisions. *See* divisions. *See also* U.S. Cavalry.
- cavalry regiments and companies. *See also* air cavalry; divisions; sky cavalry; U.S. Cavalry.
- 3d Armd Cav Rgt, 62, 350, 350, 371, 406, 438
 - 6th Armd Cav Rgt
 - Co E, 61
 - 11th Armd Cav Rgt, 113
- Cayuse. *See* aircraft, OH–6 Cayuse.
- Central America, 135, 389, 467
- Central Intelligence Agency, 205, 306–7, 358–60, 417, 458
- chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17, 17–18, 23, 25, 46–48, 89, 100, 106, 123, 145–46, 175, 191–92, 228, 232, 235, 311–13, 331, 344, 351, 357, 359. *See also* Bradley, General Omar N.; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Staff; Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.; Radford, Admiral Arthur W.; Twining, General Nathan F.
- Chase, Maj. Gen. William C., 135
- Checkpoint Charlie, 405, 405n31
- Chickasaw. *See* aircraft, H–19 Chickasaw.
- Chidlaw, General Benjamin W., 76
- Chief (cavalry horse), 57
- chief of Army Field Forces, 9, 16, 26, 28, 71, 102. *See also* Army Field Forces.
- chief of the Army Reserve, 334, 455
- chief of information, 16, 26–27, 34, 53, 55, 102, 123, 125, 143, 168, 178, 254, 402, 454. *See also* chief of public information; Meloy, General Guy S.; Mudgett, Maj. Gen. Gilman C.; Parks, Maj. Gen. Floyd L.; public information.
- chief of legislative liaison, 16, 27, 54, 82, 170, 179, 402. *See also* Hauck, Brig. Gen. Clarence J., Jr.; legislative liaison; Michaelis, Maj. Gen. John H.; Reber, Maj. Gen. Miles.
- chief of military history, 16, 102, 168, 177
- chief of naval operations, 19, 94, 96, 234, 310, 345. *See also* Burke, Admiral Arleigh A.; Carney, Admiral Robert B.; Fechteler, Admiral William M.; service chiefs.
- chief of public information, 82, 152, 402. *See also* chief of information; public information.
- chief of psychological warfare, 30, 33, 73–75, 102, 138. *See also* psychological warfare.
- chief of research and development, 101–2, 202, 204, 264, 302, 319–20. *See also* Air Force units, Research and Development Cmd; Army Research and Development Board; assistant secretary of defense, research and development; deputy chief of staff (research and development); Research and Development Command.
- chief of staff of the Air Force. *See* Air Force chief of staff.
- chief of staff of the Army, 16, 18, 20, 22–24, 27, 31, 34, 38–39, 43, 48, 50, 54, 63, 69, 72, 79, 81, 82, 84–85, 93, 95, 97, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 118–19, 143, 145, 158, 164–65, 167, 170, 172, 175,

- 179, 212, 238, 247, 249, 253, 262, 266, 270, 275–76, 277, 284, 289, 295, 302–3, 310–11, 312, 313, 317, 319–20, 322, 330, 333–34, 354, 366, 373, 377, 383–84, 390, 394, 399–400, 402, 403, 417, 424, 427, 429, 436, 440, 456, 458. *See also* assistant chief of staff; Bradley, General Omar N.; Collins, General J. Lawton; Decker, General George H.; deputy chief of staff; Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.; Ridgway, General Matthew B.; service chiefs; Taylor, General Maxwell D.; vice chief of staff of the Army; Wheeler, General Earle G.
- China, 1, 7, 29, 69, 122, 135, 145, 267, 296, 338–39, 353, 387, 394
- Chinese Nationalist forces, 181, 267–68
- Chinook. *See* aircraft, CH–47 Chinook.
- Choctaw. *See* aircraft, CH–34 Choctaw; aircraft, H–34 Choctaw.
- Ch'örwön Valley, 6
- Chrysler, 332
- Churchill, Winston, 144
- CIA. *See* Central Intelligence Agency.
- civil guard and self-defense forces, 385, 429
- civil rights, 121n95, 381, 452–54
- civil rights, deputy assistant secretary of defense for. *See* deputy assistant secretary of defense, civil rights.
- Civil War, 452
- CJCS. *See* chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Clark, General Mark W., 2, 276
- Clarke, General Bruce C., 245, 246, 289–90, 316, 320, 332, 363, 370–71, 377, 408–9, 435, 456. *See also* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), commanding general; U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), commanding general.
- Clarke, Maj. Gen. Christian H., Jr., 284
- Clausewitz, Carl von, 210
- Clifton, Brig. Gen. Chester V., 351, 390
- Code of Conduct. *See* Armed Forces Code of Conduct.
- Cohn, Roy M., 51
- Cold War, 3, 29–30, 35, 40, 73, 222, 228, 243, 266, 296, 309–11, 338, 394, 405–6, 417, 424, 428, 455
- Colglazier, Lt. Gen. Robert W., 437. *See also* deputy chief of staff (logistics).
- College Press Conference, 179
- Collier, Lt. Gen. John H., 117
- Collins, Lt. Gen. James F., 241, 286, 336. *See also* deputy chief of staff (personnel).
- Collins, General J. Lawton, 18, 21, 31, 136, 331. *See also* chief of staff of the Army.
- Colombia, 327–28, 385
- Colorado, 59, 76, 178, 192, 199, 239–40, 281, 326, 374, 391, 445
- Colorado Springs, 76
- Colt Firearms Company, 448
- Columbia Broadcasting System, 279
- Columbia University, 353
- Combat Arms Regimental System, 201
- combat commands
- Combat Cmd A, 374, 391
 - Combat Cmd C, 108
- Combat Development Experimentation Center, 204, 245, 404
- Combat Development Test Center, 383, 459
- Combat Developments Command, 404, 447
- Combat Developments Group, 614. *See also* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), CONARC Combat Developments Group.
- combat developments groups, 26, 404. *See also* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), CONARC Combat Developments Group.
- Combat Developments Office, 298
- Combat Developments Section. *See* Army Field Forces, Combat Developments Section.
- Command and General Staff College. *See* U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
- Commanders' Conference. *See* Army Commanders' Conference.
- commands, U.S. Army
- 1st Logistical Cmd, 254
 - 1st U.S. Army Missile Cmd, 209
 - 2d Logistical Cmd, 418
 - 2d U.S. Army Missile Cmd, 209
 - 4th U.S. Army Missile Cmd, 270
 - 9th Logistical Cmd, 339–40
 - Army Ballistic Missile Cmd, 156, 205, 300. *See also* Army Ballistic Missile Agency.
 - Army Materiel Cmd, 401, 403, 404, 447, 453
 - Army Ord Missile Cmd, 260–61, 302
 - Combat Developments Cmd. *See* Combat Developments Command.
 - Communications and Electronics Cmd, 401
 - Far East Cmd, 75, 96, 174, 219
 - General Equipment Cmd, 401

- commands, U.S. Army—*Continued*
 Material Development and Logistic Cmd (MDLC), 400–1
 Mil Air Transport Cmd, 181, 329
 Missile Cmd, 401
 Munitions Cmd, 401
 Northern Area Cmd, 256
 Ord Tank-Automotive Cmd, 401
 Peninsula Base Cmd, 418, 420
 Southern Area Cmd, 61
 Supply and Maintenance Cmd, 401
 Taiwan Def Cmd, 268
 U.S. Army Air Def Cmd, 209, 313, 394. *See also* commands, unified, Continental Air Def Cmd.
 U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Cmd, 9, 76
 U.S. Army Caribbean Cmd, 8, 327, 367–68
 U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Cmd, 219
 U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), 16, 29, 81, 82, 83, 103, 110, 114–17, 125, 142, 164–65, 167, 170, 174, 177, 181–83, 199, 203–4, 209, 213–14, 244–45, 247, 254–55, 289–90, 298, 317–18, 320–21, 327, 329, 357, 364, 366, 373, 376, 394, 404, 417–18, 421–23, 425, 441, 456
 Arty Section, 209
 commanding general, 103, 181, 204, 247, 255, 289, 364, 376, 394, 417–18, 456. *See also* Clarke, General Bruce C.; Dahlquist, General John E.; Powell, General Herbert B.; Wyman, General Willard G.
 CONARC Combat Developments Group, 164. *See also* Combat Developments Group; combat developments groups.
 HQ, 83, 102, 109–10, 393
 U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Thailand, 430
 U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Vietnam (MACV), 429–30, 430n91, 457, 459–60
 Weapons and Mobility Cmd, 401
 commands, unified
 Alaskan Cmd, 235
 Atlantic Cmd, 235, 417–18
 Continental Air Def Cmd, 76, 119, 154, 225, 235, 280, 313, 421. *See also* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air Def Cmd.
 Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Cmd, 235
 Strategic Air Cmd, 22, 148, 151, 205, 235, 310, 326
 U.S. Caribbean Cmd, 235
 U.S. European Cmd, 75, 134, 182–83, 235, 256–57, 266, 375, 410
 U.S. Pacific Cmd, 18, 219–20, 235, 270, 278, 304, 306, 347, 429, 431
 U.S. Strike Cmd (STRICOM), 375–76, 392–93, 395, 443
 Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, 415, 451
 Committee for Non-Violent Action, 417
 Communications and Electronics Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Communications and Electronics Cmd.
 Communications Zone. *See* U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), Communications Zone.
 communism, 1, 7, 29–35, 51, 88, 91–92, 100, 106, 122, 135, 138–41, 144–45, 180, 183, 187, 221, 228, 256, 267–69, 274, 294, 296, 304, 306, 327, 337–39, 344–45, 347, 351–52, 359, 361, 363, 368, 382, 384, 387, 389, 394, 424, 430–31, 434, 463, 467–68
 comptroller of the Army, 16, 49, 82, 254, 277, 301–2, 311, 402. *See also* assistant secretary of the Army, finance and comptroller; comptroller general; Decker, George H.
 comptroller general, 82, 303. *See also* comptroller of the Army.
 CONARC. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC).
 CONARC Combat Developments Group. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), CONARC Combat Developments Group.
 CONARC Commanding General. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), commanding general.
Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces in Paramilitary Operations, 424
 Congress. *See* U.S. Congress.
 Connecticut, 411
 Continental Air Defense Command. *See* commands, unified, Continental Air Def Cmd.
 Continental Army Command (CONARC). *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC).
 Continental Army Command Combat Developments Group. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), CONARC Combat Developments Group.

- Coordinating Committee on Atomic Energy, 158
- Coordinating Group. *See* Taylor, General Maxwell D.
- Cordiner, Ralph J., 226–27, 242
- Corporal missile. *See* missiles, Corporal.
- corps
 - I Corps, 6, 59, 104, 198, 324, 392, 434
 - III Corps, 59, 113, 198, 280, 287, 374, 376, 393
 - V Corps, 1, 59, 104, 196, 245, 322, 437
 - VII Corps, 59, 104, 196, 245, 277, 322, 437
 - IX Corps, 6, 59, 104, 219
 - X Corps, 6, 32, 59
 - XVI Corps, 6, 59
 - XVIII Abn Corps, 59, 106, 113, 181–82, 198, 254, 256, 258, 290, 307, 324, 329, 372, 376, 393, 395, 415, 417–18
- Corps of Cadets. *See* U.S. Military Academy, Corps of Cadets.
- counterforce, 356
- counterguerrilla operations, 314, 338, 342, 346–47. *See also* counterinsurgency operations; guerrilla warfare; insurgency.
- counterinsurgency operations, 138, 215, 271, 337, 342, 347, 385–86, 389, 391, 423–28, 430–31, 443, 463, 468–69. *See also* counterguerrilla operations; guerrilla warfare; insurgency.
- counterintelligence, 346, 429
- countervalue, 356
- Creasy, Maj. Gen. William A., 160–61
- Crisis, Berlin. *See* Berlin, Crisis.
- Critz, Maj. Gen. Harry H., 396
- cross-country logistical carrier, 150-ton, 251
- CSA. *See* chief of staff of the Army.
- Cuba, 327, 344–45, 348, 358–61, 363, 389, 394, 417–23, 454
- Cuba Study Group, 360
- Cuban Missile Crisis, 417–23, 454
- Czechoslovakia, 60–61, 144, 195
- Đà Lạt, 137
- Da Nang, 305, 340, 341
- DACOWITS. *See* Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services.
- Dahlquist, General John E., 62–64, 64, 69, 72, 103, 108, 114–15, 164, 167. *See also* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), commanding general.
- Daley, Lt. Gen. John P., 404
- Dallas, 461
- Dart missile. *See* missiles, Dart.
- Davidson, Lt. Gen. Garrison H., 367, 408
- Davidson Army Airfield, 301
- Davies, Paul L., 28
- Davies Committee, 28, 80
- Davies Plan, 80, 101
- Davy Crockett weapon system, 246, 259, 315, 407, 447. *See also* weapon systems.
- DCS. *See* deputy chief of staff.
- de Havilland DHC-4. *See* aircraft.
- Decker, General George H., 49, 266, 277, 311, 312, 313, 317, 326, 340, 354, 357, 364, 366–67, 379, 382, 384–85, 387, 390, 399, 405, 413. *See also* chief of staff of the Army; comptroller of the Army; vice chief of staff of the Army.
- Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 39
- Defense Department. *See* U.S. Department of Defense.
- Defense Mobilization. *See* Office of Defense Mobilization.
- Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 278, 357
- Defense Science Board, 251
- defense secretary. *See* secretary of defense.
- Delaware, 411
- Dennison, Admiral Robert L., 417–18
- Department of the Army, 16, 28, 80, 95, 103, 125, 139, 223, 255, 258, 270, 278, 283, 302–3, 307, 317, 339, 357–58, 381, 383, 400, 402, 403, 407, 434
- Department of the Army Pamphlet 1–10, *Improve Your Writing*, 302
- Department of Commerce. *See* U.S. Department of Commerce.
- Department of Defense. *See* U.S. Department of Defense.
- Department of the Navy, 313, 377
- Department of State. *See* State Department.
- Department of the Treasury, 85. *See also* secretary of the Treasury.
- deputy assistant secretary of defense. *See also* assistant secretary of defense; deputy secretary of defense; secretary of defense; undersecretary of defense; U.S. Department of Defense.
- applications engineering, 101. *See also* Martin, William H.
- civil rights, 452
- special operations, 337
- deputy assistant chief of staff (intelligence), 35
- deputy chief of staff. *See* deputy assistant chief of staff (intelligence); deputy chief of staff (administration); deputy chief of staff (forces); deputy chief of staff (logistics); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations and administration);

deputy chief of staff—*Continued*

- deputy chief of staff (operations);
- deputy chief of staff (personnel);
- deputy chief of staff (plans and operations); deputy chief of staff (plans and research); deputy chief of staff (plans); deputy chief of staff (plans, programs, and systems); deputy chief of staff (public affairs); deputy chief of staff (research and development); deputy chief of staff (strategy and international affairs); *See also* assistant chief of staff; chief of staff of the Army.
- deputy chief of staff (administration), 16
- deputy chief of staff (forces), 404
- deputy chief of staff (logistics), 80–81, 82, 102, 183, 186–87, 254, 318–20, 326, 330, 402, 429, 437. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics); Colglazier; Lt. Gen. Robert W.; O'Neill, Maj. Gen. Edward J.
- deputy chief of staff (military operations), 102, 173, 186–87, 213, 215, 221, 247, 256, 302, 322, 334, 338, 366, 374, 393, 404, 436–37, 441. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); deputy chief of staff (operations and administration); deputy chief of staff (plans); deputy chief of staff (plans and operations); deputy chief of staff (plans and research); deputy chief of staff (plans, programs, and systems); deputy chief of staff (research and development); Eddleman, General Clyde D.; Hamlett, General Barksdale, Jr.; Johnson, Maj. Gen. Harold K.; Moore, Lt. Gen. James E.; Oakes, Lt. Gen. John C.; Parker, Lt. Gen. Theodore W.
- deputy chief of staff (operations), 39, 102, 158, 175, 181–82, 184, 195, 202–3, 253–54, 258, 266–68, 318, 321, 427. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations and administration); deputy chief of staff (plans); deputy chief of staff (plans and operations); deputy chief of staff (plans and research); deputy chief of staff (plans, programs, and systems); deputy chief of staff (research and development); Eddleman, General Clyde D.; Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.; Weible, General Walter L.
- deputy chief of staff (operations and administration), 71, 82, 83, 102, 103. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); Weible, General Walter L.
- deputy chief of staff (personnel), 102, 203, 223, 225, 241, 254, 286–87, 318, 336, 380, 386, 402, 413, 453. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–1 (personnel); Booth, Lt. Gen. Donald P.; chief of staff of the Army; Collins, Lt. Gen. James F.; Porter, Maj. Gen. Robert W., Jr.; Richardson, Lt. Gen. James L., Jr.; Vittrup, Lt. Gen. Russell L.
- deputy chief of staff (plans), 16, 102, 164. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); Eddleman, General Clyde D.; deputy chief of staff (plans and operations), 404. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations).
- deputy chief of staff (plans and research), 82, 101. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); chief of research and development; deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M.
- deputy chief of staff (plans, programs, and systems), 402. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations).
- deputy chief of staff (public affairs), 53
- deputy chief of staff (research and development), 202, 402. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); chief of research and development; deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); Wood, Maj. Gen. Robert J.
- deputy chief of staff (strategy and international affairs), 402
- deputy defense secretary. *See* deputy secretary of defense.
- deputy secretary of defense, 146, 153, 261, 264, 274, 352, 357, 385, 414. *See also* assistant secretary of defense; deputy assistant secretary of defense; Gates, Thomas S., Jr.; Gilpatric, Roswell L.; Kyes, Roger M.; Quarles, Donald A.;

- Robertson, Reuben H., Jr.; secretary of defense; undersecretary of defense; U.S. Department of Defense.
- Detroit, 401
- Deuce and a Half. *See* trucks, M35 2½-ton.
- DEW. *See* Distant Early Warning Line.
- Dick, Lt. Gen. William W., 394
- Dickenson, Cpl. Edward S., 56
- Diệm, Ngô Đình. *See* Ngô Đình Diệm.
- Điện Biên Phủ, 88–90, 136, 268
- director of installations. *See* Barney, Maj. Gen. Keith R.
- Disoway, Lt. Gen. Gabriel P., 397
- Distant Early Warning Line, 123
- divisions. *See also* Air Transport Brigade, 10th; Airborne Brigade, 173d; armored units, 194th Armd Bde; infantry brigades (nondivisional); Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division (ROCID).
- 1st Armd Div, 9, 10, 59, 106, 108, 113, 119, 164, 196, 197, 200–1, 374, 391–93, 418, 420, 422, 434
- 1st Cav Div, 1, 6, 59, 196, 198, 200, 200, 219, 324, 324, 434
- 1st Inf Div, 1–2, 11, 59, 104, 198–99, 201, 210, 212, 236, 253, 323, 324, 376, 392–93, 418, 420, 426
- 2d Armd Div, 1, 11, 59, 196, 198, 200, 218–19, 239, 298, 323, 324, 376, 392–93, 399, 437, 438, 438, 439
- 2d Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 196, 197, 239, 298, 317, 323, 324, 374, 376, 392–93, 409, 415, 418, 420, 426, 435, 443
- 3d Armd Div, 9, 10, 60, 172, 196, 198, 200, 322, 325, 438
- 3d Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 106, 107, 107, 110, 113, 164, 197, 198, 200, 322, 325, 350, 377, 424, 435
- 4th Armd Div, 59, 113, 196, 197, 198, 200, 322, 325
- 4th Inf Div, 10, 11, 59, 105, 172, 197, 198, 200, 212, 238, 254–56, 323, 324, 372, 376, 378, 392–93, 408, 426, 435, 437
- 5th Armd Div, 9, 10, 60, 105
- 5th Inf Div, 59, 172, 196, 204, 374, 391–93, 434, 443–44
- 6th Armd Div, 9, 10, 60, 105
- 6th Inf Div, 9, 10, 59, 105, 371
- 7th Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 198, 200, 200, 276, 324, 324, 434
- 8th Inf Div, 9, 10, 59, 172, 196, 198, 200, 322, 325, 377, 409–10, 434, 438
- 9th Inf Div, 9, 10, 59, 172, 197, 198–200, 239, 281, 323
- 10th Inf Div, 9, 10, 59, 104, 196, 198, 200, 204
- 11th Air Assault Div, 440, 443
- 11th Abn Div, 1, 9, 10, 59, 172, 183–84, 196, 198, 198–99, 276
- 23d Inf Div, 59, 105
- 24th Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 196, 200, 256–57, 322, 325, 361, 426, 434
- 25th Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 198–99, 220, 254, 268, 270, 307, 323, 324, 339, 426, 460
- 27th Inf Div, 132
- 28th Inf Div, 11, 11, 59
- 29th Inf Div, 287
- 30th Armd Div, 132
- 30th Inf Div, 132–33
- 31st Inf Div, 9, 10, 12, 59
- 32d Inf Div, 371, 373–74, 393
- 34th Inf Div, 20, 411
- 35th Inf Div, 411
- 37th Inf Div, 9, 10, 12, 59, 62
- 38th Inf Div, 133
- 39th Inf Div, 133
- 40th Armd Div, 132
- 40th Inf Div, 6, 12, 59, 132
- 41st Inf Div, 133
- 42d Inf Div, 98
- 43d Inf Div, 11, 12, 59, 411
- 44th Inf Div, 9, 10, 12, 59
- 45th Inf Div, 6, 12, 59
- 47th Inf Div, 9, 10, 12, 59
- 48th Armd Div, 132
- 48th Inf Div, 132
- 49th Armd Div, 133, 371, 373–74, 393
- 51st Inf Div, 133, 411
- 63d Inf Div, 399
- 69th Inf Div, 59, 105
- 71st Inf Div, 59, 105
- 79th Inf Div, 329, 411
- 82d Abn Div, 1, 9, 10, 59, 62, 113, 117, 182, 184, 197, 199–200, 210, 212–13, 238, 254, 293, 323, 324, 328–29, 374, 376, 392–93, 396, 418, 426, 443–44, 448
- 94th Inf Div, 411
- 96th Inf Div, 411
- 101st Abn Div, 59, 96, 105, 165, 197, 199, 201, 212–13, 238, 254–56, 293, 323, 324, 329, 371–72, 374, 376, 392–93, 418, 426, 443, 444, 444
- 103d Inf Div, 411
- ATFA–1 Inf Div, 110. *See also* Atomic Field Army (ATFA–1).
- Operations Div, 28
- Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts for Atomic Nonatomic Army during the Period 1960–1970. *See* PENTANA.
- Doctrine and Concepts Division, 314
- Dodge, Maj. Gen. Charles G., 416. *See also* chief of public information; public information.

- Dodge, Joseph M., 14
 Doolittle, Gen. James H., 37n61
 Doolittle Board, 37
 Douglas, Paul H., 240
 Douglas Aircraft Company, 260
 Douhet, Giulio, 120–21
 draft, the, 4, 35, 51, 87, 126, 128, 130–31, 284, 288, 336, 369, 451, 455, 467
 Duc Hoa, 459
 Dulles, Allen W., 205, 337, 358–60
 Dulles, John Foster, 90, 248–49, 274, 275.
See also secretary of state.
 Durbrow, Elbridge, 346
- East Africa. *See* Africa.
 East Berlin, 370. *See also* Berlin.
 East Germany, 195, 273, 344, 362, 368. *See also* Germany.
 Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command. *See* commands, unified, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Cmd.
 Eastern Europe, 144, 180, 195, 282, 296, 362
 Eddleman, General Clyde D., 20, 34, 155, 164, 168, 170, 179, 181, 212, 213–14, 221, 256–57, 266, 321–22, 354–55, 386, 423. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); deputy chief of staff (plans); vice chief of staff of the Army.
 Eddy, Lt. Gen. Manton S., 60
Effective Army Writing, 302
 Eglin Air Force Base. *See* Air Force bases, Eglin.
 Egypt, 144, 180, 183, 222
 Eighth Army. *See* armies, Eighth Army.
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2–3, 5, 13, 13–15, 17–25, 28, 30–31, 37–40, 43, 46–49, 51–52, 59, 75–76, 83, 89–100, 102, 105, 118, 120, 122–23, 128–30, 132, 136, 140, 142–48, 156, 172, 174–75, 177, 180–81, 183, 189–96, 199, 206, 209, 213–14, 221–22, 224–28, 231–36, 242–43, 252, 255–56, 258, 263–65, 267, 273–74, 276, 277–79, 294, 297, 301, 304, 308–16, 331, 332, 333, 336, 339, 342–45, 347, 349–53, 356–58, 368, 394, 406, 409–10, 422, 434, 450, 465–69. *See also* general of the Army; president of the United States.
 administration, 19, 20, 22–23, 31, 37, 46, 48, 50–52, 76, 83, 93–94, 96, 98, 102, 118, 129, 132, 142, 144–45, 176, 180, 189–92, 194, 224, 231, 236, 274, 279, 295, 297, 301, 309–11, 313, 336, 347, 358, 406, 434, 468–69
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 221–22
 Eliot, George Fielding, 60
 Ellender, Allen J., 281
 Ély, General Paul H. R., 89, 136
 English Channel, 195, 217
 Ent Air Force Base. *See* Air Force bases, Ent.
 Equal Rights section, 453
 European Command. *See* commands, unified, U.S. European Cmd.
 European Defense Community, 48
 European Reinforcement Troop List, 211
 European Theater of Operations, 144, 287
 exercises. *See also* Operation Plan
 SWAGGERSTICK; operations; projects; ROTAPLAN.
 BANYAN TREE, 293
 BANYAN TREE II, 327–28
 BIG SLAM/PUERTO PINE (joint exercise), 329
 BLUE BOLT, 66, 108, 110, 112–13
 CARIBOU CREEK, 293
 CARTE BLANCHE, 116
 DEEP FURROW, 376
 DESERT ROCK VI, 111, 112
 FLASHBURN, 62, 63
 FOLLOW ME, 66, 107, 108, 109, 112
 JUMP LIGHT, 201
 KING COLE, 201
 LION NOIR, 218
 LITTLE BEAR, 327, 328
 LONG THRUST, 371–72, 408, 438. *See also* operations, LONG THRUST II.
 ROCKY SHOALS, 255
 SABRE HAWK, 245, 249, 250
 SAGE BRUSH (joint exercise), 110, 112–13, 115–17, 120, 163–64
 SLEDGE HAMMER, 201
 SNOWFALL, 62
 SWIFT STRIKE, 374–75
 SWIFT STRIKE II, 445
 SWIFT STRIKE III, 437, 443, 444–45, 444
 WHITE CLOUD, 255
 WINTERSHIELD II, 408
 Explorer satellites. *See* satellites, Explorer 1; satellites, Explorer 3.
- Face the Nation*, 179, 194
 Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, 447
 Far East, 29, 48, 50, 103–4, 129, 134–35, 138, 144, 167, 172, 196, 248, 345, 433–34. *See also* commands, U.S. Army, Far East Cmd; U.S. Army Forces, Far East.
 Far East Broadcasting Company, 228

- Far East Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Far East Cmd.
- Farrell, General Frank W., 289
- Faubus, Orval E., 213–14
- FBI. *See* Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Fechtel, Admiral William M., 19, 21
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, 32
- Federal Housing Administration, 126
- Federal Records Centers, 302
- Federal Republic of Germany, 134. *See also* Germany.
- Felt, Admiral Harry D., 267–68, 305–6, 347, 429, 459
- Field Artillery School, 441
- field artillery units. *See* artillery units.
- Field Coordination Office, 189
- field manuals
- 100–5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations*, 62, 425
 - 21–20, *Physical Training*, 223
- Fifth Army. *See* armies, Fifth Army.
- finance, 16, 82, 311, 319, 369, 402
- finance and comptroller, assistant secretary of the Army for. *See* assistant secretary of the Army, finance and comptroller.
- Finletter, Thomas K., 3, 151, 155, 398. *See also* secretary of the Air Force.
- First Army. *See* armies, First Army.
- Fischer, Lt. Gen. Harvey H., 392
- Fitch, Maj. Gen. Alvah R., 417. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–2 (intelligence).
- Fitzsimons Army Hospital, 240
- fixed-wing aircraft, 71–73, 117, 148, 151, 153, 160, 172, 377, 384, 396–97, 456, 466. *See also* aircraft; rotary-wing aircraft.
- Fleming, Arthur S., 129
- Florida, 77, 118, 132–33, 152, 206, 208, 208, 255, 261, 262, 293, 375, 411, 416, 418, 420–22
- Florida Missile Test Range, 262
- Flying Crane. *See* aircraft, CH–54 Sky Crane.
- flying platform, 162, 162
- Fogle, Col. George C., 327
- Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation, 28
- Force Plan for 1957. *See* JCS 2101/113.
- Ford, Paul, 124
- Ford Motor Company, 344, 352, 354
- Foreign Military Affairs. *See* Office of Foreign Military Affairs.
- Formosa, 122, 135. *See also* Taiwan.
- Forrestal, Michael V., 458
- forts
- Belvoir, 301, 404
 - Benning, 59, 106–7, 170, 216, 227, 239, 294, 298, 326, 330, 332, 333, 409, 420, 435, 440
 - Bliss, 26, 152, 209, 259
 - Bragg, 59, 62, 73–75, 133, 183, 215, 255, 266, 293, 307, 326, 328, 346, 352, 372, 384, 386, 393, 395, 423, 427, 427, 431, 448
 - Campbell, 59, 105, 213–14, 276, 326
 - Carson, 59, 178, 192, 199, 239, 281, 326, 374, 391, 445
 - Chaffee, 10, 192, 199, 281. *See also* camps, Chaffee.
 - Devens, 374, 391
 - Dix, 59, 326
 - Douglas, 413
 - Eustis, 163
 - Gordon, 192, 199, 326
 - Greely, 293
 - Gulick, 386
 - Hood, 59, 106, 108, 113, 133, 196, 209, 213–14, 218, 239, 280, 298, 374, 391, 393, 420, 438
 - Hunter Liggett, 204
 - Jackson, 59, 62, 133, 192, 199, 326
 - Training Center, 284
 - Knox, 60, 170, 251, 304n70
 - Kobbe, 328
 - Leavenworth, 60–61, 251, 435
 - Lee, 418
 - Leonard Wood, 50, 60, 199
 - Lewis, 59, 133, 327, 371, 378, 384, 408, 435
 - McNair, 56
 - Meade, 371, 420
 - Monmouth, 35, 51
 - Ord, 59, 196, 204, 212, 245, 404, 413, 435
 - Polk, 10, 196, 197, 225–26, 281, 371. *See also* camps, Polk.
 - Richardson, 293
 - Riley, 57, 59, 199
 - Rucker. *See* camps, Rucker.
 - Sill, 72, 209, 214, 441
 - Stewart, 317, 326, 420, 422
- Fourth Army. *See* armies, Fourth Army.
- France, 7, 89, 91, 144, 180, 182, 268, 282, 344, 362, 408
- Franke, William B., 310. *See also* secretary of the Navy.
- Frankfurt, 438
- Freedom Ride demonstrations, 415
- Freedom Village, 8
- Freeman, General Paul L., Jr., 354, 435, 437. *See also* U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), commanding general.
- French Foreign Legion, 282

- G-1 (Personnel). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff (personnel).
- G-2 (Intelligence). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-2 (intelligence); deputy assistant chief of staff (intelligence).
- G-3 (Operations). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (operations).
- G-4 (Logistics). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff (logistics).
- G. I. Bill of Rights. *See* Servicemen's Readjustment Act.
- Gaither, Lt. Gen. Ridgely, 235
- Garden of the Gods, 178
- Garroway, Dave, 179
- Gary Air Force Base. *See* camps, Gary.
- Gates, Millicent A., 276
- Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 274-75, 276, 294, 311, 316, 331, 332, 344. *See also* deputy secretary of defense; secretary of defense; secretary of the Navy.
- Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M., 47, 52-53, 60, 69-71, 73, 91, 101, 117, 119, 125, 128, 137-38, 204, 236, 237, 239, 342-43, 469. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (plans and research).
- Gemini program, 416
- general of the Army, 2, 17, 21, 23, 221, 332. *See also* Bradley, General Omar N.; Eisenhower, Dwight D.
- general counsel, 80, 82, 98, 352, 399, 402, 451. *See also* Brucker, Wilber M.; Vance, Cyrus R.
- General Electric Company, 143, 226, 332, 378
- General Equipment Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, General Equipment Cmd.
- General Motors, 14, 46, 231
- General Reserve, 4, 9, 41-42, 59, 104, 137, 375. *See also* Army Reserve; Immediate Reserve; Ready Reserve; Reinforcing Reserve; Retired Reserve; Standby Reserve.
- General Services Administration, 79
- General Staff, 20n16, 52, 102, 106, 357, 399. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-1 (personnel); assistant chief of staff, G-2 (intelligence); assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations); assistant chief of staff, G-4 (logistics).
- general utility helicopter. *See* aircraft.
- Geneva, 90-91, 136
- Accords (Treaty), 186, 221, 346, 468
- Conference (Conventions), 7, 58, 268
- Georgia, 59, 106-7, 132, 170, 192, 199, 216, 227, 239, 294, 298, 317, 326, 330, 332, 332-33, 409, 420, 422, 435, 440
- German High Command, 276
- Germany, 1-2, 7, 74, 77, 90, 96, 105, 116, 134-35, 144, 172, 195-96, 198, 213-15, 218-19, 239, 250, 256, 258, 266, 273, 282, 296, 303, 344, 354, 361-63, 366-74, 380, 387, 389-91, 394, 405-9, 422, 434-35, 437, 438, 439, 439, 446, 451, 454, 467
- Gesell, Gerhard A., 415, 451-52
- Gesell Committee. *See* Committee on Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Forces.
- Giáp, Võ Nguyên, 90
- Gilpatric, Roswell L., 352, 357, 385, 414. *See also* deputy secretary of defense.
- Ginder, Maj. Gen. Phillip D., 203. *See also* assistant chief of staff (reserve components).
- Glennan, Thomas Keith, 263, 300
- gold-flow issue, 304, 304n70, 409, 436
- Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 47-48, 351
- Goodyear Aircraft Company, 260
- Gore, Albert A., 359
- Gorman, Col. Emily C., 454
- Grafenwoehr Training Area, 25, 61
- Graham, Harold M., 163
- Great Britain. *See* Britain.
- Green Berets, 352, 462
- grenade launcher, M79 40-mm., 378, 449, 450
- Ground Forces. *See* Army Ground Forces.
- Gruber, Lt. Edmund L., 177
- Gruenther, General Alfred M., 19, 55, 89, 182, 195
- Grumman Aircraft Engineering, 332
- guerrilla warfare, 99, 138, 186, 251, 265-67, 269, 315, 337-38, 342, 346-47, 358, 360, 377, 382, 423-24, 428, 443, 459, 463, 468. *See also* counterinsurgency operations; counterinsurgency operations; insurgency.
- guerrilla gap, 351
- Guided Missile Center, 152. *See also* forts, Bliss.
- guided missiles. *See* missiles.
- Guided Missiles Directorate, 158
- gunships. *See* aircraft.
- Hải Phòng, 88, 90
- Hamlett, General Barksdale, Jr., 94, 366, 413, 456. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); vice chief of staff of the Army.

- Handy, General Thomas T., 157
- Hannah, John A., 23, 86. *See also* assistant secretary of defense.
- Hanoi, 88
- Harkins, General Paul D., 164, 429–30, 457, 459, 461. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations).
- Harrell, Maj. Gen. Ben, 395
- Harris, Maj. Gen. Hugh P., 332
- Hart, Maj. Gen. Charles E., 72
- Harvard Business School, 352
- Harvard University, 352
- Hauck, Brig. Gen. Clarence J., Jr., 54. *See also* chief of legislative liaison.
- Havana, 421
- Hawai'i, 59, 104, 172, 176, 198–99, 220, 254, 268, 270, 281, 307, 324, 339, 342, 392, 426, 460
- Hawk missile. *See* missiles, Hawk.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. *See* Department of the Army.
- heavy lift aircraft. *See* aircraft.
- Heintges, Brig. Gen. John A., 269, 306
- helicopter companies, 158, 270, 429, 460
- 31st Helicopter Co, 415
- 57th Helicopter Co, 461
- Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Co, 385
- helicopters. *See* aircraft.
- Helios, 405
- Hercules missile. *See* missiles, Hercules.
- Hershey, General Lewis B., 455
- Herter, Christian A., 274, 294–95. *See also* secretary of state.
- Heusinger, General Adolf, 295
- Hickey, Lt. Gen. Thomas F., 240
- Hill, Albert C., 157
- Hiller Helicopters, Inc., 162
- Hinrichs, Lt. Gen. John H., 401
- Hồ Chí Minh, 458
- Hodes, General Henry I., 217–18, 237–38, 239, 257. *See also* U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), commanding general.
- Hoelscher, Leonard W., 358, 402–3
- Holaday, William H., 204–5
- Holloway, Lt. Gen. Bruce K., 376
- Homestead, 206
- Homestead Air Force Base. *See* Air Force bases, Homestead.
- Honest John rocket. *See* rockets, Honest John.
- Honest John units, 165, 168, 170, 173–74, 176, 182, 202, 209, 237, 245, 248, 364, 447. *See also* rockets, Honest John.
- hot weather field cap, 451
- House Appropriations Committee, 122, 204, 258. *See also* House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations; Senate Appropriations Committee; Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
- House Appropriations Subcommittee. *See* House Appropriations Committee; House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations; Senate Appropriations Committee; Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
- House Armed Services Committee, 224, 234, 260, 284, 329, 452. *See also* Senate Armed Services Committee.
- House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, 279, 315. *See also* House Appropriations Committee; Senate Appropriations Committee; Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
- House Veterans Affairs Committee, 211
- howitzers. *See* artillery pieces.
- Howze, Lt. Gen. Hamilton H., 119, 158, 293, 353, 372–73, 395, 396, 398, 415, 418, 420–21, 425, 441, 469. *See also* Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (Howze Board).
- Howze, Maj. Gen. Robert L., 164
- Howze Board. *See* Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (Howze Board).
- HQDA. *See* Department of the Army.
- Huey. *See* aircraft, UH–1 Iroquois.
- Hukbalahap insurgency, 128
- Hull, General John E., 140
- Humphrey, George M., 14, 21
- Humphrey, Hubert H., 351
- Hungary, 144, 180, 195
- Huntsville, 152, 156, 189, 262
- Hutton, Brig. Gen. Carl I., 73
- I Corps. *See* corps, I Corps.
- Idaho, 411
- III Corps. *See* corps, III Corps.
- Immediate Reserve, 454. *See also* Army Reserve; General Reserve; Ready Reserve; Reinforcing Reserve; Retired Reserve; Standby Reserve.
- Independence Hall, 177
- India, 91, 339, 353
- Indiana, 10, 133, 194
- Indochina, 4, 48, 88, 90–92, 122, 136–38, 144, 185, 424. *See also* Cambodia; France; Laos; Vietnam.
- infantry battle groups. *See* infantry regiments and battle groups.
- infantry brigades (nondivisional). *See also* divisions.
- 2d Inf Bde, 374, 391

infantry brigades (nondivisional).

Continued

171st Inf Bde, 435

172d Inf Bde, 435

193d Inf Bde, 435

197th Inf Bde, 435

Infantry Center. *See* U.S. Army Infantry Center.

infantry divisions. *See* divisions.

Infantry Officers Division, 334

infantry regiments and battle groups

3d Inf

1st Battle Gp, 350

6th Inf

2d Battle Gp, 371

3d Battle Gp, 371

10th Inf, 204

12th Inf

1st Battle Gp, 327

18th Inf

1st Battle Gp, 168

20th Inf, 105

1st Battle Gp, 328

22d Inf

1st Battle Gp, 408

23d Inf

1st Battle Gp, 293

2d Battle Gp, 415

26th Inf

1st Battle Gp, 410

38th Inf

1st Battle Gp, 409

39th Inf

2d Battle Gp, 408

47th Inf

2d Battle Gp, 408

325th Inf

1st Abn Battle Gp, 328

327th Inf

1st Abn Battle Gp, 213

501st Inf

2d Abn Battle Gp, 293

503d Inf

2d Abn Battle Gp, 293, 339

504th Abn Inf

2d Battle Gp, 350

Infantry School, 66, 208

Information and Education Office. *See* Office of Armed Forces Information and Education.

inspector general, 16, 82, 127, 221, 242, 373, 402, 447

insurgency, 342, 344, 347, 382, 385, 389, 424–25, 430, 434, 458, 468. *See also* counterinsurgency operations; counterinsurgency operations; guerrilla warfare; Hukbalahap insurgency.

Intelligence and Security. *See* Army Intelligence and Security branch.

Intelligence Staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G–2 (intelligence).

intercontinental ballistic missiles. *See* missiles.

intermediate-range ballistic missiles. *See* missiles.

International Control Commission, 91, 346

Iowa, 411

IRBM. *See* intermediate-range ballistic missile.

Iron Triangle, 6

Iroquois. *See* aircraft, UH–1 Iroquois.

Israel, 180, 182, 222

Italy, 20, 119, 209, 276, 429.

IX Corps. *See* corps, IX Corps.

Jackson, Charles D., 74

Jackson, Henry M., 343

Japan, 1, 5, 6, 59, 75, 135, 175, 196, 215,

219–20, 238, 266, 270, 306, 329,

339–40, 426, 435. *See also* Okinawa;

U.S. Army, Japan; U.S. Forces, Japan.

JCS 2101/113, 48–49

Jedburgh units, 74

jeep, M151 ¼-ton, 446

Jenkins, Lt. Gen. Reuben E., 32

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 261, 263–64, 299

Jim Crow legislation, 218

Johnson, Maj. Gen. Harold K., 121, 435, 437, 441, 456. *See also* deputy chief of staff (military operations).

Johnson, Louis A., 18, 39, 46. *See also* secretary of defense.

Johnson, Lyndon B., 264, 279, 462–63. *See also* president of the United States; vice president of the United States.

Johnson, Roy W., 263

Johnston, Capt. William R., 459

Joint Air-Ground Operations Manual, 214

Joint Board on Future Storage of Atomic Weapons, 158

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18–19, 21, 21, 23–24, 31, 36, 43, 47–48, 76, 79, 89–90, 105–6, 120, 122, 151–52, 154, 157, 172, 183, 193, 206, 213, 220, 232–33, 235, 254–56, 258, 265–66, 270, 274, 278–79, 290, 310, 326–27, 331, 335, 345–47, 351, 356–57, 359–61, 368, 371–73, 382, 384, 393, 407, 418, 420, 423, 430–31, 437, 456, 459, 469. *See also* chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Staff; service chiefs; technical service chiefs.

joint exercises. *See* exercises.

Joint Ready Force, 254–55

Joint Services Capabilities Plan, 265. *See also* Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

- Joint Staff, 17, 88, 106, 228, 233–35, 278, 395. *See also* chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 118. *See also* Joint Services Capabilities Plan; Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.
- Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, 172. *See also* Joint Services Capabilities Plan; Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
- Jones, Maj. Gen. Herbert M., 242
- Jupiter missile. *See* missiles, Jupiter.
- Kansas, 57, 59–61, 199, 251, 411, 435
- Kaplan, Capt., 353
- KATUSA. *See* Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA).
- Kennedy, John F., 309, 312–13, 342–45, 348–52, 353, 356–63, 367–69, 371, 377, 380–87, 389–92, 395, 406, 410, 415, 417, 421–24, 428, 430–31, 436–37, 449, 451, 455, 458, 461, 462, 462, 465, 467–69. *See also* president of the United States.
- administration, 345, 348, 355, 359, 361, 361n26, 363, 368, 371, 377, 381, 384, 387, 389, 414, 421–24, 428, 449, 469
- Kennedy, Robert F., 360
- Kentucky, 59–60, 105, 170, 213–14, 251, 276, 304n70, 326
- Key West, 77, 118, 152, 208, 293, 420
- Key West Agreement, 77, 118
- Khrushchev, Nikita S., 180, 267, 273, 344, 362, 368, 421
- Killian, James R., 156
- Killian Committee, 156
- Kinmen. *See* Quemoy.
- Kinnard, Maj. Gen. Harry W. O., 440, 440
- Kintner, Lt. Col. William R., 60
- Kissinger, Henry A., 194, 210
- Kiwanis, 52
- Knowland, William F., 194
- Korea, 1, 2, 2–7, 8, 8–9, 12–13, 13, 18, 22–23, 26, 28–32, 35–36, 39–40, 43, 49–51, 56–60, 70–73, 75, 79, 88, 91, 96, 111, 118, 129, 135–37, 140, 144, 175, 196, 198, 200, 219–20, 231, 236, 238, 241, 270, 276–77, 280, 282, 294, 296, 304, 310, 324, 327, 330, 339–40, 347, 349, 375, 392, 410, 422, 433–34, 437, 449–50, 465, 468. *See also* Korean armistice agreement; Korean Army; Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA); Korean War; military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs), MAAG, Korea; North Korea; Republic of Korea (ROK); ROK (Republic of Korea) units; South Korea; U.S. Forces, Korea.
- Korean armistice agreement, 2, 39
- Korean Army, 282. *See also* Korea; ROK (Republic of Korea) units.
- Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA), 220, 238, 270, 280, 339. *See also* Korea; Korean Army; ROK (Republic of Korea) units.
- Korean War, 1–6, 9, 12–13, 23, 29–31, 34, 36, 39, 51, 56, 62–63, 72, 79, 86, 109, 135, 139, 147, 155–56, 164–65, 175, 231, 238, 243, 283–84, 336, 364, 380, 422, 433, 445–47, 449–50, 466–69. *See also* Korea.
- Kosong, 6
- Kremlin, 398
- Krueger, General Walter, 20, 277
- Kubrick, Stanley, 194
- Kuter, General Laurence S., 326
- Kyes, Roger M., 46, 146. *See also* deputy secretary of defense.
- Lacrosse missile. *See* missiles, Lacrosse.
- Langley Air Force Base. *See* Air Force bases, Langley.
- Lansdale, Maj. Gen. Edward G., 138, 337, 337–38
- Laos, 92, 269, 306–7, 339–40, 345–47, 351, 372, 383–84, 408, 430
- Larsen, Brig. Gen. Stanley R., 208
- Latin America, 134–35, 327, 359, 385–86, 427
- LAW. *See* rockets, M72 LAW (light antitank weapon).
- Lebanon, 235, 256, 258, 375, 423
- Lee, Maj. Gen. Robert V., 277
- legislative affairs, assistant secretary of defense for. *See* assistant secretary of defense, legislative affairs.
- legislative liaison, 16, 27–28, 54, 82, 97, 170, 179, 402. *See also* chief of legislative liaison; public information.
- legislative liaison and public information. *See* legislative liaison; public information.
- Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., 209, 220, 240, 259, 266–67, 275–77, 277, 280–81, 287–88, 295, 303, 311, 313–14, 320, 331, 332, 333, 344, 346, 351, 359–60, 375, 383, 439, 469. *See also* chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; chief of staff of the Army; deputy chief of staff (operations); vice chief of staff of the Army.
- Letterkenney Army Depot, 421
- Leviero, Anthony H., 146
- Lewis, Lt. Gen. John T., 76
- Libya, 182

- light antitank weapon. *See* rockets, M72
LAW (light antitank weapon).
- Lions, 52
- Little Gibraltar
- Little John rocket. *See* rockets, Little John.
- Little John units, 173, 220, 442. *See also* rockets, Little John.
- Little Rock, 213–14, 453
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, 461
- Lodge Act, 282
- logistical carrier, 150-ton cross-country.
See cross-country logistical carrier, 150-ton.
- logistical commands. *See* commands, U.S. Army.
- logistics, assistant secretary of the Army for. *See* assistant secretary of the Army, logistics.
- Logistics Staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff (logistics).
- Long Haul defense policy, 30
- Long, Russell B., 281, 359
- long-range guided missiles. *See* missiles.
- longer-range missiles. *See* missiles.
- Los Angeles, 327
- Louisiana, 10, 113–14, 117, 133, 163, 196, 197, 225–26, 281, 359, 371, 374
- Louisiana Maneuver Area, 113, 163, 281
- Louisiana Maneuvers (1941), 374
- Louisville Courier Journal*, 282
- Lovett, Robert A., 46. *See also* secretary of defense.
- Lumumba, Patrice É., 345
- Lynch, Maj. Gen. George E., 164
- M1 rifle. *See* rifles, M1.
- M4 Sherman tank. *See* tanks, M4.
- M5 Stuart light tank. *See* tanks, M5.
- M14 rifle. *See* rifles, M14.
- M15 rifle. *See* rifles, M15.
- M16 rifle. *See* rifles, M16.
- M16A1 rifle. *See* rifles, M16A1.
- M18 Claymore antipersonnel mine. *See* mine, M18Claymore antipersonnel.
- M35 2½-ton truck. *See* trucks, M35 2½-ton.
- M41 light tank. *See* tanks, M41.
- M47 Patton tank. *See* tanks, M47.
- M48 Patton tank. *See* tanks, M48.
- M48A3 90-mm. gun medium tank. *See* tanks, M48A3.
- M59 armored personnel carrier. *See* personnel carriers, M59.
- M60 general purpose 7.62-mm. machine gun. *See* machine guns, M60 general purpose 7.62-mm.
- M60 tank. *See* tanks, M60.
- M60A1 tank. *See* tanks, M60A1.
- M72 LAW (light antitank weapon). *See* rockets, M72 LAW (light antitank weapon).
- M75 carrier. *See* personnel carriers, M75.
- M79 40-mm. grenade launcher. *See* grenade launcher, M79 40-mm.
- M102 105-mm. howitzer. *See* artillery pieces.
- M107 self-propelled 175-mm. gun, 446
- M109 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer. *See* artillery pieces.
- M110 self-propelled 8-inch howitzer. *See* artillery pieces.
- M113 armored personnel carrier. *See* personnel carriers, M113.
- M151 ¼-ton jeep. *See* jeep, M151 ¼-ton.
- MAAGs. *See* military assistance advisory group (MAAGs).
- MacArthur, General Douglas, 98
- MacDill Air Force Base. *See* Air Force bases, MacDill.
- machine guns, 259, 298, 366, 430, 466
.30-caliber, 378, 461
M60 general purpose 7.62-mm., 161, 378
rapid-firing minigun, 378
- MACV. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).
- Madame Nhu. *See* Trần Lệ Xuân.
- Main River, 250
- Malaysia, 4, 347
- MAN. *See* Modern Army Needs.
- Management Improvement Program, 301–2
- Manila Pact, 267
- Mannheim, 408
- manpower and personnel, assistant secretary of defense for. *See* assistant secretary of defense, manpower and personnel.
- manpower and reserve forces, assistant secretary of the Army for. *See* assistant secretary of the Army, manpower and reserve forces.
- Mansfield, Michael J., 92
- Marine Corps. *See* U.S. Marine Corps.
- Marshall, General George C., Jr., 28, 46–47, 311. *See also* secretary of defense.
- Martin, William H., 101. *See also* deputy assistant secretary of defense.
- Maryland, 273, 287, 297, 327, 371, 411, 420
- Massachusetts, 86, 156, 309, 374, 391, 411
- Material Development and Logistic Command (MDLC). *See* commands, U.S. Army, Material Development and Logistic Command (MDLC).

- materiel, assistant secretary of the Army
for. *See* assistant secretary of the Army,
materiel.
- Materiel Command. *See* commands, U.S.
Army, Army Materiel Cmd.
- Matsu, 122, 145, 267
- McAuliffe, General Anthony C., 139,
266. *See also* U.S. Army, Europe
(USAREUR), commanding general.
- McCarthy, Joseph R., 35, 51–52, 53, 98, 228
- McClure, Brig. Gen. Mark, 35. *See
also* assistant chief of staff, G–2
(intelligence).
- McClure, Brig. Gen. Robert A., 73
- McElroy, Neil H., 193–94, 196, 205, 231,
234, 248–49, 258, 260, 261, 274, 297.
See also secretary of defense.
- McGarr, Lt. Gen. Lionel C., 251, 338, 382
- McNamara, Robert S., 344, 349, 352–53,
354, 354–59, 361, 366, 368–75, 380,
382, 384–85, 389, 391–93, 395, 397–98,
400–1, 406–7, 409, 411–12, 423–24,
428, 430, 433–34, 436–37, 440, 447–48,
451–53, 462–63, 467. *See also* secretary
of defense.
- MDLC. *See* commands, U.S. Army,
Material Development and Logistic
Cmd (MDLC).
- Medal of Honor, 294
- Medaris, Maj. Gen. John B., 156, 157, 162,
204–5, 261–62, 264
- Meet the Press*, 179
- Mekong Delta, 459
- Mekong River, 463
- Meloy, General Guy S., Jr., 152, 168, 170,
433–34. *See also* chief of information;
chief of public information.
- mental groups, 84, 223–24, 288
- Michaelis, Maj. Gen. John H., 170, 327. *See
also* chief of legislative liaison.
- Michigan, 98, 371, 401
- Mickelsen, Lt. Gen. Stanley R., 209
- Middle East, 134, 144, 181–83, 221–22,
256, 258, 266, 375, 386, 393, 427
- Miksche, Lt. Col. Ferdinand O., 60–61
- Milburn, Lt. Gen. Frank W., 140
- MILITANT LIBERTY, 228
- Military Air Transport Command. *See*
commands, U.S. Army, Mil Air
Transport Cmd.
- Military Air Transport Service, 149, 290,
329, 375, 444. *See also* U.S. Air Force,
Mil Air Transport Service.
- military assistance advisory groups
(MAAGs), 8, 30, 134–35, 138, 185,
221, 267–71, 280, 306, 327, 345, 424,
434
- MAAG, Germany, 135
- MAAG, Indochina, 88, 136, 185, 424
- MAAG, Korea, 136
- MAAG, Philippines, 138
- MAAG, Taiwan, 268
- MAAG, Vietnam, 185–86, 221, 271, 304,
338, 346, 382–84, 424–25, 428–31, 434
- military assistance advisory teams. *See*
military assistance advisory groups
(MAAGs).
- Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(MACV). *See* commands, U.S. Army,
U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Vietnam
(MACV).
- Military District of Washington, 81, 82
- military occupational classification project
(1949), 84
- military occupational specialties, 75, 202,
241
- Military Operations Staff. *See* assistant
chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy
chief of staff (military operations);
deputy chief of staff (operations).
- military police (MP) units, 65, 171, 220,
291–2, 364, 365, 415, 448
- 502d MP Co, 438
- 503d MP Bn, 415
- 716th MP Bn, 415
- 720th MP Bn, 213, 415
- military-industrial complex, 333, 354
- Millett, Maj. Lewis H., 294
- Milligan, Col. Mary L., 241, 242
- Milton, Hugh M., III, 127, 140, 224, 331.
See also assistant secretary of the
Army, manpower and reserve forces;
undersecretary of the Army.
- mine, M18 Claymore antipersonnel, 449
- Mineral Wells, 172
- Minnesota, 351, 411
- missile battalions. *See* artillery units.
- Missile Command. *See* commands, U.S.
Army, Missile Cmd.
- missile commands. *See* commands, U.S.
Army.
- missile gap, 190, 196, 279, 297, 310, 351
- missile systems. *See* missiles.
- missiles. *See also* rockets; satellites; weapon
systems; Wizard antimissile project.
Ajax, 12, 25, 150, 157, 205, 260, 327, 394.
See also missiles, Nike.
- Atlas, 190
- Bomarc, 120, 150–51, 154, 190, 205, 297
- Corporal, 25, 77, 78, 149, 160–61,
173–74, 176, 209, 237, 259
- Dart, 208
- Hawk, 158, 207, 208, 259, 308, 350,
420–21, 463

missiles—*Continued*

- Hercules, 150, 157, 190, 205, 206, 259–60, 268, 297, 326–27, 350, 394, 421. *See also* missiles, Nike.
- Jupiter, 154, 156, 189–90, 194, 204, 261–62, 262, 263, 466
- Lacrosse, 208, 220, 258, 350
- Nike, 11, 12, 25, 76–77, 120, 150–52, 154, 157–58, 190, 205–6, 207, 207, 259–61, 265, 268, 297–98, 308, 326–27, 350, 394–95, 401, 421, 449–50, 466. *See also* missiles, Ajax; missiles, Hercules; missiles, Zeus.
- Pershing, 259, 262, 350, 356, 379
- Polaris, 156, 190, 275
- Redeye, 259, 379
- Redstone, 149, 156, 173–74, 205, 259, 262, 379
- Sergeant, 258, 263–64, 447
- SS10, 208
- SS11, 298, 300, 378
- Talos, 150–51, 154
- Terrier, 150
- Thor, 190, 204, 263
- Vanguard, 194, 263. *See also* satellites, Vanguard.
- Zeus, 158, 190, 206, 207, 260–61, 265, 298, 350, 395, 401, 449, 466. *See also* missiles, Nike.
- Mississippi, 415–16, 453
- Mississippi National Guard, 415
- Mississippi River, 416
- Missouri, 50, 60, 199, 279, 411
- Mitchell, Billy, 189
- Mobile Forces concept, 204
- Modern Army Needs. *See* projects, MAN (Modern Army Needs).
- Modern Army Supply System. *See* projects, MASS (Modern Army Supply System).
- modern mobile Army (MOMAR), 290, 291–92, 320–21, 364, 435
- Mohawk. *See* aircraft, AO-1 Mohawk.
- MOMAR. *See* modern mobile Army (MOMAR).
- Montagnards, 457
- Montana, 411
- Moore, Lt. Gen. James E., 247. *See also* deputy chief of staff (military operations).
- mortars, 89, 110–11, 161, 166, 169, 204, 238, 246, 373, 450
- 81-mm., 110
- 4.2-inch, 65, 67–68, 110, 165, 248
- MOSSs. *See* military occupational specialties.
- Mudgett, Maj. Gen. Gilman C., 53, 123. *See also* chief of information.
- Munitions Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Munitions Cmd.
- Munsan-ni, 6, 8
- Murphy, Audie L., 124
- Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 133. *See also* U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
- Mutual Defense Assistance Program. *See* U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
- NASA. *See* National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
- Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 144
- Natchez, 416
- National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 264
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 263–64, 299–300, 302, 416, 466
- National Day, 457
- National Guard, 3, 9, 11, 40–42, 50, 59, 76, 86, 105, 127, 129, 131, 131n95, 132–33, 138, 214, 286–87, 313, 328–29, 331, 333–34, 374, 376, 381, 390, 394, 410–12, 415, 422, 453–55. *For specific units, see* artillery units; divisions. *See also* National Guard Bureau.
- National Guard Bureau, 16, 334, 402, 455. *See also* National Guard.
- National Guard–Reserve Command, 313
- National Housing Act of 1955, 126
- National Liberation Front, 304
- national military policy (program, strategy), 93, 99–100, 297, 351
- National Reserve Plan, 129
- National Security Act of 1947, 1
- national security adviser, 363, 384, 458
- National Security Council, 14, 18, 21, 90, 106, 145, 192, 314, 345, 351
- National Security Training Commission, 40, 42
- National War College, 177. *See also* U.S. Army War College.
- Nationalist Chinese forces. *See* Chinese Nationalist forces.
- NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
- Naval Air Station Key West, 293, 420
- Navarre, Lt. Gen. Henri E., 88
- Navy Department. *See* Department of the Navy.
- Navy, U.S. *See* chief of naval operations; Department of the Navy; Naval Air Station Key West; secretary of the Navy; U.S. Navy; U.S. Navy Second Fleet; U.S. Navy, Europe.

- Near East, 385
 Nebraska, 411
 Neely, Brig. Gen. Robert B., 376. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-4 (logistics).
 Nevada, 111, 411
 New Guinea, 311
 New Jersey, 35, 50-51, 59, 326, 413
 New Mexico, 207, 262
 New York, 132, 327
New York Times, 40, 46, 94, 144, 146, 172, 192, 235
New York World Telegram and Sun, 247
 New Zealand, 269
 Newport, 152
 Ngô Đình Diệm, 92, 186, 270-71, 338, 382, 457, 457-58, 460-61
 Ngô Đình Nhu, 460
 Nhu, Madame. *See* Trần Lệ Xuân.
 Nhu, Ngô Đình. *See* Ngô Đình Nhu.
 Nickerson, Col. John C., Jr., 189
 Nike missile. *See* missiles, Nike.
 Nitze, Paul H., 343, 352
 Nixon, Richard M., 52, 88, 273, 309, 331.
 See also vice president of the United States.
 Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 285-86
 NORAD. *See* North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).
 Norstad, General Lauris, 257, 370-72
 North Africa. *See* Africa.
 North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), 236
 North Atlantic Treaty (1949), 2
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 8, 48, 50, 105-6, 116, 129, 132-34, 144, 161, 172, 175, 211, 217-19, 237, 249-50, 257, 269, 280, 293, 295, 331, 367-68, 376, 406, 448
 North Carolina, 59, 62, 63, 73-75, 133, 182-83, 215, 255, 266, 293, 326, 328, 346, 352, 372, 384, 386, 393, 395, 423, 427, 427, 431, 448
 North German Plain, 296
 North Korea, 1, 7, 32-33, 56. *See also* Korea; South Korea.
 North Vietnam, 306, 347, 382-83, 387, 458.
 See also Vietnam.
 Northern Area Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Northern Area Cmd.
 nuclear projectile. *See* Davy Crockett weapon system.
 Oakes, Lt. Gen. John C., 322, 334, 338.
 See also deputy chief of staff (military operations).
 O'Daniel, Lt. Gen. John W., 136-37, 185-86
 Oden, Brig. Gen. Delk M., 395
 Office of the Adjutant General. *See* Adjutant General's Office.
 Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 31
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (Personnel). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff (personnel).
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-2 (intelligence).
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations).
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (Logistics). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff (logistics).
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army. *See* assistant secretary of the Army.
 Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. *See* Army Field Forces; chief of Army Field Forces.
 Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and Reserve Officers' Training Corps Affairs. *See* chief of the Army Reserve.
 Office of the Chief of Information. *See* chief of information.
 Office of the Chief of Military History. *See* chief of military history.
 Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. *See* chief of psychological warfare.
 Office of the Chief of Research and Development. *See* chief of research and development.
 Office of the Comptroller of the Army. *See* comptroller of the Army.
 Office of Defense Mobilization, 43, 129
 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff (logistics).
 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Military Operations). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations).
 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations).

- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel). *See* assistant chief of staff, G-1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff (personnel).
- Office of Foreign Military Affairs, 186
- Office of the Inspector General. *See* inspector general.
- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Office of Legislative Liaison and Public Information, 97. *See also* legislative liaison; public information.
- Office of Price Administration, 353
- Office of Public Information. *See* chief of information; public information.
- Office of the Quartermaster General, 16, 82, 102
- Heraldic Br, 177
- Office of Reserve Components, 455. *See also* assistant chief of staff (reserve components).
- Office of the Secretary of the Army. *See* secretary of the Army.
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. *See* secretary of defense.
- Office of the Special Assistant for Intergroup Relations, 453
- Office of Strategic Services, 74, 138, 337
- Ogden, Lt. Gen. David A. D., 221
- Okinawa, 266, 306, 339-40, 426, 435. *See also* Japan.
- Oklahoma, 72, 209, 214, 441
- Old Baldy, 6
- Old Guard. *See* infantry regiments and battle groups, 3d Inf, 1st Battle Gp.
- One Army, 286-87
- O'Neill, Maj. Gen. Edward J., 186. *See also* deputy chief of staff (logistics).
- Ontos, 79
- Opa-locka, 418
- OPD. *See* divisions, Operations Div.
- Operation Plan SWAGGERSTICK, 182-83, 256
- operations. *See also* exercises; Operation Plan SWAGGERSTICK; projects; ROTAPLAN.
- ALERT, 176
- BIG LIFT, 437, 438-39, 440
- GYROSCOPE, 85, 86n83, 104, 172, 184, 196, 200, 217-18, 239, 363, 409
- LITTLE SWITCH, 7, 8
- LONG THRUST II, 408. *See also* exercises, LONG THRUST.
- MARKET GARDEN, 375, 444
- SEARCHLIGHT, 303
- Operations Division. *See* divisions, Operations Div.
- Operations Research Center, 252
- Operations Research Office (Johns Hopkins University), 60
- Operations Staff, 29, 184, 296, 314. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations).
- Operations and Training Branch, 179
- Ordnance Corps. *See* U.S. Army Ordnance Corps.
- Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Ord Tank-Automotive Cmd.
- Organization and Training Division, 38
- Osgood, Robert E., 195, 210
- Oswald, Lee Harvey, 461
- Otter. *See* aircraft, U-1A Otter.
- Ovnand, M. Sgt. Chester M., 304
- Oxford, 415, 453
- Pace, Frank C., Jr., 3, 20, 73, 151, 155, 398. *See also* secretary of the Army.
- Pace-Finletter agreements (accords), 155, 398. *See also* Finletter, Thomas K.; Pace, Frank C., Jr.
- Pacific Command. *See* commands, unified, U.S. Pacific Cmd.
- Pakistan, 186, 222, 269
- Palmer, General Williston B., 80-81, 97, 101, 103, 125, 127, 170, 223. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-4 (logistics); vice chief of staff of the Army.
- Panama, 293, 328, 386, 426, 435
- Canal Zone, 59, 105, 328, 386
- Panamanian National Guard, 328
- Panmunjom, 1
- parallels
- 15th, 463
- 17th, 91
- Paris, 344, 362
- Parker, Sgt. Ben, 57
- Parker, Lt. Gen. Theodore W., 404, 436. *See also* deputy chief of staff (military operations).
- Parks, Lt. Gen. Floyd L., 26, 54. *See also* chief of information.
- Partridge, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 35. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-2 (intelligence).
- Pasadena, 262
- Pate, General Randolph M., 234
- Pathet Lao, 306, 339, 345
- Patrick Air Force Base. *See* Air Force bases, Patrick.
- Patton, General George S., 429
- Patton tanks. *See* tanks, M47; tanks, M48.
- Pearson, Drew, 26
- Peninsula Base Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Peninsula Base Cmd.

- Pennsylvania, 70, 177, 327, 411, 421
 pentagonal atomic-nonatomic. *See* PENTANA.
 PENTANA, 115, 164–65, 167, 170
 pentomic divisions, 170, 196–204, 246–47, 265, 271, 289–90, 320–21, 387, 446, 465, 467–68
 pentomic model (organization, structure), 172–73, 194, 201–4, 228, 244–48, 290, 302, 308, 315, 320, 322, 364, 366, 392, 433
People's Army, 1
People's Volunteer Army, 1
 Pershing missile. *See* missiles, Pershing.
 Personnel Assignment Directorate, 334
 personnel carriers, 110–11, 202, 290, 315, 322, 367, 370, 377, 439
 M59, 78, 446
 M75, 446
 M113, 446
 Personnel Staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G-1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff (personnel).
 Peru, 327
 Philadelphia, 177, 327
 Philippines, 137–38, 186, 269–70, 337, 340, 347
 Phouma, Prince Souvanna, 306
 Physical Achievement Test, 223
 Pierson, Maj. Gen. Albert, 242
 Plans Division, 20, 195
 Plans Staff. *See* assistant chief of staff, G-3 (Operations); assistant chief of staff for plans; deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); deputy chief of staff (plans); deputy chief of staff (plans and operations); deputy chief of staff (plans and research); deputy chief of staff (plans, programs, and systems).
 Poland, 91, 144, 180
 Polaris missile. *See* missiles, Polaris.
 Pope Air Force Base. *See* Air Force bases, Pope.
 Porter, Maj. Gen. Robert W., Jr., 334, 386. *See also* deputy chief of staff (personnel).
 Powell, General Herbert B., 56, 227, 320–21, 332, 364, 366, 372–73, 379, 404, 418, 420, 423, 433. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G-1 (personnel); commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), commanding general.
 Power, General Thomas S., 310
 POWs. *See* prisoners of war (POWs).
 Preparedness Committee. *See* Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Preparedness.
 president of the United States. *See* Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Truman, Harry S. *See also* White House.
 Price Administration Office. *See* Office of Price Administration.
 prisoners of war (POWs), 7, 8, 32–34, 51, 56–57, 139–41
 Procter & Gamble Company, 193
 Programs and Analysis Group, 102
 Programs Evaluation Office, 269, 306, 345
 projects. *See also* exercises; Operation Plan SWAGGERSTICK; operations; ROTAPLAN.
 80, 358, 400, 405
 AMMO, 259
 HOTFOOT, 306
 MAN (Modern Army Needs), 330–34
 MASS (Modern Army Supply System), 318
 MOLECULAR, 306–7
 VISTA, 26, 78, 404
 Pruitt, Lt. Gen. Donald L., 260
 psychological warfare, 29–30, 73–76, 338, 346, 386, 391, 425. *See also* chief of psychological warfare.
 U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center, 73
 public information, 53–54, 82, 86, 97, 121, 143, 152, 253, 259, 366, 402, 416. *See also* chief of information; legislative liaison.
 Puerto Rico, 59, 329
 Pyongyang, 30
 Quarles, Donald A., 117–18, 120, 149, 261, 264, 274. *See also* assistant secretary of defense; deputy secretary of defense; secretary of the Air Force.
 Quartermaster General. *See* Office of the Quartermaster General.
 Quemoy, 122, 144, 267
 radars
 AN/PPS4 short-range, 245
 AN/TPS21 medium-range, 245
 Radford, Admiral Arthur W., 17, 18, 21, 25, 46–47, 89, 106, 122–23, 129–30, 146, 172, 174–75, 191–93, 195, 209, 228, 232. *See also* chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 Radford Plan, 146, 175, 192
 Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 260, 332

- Radio-Television Branch, 179
 Rainbow Division. *See* divisions, 42d Inf Div.
 Ranger School. *See* U.S. Army Ranger School.
 Rangers. *See* U.S. Army Rangers.
 RCA. *See* Radio Corporation of America (RCA).
 Ready Force, 211. *See also* Joint Ready Force.
 Ready Reserve, 40, 130–31, 286, 369–70. *See also* Army Reserve; General Reserve; Immediate Reserve; Reinforcing Reserve; Retired Reserve; Standby Reserve.
 Reber, Maj. Gen. Miles, 27. *See also* chief of legislative liaison.
 Reckord, Maj. Gen. Milton A., 287. *See also* Adjutant General's Office.
 recoilless rifle, 106-mm., 79
 Recondo School, 294
 reconnaissance and commando, 294
 Red River Delta, 88
 Redeye weapon. *See* missiles, Redeye.
 Reds, the, 351
 Redstone Arsenal, 156, 189, 260, 262–63
 Redstone missile. *See* missiles, Redstone.
 regimental bands. *See* bands.
 Regular Army, 1, 38, 45, 241, 243, 287, 374, 405, 426
 Rehkamp, Pfc. Glenn W., 461
 Reinforcing Reserve, 454. *See also* Army Reserve; General Reserve; Immediate Reserve; Ready Reserve; Retired Reserve; Standby Reserve.
 Reinhardt, Col. George C., 60
 Reorganization of the Airborne Division (ROTAD), 165, 166
 Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division (ROCID), 169, 244–45
 Reorganization of the Current Armored Division (ROCAD), 170, 171
 Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD), 364, 365, 366–67, 374, 377, 387, 391–92, 396, 411–12, 433–36, 441, 444, 446, 454, 468
 Reorganization Plan No. 6, 17, 28
 Republic of Congo, 345
 Republic of Korea (ROK), 136, 434. *See also* Korea; ROK (Republic of Korea) units.
 Republic of Vietnam. *See* Vietnam.
 research and development. *See* Air Force units, Research and Development Cmd; Army Research and Development Board; assistant secretary of defense, research and development; chief of research and development; deputy chief of staff (research and development); Research and Development Command.
 research and development, assistant secretary of defense for. *See* assistant secretary of defense, research and development.
 Research and Development Command, 310, 319
 Reserve Forces Act
 of 1952, 40
 of 1955, 128–33
 Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), 16, 95, 203, 243, 284, 334, 381, 402, 455
 Reston, James B., 144
 Retired Reserve, 40. *See also* Army Reserve; General Reserve; Immediate Reserve; Ready Reserve; Reinforcing Reserve; Standby Reserve.
 Revolt of the Admirals, 18
 Revolutionary War, 45
 Rhee, Syngman, 220
 Rhine River, 296, 407
 Rhode Island, 152, 411
 Rich, Maj. Gen. Maxwell E., 411. *See also* Adjutant General's Office.
 Richardson, Lt. Gen. James L., Jr., 453. *See also* deputy chief of staff (personnel).
 Ridgway, General Matthew B., 18–20, 21, 22–25, 24, 29, 31, 33–35, 39, 42–43, 47–51, 53–54, 56–57, 59, 63–64, 69–70, 72, 76, 79, 81, 83, 85, 89–90, 92–96, 97, 98, 109–11, 118, 121–22, 125, 129–30, 133, 145, 148, 164, 249, 307, 310–11, 331, 342, 434, 451, 469. *See also* chief of staff of the Army.
 Ridgway-model utility cap, 451
 rifles
 AK47, 447
 AR15, 447–48
 Browning automatic, 161
 M1, 161, 447
 M14, 161, 378, 447–48
 M15, 161
 M16, 448, 448
 M16A1, 449
 Río Hato, 293
 ROAD. *See* Reorganization Objective Army Division.
 Robertson, Reuben H., Jr., 153. *See also* deputy secretary of defense.
 ROCAD. *See* Reorganization of the Current Armored Division (ROCAD).
 ROCID. *See* Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division (ROCID).
 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 17
 rocket launchers, 165, 248. *See also* rockets.

- rocket pods. *See* rockets.
- rockets. *See also* missiles; satellites; weapon systems.
 - 4.5-inch rocket pods, 441
 - Honest John, 25, 77, 115, 149, 160, 165, 168, 170, 173–74, 176, 182, 202, 207, 209, 237, 245, 248, 259, 364, 447
 - Little John, 173, 208, 220, 258, 350, 442
 - M72 LAW (light antitank weapon), 449, 449
- Roderick, George H., 319. *See also* assistant secretary of the Army.
- ROK (Republic of Korea) units. *See also* Korea; Republic of Korea (ROK).
 - First ROK Army, 434
 - ROK VI Corps, 434
- Rokossovsky, Konstantin, 180
- Rose Bowl, 240
- Rosson, Maj. Gen. William B., 395, 424, 427
- Rostow, Walt W., 363, 382, 428
- ROTAD. *See* Reorganization of the Airborne Division (ROTAD).
- ROTAPLAN, 363, 409–10, 436
- Rotary, 52
- rotary-wing aircraft, 71–72, 117, 148, 377, 466. *See also* aircraft; fixed-wing aircraft.
- ROTC. *See* Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC).
- Ruddy, Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Francis J., 461
- Ruffner, Lt. Gen. Clark L., 255
- Rusk, D. Dean, 359, 384. *See also* secretary of state.
- Russell, Richard B., 33, 234
- Ryukyu Islands Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Cmd.
- Sahara, 386
- Saigon, 88, 90, 138, 271, 304, 307, 340, 457, 461
- Saltonstall, Leverett M., 86
- San Marcos, 72, 172
- Sanderson, Frank K., 276
- satellites, 14, 156, 190, 194–96, 205, 217, 258, 261, 263, 265, 299, 300, 466. *See also* missiles; rockets; weapon systems.
 - Explorer 1, 261, 262, 263
 - Explorer 3, 263
 - Sputnik, 190, 194, 196, 228, 232, 259, 279, 295
 - Vanguard, 261. *See also* missiles, Vanguard.
- Schine, Pvt. G. David, 51
- Schofield Barracks, 59
- Schriever, Lt. Gen. Bernard A., 204, 310
- Seaton, Frederick A, 113. *See also* assistant secretary of defense.
- Second Army. *See* armies, Second Army.
- secretary of the Air Force, 117, 149, 151, 261. *See also* Finletter, Thomas K.; Quarles, Donald A.
- secretary of the Army, 16, 19, 20, 35, 37, 40, 45, 49, 72–73, 80, 82, 92, 94, 97, 98, 100–1, 113, 123, 133, 144, 151, 240, 242, 260, 279, 286, 303, 312, 316, 319, 334, 340, 353, 355, 357, 373, 385, 396, 399, 400–1, 402, 405. *See also* assistant secretary of the Army; Brucker, Wilber M.; Pace, Frank C., Jr.; Stahr, Elvis J., Jr.; Stevens, Robert T.; undersecretary of the Army; Vance, Cyrus R.
- secretary of defense, 14, 15, 17–18, 21, 23–24, 31, 36, 38–39, 46–49, 57, 79–80, 83–84, 89, 94, 97, 100–1, 106, 122, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154–55, 157, 189, 191, 193, 205–6, 222, 228, 231–33, 235, 260–61, 263, 274, 276, 278, 297, 306, 311, 313, 331, 335, 337, 344–45, 349, 352, 354, 354–58, 370, 378, 384, 395–96, 401, 406, 412, 422, 424, 430, 433, 436–37, 463. *See also* assistant secretary of defense; deputy assistant secretary of defense; deputy secretary of defense; Gates, Thomas S., Jr.; Johnson, Louis A.; Lovett, Robert A.; Marshall, General George C., Jr.; McElroy, Neil H.; McNamara, Robert S.; undersecretary of defense; U.S. Department of Defense; Wilson, Charles E.
- secretary of the Navy, 274, 310. *See also* Franke, William B.; Gates, Thomas S., Jr.
- secretary of state. *See* Dulles, John Foster; Herter, Christian A.; Rusk, D. Dean. *See also* State Department.
- secretary of the treasury, 14, 21. *See also* Department of the Treasury.
- selective service, 37, 43, 54, 60, 284, 288, 455
- Selective Service Act, 284
- Selective Service System, 43
- self-propelled howitzers. *See* artillery pieces.
- semiautomatic rifles. *See* rifles.
- Senate Appropriations Committee, 46, 122. *See also* House Appropriations Committee; House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations; Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

- Senate Armed Services Committee, 33, 130, 194, 234, 297, 310, 361, 462. *See also* House Armed Services Committee.
- Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Preparedness, 86, 205, 216, 314
- Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 260. *See also* House Appropriations Committee; House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations; Senate Appropriations Committee.
- Senate Democratic Caucus, 462
- Senate Preparedness Committee. *See* Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Preparedness.
- Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. *See* Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Preparedness.
- Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association, 40
- Seoul, 30
- Sergeant Bilko*, 124, 124–25
- Sergeant missile. *See* missiles, Sergeant.
- service chiefs, 18, 49, 66, 89, 102, 145–47, 191, 232, 234–36, 255, 275, 313, 319–20, 358, 400. *See also* Air Force chief of staff; chief of naval operations; chief of staff of the Army; Joint Chiefs of Staff; technical service chiefs.
- service schools, 81, 83, 86, 103, 134, 203, 221, 302, 373, 380, 468
- Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 37, 310
- Sevareid, A. Eric, 279
- Seventh Army. *See* armies, Seventh Army.
- Shawnee. *See* aircraft, H–21 Shawnee.
- Shepherd, General Lemuel C., Jr., 19, 21
- Sherburne, Maj. Gen. Thomas L., 104. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–1 (personnel).
- Sherman tanks. *See* tanks, M4.
- short-range missiles. *See* missiles.
- Sicily, 429
- Sides, V. Adm. John H., 331
- signal units, 65, 67–68, 132, 165, 166, 167, 169, 171, 201, 209, 268, 292, 364, 365, 429
- 53d Sig Bn, 213
- 54th Sig Bn, 213–14
- Silvers, Phil, 124, 125
- Sink, Lt. Gen. Robert F., 254–55, 417
- Sioux. *See* aircraft, H–13 Sioux.
- Sixth U.S. Army. *See* armies, Sixth U.S. Army.
- sky cavalry, 117–18, 153, 155, 173, 179, 202. *See also* air cavalry; cavalry regiments and companies; divisions; U.S. Cavalry.
- Sky Crane. *See* aircraft, CH–54 Sky Crane.
- Skysweeper antiaircraft weapon system, 9, 76, 77
- Slezak, John, 48, 80. *See also* assistant secretary of the Army; Slezak Plan; undersecretary of the Army.
- Slezak Plan, 80–81, 82, 101. *See also* Slezak, John.
- Smith, Margaret Chase, 447
- solid-fuel ballistic missiles. *See* missiles.
- South America, 30, 135, 389
- South Asia, 385
- South Carolina, 59, 62, 133, 192, 199, 284, 326, 374, 411, 443
- South Korea, 96, 135, 220, 433. *See also* Korea; North Korea.
- South Vietnam, 91–92, 136–38, 185–87, 221, 267, 269–71, 304, 337–38, 342, 346, 363, 382–83, 385, 423, 428–29, 434, 456–57, 457, 459–61, 463. *See also* Vietnam.
- South Vietnamese Army, xiii, 271, 304, 337–38, 384, 459
- 7th Inf Div, 304, 459
- Southeast Asia, 88, 90–92, 187, 267–71, 306–7, 314, 330, 337, 339–40, 342, 345, 347–48, 358, 363, 366, 372, 382–87, 389, 394, 396, 423, 430, 463, 467–68
- Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 269
- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 267, 339–40, 372, 382, 463
- Southern Area Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Southern Area Cmd.
- Southern European Task Force, 209, 217
- Soviet Army, 236, 315
- Soviet Bloc, 29, 265
- Soviet Union, 3, 14, 22, 30, 39, 69, 94, 138, 146, 180, 183, 194, 217, 249, 279, 294, 296–97, 300, 310, 314, 339, 344–45, 351, 394, 405
- Spaatz, General Carl A., 157
- special forces, 26, 30, 73–74, 138–39, 215, 265–67, 306, 338, 346–47, 352, 368, 383, 386, 390–91, 426–27, 426–27, 448, 450, 461, 462, 468
- special forces (SF) groups
- 1st SF Gp, 215, 266, 306–7, 339
- 7th SF Gp, 346
- 10th SF Gp, 73, 139, 215, 282
- 77th SF Gp, 74, 113, 215, 266, 307
- special warfare, 215–16, 265–67, 302, 337, 353, 386, 395, 423–25, 427, 427, 443
- Special Warfare Center. *See* U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School.
- Special Warfare School. *See* U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School.

- Special Warfare Training Center. *See* U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School.
- Sperry Gyroscope Company, 260
- Spesbach, 439
- Spivak, Lawrence, 179
- Sputnik. *See* satellites, Sputnik.
- spy planes. *See* aircraft.
- SS10 missile. *See* missiles, SS10.
- SS11 missile. *See* missiles, SS11.
- Stahr, Elvis J., Jr., 353, 355, 357, 374, 377–78, 385, 390, 395, 399, 401, 416. *See also* secretary of the Army.
- Stalin, Joseph, 144
- Standby Reserve, 40. *See also* Army Reserve; General Reserve; Immediate Reserve; Ready Reserve; Reinforcing Reserve; Retired Reserve.
- Stanford Research Institute, 260
- State Department, 180, 210, 339, 345–46. *See also* secretary of state. Policy Planning Staff, 363
- Tennis, John C., 224
- Stevens, Robert T., 19, 20, 23, 28–29, 35, 37, 45, 49–52, 57, 95, 97, 98. *See also* secretary of the Army.
- Stevenson, Adlai E., II, 343, 359
- Stewart, Jimmy, 124
- Stover, Sfc. Charles W., 107
- STRAC. *See* Strategic Army Corps (STRAC).
- STRAF. *See* Strategic Army Forces (STRAF).
- Strategic Air Command. *See* commands, unified, Strategic Air Cmd.
- Strategic Air Command* (motion picture), 124
- Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), 211–14, 220, 236, 238–39, 253–58, 270, 280, 290, 293–94, 307, 324, 327, 329, 369–70, 372, 375, 393–94. *See also* Strategic Army Forces (STRAF).
- Strategic Army Force, 181, 211. *See also* Strategic Army Corps (STRAC); Strategic Army Forces (STRAF).
- Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), 211–12, 239, 253, 369–71, 463. *See also* Strategic Army Corps (STRAC).
- Strategic Command, 313
- Strategy of Peace*, 342
- Strauss, Franz Josef, 367
- STRICOM. *See* commands, unified, U.S. Strike Cmd (STRICOM).
- Strike Command. *See* commands, unified, U.S. Strike Cmd (STRICOM).
- Stuart light tanks. *See* tanks, M5.
- Sturgis, Lt. Gen. Samuel D., 416
- Stuttgart, 354
- sub-limited warfare, 382–87
- submarine-launched missile systems. *See* missiles.
- submarines, 156, 190, 276
- Suez Canal, 180, 221–22
- Suez Crisis, 183, 210
- supply aircraft. *See* aircraft.
- Supply and Maintenance Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Supply and Maintenance Cmd.
- Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 19, 22, 55, 89, 195, 370, 439–40
- Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Europe, 95
- Supreme Court, 86
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force headquarters, 74
- Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, 8, 331
- surface-to-air missiles. *See* missiles.
- surface-to-surface nuclear rockets. *See* rockets.
- surveillance aircraft. *See* aircraft.
- survivor benefits plan, 85
- swagger sticks, 180, 227
- Swaggerstick. *See* Operation Plan SWAGGERSTICK
- Switzerland, 90–91, 136, 276
- Sylvester, Arthur, 417
- Symington, William S., 279, 296–97, 310, 313, 343
- Symington Committee, 344, 357
- Syria, 222
- tables of organization and equipment, 26, 64–65, 76, 107, 110, 167–68, 199, 397, 441
- Tactical Air Command, U.S. Air Force. *See* Air Force units, Tactical Air Cmd.
- Tactical Command, 313
- Tactical Mobility Requirements Board. *See* Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (Howze Board).
- Taiwan, 122, 135, 144–45, 181, 186, 267–68, 296
- Strait, 122, 267
- Taiwan Defense Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, Taiwan Def Cmd.
- Talos missile. *See* missiles, Talos.
- Tan Son Nhut, 340, 385, 461
- Tank Battalion, 723d, 111
- tanks
 - M4, 446
 - M5, 268
 - M41, 268

tanks—*Continued*

- M47, 78
- M48, 78, 446
- M48A3, 216
- M60, 161, 378, 446
- M60A1, 379, 446
- Taylor, General Maxwell D., 32, 96–100, 97, 105–6, 111, 115–17, 120, 122, 125–26, 137, 143, 148, 151–52, 156, 158, 164–65, 167, 170, 172–75, 178–79, 181, 186–87, 193, 199, 202, 204–6, 208–11, 213–14, 221–22, 224–26, 236, 240, 242–43, 246–51, 253–56, 261, 267, 270–71, 275, 278–79, 284–86, 289, 295–96, 309–13, 330, 342–43, 349, 354, 360–61, 361n63, 363, 366, 382, 392, 423, 428, 468–69. *See also* chief of staff of the Army.
- Coordinating Group, 102, 155
- Taylor-Rostow Mission, 382
- report, 428
- Technological Capabilities Panel. *See* Killian Committee.
- technical service chiefs, 66, 102, 255, 319–20, 358, 400. *See also* service chiefs.
- technical services, 28, 80, 83, 213, 319–20, 357
- Teller, Edward, 194
- Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 185, 346
- Tennessee, 132, 359
- Terrier missile. *See* missiles, Terrier.
- Test and Evaluation Agency, 401
- Texas, 26, 59, 72, 106, 108, 113, 133, 152, 172, 196, 199, 209, 213–14, 218, 239, 259, 279–80, 298, 371, 374, 391, 393, 413, 420, 437, 438, 461
- Thailand, 269, 307, 340, 383, 430, 434
- Third U.S. Army. *See* armies, Third U.S. Army.
- This Is Your Life*, 179
- Thor program. *See* missiles, Thor.
- Thủ Đức, 137
- Today* show, 179
- Toftoy, Maj. Gen. Holger N., 297
- Tolson, Col. John J., 71
- Trainfire target system, 216
- training centers, 1, 98, 29, 42, 104–5, 134, 137, 216, 222, 224, 280, 284, 286, 370–71, 386, 391, 412–13
- Training Circular 20–1, 298
- Training Relations and Instruction Mission, 136, 184
- Trần Lê Xuân, 458
- transport aircraft. *See* aircraft.
- transport planes. *See* aircraft.
- transportation companies, 165
 - 8th Trans Co, 384
 - 57th Trans Co, 384
 - 163d Trans Co, 214
- Transportation Corps. *See* Army Transportation Corps.
- Traub, Maj. Gen. David W., 315
- Treasury Department. *See* Department of the Treasury.
- treasury secretary. *See* secretary of the treasury.
- Troop Program, 75, 240
- Troxel, Maj. Gen. Orlando C., Jr., 265–66, 413
- trucks, 111, 153, 241, 282, 372–73, 423, 438
 - M35 2½-ton, 446
 - 5-ton, 63
 - 10-ton, 372
- Trudeau, Lt. Gen. Arthur G., 264, 319–20
- Truman, Harry S., 2, 39, 133, 218, 381, 455. *See also* president of the United States.
 - administration, 37, 343
- Tucker, Brig. Gen. Reuben H., III, 334
- Turkey, 186, 217, 434
- Twenty-Second Amendment, 342
- Twining, General Nathan F., 19, 21, 145, 150–51, 192–93, 193, 196, 311–12, 330–31, 337. *See also* Air Force chief of staff; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Uncertain Trumpet, The*, 312
- undersecretary of the Army, 16, 80, 82, 331, 334, 353, 384, 402, 415. *See also* Ailes, Stephen; assistant secretary of the Army; Milton, Hugh M. III; secretary of the Army; Slezak, John.
- undersecretary of defense. *See also* assistant secretary of defense; deputy assistant secretary of defense; deputy secretary of defense; secretary of defense; U.S. Department of Defense.
 - acquisition, technology, and logistics, 251
- Uniform Code of Military Justice, 131, 335, 414
- United Nations, 1, 181–83, 359, 434
 - Command, 1, 7, 219–20, 270, 433
 - General Assembly, 180
 - Security Council, 182
- United States Army Band, 350. *See also* bands.
- universal military training, 4, 40, 42–43, 128, 131
- University of California, Berkeley, 352
- University of Mississippi, 415

- U.S. Air Force, 3–4, 19, 26, 37n61, 50–51, 58, 60, 62–63, 71–73, 76–77, 79, 100, 106, 112–24, 140, 142, 145, 147–57, 159, 163, 172, 175, 177, 181–83, 189–90, 192–93, 204–6, 213–14, 219, 235, 251, 255, 257–61, 263–64, 295–301, 306, 310–11, 313, 317, 326–28, 335, 337, 345, 374–76, 378, 393, 395, 397–98, 418, 421, 437, 439, 443, 447–48, 458, 465–66, 469. *See also* Air Force bases; Air Force chief of staff; Air Force units; Air Force vice chief of staff; secretary of the Air Force; service chiefs.
- Association, 125
- Europe, 375
- Mil Air Transport Service, 329. *See also* Military Air Transport Service.
- U.S. Army, Alaska, 8, 327, 367
- U.S. Army, Caribbean. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Caribbean Cmd.
- U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), 7, 20, 134, 139, 174, 182–83, 217, 237–38, 256–58, 266, 316, 320–22, 363, 369–71, 375, 377, 399, 406–8, 435, 437, 456
- commanding general, 139, 217, 237, 257, 266, 316, 320, 322, 363, 370, 408, 435. *See also* Clarke, General Bruce C.; Freeman, General Paul L., Jr.; Hodes, General Henry I.; McAuliffe, General Anthony C.
- Communications Zone, 7, 238, 437
- U.S. Army, Japan, 219
- U.S. Army, Pacific, 8, 59, 220, 238, 269–70, 278, 285, 306–7, 333, 339, 367–68, 430
- U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Cmd.
- U.S. Army Air Corps, 3, 120, 352
- U.S. Army Air Defense Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air Def Cmd.
- U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Cmd.
- U.S. Army Audit Agency, 393, 410
- U.S. Army Band. *See* United States Army Band.
- U.S. Army Caribbean Command. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Caribbean Cmd.
- U.S. Army Combat Development Experimentation Center. *See* Combat Development Experimentation Center.
- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 60–62, 251, 287, 320, 435
- U.S. Army commands. *See* commands, U.S. Army.
- U.S. Army Europe Communications Zone. *See* U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), Communications Zone.
- U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 5, 48, 59, 219
- U.S. Army Forces, Taiwan, 268
- U.S. Army Infantry Center, 170, 216, 227, 395, 449
- U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, 450
- U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center. *See* psychological warfare, U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center.
- U.S. Army Ranger School, 294
- U.S. Army Rangers, 228, 333, 353, 383
- U.S. Army Special Forces. *See* special forces; special forces (SF) groups.
- U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School, 386, 423, 427, 443. *See also* special warfare.
- U.S. Army War College, 70, 115, 164, 287. *See also* National War College.
- U.S. Caribbean Command. *See* commands, unified, U.S. Caribbean Cmd.
- U.S. Cavalry, 70–71, 119, 201, 416. *See also* air cavalry; cavalry regiments and companies; divisions; sky cavalry.
- U.S. Congress, 17–18, 24, 26–27, 33, 37, 39–40, 45, 50, 52, 54, 85, 89–90, 97–98, 100, 104, 106, 122, 126, 128, 130, 144–46, 149, 152, 170, 175–77, 179–80, 192–94, 205, 224, 227, 232, 234, 236, 240, 258, 260–61, 263–64, 278–80, 288, 297, 300, 311–12, 329, 331, 334–35, 342, 357, 359, 361, 368–69, 373, 393, 400–1, 412, 414, 440, 452, 455, 458, 462, 469
- U.S. Constabulary, 2
- U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC). *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC).
- U.S. Department of Commerce, 20
- U.S. Department of Defense, 2, 14–15, 17–18, 24, 26, 31, 33, 43, 46, 48, 53, 63, 85, 87, 93, 96–98, 120, 127, 137, 140, 149, 181, 186, 190, 194–95, 199, 207, 210, 219, 223–24, 226–27, 231–36, 240, 255, 260–61, 263–64, 267, 269, 276, 280, 297, 313, 315–16, 330, 343–44, 352–54, 356–58, 366, 368, 375, 377, 380, 385, 389, 399, 413–14, 417–18, 428, 448, 451, 469. *See also* assistant secretary of defense; deputy assistant secretary of defense; deputy secretary of defense; secretary of defense; undersecretary of defense.

- U.S. Department of State. *See* State Department.
- U.S. European Command. *See* commands, unified, U.S. European Cmd.
- U.S. Forces, Japan, 219
- U.S. Forces, Korea, 219, 434
- U.S. Information Agency, 75
- U.S. MAAGs. *See* military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs).
- U.S. Marine Corps, 19, 38, 58, 100, 122–24, 140, 147, 177, 234, 240, 256, 294, 343, 377, 421, 423, 434, 448, 462
- U.S. Military Academy, 209, 243, 311, 350, 381
- Corps of Cadets, 350
- U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups. *See* military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs).
- U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand. *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Thailand.
- U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). *See* commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Vietnam (MACV).
- U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 8, 133–39, 186
- U.S. Navy, 3, 18, 22, 26, 49, 58, 60, 73, 100, 106, 123, 140, 148, 150, 153–54, 156, 159, 177, 182, 190, 194, 213, 219, 234–35, 261, 263, 274, 278, 294, 310, 313, 343, 345, 375–77, 421, 466. *See also* chief of naval operations; Department of the Navy; missiles; Naval Air Station Key West; satellites; secretary of the Navy; U.S. Navy Second Fleet; U.S. Navy, Europe.
- Logistics Plans Division, 181
- Navy League, 125
- U.S. Navy, Europe, 375
- U.S. Navy Second Fleet, 418
- U.S. Pacific Command. *See* commands, unified, U.S. Pacific Cmd.
- U.S. Steel, 332
- U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM). *See* commands, unified, U.S. Strike Cmd (STRICOM).
- USAREUR. *See* U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR).
- USAREUR Commanding General. *See* U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), commanding general.
- USNS *Comet*, 258
- USS *United States*, 18
- USS *Wasp*, 345
- Utah, 329, 411, 413
- Utah National Guard, 329
- V Corps. *See* corps, V Corps.
- Vance, Cyrus R., 352, 399, 399, 448. *See also* general counsel; secretary of the Army.
- Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., 19. *See also* Air Force chief of staff.
- Vanguard missile. *See* missiles, Vanguard.
- Vanguard satellite. *See* satellites, Vanguard.
- Vann, Col. John P., 459, 460
- Vermont, 411
- Veterans of Foreign Wars, 54
- vice chief of staff, Air Force. *See* Air Force vice chief of staff.
- vice chief of staff of the Army, 16, 19–20, 54, 81, 82, 97, 101, 103, 127, 158, 170, 209, 212, 220, 223, 240, 259, 276–77, 311, 321–22, 326, 340, 354, 371, 373, 386, 402, 413, 423, 456. *See also* Bolte; General Charles L.; chief of staff of the Army; Decker, General George H.; Eddleman, General Clyde D.; Hamlett, General Barksdale, Jr.; Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.; Palmer, Lt. Gen. Williston B.
- vice president of the United States. *See* Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard M.
- Vienna Conference, 362, 368
- Viet Cong, 304, 337, 342, 346, 363, 382, 428, 456–57, 459
- Viet Minh, 88, 90–92, 181, 186–87, 271, 338
- Vietnam, 89–92, 136–37, 181, 184, 186–87, 220, 267–70, 305, 306, 330, 339–40, 341, 342, 347, 349, 351, 363, 382, 384, 385, 385–86, 389, 423–24, 430, 434, 443, 446, 448, 455–59, 457, 460n56, 461, 461, 465–66
- Vietnam War, 4, 307, 387, 428, 431, 451, 454, 460, 463, 467–68
- Vietnamese Army, 88, 138, 185, 221, 271, 304, 337–38, 346, 383, 429
- VII Corps. *See* corps, VII Corps.
- Vinson, Carl, 224, 452
- Virginia, 70, 163, 298, 301, 353, 404, 418, 461, 462
- Vittrup, Lt. Gen. Russell L., 380. *See also* deputy chief of staff (personnel).
- von Braun, Wernher, 149, 156, 261, 301
- von Kann, Maj. Gen. Clifton F., 298, 376, 395. *See also* assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations); assistant chief of staff and J–3 (Joint Staff operations) for STRICOM.
- Walker, Maj. Gen. Edwin A., 361
- Wall, Berlin. *See* Berlin, Wall.

- Wall Street Journal*, 387
- War College. *See* National War College;
U.S. Army War College.
- War Department, 177, 353
Decimal File System, 303
- War Planning Office, 47
- Warsaw Pact, 406
- Washington (state), 59–60, 133, 327, 355,
371, 384, 408, 411, 435
- Washington, D.C., 46, 56, 81, 82, 89, 103,
327, 415, 451, 453
- Washington Post*, 26
- Wayne, John, 123–24
- weapon systems, 156, 204, 246, 378, 407.
See also Davy Crockett weapon system;
missiles; rockets; satellites; Skysweeper
antiaircraft weapon system; Trainfire
target system.
- Weapons and Mobility Command. *See*
commands, U.S. Army, Weapons and
Mobility Cmd.
- Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, 157,
252, 331
- Weible, General Walter L., 39, 71, 83, 103,
125. *See also* deputy chief of staff
(operations); deputy chief of staff
(operations and administration).
- Wertheim, 250
- West Berlin, 273, 370, 435. *See also* Berlin.
- West Germany, 218, 371, 408. *See also*
Germany.
- West Point. *See* U.S. Military Academy.
- West Virginia University, 353
- Western Electric Company, 260
- Western Europe, 1, 4, 116, 144, 195, 217,
222, 367, 389, 405, 409, 431
- Western Hemisphere, 385
Reserve, 211
- Westmoreland, Maj. Gen. William C.,
293–94
- Weyand, General Otto P., 117–18, 120
What's My Line?, 179
- Wheeler, General Earle G., 399, 400, 404,
410, 436–37, 440, 448, 457–58. *See also*
chief of staff of the Army.
- Wheelock, Lt. Col. John C., 111
- Wheelus Air Base, 182. *See also* air bases;
Africa.
- White, Sp4c. Harry L., 448
- White, General Isaac D., 220, 238, 269–70,
278, 285, 307, 333, 339–40
- White, General Thomas D., 193, 317. *See
also* Air Force chief of staff.
- White House, 51, 174, 227, 273, 294, 351,
360–61, 366, 381, 420, 452. *See also*
Eisenhower, Dwight D; Johnson,
Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Truman,
Harry S.
Conference on Education, 193
- White Sands, 262
Missile Range, 207
- Whiz Kids, 349, 354
- Williams, Col. Robert R., 71, 395
- Williams, General Samuel T., 185, 185, 271,
304, 306, 338
- Wilson, Charles E., 14, 15, 17, 17–18, 20,
22–25, 33, 38, 46–50, 52, 57, 59, 63, 76,
80–81, 90, 94–96, 122, 129, 131, 140,
149–54, 156, 160, 189–95, 204, 219,
231. *See also* secretary of defense.
- Wilson, Earl, 194
- wire-guided missiles. *See* missiles.
- Wisconsin, 371, 411
- Wizard antimissile project, 260
- Wolters Air Force Base. *See* camps, Wolters.
- Womble, R. Adm. John P., 36
- Womble Committee, 36–38
- Women's Army Corps, 4, 39, 241, 242, 380,
454
- Wood, Maj. Gen. Robert J., 202. *See also*
deputy chief of staff (research and
development).
- World War I, 7, 20, 30, 98, 129, 133, 160,
252, 287, 295, 422
- World War II, 1–4, 6, 9, 12–13, 18, 20,
28–31, 36–40, 43, 47, 51, 63–64, 74, 79,
91, 96, 104, 109, 119, 129, 133–34, 142,
147, 149, 156, 160, 168, 174–75, 193,
215, 246, 274, 276–77, 287, 295, 301,
310–11, 317, 336–37, 344, 352–53, 364,
375, 380, 399–400, 410, 413, 421–22,
424, 429, 433, 444–47, 450–51, 469
- Wyman, General Willard G., 181–82, 204,
240, 248, 255. *See also* commands, U.S.
Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd
(CONARC), commanding general.
- X Corps. *See* corps, X Corps.
- XVI Corps. *See* corps, XVI Corps.
- XVIII Abn Corps. *See* corps, XVIII Abn
Corps.
- Yale University, 352
- Yarborough, Maj. Gen. William P., 427,
431, 443
- Yarmolinsky, Adam, 451–52
- York, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 459
- Young, Maj. Gen. Robert N., 37–39, 80, 85.
See also assistant chief of staff, G–1
(personnel).
- Youth Wants to Know*, 179
- Yuma Proving Ground, 379
- Zeus missile. *See* missiles, Zeus.
- Zone of the Interior, 32

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