





Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units

Major James F. Gebhardt, US Army (Retired)



Combat Studies Institute Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gebhardt, James F., 1948-

Eyes behind the lines : US Army long-range reconnaissance and surveillance units / James F. Gebhardt.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Military reconnaissance—United States. I. Title.

U220.G43 2005

355.4'13'0973--dc22

2005017615

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Foreword

Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units is the 10th study in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work is an out-growth of concerns identified by the authors of *On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM*. Specifically, these authors called into question the use of long-range surveillance (LRS) assets by commanders during that campaign and suggested an assessment ought to be made about their continuing utility and means of employment. This revision contains some important additional information the author received after this book was originally published

Major (Retired) James Gebhardt, of CSI, researched and wrote this Occasional Paper with that end in view. In this study, Gebhardt surveys the US Army's historical experience with LRRP and LRS units from the 1960s Cold War and Vietnam War, through their resurgence in the 1980s and use in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, to the advent of the GWOT. The paper's analytical framework examines each era of LRS units in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel. In doing so, the author makes a strong case for continuing the LRS capability in the Army's force structure.

The variety of environments and enemies likely to be faced by the military in the GWOT continues to demand the unique human intelligence abilities of trained and organized LRS units. As the Army leads the Armed Forces of the United States in combating terrorists where they live, the lessons found in this survey remain timely and relevant.

Timothy R. Reese
Colonel, Armor
Director, Combat Studies Institute

Acknowledgments

I first became involved in long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) issues in early September 1967, when I volunteered to attend the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Recondo School at Nha Trang. At the time, I was a 19-year-old rifleman in a mechanized infantry company and badly wanted a change of venue for the remaining six months of my 12-month tour. I was fortunate to graduate from MACV Recondo School, even more fortunate to survive the next six months as a novice LRRP team leader in a newly formed LRRP detachment and return home safely from the war in March 1968. Those six months of LRRP duty were my only exposure to this type of unit in my almost two decades of military service that followed Vietnam. But they have helped me better understand the issues included in this study. My own experience played a role in reflecting on several specific issues and is documented in textual reference endnotes when used.

Another group of LRRP veterans has made an enormous contribution to this study—the men who belong to the VII Corps LRRP Association. They not only have formed an association of USAREUR (United States Army Europe) LRRP veterans (both V and VII Corps) with an Internet presence that conducts periodic reunions, but they also have become archivists of a sort, sending all their clippings, orders, photographs, and other documents to one member, who in turn has loaded them onto a compact disk for public distribution. The current VII Corps LRRP Association president is Kirkland H. Gibson; the archivist is Anselmo Rodriguez. Behind these two men are scores of solid citizens who served in all ranks of the Army from private first class to colonel, in peace and war, many of whom who have shared their time and experiences with me over the Internet.

One of these men, Colonel (Retired) Ellis D. Bingham, the communications officer of the VII Corps LRRP Company from its inception in July 1961 to October 1962, continued to lobby for the LRRP concept after his reassignment. Then Major Bingham had a vision for LRRP that was not realized until long after the Vietnam War. He saved his personal and official correspondence from that era and graciously loaned it to me for the writing of this study.

The Vietnam LRRP veterans have contributed to this study largely through their anecdotal histories. While their memoirs, primarily published in paperback editions beginning in the mid-1980s, lack the accoutrements of scholarly history (footnotes, bibliography, and so on), the consistency of

their work is remarkable in a number of areas germane to this study.

I owe a large debt to another group, the LRRP and LRSU (long-range surveillance unit) veterans who elected to complete a multi-page questionnaire based on their personal experiences. Their intimate knowledge of what happened at distinct places and times, in some cases more than 40 years ago, provided many points of light out of which the larger picture came into view. I was also fortunate to interview several veterans of Operation DESERT STORM, including a LRSD (long-range surveillance detachment) commander, a military intelligence battalion S3 and the VII Corps G3. These perspectives greatly enhanced my understanding of LRS performance in that operation.

The staff at Fort Leavenworth's Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) has been indispensable in providing interlibrary loan and document-retrieval services to support this research. Dr. William G. Robertson, Dr. Donald P. Wright, Lieutenant Colonel Brian M. De Toy, and Ms. Catherine Shadid Small sat on the editorial board. My colleague, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) David P. Cavaleri, provided needed critical review of key passages and many helpful research suggestions. Ms. Small was also responsible for the editing and layout of the study for publication. I am solely responsible for the analysis and opinions expressed in this work.

James F. Gebhardt
CSI, Fort Leavenworth

Chapter 1

Introduction

This study, an examination of US Army LRRP doctrine and experience, generated from a comment made by one of the authors of *On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM*:

The Army should also assess long-range surveillance units. Lightly equipped helicopter-inserted long-range surveillance units organic to conventional maneuver divisions and the corps military intelligence brigade did not produce great effect for the investment of talent and the risk to those involved. There may be nothing inherently unsound in the structure of long-range surveillance units. Perhaps the issue is whether the Army is prepared to risk these relatively fragile units in fast-moving, ambiguous situations. These same units might prove useful in some other environment, but in any case, assessing the utility and the means of employing these units makes sense based on their apparent lack of utility in [Operation IRAQI FREEDOM] OIF.¹

The support for this remark is the fact that during OIF, long-range surveillance units (LRSU) of the 3d Infantry Division selected some 27 deployment sites but used only three. Their parent division was moving too fast and there was great concern for the risk versus reward of using these teams. The *On Point* authors further tied this issue of questionable LRSU performance back to Operation DESERT STORM, asserting that “LRS units assigned to conventional maneuver units also produced very little in DESERT STORM, suggesting that their role and viability should be reassessed.”²

As this study was being prepared in the fall of 2004 and early 2005, that reassessment was ongoing; the Army was studying the size and composition of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) brigade. Even though at the time of this writing the proposed RSTA brigade included a long-range surveillance (LRS) company, its future may yet be in jeopardy. The purpose and goal of this work is to provide decision makers throughout the Army with a historical perspective that enables them to make a better-informed decision on the future of LRSU.

LRSU did not emerge in the force structure in the early 1980s without antecedents. The Army itself, in the Vietnam era, drew long-range patrol unit

lineages from a variety of seemingly unrelated sources, finally settling on the 75th Rangers in early 1969. Some researchers of long-range surveillance prefer as LRRP forebears Lieutenant General Walter Kruger's Alamo Scouts, an organization of hand-picked soldiers from throughout his Sixth Army that trained and operated from late 1943 to the end of the war in the Pacific Theater.³ This study, however, looks closer to the modern era and finds important and useful antecedents to LRSU in the LRRP units of the US Army in Europe beginning in the late-1950s, and in the Vietnam War itself.

This study is not a full-blown history of LRRP and LRSU; it is more like a survey.⁴ It strives to use the historical facts as bases for analysis. The framework both for organizing the research and presenting this study's analysis is doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel (DOTMLP). These themes are used as headings throughout the four main chapters. This study examines the US Army's LRRP doctrine through the lens of five field manuals, published between 1962 and 1995, with limited reference to a draft manual now scheduled for publication at the end of 2005. Where appropriate, this work compares the Army's doctrine for LRRP employment with actual LRRP use in combat, specifically in Vietnam over several years and in Operation DESERT STORM.

LRRP organization is reflected in a discussion of the table of organization and equipment (TOE) in the three eras, with particular emphasis on changes in the structure of both the headquarters and patrol elements. Training for LRRP soldiers began at the unit level in USAREUR and was bolstered in the Vietnam and modern eras by formal training institutions. This work examines the influence of these two institutions on the LRRP soldiers and units of their respective generations. Materiel issues fall into the relatively distinct categories of vehicles, weapons, and communications/surveillance equipment. A look at LRRP-unit leadership as it pertains to the tactical (not the administrative) role of leaders is also included, with questions like: What tasks have relatively junior officers (field grade at most) and senior noncommissioned officers performed in LRRP units over time? Finally, this study looks at the soldiers who have manned LRRP units over the three eras—who these soldiers were and how they have been recruited and retained.

Three manifestations of LRRP units are recognized in this work: USA-REUR from the late 1950s to the late 1960s (Chapter 2), Vietnam from 1966 to 1972 (Chapter 3), and the LRSU era of roughly 1981 to the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism in late 2001 (Chapter 4). The author has

chosen not to comment on most LRSU activities post-late 2001, in an effort to avoid compromising any LRSU tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) out of a genuine respect and concern for the soldiers who are still performing LRS missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locales. Those needing to study these most recent LRSU activities will find sources and means to do so in other venues.

In this study, each chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the DOT-MLP trends noted for that period. Chapter 5 is a multi-domain analysis that seeks to synthesize the chapter conclusions. It ends with the author's opinion on the future viability of LRSU for the contemporary operational environment (COE).

Notes

1. Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army: 2004), 423.
2. Ibid., 164.
3. For a brief but excellent description of this unit, see Major Billy E. Wells, Jr., “The Alamo Scouts: Lessons for LRSUs,” *Infantry* (May-June 1989): 26-32.
4. The history of LRRP is largely contained in two works: in Michael Lee Lanning’s, *Inside the LRRPS: Rangers in Vietnam* (New York: Ivy Books, 1988), and in Shelby L. Stanton’s, *Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam* (New York: Orion Books, 1992). A comprehensive history of LRSU has yet to be written.

Chapter 2

USAREUR Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols, 1957-68

Background

Military historians link the emergence of long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) units in the US Army in Europe (USAREUR) in the early 1960s to the tactical and operational issues arising out of the strategic positioning of Soviet and US forces in Western Europe in the late 1950s.¹ The need to acquire high-value targets for long-range artillery, air strikes, and even tactical nuclear-delivery means, coupled with the desire not to cause widespread physical destruction to Europe through indiscriminate use of firepower, led US Army commanders to experiment with long-range patrols. The technical intelligence-collection assets of that era were inadequate for locating or confirming the desired targets to the necessary degree of accuracy.

At least four long-range patrol organizations emerged from this experimentation: a reconnaissance platoon in the US Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF or more commonly, SETAF) in northern Italy, two corps-level provisional LRRP units in the Seventh Army in Germany, and a division-level LRRP detachment in the 3d Infantry Division of V Corps in Germany.²

The SETAF reconnaissance platoon appeared in late 1957. Operating in the Italian Alps and adjoining lowlands of the Po Valley, this unit developed TTP for long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition activities. This unit, informally called “sky cavalry,” but with the formal designation of Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon, 110th Aviation Company (Surveillance), remained in existence until disbanded in 1964. It was stationed at Boscomantico Army Airfield, near Verona, Italy, which was at that time the site of SETAF Headquarters (HQ) and also HQ, 1st Missile Command.³

V Corps, historically responsible for the defense of the Fulda-Frankfurt axis of West Germany, employed LRRP units in Exercise *Sabre-Hawk* in February 1958.⁴ Several lessons were drawn from this experience; one was that a special organization and special training were required for LRRP operations. V Corps HQ reported these lessons in a memorandum on 8 March 1958, with the subject line “Battlefield Surveillance and Target Acquisition—Stay Behind and Long Range Patrols” and including four enclosures.⁵

The Seventh Army in Germany created provisional surveillance platoons in the reconnaissance squadrons of infantry and armored divisions in 1958.⁶ These units participated in two separate field exercises in 1959.⁷ In April 1959, HQ, Seventh Army forwarded the results of a “LRRP study” by its G2 (intelligence staff) to the Department of the Army with a recommendation for a LRRP organization.⁸ HQ, Seventh Army followed this up with another memorandum, subject line reading “Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Study,” in August 1959.⁹

In preparation for the Seventh Army’s upcoming *Winter Shield* major field training exercise (FTX), the VII Corps commander (Lieutenant General Guy S. Meloy, Jr.) authorized the formation of a provisional LRRP company in the fall of 1959.¹⁰ This unit, which was organized and began training on 7 December 1959 and was disestablished on 10 March 1960, was formed on the base of A Company, 2d Armored Rifle Battalion, 51st Armored Infantry Regiment, 4th Armored Division. An infantry combat veteran of the Korean War, Captain Philip D. Grimm, was the commander of this provisional LRRP company.¹¹

The company’s mission was to patrol the zone of the corps’ area of interest to a depth of 10 to 50 miles inside enemy-held territory, supplementing the technical target-acquisition capability available in the corps at that time (side-looking airborne radar [SLAR] and aerial-drone photography).¹² The unit was organized with a company headquarters; intelligence-operations, communications, supply, transportation and maintenance, and mess sections; and two patrol detachments. Operating in the field under the VII Corps G2’s control, the LRRP company was split between the corps main command post (company minus) and the corps alternate command post (communications and intelligence-operations sections). The communications section was quite large, with one officer and 55 enlisted men manning three base radio stations. Each patrol detachment contained eight patrols with six men in each patrol, one of whom was a radio operator.

Captain Grimm trained his LRRP company in two phases. The basic phase, which lasted approximately five weeks, emphasized individual soldier skills required for long-range patrolling, as well as physical hardening. This phase culminated in a 77-mile, 69-hour combination land-navigation, evasion and escape, and exfiltration problem. Radio operators were sent to the 10th Special Forces Group during this phase for practical training in how to operate communications equipment in a field environment. Other special forces personnel came to the company for one week and presented training in aircraft terminal guidance, aerial resupply techniques, and survival. The

advanced phase consisted of a two-week FTX, during which the company (minus the radio base stations) was fully operational.

The LRRP company was equipped with continuous wave (CW) radios, standard-issue cold-weather gear, and boots with German mountain-climbing soles; it also ate a US Air Force survival ration, favored for its light weight and low bulk, during field training and operations. Soldiers who met a specified training standard were authorized by the VII Corps commander to wear a black beret.¹³

Four CH-34 helicopters and their crews were attached to the LRRP company during its entire existence. The unit also had access to a U-6 “Beaver” for resupply missions. In a photograph from the Grimm collection, LRRP soldiers are attaching a wooden ammunition box to the airplane’s wing shackles.¹⁴ This method worked well in training, but proved inadequate during the *Winter Shield* exercise due to poor weather conditions.

The LRRP company was handicapped during *Winter Shield* by the use of non-organic radio operators at the radio base stations, which resulted in a message-received success rate of only 45 to 50 percent. Nonetheless, according to Captain Grimm, “The LRRP company furnished over 85 percent of the information VII Corps received during the entire course of WINTERSHIELD I.”¹⁵

Concurrent with the conduct of FTX *Winter Shield*, in late January 1960 a memorandum was published by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, with the subject line: “Proposed Long Range Reconnaissance Organization.”¹⁶ FTX *Winter Shield* resulted in a recommended table of distribution for long-range reconnaissance units and an addendum to an Army training directive on “stay-behind” operations.¹⁷

In September 1960, at the direction of Seventh Army, V and VII Corps both formed provisional 80-man reconnaissance units. These units participated in Exercise *Winter Shield II* and “confirmed the effectiveness of long-range reconnaissance patrols in a special target acquisition role.”¹⁸ USAREUR approved the formation of two corps-level LRRP companies in March 1961, and these companies were activated in July of that year.¹⁹ The V Corps company was stationed at Wildflecken, just south of Fulda, and the VII Corps company was stationed at Nellingen Barracks near Stuttgart.

The V Corps LRRP company moved to Frankfurt in 1963, first to Edwards

Kaserne (January) and later to Gibbs Kaserne (May). Redesignated as Company D (LRP), 17th Infantry (Airborne) on 15 May 1965, it remained in Frankfurt until June 1968, when it was redeployed back to Fort Benning, Georgia. The company was renamed A Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry (Airborne) in February 1969 and moved to Fort Hood, Texas in February 1970, where it was deactivated in December 1974 after the formation of 1st and 2d Battalions, 75th Ranger Regiment, at Fort Benning and Fort Lewis.²⁰

The VII Corps LRRP company was redesignated as Company C (LRP), 58th Infantry (Airborne) on 15 May 1965, and remained at Nellingen Barracks near Stuttgart until it was redeployed back to Fort Riley, Kansas in 1968. It subsequently was renamed B Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry (Airborne), moved to Fort Carson, Colorado, and in June 1974 was moved for the last time to Fort Lewis, Washington, where it was deactivated just as the 2d Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment was being formed.²¹ This study will focus on the V and VII Corps LRRP companies during their modest tenure in Germany.

The 3d Infantry Division, a subordinate unit of V Corps, also formed its own provisional LRRP detachment on 20 November 1961 and stationed it at Daley Barracks in Bad Kissingen. This provisional unit remained in existence until 14 August 1964, when it was disbanded and its soldiers returned to their units of assignment.²² Because it was a subordinate unit of V Corps, it will be discussed along with the V Corps LRRP company in this study.

Doctrine

Citing the Seventh Army LRRP initiative of April 1959, in August 1960 the Commander, Continental Army Command (CONARC)—predecessor to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM)—directed the Commandant of the Armor School at Fort Knox to develop a “proposed doctrinal guidance statement,” “interim organizational and operational concepts,” and “interim training literature required to provide training to individual members and units of LRRP.”²³ The suspense dates for this project were 1 December 1960 for the proposed doctrinal guidance statement, 1 February 1961 for the interim organizational and doctrinal concepts, and 1 June 1961 for the interim training literature.

Fort Knox produced a draft operational and organizational concept document in January 1961 and released a 44-page interim operational and

organizational concept document in April 1961.²⁴ Organizations that provided comments to the Fort Knox operational concept documents included the Intelligence Center, Command and General Staff College, Aviation School, Artillery and Missile School, and Infantry School. The training literature, a 100-page document, was published in July 1961.²⁵ The Department of Armored Operations at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas developed and published two drafts of a proposed TOE for the LRRP company in November 1961 and January 1962, about six months after the provisional corps LRRP companies had been activated in Germany.²⁶

A draft US Army Field Manual (FM) 31-18, *Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, Division, Corps, and Army*, was published in December 1961, followed quickly in January 1962 by its final draft and then the approved version in June 1962. This thin field manual of just 26 pages contained the first Department of the Army-approved doctrine for the employment of long-range patrols.²⁷ The supervisory responsibility for this manual, if not the authorship itself, resided in the Department of Armored Operations of CGSC. But as the historical record shows, the Armor School at Fort Knox had considerable input into the work products. Historical materials from the V and VII Corps LRRP veterans' groups do not suggest that either company in Germany significantly participated in the writing of this doctrine.

The 1962 manual defines a long-range patrol as:

. . . a military force organized and trained as an information gathering agency responsive to the intelligence requirements of the tactical unit commander. Patrols consist of specially trained personnel capable of performing reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, or combat raid operations within the field army area of influence.²⁸

FM 31-18 describes the LRP's primary mission as “enter[ing] a specified area within the enemy's rear to observe and report enemy dispositions, installations, and activities,” and then lists 10 specific missions:

- Determine strength, equipment, location, disposition, organization, and movement of enemy forces, nuclear weapons delivery systems, reserves, command posts, and key installations
- Conduct surveillance of specific routes or areas
- Execute special demolitions missions
- Locate, exploit, destroy, or capture special intelligence targets

- Conduct post-strike nuclear-damage assessment and perform CBR (chemical, biological, radiological) surveying and monitoring
- Establish and maintain contact with special forces, guerrillas, and other friendly forces
- Assist in terminal guidance for delivery of pathfinders
- Adjust air strikes and artillery fires
- Perform target-acquisition or survey tasks
- Perform other ground-collection tasks as ordered.²⁹

The 1962 doctrine envisions one LRP company per corps, with all or a portion of the company attached to or placed in support of the corps' subordinate units. FM 31-18 charges the commanders of all these units to employ the LRPs for the missions listed above. The LRP company was to be organized into a company HQ and three patrol platoons. In the company headquarters was to be a small headquarters section (two officers and two enlisted men, 2/2), the administration, mess, and supply section (0/16), transportation and maintenance section (0/12), operations section (3/7), and communications section (1/22). Each patrol platoon was to consist of a headquarters (1/4) and eight patrols (0/5). The total company strength was to be nine officers and 191 enlisted men. Committed patrols, unless part of a detached platoon, were to operate directly under company control and report to the company operations section.³⁰

FM 31-18 also provides for the creation of provisional LRP units by divisions, missile commands, armored cavalry regiments, or separate brigades. According to the manual, factors that would influence the creation of provisional LRP units are range of weapons and depth of areas of influence, along with the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition capabilities inherent within organic combat units.³¹

Encrypted, CW radio was to be the primary means of communication between committed patrols and the three base radio stations operated by the LRP company. FM radio was to be used to communicate with uncommitted patrols and between the LRP company and its higher HQ, while wire was to be used for communications within the LRP company HQ and between its operations section and the intelligence section of higher HQ. According to the manual, messengers were to be used for carrying maps, overlays, sketches, and reports back and forth between headquarters. Visual means of communication were to be used by patrols for marking landing sites and in aiding terminal control of aircraft during delivery and recovery of patrols.³² Because the primary means of communication

of committed patrols was CW radio, assigned radio operators had to be proficient at the intermediate level in sending and receiving International Morse Code. It was desirable that other patrol members also have some degree of proficiency.³³

FM 31-18 discusses planning for a LRP operation as being conducted by the intelligence or operations section of the higher HQ, with the participation of the LRP company commander or his representative. This planning would then result in the following minimum guidance being provided to the LRP company:

- specific mission statement for a patrol
- all available information on terrain, weather, enemy, and area of operation
- method of delivery and return, with provision for coordination with transportation unit
 - friendly tactical information
 - special instructions on use of electronic surveillance equipment
 - method of obtaining special equipment for patrol's use
 - evasion and escape (E & E) procedures.³⁴

The manual charges responsibility to the LRP company commander and operations section for the detailed preparation of the patrol plan, with help from the patrol leader and a representative of the unit providing transportation. FM 31-18 lists many specific elements of this plan, taken from FM 21-75, *Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling*.³⁵

It also requires the detailed patrol plan be coordinated with several staff elements of the controlling headquarters: intelligence and operations sections, fire-support elements (artillery, air defense, and tactical air support), and chemical, biological, and radiological elements. The controlling headquarters intelligence section was to be responsible for any further coordination required.³⁶ The higher HQ was to exercise continuous and very restrictive control of the operations of committed patrols, using the LRP company chain of command and communications network.³⁷

The “Operations” section of this field manual provides insight into LRP-unit tactics in 1962. From a LRP company command post (CP) located somewhere near the corps or army main CP, LRPs were dispatched to confirm or amplify information acquired from aerial observation, photography, electronic surveillance, or radio intercept, or to enter an area about which nothing was known. In addition, the LRP could be used to locate targets

for long-range weapons or to provide early warning about the movement of specific enemy weapon systems or units (reserves). LRP s could also be inserted in such a manner as to provide saturation or area coverage.³⁸

In their patrol area of operations, LRP s could undertake route surveillance, reconnaissance of a specific area, detailed target acquisition to facilitate effective attack, nuclear damage assessment or CBR monitoring and survey, and combat raids. The brief paragraph on combat raids recommends using linguists for obtaining information as a by-product of a raid, and indigenous personnel knowledgeable of the target area. FM 31-18 does not define or list what it considers legitimate targets for a LRP combat raid in 1962. The 1962 doctrine envisions LRP operations in jungle, desert, mountain, and northern (arctic) terrain.³⁹

The manual illustrates that several factors governed the method of LRP delivery: mission, enemy situation, assets available, weather and terrain, depth of penetration, and target priority. Security and secrecy of movement were emphasized over convenience. The methods of delivery included: stay-behind, air-landing, parachute (static-line, not free fall), water, and land infiltration.⁴⁰ Recovery was normally planned before the initiation of a patrol and, irrespective of what headquarters (the LRP company or a higher HQ) was controlling the patrol, responsibility for executing its recovery belonged to the LRP company commander. FM 31-18 views ground exfiltration by individuals or small groups as a normal means of LRP recovery.⁴¹

According to FM 31-18, LRP company personnel were to be volunteers and parachute qualified. The company commander, operations officer, platoon, and patrol leaders were to be Ranger qualified. It was desired that other personnel have Ranger or special forces qualification. All personnel were also to be cross-trained as radio operators and receive continuous training in a number of subjects: demolitions, combat surveillance, target-acquisition techniques, evasion, escape, survival, advanced first-aid procedures, map reading, tactical appreciation of terrain, and an extensive knowledge of enemy tactics, organization, weapons, and logistical systems. LRP units were to maintain proficiency by conducting frequent long-range reconnaissance and combat-raid exercises.⁴²

Less than three years later, in January 1965, the second edition of FM 31-18 was published. Page-by-page comparison of these two manuals reflects the accumulated European experience in some areas. The purpose and scope of the new manual was the same. However, the definition of a long-range patrol was slightly enlarged and refined.⁴³

The actual mission list in the new manual was shortened by two: “execute special demolitions missions” and “establish contact, exchange information, and maintain liaison with special forces, friendly guerrillas, and other friendly forces” were both dropped.⁴⁴ The direct-action mission from the 1962 manual (“locate, exploit, destroy or capture special intelligence targets”) was simplified and restated in 1965 as “execute combat raids on a limited basis as required.”⁴⁵ The capabilities of a LRP company increased by one (“be equipped and trained for employment in any theater of operations”), and the limitations decreased by one (“missions requiring offensive action subject the patrols to possible early discovery”).⁴⁶ That is a curious deletion, since the 1965 mission list included combat raids on a limited basis.

The “basis of issue” of a LRP company changed slightly in 1965 to one per field-army headquarters and one per corps (the 1962 manual did not include the LRP company at field army). A 1965 LRP company had one less officer and one less soldier in the operations section, a 33 percent larger communications platoon (up from 22 to 35 soldiers), a 25 percent larger transportation and maintenance section (up from 12 to 15 soldiers), and lost two soldiers from each patrol platoon headquarters, for a total company strength of eight officers and 200 soldiers.⁴⁷ This significant increase in size of the communications element reflected the importance attached to reliable communications in the USAREUR LRRP experience.

The LRP company in 1965 had three patrol platoons, each platoon comprising a small headquarters element and eight patrols of five men each. A patrol consisted of a patrol leader, two radio operators, and two observers. When committed, a patrol operated directly under company control and reported information to the company operations section.⁴⁸ Each patrol was equipped with two radios, either AN/PRC-25 or -77, with an AN/GRA-71 burst transmission group coder. The soldiers of the patrols were all armed with the M14 semi-automatic rifle.⁴⁹ Each patrol also had access to one observation telescope and one infrared metascope.⁵⁰

While the LRP company owned five M60 machine guns, two were assigned to the company HQ section and then one went to each of the three base radio stations in the communications platoon for defense. The company also owned eight M2 .50-caliber machine guns, all of them assigned to the transportation and maintenance section. The single M79 grenade launcher in the company belonged to the HQ section. The company’s six 3.5-inch rocket launchers were assigned one to the transportation and maintenance section, two to the operations section, and one to each of the three

base radio stations, also for defense.

In 1965, the missions for LRP s were still derived from the intelligence-collection plan and the operations plan of the controlling HQ. The patrols' methods of operating, communicating, and reporting (TTP in today's terms) were to come out of the patrol company standing operating procedures (SOP). In hindsight, it would have been helpful if the 1965 field manual had contained, even as an appendix, a recommended tactical SOP based upon the combined experience of the two LRRP companies in USA-REUR. The minimum guidance issued by higher headquarters for a LRP mission was modified somewhat in 1965:

- designated patrol position or area to be kept under observation and information desired (mission)
- disposition of all friendly forces operating in patrol area
- method of delivery
- routes, primary and alternate, to patrol position, landing zone, or drop zone
- primary and alternate landing zone or drop zone locations
- restrictions regarding routes, specific areas, and times of delivery, so that they may be considered planning and deployment of the patrol
- special equipment required
- any other issues in accordance with the company SOP.⁵¹

The patrol plan's list of essential elements was modified slightly in 1965, adding reference to a flight plan and a logistical support plan and dropping references to a local security plan and provisions for operational readiness inspection and rehearsals.⁵²

In 1965, as in 1962, higher HQ was responsible for maintaining continuous control during LRP operations, using the communication net and chain of command of the LRP company. The field manual strongly emphasizes restrictive controls, including several graphic control measures, to avoid duplication of effort and ensure the safety of the patrol.⁵³ This may appear to conflict with the previous statement that committed patrols operated directly under company control, yet what it really means is that higher headquarters did not issue orders and instructions directly to committed patrols, but rather controlled them through the chain of command.

While the mission list for LRP s in 1965 includes reconnaissance and surveillance of areas, a careful reading of the operations section of FM

31-18 suggests that patrols were preferred to observe from a static position, not while moving about an area of operations (AO). FM 31-18 (1965) still emphasizes locating targets for long-range weapons and providing information or early warning about enemy reserves and special weapons delivery means. It recommends, as its method of employment, emplacing a patrol to observe a point target or a system of patrols to watch a larger area, each patrol monitoring a specific target or terrain feature within that larger area. The manual does acknowledge that an entire patrol might have to move to reconnoiter an area not under direct observation.⁵⁴

The entire paragraph in the 1962 manual titled “Combat Raids” (paragraph 19) was dropped from the 1965 manual, leaving intact as the four primary missions of a LRP in 1965: reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and tactical damage evaluation/CBR monitoring. In all likelihood, elimination of this paragraph reflected the USAREUR experience, wherein any suggestion of offensive activity in actual combat situations was anathema to the LRP concept. The mere firing of a weapon, it was felt, would compromise a patrol and prevent it from accomplishing the paramount missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. On the other hand, as was pointed out earlier, “execute combat raids on a limited basis as required” remained at the bottom of the 1965 list of specific missions.

FM 31-18’s 1965 version added high altitude-low opening (HALO) parachute techniques to the possible methods of patrol delivery by parachute, clearly reflecting the USAREUR experience in both V and VII Corps LRRP companies.⁵⁵ The use of ground vehicles for patrol delivery was also added. In 1965, just as in 1962, the LRP company commander was charged with the issuance of orders and control of recovery operations.⁵⁶

Finally, the training paragraph of the 1965 manual cites experience in the Seventh Army, European Theater, when it suggests that “about eight months are required to produce an effectively trained and reliable long range patrol.”⁵⁷ This prescription for well-trained long-range patrols would soon fly in the face of the 12-month tour length established for duty in Vietnam.

The planned and actual employment of LRP units in USAREUR, as recalled by those who served and trained in the units, coincides quite closely with the published doctrine of 1962 and 1965.⁵⁸ The VII Corps LRRP company, for example, trained for six specific missions:

- To locate artillery and air targets, specifically artillery pieces with

a nuclear delivery capability, rocket launchers and guided missiles that could affect the corps, and large armored elements along major avenues of approach.

- To maintain continuous surveillance of primary avenues of approach and major target complexes.
- To conduct damage assessments of a nuclear, artillery, or air strike on large command posts and supply installations.
- To locate and identify enemy units and installations.
- To conduct chemical-biological-radiological surveys.
- To conduct limited area search and route reconnaissance.

The corps area of influence in the early 1960s was about 50 miles in front of the corps. LRRP-unit personnel anticipated that their deployed patrols would soon find themselves up to 300 miles behind the front line as the enemy forces advanced toward France and the English Channel. In their respective corps zones, LRRP companies had target folders for patrol missions to cover all the major avenues of approach in depth, every 10 to 20 miles whenever possible. The most probable methods of insertion would be stay-behind and air-landed initially, and by parachute subsequently.

Patrols had a radius of action of three to five miles and a duration of up to four days. Patrols trained in peacetime to remain in position for periods of up to 10 days. The command expected 50-75 percent of patrols to survive.⁵⁹ A sighting of a nuclear-delivery system by a patrol would result in an encoded message being sent by burst-transmission method to the base station. The base station would forward this message to the company operations section, where it would be decoded and analyzed. If deemed worthy, the message would be forwarded in encoded form by point-to-point telephone to the corps combat-surveillance center, where a LRRP company liaison officer (LNO) would decode it and pass it to the G2 representative. This entire process, from patrol sighting to delivery to the G2 representative, required on average 30-40 minutes.

In addition to decoding and passing patrol messages, the LNO at the corps combat-surveillance center also advised the G2 or corps commander on the capabilities and limitations of the LRRP company, coordinated artillery and air-defense corridors through which LRRP-supporting aircraft could safely fly, and requested Army or Air Force aircraft support for special missions.

Related to its wartime mission, the VII Corps LRRP company conducted communications training missions along the Czechoslovakian

border in 1962-63 and was briefly assigned a reconnaissance and surveillance mission there in the winter of 1963-64. A small LRRP team occupied a tower on the west side of the border fence that permitted them to observe Eisenstein, Czechoslovakia, for the movement of rail cars and military equipment.⁶⁰

V and VII Corps LRRP units planned another mission for wartime—the emplacement of atomic demolition munitions (ADM). The role of LRRP personnel was to draw the devices from their special storage areas and deliver them to designated emplacement sites (preferably by helicopter) in the company of an attached weapons technical specialist. While this mission is mentioned in the 1962 version of FM 31-18 (“execute special demolitions mission”), it did not appear in the 1965 version.⁶¹ In preparation for this mission in peacetime, LRRP personnel tested various methods of rigging and jumping with the devices, which were quite heavy.⁶²

With the exception of the ADM-emplacement mission, the two LRRP companies in USAREUR were almost exclusively intelligence-gathering organizations. Their proposed wartime employment was consistent with the doctrine that they, in fact, helped rewrite in the 1964-65 time period. As a later section of this study will show, their training program and activities also were consistent with the doctrinal emphasis on intelligence collection and reporting.

Organization

The SETAF provisional LRRP unit had a command element, 12 six-man patrols, and a rigger section in November 1961. The two officers in the unit were the commander and patrol platoon leader. The unit reported directly to the SETAF G2/G3 staff on field-training exercises.⁶³

The V Corps LRRP Company (Airborne) was established on 15 July 1961 and stationed in Wildflecken, near Fulda. It was initially assigned to the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) for administration and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction. After its move to Frankfurt in 1963, it was assigned to V Corps Special Troops. From its creation in 1961 until it departed Germany in mid-1968, the company remained under the operational control of the Corps G2. The unit retained the V Corps LRRP mission even while it was stationed at Fort Benning from 1968 to 1970 and later at Fort Hood.⁶⁴

In 1964, while it was still a provisional unit, the company had two patrol platoons, a communications platoon, and a headquarters platoon with clerks, cooks, armorers, and a rigger. For a time, the 2d Platoon was the

training platoon while the 1st Platoon was the operational one. Four men were assigned to a patrol. When TOE 7-157E was approved for the unit in May 1965, the company was organized with three patrol platoons of eight patrols each. Patrol strength increased from four to five men and the company received its own transportation section.⁶⁵

The 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment was stationed in Bad Kissingen, about 20 miles from the East German border. It received its administrative and logistical support from the 10th Engineer Battalion in Wurzburg and, for a time, was billeted with soldiers of the 14th ACR.⁶⁶ The detachment was commanded by a captain with a first lieutenant as operations officer, a first sergeant, and an operations noncommissioned officer (NCO).⁶⁷ A spring 1962 photograph of the detachment shows two officers and 34 NCOs and enlisted men.⁶⁸ The detachment headquarters, in addition to the command and administrative section, included the operations section, a small supply element, and a communications section. A standard patrol in the detachment was four men: patrol leader, radio operator, assistant radio operator, and scout. This detachment, therefore, could field five or six four-man patrols at any one time.⁶⁹

When it was first formed, the VII Corps LRRP Company had a headquarters platoon with clerks, cooks, operations, and transportation sections; a communications platoon of three base stations, each operated by an eight-man squad; and two patrol platoons consisting of six to eight four-man patrols each.⁷⁰ The unit was assigned to VII Corps Special Troops.⁷¹

Training

A detailed view of the training program of the VII Corps LRRP Company is available for the period between 1 April 1963 and 30 June 1964.⁷² This document provides insight into the intended combat employment of the unit. It states six general training objectives:

- To teach the individual soldier patrolling and reconnaissance techniques.
- To develop individual and unit proficiency in 12 listed areas.
- To develop the individual soldier physically for extended operations behind enemy lines.
- To teach and develop leadership and gain experience for the unit's commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
- To develop self-confidence, self-discipline, and self-reliance among all unit personnel.

- To develop fully trained reconnaissance-patrol members.

The guidance shows 107 hours of mandatory training for the 14-month period, 50 hours of which are in CBR and 28 of which are in Soviet order of battle (OB). Patrol training is divided into 67 line items for a total of 2,332 hours. The larger blocks of that training time are listed below, with time expressed in hours:

• Company field-training exercise	530
• Communications subjects	239
• Ski training	194
• Intelligence subjects (Soviet OB, equipment ID, and tactics)	176
• Land navigation, patrolling, E & E, day and night movement	170
• Airborne operations	147
• Commanders time	141
• Physical training	126

While 22 hours are set aside for helicopter training and terminal guidance, only 8 hours are allocated for water-borne operations. Almost as many hours are devoted to demolitions (38) as to weapons qualification (40). Language training is listed as a subject, but no specific hours are allocated. Although a combined 8 hours are devoted to Geneva Convention and enemy prisoner- of-war (EPW) handling, no training time is shown for conducting raids, ambushes, or other types of offensive combat in which prisoners might be captured. The six general training objectives and 67 listed training subjects suggest that reconnaissance (target acquisition, identification, and reporting) was the primary training and mission focus of this unit.

Parachute operations played a large role in VII Corps LRRP Company training. VII Corps LRRP soldiers who arrived in the unit without parachute qualifications were sent to airborne training conducted at Wiesbaden Air Base by the 8th Infantry Division Airborne School.⁷³ Many members of this unit belonged to a local skydiver club and performed HALO jumps both on and off duty.⁷⁴

Training in the V Corps LRRP Company is described more generally in sources as communications exercises in the summer and tactical exercises in the winter.⁷⁵ The patrols conducted an E & E exercise at least annually, with a special forces NCO as a grader with each patrol. One such exercise, conducted in December 1960 while the unit was still provisional, had LRRP

soldiers negotiating a snow-covered course that extended about 40 kilometers in an area between Wildflecken and Bad Kissingen. The four-man patrols had three days to cover the distance, find two "partisan checkpoints" to obtain rations, and evade both dismounted and mounted aggressor patrols.⁷⁶ After the V Corps LRRP Company was formed, LRRP patrols were frequently used as aggressors against conventional units in large FTXs.⁷⁷

LRRP soldiers maintained jump status by performing a parachute jump at least once every 90 days, using both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. On occasion, soldiers trained and jumped with German parachute units.⁷⁸ In addition to the basic airborne course, the 8th Infantry Division Airborne School at Wiesbaden Airbase also conducted an eight-week, 262-hour course in military free-fall parachuting, which was attended by many LRRP personnel from both V and VII Corps.⁷⁹ A photographic record exists of both V and VII Corps LRRP soldiers in attendance at a French free-fall school.⁸⁰ Like in the VII Corps LRRP Company, many HALO-trained V Corps LRRP soldiers also belonged to the V Corps skydiving club.⁸¹ Weapons qualification was conducted with assigned weapons and the soldiers were also trained in the use and maintenance of common Warsaw-Pact small arms. Other areas of training included land navigation, small-boat handling, Morse-Code communications skills, and Warsaw-Pact equipment identification.

Training in the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment included rigorous physical training, day and night patrolling, map reading and land navigation, forward-observer techniques, camouflage, explosives and demolitions, mountaineering skills, escape and evasion, path finding and helicopter operations, hand-to-hand combat, CBR, first aid, Soviet-Bloc weapons and equipment identification, and extensive radio field communications and Morse-Code instruction.⁸² The detachment participated in the division's FTXs and war games, frequently as aggressors or guerrillas inserted behind the lines by helicopter. On occasion, the detachment worked jointly with the V Corps or VII Corps LRRP companies.

The SETAF LRRP unit conducted ski training in the winter of 1961-62 and mountain training during the following summer. In addition to participating in regular parachute jumps, unit personnel trained in the operation of the then new AN/TRC-77 radio. During SETAF annual spring FTXs, the LRRP detachment played the role of aggressor troops against the artillerymen of the Corporal and Honest John missile units. In January 1963, in anticipation of being phased out, the LRRP unit trained members of the Italian Parachute Brigade in performing its LRRP mission.⁸³

A notional combat patrol for the SETAF LRRP unit involved the last-light low-level parachute insertion of a team of five highly trained infantrymen some 30 kilometers behind enemy lines.⁸⁴ Their mission was to confirm the location of an enemy tank-equipped force initially acquired by technical intelligence (aerial photography), and also to determine if a river was tank-fordable in the vicinity of a particular bridge. The team successfully parachuted from a U-1A *Otter* after a 50-minute flight. Approximately 4 hours after burying its parachutes in a patch of woods, the patrol reached the intermediate reconnaissance objective—the tank-capable bridge—and established a patrol base. Two men from the patrol went out to determine if a ford site existed nearby while two other men slept. The patrol leader remained on radio watch.

Two hours later, the scouting party returned to the patrol base with the required information, and the radio operator immediately transmitted it to HQ using a brevity code. About 3 hours later the patrol had walked to within two miles of its primary objective and established another patrol base. Two 2-man scouting parties spent several hours maneuvering and observing enemy forces, equipment, installations, and activities in and around the target area. One scouting party returned to the patrol base in mid-afternoon, shortly after which the three men were compromised by a dog in the company of an old man. After assuring themselves that the man had not seen them, the three men quickly moved to an alternate patrol base, taking their equipment and two additional rucksacks with them. The second scouting party rejoined the patrol at this new location at 1830.

After the two scouting parties synthesized their observations, the patrol leader prepared a report using a special format and the radio operator transmitted the report back to HQ. The patrol then set off on foot to reach a helicopter landing zone that was about 10 hours away. An H-34 *Choctaw* helicopter arrived near the pick-up zone at the appointed time and landed after an exchange of mutual-recognition signals. The description of this notional patrol closes with a tactical nuclear strike against the patrol's primary surveillance target—an enemy unit with command post, at least 22 tanks, 300-500 troops, and five antiaircraft positions.⁸⁵

External training was available to SETAF and USAREUR LRRP units from a variety of sources. The 10th Special Forces Group at Bad Tolz played a role in offering special-training opportunities to the LRRP units in Germany. An interesting inclosure to the August 1960 correspondence from the CONARC commander to the Armor School commandant was a January 1959 "After Action Report on Long Range Patrol School" from

HQ, 10th Special Forces Group.⁸⁶ A veteran of this era has identified a communications-training course provided by the 10th Special Forces in December 1958 or January 1959 to non-SF LRRP units.⁸⁷ NCOs from 10th Special Forces participated in V Corps LRRP annual readiness tests and E & E exercises as graders.⁸⁸

Radio operators from V Corps and the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment received advanced instruction from signal corps units near their barracks.⁸⁹ Sylvania Corporation civilian contractors provided on-site instruction in the operation and maintenance of the AN/TRC-77 CW radio.⁹⁰ VII Corps LRRP soldiers completed airborne training with the 8th Infantry Division at Wiesbaden.⁹¹ Some V and VII Corps LRRP Company soldiers were also able to train with NATO counterparts at German Ranger School and Norwegian Mountain School.⁹² In Italy, SETAF LRRP soldiers attended technical mountain training conducted by Italian army mountain troops.⁹³

VII Corps regularly sent its LRRP company to Nijmegen to participate in the 100-mile commemorative march. 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment soldiers also participated in the Nijmegen march and the division-wide expert infantryman's badge (EIB) competition in 1964.⁹⁴ The participation of LRRP units in the long-distance marching competitions is indicative of the high level of physical fitness maintained in the units across the board. In peacetime, the EIB was (and remains) the highest skill badge an infantryman could earn. LRRP soldiers rightly were granted access to these competitions to enable professional development in their primary MOS.

Materiel

Among the communications equipment used by all LRRP units in Europe were the man-portable AN/GRC-109 and AN/GRC-9 CW radios. Both of these were later replaced by the AN/PRC-74 and then the AN/TRC-77 for long-range communications using Morse code. While the AN/GRA-71 burst encoder became available and was issued to units in the spring of 1964, units tended to keep them locked in a secure place. Patrols used the AN/PRC-10 and AN/PRC-25 FM radios for communications within the patrol and for ground-to-air communications.⁹⁵ The AN/GRC-26 radio, normally mounted in a van or shelter, was used for communications between the base station and patrols.

The performance of LRRP communications was a matter of personal interest and concern of one VII Corps commander, Lieutenant General

Charles H. Bonesteel, III.⁹⁶ He familiarized himself with LRRP communications procedures and encouraged the efforts of the LRRP company communications officer to test and perfect base-station placement so that communications between deployed teams and the LRRP company and corps HQ would improve. In the opinion of this corps commander, the success of these communications techniques provided his corps “far more battlefield surveillance and even target acquisition than we thought we had.”⁹⁷

European LRRP soldiers initially carried the M1 rifle, were among the first to receive the new M14 semi-automatic rifle, and later were early recipients of the full-automatic-capable M16 rifle in late 1964.⁹⁸ At least one member of the V Corps LRRP Company was issued and carried a folding-stock AK47 for about 18 months.⁹⁹ The 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment was armed with M1 carbines.¹⁰⁰

While early in its history the VII Corps LRRP Company did not have organic vehicles to move the unit, a veteran who served in the unit after 1964 indicates that this deficiency was corrected.¹⁰¹ The V Corps LRRP Company in 1964 did not have organic tactical transportation except for a handful of M-151 jeeps for administration and light resupply. From mid-1965, when the new TOE became effective and the company was redesignated Co. D (LRP), 17th Infantry (Abn), it received an adequate number of 2 1/2-ton trucks.¹⁰²

While European LRRP units used many items of standard US Army field gear, all detachments took liberties with the uniform. V Corps LRRPs wore French and German camouflage clothing for both summer and winter use. All patrol members had boots re-soled with German Vibram so their footprints looked German. The 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment wore German-army camouflage uniforms and carried rucksacks rather than standard load-bearing equipment (LBE) packs. The SETAF LRRP soldiers wore a US-Marine camouflage jacket and pants in the field.¹⁰³ VII Corps, V Corps, and SETAF LRRP soldiers wore berets as distinctive headgear, maroon in the two corps units and black in Italy.

Rotary- and fixed-wing support was essential to LRRP-unit training and operations. In an interview conducted in 2002, Colonel (retired) Edward V. Maltese, the first commander of the VII Corps LRRP Company stated, “Our biggest problem was with helicopter support.” This was revealed to the corps commander during a visit to the unit, and shortly thereafter the corps aviation officer called the unit commander and the problem was resolved.¹⁰⁴ Because it was attached to an aviation company, the SETAF LRRP unit had

access to 15 UA-1 *Otter* fixed-wing and 15 CH-34 *Choctaw* rotary-wing aircraft.¹⁰⁵

Leadership

While biographical information is difficult to obtain on all the early leaders of the LRRP units in Europe, it appears that some care was taken in their selection. Major Edward V. Maltese, the first commander of the VII Corps Company, was an infantry officer with combat experience in the 82d Airborne Division in World War II and the 187th Parachute Infantry Regiment in Korea. His first executive officer was Captain Edward M. Hunt, an enlisted combat veteran of World War II who earned a Silver Star while serving in the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division. Hunt received a direct commission to second lieutenant in 1951 and subsequently served in both airborne and conventional units in Korea and the continental United States. He was a 1958 graduate of Ranger training at Fort Benning. Hunt succeeded Major Maltese and became the second commander of the VII Corps LRRP Company. An early commander of the V Corps provisional LRRP unit was a Major George R. Jost, who “was in reconnaissance work during WW II in Germany and led patrols in Alaska and Korea.”¹⁰⁶

While junior officers had important responsibilities in garrison, they did not generally participate in field activities as members of patrols.¹⁰⁷ The importance of these units as incubators for the professional development of young officers, however, should not be overlooked. All three officers who commanded the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment during its approximately three-year existence were airborne Rangers, as was the first operations officer. The first commander, First Lieutenant Edward M. Jentz, was promoted to captain while in command and in late 1962 departed to the 10th Special Forces Group. He later served in Vietnam in the 173d Airborne Brigade, in 5th Special Forces Group, and MACV Studies and Observations Group (SOG), and retired as a colonel. A platoon leader in this unit, Lieutenant John Pipia, commanded a special forces A-team and an infantry company in Vietnam. Later, as a member of the 4th Infantry Division G2 staff, he supervised the employment of 4th Infantry Division LRRP teams in the central highlands of Vietnam.¹⁰⁸ The operations officer, Lieutenant John Peyton, served three tours in Vietnam with the 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Cavalry Division, and in MACV as an adviser to Vietnamese Army forces.¹⁰⁹ Lieutenant David B. Tucker, operations officer of the VII Corps LRRP company in late 1963, commanded the 1st Cavalry Division’s LRRP unit in Vietnam in the summer of 1967 and was slated to

become the commander of the I Field Force LRP Company at the time of his death on 1 October 1967.¹¹⁰

The SETAF LRRP Detachment had two commissioned officers—the commander and a single lieutenant. The commander, Captain James Stampfer, had served in Ranger, airborne, and special forces units as an enlisted man and was a combat veteran of the Korean War. He was a 1954 Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduate and came to SETAF after rotary-wing flight school. With the cooperation of the SETAF G2/G3 staff, he took over a moribund training program and re-energized the unit. His single second lieutenant platoon leader, James D. James, went on as a captain to form and command the LRRP company of 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam, beginning that assignment in November 1966.¹¹¹ Major Stampfer also went to Vietnam, where he commanded an attack helicopter company.

Personnel

The first cohort of personnel for the VII Corps LRRP Company was formed from volunteers. Surprisingly, the European edition of *Stars and Stripes* published a small article listing the nine qualifications required to volunteer for assignment to the new unit:

- volunteer
- airborne qualified
- minimum physical profile of 111121¹¹²
- GT score of 100
- 1 year retainability
- no special or general courts-martial action during current enlistment
- military occupational specialty (MOS) of 111.07 and 111.17 (infantryman)
- working knowledge of communications
- confidential security clearance or statement of eligibility for same¹¹³

The assignments NCO at VII Corps “cherry picked” personnel and informed Major Maltese, the company commander, who would then interview and select the soldiers he wanted. Many of the unit’s first NCOs were World War II and Korean War veterans, some had American or German Ranger qualification, some had served in special forces. Others had served in foreign armies and spoke foreign languages fluently.

One typical volunteer was previously assigned as radio operator in a combat-engineer company. He volunteered for VII Corps LRRP Company

as soon as he heard it was forming and became a charter member. When he was recruited, he spoke French and German and was an expert rifleman. He received airborne training in the unit.¹¹⁴ Another soldier was later assigned to the V Corps LRRP Company involuntarily right out of Fort Benning jump school. He had an infantry rifleman (11B) primary MOS and earned radio operator (5B) as a secondary MOS while in the detachment.¹¹⁵

NCOs and personnel for the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment were recruited from battle group (BG) LRRP detachments that had been formed in the 4th and 15th Infantry Regiments.¹¹⁶ These personnel were all volunteers and came with various military occupational specialties. Several of the NCOs were parachute and Ranger veterans, some with World War II combat experience and others with Korean War combat experience. Some also had instructor experience at the Fort Benning Ranger School or in other previous units of assignment.

As is still common in the special-operations community, these sergeants tended to migrate back and forth between airborne, Ranger, and special forces units throughout their careers. Many of them later served in special-operations assignments in Vietnam and elsewhere. Some returned to the “mainstream” Army; a select few later occupied senior NCO leadership positions in LRRP units.¹¹⁷

During the relatively brief period of its existence, the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment experienced a phenomenon that was later to be repeated in many Vietnam LRRP units. At the beginning, all the patrol leaders were experienced middle-grade NCOs. As these men departed the unit at their date eligible for return from overseas (DEROS), young specialists fourth class (SP4s) and privates first class (PFCs) stepped forward to take their place. Although the young soldiers had the training and experience to assume leadership of LRRP patrols, they were not being promoted by their unit of assignment because they were detached for LRRP duty.¹¹⁸

One of the young LRRP sergeants from the VII Corps LRRP Company (1964-66), James R. Jackson, attended Infantry OCS at Fort Benning in 1967 and, upon arrival in Vietnam in March 1968, was assigned as the operations officer to F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. In his second tour in 1969-70 he was a district senior adviser assigned to MACV.¹¹⁹ Craig Vega’s service with the VII Corps LRRP Company began in the early summer of 1966. In January 1967 he volunteered to serve in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division LRRP Detachment in Vietnam. Vega arrived in Vietnam in May 1967 and served 12 months

in the brigade and later (from November) in the division LRRP unit.¹²⁰ Other enlisted veterans of the early European LRRP units met sadder fates in Vietnam. Sergeant Thomas O. Reyna, a member of the VII Corps LRRP company in 1967, was killed in May 1968 while serving in the 101st Airborne Division. Staff Sergeant Clifford N. Mize, who served in the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment in 1962, was killed in Pleiku Province on 23 June 1967 while assigned as an aeroscout in D Troop, 1-10 Cavalry of the 4th Infantry Division.¹²¹ Staff Sergeant Glenn H. English, Jr., who served in the VII Corps LRRP Company in 1962-64, earned the Medal of Honor posthumously on 3 September 1970 while assigned to E Company, 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, 173d Airborne Brigade.¹²²

Relocation

In June 1968, the V and VII Corps LRP companies returned to the United States, to Fort Benning and Fort Riley, respectively. D Company (LRP), 17th Infantry at Fort Benning was used to support three Ranger training sites in Georgia and Florida while also supporting the Vietnam orientation training at Fort Benning proper. Manned in part by Vietnam combat veterans from the 101st Airborne Division and 173d Airborne Brigade, this company also participated in training Company D, 151st Infantry of the Indiana National Guard for its deployment to Vietnam as a LRP company.

About six months after returning to the United States from Germany, on 1 February 1969 both LRP companies underwent another name change, to A Company 75th Rangers at Fort Benning and B Company 75th Rangers at Fort Riley. A Company was transferred to Fort Hood, Texas in February 1970 and B Company to Fort Carson, Colorado, with both units retaining their USAREUR LRP missions. Both companies remained in existence until the 1st and 2d Battalions, 75th Ranger Regiment started up in mid- to late 1974.

The USAREUR Experience

Modern LRRP was born in US Army units in Italy and Germany in the late 1950s out of the operational commanders' need to see deep in order to acquire high-value targets for their long-range conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. The doctrine written for these units in 1962 and revised in 1965 and 1968 regarded the LRRP capability as an important adjunct of the intelligence staff of divisions, corps, and field armies. In their training and planning for combat employment, all these units avoided direct, offensive combat actions except in self-defense. The organization

of LRRP units was built around a five- or six-man patrol, several patrols to a platoon, and a small number of patrol platoons in a detachment or company. The other critical organizational element of LRRP units was the communications section, comprised of two or three base stations.

Since no institutional training for LRRP existed, all training in this period was conducted in units and by sending personnel to special schools for specific MOS-related skill training. The primary focus of training was enemy equipment recognition, communications skills, and the TTP of surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling, insertions, and extractions. LRRP units were among the first to receive the M14 and M16 rifles when they were issued, and had access to recently developed communications and encryption devices. LRRP units were adequately equipped with wheeled vehicles for administrative movements after their TOE was approved in 1964.

The officer and NCO leadership of early LRRP units were carefully selected, and frequently were World War II or Korea combat veterans or had special forces or Ranger training and experience. Enlisted soldiers selected for duty in LRRP units were almost without exception volunteers, primarily from infantry and communications career fields. While some of their missions and day-to-day training activities were classified, the two corps-level LRRP companies in USAREUR were high-profile units and well known to their commanding generals and the press. These units established a legacy that remains visible today in LRSU.

Passing the Guidon

While it is difficult to empirically measure the impact the European LRRP experience had on the US Army, subjectively one can postulate several important contributions whose effects can still be observed almost 50 years later. All of the LRRP units in Europe (SETAF, 3d Infantry Division, V and VII Corps) were created because a need existed for information that could not be reliably provided by technical assets to local tactical- or operational-level commanders. All started as provisional units, were built “out of hide,” and were tested in major exercises as “proof of principle” while their commanders at several echelons worked on the necessary resourcing and documentation issues to attain full TOE status for them. By the time this was finally achieved in 1965, only the V and VII Corps LRRP companies had survived and prospered. These two companies then became a vital developmental laboratory for US Army long-range patrol doctrine, training, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The 1965 and 1968 editions of FM 31-18 were based in large part on this USAREUR experience.

The lessons learned in this “LRRP laboratory” were disseminated at many levels. Starting at the bottom, soldiers who trained and operated as LRRP soldiers in Germany and remained in service took their special knowledge and skills to other units and passed them along. Limited numbers of these young men served in combat units in Vietnam and some distinguished themselves with valor and sacrifice. NCOs from LRRP units rotated into other special-operations units or back to the conventional side of the Army, where they also passed along both their leadership and tactical/technical skills and experience. Some of these NCOs served multiple Vietnam combat tours in conventional and special-operations units. Junior officers who served as lieutenants and captains in European LRRP units went to Vietnam as captains and majors, where a few actually commanded LRRP units in combat. Others occupied important positions in advisory units to Vietnamese forces and on staffs.

Not emphasized in this study, yet still important, is the support to LRRP organizations in Europe provided by such future notable Army leaders as Colonel Melvin Zais, Jr., Colonel William E. DePuy, Major General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., and Lieutenant General General Charles H. Bonesteel, III. Colonel Zais helped give birth to LRRP as the G3 at Seventh Army in 1961; Colonel DePuy, as commander of 1st Battle Group, 30th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division at Schweinfurt in 1960-61, provided personnel to form the nascent LRRP detachment of 3d Infantry Division. Major General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., as commanding general of 3d Armored Division in V Corps in 1960-62, provided a platoon of soldiers to the provisional V Corps LRRP Company formed in 1961. Lieutenant General Abrams nurtured that same LRRP company as V Corps commanding general in 1963-64. Lieutenant General Bonesteel became intimately familiar with LRRP company operations as the VII Corps commander from August 1962 to August 1963, and later was a patron of the LRRP concept from his position as Director of Special Studies, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army in the Pentagon from September 1963 to September 1966.

The communications officer of the VII Corps LRRP Company, from its inception in July 1961 to late October 1962, did much to promote the LRRP concept after leaving the unit. Captain Ellis D. Bingham was subsequently assigned to the US Army Signal Center and School, Department of Command Communications, at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. From this post and later as a student at CGSC, Captain Bingham mounted a one-man campaign to transfer the lessons he had learned in VII Corps to the larger Army and later to the Vietnam operating environment.

Bingham’s LRRP-related activities from May 1964 to April 1966 fell

into three distinct areas. First, as a signal corps officer with LRRP-communications experience, he was periodically asked by Colonel M.B. Dodson, Director of Reconnaissance and Surveillance (DRS), Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) in the Pentagon, to provide input on technical issues pertaining to specific communications systems the Army was developing and testing for use by special forces and LRRP units.¹²³

Second, Captain Bingham also traveled to the Pentagon on at least two occasions to brief high-level Army staff officers on LRRP issues. On 15 May 1964, he and Major Edward M. Hunt (who was the second commander of the VII Corps LRRP Company, from May 1962 to June 1963) briefed Lieutenant General Ben Harrell (Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development), his one-star deputy, and several officers from his staff.¹²⁴ The purpose of the meeting was to discuss issues pertaining to the TOE of the LRRP company, which was nearing approval at that time. (This TOE was published on 28 September 1964.) Representatives of the US Army Combat Developments Command, Combined Arms Agency (CARMSA), Fort Leavenworth, were also at this meeting, and Hunt and Bingham were given the opportunity, over night, to comment on the draft FM 31-18 being developed at Fort Leavenworth. While Colonel Dodson at ACSI-DRS was Bingham's official host, in fact it was General Bonesteel who provided Hunt and Bingham access to this meeting and through it to the Fort Leavenworth manual-writing team.¹²⁵

Now promoted to major, Bingham returned to Washington on 21-23 June 1964, this time to brief the ACSI, Major General Edgar C. Doleman, and his deputy Brigadier General Charles J. Denholm on 21 June.¹²⁶ This was a classified briefing in which Bingham discussed general employment concepts for LRRP with an extended question-and-answer period. Bingham's official sponsor for this travel was once again Colonel Dodson. On the way out of the Pentagon on 23 June, Bingham made an office call with General Bonesteel. Bingham returned to Washington on 4 August to respond to additional questions from General Doleman and his staff.¹²⁷

Having been formally introduced to the Fort Leavenworth FM 31-18 writing team in May 1964, Bingham had subsequent telephone contact and exchanges of views with this group throughout the remainder of 1964. The project officer at Fort Leavenworth sent Major Bingham a copy of the soon-to-be published LRP company TOE and a draft of FM 31-18 on 18 September 1964. Bingham was invited to comment on the field manual, which he did formally on 6 October 1964.¹²⁸ Among these comments were the following:

At field army level, I envision the LRRP Company under the control of the Military Intelligence Battalion. This will insure a combined effort in addition to insuring the timely dissemination of intelligence information over existing intelligence nets.

In fact, as will be pointed out in this study's third chapter, some 20 years later the Army eventually arrived at this same conclusion and placed both the division LRS detachment and the corps LRS company in MI force structures.

Major Bingham continued his conversations with the doctrine writers in December 1965 when, as a student at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, he delivered a briefing to several CARMSA staff members on his favorite subject, LRRP.¹²⁹

The third arena into which Bingham thrust himself was to generate and send unsolicited memorandums, staff studies, and other correspondence to General Bonesteel and Colonel Dodson at the Pentagon. The document trail for this activity begins on 13 May 1964, as Bingham was preparing for the 15 May briefing with the ACSFOR. On this occasion, for the first but by no means the last time, Bingham raised the issue with Colonel Dodson of creating a CONUS-based LRRP company that could send a small number of LRRP patrols to Vietnam to test survivability in that environment.¹³⁰ This occurred a full year before the 173d Airborne Brigade was committed to the Vietnam War and two years before the first divisional LRRP detachment was created in Vietnam.

Bingham followed up with another letter to Colonel Dodson on 14 May, in which he recommended study of the Navy and Marine Corps long-range reconnaissance capability.¹³¹ On 12 June 1964, Bingham sent Colonel Dodson a letter containing "mini reviews" of five books on the subject of coast watching in the Pacific Ocean Theater during World War II.¹³² On 23 June 1964, Bingham acceded to Colonel Dodson's advice about organization and stated his intent "to start planning to insure the progression of employment concepts and equipment."¹³³ In this same letter, Bingham mentioned to Dodson that he had made an office call with General Bonesteel that very morning saying, "He is still 100% behind the concept."

To further his quest, in September or October of 1964 Bingham wrote a brief staff study (four-plus pages), whose purpose was "to determine whether long range reconnaissance patrols could be effectively employed

in Vietnam.” He concluded “that a long range reconnaissance patrol platoon (airborne) . . . be committed in Viet Nam with minimum delay.”¹³⁴³ Bingham mailed this document to Colonel Dodson in the weeks after its creation and Dodson acknowledged receipt of it in a reply letter on 18 November.¹³⁵

Several months later, in July 1965, Bingham wrote General Bonesteel to inform him he was going to Fort Leavenworth as a CGSC student, where he would continue to pursue his LRRP interest. Bingham also asked for an office call with General Bonesteel at his Pentagon office. He included with the letter a version of the “staff study” he had mailed to Colonel Dodson the previous fall.¹³⁶ General Bonesteel replied on 12 July, extending an invitation for the office call.¹³⁷ Major Bingham visited with General Bonesteel on his way to Fort Leavenworth in July 1965 and discussed with him their common interests in LRRP matters.

On 3 February 1966, Bingham sent a letter to Bonesteel and included with it his CGSC treatise titled “The Infantry Long Range Patrol Company,” completed in December 1965. The treatise concluded with five recommendations:

- Organize a LRP company training center in CONUS to facilitate training, research, and development of equipment and deployment techniques, and to provide US STRIKE Command with a LRP capability.¹³⁸
- Organize and train a LRP company for employment in Vietnam as a test to determine effectiveness and survivability.
- Conduct study to determine feasibility of centralized and coordinated effort for all surveillance capabilities at corps and field army level.
- Conduct immediate testing of LRPs in CONUS in conjunction with and support of airmobile operations.
- Test LRPs as a ground guidance means for high-altitude bombing of jungle areas.¹³⁹

General Bonesteel responded on 19 February with a letter, informing Bingham that his letter and study had been sent to Brigadier General William DePuy, J3 on General William C. Westmoreland’s staff in Vietnam, and also to “Army Staff action level types here in the Pentagon.”¹⁴⁰ About two weeks later, Colonel Dodson sent Bingham a letter confirming receipt of the study from General Bonesteel.¹⁴¹ Colonel Dodson commended Bingham and informed him that he [Bingham] could be updated on the latest developments in the LRP area by perusing a classified memorandum Dodson had sent to the appropriate secure storage facility at Fort Leavenworth.¹⁴²

In very late March or early April, 1966, Bonesteel forwarded to Bingham the original of a letter from General DePuy, dated 14 March 1966.¹⁴³ In this letter to Bonesteel, DePuy stated the following:

I appreciate your sending me Major Bingham's study. We have indeed been working on some of these things, but much work remains to be done and we certainly are not the experts at this point in time.

Tomorrow I am taking command of the 1st Division and I plan to do some work along these lines. Bingham's suggestions have stimulated some additional thought.

General DePuy assumed command of 1st Infantry Division on 15 March 1966, and true to his word, in April 1966 he caused the formation of a LRRP detachment in the 1st Infantry Division, the first divisional LRRP detachment to be formed in Vietnam.¹⁴⁴

The actions of Major Ellis D. Bingham, while not the proximate cause of the creation of LRP in Vietnam, certainly contributed substantially to the process. In his official capacity as a member of the Signal Center and School staff, he participated in technical evaluations and reviews of communications equipment destined for the LRP and special-operations community. He also interacted with the doctrinal community that was preparing the second edition of FM 31-18, the force-development community that was designing the organizational structures, and the intelligence community that was defining the LRRP mission in Vietnam. On a personal level, he made it his mission to expand the LRRP concept from the high-intensity war environment of Europe to the low-intensity (counterinsurgency) environment of Vietnam. The next chapter discusses the LRRP experience in Vietnam.

Notes

1. See, for example, Shelby L. Stanton, *Rangers at War* (New York: Orion Books, 1992), 13-4, and David W. Hogan, Jr., *Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 156.
2. Other LRRP detachments may also have been formed. Just as this study was being completed, I learned of a LRRP platoon that was created in the headquarters of 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (VII Corps, USAREUR) in the early fall of 1963. E-mail interview, Colonel (Retired) James S. Mathison, 21 March 2005. 36th Infantry Battalion, 3d Armored Division, formed and maintained a long-range patrol unit of two 4-man patrols from late 1959 until September 1960. See e-mail, Richard Cole to Kirk Gibson, forwarded to author on 27 July 2005, and written materials from Richard Cole to author received on 23 September 2005 (hereafter referred to as “Cole collection”).
3. A description of the unit by its former commander can be found in James Stamper, “Southern European Task Force (LRRP),” *Patrolling* (newsletter of the 75th Ranger Regiment Association, Inc.) 12, no. IV (September 1999): 11-12. Mr. Stamper commanded this unit from October/November 1961 until its inactivation in 1964.
4. See Lieutenant Colonel Andrew J. DeGraff, “LRRP and Nuclear Target Acquisition,” *Military Review* 40 (November 1960): 15-21, 15. DeGraff indicates that these personnel had been selected, organized, and trained before the exercise. Another source suggests that this training was 2-3 weeks in duration. See Major Edward M. Hunt, “Briefing 1300 Hours, 15 May 1964,” in VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Major Hunt’s Briefing.” Hunt served first as the executive officer and from May 1962 to May 1963 as the commanding officer of the VII Corps LRRP company. More about the context of Hunt’s Pentagon briefing is discussed in the text near the end of this chapter.
5. This memorandum is listed as reference 1.b. in Letter, ATINT-D&D 322/19(C) (8 Aug 60), from the Commander, United States Continental Army Command, to the Commandant, US Army Armor School, subject line: Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP)(U). While I have not seen the memorandum or its enclosures, it is highly likely that they contained a report on the use of LRRPs in the just-completed exercise.
6. Stanton, 14.
7. DeGraff, 16.
8. Memorandum, AETGB-TR 250/4, HQ US Seventh Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, GW, 28 April 1959, subject line: “LRRP Study (U),” with inclosure: Subject Study. Referenced in paragraph 1.c and characterized in paragraph 2 of Letter, ATINT-D&D 322/19(C) (8 Aug 60), CONARC commander to Armor School commandant, 8 August 1960, subject line: “Long-Range

Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) (U)."

9. Memorandum, AETGB-TR 268/4, HQ US Seventh Army, 14 August 1959, subject line: "Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Study (U)," with inclosure, referenced in paragraph 1.d of letter 322/19 (8 Aug 60).

10. The actual date the corps commander authorized the creation of this unit is uncertain, but the planning and staff actions required to execute on this date would suggest the concept was briefed to the commanding general for a decision several weeks before 7 December. See undated draft letter (hereafter cited as Moe draft letter), Captain Philip D. Grimm to Colonel Moe, G3 of the US Military Assistance Group to the Federal Republic of Germany, contained in a collection of documents from the estate of Colonel Philip D. Grimm (Retired), hereafter cited as Grimm collection. These documents were provided to the author by Major Russell A. Grimm (Retired) on 3 August 2005.

11. For more details about Colonel Grimm's long and distinguished career, see www.arlingtoncemetary.net/pdgrimm.htm; last accessed on 5 August 2005.

12. Moe draft letter.

13. This was more an acquiescence than an authorization. According to Captain Grimm's notes accompanying a photograph of an inspection visit, Lieutenant General Meloy informally approved the black berets during his inspection of the unit; Grimm collection. Photographs of the men wearing these berets were widely published. See Henry B. Kraft, "Commando-Ranger Unit Gets Tough Training," *The Stars and Stripes*, 16 February 1960, 11-2.

14. Grimm collection. The "Beaver" was manufactured by de Havilland Canada in the post-World War II period. It could carry a pilot and five passengers or 1,080 pounds of cargo, and had a range of 5.5 hours and a top speed of 97 knots.

15. Moe draft letter; Grimm collection.

16. Memorandum, ACSI-CIDO, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 26 January 1960, subject: "Long Range Reconnaissance Organization (U)," with inclosure, referenced in paragraph 1.e. of letter 322/19 (8 Aug 60).

17. DeGraff, 16.

18. Stanton, 14-5. The V Corps provisional unit was comprised of volunteers, primarily from battle groups of the 3d Infantry Division.

19. The Seventh Army G3 at this time was Colonel Melvin Zais (who later went on to command the 101st Airborne Division and then XXIV Corps in Vietnam). VII and V Corps LRRP company veterans credit the creation of these two companies to Major Edward V. Maltese, the operations officer in the G2 staff at Seventh Army. See the article "When the LRRPs were One," VII Corps LRRP Association CD, 9 November 2004, in folder "VII Corps LRRP—The Officers/Col Maltese."

20. This brief history is from the unit's presence on the Internet: "The First

and the Last LRRPs: A Short History of V Corps LRRP-A/75 Rangers 1961-1974,” <http://www.75thrra.com/history/a75-his.php>; last accessed on 13 December 2004.

21. This brief history is from the unit’s presence on the Internet: “B/75 Rgr & C/58 LRP & VII Corps LRP History,” <http://www.75thrra.com/history/b75-his.php>; last accessed on 13 December 2004.

22. See “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment” [3d Infantry Division], at <http://www.75thrra.com/history/3id-his.php>; last accessed on 13 December 2004.

23. Letter, ATINT-D&D 322/19(C) (8 Aug 60), from the Commander, United States Continental Army Command, to the Commandant, US Army Armor School, subject: Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) (U), paragraph 3.a., b., and c.

24. “Draft Manuscript, Interim Operational and Organizational Concepts, Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol for the Division, Corps, and Army,” (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, January 1961); and “Interim Operational and Organizational Concepts, Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol for the Division, Corps, and Army,” (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, March 1961).

25. “Training Text 17- () [unnumbered in original text], Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol for the Division, Corps, and Army (U)” (Fort Knox, KY: July 1961).

26. “Initial Manuscript, First Draft, Advance Plan Table of Organization and Equipment 31-57 (Proposed), Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 18 November 1961). A disposition form in the front of this document identifies the Department of Armored Operations as its source. “Final Manuscript, Draft, Advance Plan Table of Organization and Equipment 31-57 (Proposed), Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, January 1962).

27. US Army Field Manual 31-18, *Long Range Patrols, Division, Corps, and Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 18 June 1962).

28. Ibid, paragraph 3.

29. Ibid., paragraph 4.

30. Ibid., paragraph 6 and figure 1.

31. Ibid., paragraph 7.

32. Ibid., paragraph 9.

33. Ibid., paragraph 10.

34. Ibid., paragraph 12.a.

35. Ibid., paragraph 12.b.

36. Ibid., paragraph 13.
37. Ibid., paragraph 14.
38. Ibid., paragraph 15.
39. Ibid., paragraphs 16-20.
40. Ibid., paragraph 21.
41. Ibid., paragraph 22.
42. Ibid., paragraph 24.
43. FM 31-18, *Infantry Long Range Patrol Company*, 13 January 1965, paragraph 3.
44. Ibid., paragraph 4, page 3.
45. FM 31-18 (1962), paragraph 4.d. on page 3; FM 31-18 (1965), paragraph 4.g. on page 3.
46. FM 31-18 (1965) paragraph 5, pages 3-4.
47. Ibid., organizational chart at figure 1 on page 5.
48. Ibid., paragraph 6.b., page 7.
49. The information about equipment comes from Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 7-157E, “Infantry Long Range Patrol Company” (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 September 1964), Section III.
50. The AN/PAS-6 metascope was a small (two pounds), hand-held device that emitted an infrared beam for illumination and featured a monocular viewer to observe objects and terrain thus illuminated. It was first issued to US Army troops in the early 1950s. Because it was an active device, it was subject to detection by anyone equipped with a similar device, and could be used for signaling as well as observation.
51. FM 31-18 (1965), paragraph 12.a., pages 14-5.
52. Ibid., paragraph 12.b., pages 15-6.
53. Ibid., paragraph 14, page 17.
54. Ibid., paragraphs 15 and 16, pages 18-9.
55. Ibid., paragraph 20.d., page 22.
56. Ibid., paragraph 22.a., page 23.
57. Ibid., paragraph 23, pages 24-5.
58. This description of LRP-unit employment is from a briefing given by Major Hunt, the second commander of the VII Corps LRRP company, at the Pentagon on 15 May 1964, found on the VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Major Hunt’s Briefing.”
59. The veterans did not anticipate such a high survival rate. Those who discuss

this issue among themselves suggest they planned to “go to ground” after their mission was accomplished.

60. E-mail interview with Kirk Gibson, 27-8 January 2004, and with Joseph T. Chetwynd on 3 March 2005. This town has the name Zelezna Ruda [“iron ore” translated] on Czech-language maps.

61. This mission to deliver ADMs was not mentioned in Major Hunt’s May 1964 Pentagon briefing.

62. This mission is discussed in several pieces of correspondence in the VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “Word Documents and EMAIL.”

63. Stamper, 11.

64. “The First and the Last LRRPs,” 4, 5.

65. This information is from “The First and the Last LRRPS,” and also from a survey completed by unit veteran Robert Murphy on 30 November 2004 and an e-mail interview with Mr. Murphy, 11 December 2004.

66. This regiment was inactivated and replaced as the V Corp Armored Cavalry Regiment by the 11th ACR in 1972.

67. This commander was First Lieutenant Edward M. Jentz, from the 1st Battle Group, 30th Infantry (Jentz was promoted to captain in January 1962). The 1st Battle Group commander was Colonel William E. DePuy. According to Jentz, Colonel DePuy asked him to stay with the battle group, but upon realizing that Jentz was committed to the LRRP concept, then changed his mind: “He gave me his blessing and further told me that [for] any support I might need to call him. There was no doubt in my mind that he wanted one of his guys to command that unit.” E-mail correspondence between the author and Colonel (Retired) Edward M. Jentz, 9 February 2005. For a complete biographical sketch of General William E. DePuy, go to <http://www3.sdsstate.edu/academics/collegeofartsandscience/militaryscience/alumni/distinguishedalumni/depuy/index>; last accessed 8 February 2005.

68. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 9.

69. This description is based upon an e-mail interview with Mike McClintonck, a former detachment member, on 16 December 2004.

70. Kirkland H. Gibson survey, received 12 November 2004.

71. Orders were issued by HQ, VII Corps Special Troops APO US Forces 09107 in the time period December 1964 to July 1966 for promotions, weapons qualifications, and MOS actions and can be viewed on the VII Corps CD in the folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Orders.”

72. US Army Long Range Reconnaissance Company (ABN), APO 46, US Forces, 7 March 1963, “Training Memorandum Number 3.” VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Capt Garbers LRRP Training

Memorandum.”

73. See VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Orders” for a copy of a 20 September 1966 order sending seven soldiers from Company C (LRP), 58th Infantry to the 8th Infantry Division Basic Airborne Course, and see the same folder “/Jump School” for a copy of the school’s student guide.

74. The VII Corps newspaper *Jayhawk*, Friday, 4 March 1966 edition, shows a photograph of a VII Corps LRRP Company soldier demonstrating HALO (high-altitude low-opening) equipment to visiting dignitaries on 23 February 1966. See VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/News Articles.”

75. This description of V Corps training is from the Murphy survey.

76. See Private Ronald Kovan’s “The Long Rangers,” *The Guardian* (V Corps newspaper), 14 January 1961, in VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “V Corps LRRP.”

77. The sources do not specifically indicate why the LRRP company was used for the aggressor mission. My own experience suggests at least three reasons: The LRRP company, by the nature of its own mission and training, was cognizant of enemy tactics and could replicate them; LRRP soldiers used these taskings to maintain their own skills in small-unit infiltration tactics; and the LRRP company was subordinated to the corps G2 and could be easily tasked.

78. Evidence for this comes in the form of a group TDY order from HQ, 14th Armored Cavalry, APO 26, dated 25 June 1962, sending an officer and eight men from the LRRP company to a German parachute unit for approximately 14 days of training. See VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “V Corps LRRP.”

79. The course length of eight weeks/262 hours is shown on Special Orders Number 188 (extract) from Headquarters, 8th Infantry Division, APO 111, US Forces, dated 28 August 1962, provided by Robert Murphy.

80. VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “VII Corps LRRP—The Enlisted Men/James Jackson/Hanberry French Freefall School.”

81. Several members of this club are shown standing next to the open door of a CH-34 *Choctaw* helicopter in a 1964 newspaper photograph. See VII Corps LRRP Association, in folder “V Corps LRRP.” HALO-trained soldiers in the V Corps LRRP Company were also used to test new parachute systems and automatic-opening devices. Telephone interview with Robert Clark, 3 May 2005.

82. This description of 3d Infantry Division training is from “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 5-6.

83. Stamper, 11.

84. This notional patrol is described by Captain Joseph H. Devins, Jr. in “Long Range Patrolling,” *Infantry* (October-November 1960): 34-8.

85. In 1959, SETAF's 1st Missile Command was equipped with Corporal and Honest John nuclear-capable missiles. See http://www.usfava.com/SETAF/USAREUR_SETAF.htm#1stMsl; last accessed on 13 December 2004.

86. Some evidence suggests that Seventh Army operated a LRRP school at Gelnhausen or Schweinfurt during this period. The cadre included combat-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers from various USAREUR units, including 10th Special Forces. The course of instruction was at least four weeks, with classes in Soviet military equipment and formation recognition, survival, escape and evasion, land navigation, and physical conditioning. See Cole collection, and also a facsimile of Cole's Form DD214, in VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder "V Corps LRRP." Cole remembers the school, which he attended in the summer of 1960, as being six to eight weeks in length, but his DD214 indicates four weeks.

87. E-mail from Lee Farley through Robert Murphy to author, 10 December 2004.

88. Murphy survey, 4-5.

89. Robert Murphy received intermediate-speed radio-operator training from 32d Signal Battalion in Hoechst, Murphy survey. 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment radio operators received several weeks of radio and Morse-code training at the 123d Signal Battalion in Wurzburg, "Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment," 5.

90. "The First and the Last LRRPs," 2.

91. VII Corps LRRP CD, folder "LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Orders/9-20-66 TDY Jump School."

92. Robert Clark and Glenn Rutherford, radio operators from the V Corps LRRP Company, attended German Ranger School from 25 May to 27 July 1963, and were awarded German airborne wings and German "ranger" status upon graduation. E-mail and telephone interview of Robert Clark, 3 May 2005.

93. Stamper, 11.

94. "Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment," 7.

95. Gibson and Murphy surveys for VII and V Corps; Stamper, 11 for SETAF.

96. General Bonesteel discussed his VII Corps LRRP Company communications in an oral interview conducted on 9 November 1972 and published by the US Army War College in 1973. See Project 73-2, "General Charles H. Bonesteel III, USA Retired," in the collection of the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 299-302.

97. Bonesteel interview, 301-2. The communications officer was Captain Ellis D. Bingham.

98. Gibson and Murphy surveys.

99. Murphy survey. He was issued this rifle as a training prop, but carried it in the field and also on parachute jumps. He had an “inexhaustible supply” of ammunition and regularly allowed other soldiers to fire this weapon for familiarization.

100. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 4.

101. “We had cooks, motor pool, commo vehicles, etc., and could move all in a moment’s notice,” Gibson survey.

102. Murphy survey.

103. Stamper, 12.

104. VII Corps LRRP Association CD, “When the LRRPs Were One,” in folder “VII Corps—The Officers/Col Maltese.”

105. Built by deHavilland Canada, the *Otter* was a single-engine monoplane with a cruise speed of 132 mph, service ceiling of 18,000 feet, and range of 875 miles with a full payload of 2,100 pounds. It had space for 14 passengers. The CH-34 *Choctaw* (Sikorsky S-58) was a medium-lift helicopter with a maximum speed of 138 mph, range of 260 nautical miles, and maximum takeoff lift of 13,000 pounds. It had two pilots and a crew chief and space for 12-16 passengers.

106. See “The Long Rangers,” *The Guardian*, in VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder.

107. “I am not aware of them going out on either patrol or base station (commo vehicle) missions, other than an occasional visit,” Gibson (VII Corps) survey. “I never once operated with an officer in the field,” Murphy (V Corps) survey.

108. E-mail, John Pipia to author, 29 December 2004.

109. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 8, fn 18.

110. Tucker was killed by a .51-caliber machine-gun round while flying in a helicopter. See Kregg P. J. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands: 1st Cav LRRPs in Vietnam, 1966-67* (New York: Ivy Books, 1999), 222 for Tucker’s assumption of command from James D. James in June 1967, and 239-40 for an account of Tucker’s death. His name is carried on the list of KIAs (killed in action) for both the 1st Cavalry Division LRRP Company and the I Field Force LRP Company. The helicopter he was riding in had departed Pleiku, where he was recruiting soldiers for his new unit from the 101st Airborne Division LRRPs. The plan was for him to be the XO of E-20th Infantry (LRP), I Field Force, until the new CO, Major D.M. Malone was promoted, and then to assume command upon Malone’s departure. This was a field-grade position and Tucker was a promotable captain at the time of his death. Tucker had earlier escaped death in a jeep accident that killed his driver in Germany in November 1963. See VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/New Articles/PO35-b-1.”

111. See Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 22; and Stamper, 11.

112. PULHES is a physical profile serial system used by the US Armed Forces for decades. It ranks service personnel at four levels in six areas: physical condition, upper extremities, lower extremities, hearing (ears), vision (eyes), and psychiatric. A ranking of 1 was the highest and 4 the lowest. A 2 in this position indicates that the LRRP soldier-candidate could have less than perfect vision (eyes) but correctable to a defined standard.

113. VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder "LRRP History & Fact Sheets/News Articles."

114. Gibson survey.

115. Murphy survey. He believes he was assigned to the unit because of his high GT (general-technical) score.

116. "Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment," 2-3, mentions infantrymen, tankers, and artillerymen.

117. Staff Sergeant Wayne Edelen, a member of the V Corps LRRP Company in January 1963, in September 1966 was a sergeant first class and the senior drill sergeant of my advanced infantry training platoon (1/C/4/3d Training Brigade) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. First Sergeant Gerald M Tardif, who was the first sergeant of the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment in the spring of 1962, was later the first sergeant of the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP), 173d Airborne Brigade in Vietnam in 1968. Rowe Attaway supervised Base Station No. 2 in VII Corps LRRP Company during his tour in that unit (October 1961-January 1964); later he was the communications section chief and then acting first sergeant of B Company, 75th Rangers at Fort Carson, Colorado (January-September 1969); and after that he served as a platoon sergeant in C Company, 75th Rangers (I Field Force) in Vietnam (September 1969-October 1970).

118. "Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment," 6.

119. E-mail interview with James R. Jackson, 5 January 2005.

120. E-mail interview with Craig Vega, 14 March 2005.

121. Staff Sergeant Mize's unit of assignment at time of death is listed at <http://users2.ev1.net/~scoutsout/html/kia.htm>; last accessed on 4 February 2005.

122. Staff Sergeant English is buried at the Fort Bragg Post Cemetery. The education center at Fort Campbell, Kentucky is named in his honor.

123. See, for example, Major Ellis D. Bingham, Memorandum(s) for Record (MFR), subject line: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 12 and 15 June 1964, and other MFRs with no subject line on 24 and 31 July 1964, all regarding telephone conversations or meetings in which these technical issues were the main subject. See also Bingham, memorandum to Colonel M.B. Dodson [ASCI-DRS], subject line: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 28 May 1965, in which Bingham reported the results of a conference at Fort Monmouth with technical experts on communications equipment issues, specifically radios and batteries; and Colonel M.B. Dodson, letter dated 13 July 1965 containing further reference

to technical issues raised by Bingham in the 28 May memorandum. These memorandums and letters are contained in a collection of documents received from Colonel (Retired) Ellis D. Bingham on 9 February 2005, hereafter referred to as the “Bingham collection.”

124. For a detailed account of the meeting, see Bingham, MFR, subject line: Interview with General Harrell on Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company, dated 15 May 1964, Bingham collection. The full text of Hunt’s briefing is on the VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Major Hunt’s Briefing.” On this and several other occasions, Major Bingham voiced his objection to the inclusion of the “raid capability” mission in LRRP doctrine.

125. Bingham e-mail to author, 30 December 2004.

126. See Bingham, Letter to Colonel Dodson, subject: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 23 June 1964, paragraph 2, Bingham collection.

127. The 4 August meeting is referenced in a 27 July Bingham MFR of a telephone conversation with Major R.G. Shank, acting chief of Ground Branch, ACSI-DSR, and another MFR written on 31 July, Bingham collection. Colonel Bingham confirmed both that the 4 August meeting occurred and its subject in an e-mail to the author on 11 February 2005.

128. Bingham, MFR, telephone conference with Major Jean Burner, CARM-SA; and memorandum to Major Burner, subject line: Employment of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols at Field Army Level, dated 6 October 1964, Bingham collection.

129. Bingham, MFR (hand written) listing names of attendees, dated 16 December 1965. This list included representatives from several divisions (Command and Staff; Division Operations; Larger Unit Operations; Combined, Joint, Special Operations, and Special Weapons) and as well two officers from an unidentified intelligence agency, Bingham collection.

130. Bingham, memorandum to Colonel Dodson, subject line: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 13 May 1964, paragraph 7, Bingham collection.

131. Bingham, memorandum to Colonel Dodson, subject line: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 14 May 1964, Bingham collection.

132. Bingham, memorandum to Colonel Dodson, subject line: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 12 June 1964, Bingham collection.

133. Bingham, memorandum to Colonel Dodson, subject line: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 23 June 1964, Bingham collection.

134. Bingham, staff study titled “Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company (Airborne), undated [date established by reference in later document], Bingham collection. Bingham’s recommendations at the end of this study were that such a unit be created and he be placed in command of it.

135. Dodson, letter to Bingham, 18 November 1964, Bingham collection.

136. Bingham, letter to Lieutenant General Charles H. Bonesteel, III, 6 July 1965, Bingham collection.

137. Bonesteel, letter to Bingham, 12 July 1965, Bingham collection.

138. The US STRIKE Command was established at MacDill AFB, Florida in 1961 as a unified command with integrated personnel from all branches of service capable of responding to a global crisis. It was redesignated the US Readiness Command in 1972, which was replaced by the US Special Operations Command in 1987.

139. Bingham, letter to Bonesteel, 3 February 1966; Treatise “THE INFANTRY LONG RANGE PATROL COMPANY,” December 1965, Bingham collection.

140. Bonesteel, letter to Bingham, 19 February 1966, Bingham collection.

141. Dodson, letter to Bingham, 11 March 1966, Bingham collection.

142. Unfortunately, this document has not survived. But when asked to characterize it now, almost 40 years later, Bingham states that “DA was authorizing the establishment of a LRRP training operation in Nam and authorizing a CONUS training base with the 75th Rangers.” These steps were similar to those Bingham had been advocating for for two years. Bingham, e-mail to author on 11 February 2005.

143. Brigadier General William E. DePuy, letter to General “Tick” Bonesteel, 14 March 1966, Bingham collection.

144. Stanton, 71.

Chapter 3

The Vietnam Experience, 1966-72

Chronology

The conventional approach to the history of LRRP, LRP, and Ranger unit employment in Vietnam is first to acknowledge the three chronological periods of their existence: LRRP from late 1965 to December 1967, LRP from late September 1967 to February 1969, and Ranger thereafter to the end of the war. The first period began in December 1965, with the creation of a provisional LRRP platoon by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.¹ The 1st Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade both formed provisional LRRP units in April and the 25th Infantry Division in June 1966.² General William C. Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), officially authorized the creation of provisional LRRP units on 8 July 1966.³ Other divisions and brigades stood up provisional LRRP units during the ensuing months: the 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions in November 1966, 196th Light Infantry Brigade in January 1967, and 1st Air Cavalry Division in February 1967.⁴ The 9th Infantry Division LRRP Platoon came into being in the fall of 1966 while the division was still at Fort Riley, Kansas, and deployed to Vietnam in January 1967. This unit was expanded to a company in July 1967.⁵ The 101st Airborne Division “main body,” while still at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, converted its divisional Recondo School into a provisional LRRP unit in the summer of 1967, before the division deployed to Vietnam. This provisional company arrived in Vietnam in late November 1967.⁶

The second period began in late June 1967, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, authorized the formation of two long-range patrol companies for I and II Field Forces.⁷ Company E (Long Range Patrol), 20th Infantry (Airborne) was activated on 25 September 1967 and assigned to I Field Force with station at Phan Rang. The nucleus of this unit came from the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division LRRP Platoon, along with soldiers from the replacement stream. Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry (Airborne) was activated on 25 September 1967 and assigned to II Field Force with station at Bien Hoa. Its nucleus came from the LRRP platoon of the 173d Airborne Brigade, along with soldiers from the replacement stream.⁸ Each of the two field force LRP companies had an authorized strength of 230, and was commanded by a major.⁹

In an apparent response to division commanders’ tactical requirements,

and bolstered by the proven combat effectiveness of the provisional LRRP units, in the fall of 1967 the Army authorized separate company designations for LRRP units in divisions and detachments in separate brigades.¹⁰ The divisional LRP companies were authorized 118 men and the brigade detachments 61 men. The wholesale renaming of existing divisional LRRP units occurred on 20 December 1967 in the 23d (Americo), 1st Air Cavalry, 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 9th Infantry, and 25th Infantry Divisions.¹¹ LRP detachments were created in the 199th Light Infantry Brigade on 10 January 1968, in the 173d Airborne Brigade on 5 February 1968, and in the 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division and 1st Brigade 5th Mechanized Division on 15 December 1968.¹²

On 1 February 1969, the final period of the existence of these units began when the Department of the Army redesignated the LRP companies and detachments as lettered Ranger companies of the 75th Infantry Regiment under the combined arms regimental system (CARS). All of the LRP companies and detachments were “reflagged” as Ranger companies on that date, except Company D (Ranger), which was formed on 20 November 1969 upon the rotation of the Company D (Ranger), Indiana National Guard back to its home state.¹³ The third period ended when the Ranger companies were inactivated as their parent units were withdrawn from the war between November 1969 (Company O of 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division), and 15 August 1972 (Company H of 1st Air Cavalry Division).¹⁴

Doctrinal and TOE Baseline

When the first US Army conventional forces (173d Airborne Brigade) entered Vietnam in May 1965, Field Manual (FM) 31-18, *Infantry Long Range Patrol Company*, was in its second edition.¹⁵ The Army had a well-established, somewhat concise doctrine for the employment of long-range patrols. It was based on several years of experience in Europe, where both V Corps and VII Corps had organized, trained, and fielded LRP companies as early as 1960. The doctrine emphasized reconnaissance of specific routes, areas, or locations, and did not emphasize general reconnaissance of an area of operations (AO). While the LRP company had sufficient wheeled-vehicle transportation to move itself from the garrison to the field, it could only insert its own patrols by walking. Any other means of delivering a patrol to an operations area required external support. The G2/S2 staff exercised the greatest influence over LRP operations, followed closely by the G3/S3 staff. Finally, while higher headquarters exercised continuous control of a LRP operation, this control was accomplished

through the LRP company commander, who also was responsible for the recovery of his patrols.

The US Army made modest revisions to this doctrine and published a new FM 31-18, *Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company*, in August 1968.¹⁶ The title was modified slightly to *Long-Range Reconnaissance Ranger Company* in a change published in March 1969, a logical step after the redesignation of all the existing LRP companies as Ranger companies.¹⁷ While the 1968 manual with 1969 changes contained many subtle alterations, the more significant ones deserve specific mention.

When reading the mission list provided in the new manual, one is struck by the fact that “execute combat raids on a limited basis as required,” which was the last item on the 1965 mission list, does not appear at all in the 1968 mission list, despite that in late 1968 LRRP teams in Vietnam were regularly assigned this type of mission. Two missions were added to the 1968 manual: “Deploy on periphery of area of operation (AO) to detect enemy’s attempts to break contact and evade friendly forces,” (screen mission) and “maintain surveillance over suspected infiltration routes and avenues of approach.”¹⁸ Both of these missions were regularly assigned to LRRP teams in Vietnam. On the subject of training, the 1968 doctrinal time standard for an “effectively trained and reliable LRRP unit” remained at eight months.¹⁹

Whereas in 1965 continuous control during LRP operations was to be exercised by higher HQ, in 1969 “operational control” of LRRP company operations was further delegated to the G2/S2 staff section of that higher HQ.²⁰ The 1968 manual contains a new paragraph titled “Combat Support.”²¹ It discusses the responsibilities of the controlling HQ in providing combat support, the use of Army aviation for mobility, and the attachment of specially trained persons (linguists, indigenous guides, scout dog teams, and tracker teams) and equipment (long-range surveillance systems) to LRRP units for specific missions. This paragraph also strongly reflects Vietnam experience accumulated up to that time.

FM 31-18, 1968 contains another new section titled “Security.”²² Curiously, this section belies the common employment of ambush tactics by LRRPs in the combat theater by stating that patrols possess “no offensive capability” and use weapons “only for self-defense or to break enemy contact.” This language strongly suggests that the manual’s authors did not advocate the offensive employment of LRRP patrols, a practice that was, in fact, widespread and growing in the combat theater in late 1968. While

it is difficult to assess the pervasiveness of the use of the administrative security measures advocated here, all of the tactical security and deception measures listed are readily visible in the Vietnam LRRP/Ranger memoir literature of the period.

Paragraph 4-2, “Reconnaissance and Surveillance,” mirrors the same-titled section in the 1965 manual with one exception: the words “or may accomplish the [surveillance] mission using reconnaissance by movement” were added in 1968, both here and at the front of the manual where the LRRP was defined.²³ In the 1968 version, paragraph 4-6, “Methods of Patrol Delivery,” contains a new subparagraph on the employment of the helicopter for LRRP insertions.²⁴ It also contains a new paragraph titled “Debriefing,” which requires the debriefing of patrols as soon as possible upon return from mission and charges the responsibility to conduct this debriefing to the LRP company operations section.²⁵

The most significant change to FM 31-18 was the addition of Chapter 5, titled “Stability Operations.” It appears to have been included in this manual to acknowledge the extensive employment of provisional LRP units in Vietnam. While the base 1968 manual continued to maintain the reconnaissance nature of the LRRP mission in this chapter, the March 1969 change added the following sentence to paragraph 5-2, “Planning Concepts”: “A secondary mission for LRRP is to conduct small-scale offensive actions, i.e., ambushes of small enemy patrols or units.”²⁶ More than any other portion of the manual, chapter 5 clearly describes the responsibilities of various parties for the conduct of a LRP mission, from the controlling HQ to the LRRP company commander, operations officer, communications officer, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and patrol leader.

In tacit recognition of what had already occurred in Vietnam some two years before this manual’s publication, chapter 5 contains a paragraph titled “Provisional LRRP.”²⁷ According to the manual, delineating command-and-staff responsibilities for LRRP activities is key in the following areas:

- identifying and recruiting leaders and soldiers
- logistical support
- training
- planning, preparing, and conducting operations
- other support actions

New to this manual are two appendices: patrol steps (one page) and

a rudimentary LRRP SOP (two pages). A section later in this study will compare LRRP and Ranger employment in Vietnam to the doctrine contained in these two field manuals.

Doctrine of Employment

Depending on how one counts, two field-army (or corps-level) companies, eight divisional companies, and five brigade detachments were employed in Vietnam in the four-year period before their redesignation as Ranger companies. Eventually 13 Ranger companies were formed. Given the geographical variance of the field force, division, and brigade operational areas, the average field force command-tour lengths of 15 months (I Field Force) and 10 months (II Field Force), division command-tour length of approximately nine-10 months, and the changing tactical and operational situation over the course of the war, characterizing the employment doctrine of any single LRRP/LRP/Ranger unit in Vietnam is problematic, let alone the doctrine of more than a dozen such units. But through examining both the primary and secondary sources, one can identify missions assigned to LRRP/LRP/Ranger teams and from that draw conclusions about their doctrinal employment.

Here, for example, is a list of missions assigned to LRRP teams of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, by the brigade S2 during the period from June 1966 to November 1967: confirm enemy control of specific terrain, determine if enemy has moved back into an area vacated by brigade maneuver battalion, obtain intelligence on enemy resupply activity, confirm sightings of enemy troops and identify unit, capture enemy prisoner, conduct reconnaissance in zone to find enemy force (several iterations), support civil-affairs project, conduct road checkpoint, confirm intelligence information obtained from a PW interrogation, reconnoiter an area and establish ambush, provide extended-range listening post/observation post (LP/OP) for forward fire-support base, and establish blocking position for advancing infantry unit. One can also add to this a number of routine close-in ambush patrols around the brigade base camp, which were required of all combat units but also were used by LRRP units to train new personnel in patrol procedures.²⁸ Two trends can be observed in this list: the brigade intelligence officer was assigning the missions, and the preponderance of LRP activity was intelligence-driven and not intended to result in combat.

The main body of the 101st Airborne Division deployed to Vietnam in November 1967. The division formed F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry (Airborne) in January 1968 by combining the forces of 1st Brigade's

provisional LRRP platoon with the divisional Recondo School-based unit from Fort Campbell and soldiers from the replacement stream. The 101st Airborne Division used this LRP company for a variety of defensive missions in southern and northern South Vietnam through the late spring of 1968, when the division commander finally released it to the control of the division intelligence staff.²⁹ Here is a list of missions assigned to this LRP unit's teams from late March through November 1968: conduct area reconnaissance to update intelligence information on enemy base camps and units (secondary—interdict and destroy rocket teams or sites), monitor junction of three high-speed trails (secondary—look for regimental base camp), deliver and install seismic-intrusion devices in remote area (multiple occasions), conduct area reconnaissance for suspected enemy base camp, find radar-controlled antiaircraft heavy machine gun, conduct saturation patrols of a border area (multiple teams inserted), find and eliminate rocket teams, observe enemy troop movement in zone (secondary—locate and destroy enemy radio transmitter), find and ambush small parties of enemy soldiers, and attempt to capture a prisoner.³⁰

It is clear from the memoirs of soldiers who served in the 101st Airborne Division's LRP unit that the division G2 assigned missions and members of the G2 staff briefed LRP teams before departure on missions, debriefing them upon their return.³¹ An officer of this unit informed the USARV Long Range Patrol Conference in August 1968 that “the LRP company receives its missions directly from the division G2, the Commanding General authorizes each mission, and the G3 provides the assets.”³² Of course, many of these patrols resulted in enemy contact, some of it initiated by patrols and more of it by the enemy upon their discovery of LRP teams in their midst. Many brave soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division were killed and wounded in these actions. But the mission analysis alone leads to the conclusion that, in this division, LRP teams were employed more as an intelligence asset than a combat asset.

Like other LRP companies, the 101st Airborne Division's F Company, 58th Infantry was redesignated to a Ranger company (L Company) in early February 1969. Despite this change in designation, the unit continued to maintain an intelligence-gathering focus. In February 1969, for example, patrols were sent out to identify and call in indirect fire on enemy rocket-firing sites, implant remote sensors, monitor NVA infiltration routes, verify enemy activity in a particular area using saturation patrols, and monitor enemy sampan traffic on a river.³³ In March 1969, missions included search and rescue for downed helicopter crewmen, location of rocket-firing sites, and reconnaissance around a firebase. The latter resulted in the detection

of a large enemy dismounted force's approach to the firebase. The ensuing warning from the Ranger patrol gave the firebase defenders approximately 2 hours to prepare for the ground assault, which resulted in a successful defense of the position.³⁴ In October 1969, this unit inserted a four-man reconnaissance team into an area to confirm "people sniffer" sensor reports of enemy presence for the division G2.³⁵ In September 1970, a four-man team from this Ranger company successfully installed a wiretap on an enemy land-line in the A Shau Valley.³⁶

Indications of offensive, direct-action missions planned or conducted by this Ranger company include the insertion of a team to destroy suspected bridges in late March 1970, the forming and insertion of a heavy team (11 men, equipped with an M60 machine gun) in early April with the mission to hunt and kill, and the reinforcing of a team with both a sniper rifle and M60 machine gun in later April.³⁷ Meanwhile, in July and August 1970, a special cadre team from L Company (Ranger), comprised of one officer and four enlisted men, performed duty as instructors for an eight-day "ranger strike operations course" taught to the reconnaissance company of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 1st Infantry Division. This team provided instruction at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Center and also followed the ARVN soldiers into the field for the field-exercise portion of the training.³⁸

In the 18 months from May 1970 until its deactivation in November 1971, teams of the 101st Airborne Division Ranger Company were employed for long-range reconnaissance of the jungle-covered mountains of northern South Vietnam adjacent to Laos. These patrols frequently relied on remotely sited radio-relay stations operated by other Ranger teams. Although the overarching purpose of these patrols was to acquire intelligence information on the enemy, the mission was often accompanied by contact with enemy forces and ensuing Ranger casualties. The Ranger company was also tasked on occasion to conduct raids, such as three unsuccessful platoon-size efforts in April 1971 to ambush an enemy motorized convoy in the A Shau Valley.³⁹ Another company-size mission was launched in July 1971 to locate a suspected enemy hospital, but was suspended after a night in the woods amid heavy enemy rocket fire.⁴⁰

In this late period of the war, the pendulum in 101st Airborne Division was clearly swinging from the intelligence mission to the combat-raid mission. As to why this was so, here is one explanation from a veteran of the 101st Airborne Division LRP Company:

In Vietnam, Rangers worked best in the capacity of their

Long Range Patrol predecessors. Trained to operate in six- to 12-man teams, they were poorly tasked to perform offensive operations. Their successes in small ambushes and in defending themselves even when heavily outnumbered by enemy forces often misled brigade and division commanders into believing they were capable of conducting large, more complex offensive combat operations.⁴¹

Major General William R. Peers' 4th Infantry Division had four LRRP platoons in 1967, one assigned to each of three maneuver brigades and the fourth to a cavalry squadron for use by the division G2.⁴² The platoons at brigade level were assigned to the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) but took their instructions directly from the brigade S2. These platoons had 40 assigned LRRP soldiers in eight teams of five men each, plus three "Hawkeye" teams of two US and two indigenous personnel each. Supporting each platoon were two officers, an intelligence sergeant, operations sergeant, and six communicators, for a total of 56 US and six indigenous personnel in each platoon.⁴³

The primary mission of these LRRP teams was observation. Negative observation reports—the absence of sightings of enemy units—were also considered important. LRRP teams were also used extensively to reconnoiter helicopter landing zones in preparation for combat assaults by larger units. The LRRP teams were inserted into an area three to five kilometers from a landing zone (LZ) two to three days ahead of a planned operation and would then walk into the LZ. The LRRP team would remain in position observing the LZ until the assault was executed. This practice saved large amounts of artillery ammunition that would have been expended firing preparations on undefended LZs, and gave infantry units greater confidence in the ground situation as they approached an LZ. This pathfinder-like mission came directly out of LRRP doctrine developed in USAREUR and published in 1962 and 1965.⁴⁴

Because the enemy in the 4th Infantry Division AO was aware of the use of LRRP teams, he frequently reacted quickly against them upon or shortly after insertion. The LRRP team thus functioned as a lure, and was quickly extracted and replaced by a much larger infantry force. LRRP teams were also employed as screening forces to detect enemy infiltration into specific areas.⁴⁵

A soldier assigned to the LRRP platoon of 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division during the first half of 1967 lists the following activities of his unit: combat and raid missions, special reaction teams to brigade headquarters

for downed helicopters, rapid reinforcement of outposts, OP/LP outside of forward operating bases for early warning, local ambush patrols, reconnaissance of an LZ, search of a border area for an enemy base camp or headquarters, provision of security for a sniper team, and service as a radio-relay team for other deployed teams.⁴⁶ Peers' successor, Major General Charles P. Stone (January through November 1968), maintained the organization and mission of the division's LRP company as it had been developed by General Peers.⁴⁷

Major General Donn R. Pepke, who commanded this division from 30 November 1968 to 14 November 1969, on 6 October 1969 directed the consolidation of all the brigade LRRP platoons into the division Ranger company. Up to this time, LRP activities in the division had been divided between the brigade LRRP platoons and the division-controlled Ranger company. Here is Major General Pepke's description of the division Ranger company's mission:

The mission of Company K (Ranger), 75th Infantry is to provide a long range reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capability to the 4th Infantry Division; provide personnel and equipment to train, administer, plan for, and employ LRPAs as directed; and conduct limited harassing activities.⁴⁸

Upon this reorganization of division LRP assets, Pepke gave the division G3 responsibility for staff supervision of this asset and charged the G2 to recommend missions to the G3 according to weekly intelligence reports.⁴⁹ The overall focus of 4th Infantry Division LRP and Ranger operations appears to have trended more toward combat actions.

The 9th Infantry Division LRRP units, deployed in the lowlands south of Saigon, had an entirely different problem—terrain that teemed in civilian population and lacked in concealment. Helicopter insertions were problematic due to the high likelihood of compromise of patrols. Regardless of the insertion method, patrols frequently had to be extracted after 24 to 48 hours on the ground. The missions performed by 9th Infantry Division LRRP units included general surveillance of enemy infiltration routes and suspected base-camp areas, terrain analysis of the many waterways and canals in their AO, providing security for underwater demolition teams (UDT) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) while they removed enemy-placed ordnance, and point reconnaissance of designated locations.⁵⁰

Upon the activation of the 9th Division's long-range patrol company

in December 1967, LRP teams continued to conduct both area- and point-reconnaissance missions east and south of Saigon. In January 1968, some 9th Division teams joined with US Navy SEAL teams to conduct ambushes and attacks in the waterways of the Mekong Delta, while others continued the reconnaissance of this water-logged terrain. The description of the LRP company's operations through 1968 contains both reconnaissance and combat actions, performed by single LRP teams or in concert with US Navy SEALS, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) personnel, ARVN marine units advised by US Marines, and sniper trainers from the US Army Marksmanship Training Unit.⁵¹ The division commander from February 1968 to April 1969, Major General Julian J. Ewell, cryptically characterized the employment of his Rangers with the words “Rangers (LRRP) as hunter-killers (or as recon parties)” in his post-command debriefing report.⁵²

The period from 1 February 1969 to mid-September 1970, during which the 9th Infantry Division LRP unit carried the designation of Company E (Ranger), 75th Infantry, is characterized by a mix of reconnaissance and offensive combat operations. When the 3d Brigade of 9th Infantry Division was selected in June 1969 to stay in Vietnam while the remainder of the division redeployed back to the United States, the Ranger company was transferred to that brigade and prepared for brigade-level reconnaissance tasks in the province southwest of Saigon.⁵³ Even though the 3d Brigade itself moved north to the Tay Ninh area for the invasion of Cambodia in May and June 1970, the Ranger company remained in or near the former 9th Infantry Division base camp at Dong Tam or Tan An, both due south of Saigon. There, the Ranger company continued to conduct ambush patrols and, later in the summer, responded to reports from unattended electronic-surveillance and manned ground-surveillance radar systems. The Rangers' mission was “to reconnoiter the exact nature of as many potential targets as possible.”⁵⁴ Given the nature of the terrain south of Saigon, many of this unit's activities were water-borne. During March through July 1970, for example, Ranger teams used engineer-crewed small boats to conduct ambushes in the canals and tributaries of the area.⁵⁵ In sum, 9th Infantry Division LRRP/LRP/Ranger teams conducted a combination of reconnaissance and combat missions, with a tendency toward the latter, that were influenced heavily by the densely populated terrain lacking means of concealment for inserted teams.

When it was stood up in February 1967, the 1st Cavalry Division LRRP unit was comprised of two six-man teams and a HQ element.⁵⁶ For operations in the field, these teams were placed under the operational control

of maneuver brigades, where the brigade S2 designated their missions.⁵⁷ These missions emphasized reconnaissance over contact.⁵⁸ A veteran of this unit cites the following accomplishments early in the unit's history: correcting maps; finding numerous high-speed trails, bunker complexes, base camps, cache sites, and jungle hospitals; and monitoring movement of enemy units.⁵⁹

From its designation as the 1st Cavalry Division Long Range Patrol Detachment in April 1967 through redesignation as Company E (Long Range Patrol), 52d Infantry in December 1967 until October 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division LRRP teams remained parceled out to maneuver brigades, who used them in a variety of missions. These missions included close-in reconnaissance for maneuver infantry units and LP/OP duties around forward fire-support bases.⁶⁰

In late October 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division was shifted from I to II Field Force and headquartered at Phuoc Vinh, north of Saigon. The division's AO extended along the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long provinces. These areas contained significant routes for enemy infiltration into the Saigon area from Cambodia. In this new AO, Company E's patrol teams continued to be tasked by the division G2 or brigade S2s.⁶¹ In an effort to ensure the proper use of his personnel, the E Company Commander communicated directly, in writing, with the division commander when he felt his teams were being improperly tasked.⁶² Another indication of the company commander's intelligence focus is his maintenance of an enemy order of battle (OB) file in the company area, which was updated by every patrol upon its return from a mission.⁶³ However, while missions may have had an intelligence or reconnaissance purpose, many of them resulted in contact with small and large enemy elements.

Examination of 1st Cavalry Division's H Company (Ranger) mission activities after its redesignation in February 1969 suggests that its repertoire included both reconnaissance and direct-action activities. The unit's two Ranger platoons were organized in five-man teams, and the available literature does not reference heavy teams (combined teams) for raids, strikes, or other small-unit offensive actions. However, Ranger patrols were sent out with instructions to conduct ambushes of small enemy elements, reconnoiter roads and trails that came out of Cambodia, employ anti-vehicular mines, search for enemy base camps, conduct bomb-damage assessment, search for enemy "rocket teams" proximate to US Army base camps, recover bodies and equipment from crashed helicopters, and capture enemy soldiers. In the summer of 1969, Rangers from four teams trained for a

POW-camp raid into Cambodia, but the mission was cancelled.⁶⁴ The early reporting of a large enemy ground infiltration by a Ranger team in early November 1969 is credited with saving a 1st Cavalry Division forward fire-support base from being overrun.⁶⁵

During the period from December 1969 to April 1970, as part of the larger program of “Vietnamization” of the war, the Ranger company formed two joint teams with South Vietnamese paratroopers, three Americans and three Vietnamese on each team.⁶⁶ H Company Rangers were employed extensively for ground reconnaissance during the incursion into Cambodia that occurred in May and June 1970.⁶⁷ As some American combat units were sent home from Vietnam, those that remained were repositioned and drawn in closer to protect strategic assets. The 1st Cavalry Division Ranger Company, reduced in size when large portions of the division departed Vietnam in April 1971, was reassigned to the remaining 3d Brigade and moved to the Bien Hoa area. Here it continued to conduct surveillance missions northeast of the capital area and later to conduct combat missions to interdict enemy rocket teams firing into the capital area. These missions frequently were reactions to enemy activity brought to light by SLAR (side-looking airborne radar), infra-red, “sniffer,” or agent reports. If enemy activity was confirmed by a Ranger patrol, some type of offensive combat action was enjoined: an infantry assault, artillery fire, airstrikes, or combinations of these three actions.⁶⁸

The difficulty of characterizing LRRP and Ranger missions in Vietnam as either “intelligence/reconnaissance” or “direct-action combat” in nature is driven home by the example of the 25th Infantry Division. Major General Harris W. Hollis, shortly after assuming command in September 1969, changed the mission of the Ranger company from intelligence gathering to offensive combat:

Beginning in October 1969 our Rangers’ method of employment was oriented primarily to ambush and reconnaissance, to “snatch” missions, and “sniff” operations, and air rescue missions with sniper teams.⁶⁹

To facilitate this mission shift, General Hollis gave responsibility for staff supervision of Ranger employment to the division G3 and placed a Ranger platoon in direct support of each maneuver brigade in the division. Further evidence of these teams’ offensive mission is the arming of each one with an M60 machine gun and the inclusion of at least one sniper-qualified team member.

Just six months later, Major General Edward Bautz, Jr., the new division commander, about five weeks after assuming command, changed the division Ranger company's mission back to acquisition of intelligence. This mission change was accompanied by the division intelligence staff's increased reliance on electronic sensor fields and ground-surveillance radar acquisitions.⁷⁰

Finally, Brigadier General Hubert S. Cunningham, commander of the 173d Airborne Brigade from August 1969 to August 1970, used his Ranger teams "primarily as an intelligence gathering source and to further develop intelligence based on sonar readouts, Airborne Personnel Detector (Snoopy) readouts, and agent reports."⁷¹ His immediate successor, Brigadier General Elmer R. Ochs, while acknowledging that the Ranger company's mission was surveillance and reconnaissance, also ascribed to it the capability of "conducting small unit ambushes, limited raids, POW snatches, and path-finder operations for heliborne and parachute operations."⁷²

The general conclusion one can draw from this overview of LRRP/ LRP/Ranger employment by several maneuver divisions and a few separate brigades in Vietnam is that there was no single, standard approach to the issue. These units were employed for a variety of reconnaissance and combat missions, based on the terrain and enemy situation in a given division or brigade's AO, the density of the civilian population, the tactical and operational imperatives of the division or brigade, and the desires of the controlling-unit commander and his G2/G3. One can also posit that the writers of LRRP doctrine in 1965 and 1968 probably did not envision the amount of combat these units would engage in, given the reconnaissance focus of both fielded editions of FM 31-18.

Two additional LRP units in Vietnam bear examination—the LRP companies of the two corps-level headquarters, I and II Field Force. Both units were formed in the fall of 1967 by combining combat veterans from other LRRP units with soldiers recruited from the replacement stream. In the case of Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (I Field Force), the combat veterans came from the 1st Brigade LRRP Platoon of the 101st Airborne Division.⁷³ Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force) received the bulk of its combat veterans from the LRRP platoon of the 173d Airborne Brigade.⁷⁴ Although the formation of these two companies was authorized in mid-September 1967, neither became fully operational until early December.⁷⁵

On paper, the mission of Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry, I Field

Force was long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in the corps-level AO.⁷⁶ In fact, the unit performed a broad spectrum of reconnaissance, combat, and training missions in its four-year period of existence.⁷⁷ Platoons and teams of this company operated as standard rifle units, as attachments to special forces-led units, as training cadre for ARVN infantry divisions and the ARVN Ranger Training Center, as reconnaissance support to the Republic of Korea 9th Division, and as LRP and Ranger forces for the 4th Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade.⁷⁸ General Peers, commander of I Field Force from March 1968 to March 1969, strongly supported the LRRP concept and used his own LRPs to train ARVN soldiers for both long-range and medium-range patrolling.⁷⁹ The memoir by two of this unit's veterans describes its activities in the period September 1969 to September 1970 as much more inclined toward direct-action "hunter-killer" activities than reconnaissance.⁸⁰ Their characterization is supported by the words of Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, who commanded I Field Force from 16 March 1969 to 23 February 1970:

The mission of the Corps Ranger Company . . . has also been modified. Rather than gathering intelligence by passive means, the Corps Ranger Company was employed in attacking small groups of enemy and in gaining intelligence by capturing personnel and documents. During the past calendar year, the Ranger Company achieved a 48:1 kill ratio, better than any of the other units in II Corps.⁸¹

The pattern of activities of F Company (LRP), 51st Infantry, II Field Force was somewhat more regular. This unit was stationed at Bien Hoa, near II Field Force HQ, and remained there except for an occasional foray to nearby Cu Chi or Phuoc Vinh, where it supported subordinate divisions or brigades.⁸² Whereas the I Field Force reconnaissance company spent its entire existence moving throughout the area of responsibility (AOR), performing a variety of reconnaissance, combat, and training missions for numerous allied and US Army divisions and brigades, the II Field Force reconnaissance company had one overriding mission from late 1967 to early 1969—to provide reconnaissance and intelligence necessary for the protection of the capital region. Despite its name and paper mission, F Company veterans paint a picture of a unit whose primary activity was seeking out and killing enemy soldiers, by ambush, indirect fire, or close-air and helicopter-gunship support.⁸³ An officer who served in this unit recalls that it was subordinated to the higher HQ G3 (not G2) staff section.⁸⁴

The II Field Force Commander during this early period was Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand. In his post-command debriefing report, he praised the effectiveness of his LRP company in “reconnoitering enemy base areas and lines of movement” and recommended the formation of more such units.⁸⁵

F Company, 51st Infantry was inactivated in late December 1968, upon the arrival in Vietnam of its replacement, Company D (Long Range Patrol), 151st Infantry, Indiana National Guard.⁸⁶ Through an administrative sleight of hand orchestrated between General William Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Creighton Abrams, the MACV commander, Major George Heckman of F Company retained nominal command of the Indiana Rangers, as they came to be called, and combat operations continued as before with different faces in the patrol teams.

Upon the departure of the Indiana Rangers from Vietnam in November 1969, II Field Force quickly formed Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry to replace it. Its mission for the brief period of its existence (November 1969-April 1970) was “to provide corps-level Ranger support to II Field Force Vietnam by collecting intelligence, interdicting supply routes, locating and destroying encampments, and uncovering cache sites.”⁸⁷

It is clear from this broad overview of LRRP/LRP/Ranger unit missions in Vietnam that while high-level commanders may have been cognizant of the employment doctrine contained in FM 31-18, that knowledge certainly did not inhibit their use of these units for missions unrelated to reconnaissance. LRRP/LRP/Ranger soldiers engaged in a great deal of combat in support of their controlling HQ.

Organization

A 230-man LRP company, such as existed in I and II Field Forces in the fall of 1967, was a surprisingly large organization. Commanded by a major, this company had four line platoons plus headquarters, operations, communications, mess, and maintenance sections. The officer component included the commander, operations, intelligence, and communications officers, and platoon leaders. Each line platoon had up to seven patrols with six men in each patrol. In addition, the II Field force LRP Company had attached to it a dedicated Huey helicopter-lift platoon for insertions and extractions, a gunship platoon for fire support, a full ground-cavalry troop to act as a quick reaction force (QRF), a forward air controller (FAC) to coordinate and deliver air strikes, and artillery liaison officers to coordinate artillery support.⁸⁸ This was a battalion-size force of up to

500 personnel, all focused on a single LRP company and its training and combat operations.

While the I Field Force LRP Company was similarly structured, it was more often dispersed throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone. In August 1968, for example, the company HQ with 2d Platoon was under the operational control (OPCON) of Company B, 5th Special Forces Group. The 1st Platoon was OPCON to 4-503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, the 3d Platoon was OPCON to 3-503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 4th Platoon was OPCON to 3-506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division.⁸⁹ Because this unit was often decentralized, it did not have dedicated helicopter support but instead received aviation support from the units for which it was operating.

Both field-force LRP companies had regular access to fixed-wing FAC support for teams in the field. These aircraft were used for radio relay and for directing close-air support in II Field Force, and also for managing deployed teams in I Field Force.⁹⁰ An August 1968 description of the FAC support to the I Field Force LRP Company in that period uses the term “direct support” to describe the subordination of the FAC.⁹¹

The provisional LRRP units and their successor LRP companies at division were much smaller organizations. They typically had a captain commander and two or three lieutenants who served as operations officer and platoon leaders. The early 1st Air Cavalry Division LRRP unit had two six-man LRRP teams and a headquarters element comprised of two medics, a communications section, and an operations section.⁹² When this unit was enlarged to a company in the spring of 1967, it was authorized 16 teams of six men each.⁹³ Additional officer, operations, and communications personnel in the company HQ would round out this unit to a full MACV-authorized strength of 118. This particular LRP unit was initially attached to the 191st Military Intelligence Detachment for logistical support, but remained under the operational control of the division G2.⁹⁴ Later, the LRRP detachment was attached to 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Air) for logistic support, messing, and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).⁹⁵

F Company, 58th Infantry (LRP), 101st Airborne Division, when it was formed at Fort Campbell in the summer of 1967, had a headquarters element with a strong communications section, and two patrol platoons with four or five six-man patrols in each.⁹⁶ When it arrived in Vietnam and until August 1968, this company was administratively assigned to the

326th Engineer Battalion.⁹⁷ In August 1968, the company looked roughly the same: two line platoons, with six six-man teams in each. The company HQ section included the CO, XO, 1SG, two to three clerks, and a driver. The communications section consisted of a sergeant and eight to 10 communications specialists.⁹⁸ The LRP company was collocated with and put under the operational control of 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Air), which provided its lift and gunship helicopter support and QRF.⁹⁹ Later, when this unit transitioned to a Ranger company, it had headquarters, supply, and communications sections and two field or line platoons.¹⁰⁰

In the Americal Division in 1968, the LRP company HQ served as an administrative, logistical, and training base for LRP teams that were parceled out to the operational control of the division's three brigades. The division HQ maintained control over the use of the teams by requiring the commanding general's approval of the teams' missions.¹⁰¹

When it was formed in April 1966, the LRRP detachment of the 1st Infantry Division had two officers—the commander and an XO/operations officer. The unit fielded six teams of five men each and was assigned to Troop D, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment for support (mess, barracks, supply, and QRF).¹⁰²

When General Peers established the 4th Infantry Division Recondo Detachment in June 1967, it was administratively assigned to the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. This provided the LRRP unit with both helicopter support and a QRF from the aero-rifle platoon. This assignment was retained even when the detachment was a Ranger company in 1969.¹⁰³ Similarly, the 25th Infantry Division's LRRP Detachment, when it was formed in June 1966, was attached to the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry and collocated with that unit at Cu Chi for messing and UCMJ matters.¹⁰⁴

An early example of the organization of a brigade-level LRRP detachment is provided by the 173d Airborne Brigade in late April 1966. This provisional platoon was commanded by a captain and had a lieutenant XO, intelligence and communications sergeants, two communications specialists, and a medic in the platoon HQ. The nine patrols each had six men: patrol leader and assistant, radioman, scout, and two assistant scouts. This particular platoon was attached to Troop E, 17th Cavalry (Armored).¹⁰⁵ When the brigade formed the 74th Infantry Detachment (Airborne Long Range Patrol) in December 1967, its organization strength remained at two officers and 59 men.¹⁰⁶ Two years later, the brigade commander, considering the operational commitments of his Ranger company, increased

its strength from the authorized 61 to 115.¹⁰⁷

In similar fashion, Company M (Ranger), formed from the 71st Infantry Detachment of 199th Light Infantry Brigade in February 1969, was paired closely with Troop D, 17th Cavalry (Armored).¹⁰⁸ The 196th Infantry Brigade Long Range Patrol Detachment, when it was formed in January 1967, was assigned to the brigade intelligence section but placed under the administrative control of Troop F, 17th Cavalry (Armored).¹⁰⁹ When the successor to this detachment in the 23d Infantry Division (Americus) was redesignated as Company G (Ranger), 75th Infantry two years later, the Ranger company was “satellited with the 16th Aviation Group for administration, helicopter transport, and aerial or ground assistance.”¹¹⁰

A clear pattern emerges from this overview: The bulk of LRRP/LRP/ Ranger units in Vietnam were operationally controlled by, assigned to, attached to, or collocated with an air cavalry or ground cavalry unit. These were marriages both of necessity and convenience, since the requirements for helicopter lift, gunships, and QRFs were certainly met by many of these affiliations. The LRRP units also needed mess and logistic support, along with someone to administer their UCMJ needs. They frequently gave back, in return, detail support to the mess hall (kitchen police—KP), soldiers to perform perimeter bunker guard and ambush patrols, and for the air cavalrymen, additional QRFs for downed helicopter rescue and retrieval operations (combat search and rescue—CSAR).

At the team or patrol level, one can find patrols as small as three and four men under special circumstances, but the generally adopted LRRP team strength was five or six.¹¹¹ Special attachments for a specific mission might enlarge a standard patrol team to seven or eight men. The 9th Infantry Division LRP unit, operating in the Mekong River Delta region in 1968, used eight men because they divided evenly into two boats.¹¹² The 25th Infantry Division Ranger company in late 1969-early 1970 was also organized around eight-man teams.¹¹³ The duty positions were variously named but included a team leader and assistant team leader, one or two radio-telephone operators (RTO), and two or three scouts. Whatever the team size, someone with experience had to walk “point” (lead) and “trail” (last man in column) to provide the required movement security. While some units may have had a few MOS-qualified medics assigned to them, the typical patrol did not, and one of the team members performed this function. Those units that engaged in offensive combat actions on a regular basis frequently combined two “light” teams into a single “heavy team” on an *ad hoc* basis to provide more firepower and security.

Indigenous Soldiers

Many LRRP, LRP, and Ranger units had indigenous soldiers assigned or attached to them, on a temporary or permanent basis. Indigenous soldiers came from three primary sources: the ARVN, Montagnard tribesmen, or former enemy soldiers from the *Chieu Hoi* program in the form of Kit Carson Scouts. In some units, such as the 1st Cavalry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade, indigenous personnel were recruited, trained, and embedded in LRRP teams.¹¹⁴ The 1st Cavalry Division, which first began using indigenous personnel in May 1967, suffered one of the drawbacks of employing indigenous personnel in early 1968. One of its Kit Carson Scouts, a former North Vietnamese Army (NVA) lieutenant, deserted the unit while on patrol. He took with him all the TTP learned while assigned to the LRRP unit.¹¹⁵

The 101st Airborne had extensive experience working with indigenous personnel. A platoon of ARVN Rangers was assigned to F Company (LRP) in July 1968 and for about a month, two of these soldiers deployed with each LRP team. The experiment was not well received by 101st LRRP soldiers due to the tactical incompetence of the ARVN troops.¹¹⁶ L Company (Ranger) began using Kit Carson Scouts in the fall of 1969 with better success.¹¹⁷ When L Company was again assigned a group of ARVN Rangers in the summer of 1970, the tactical ineptitude of the South Vietnamese contributed to the project's demise.¹¹⁸

Other units that employed indigenous forces at some time during the war included the LRRP or Ranger units of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and 5th Infantry Division.¹¹⁹ General Peers strongly advocated for the use of indigenous forces when he was commander of I Field Force in 1968:

I have found here in this environment that it is very advantageous to utilize one or two indigenous personnel with each of the LRP teams. The reason for this is that they are natives of these areas and know the patterns, the markings, the life within the jungle. They can see and hear things that the ordinary American ear or eye is not accustomed to seeing or hearing. They have proved most satisfactory.¹²⁰

Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (I Field Force) not only trained South

Vietnamese Rangers for several months in 1968 but also employed many of them in LRP operations, along with Kit Carson Scouts.¹²¹ Its successor unit, C Company (Ranger) also employed soldiers from the Republic of Korea Army in late 1970 and early 1971.¹²² Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force) also employed Kit Carson Scouts, as did its successor unit, Company D, 151st Infantry (Ranger) of the Indiana National Guard.¹²³

The advantages of employing indigenous personnel were obvious: they had language and cultural knowledge, better understood the terrain, knew enemy TTP, and by their non-American appearance bought a few moments of precious time for the remainder of the patrol to react appropriately during a sudden encounter with the enemy on a jungle trail. The disadvantages of employing indigenous personnel were equally obvious: unit security was compromised, communication within teams was difficult, standards of training and conduct differed, and mutual trust and cohesiveness were hard to build. Examples of these problems occurred throughout the war and in several units.¹²⁴

Training

Training unit personnel was among the most difficult issues LRRP-unit commanders faced in Vietnam. The two primary methods employed, singly and in combination, were training in the LRRP unit and training at the MACV Recondo School in Nha Trang. In a few exceptional cases, such as the 9th Infantry Division in 1966, 101st Airborne Division in 1967, and Company D, 151st Infantry (Indiana National Guard) in 1968, units formed and trained before they arrived in Vietnam. But once in country, they were faced with training their own replacement soldiers like every other unit.

Unit Training

Several LRRP memoirs describe unit training in terms of a week to two weeks of classes, eight to 12 hours per day. In the 101st Airborne Division in the summer of 1968, this week of training included classes in noise and light discipline; hand signaling; escape and evasion; patrolling techniques; radio procedure; calling for fire missions and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC); land navigation; immediate action drills (IAD); emergency medical treatments for various wounds, injuries, and ailments; camouflage of person and equipment; load packing; and helicopter operations. This week of classroom training was followed by training patrols just outside the perimeter of the base camp.¹²⁵

In the 1st Cavalry Division in 1967, this training included classes in

map reading, identification of enemy weapons and equipment, marksmanship, terminal guidance of aircraft and helicopters, LZ selection, medical training, rudimentary language training, physical conditioning, ambush techniques, radio and communications procedures, combat-reaction drills (IAD by another name), and explosives and demolition.¹²⁶ In 1968 this unit-training course lasted 10 to 12 days and was still at two weeks in length a year later, after the unit was converted to a Ranger company.¹²⁷ In 1969 the unit training ran for two weeks and included map reading, rappelling, radio maintenance and operation, aerial-rocket and gunship coordination, medic training, ambush techniques, enemy weapons familiarization, enemy unit identification, and physical conditioning.¹²⁸

In the 173d Airborne Brigade in 1968, unit training for individual soldiers lasted from one to two weeks and was followed by a trial mission.¹²⁹ Another source describes training for the Ranger unit of the 173d Airborne Brigade as a minimum of 96 hours over the course of seven to 10 days.¹³⁰ While the 173d Airborne Brigade used MACV Recondo School, it also made a concerted effort to send personnel to the Malaysian Tracking School.¹³¹ Soldiers selected for assignment to E Company (LRP), 20th Infantry, I Field Force attended a 15-day course taught at An Khe by Ranger-qualified instructors. Subjects included physical conditioning, rappelling, radio procedures, first aid, day and night land navigation, patrolling tactics, ambushes, weapons familiarization, MEDEVAC procedures, artillery and gunship terminal guidance, and helicopter operations.¹³²

The capstone of all unit-training programs was actual combat patrolling. When conditions permitted, ambush patrols that most LRRP units were tasked to perform outside their base camp perimeters as a matter of routine were used as training opportunities.¹³³ These were generally overnighters, for which a light (six-man) or heavy (12-man) patrol walked out the main gate before last light to the nearest area of concealment, established an ambush on a road or trail leading toward the base camp, and returned just after first light in the morning. When soldiers had mastered this task and their leaders felt they were prepared, they were assigned to “break-in” long-range patrol missions, normally no more than two “newbies” to a six-man team. At times, however, the operational tempo did not permit the use of these missions and new team members were committed to combat patrols without them.¹³⁴

Because soldiers were rotating into and out of LRRP units singly and in cohorts, training was both episodic and continuous. On several occasions, due to large personnel turnover, a LRRP unit would have to stand down

from combat operations for several weeks to conduct unit training. An example of this occurred in the 101st Airborne Division in December 1968 and January 1969.¹³⁵

It is no coincidence that all these unit-training programs were remarkably similar in both content and length. The unit cadre who served as instructors were a somewhat homogeneous lot, being infantry NCOs with Ranger and special forces backgrounds. A second explanation for this commonality was the mission itself. While the terrain certainly varied between the central highlands and the delta, so much of what LRRP soldiers practiced and executed was the same in all places. A third reason for the similarity in unit training throughout Vietnam was the MACV Recondo School in Nha Trang.

MACV Recondo School

MACV Recondo School was a product of the 5th Special Forces Group, created expressly for the purpose of training soldiers from all the free-world forces in the art and science of long-range reconnaissance techniques.¹³⁶ General William Westmoreland formally approved the school's creation in a message to the 5th Special Forces Group commander of 4 September 1966. The facilities and instructor group in Nha Trang had previously been used to train reconnaissance teams for Project DELTA, a special forces and South Vietnamese Army enterprise that had conducted special operations in Viet Cong-controlled areas since late 1964.

The course taught at MACV Recondo School was three weeks in length, with 260 hours of classroom and field instruction. It was made available to all free-world forces, resulting in the attendance of Vietnamese, Korean, Australian, Thai, and Republic of the Philippines soldiers and airmen, along with personnel from all branches of the US Armed Forces. The typical class size was 60 students, with a new class intake every two weeks. Due to the high academic and physical demands of the course, the dropout rate over time was about 30 percent. Graduates returned to their parent units and were then subject to being reassigned to a LRRP/LRP/Ranger unit for the remainder of their in-country time.

The prerequisites for attendance at MACV Recondo School were listed in USARV Regulation 350-2:

- Must be a volunteer and possess a combat-arms MOS.
- Must have been in country for one month and have six months' retainability after graduation.
- Assignment to a LRRP unit is anticipated.

- Must be proficient in general military subjects.

Because non-graduates and graduates alike returned to their parent units, it was in the best interest of units to fill their quotas with carefully selected students. On the other hand, many LRRP soldiers were not afforded the opportunity to attend MACV Recondo School. General Peers, 4th Infantry Division commander, briefing other senior commanders on LRRP issues in September 1967, stated that “due to the quotas for the school and to the rapid turnover of personnel, only about one out of every five of our [4th Infantry Division] LRRP personnel ever attend the Recondo School.”¹³⁷

Students arrived at the school with their personal assigned weapon and load-bearing equipment (LBE), and with a prescribed number of loaded magazines and hand grenades. The school provided a standard issue of required special equipment, along with a 30-pound sandbag. The sandbag was carried in the student’s rucksack at all times and was subject to being weighed by any instructor at any time. Students were formed into five-man teams and assigned an instructor/adviser, who advised and evaluated the team throughout the course.

Every morning began with physical conditioning before breakfast. In September 1967, this meant a modest period of calisthenics followed by conditioning marches in week one. The marches began at a distance of two miles on Monday and increased to seven miles on Saturday, with a required completion time of under 90 minutes for the 7-mile march. Students carried their rifles and wore all of their LBE with rucksack, four full 1-quart canteens, and their sandbag for these marches. Students who failed to make the grade physically were returned to their units after the first week. Physical conditioning during the second week employed a formation run in place of the forced march, and the weapons, LBE, and rucksacks with sandbags were left in the barracks.

MACV Recondo School’s curriculum contained the following major subject blocks and time allocation in the spring of 1967:

- Administration–15:00
- Physical Training–14:20
- Medical–3:30
- Communications–8:30
- Intelligence–4:40
- Patrol Training–62:40
- Weapons Training–15:10

- Air Operations—18:30
- Combat Operations—112:40
- Land Navigation—15:30
- Quizzes, examinations, and critiques—6:30
- Commandant’s Time—13:00

Of the total 288 hours, 45:30 was concurrent training in patrolling, weapons training, and air operations.¹³⁸

The first week of formal instruction was conducted in a classroom on the school compound. The second week was spent in training areas outside the compound on practical subjects, such as weapons firing, tower and helicopter rappelling, and other field activities. The third week was spent in preparing and conducting an actual instructor-led combat patrol in a relatively safe jungle environment. These patrols occasionally made contact with enemy forces and resulted in the wounding and death of both US and enemy personnel.

Upon completion of MACV Recondo School, graduates were awarded a certificate with a Recondo number and a Recondo patch to wear on their right pocket while in country, then were sent back to their parent unit for possible assignment to a LRRP/LRP/Ranger unit.¹³⁹

While the typical Recondo School class was comprised of enlisted and NCO personnel from all services and a few foreign armies, company-grade officers were also permitted to attend. The list of graduates by class shows on average two or three lieutenants and the occasional captain in a graduating class of 40-45 students.

All seating in the school was set aside in October and November 1967 to train personnel for the LRP companies of Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (I Field Force) and Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force) in four truncated classes. A total of 333 personnel were trained, but did not complete all the requirements for graduation and therefore were not awarded Recondo numbers.

MACV Recondo School graduated 2,700 US students and also trained the 333 additional personnel mentioned above, for a total of about 3,000 US personnel between September 1966 and December 1970.¹⁴⁰ But the school’s training impact was far greater than sheer numbers. The training conducted in LRRP units around the country was inextricably linked to MACV Recondo School training. Most units required their soldiers to have

demonstrated aptitude and ability to conduct LRRP operations before they sent them to Recondo School. These units conducted training to qualify soldiers for LRRP duty and also to prepare them for success at Recondo School, based on their knowledge of its physical- and academic-training standards. This pre-screening provided the special forces instructors at Nha Trang with better students, and undoubtedly raised the standard of Recondo School graduates.

MACV Recondo School, in turn, with its comprehensive and detailed classroom and field curriculum and rigorous physical conditioning, defined a common set of TTP for all LRRP units in Vietnam, irrespective of their mission or operating terrain. The importance of this common set of standards cannot be overemphasized. Graduates left Nha Trang with their mental and physical rucksacks full of knowledge of the intimate details of LRRP activities. They took back to their units the paper handouts used by the school in academic instruction.¹⁴¹ They incorporated sandbags in their unit physical conditioning training.¹⁴² Primarily as a consequence of Recondo School training, every LRRP unit in Vietnam spoke a common language of long-range patrolling.

Materiel

TOE 7-157E, the authorization document for a long-range patrol company during the Vietnam War, contains a list of all items of equipment that should have been present in both of the Field Force LRP companies. For the purposes of this study, this TOE serves as a guide to the general types of equipment one might find in any LRRP unit in Vietnam. The several memoirs written by LRRP veterans are a better source to determine what weapons and equipment units actually had access to and used in the performance of their combat mission.

Outside of the two Field Force LRP companies, few LRRP units had assigned vehicles. At most, a unit might have a jeep for the commander and first sergeant, a 3/4-ton truck for the supply sergeant, and perhaps one 2 1/2-ton truck to move personnel from the unit area to the helipad and return. Because provisional LRRP units were not established on authorized TOEs, these vehicles were normally borrowed but sometimes stolen from other units (with commensurate modification to data plates and bumper markings). The practice of “liberating” a vehicle from its owning unit and repainting its bumper markings was common in Vietnam and should not surprise anyone. When a unit was relocated from one area in country to another, these “stolen” vehicles were frequently abandoned in place or returned to their rightful owners.¹⁴³

Another method of requisition commonly used in Vietnam was the trading of commodities between units. When the 1st Cavalry Division stood up its LRRP unit in late 1966, “horse-trading” was used to obtain exotic weapons, radios, generators, and rucksacks.¹⁴⁴ In addition to standard supply items, LRRP-unit personnel frequently possessed enemy weapons and equipment that could be traded away in rear areas, with the full knowledge that more trophy items would be acquired on a reoccurring basis.

TOE 7-157E provided for a standard assortment of weapons: M14 rifles in large numbers, several M60 7.62mm and M2 .50-caliber machine guns, M1911A1 .45-caliber pistols, an M79 grenade launcher, and several 3.5-inch rocket launchers. Replace the M14 with variants of the M16 rifle, drop the .50-caliber machine guns, replace the 3.5-inch rocket launchers with the M72 LAW, add several additional M79 grenade launchers (and late in the war the XM203), and the result is a fairly standard list of armaments found in virtually every LRRP unit by the late-war period. But this list does not begin to describe the total weaponry possessed by LRRPs. Other weapons abounded, some military and some of civilian origin. Here is a list of these other weapons:

- “exotic” weapons (unspecified) in the 1st Cavalry Division¹⁴⁵
- Silenced Sten guns in multiple units¹⁴⁶
- assortment of modified, unauthorized, classified, stolen, silenced, and otherwise illegal weapons in the 101st Airborne Division¹⁴⁷
- M2 (full-automatic capable) carbine in multiple units¹⁴⁸
- M3 submachine gun in multiple units¹⁴⁹
- Thompson .45-caliber submachine gun in 1st Infantry Division and Americal Division¹⁵⁰
- 12-gauge shotgun in multiple units¹⁵¹
- AK47 (common in many units for use by point man, who may also have been wearing black pajamas to provide the patrol greater reaction time to sudden enemy contact)¹⁵²
- Simonov semi-automatic carbine (SKS)¹⁵³
- CZ58 rifle in the 173d Airborne Brigade¹⁵⁴
- silenced/unsilenced Swedish K submachine gun in multiple units¹⁵⁵
- M79 with cut-off barrel and stock in multiple units¹⁵⁶
- M14 with and without scope in multiple units¹⁵⁷
- Winchester Model 70 bolt-action rifle in the 101st Airborne Division¹⁵⁸

- high standard .22-caliber pistol (government-issue) or Ruger .22-caliber pistol¹⁵⁹
- numerous personal weapons¹⁶⁰

Men carried personal weapons other than standard-issue M16 variants for many reasons as diverse as the list itself. Perhaps the best reason was expressed by a veteran of the 1st Infantry Division LRRP Detachment: “[We used] anything that made fire fights sound more like their weapons and gave no indication of the size of our force.”¹⁶¹ In general terms, these men understood that a non-standard weapon required them to carry their own irreplaceable ammunition supply. They also learned that silenced weapons were not always silent and that “sawed-off” weapons (M79, M14, even the M60 machine gun) did not perform to the same standard as an unmodified weapon of the same type. Any submachine gun that fired the .45-caliber round was exceptionally heavy in combination with its ammunition supply. And a black-pajama-clad point man carrying an AK47 did not want to be observed by a friendly patrol or helicopter. That could lead to a disastrous outcome.

Different units had various rationales for issuing and carrying the M72 LAW. In II Field Force, the M72 LAW was initially viewed as a psychological weapon, used to shock and stun enemy soldiers and also to confuse them as to the size and identity of the American unit they had engaged.¹⁶² But on occasion the weapon was actually fired for its destructive effect, in one case at an enemy sampan.¹⁶³ Infrequent mention of the M72 LAW is made in 101st Airborne Division memoirs. In one case, the LRRP team’s mission was to find and destroy an enemy radio transmitter. In another mission, conducted in April 1969 in the A Shau Valley, a team carried a LAW because of rumors of NVA armor using the road through the valley. In the third example, in March and April 1971, Ranger teams equipped with claymores, shaped charges, and LAWs were inserted along a road to ambush and destroy enemy vehicular traffic.¹⁶⁴ The LAW was occasionally used to break contact with the enemy in the 1st Cavalry Division LRRP company.¹⁶⁵ The paucity of references to this weapon in memoir literature suggests that its use was not widespread.¹⁶⁶

The list of standard-issue items for a LRRP soldier looks about the same across all units, plus or minus a garment here and there or the different number of canteens (reflecting seasonal weather and terrain variations). If one inspected the personal gear and rucksack of any LRP soldier in any LRP unit in 1968, one would likely find the following items:

- personal weapon (M16 or CAR15) with at least 18 to 20 20-round

magazines (18 rounds per magazine with ball-to-tracer ratio as per unit SOP)

- fragmentation grenades (minimum four-six)
- smoke grenades (minimum 1)
- white phosphorus grenades (frequently 1)
- chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) grenades (frequently 1)
- claymore mine (minimum 1)
- map in protective plastic
- C4 or other explosive substance (1/4-pound block or more)
- detonation cord, non-electric blasting caps
- dehydrated rations (two per day for anticipated duration of patrol)
- water (minimum two quarts) and purification tablets
- strobe light (team leader and assistant team leader)
- signal mirror, pen flare, signal panel (selected patrol members)
- PRC-25 or PRC-77 radio (selected patrol members), signal operating instructions
- URC-10 radio (selected patrol members)
- extra radio battery (selected patrol members)
- Starlight scope (selected patrol member)
- Olympus Pen EE or Polaroid camera (selected patrol members)
- serum albumin or other blood products (selected patrol members)
- binoculars (selected patrol members)
- drugs (morphine syrette, tetracycline, dextroamphetamine, darvon, codeine tablets, and others)
- large knife (issue survival knife or commercial knife)
- lensatic compass
- insect repellent
- camouflage stick
- rope (six-foot length) for rappelling seat, two snap links
- heavy-duty leather gloves
- clothing items (extra socks, poncho liner, sleeping sweater)
- extra ammunition for M79 or M60 (as required by mission)¹⁶⁷

The AN/PVS-2 Starlight Scope weighed seven and one-half pounds and was about 18 inches long and eight inches high. This first-generation night vision device, intended to be attached to an M14 or M16 rifle as a sighting device but more often hand-held, was used by some units that operated in more open terrain. These included the LRRP/Ranger units in I and II Field Forces, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division, and the 173d Airborne Brigade.¹⁶⁸

Depending on the exact load configuration of a rucksack, particularly in heavy items such as water, ammunition, and communications gear, the overall combat load for a LRRP soldier could easily range from 70 to 100 pounds. The physical demands on LRRP soldiers were great indeed. LRRP soldiers' tendency to load themselves down did not escape the attention of General Peers, who had intimate knowledge of LRRP activity from his own command experience in Vietnam:

It is my view that most of our LRP's go in too heavy. They've got everything but the kitchen sink hung on them. The mission that these people perform should determine the equipment that they take along. There are a few basic items and anything beyond that is pure impedimenta. First is the man himself; of course, he must take along food, but he should not have to take along water. In dry areas during certain seasons, maybe yes, because it may be a tremendous inconvenience and dangerous to go back and forth to a water hole. . . . He needs his weapon. He needs ammunition, and he perhaps needs a poncho. . . . In our environment we operate with the radio, so a radio has to go along. If they are going out on a surveillance mission, it would be advantageous to take along a pair of binoculars. . . . I would recommend to all of you that you cut down to the minimum what these men will take to the field.¹⁶⁹

No discussion of the materiel aspect of LRRP/Ranger unit operations in Vietnam can be complete without mention of the helicopter and other dedicated aircraft. Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force) had dedicated helicopters. The former operations officer of this unit mentions a dedicated lift platoon and gunship platoon.¹⁷⁰ Another source describes the helicopter support to this unit as "one C & C, three Slicks [lift helicopters], and three to four gunships . . . for exclusive use by the company." This same source's description of the unit cantonment area includes a helicopter

landing pad.¹⁷¹ A veteran of one helicopter-support unit recalls that whenever a LRP team was inserted, his unit kept a gunship team and a lift helicopter physically mission ready in a small field at the LRP compound. The crews for these helicopters slept in the LRP compound. This veteran, who flew a Huey UH-1C gunship, indicates that he was under the operational command of the LRP company commander unless the cavalry's ground platoon was also committed, at which time the helicopters reverted to the control of the cavalry troop commander.¹⁷²

In one other LRRP unit, in the 1st Cavalry Division, there is a suggestion of a single dedicated helicopter and four crewmen for the LRRP-unit commander.¹⁷³ The time period for this particular source is very late in 1966 or early in 1967, and the presence of four crewmen suggests a Bell UH-1 Iroquois Huey utility helicopter rather than a Hughes OH-6A light observation helicopter (LOH, but commonly called "loach"), which had a crew of two (pilot and observer). In either case, one helicopter was insufficient to satisfy all the transportation requirements of a LRRP unit, even one with only two deployable teams.

In all other cases, helicopters were borrowed assets, provided by higher HQ on request of the LRRP-unit commander or by direction from the controlling HQ staff. To be sure, many LRRP units, particularly those operationally controlled by a cavalry squadron, had habitual relationships with their helicopter-support units. And within those helicopter units, some pilots appear to have become particularly adept at supporting LRRP insertions and extractions.

So what was the typical helicopter requirement for a LRRP team? A single UH-1, two if the unit SOP required it, was needed to conduct a pre-mission air reconnaissance or overflight. The purpose of this flight was to enable the LRRP company and reconnaissance team leadership to view the reconnaissance zone in its entirety from the air, to select primary and alternate insertion LZs and extraction pick-up zones (PZ), and to view possible movement routes or select observation positions for the patrol. Participants in this overflight were normally someone from the company chain of command (company commander, operations officer, or platoon leader), the reconnaissance team leader, and possibly his assistant. This overflight was normally executed about 24 hours in advance of the planned insertion time. Logically, the same helicopter pilot who flew the reconnaissance overflight would also fly the insertion mission on the following day.

The actual insertion of a six-man LRRP team was normally accomplished

using five helicopters: a C & C helicopter for the LRRP company commander or his designated representative (operations officer or platoon leader), two UH-1s (one for the inserted team and the other to portray false insertions), and two Huey or Cobra gunships. If a 12-man heavy team was being inserted, at least one more UH-1 was required to carry the additional six men. If helicopters were plentiful, additional lift helicopters could accompany the mission to portray the insertion of a larger force, or additional gunship helicopters could accompany the insertion to provide additional fire support and a safe extraction in the event of enemy presence in the LZ area.

Picture, then, a LRRP company commander attempting to insert a half dozen or more six-man teams in a brigade or divisional AO over a period of several hours to execute a “saturation” mission. Such an AO may be 20 kilometers or more from the base camp, requiring refueling between insertion sorties. It could take a relatively limited number of helicopters a long time to insert all the teams, or conversely a relatively large number of helicopters a short time.

Once inserted into its reconnaissance zone, the LRRP team was then at the mercy of the weather and the chain of command for subsequent helicopter support. A notable example of a LRRP team in contact that could not be extracted because helicopters were not immediately available occurred on 20 November 1968. About an hour after springing an ambush on a small enemy force in mid-morning of that day, a 101st Airborne Division LRP heavy team (12 men) came under attack and spent the remainder of the day pinned in its position by a larger enemy force. It could neither be extracted nor reinforced due to the unavailability of helicopter-lift support. By the end of the day the team had lost four KIA and several WIA, and were finally rescued by an *ad hoc* force of off-duty LRP company personnel followed by a QRF from the cavalry squadron.¹⁷⁴

Lift helicopters used for emergency LRP-team extractions out of severe terrain or triple-canopy jungle typically had to be rigged with rope ladders, jungle penetrators, and McGuire rigs. Helicopter crews had to be trained in the use of all these devices, because their use severely affected control of the helicopter. By their very nature, these extractions were frequently conducted under enemy fire, sometimes at night, and often involving wounded personnel. It is no surprise that LRP units developed a special relationship with their habitual helicopter-support units and crews.

In a similar fashion, gunship pilots who routinely supported LRP units developed TTP intended to bring suppressing and killing fire in close to

LRP-team positions. LRP teams identified their exact locations using panels, strobe lights in the open and in M79 grenade-launcher barrels, colored smoke, trip and pen-gun flares, and tracer fire. Skilled gunship pilots routinely delivered ordnance to within mere feet of LRP positions. Also on occasion LRP soldiers sustained injury from gunship fire.

Even though an enormous number of helicopters were present in the theater, they were a critical asset and, thus, strictly managed. In August 1968, General Peers stated that “any time you get about five or six LRP’s out you have to keep about two gunships, sometimes four gunships depending on the situation, and two to four slicks setting aside that you cannot use for anything else.”¹⁷⁵ As the former commander of 4th Infantry Division and at that time I Field Force commander, Peers knew well the aviation support required for LRP operations.

Other types of aircraft support to LRP teams included dedicated fixed-wing O-1 (L-19A) “Bird Dog” light observation aircraft in both I and II Field Force LRP companies. In both of these units, the aircraft flew above or off to the side of a reconnaissance zone in direct support of the LRP patrol. The pilot or observer had several functions: to serve as an aerial radio relay operator, to adjust artillery, to provide exact position coordinates to a patrol on the ground, to make visual contact with patrol for extraction, to provide information and warning to patrol of enemy activity, and to precisely locate a patrol in contact.¹⁷⁶ The front-seat pilot was, of course, an Air Force FAC, who was empowered to bring in and control close-air support (CAS) aircraft. When it first formed a LRRP detachment in October 1966, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division made frequent use of an L-19A for airborne radio-relay with its LRRP teams.¹⁷⁷ In 1968, the 101st Division LRP unit used FAC support for insertions.¹⁷⁸ Other LRP units had occasional access to fixed-wing aircraft support for radio-relay and other purposes; however, it was on a periodic rather than continuous basis.¹⁷⁹

Tactical Role of Leaders

The administrative duties and responsibilities of small-unit leaders to sustain, shelter, promote, reward, punish, and in other ways provide for soldiers’ daily existence are constants in peace and war. This section examines the tactical role of the leadership component of LRRP units: the commander, operations officer or NCO, and platoon leadership. As in other areas of this study, one size does not fit all. Many LRRP units had inspired leadership; some did not. The focus of this section is more on what leaders did to contribute to their unit’s tactical mission than on how well or poorly they did it.

Doctrinally, in the tactical realm the LRRP/Ranger company commander was charged with specific responsibilities in 1965:

- Control the tactical employment of the long-range patrol platoons.
- Maintain close liaison with the staff of the controlling HQ.
- Participate in the initial planning for patrol operations.
- With assistance from company operations section, prepare detailed patrol plans.
- Issue orders and control patrol-recovery operations.
- Report the information gathered to G2 staff.

With one exception, these same responsibilities were contained in the new FM 31-18 published in August 1968, but with the following added company-commander tasks in stability operations:

- Issue warning order to patrol platoon.
- Assisted by operations officer, analyze mission and develop detailed plans for aerial reconnaissance, insertion, extraction, fire support, and communication.
- Continue preparation, planning, supervision, inspections, and follow-up actions to ensure the continuance of a high state of operational readiness.

The missing duty for LRRP company commanders in 1968 stability operations was, “Issue orders and control patrol recovery operations.” This task was now shared by the controlling HQ (“initiates contingency plans for emergency extraction”) and the aviation-mission commander (“directs the emergency extraction”).¹⁸⁰

The writings of several LRP/Ranger veterans give us some “keyhole” insights into the actual duties performed by LRRP/LRP/Ranger company commanders in the Vietnam War. In F Company (LRP) 51st Infantry, II Field Force, the company commander is depicted as responding to the scene of LRP-team contacts in the C & C helicopter, bringing with him a pair of gunships to assist in the extraction of the team and its wounded personnel.¹⁸¹ The company commander participated in both insertions and extractions of teams.¹⁸² On other occasions, the company commander issued tactical orders by radio to deployed teams, telling them to stay in position or move, and approving or denying team requests to be extracted.¹⁸³ The company commander was also present when a team was debriefed upon completion of a mission.¹⁸⁴

A partial picture of company-commander duties and responsibilities is available for the LRRP unit of 1st Cavalry Division. The first commander, a combat-experienced Ranger- and special forces-qualified officer, stood up the unit in November 1966 and guided it through recruitment, training, and operational commitment until his date eligible for return from overseas (DEROS) in June 1967.¹⁸⁵ Because this provisional unit's teams initially were placed under the operational control of brigade HQ, little description exists of this commander's tactical role. However, on one occasion he is depicted participating in the aerial reconnaissance overflight and on another as debriefing the division G2 about the results of a successful patrol.¹⁸⁶

A later commander of E Company (LRP), 52d Infantry, 1st Cavalry Division (which in time became H Company [Ranger]), participated fully in the tactical activity of his unit.¹⁸⁷ He was brought into command of the LRP company in the summer of 1968 to either resurrect it or bury it. At the time, the commander of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, to which the LRP company was attached for logistic support and UCMJ authority, was attempting to make it into his E Troop. After the unit deployed from I Corps to III Corps tactical zone in October 1968, this commander went on the first mission in the new AO as the "bellyman" in the extraction helicopter.¹⁸⁸ The new commander made tactical misuse of his LRP teams by brigade S2 and S3 personnel more difficult by establishing a tactical SOP and by communicating in writing with the division commander.¹⁸⁹ Occasionally, this commander went on a combat patrol, once with the mission to plant anti-vehicular mines along an enemy infiltration route and another time to recover remains from a helicopter crash site.¹⁹⁰ A successor to this commander is noted as giving tactical orders to a deployed team by radio (as opposed to the S2 or S3).¹⁹¹

The history of the 101st Airborne Division's LRRP, LRP, and Ranger units is well told in nine or 10 separate accounts by seven different authors. One of the early commanders of the 1st Brigade's LRRP Detachment was a 23-year-old OCS-graduate second lieutenant.¹⁹² In May and June 1967 he planned and then participated in LRRP missions to capture enemy personnel.¹⁹³ On at least one other occasion, this young officer went on a patrol as team leader during which several large groups of enemy soldiers were observed.¹⁹⁴

Almost a year later, in May 1968, the commander of F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry was in a C & C helicopter, circling above a team and controlling a pair of Marine F-4 Phantoms in an air strike on enemy troops spotted by the team.¹⁹⁵ The company commander was also frequently present when

a team leader briefed back his mission order.¹⁹⁶ In late June the company commander was involved in directing the insertion of a patrol from his C & C helicopter.¹⁹⁷ In late July 1968, after a “fragging” incident involving an unpopular new commander, a replacement commander was brought in to shape up the unit or disband it.¹⁹⁸ The new commander made tactical decisions about and participated in the insertion and extraction of teams.¹⁹⁹ In October 1968 and February 1969, he ordered the tactical deployment of several teams to saturate patrol of an area of particular interest.²⁰⁰ The company commander was also a frequent participant in reconnaissance overflights to select helicopter LZs and PZs.²⁰¹ These tactical activities, attributed to the early commanders, continued to be performed, in greater or lesser degrees, by subsequent commanders of the 101st Airborne Division LRP and later Ranger company.²⁰²

Irrespective of the division of assignment, the LRP-unit commander was the most important interface to the supported unit and its staff regarding missions assigned to his company. The typical divisional LRP company commander was a captain and his mission taskings came from majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. Unless he had the ear of a higher-ranking officer, it was difficult for a LRP company commander to refuse or even negotiate a mission he felt was inappropriate for his unit.

The other area where the divisional LRP company commander had little tactical control was the availability of helicopter support. Even when LRP units were placed under the operational control of divisional air-cavalry squadrons, which had their own helicopters, the LRP captain was at the mercy of the aviation lieutenant colonel and his staff. The availability and tactical control of lift- and gunship-helicopter support was always an issue of concern when LRP patrols were in the field.

What tactical role did lieutenants perform in LRP units? Of course it varied from unit to unit and from commander to commander. But one can generalize based upon the available secondary sources. In the I Field Force LRP Company, lieutenants supervised patrol activities from the back seat of a light fixed-wing aircraft.²⁰³ Before the platoon leader could control patrols from the air, however, he was expected to participate in a few ground missions to gain an understanding of what teams were doing.²⁰⁴ A lieutenant also went to the field with his platoon when it was deployed to a forward base from which patrols were sent out.²⁰⁵ And lieutenants participated in the insertion of patrols.²⁰⁶ In F Company (LRP), 51st Infantry in II Field Force, a platoon leader was killed while leading a patrol on 15 December 1967.²⁰⁷ It was a regular policy in this unit that a platoon leader

lead or accompany heavy teams in the field, and this was apparently done on many occasions.²⁰⁸

In the spring of 1967, the detachment commander of the 4th Infantry Division's 2d Brigade LRRP unit showed an interest in going on patrol, something "his predecessor did not do often, except to familiarize himself with what kind of conditions we worked under in the field."²⁰⁹ A veteran of the 173d Airborne Brigade LRP/Ranger Detachment, without naming specific leaders, indicates that someone from the chain of command always went to the scene to assist and control the extraction of teams that had been in contact.²¹⁰ Another veteran of this unit, from the 1970-71 period, states that the lieutenants (platoon leaders) controlled the infiltrations and extractions.²¹¹ In the 1st Cavalry Division, a platoon leader in H Company (Ranger) was expected to accompany his team leaders on reconnaissance overflights and supervise the insertion and extraction of his platoon's teams. He accompanied patrols to conduct special missions and also to confirm patrol-leader qualifications and performance.²¹² A new lieutenant was sent out on a mission to simultaneously expose him to patrol activities and expose the soldiers to him.²¹³

The record of platoon-leader tactical duties in the 101st Airborne LRP/Ranger companies is replete with examples. An account of this unit for 1968 credits the XO as the only officer to have taken a team out under his own command, which leads to the conclusion that platoon leaders were not doing so during that time period.²¹⁴ Another account cites the need for field duty and combat time to qualify a lieutenant for his Combat Infantryman Badge as the reason a platoon leader went on a patrol.²¹⁵ According to a third source, lieutenants in the 101st Airborne LRP unit went on reconnaissance overflights with their team leaders, participated in pre-mission briefings, and went on patrols in other-than-leader roles.²¹⁶ Another task of the platoon leader, apparently routine, was to deliver artillery pre-plotted fire lists and operational overlays for upcoming patrol missions to the radio-relay team supporting the missions from its forward location.²¹⁷ Platoon leaders also flew insertions and extractions, sometimes in the C & C aircraft with the commander and other times as the bellyman in the extraction helicopter.²¹⁸

Late in the war, in the period between April and July 1971, L Company (Ranger) of the 101st Airborne Division was ordered to conduct several offensive missions in platoon or larger strength. A platoon leader was killed during a road-ambush mission on 16 April 1971.²¹⁹ A different platoon leader led his teams into the same area three days later and was forced out by heavy contact. A third, stay-behind mission into the same area on

23 April began with the helicopter insertion of the entire Ranger company (two platoons), followed a short time later by the planned extraction of one platoon. This mission also ended in failure as its radio-relay team on a ridge above the valley came under heavy attack.²²⁰

This same platoon leader accompanied one of his teams as a sixth man in a June 1971 mission, deferring to the leadership of the team's sergeant E-5 team leader.²²¹ Another platoon leader led a heavy team on a reconnaissance mission in mid-June that ended in contact and several Ranger casualties.²²² In mid-July, both of these platoon leaders led the entire Ranger company in a raid operation that ended inconclusively.²²³ Generally speaking, the active participation of lieutenants in the 101st Airborne Division Ranger Company in team-level patrols was a function of personality and expediency. Lieutenants were not required to go on patrols, but some did of their own volition. They actively participated in patrol preparation, insertion, and extraction.²²⁴

Active participation by platoon leaders in Ranger team actions also occurred in other divisions. In the 25th Infantry Division, a first lieutenant led a Ranger heavy team on a combat patrol on 2 April 1970 that ended in heavy contact with the enemy. Two E-7 team leaders joined him in leadership of this patrol, one of whom was killed during the action.²²⁵

In many respects, the tactical role of platoon sergeants in LRRP units mirrored that of platoon leaders. They flew on pre-mission aerial-reconnaissance flights, supervised the team leaders as they prepared mission orders, and participated in insertions and extractions of teams as belly-men.²²⁶ A platoon sergeant in F Company (LRP), 51st Infantry of II Field Force met with the controlling S2 and S3 daily, scheduled his teams for upcoming missions, managed team assignments, coordinated artillery for the team leader, coordinated with helicopter pilots, participated in reconnaissance overflights, insertions, and extractions, supervised controlled substances (issue and turn-in of drugs), helped the team leader with map and special equipment issue and turn-in, supervised team rehearsals and briefings, and supervised turn-in of all weapons and ordnance upon completion of missions.²²⁷ On occasion, one can find a reference to a platoon sergeant accompanying a patrol or in rare cases leading a patrol.²²⁸ Whether they went as a "supernumerary" or led the patrol was a matter of personal choice. One can find references to two platoon sergeants in the 101st Airborne LRP and Ranger companies who frequently led patrols, and another reference to a Ranger platoon sergeant who rarely went on a patrol.²²⁹

If platoon leaders and platoon sergeants had significant tactical roles in reconnaissance overflights and insertion and extraction of patrols in helicopter-supported operations, their tactical role was diminished in units that relied less on helicopters and more on other methods of insertion. In late 1967 and early 1968, LRRP teams from the 25th Infantry Division LRRP detachment, which was attached to the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, were sometimes used for extended LP/OP duty in support of one of the division's maneuver brigades or battalions. These teams, both light and heavy, were inserted by walkout or stay-behind methods into LP/OP or ambush positions selected by the using unit, without any reconnaissance overflight or other LRRP-unit input. If the patrol was being conducted by a heavy team, its leader was the senior NCO of the two teams that comprised the patrol. The patrol would submit its periodic situation reports to the using unit and had to rely completely on the using unit for QRF and other combat support in the event of contact. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants had no role whatsoever in the conduct of these patrols.²³⁰

In summation, LRRP- and Ranger-unit commissioned officers had important tactical roles to play that did not necessarily involve leading men on the battlefield. Effective company commanders participated in mission development and planning, personally supervised the insertion of teams, led reaction forces to the field when a team was in contact beyond its capability to withstand, and made the life-and-death decisions concerning extraction under fire. Platoon leaders, who frequently rotated to other assignments and units after just six months in position, conducted pre-mission reconnaissance, participated in insertions and extractions, and occasionally went on patrols as a team member, less often as a team leader. Late in the war, when Ranger units were more frequently assigned raid-type missions, lieutenants led heavy teams and platoons of Rangers into the field. Platoon sergeants assisted in preparing teams for combat, supported insertions and extractions, and on occasion led patrols to the field.

Personnel

With sufficient time and resources, one could examine the enlisted personnel who comprised the patrol teams and support elements in Vietnam LRRP and Ranger units from many perspectives: age, induction source (conscript or volunteer), formal civilian education, military occupational specialty, time in service, combat experience before LRRP assignment, ethnicity, urban or rural, and in other demographic, sociological, and psychological aspects. These perspectives, though interesting and no doubt informative, are beyond the reach of this study.

When one addresses the personnel issue as it relates to LRRP and Ranger units in Vietnam, the dominant theme is recruitment and retention of soldiers. In the words of a former company commander, “Proper recruiting is half the battle in developing a highly proficient Ranger company.”²³¹ The reason is obvious—the “DEROS clock” of every soldier who volunteered for service in one of these units was already below one year and counting at the time of his assignment. The doctrine of the period, based on prewar experience of LRRP units in Germany, postulated that it took eight months to train an “effective and reliable LRRP unit.”²³² In the early days, many soldiers arrived in LRRP detachments having already served up to six months in other units. Although these soldiers had valuable line-unit combat experience, the LRRP unit had scant time to take advantage of it. LRRP-unit commanders addressed this problem in a number of ways.

Some early LRRP commanders were permitted to “raid” line-infantry units for personnel.²³³ Line-unit commanders generally opposed this process, for a good reason expressed here in simple terms by General Peers:

Looking at it from a commander’s point of view. . . as a division commander or as a brigade commander, the LRPCs are expensive and don’t forget it. Why are they expensive? You want to remember that you are dealing with select people. Where do you get select people? You get them from the units and when you take 200 select people from the combat elements of an infantry division, you have taken 200 potential fire team and squad leaders. Believe me, that hurts a division.²³⁴

There was some reliance on volunteerism from ordinary soldiers in line units who were looking for a change of duty, but this required cooperation not necessarily forthcoming from the losing chain of command.²³⁵ A brigade LRRP unit of 4th Infantry Division generated a recruiting handbill in the early summer of 1967 and circulated it around line units.²³⁶ In August 1967, a notice was sent out to 25th Infantry Division units requesting qualified volunteers for attendance at MACV Recondo School, with the possibility of subsequent assignment to the division LRRP detachment.²³⁷ Many LRRP units dispatched short-time NCOs to division or brigade in-country training centers to actively recruit new personnel directly out of the replacement stream.²³⁸ In at least one case, the LRRP-unit commander made this recruitment pitch.²³⁹

The benefit of this method was that the soldiers thus acquired had a

full 12 months remaining in their tour of duty. On the downside, these soldiers typically had no combat experience and little relevant training, which affected unit operational readiness and combat performance. Here, for example, is a report from a representative of the II Field Force LRP Company to the August 1968 Long Range Patrol Conference at Nha Trang:

The company has been short on personnel. Because it needs a full 28 teams to accomplish its mission, it maintains this number by cutting down on the number of people in each patrol from six to five, sometimes to four. A limiting factor is turn around time. This has been as low as 36 hours per five-day patrol. It is not desirable to cut the turn around time that much, especially with the influx of untrained personnel directly out of the replacement pipeline.

A LRP operation requires trained, experienced people, but these replacements have been assigned directly to BCT, AIT, airborne school, then directly assigned to the Long Range Patrol unit. They do not even know squad tactics much less LRP tactics. Previously, every incoming individual had a training period of three months; now due to operational pressure, they have to learn in the field.²⁴⁰

In August 1968, the commander of the LRP detachment of 173d Airborne Brigade reported that about six weeks were required to “mold a soldier into a LRP member”:

All the 173d Airborne Brigade LRP members are volunteers who have been in a rifle company at least three months, pass a selection board, receive a week of training and then are integrated into an operational team. After a period of time, he attends the MACV Recondo School and if he graduates, is again integrated in the unit. . .²⁴¹

The list of desired characteristics in a LRP soldier varied from one unit and recruiter to the next, but generally included high school education or above, 20 or 21 years old, rural as opposed to urban background, clean police record, physically strong and healthy, psychologically stable, and able to work as a member of a team.²⁴² General Peers spoke on this issue at the August 1968 Long Range Patrol Conference at Nha Trang:

[A]n individual must be qualified both physically and

psychologically. I would insist upon this. Physically, because LRP duties are very, very arduous and you never know when you are going to have to cover 10 to 15 kilometers on the ground in very short order. You must have the kind of people that are capable of doing this. . . The psychological qualifications to be a member of a LRP are extremely difficult. You need somebody out there who has nerves of steel, who can stay in there along the side of a trail, can sit there and watch that trail with a large enemy formation going by and not have the slightest inclination to stand up and fire a rifle or even move. . . To do this, he has to be qualified mentally and physically.²⁴³

Divisions made a concerted effort to make duty in a LRRP unit attractive. Here, for example, is a list of the “emoluments” authorized by Peers in 1967 for his 4th Infantry Division LRRPs:

- distinctive items to wear in base camp, including a bush hat with identifying band and a pocket patch
- priority consideration for promotion as he becomes eligible
- special attention on awards and decorations
- additional out-of-country R&R (every soldier was authorized one 7-day rest-and-relaxation leave during a 12-month tour of duty)
- minimum of 36 hours stand down following a mission to rest and recover

Apparently they were sufficient to attract an adequate number of soldiers to the LRRP unit: “With these emoluments a ready source of highly qualified volunteers is available. We have had no problem getting volunteers.”²⁴⁴

The outgoing commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division raised the issue of the shortage of trained personnel for his Ranger company in his post-command debriefing report. Major General John M. Wright, Jr., who commanded the division from May 1969 to May 1970, opined that “every man assigned to the company should be a graduate of the Army Infantry School’s Ranger Course.” The effort in his division to identify the Ranger qualification or lack thereof for incoming replacements was complicated by the Army’s use of only a single MOS identifier in personnel rosters, G for Ranger-qualified personnel and P for parachutist-qualified personnel. Because parachute qualification was a pay issue, that identifier

took precedence over other identifiers. He concluded his discussion by recommending that “all replacements for the ranger companies in Vietnam be ranger qualified personnel.”²⁴⁵

A fair number of soldiers assigned to LRRP units stayed in them beyond their one-year DEROs by voluntarily extending their tours of duty.²⁴⁶ The standard extension increment was 180 days. Adding to the genuine desire of some soldiers to serve longer in an assignment they liked were two other primary reasons for extending: the granting of a bonus 30-day home leave before serving the extension and the granting of an early release from active duty upon completion of the extension if their remaining time in service was below a stated threshold. This would enable these soldiers to avoid any stateside garrison duty, considered by many as onerous, upon the completion of their combat duty.

Other factors, aside from end-of-tour departure of soldiers, caused chronic personnel shortages in LRRP units: casualties, illnesses, training (primarily MACV Recondo School), 7-day R & R leave, emergency leave, and 30-day extension leave. The 9th Infantry Division LRRP unit, when the division was operating in the Mekong Delta region, suffered particularly high illness rates due to disabling skin disease and bacterial infections from prolonged exposure to water.²⁴⁷

The literature on specific LRRP and Ranger units clarifies the impact of personnel shortages across the entire span of the war. Virtually every LRRP unit had to run its own two- to three-week training program, either continuously or periodically, to train inexperienced replacements for combat duty. Units would also respond to the problem by reducing team size from six down to five and even four members, and then by reducing the number of fielded teams.²⁴⁸ On occasion, units stood down for periods of days or even weeks in order to rebuild teams.²⁴⁹ Before one such stand down, in December 1968 the 101st Airborne Division LRP Company had two experienced men per team.²⁵⁰

Maintaining the NCO strength of a LRRP unit was as difficult, if not more so, than maintaining troop strength. Early in the war, junior and middle-grade NCOs had from two to 10 years of active-duty experience with possible attendance at Ranger school. But by late 1967 it was not uncommon to find LRP teams deployed to the field under the leadership of a specialist 4th class or very young sergeant with only several months of in-country experience. As the war dragged on, junior NCOs began arriving in LRRP and then Ranger units straight out of training- center schools with

virtually no troop-leading experience in the real Army.²⁵¹ These “shake ‘n’ bake” sergeants from Fort Benning were combined with combat-seasoned soldiers promoted to NCO rank from within. The following quote reflects this practice in the 1st Cavalry Division in the summer of 1968:

Lately there has been a lack of trained team leaders as most of the present team leaders are rotating in August. To get the new NCOs and potential team leaders more experienced, team integrity is being broken in an effort to get these people as much experience as possible in the field before the others rotate.²⁵²

In either case, teams tended to be led by younger and less-experienced NCOs as the war went on.²⁵³

The Vietnam Experience

The Vietnam War provides an excellent opportunity to study the combat experience of LRP units in an operating environment that in some ways resembles the current and predicted future operating environments. Even though Vietnam lacked the desert terrain that has characterized US Army combat operations since 1990, it was heavily populated with towns, agricultural areas, and rural villages. LRRP units operating in relatively open terrain along the coast, in the delta region, or near Saigon always were in danger of compromise by civilians, innocent or otherwise. Vietnam was laced with rivers and canals that the enemy used for movement of troops and supplies. Vietnam had vast regions of jungle and forested mountain areas, beyond which were international borders with concealed infiltration routes. In Vietnam, the insurgent enemy soldier frequently demanded support from or hid amid the peaceable population. The conventional enemy soldier was typically well trained, competently led, and heavily armed. LRRP soldiers fought them both.

Infantry division and separate brigade commanders adapted their LRRP-unit tactical operations to the mission, enemy, terrain, and troops available. LRRP teams were inserted and extracted largely, but not exclusively, by helicopter. Other common methods of reaching the mission area were stay-behind or drop-off from conventional infantry units, some use of walk-out insertion from remote firebases, and use of US Navy or indigenous craft in areas best served by waterborne insertion. The preponderance of divisional LRRP units were in some degree controlled by or dependent on a ground or air cavalry unit for administrative, logistic, and UCMJ support. Their combat missions were largely assigned by brigade,

division, or higher G2 staffs, and in some cases by G3 staffs.

LRRP units, and later Rangers, performed most of the routine missions for a standard rifle platoon in Vietnam, along with their doctrinal missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, damage assessment, and target acquisition. As the LRP companies transitioned into Ranger units, the tactical pendulum tended to swing over from covert reconnaissance and surveillance (human intelligence or HUMINT activities) to the direct-action combat side. Late in the war, Ranger units were conducting platoon- and even company-size operations not directly related to reconnaissance (screens, raids, ambushes, et cetera). LRRP and Ranger-unit veterans criticize high-level commanders for this so-called misuse of a special capability. This criticism may fairly be applied to commanding generals who paid little attention to their LRRPs and Rangers or permitted them to be used for routine “palace guard” ambush patrols or extended LP/OP for fire-support bases or field tactical headquarters. However, those commanding generals who employed their LRRP or Ranger units for direct-action missions did so deliberately, each for his own reasons, and not necessarily out of ignorance of LRRP doctrine.

Whether organized as a company or platoon, most LRRP units functioned in six-man light teams or 12-man heavy teams, the latter most often employed when enemy contact was sought or anticipated. These teams were primarily but not exclusively led by young NCOs, with platoon leaders and platoon sergeants occasionally accompanying or leading teams. Some LRRP units maintained their own around-the-clock tactical operations centers with assigned communications personnel, while others relied on the units to which they were attached.

Vietnam-era LRRP soldiers trained both at their units and at the MACV Recondo School in Nha Trang. While the doctrine of both the 1965 and 1968 versions of FM 31-18 postulated that more than eight months were required to train a LRRP soldier to proficiency, virtually no Vietnam-era LRRP soldiers were afforded that luxury. Early in the war many of them came to LRRP detachments with combat experience in conventional infantry units, but late in the war the bulk of LRRP soldiers were coming directly out of the replacement stream. They were introduced into combat after just weeks of training at the unit, with possible later attendance at MACV Recondo School for the select few.

LRRP soldiers went into combat equipped primarily with M16 rifle variants, but also were prone to carrying M60s, M79s, shotguns, standard

sniper rifles, AK47s, and numerous other weapons. Their communications equipment was standard-issue PRC-25 and PRC-77 radios, with the occasional URC-10 in some units. They had access to night-vision devices of that period, primarily the AN-PVS2 Starlight Scope, but found it bulky, heavy, and impractical in many terrain situations. In their medical-kit bags they carried blood products or substitutes, morphine, and an assortment of performance-enhancing drugs that were issued, sometimes abused, and later turned in after each patrol.

One of the unstated objectives of this study was to determine whether LRRP units of the Vietnam War benefited from the experience gained by LRRP units in USAREUR and Italy in the preceding years. The most tangible evidence of this benefit should be the field manual itself, but very few LRRP soldiers in Vietnam ever saw FM 31-18.²⁵⁴ Two examples exist of officers with LRRP experience in Europe in command of LRRP units in Vietnam.²⁵⁵ A former acting first sergeant from the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment served as the first sergeant of the Ranger unit of 173d Airborne Brigade several years later.²⁵⁶ And there are at least two isolated cases of USAREUR LRRP company enlisted men serving in LRRP units in Vietnam, both having volunteered for the duty.²⁵⁷ There does not appear to have been any official attempt by the Army personnel system to identify European LRRP-unit veterans for assignment to like units in Vietnam.

At higher levels of command, senior officers can be found in Vietnam who had some working knowledge of LRRP activities in Europe before the Vietnam War. Such a case is Major General Melvin Zais, Jr., who was a deputy commanding general of 1st Infantry Division in May-June 1966, later commanded 101st Airborne Division from July 1968 to late May 1969, and then XXIV Corps from June 1969 to June 1970. From July 1959 to May 1962, Colonel Melvin Zais was the G3 of Seventh Army in USAREUR, where he played a crucial role in the formation of the first provisional LRRP units in both V and VII Corps.²⁵⁸

General Creighton Abrams arrived in Vietnam in mid-1967, well after LRRP provisional units were authorized and were being formed. He was familiar with LRRP doctrine from his own command experience in 3d Armored Division (1960-62) and V Corps (1963-64). He was serving as Westmoreland's deputy when all the provisional LRRP units were designated LRP companies and detachments in December 1968, and was the Commanding General of MACV when all the LRP companies and detachments were redesignated as Ranger companies in early 1969. As Chief of Staff of the US Army after the war, and undoubtedly influenced

by Ranger-unit performance in Vietnam, General Abrams authorized the creation of Ranger battalions.

Passing the Guidon

What legacy, if any, did the Vietnam LRRPs and Rangers pass to LRSU soldiers when their units were formed in the mid-1980s, over a decade after the Vietnam War's end? This is a difficult question to answer. Certainly there were many NCOs and officers with Vietnam LRRP and Ranger experience still on active duty when LRSU were being established. But without written histories and personnel rosters of these LRSU to peruse, it is difficult to determine how many of the new LRSU NCOs were Vietnam LRRP- or Ranger-unit veterans. Certainly the officers assigned to a LRSU were unlikely to have served in Vietnam combat, except as enlisted men.²⁵⁹

On the other hand is the example of Lieutenant Colonel David Ohle, a Vietnam Ranger company operations officer and company commander in early 1971 who, in 1986, was commanding a cavalry squadron at Fort Campbell, and had assigned to his operational control the LRSD of the 101st Airborne Division.²⁶⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Ohle's Vietnam experience certainly qualified him to mentor the LRSD commander and also those above him who may not have had previous exposure to LRRP or LRS activities. Brigadier General (Retired) David Grange also commanded a platoon in the 101st Airborne Division Ranger Company in Vietnam, in the summer of 1971.²⁶¹ Throughout his post-Vietnam career, which included several special-operations assignments before he commanded the 1st Infantry Division in 1997, he would have had many opportunities to draw upon his Vietnam Ranger combat experience.

The most tangible evidence of Vietnam influence in the post-Vietnam LRSU world is in doctrine, which will be reviewed in some detail in the following chapter. It is clear that LRSU doctrine developers studied the Vietnam LRRP and Ranger experience when developing the missions and TTPs for LRSU.

Finally, the Vietnam LRRP and Ranger soldiers left a legacy of courage and sacrifice that stands as an example to all current and future LRSU leaders and soldiers. Three hundred and thirty-three of them gave their lives in that war, hundreds more were wounded, and several remain among the missing in action; three earned posthumous Medals of Honor.²⁶² The lessons they learned were paid for at a high price, indeed. The youngest veterans of Vietnam LRRP/LRP/Ranger units and operations are now approaching

retirement age. Many of them have organized themselves in such a way as to be accessible via the Internet. Those Army agencies or commands with particular interests in regard to TTP for specific enemy, mission, or terrain conditions similar to those experienced in Vietnam will find a group of veterans that has been waiting almost four decades to share its experiences. As Chapter 4 will show, at least two LRSU tapped into their Vietnam roots for inspiration in the 1990s.

Notes

1. For consistency, I am using Shelby L. Stanton's, *Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam* (New York: Orion Books, 1992) for this chronology. This work provides a concise history of the activation, redesignation, and deactivation of all of the LRRP, LRP, and Ranger units in the Vietnam War. The 101st Airborne history begins at 161; the discussion of the formation of this first provisional LRRP platoon is on page 163.
2. Stanton, 71, 186, and 138.
3. Michael Lee Lanning, *Inside the LRRPs: Rangers in Vietnam* (New York: Ballantine, 1988), 55-6. The text quotes from the message released by the MACV operations officer, Major General John C. F. Tillson III.
4. Stanton, in order: 94, 115, 31, and 46.
5. Ibid., 119.
6. The activity to form and train this LRRP unit at Fort Campbell is described in excellent detail in Kenn Miller, *Six Silent Men: 101st LRP/Rangers* (New York: Ivy Books, 1997), 1-8, 17.
7. Stanton, 210.
8. Ibid., 230.
9. The number 230 comes from Stanton, page 230. Its origin is uncertain, since TOE 7-157E authorized a strength of eight officers, 41 NCOs, and 159 soldiers (a total of 208).
10. Lanning discusses this transition on pages 60-62.
11. Stanton, 37, 47, 77, 100, 123, and 143 respectively.
12. Ibid., 246, 168, 191, 252, and 261 respectively.
13. Ibid., 243. A brief history of the Indiana National Guard LRP/Ranger company is at 236-42.
14. Ibid., 255 and 70 respectively.
15. Field Manual (FM) 31-18, *Infantry Long Range Patrol Company* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 13 January 1965).
16. FM 31-18, *Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 23 August 1968).
17. FM 31-18, C [change] 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 7 March 1969).
18. FM 31-18, 1968, paragraph 2-1.c.(6) and (7) on page 5.
19. Ibid., paragraph 2-6.b. on page 8.
20. FM 31-18, C1, paragraph 2-5.1.

21. FM 31-18, 1968, paragraph 3-5 on page 14.
22. Ibid., paragraph 3-7 on page 15.
23. Ibid., paragraphs 1-3.a on page 3 and 4-2.a. on page 16.
24. Ibid., paragraph 4-6.d., page 18.
25. Ibid., paragraph 4-8 on page 19 and paragraph 2-3.a.(3)(f) on page 6.
26. FM 31-18, C1, 7 March 1969.
27. FM 31-18, paragraph 5-9 on page 24.
28. This mission list was extracted from a textual analysis of James W. Walker, *Fortune Favors the Bold: A British LRRP with the 101st* (New York: Ivy Books, 1998); see also Reynel Martinez, *Six Silent Men: 101st LRP/Rangers: Book One* (New York: Ivy Books, 1997). Both men served in this unit. The civil-affairs project was the resettlement of a large civilian population in the Song Ve Valley, Quang Nhac Province, conducted in mid-June 1967. The brigade LRRP platoon was inserted behind two sweeping maneuver battalions with the mission to maintain surveillance of egress routes. In addition to the descriptions in Walker and Martinez, the fact of LRRP involvement in this operation is stated in “Debriefing Report of Brigadier General S. H. Matheson, former Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division,” dated 2 March 1968, page E-2, accessed as Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) document AD879473.
29. Stanton, 168-9, uses the date of resumption of true long-range missions as 4 May 1968. Miller, 14-54, describes this period well.
30. All these missions except the last are described by Miller, from page 54 to the end of his book. The prisoner-capture mission is from Larry Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne* (New York: Ivy Books, 1992), 37. Chambers arrived in the 101st Airborne LRP Company in September 1968 and served in the unit until mid-summer 1969. John Burford, in *LRRP Team Leader* (New York: Ivy Books, 1994), indicates on page 6 that the unit’s primary mission was reconnaissance, with secondary missions to conduct small ambushes, bomb-damage assessment, and downed-pilot rescue. Burford served in the unit for one year from July 1968. Gary Linderer describes his 12-month tour in this unit from June 1968 to June 1969 in *Black Berets and Painted Faces* (New York: Doubleday Books, 1991). He suggests that while prisoners were indeed captured, they were often simply targets of opportunity or survivors of ambushes. The mission to capture prisoners was rarely assigned (page 109). The other missions described by Miller, Chambers, and Burford are also listed in Linderer.
31. See, for example, Chambers pages 35-37 and 58, and Miller pages 81-2 and 165.
32. The officer was 1st Lieutenant Owen D. Williams; “Synopsis of Presentation of the 101st Airborne Division (AM),” *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 9-10 August 1968 (APO San Francisco 96375: Headquarters,

United States Army Vietnam), 37.

33. Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 277-300.

34. Ibid., 374-400. This unusual mission was executed by a combined element of three six-man teams, with a fourth team inside the firebase acting as radio relay. One hundred and twelve enemy bodies were found in and around the perimeter the next morning. This action occurred at Fire Base Jack on the night of 28-29 March 1969.

35. Gary Linderer, *Six Silent Men: 101st LRP/Rangers: Book Three* (New York: Ivy Books, 1997), 154. The “sniffer” was an array of equipment mounted into the cargo bay of a Huey helicopter and flown over the target zone. A photograph and description of this device can be found in Lieutenant General John H. Hay, Jr., *Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Materiel Innovations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1989), 80-81.

36. Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 237-40.

37. Frank Johnson, *Diary of an Airborne Ranger* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001), 68, 111, 140. Johnson was assigned to L Company from September 1969 to July 1970. Larry Chambers also describes the heavy-team mission in *Death in the A Shau Valley: L Company LRRPs in Vietnam, 1969-70* (New York: Ivy Books, 1998) on pages 142-148.

38. “Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (RZ) (U),” 15 August 1970, paragraph 1.b.(2) on page 6.

39. Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 286-303. The first attempt ended in the deaths of two Rangers, the second attempt in the serious wounding of a Ranger, and the third attempt in the deaths of 22 soldiers from a cavalry squadron quick reaction force (QRF), loss of two helicopters and several crewmen, and one KIA and two MIA Rangers from a supporting radio-relay team. The story of their failed mission is in Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 304-15.

40. Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 329-32.

41. Ibid., 293.

42. This description is from page 4 of “LRRP Briefing—Commander’s Conference, 24 Sept. 67,” a 16-page, double-spaced, typewritten document received from the US Army Military History Institute. It appears to be the script used by General Peers for his conference presentation. It contains references to charts that were not preserved. The information in this document is supported by another, later document. See US Department of the Army, 4th Infantry Division, APO 96262, “Combat Operations After Action Report—Operation FRANCIS MARION,” dated 25 November 1969, page 9. William R. Peers, a native of Iowa, was commissioned at UCLA in 1937. In World War II he was the operations and training officer, and from December 1943 to July 1945 the commander of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma. During the Korean War he was seconded to the CIA to

run covert operations in China. In July 1965, Major General Peers was the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) for Special Operations at the Pentagon. He later commanded the 4th Infantry Division in Vietnam from January 1967 to January 1968, and II Field Force from March 1968 to March 1969. He is most noted for chairing the Peers Inquiry, the formal US Army investigation into the My Lai massacre and its aftermath, the findings of which were released in March 1970.

43. The Hawkeye teams were “hunter-killer” teams, sent out to find and engage small-enemy elements. Depending on the terrain and mission, weapons a Hawkeye team might carry included the M16, M79, shotgun, or M14 with sniper scope. The choice of Hawkeye team weapons was up to the team leader. “LRRP Briefing—Commander’s Conference, 24 September 67,” 6.

44. See FM 31-18, 1962, paragraph 4.d on page 3, and FM 31-18, 1965, paragraph 4.g on page 3.

45. Lanning, 60.

46. Frank Camper, *L.R.R.P.: The Professional* (New York: Dell, 1988), 14-15, 17-34, 139, 151, 182, 199, 215, and 232.

47. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Major General Charles P. Stone, RCS-CSFOR-74 (U),” dated 15 November 1968, 22.

48. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Donn R. Pepke, CG, 4th Infantry Division, Period 30 Nov 68 to 14 Nov 69 (U),” dated 19 December 1969, paragraph 4 of Inclosure 9, accessed as DTIC AD506705.

49. Pepke, paragraph 5 of Inclosure 9.

50. Stanton, 118-22.

51. Ibid., 123-30; see also the article by Specialist Tom Gable, “LRRP,” in *Infantry* 59 (January-February 1969): 37-8. Another brief description of this unit’s operations in 1968 is in “Synopsis of Presentation of the 9th Infantry Division,” *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 31-2.

52. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTG Julian J. Ewell, CG, 9th Infantry Division, Period 25 February 1968 to 5 April 1969 (U),” dated 24 November 1969, page 6; accessed as DTIC AD505846.

53. Stanton, 133.

54. Ibid., 136.

55. See the article by Captain Gerald W. Johnson, “Aquabush,” in *Infantry* 62, (January-February 1972): 50-53.

56. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands: 1st Cav LRRPs in Vietnam, 1966-67*, 84-5.

57. Ibid., 91, 103.

58. Ibid., 86-7.

59. Ibid., 106.
60. Stanton, 49; Kregg P. J. Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command: The Cav's LRP/Rangers in Vietnam, 1968-1969* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2000), 68.
61. Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 84, 89-90.
62. Ibid., 90.
63. Ibid., 87.
64. Ibid. Jorgenson describes these missions and ensuing patrols in some detail from page 128 to the end of the book. The helicopter crash-recovery is discussed in Chapter 29, and also in Stanton on pages 61-2. The POW-camp raid training is from Jorgenson, Chapter 34. One of the trail complexes was called the Jolley Road. Ranger teams were used to monitor this trail system in early 1970. See “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Elvy B. Roberts, CG, 1st Cavalry Division, Period 23 April 1969 through 5 May 1970 (U),” page 6; accessed as DTIC AD509767.
65. Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 262-3. This was FSB Buttons, located next to the town Song Be, and the date was 4 November 1969.
66. The intent of this program, called Operation DONG TIEN, was to train soldiers from the ARVN Airborne Recon Company in US Army LRRP/Ranger tactics. See “Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Co. H (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U),” dated 22 July 1970; accessed as DTIC AD510331. This document contains a routine report from the Ranger company commander to the Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), dated 15 May 1970.
67. The characterization of missions from December 1969 to the end of the war is from Stanton, 64-9.
68. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet, RCS CS-FOR-74,” dated 25 June 1972, 7; accessed as DTIC AD523510.
69. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Harris W. Hollis, CG, 25th Infantry Division, Period 15 September 1969 to 2 April 1970 (U),” 33 and 39; accessed as DTIC AD509875. General Hollis came to the 25th Infantry Division after about five months as commander of the 9th Infantry Division. “Snatch” missions were EPW-capture missions, and “sniff” operations involved the use of Rangers to respond to detections made by helicopter-mounted “sniffer” equipment.
70. Here is what General Bautz wrote in his end-of-tour report: “Ranger companies should be used primarily for intelligence. Teams should be allocated to Brigades on a mission basis. Ranger teams should be specifically trained for long-range reconnaissance patrols and not assigned normal combat patrol missions.” “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Edward Bautz, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MACV & CG, 25th Infantry Division, Period March 1969 to December 1970 (U),” dated 24 February 1971, page 5, accessed as DTIC

AD514361.

71. "Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG H. S. Cunningham, CG, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period 9 August 1969 to 10 August 1970 (U)," dated 10 November 1970, page 1, accessed as DTIC AD512272.

72. "Senior Officer Debriefing Report—Brigadier General E. R. Ochs," 9 March 1971, 7-8, accessed as DTIC AD514579.

73. Stanton, 210.

74. *Ibid.*, 230.

75. 3 December for E Company (Stanton, 211) and 2 December for F Company (Stanton, 231).

76. *Ibid.*, 210.

77. These mission descriptions are from Stanton, 211-26.

78. "Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)," 15 August 1969, 9, accessed as DTIC AD505923.

79. General Peers addressed this use of I Field Force LRP in a presentation to the USARV Long Range Patrol Conference, 9-10 August 1968, at the MACV Recondo School in Nha Trang. See "Presentation of LTG Peers," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 7-13, 13.

80. For a detailed description of life in the I Field Force Ranger unit during this 12-month period, see John L. Rotundo and Don Ericson, *Charlie Rangers* (New York: Ivy Books, 1989).

81. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, "Senior Officer Debriefing Report (RCS-CSFOR-74)," dated 23 February 1970, page 5, accessed as DTIC AD508664.

82. Stanton describes the entire life cycle of this unit on pages 229-36. Teams from F Company on occasion worked for 25th Infantry Division, 3d Brigade 101st Airborne Division, or 199th Light Infantry Brigade.

83. See Dennis Foley, *Special Men: A LRP's Recollections* (New York: Ivy books, 1994), Gary Douglas Ford, *4/4: A LRP's Narrative* (New York: Ivy Books, 1993), and Don C. Hall and Annette R. Hall, *I Served* (Bellevue, WA: A.D. Hall Publishing, 1994). All three of these memoirs are consistent in their description of unit mission—it was to kill as many enemy as possible, even to the point of bringing their bodies back to the company area as "proof of kill," and burying them in a cemetery maintained within the company compound.

84. Foley, 274 and 298.

85. "Senior Officer Debriefing Report of LTG Fred C. Weyand," dated 4 October 1968, page 8.

86. Stanton describes the life cycle of this company on pages 236-242.
87. *Ibid.*, 242-244.
88. Foley, 274. The nature of the helicopter support to this unit is described later in the study. The QRF was the aero-scout platoon of A/3-17 Cavalry until June 1968, and after that rotating platoons from D Troop, 3-17 Cavalry. These platoons were physically barracked with the LRP company, relocating to Phuc Vinh, Cu Chi, Di An, and other locales as required to act as the ground reaction force for LRP teams when in contact. Author e-mail interviews with Bill Nevius, 30 November and 1 December 2004. An excellent memoir of a helicopter pilot in this unit that flew support missions for the LRP company is Charles E. Oualline, *Flying Alligators and Silver Spurs* (Collierville, TN: Instantpublisher.com, 2004).
89. Major Paul F. Keefe, "Synopsis of Presentation of I Field Force, Vietnam," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 17-20, 17. Major Keefe was the I Field Force G2 at the time.
90. Ford, 147, 200; Hall, 468, 482; Rotundo and Ericson, 106, 203.
91. "These FACs were placed under control of the LRP company commander for further allocation as he saw fit," Keefe, *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 18.
92. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 82-4.
93. Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 58-61.
94. Unit History, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment, 1st Cavalry Division. www.75thrra.com/history/h75-his.php; last accessed on 1 December 2004.
95. Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 10-11. The authorization of 118 men included three officers (commander and two platoon leaders), 17 enlisted men in the company headquarters, and two platoons of 49 enlisted men each (platoon sergeant plus eight six-man patrols per platoon). See Stanton, 324.
96. Miller, *Six Silent Men*, 2.
97. *Ibid.*, 166.
98. Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 98.
99. *Ibid.*, 127. It is unstated here, but the likelihood is great that the LRP soldiers also messed with the cavalry unit. See also Miller, 181.
100. Johnson, *Diary of an Airborne Ranger*, 8.
101. "Synopsis of Presentation of the Americal Division," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 33.
102. Stanton, 71-2; survey, David L. Casey, 9 December 2004.
103. Stanton, 97, 108.

104. Ibid., 142. This unit continued in its “attachment” relationship with 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry even after redesignation as F Company (LRP), 50th Infantry in December 1968; author’s personal experience and surveys from Dennie Callahan, 23 December 2004, and Ronald Elliff, 25 February 2005.

105. Stanton, 186.

106. Ibid., 191.

107. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG H. S. Cunningham, CG, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period 9 August 1969 to 10 August 1970 (U),” dated 10 November 1970, 11. Cunningham’s successor, Brigadier General Elmer R. Ochs, continued to maintain the company at the increased strength level; “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—Brigadier General E. R. Ochs,” 9 March 1971, 9.

108. Stanton, 247.

109. Ibid., 31.

110. Ibid., 39.

111. An example of a three-man team in the 4th Infantry Division Recondo Detachment in October 1967 is given in Stanton, 98. In the summer of 1967, teams in the 196th Light Infantry Brigade were reduced to four men due to personnel shortages; see Stanton, 33. The LRRP platoon of 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division operated with four- and five-man teams in the summer of 1967; see Stanton, 96 and 97. The 4th Infantry Division’s K Company (Ranger) also operated on occasion with a 4-man patrol; see Stanton, 108. The 101st Airborne Division, L Company (Ranger) used a 4-man patrol in the fall of 1969 due to personnel shortages; see Chambers, *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 113. 101st Airborne Rangers used four- and five-man teams on occasion; see Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 147, 154, and 238 (wiretap mission); and Chambers, *Death in A Shau Valley*, 113. Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force) was using four-man teams due to personnel shortages in the spring of 1968, just months after the unit was created; see Hall, 455. C Company (Ranger), I Field Force used a four-man team for a mission in June 1970; see Rotundo and Ericson, 185.

112. “Synopsis of Presentation of the 9th Infantry Division,” *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 31.

113. Major General Harris W. Hollis, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 39. Since Hollis had commanded the 9th Infantry Division for five months before assuming command of 25th Infantry Division in September 1969, it is possible he brought the eight-man team concept with him from that previous assignment.

114. Stanton, on page 46, indicates that the 1st Cavalry Long Range Patrol Detachment had 18 Montagnard tribesmen and 18 South Vietnamese scouts in April 1967. Jorgenson describes the recruitment process in *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, page 71, and their role in the unit on pages 85-6. David C. Cummings describes the use of Kit Carson Scouts in N Company (Ranger) during the period August 1970 to March 1971 in his survey, received 27 January 2005.

115. The first use of Rhade (Montagnard) tribesmen by this organization is explained on the unit's Internet website, www.75thrra.com/history/h75-his.php; last accessed on 21 June 2005. The absconding of the *Chieu Hoi* is from Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 8-9.

116. See Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 70, and Miller, 168.

117. See Chambers, *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 131.

118. Johnson, *Diary of an Airborne Ranger*, 134-8.

119. Stanton, 32, 39, 95, 122, 126, and 143. See also Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 16, 72-84, 218-26, and 269-84. A brief description of the 4th Infantry Division's experience in training and integrating indigenous forces can be found in "Synopsis of Presentation of the 4th Infantry Division," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 29-30. This same document briefly describes the use of indigenous personnel by the 173d Airborne Brigade LRP unit on page 40.

120. "Presentation of LTG Peers," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 9.

121. Stanton, 214, 221, 225; Rotundo and Ericson, 156; "Synopsis of Presentation of I Field Force, Vietnam," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 20.

122. Rotundo and Ericson, 237.

123. Hall, 214, 362; Ford, 184, 191; Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 319-26..

124. At the August 1968 USARV Long Range Patrol conference in Nha Trang, the MACV J2 warned the attendees of the possible penetration of the Kit Carson Scout program by the enemy. See "Synopsis of the Presentation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, MACV," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 47.

125. Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 33, 73. Similar training is described for the 1st Brigade LRRP Detachment in Martinez, 11-15 and 201-3.

126. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 66, 72.

127. Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 23, 71-2; and *Acceptable Loss*, 23-4.

128. Jorgenson, *Acceptable Loss*, 23-4.

129. Bill Shanahan and John P. Brackin, *Stealth Patrol: The Making of a Vietnam Ranger* (Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press, 2003), 43-7.

130. Major Richard D. James, "Delta Team is in Contact," *Infantry* 60 (November-December 1970): 12-15.

131. Cummings survey.

132. Rotundo and Ericson, 47-50 and 71.

133. An example of this practice in the 101st Airborne Division is described in Miller, 177-8 and 272; Walker, 172-3; and Linderman, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 250.

134. An example of this occurred in 101st Airborne Division in early 1970. See Chambers, *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 161.

135. Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 241; and Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne*, 61.

136. This summary comes from the excellent history of this school in Tom Halliwell, *A History of the MACV Recondo School (1966-1971)*, 2 volumes (Houston, TX: RADIX Press, 2002). This work also contains a complete listing of the school's instructor staff and graduates.

137. Peers, "LRRP Briefing—Commander's Conference, 24 September 67," 8.

138. Halliwell, volume 1, 74.

139. After graduating from this course on 23 September 1967 (Recondo Number 681), I returned to my assigned unit, A/2-22 Infantry (Mechanized), 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at Dau Tieng in III Corps Tactical Zone, and was immediately put in charge of a rifle squad. About two weeks later, I was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division LRRP Detachment at Cu Chi, and served there as a LRRP team leader until my 12-month tour ended in March 1968.

140. Among the additional 659 foreign graduates were 296 Koreans, 193 Thais, 130 Vietnamese, 22 Filipinos, and 18 Australians; Halliwell, volume 1, 40.

141. An example of this is in Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne*, pages 158-9. Chambers used the pack list he received at Recondo School when he returned to his unit.

142. See, for example, Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 71-2, and *Acceptable Loss*, 26.

143. This occurred with 101st Airborne Division, for example, when its LRP company relocated from Bien Hoa to Phu Bai (Camp Eagle) in early 1968. See Miller, 20. Other references to stolen vehicles are in Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, on pages 20-21 (1st Cavalry Division); and Ford, 70 (II Field Force).

144. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 73-4; Miller, 67.

145. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 73-4.

146. Martinez, 80; Miller, 67; Burford, 8; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 410 for 101st Airborne Division; Ford, 215 for II Field Force. An official confirmation of the presence of silenced Sten guns in the 101st Airborne Division LRP unit is in "Synopsis of Presentation of the 101st Airborne Division (AM)," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 38.

147. Miller, 167.

148. Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 16 and 59, and Casey survey for 1st Infantry Division; Camper, 117, 122, and 214 for 4th Infantry Division; Cummings survey for 173d Airborne Brigade.

149. Walker, 193 and 223 for 101st Airborne Division; Camper, 196 for 4th Infantry Division; Ford, 130 in II Field Force; Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 167-80 for 173d Airborne Brigade.

150. Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 16; and Johnny B. Starnes survey, received 5 January 2005.

151. Walker, 223, and Burford, 8 for 101st Airborne Division; Camper, 120 for 4th Infantry Division; Ford, 98, for II Field Force; Cummings survey and Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 167-80 for 173d Airborne Brigade.

152. Shanahan and Brackin, 136 and 252, Cummings survey, and Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 167-80 for 173d Airborne Brigade; Casey survey for 1st Infantry Division; Camper, 117, for 4th Infantry Division; Ford, 130, and Hall, 290 for II Force; Burford, 8, and Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 292 for 101st Airborne Division; Starnes survey for Americal Division.

153. Casey survey for 1st Infantry Division, Starnes survey for Americal Division.

154. Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 167-80. This weapon fires the same cartridge as the AK47 and the SKS (7.62 x 39mm), but differs greatly in design and construction from both of those weapons.

155. Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne Division*, 80, and *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 17. Starnes survey for E Company (LRP), II Field Force; Cummings survey for 173d Airborne Brigade; Specialist 4th Class (SP4) Gregory Kelly, F Company (LRP), 50th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division carried a Swedish K (my personal observation). Kelly was KIA on a combat patrol on 6 April 1968. This weapon's official nomenclature is "Carl Gustav Model 45" submachine gun. It fired the 9mm parabellum cartridge out of a 30-round stick magazine, and was popular in the special forces at the time.

156. Rotundo and Ericson, 99 in I Field Force; Ford, 181, describing 25th Infantry Division LRP Company; Cummings survey for 173d Airborne Brigade.

157. Johnson, *Diary of an Airborne Ranger*, 140, for 101st Airborne Division; Rotundo and Ericson, 225, for I Field Force; Jorgenson, *Acceptable Loss*, 55, and *MIA Rescue*, 7 for 1st Cavalry Division; Camper, 232, for 4th Infantry Division; Stanton, 127-8, for 9th Infantry Division; Stanton, 217, for I Field Force; Ford, 130, and Hall, 380 and 481 (sawed-off!), for II Field Force; Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 261-8, for 199th Light Infantry Brigade; Starnes survey for Americal Division; Cummings survey for 173d Airborne Brigade.

158. Stanton, 165.

159. Ford, 215, in II Field Force.

160. Examples: a .32-caliber pistol, Johnson, *Diary of an Airborne Ranger*, 202 in 101st Airborne Division; snub-nose .38-cal. revolver in II Field Force, Hall, 229; .38-cal. revolver in 1st Infantry Division, Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 85-99; and Americal Division, Starnes survey; Browning Hi-Power (9mm semi-automatic pistol) in II Field Force, Ford, 118, who also indicates there were approximately 50 privately owned handguns in this unit; Houser also reports “acquired personal pistols” in II Field Force, Houser survey; Browning Hi-Power in 101st Airborne Division, Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 177; .357 magnum revolver in 173d Airborne Brigade, Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*.

161. Casey survey.

162. Hall, 225; Houser survey confirms carry of the LAW in II Field Force.

163. Ford, 160.

164. Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 163 and 429; and *Six Silent Men*, 275 and 296.

165. Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 93. See also Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 202-17.

166. Feller mentions occasional carry of the LAW in Company O (Ranger), 82d Airborne Division, without reference to its intended use; Feller survey.

167. Equipment lists can be found in Halliwell, volume 1 on pages 107-8; Lanning, 195; Chambers, *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 90, and *RECONDO: LR-RPs in the 101st Airborne*, 28; Burford, 29; Miller, 77; Rotundo and Ericson, 54, 67-80; Shanahan and Brackin, 56; Camper, 117; and Ford, 2-3.

168. See Rotundo and Ericson, 113 for I Field Force; Hall, 358, and Ford, 227 for II Field Force; Stanton, 79 for 1st Infantry Division; Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 120, and Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 85-99 and 202-17 for 1st Cavalry Division; Camper, 33-4 and 85-6 for 4th Infantry Division; Linderer, *Phantom Warriors*, 285-93 for 9th Infantry Division; Burford, 155, Chambers, *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 20, Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 90 and 302, and *Six Silent Men*, 112, and Walker, 194-202 for 101st Airborne Division; and Stanton, 188 for 173d Airborne Brigade.

169. “Presentation of LTG Peers,” *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 9-10.

170. Foley, 274.

171. Hall, 226 and 232. Hall, in an e-mail exchange with the author on 1 December 2004, indicates that at any one time there could be two C & C, five or six lift, and four or five gunship helicopters at the company helicopter pad. These helicopter assets came from A Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment from December 1967 to June 1968. This unit maintained a gunship fire team (two helicopters) on standby status at F-51st Infantry headquarters (pages 191-2). From

June 1968 to April 1970, lift support came from the 117th Assault Helicopter Company, and gunship support from the 334th Assault Helicopter Company. Author e-mail interview with Bill Nevius, 30 November 2004.

172. Author e-mail interview with Bob Harrison, 30 November 2004.

173. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 76.

174. This action, which resulted in the awarding of two Distinguished Service Crosses (Billy Walkabout and Albert Contreras) and two Silver Stars (Riley Cox and Gary Linderer), is described in Miller, 227-52; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 184-209; Burford, 120-44; and Chambers, *RECONDO: LR-RPs in the 101st Airborne*, 40-52. The four KIA were Albert D. Contreras, Jr. (team leader), Terry W. Clifton, Arthur J. Heringhausen, and Michael D. Reiff. The Walkabout citation is General Orders Number 3945, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 23 October 1969; and the Contreras citation is General Orders Number 476, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 20 February 1970. (Sergeant Contreras' name is incorrectly spelled "Contreras" on the citation order.)

175. "Presentation of LTG Peers," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 11.

176. See Ford, 147, 200-07, and Hall, 356, 431, 468, and 482 for mention of the "Bird Dog" in II Field Force. According to Hall, no one from his LRP unit rode in the aircraft; e-mail from Hall to author, 3 December 2004. See also "Synopsis of Presentation of II Field Force, Vietnam," in *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 21-23, 21. This source indicates that the LRP company had access to an O-1 for 6 hours each day. In I Field Force, a platoon leader from the LRP company frequently rode in the back seat; see Rotundo and Ericson, 71-80, 106, and 203.

177. Martinez, 40, 45, 59, 112, and 147.

178. "Synopsis of Presentation of the 101st Airborne Division (AM)," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 38.

179. Shanahan and Brackin, 184, describe an aircraft appearing overhead every 3-4 hours for radio relay in the 173d Airborne Brigade. Chambers, *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 131-4, mentions liaison with the USAF Airborne Command and Control Center for a C-130 flying out of Thailand if required for radio relay (fall 1969). Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 229, mentions a fixed-wing aircraft for radio-relay use during the night in May 1970, and on page 300, the use of a USAF "sniffer"-equipped C-130 used to support a patrol in contact in late April 1971.

180. FM 31-18, 1968, paragraph 5-4.g.(2) on page 23.

181. Ford, 6-7; Hall, 319.

182. Foley, 298.

183. Ford, 142, 191-8; Hall, 458-63.

184. Hall, 266-7.

185. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, in several places describes the activities of Captain James D. James, the first commander of this organization. James was a veteran of the SETAF LRRP Detachment in Italy.

186. Ibid., 91, 150.

187. The description that follows is from Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, chapter 2.

188. Ibid., 78-82. The “bellyman” rode in the cargo compartment of the helicopter and wore an aircraft-crewman helmet so he could communicate with the aircraft commander and crew. His duties were to interface between the LRP team and helicopter crew, assist LRP team members in getting off or on the helicopter, deploy and secure rope ladders or McGuire rigs, secure weapons and equipment of wounded soldiers, assist in treating wounded during the flight back to base, help defend the helicopter and crew if the aircraft crashed or was shot down, and so on. This duty was common to most LRP detachments and was frequently performed by an operations sergeant, platoon sergeant, NCO on medical profile, or other unit mid-level leader.

189. Ibid., 89-90.

190. Ibid., 152, 204-10; Stanton, 61.

191. Jorgenson, *Acceptable Loss*, 43.

192. Martinez, 126.

193. Ibid., 153-4, 204-10.

194. Ibid., 243-50.

195. Miller, 110.

196. Ibid., 154; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 103-4.

197. Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 48.

198. The fragging incident, which involved the placement of an M14 “toe-popper” mine at the entrance to the company commander’s tent, is described in Miller, 170-4; Burford, 9; and Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 80-4. The company commander stepped on the mine and suffered serious injury to one foot. His replacement was Captain Kenneth R. Ekland.

199. Burford, 83; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 48, 103-4, 296, 308; Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne*, 28, 37.

200. Miller, 198-99; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 287.

201. See, for example, Burford on 145-6; Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne*, 42.

202. See, for example, Chambers, *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 18, 60-67, 68,

113, 116, 119, 120, and 136.

203. Rotundo and Ericson, 71-80, 106, 203.

204. Ibid., 203.

205. Ibid., 109-23.

206. Ibid., 146.

207. This was First Lieutenant John H. Lattin, Jr. The patrol action is described by Hall at 280 and Ford at 81. Ford attributes his death to friendly fire from the QRF.

208. Ford cites several heavy patrols accompanied or led by his platoon leader, First Lieutenant Albert Snyder, and later First Lieutenant Donald Peter. See *4/4: A LRP's Narrative* on pages 98, 103, 125, 182, and 225. Hall, on the other hand, complains that while it was company policy that an officer lead heavy patrols, after Lattin's death this policy was not followed. See *I Served*, 254, 313, 339, 353, 423, 458, and 495. Foley, who was the operations officer of this unit for a time in 1968, acknowledges this conflict between young combat-experienced NCO team leaders and equally young but relatively inexperienced lieutenants. He concludes that making the inexperienced lieutenants patrol leaders did not solve anything; see *Special Men: A LRP's Recollections*, 294-5.

209. Camper, 188.

210. Shanahan and Brackin, 250.

211. Cummings survey.

212. Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 145-51.

213. Ibid., 244-49; *Acceptable Loss*, 37.

214. Miller, 169.

215. Burford, 121.

216. Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne*, 25, 42, 44, and 194; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 98.

217. Johnson, *Diary of an Airborne Ranger*, 198.

218. Examples of these duties can be found in Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, on pages 244, 253, and 271.

219. Ibid., 286-94. First Lieutenant Paul Sawtelle, a 1969 West Point graduate, was a relatively inexperienced new arrival to the company.

220. Ibid., 297-315. Two men in the radio-relay team were killed and a third was captured, to be released at the war's end two years later.

221. Ibid., 320-22.

222. Ibid., 323-8. The platoon leader was David Grange III, and he was later awarded the Silver Star for his actions during this fight.

223. Ibid., 329-32.

224. Telephone conversation between author and unit veteran Gary Linderer, 2 December 2004.

225. Stanton, 156-8. Sergeant First Class Alvin W. Floyd, Sergeant Michael F. Thomas, and Specialist 4th Class Donald W. Tinney were killed in this combat.

226. References to platoon sergeants participating in insertions or extractions can be found in Ford, 1; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 302; Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne*, 42.

227. Author interview of Don C. Hall, e-mail on 6 December 2004.

228. See, for example, Ford, 98; Hall, 254; Rotundo and Ericson, 196; Martinez, 240, 262-5; Miller, 165, 194; Chambers, *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne*, 41, 42; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 98.

229. The two platoon sergeants who frequently led patrols were Platoon Sergeant (PSG) (later Command Sergeant Major [CSM]) Richard Burnell and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Brubaker. See Miller, 165 and 194 for comments on Brubaker. Burnell is mentioned in Miller, 5, and Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, on pages 184-204 and 302, and thoroughly discussed in Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 8-11. The platoon sergeant who had never been on a patrol is mentioned in Johnson, 153. I personally met SFC Richard Burnell when he was my senior tactical NCO at ROTC Ranger School, Fort Benning, in the summer of 1973. He walked with a pronounced limp and in his personal demeanor matched all the descriptions of these accounts.

230. I served in this unit (25th Infantry LRRP Detachment) from October 1967 to March 1968, and led one such patrol as a 19-year-old E-5 in February 1968. I do not recall a platoon sergeant or platoon leader leading or accompanying any patrol, even a routine base-camp perimeter- or extended- ambush patrol, during the six months I was assigned to this unit. See also Ronald L. Elliff survey.

231. James, "Delta Team is in Contact," 12.

232. FM 31-18, paragraph 2-6b.

233. Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 15-6, describes this process in the 1st Cavalry Division. Michael Lanning has a good discussion of this issue on pages 78-9.

234. "Presentation of LTG Peers," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference*, 11.

235. Frank Camper volunteered for LRRP duty in the 4th Infantry Division on 13 December 1966 but was not allowed to leave his parent unit until February 1967. See *L.R.R.P: The Professional*, 84 and 111.

236. See Camper, 153-4 for the text of this handbill.

237. I responded to this appeal from my mechanized infantry unit in August

1967. Others recruited by this method include Hall, 163; Ford, 60; and Shanahan, 36.

238. See, for example, Rotundo and Ericson, 33; Jorgenson, *Acceptable Loss*, 21; Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 27; Burford, 6; Johnson, *Diary of an Airborne Ranger*, 6; and Lanning, 80. Larry Chambers served as one of these recruiters; see *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne Division*, 204. David Cummings was recruited by one of these NCOs at the 173d Airborne Brigade training center; he and two other soldiers out of about 100 present volunteered for Ranger (LRRP) duty; see Cummings survey. Ronald Elliff had two of these recruits on his LRP team in the 25th Infantry Division in early 1968; see Elliff survey.

239. This was in the 1st Cavalry Division. See Jorgenson, *The Ghosts of the Highlands*, 67.

240. "Synopsis of Presentation of II Field Force, Vietnam," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 23.

241. "Synopsis of Presentation of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 39.

242. Lanning has a good discussion of these issues on pages 80-83.

243. "Presentation of LTG Peers," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 7.

244. Peers, "LRRP Briefing—Commander's Conference, 24 Sept 67," 13.

245. "Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG John M. Wright, Jr., CG, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period 25 May 1969 to 25 May 1970 (U)," 23-4, accessed as DTIC AD510128.

246. Linderer indicates that in August 1969 about a third of the Ranger company in 101st Airborne Division was on extensions; see *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 99.

247. Stanton, 116-7.

248. See, for example, Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 59. His unit was authorized 16 six-man patrols but rarely had more than 12 and sometimes went down to five-man patrols. Walker, 179, discusses the impact of personnel rotations on team integrity in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Burford, 120, writes that his unit (F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry) in 101st Airborne Division could never field more than eight teams at a time. Linderer indicates that F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry in 101st Airborne Division underwent internal reorganization of teams in October and November 1968; see *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 159 and 183. Miller, on page 196, writes that during October 1968 strong teams had a steady base of three to four men, but the remainder were floated between teams and even platoons. Chambers indicates that in the fall of 1969, L Company (Ranger), 101st Airborne Division, had four-man teams due to

personnel shortages; see *Death in the A Shau Valley*, 113.

249. Larry Chambers, a member of F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division describes this condition in his company in late 1968 or very early 1969; see *RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne*, 61-2. Linderer paints an even grimmer picture for late December 1968 and January 1969: not enough experienced men to deploy more than three to four operational patrols; see *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 241.

250. Linderer, *Black Berets and Painted Faces*, 250.

251. This occurred in the 25th Infantry Division LRP Company in early 1968; see Elliff survey. In the 1st Cavalry Division, see Jorgenson, *LRRP Company Command*, 23.

252. "Synopsis of Presentation of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM)," *USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary*, 26-8, 27.

253. Lanning also provides an excellent discussion of the NCO manning problem on pages 83-4.

254. No Vietnam-era respondent to a survey claimed exposure to FM 31-18, and in fact "company SOP," "oral tradition," and "OJT" were frequently cited as the sources of doctrine and TTP in units. See surveys by Callahan, Casey, Cummings, Elliff, Feller, Houser, Nash, and Starnes.

255. These are James D. James, from SETAF to 1st Cavalry Division, and Captain David B. Tucker, from VII Corps operations officer in late 1963 to commander of the 1st Cavalry Division LRRP Company in the summer of 1967.

256. This is Sergeant First Class Gerald M. Tardif, who was the acting first sergeant of the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment when it was formed in November 1961. During one of his multiple tours in Vietnam, 1st Sergeant Tardif was 1SG of N Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry. "Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment," 2, 8 (fn 18).

257. Roy Boatman served in the V Corps LRRP Company in 1966 and later in the 74th LRP Detachment and N Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry (173d Airborne Brigade) in Vietnam. Craig Vega served in the VII Corps LRRP company in 1966 and later in the LRRP detachment of 101st Airborne Division. E-mail interviews with Roy Boatman, 15 December 2004, and Craig Vega on 15 March 2005.

258. While Major General Zais did have personal interactions with the members of his division LRP company that are recorded in unit memoirs, his own oral history of the entire period does not reflect any musings or observations on the formation or employment of LRP units. See Melvin Zais, General Retired, *Senior Officers Oral History Program Project 77-3* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Military History Institute, 1977), four volumes, Volume II (376-418) for time as Seventh Army G3, Volume II (447-74) for time in 1st Infantry Division, and Volume III (512-96) for time in command of 101st Airborne Division.

259. I was promoted to the rank of major in the summer of 1985 and, had I been an infantry officer, I could have been selected to command a LRSC. I was an enlisted LRRP soldier in 1967-68. There could have been a few other officers with similar service backgrounds still on active duty in the US Army at that time.

260. See Linderer, *Six Silent Men*, 282, 295-6, 313-4, and 340-2. Lieutenant Colonel Ohle's command at Fort Campbell was 2-17 Cavalry Squadron, the same unit to which his Ranger company was attached in 1971. Ohle later retired from the US Army at the rank of lieutenant general.

261. Ibid., 323-8. Grange earned both a Silver Star and a Purple Heart on the mission described in these pages.

262. The number 333 is the total from lists found on the 75th Ranger Regiment Association Internet website. These lists are also reproduced at the back of Linderer, *Phantom Warrior*. Posthumous Medal of Honor recipients are Lazlow Rabel, 74th LRP Detachment, 173d Airborne Brigade; Robert J. Pruden, G Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 23d (Americus) Infantry Division; and Robert D. Law, I Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. The missing in action are listed by Stanton in his Appendix A. Of the men on that list, one (Private First Class Issako Malo) returned from captivity in March 1973; the remains of three others (Private First Class Joseph E. Fitzgerald, Sergeant John A. Jakovac, and Private First Class Brian K. McGar) were returned in 1994 and identified and buried in 1997. The remaining men Stanton lists (James A. Champion, Deverton C. Cochrane, Dickie W. Finley, Kenneth R. Lancaster, and Donald S. Newton) remain missing but their official status is "presumptive finding of death," with various dates of this finding ranging from 20 August 1974 (Newton) to 25 September 1978 (Champion).

Chapter 4

Long-Range Surveillance Units, 1981-2001

Starting Over

When the last Ranger company in Vietnam (Company H, 1st Cavalry Division) was inactivated in August 1972, three TOE Ranger companies remained in the active Army: Company A at Fort Hood, Texas (the legacy company of V Corps LRRPs in the 1960s); Company B at Fort Carson, Colorado (the legacy company of VII Corps LRRPs in the 1960s); and Company O (this was the designation of the Ranger company of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division in Vietnam, inactivated on 20 November 1969 and reactivated in Alaska in August 1970).¹ Company O was deactivated in September 1972. Company A gave up many of its personnel to recruiters from 1st and 2d Ranger Battalions in the summer and fall of 1974 and was deactivated in December of that year. Company B was moved to Fort Lewis, Washington in June 1974 and formed the nucleus of 2d Battalion, 75th Rangers when that unit was activated on 1 November 1974. No LRP companies existed in the active Army after late 1974.

The requirement for a LRRP capability, however, did not go away. Four years later, in 1978, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Lieutenant General Edward C. Meyer, directed that a study be conducted to ascertain the organization, missions, and control of special forces and Ranger units in the 1980s. This study, large portions of which remain classified, was completed and published in April 1979.² Lieutenant General Meyer's question about who would be assigned the LRRP mission in the 1980s was addressed in the study, which recommended that two LRRP companies be activated for early deployment to Europe, where they would be organic elements of the corps combat electronic-warfare and intelligence (CEWI) groups (an MI unit).³

The suggested TOE for these units was the airborne infantry Ranger company (TOE 7-157), with a provision to vary the number of assigned reconnaissance teams to meet specific mission requirements. Its mission would be to conduct long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition operations in support of the corps, to a depth of 50-150 kilometers. The study did not propose a similar unit to provide comparable capability to a division.

The wheels of Army bureaucracy turned slowly and, over five years later, on 26 October 1984, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

published Pamphlet 525-42, *US Army Operational Concept for Long-Range Surveillance Units*. This document listed the following mission tasks for a long-range surveillance unit (LRSU, pronounced *lursue*):

- Conduct long-range intelligence collection through reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Determine and report location, strength, equipment, disposition, organization, and movement of enemy forces; determine location of high-value targets, to include nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapon-delivery systems, nuclear weapon storage sites, reserves, command-and-control elements, and key fixed and mobile installations.
- Conduct damage assessment and NBC monitoring.
- Emplace and employ unattended sensors and electronic intelligence, target acquisition, and designation equipment.
- Obtain information on possible drop and landing zones.
- Assess terrain and weather.
- Conduct pathfinder operations.
- Assess indigenous communications facilities for possible future allied use.⁴

Note the use of the words “surveillance unit” in the naming of this “new” organization. This was a deliberate choice of words to further emphasize the intelligence nature of these organizations and personnel. Its predecessors in names, titles, and doctrinal literature were “long-range reconnaissance patrol,” “long-range patrol,” and “patrol.”

While this TRADOC concept document envisioned the LRSC (company) to be organic to the corps, it stated that the LRSD (detachment) was organic to light- and heavy-division cavalry squadrons.⁵ This seemed to follow the practice established in Vietnam wherein most division LRRP companies and detachments were attached to divisional air and ground cavalry units.

Doctrine

A draft Field Circular (FC) 7-93, *Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations*, was published on 1 July 1985, followed in June 1987 by Field Manual (FM) 7-93, *Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations*. Both documents were authored by the TRADOC-designated proponent for LRSU—the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Because the 1987 field manual was clearly derived from the 1985 draft FC and the

corrections made to it during the staffing process, this study will just discuss the field manual. Between the publication of these two documents, on 20 May 1986, TRADOC determined that LRSU would be organic to the MI brigade at corps level and to the MI battalion at division level.⁶ This decision in some measure determined that, in the future, LRSU would be used for intelligence collection and not for offensive combat activities, as had so often been the case with LRRP units in Vietnam.

It also fuelled the struggle for control of LRSU doctrine and propensity between the US Army Infantry School (USAIS), the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS), and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (JFK SWC).⁷ In the end, the USAIS and USAICS came to a formalized agreement that was included in a memorandum of understanding in February 1990. The Infantry School took responsibility for LRS doctrine, unit training, TTP, and LRS TOE. USAICS retained responsibility for intelligence-related LRS-unit activities and the LRS-personnel authorizations in MI units.⁸

Careful study of FM 7-93 reveals that it was not created out of thin air—it was an expanded and elaborated evolution of the August 1968 version of FM 31-18. FM 7-93 contains many passages of text lifted directly from its predecessor, establishing a clear doctrinal connection to the V and VII Corps LRRP companies of USAREUR in the early 1960s, whose TTP and operational employment mission were the experiential basis for the 1968 LRRP doctrine. The new doctrinal manual did not ignore the hard-won lessons of Vietnam either. Located in the very front of the new manual is the most important of those lessons, where the text emphasizes the HUMINT nature of the LRSU and strongly discourages their use for direct-action missions.⁹ This focus away from direct action and toward surveillance pervades the manual.

According to the terms of AirLand Battle, the doctrinal touchstone of the late 1980s, LRSU were placed in the force structure to enable the corps commander to collect HUMINT as far out as 150 kilometers from his forward line of troops (FLOT), and the division commander to collect HUMINT 50 kilometers from the FLOT by patrols lasting up to eight and six days respectively. Of the four basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine (initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization), LRSU supported all of them, but most of all supported depth. LRSU gave corps and division commanders the ability to see deep into the enemy's rear.¹⁰

A USAREUR or Vietnam-era LRRP soldier would immediately recognize

the 1987 LRSU organization in either company or detachment configuration. It looked about the same as a LRRP company or detachment of either vintage. The 1987 LRSC was comprised of a headquarters, communications, and three surveillance platoons. In the HQ were the administrative, operations, and maintenance sections. The communications platoon included a small HQ and four base stations. Each of the three surveillance platoons had six surveillance teams with six men in each team. A 1987 LRSD was smaller, having no operations or maintenance sections, only two base stations, and four six-man teams in its surveillance element. Like all the USAREUR LRRP soldiers but unlike most Vietnam-era LRRP soldiers, all LRSU members were required to be airborne qualified.¹¹

The capabilities and limitations of LRSU in 1987 varied only slightly from LRRP units two decades earlier. The near-universal employment of helicopters for support of LRRP missions experienced in Vietnam obviated the need for the 1968 capability to “operate with austere support,” and it fell out of the list in 1987. The difficulty of delivery and recovery operations in enemy-held territory, expressed as a limitation in 1968, was dropped from the limitation list in 1987, also reflecting the Vietnam experience. The 1987 limitation, “Teams are lightly armed with limited self-defense capabilities. They normally fight only to break contact,” was pulled out of the “Security” paragraph of the 1968 manual.¹² This limitation hearkened back to the USAREUR early-1960s experience, when LRRP teams viewed use of personal weapons as abhorrent except in self-defense. It also coincided with the renewed focus in 1987 on the HUMINT nature of LRSU.

The subordination of LRSU command and control (C & C) to the G2 of corps and division was in keeping with long-established doctrine and practice. The placement of LRSU in MI brigades and battalions further solidified the pre-eminence of the intelligence mission over any other activity for LRSU. FM 7-93 for the first time in doctrinal history succinctly linked LRSU missions to the corps and division commanders’ priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR).¹³

FM 7-93 did maintain the four traditional missions for these units, albeit nuanced slightly: surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and damage assessment.¹⁴ Primary among these four missions was surveillance, with emphasis on “static.” If reconnaissance was intended, the emphasis was on minimized movement. The statement of both of these missions brings to mind similar language in the 1962, 1965, and 1968 editions of FM 31-18 that attempted to limit the movement of a patrol. This is different than the

common practice in Vietnam of inserting a LRRP team into an irregular box drawn on a map with the mission to reconnoiter the entire area. Such missions frequently resulted in a chance encounter (meeting engagement) followed by a brief fire fight and then emergency extraction.

The third mission, target acquisition, in 1987 included the emplacement of sensors, also something commonly practiced in Vietnam. The fourth mission was damage assessment, sometimes a corollary to target acquisition but more often a response to ordnance delivered before the LRS insertion, a frequent mission during the Vietnam era.

What was considered a likely target for surveillance in 1987? The example list is interesting both for what it contained and what it ignored:

- critical points along avenues of approach
- critical points along key lines of communication
- airfields
- bridges or rail junctions
- ordnance or logistical depots
- railyards
- known enemy command posts and or headquarters
- assembly areas¹⁵

This admittedly partial list is striking because, with the exception of “ordnance or logistical depots” and “command posts and headquarters” (which can also be categorized as locations), it did not reference enemy units or forces. Specifically, it did not refer to “special weapons delivery means” or “enemy reserves,” two vital concerns of the commander emphasized in previous LRRP doctrinal manuals.

While it was common in Vietnam for patrol-operated radio-relay stations to be established in the field to pass communications between a patrol and its controlling unit TOC, LRRP-unit tactical operations centers (TOCs) rarely strayed from their base camps. FM 7-93 introduced (or reintroduced after a 20-year hiatus) the concept of an operations base for the LRSU, located near the collection management and dissemination section of the MI brigade or the division tactical operations center (DTOC). This operations base encompassed living and working areas for the entire unit, including an enclosure for the isolation center, TOC, and base radio station.

In 1987, LRSU used high-frequency radio as the principal means of

communication. An AM/SSB (single sideband) radio with auxiliary burst-transmission equipment was used for communications from the teams to the base stations; an FM radio provided an alternate means. The communications procedure recommended in FM 7-93 mirrors that of FM 31-18, 1968. The manual explains that the team should send its report to a designated station, but that all base stations monitored all frequencies in use. If the designated station did not respond to the team's report, another station that monitored the message should acknowledge receipt and then transmit the message to the company or detachment TOC.¹⁶

FM 7-93's mission-development section borrows both text and organization from FM 31-18. New material added to the "Fundamentals" chapter includes brief sections on operational security and electronic measures, the latter emphasizing Soviet capabilities to intercept electronic transmissions and conduct radio-direction finding. These capabilities threatened LRS-team mission and survival.

Chapter 3, "Operations," re-emphasizes the primacy of the surveillance mission for LRSU. It resurrects a patrolling technique commonly practiced in USAREUR in the 1960s but much less used in Vietnam—splitting the LRS team between a patrol base occupied by the radio operator and perhaps team leader and a forward observation position sited for maximum coverage of a point target. This chapter introduces the conceptual framework that still makes up the five phases of LRS operations: planning, insertion, execution, extraction, and recovery.

In 1987, the components of planning included contingency plans for several unanticipated events, control measures, and isolation activities. Isolation was both a time and a place the team used for intensive mission preparation. The team entered isolation upon receipt of the warning order and remained there through the entire troop-leading procedures until the final inspection was completed. Upon leaving isolation, the team departed the operations base and began the insertion phase.

The methods of insertion practiced in 1987 were traditional: stay-behind; air insertion using a variety of delivery means, including HALO and HAHO techniques; amphibious, using surface or sub-surface vessels; and land infiltration. All of these methods had historical antecedents in either conventional or special-operations forces, in USAREUR and Vietnam.

As evidenced in FM 7-93, the execution phase encompassed all the activities that occurred from the infiltration site through the surveillance site to the extraction site. This passage of text in Chapter 3 again emphasizes the

use of a patrol base and observation positions, a tactic born in USAREUR but rarely used in Vietnam.¹⁷ The extraction phase in essence began as soon as the surveillance mission was complete, and at times also from the site where the surveillance was conducted, depending on the extraction means. While every LRS team had to plan for land exfiltration as a team, in small groups or as individuals, most extractions involved the use of air or water means to recover the team deep from within enemy territory and return it to friendly lines. Among the air extraction methods by helicopter discussed, Vietnam-era techniques of ladders, STABO rigs, and jungle penetrators were notable. The last phase of LRS operations was recovery—the return of the team to its operations base, debriefing, equipment maintenance, and stand-down.

FM 7-93's final chapter contains an exposition of combat and combat-service-support requirements. According to the manual, combat support for LRS operations came in the form of aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing), fire support, air-defense artillery, engineer, and electronic support. Combat-service support came primarily in the area of various classes of supply and resupply, transportation, maintenance, medical support, and several miscellaneous forms of support (riggers, finance, chaplain, and personnel replacement). A brief paragraph on personnel replacement emphasizes a hard lesson learned in Vietnam: Because of lengthy and arduous training requirements, LRS replacement soldiers do not come quick and easy. Care was required in managing the personnel system to preclude a loss of LRS-unit effectiveness.¹⁸

Five appendices were added to FM 7-93: operational environments, communications and electronic warfare, and formats for standing operating procedures, briefbacks, and debriefings. With glossary and references, the 1987 field manual is about three times the length of its 1968 predecessor.

Viewed in retrospect, FM 7-93 was an artful amalgamation of the USAREUR-derived LRRP doctrine of the early 1960s with the TTP gained from the experience of the Vietnam War, applied to a target- and concealment-rich linear battlefield deep in the geographical sense. LRRP soldiers in Europe in the 1960s were viewed primarily as HUMINT collectors. In the Vietnam era the pendulum swung sharply toward LRRP soldiers and Rangers as offensive weapons. The strongest doctrinal imperative of this first post-Vietnam articulation of LRS doctrine and TTP was that LRS soldiers once again were HUMINT collectors. Placing LRS companies and detachments in the TOEs of MI brigades at corps level and MI battalions at division level respectively further reinforced the intelligence-based nature

of these units.

LRSU Organizations

Provisional Organizations

Even as the larger Army was engaged in the effort to redefine its long-range reconnaissance and surveillance mission requirement, at least three Army division commanders formed provisional reconnaissance units in the early 1980s: Major General Robert M. Elton in the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Major General James J. Lindsay in the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, and Major General Fred K. Mahaffey in the 3d Infantry Division in Germany.

The G2 of the 9th Infantry Division, in a 1981 staff study, identified the inability of existing divisional intelligence assets to collect required information on enemy activities in both the division's area of interest and area of influence.¹⁹ To solve this problem, the staff study recommended creating a divisional reconnaissance unit comprised of a small headquarters section and three patrol platoons, each with three 3-man patrols, for a total strength of 30 personnel.

The detachment would be tasked directly by the division G2, with several missions: operate in enemy-held territory to locate high-value targets for attack; perform reconnaissance and surveillance on specific sites, routes, or areas and determine enemy movement patterns; provide cueing information for other intelligence-collection resources; and conduct limited tactical damage assessment and chemical, biological, and radiological monitoring.

Led by tactically proficient military intelligence or infantry officers, the teams would be manned by rigorously trained personnel selected from within the division. These men would be armed with .45 caliber M3 submachine guns, intended for defensive combat only. They would be inserted by stay-behind methods, delivered by division air assets, or by ground infiltration. Patrol duration would be a minimum of five days; extraction would be accomplished by division air assets, linkup with advancing ground forces, ground exfiltration, or escape and evasion.

The division G1, G3, and G4 all nonconcurred with the recommendation, each for cogent reasons, while the division G2 concurred.²⁰ In the end, Major General Elton went with the advice of his G2, authorized the creation of the provisional reconnaissance detachment, and attached it to the 109th MI Battalion.²¹

Among the training materials used by this provisional detachment was a document obtained from the Ranger battalion stationed at Fort Lewis, titled “Tips of the Trade/Lessons Learned.” The document contained 80 numbered “tips” on 31 pages that were “written for Long Range Reconnaissance teams operating in Vietnam.”²² Use of this document for training the 9th Infantry Division provisional reconnaissance detachment establishes a direct link between the Vietnam-era LRRPs and the post-Vietnam LRSU, across a chronological gap of almost 10 years.²³

The commander of 82d Airborne Division, Major General James J. Lindsay, authorized the formation of a division reconnaissance platoon late in the late spring of 1983, shortly before he turned over command of the division.²⁴ In a letter to the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, General Lindsay stated the platoon’s mission and advantage:

To conduct early warning and intelligence reporting operations concerning the location, disposition, composition and activity of enemy forces within the division’s area of influence and interest. . . . The reconnaissance platoon provides the Division a HUMINT capability not significantly degraded by adverse weather or enemy electronic warfare measures.²⁵

A group of approximately 40-50 men was selected through competition between several of the division’s parachute infantry battalion reconnaissance platoons, and assigned to B Company, 313th MI battalion.²⁶ This LRS platoon was organized around six six-man surveillance teams with a headquarters consisting of a platoon leader and platoon sergeant, two medics, two communications men, and NCOs trained in operations, intelligence, fire support, and engineer specialties. Each six-man reconnaissance team comprised a patrol leader and assistant patrol leader, two riflemen, and two radio operators.

The reconnaissance platoon leader was responsible for training these teams, supervised and supported by his company commander and the MI battalion S3. The model for a portion of this training was the British Special Air Service (SAS), whose TTP were studied from an SAS training film obtained by the division. On 1 September 1983, three months after assuming leadership of the unit, the platoon leader evaluated his men as strong in land navigation and map reading, patrolling and troop leading, physical fitness, and airmobile insertion/extraction techniques. He further concluded men needed additional training in use of communications equipment, NATO- and Warsaw-Pact equipment identification, airborne skills, medical training,

and marksmanship.²⁷ In early 1984, the platoon's training program was built around a long-range reconnaissance platoon skill qualification test (LRRP SQT) that contained seven elements: land navigation, patrolling (planning phase), communications procedures, equipment identification, physical conditioning, advanced medical aid, and indirect fire. Soldiers who passed five of the seven tested elements were awarded a locally designed and authorized "Expert LRRP Patch" to be worn above their right fatigue jacket pocket while assigned to the unit.²⁸

The teams were equipped with standard small arms (M16 rifles) for self-defense, with no machine guns, antitank rocket launchers, sniper rifles, or exotic weaponry or silencers. Because the patrols were to be inserted by walking, parachute, or air-assault means, they had neither tactical nor administrative vehicles. The platoon HQ was authorized a single 5/4-ton, 4X4 tactical-shelter carrier with driver. Authorized communications gear included the AN/PRC-70 and AN/PRC-90 radio sets with speech-security, keying, and burst-transmission devices of that era. Other authorized team equipment included a still camera, telescope, infrared viewer, two night-vision sights (AN/PVS-4), and two radiac meters.

The 82d Airborne Division provisional LRRP platoon deployed to Grenada for Operation URGENT FURY in two contingents, the first on 31 October and the second on 7 November 1983.²⁹ Until the platoon redeployed to Fort Bragg on 2 December, it performed four reconnaissance missions for the division then, in turn, was attached to the 1-17th Cavalry, 3d Brigade, and 2-505th Infantry. The platoon's missions were assigned by the G2 at division level or the controlling unit's S2 at lower levels. The sum total of assigned missions included executing a road block, searching houses, searching remote islands (Grand Etang, Green Island, and Ronde Island off the northern coast of Grenada), surveillance, and one characterized by the platoon leader as "a search and destroy mission." During its brief stay on Green Island, a team exchanged fire with a force of unknown size and composition and suffered a few wounded men.

When a short time later the Department of the Army approved the TOE for the LRSC and LRSD, the 82d Airborne Division's LRSD was initially assigned to the division's cavalry squadron, but later returned to the 313th MI Battalion as Echo Company.

TOE Organizations

TOE LRS detachments and companies were created throughout the Army in 1985, 1986, and 1987, in all 18 divisions and in USAREUR's V

and VII Corps.³⁰ In V Corps, for example, E Company, 51st Infantry (LRS) (Airborne) was activated and assigned to the 165th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation).³¹ This company was comprised of an HQ platoon with supply (including arms room), NBC, training, and operations sections; a communications platoon; and three surveillance platoons. Each surveillance platoon had four LRS teams, with five to six men on each team. Early in its life, this unit did not have platoon leaders but was well-staffed by former Ranger Department instructors and Ranger battalion NCOs.³²

This LRS company, along with two LRS detachments formed in the 3d and 8th Infantry Divisions (V Corps subordinate elements), participated in Exercise *Caravan Guard* 88. Surveillance teams were inserted by UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters during the exercise first phase, recovered and reinserted by helicopter in the exercise second phase, and recovered in the exercise third phase. V Corps LRS teams, which were the only around-the-clock intelligence-collection asset in the exercise, transmitted more than 300 reports and provided approximately 50 percent of the combat information received at the corps HQ.³³

Experience gained in exercises such as *Reforger* and *Caravan Guard* and other training activities revealed perceived shortfalls in LRSU organization, doctrine, force structure, personnel, and equipment. The LRSD of 3d Infantry Division, for example, chose to collocate its LRS command post and forward-operating base with its parent MI battalion HQ rather than the DTOC, as suggested by FM 7-93.³⁴ The MI battalion S2 identified the urgent surveillance reports and forwarded them to the DTOC by pulse-control modulation (PCM) means. This arrangement afforded the LRSD many advantages in C & C and support.

The former LRSD commander of 3d Infantry Division suggested that six teams were insufficient for his unit's mission requirements and recommended that two additional teams be authorized in heavy divisions.³⁵ The leadership of early detachments consisted of a detachment commander, detachment sergeant, base radio station section chiefs (two), and team chiefs (four in the light divisions and six in heavy and air mobile divisions). The 3d Infantry Division augmented this cadre with an executive officer and supply sergeant, and also recommended the addition of an armorer, NBC NCO, supply clerk, operations sergeant, and intelligence sergeant to the TOE, and upgrading the detachment sergeant's rank from platoon sergeant to first sergeant.³⁶

The 3d Infantry Division LRSD also experienced the personnel recruitment problems that became problematic in the LRSU community in the

early and mid-1990s—an insufficient recruitment base of light-weapons infantry soldiers. This particularly occurred on installations where the pool of MOS-eligible personnel was relatively smaller. The two primary career fields of LRS soldiers have always been light-weapons infantrymen (11B) and radio operators (31C). Installations such as Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Riley, Kansas, and heavy divisions in Germany rich in armor crewmen and mechanized infantry soldiers were sorely lacking in 11Bs.³⁷ LRS-unit commanders were forced by circumstances to retrain 11M and 11H soldiers and also to recruit from the installation or larger-unit replacement stream.³⁸ Because of personnel shortages in the 31 career field and the inability of many communications-trained personnel to meet the high physical demands of LRS-team duty, both the 1st and 3d Infantry Division LRSDs replaced the 31C radio operator on the surveillance team with an 11B.³⁹

Another example of this persistent manning problem comes from the 10th Mountain Division (Light). In April 1991, the commander of 110th MI Battalion wrote a memorandum addressed to the division's G1, G2, and G3.⁴⁰ This memorandum strongly endorsed several concerns expressed earlier by the division's LRSD commanders. One LRSD commander voiced two requests: that incoming soldiers be screened for possible assignment to the detachment, with specific listed criteria; and that those who met the screening criteria be attached to the LRSD for a 30-day assessment period.⁴¹ The second LRSD commander requested that the division man the LRSD at 10 percent over strength in selected personnel.⁴² The MI battalion commander specifically endorsed the request for 10 percent overage manning in MOS 11B.

Early LRS detachments had another serious deficiency—they lacked the capability to transport themselves, both for administrative and tactical purposes. The MI battalions to which they were assigned lacked a support platoon and thus were not equipped to provide them direct support. Not unlike many LRRP detachments in Vietnam 20 years earlier, LRSDs even had to borrow transportation to move teams to the airfield for helicopter insertion.⁴³ This problem had not been solved before units deployed to Southwest Asia for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.⁴⁴

LRS Institutional and Unit Training

Institutional Training

When the LRS units were brought back into the Army inventory in the mid-1980s, the Army immediately set about to create an institutional training program. This effort began in 1985 in the Ranger Department at Fort

Benning, with the convening of a series of conferences.⁴⁵ Participants in these conferences included representatives from foreign-army units with similar missions (British and Australian SAS, German, French, and Italian special reconnaissance units), from the NATO reconnaissance school in Germany, from various US Army special operations institutions (Ranger and special-forces units), and from the conventional Army (medical experts, for example, to discuss special nutrition requirements).

The Ranger Department combined the conference results with the operational and organizational concepts contained in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-42, *US Army Operational Concept for Long-Range Surveillance Units* (October 1984), and developed two programs of instruction for a “train-the-leaders” course: one of eight weeks’ duration that was taught as a pilot course at Fort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School in March 1986, and another of much shorter duration to be taught in the field by mobile training teams. In 1986, the long course was shortened from eight weeks to five and moved to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, where it still resides.⁴⁶ A reserve-component version of the course consisted of six weekend drills at home station followed by a two-week instructional phase at Fort Benning.

The curriculum of the active-component five-week course included major blocks of instruction in the following subject areas: command and control, reconnaissance operations, command-post exercises, field-training exercises, land navigation, threat subjects, and communications/electronics. The threat-subjects block, in essence Soviet equipment- and system-recognition training, was placed in the curriculum in agreement with the US Army Intelligence Center and School.⁴⁷ The graduation exercise for the early course was constructed to replicate a real-world reconnaissance mission and was frequently conducted within a larger joint exercise or in support of a real-world mission.⁴⁸

The classes of 31-36 soldiers were open to male officers and NCOs currently assigned or on orders to be assigned to LRSU in leadership positions down to surveillance team leader, or a member of a base radio station communications staff. The intent was to train LRSU leaders in the required TTP and thus enable them to return to their units and train LRSU soldiers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that while many LRSU NCOs availed themselves of this training over the ensuing years, too many commissioned officers did not.⁴⁹

In early 2005, the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) now being taught at Fort Benning has two phases, the first lasting

17 days and the second lasting 16 days.⁵⁰ The course is split in this manner to enable reserve-component personnel to attend training during brief periods of active duty. Six resident courses are scheduled for FY-05, along with two mobile training team (MTT) courses of equal duration. While the course curriculum has undergone many changes over the almost 20 years of its existence, its essence remains the same. The emphasized subject areas are physical training, vehicle identification, communications, operational techniques (TTP), and a graded seven-day FTX. Outprocessing and graduation occur on day 33.

The content and role of the RSLC at Fort Benning beg comparison to that of the MACV Recondo School in the Vietnam era. The RSLC differs from MACV Recondo School principally in two aspects: The Fort Benning course is significantly longer—five weeks versus three weeks—reflecting the increased complexity of modern LRS operations doctrine and materiel. The Fort Benning course also was established as, and remains, a leaders course, intended to prepare officers and NCOs to return to their units and train soldiers. MACV Recondo School, while it occasionally trained company-grade officers and senior NCOs, was established primarily to train junior NCOs and LRRP soldiers.

But in other aspects, the RSLC is very similar to MACV Recondo School. It drew its curriculum from, and remains in, the firm grasp of an assemblage of subject-matter experts, who were and still are responsible for writing LRSU doctrine. The RSLC has become the gold standard for LRSU training and operations, a place where lessons captured in worldwide training and operations are collected, collated, distilled, and incorporated into the training curriculum and doctrinal publications. Because the RSLC trains trainers, LRSU-training programs throughout the Army have a common-core-subject base, supplemented by local unit requirements. The importance of the RSLC as an institution of Army-wide LRSU quality control cannot be overstated.

Unit Training

An examination of the unit training experience of a few LRSUs during the current era reveals several interesting aspects. The LRSD of 1st Infantry Division, activated in the 101st MI Battalion in 1988, during its early existence participated in a *Reforger* exercise in Germany and deployed to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin for every brigade rotation.⁵¹ The NTC rotations were particularly useful in perfecting the detachment's long-range communications skills, in that a training objective of each rotation was to transmit and receive messages from Fort Irwin

to Fort Riley using the detachment's assigned communications equipment. The communications section also developed a detailed no-communications drill that served the detachment well. Over time, several of the detachment's soldiers were able to attend the RSLC at Fort Benning. The detachment accomplished its airborne training by bringing an MTT from Fort Benning to Fort Riley in the fall of 1990, and thereafter maintained proficiency through permissive jump status.⁵² In garrison, this detachment conducted an annual competitive training event named "Law Stakes," which pitted LRS soldiers against each other in individual proficiency skills.⁵³ After returning from Operation DESERT STORM and before it was inactivated, the 1st Infantry Division LRSD used a counter-drug mission under Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) as a training opportunity to conduct battle-focused training.⁵⁴

The LRSD of 6th Infantry Division in Alaska jumped and conducted a field-training exercise monthly, conducted annual winter survival and glacier training, went to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) every year or so, and participated in an exchange exercise with the 25th Infantry Division LRSD.⁵⁵

The LRSD of the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, conducted the following training in the 12-month period from May 1990 to May 1991:⁵⁶

- German reciprocal exchange (May 1990)
- *Fuerzas Unidas* (Paraguay Exercise) (July 1990)
- Battle drill and live-fire exercise week (August 1990)
- Survival training week (September 1990)
- Communications training week (September 1990)
- 4-21 Infantry Bold Thrust support (September 1990)
- JRTC (3d Brigade) (October 1990)
- Rappel insertion training week (November 1990)
- Airborne insertion training week (December 1990)
- Battle drill and live-fire exercise week (January 1991)
- Cascade Strike II CPX (January 1991)
- Threat ID training week (January 1991)
- Exercise support to 2d Brigade (February 1991)
- Communications training week (February 1991)
- Insertion training week (March 1991)

- Land navigation training week (March 1991)
- LRSD team certifications (April 1991)
- Counter-narcotics mission (May 1991)

The training forecasted for the subsequent six months included the following:

- NTC with 2d Brigade (June 1991)
- Expert Infantry Badge with 3d Brigade (June 1991)
- Threat ID training week (July 1991)
- Detachment certification (HUMINT external evaluation) (July 1991)
- *Fuerzas Unidas* (August 1991)
- JRTC (2d Brigade) (September 1991)

The LRSC of I Corps, assigned to the 14th MI Battalion and stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington, participated in a variety of unit-training missions during the brief period of its existence.⁵⁷ The unit deployed annually to Korea for Exercise *Ulchi Focus Lens*, a large combined deployment and command-post exercise of US and Republic of Korea (ROK) Army units. A team of LRS soldiers competed in Exercise *Cambrian Patrol* in Wales, United Kingdom, against teams from several other NATO countries and earned a gold medal. Closer to home, I Corps LRSC teams assisted federal agencies in counter-narcotics operations on federally controlled lands of Arizona, Oregon, and California. Using their ground-tracking and counter-tracking skills, the LRS teams were able to deliver federal agents to specific locales in the forest undetected to perform their law-enforcement mission.⁵⁸

While it can be established that many LRSUs have periodically trained at the NTC at Fort Irwin and the JRTC at Fort Polk over the years, available sources do not allow for detailed analyses of the specific missions trained or the results of training.⁵⁹ For the period of the late 1990s, however, LRSUs that exercised at the JRTC trained in the standard doctrinal deep-reconnaissance mission. They did not train or rehearse in direct-action missions, and in fact resisted some external suggestions that they do so.⁶⁰

Personnel from LRSUs in Germany had ready access to US Army schools, to NATO facilities such as the International Long Range Patrol School in Weingarten, Germany, and to training exercises and courses of like organizations in individual NATO armies.⁶¹

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

In the XVIII Corps area of operations, LRSU were employed in both

phases of the war: during DESERT SHIELD in an effort to detect the possible movement of Iraqi forces against the corps' maneuver and logistic elements while they established their jumping-off positions, and during DESERT STORM to provide intelligence on enemy presence or activity on divisional intermediate objectives. All of the corps' American divisions had LRSD and the corps HQ had an attached LRSU.⁶² Lieutenant General Gary Luck, the corps commander, issued guidance that "no teams would be inserted unless there were specific areas vital to the overall operation that could not be covered with other resources."⁶³

After arriving in theater, LRS teams of the 24th Infantry Division prepared for their combat mission under the supervision of the division G2 and the 124th MI Battalion commander.⁶⁴ The first issue to be resolved was command and control of the LRSU. While doctrine provided for the G2 to have operational control of LRS teams in combat, in this division command and control was retained by the MI battalion and the G2 developed missions and coordinated division-level support.⁶⁵ Major General Barry McCaffrey, the commanding general, retained authority to himself to approve all LRSD missions, resupply operations, and extractions.⁶⁶ The 24th Infantry Division studied and then consciously avoided attempts to "mobilize" their LRSD at the last minute and focused on the standard, doctrinal hide-position dismounted employment of their LRS teams.⁶⁷

The most serious equipment shortfall was communications gear, both for the teams and the base stations. The division was able to provide additional radios for base stations but was unable to acquire redundant HF or tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios for the deployed teams. LRS soldiers trained in the desert for several consecutive days on terrain similar to their mission area, honing their survival and communications skills and building confidence in their TTP. While the division expected to insert LRS teams with ground vehicles during the defensive phase of the operation, helicopter crews that would later be used during the offensive phase flew practice insertions and extractions with the teams.⁶⁸ During this phase, the LRSD commander rotated out of command and was elevated to the division staff to plan and coordinate LRS activities.⁶⁹

When the division tactical command post (DTAC) deployed forward into a tactical assembly area in early January, LRS teams went along and were inserted into hide-sites on the border berm to keep Iraqi border guard posts under observation.⁷⁰ At this time the teams were communicating with the division main command post (DMAIN) some 500 kilometers away. The teams were able to establish the normal pattern of activities of the Iraqi

border guards, useful as baseline data when the division deployed forward a few weeks later. After these Iraqi posts were destroyed around 19-20 February, cavalry units were sent forward and the LRS teams were withdrawn to their base near the DMAIN to prepare for their combat mission.⁷¹

The planning process for cross-FLOT employment of LRS teams in the 24th Infantry Division began in the division staff at nightly planning meetings, where the commanding general and others proposed potential LRS missions and targets. The division G2 passed these nominated targets to G2 and G3 planners for consideration and elaboration. The goal was to develop three targets for each available team. Work products were shown to the commanding general, who approved and prioritized them. Missions were further coordinated with the MI battalion and aviation brigade commanders who would later have to execute and support them. The estimates for each mission included the following components:

- general target sites
- mission times
- enemy, weather, and terrain
- information to be gained
- other sources that could potentially acquire this information
- feasibility of insertion, extraction, resupply, and communications
- risks of compromise
- east of transition into future operations⁷²

As G-Day (ground day, the day on which the ground attack would commence) approached, General McCaffrey narrowed the target list considerably while also extending it forward in time and space.

The LRSD commander and his staff participated with division staff elements in developing the target folder for each mission.⁷³ For a given named area of interest (NAI), a terrain analyst selected several possible hide-sites based on all available imagery. He reviewed these with the LRSD personnel, and together they selected primary and alternate hide-sites. Considerations in this selection included distance and visibility to the NAI, proximity of enemy activity, concealment for the team, and distance to possible helicopter landing zones (LZ). The terrain analyst then prepared a 1:50,000 scale overlay with a radius of 10 kilometers from the primary hide-site, with all important positions recorded. This overlay was reviewed again by LRSD personnel before submission through the MI battalion commander and division G2 to the commanding general for final approval.

Because the assistant division commander for maneuver (ADC-M), Brigadier General James T. Scott, had special-operations experience, he received a pre-brief on the final mission list.⁷⁴ General McCaffrey received the final briefing on 21 February, with the ADC-M, commanders of the MI battalion, aviation company, and LRS detachment, the G2 LRS staff officer, and others in attendance. The three briefers were the LRS staff officer, LRS detachment commander, and aviation company commander. The commanding general approved six missions, three to be inserted after 2230 on 22 February and three for 25 February.

The 24th Infantry Division inserted three teams on the night of 22 February using Blackhawk helicopters from its own aviation assets, supported by Air Force electronic-warfare aircraft.⁷⁵ About 160-220 kilometers from the line of departure, the three teams went into hide-sites on the division's first three brigade objectives. These teams remained undetected and submitted intelligence reports via HF radio until the division passed through them, and then were recovered by helicopter. This recovery occurred sometime on the morning of 25 February in the west portion of the division AO (Objective BROWN was secured by 0706) and later in the day of 25 February in the east portion of the division AO (Objective GREY was secured at 1501). The third team, on Objective RED (secured at 1800), was recovered on the evening or during the night of 25 February. These LRS teams had remained in hide-positions in enemy territory for approximately 54 to 72 hours, transmitting their reports on enemy movement into and out of the zone directly to the base station at the DMAIN.⁷⁶ While the division had planned for three additional LRS insertions on 25 February, by that time the division had passed through the targets. No further doctrinal use was made of this division's LRS teams.

The 101st Airborne Division inserted four LRS teams on the night of 23 February, three into forward operating base (FOB) COBRA and a fourth on main supply route (MSR) TEXAS northeast of As Salman. The three teams at FOB COBRA were to report on enemy activity there in advance of the division's seizure of the terrain for subsequent use as a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) for its large helicopter force. The team on MSR TEXAS was to report on any movement into the French area. The depth of all these insertions was approximately 160 kilometers.⁷⁷

The corps LRSU, Company D of 522d MI Battalion, was assigned a mission to conduct terrain reconnaissance in front of the corps. The unit spent considerable time and effort in the preparatory period developing and practicing mobile terrain-reconnaissance techniques using civilian

pickup trucks delivered and extracted by CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The teams were to be inserted, conduct route reconnaissance along designated 30-40 mile routes, and be extracted. Three teams, which along with their helicopter support were designated Task Force *Stalker*, conducted full-up rehearsals of this mission for about two weeks before G-day.⁷⁸

Intelligence that came into the corps from other sources obviated the need for this mounted reconnaissance, and other missions of a more conventional nature were selected for the three teams. They would be inserted into an NAI from which they could monitor the movement of Iraqi forces toward the corps from the north or east. The teams were all inserted about 130 miles into Iraq on the late evening of 23 February using UH-60 helicopters. Team 2 was compromised by Bedouins about 3 hours after insertion; Team 1 was compromised by women and children on the afternoon of 24 February; and Team 3 was compromised by a small group of deserting Iraqi soldiers (that they took control of) on the evening of 24 February. All three teams were recovered safely, along with the EPWs captured by Team 3, less than 24 hours after insertion. The mission was judged a failure in that the anticipated movement of Iraqi forces would likely have come during the subsequent 24-hour period.

In addition to his own corps assets, Lieutenant General Luck had the use of five special forces ODAs (operational detachment alpha) for long-range reconnaissance of avenues of approach into the corps area from the north. These avenues were outside of the corps' area of operations but in the corps' area of interest. The five teams were inserted north and south of the Euphrates River on 23 February by helicopters of 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and between them manned eight hide-sites. Only three of these eight sites remained in operation long enough to perform the assigned surveillance mission. The remainder were compromised by Iraqi civilian or military personnel and had to be abandoned, some under enemy fire. The terrain in the surveillance-objective area lacked sufficient concealment for the teams, and there were too many civilians, both villagers and Bedouins, wandering about the area. A participant in this operation also cited lack of training and inadequate intelligence as reasons for its overall failure.⁷⁹

In the VII Corps AO to the east, limited employment of LRS units occurred before G-Day. F Company, 51st Infantry (LRS) was assigned to the 511th MI Battalion but in OPCON to the 207th MI Brigade while its parent battalion was fully engaged in planning to execute the corps' EPW mission. F-51st Infantry was a highly trained unit that had participated in

corps-level exercises and maneuvers in Germany.⁸⁰ The corps aviation unit that supported the LRS company, 11th Aviation Brigade, because of other out-of-country commitments, was generally not available for training, and consequently the LRS company used trucks for exercise insertions and extractions. The corps staff had not developed command-and-control expertise for the fixed- and rotary-wing aviation support required for deep insertions and extractions of LRS teams.

When the LRS company arrived in the desert, it undertook a rigorous training program to prepare for combat. It practiced helicopter operations with air crews of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment to develop insertion and extraction expertise. LRS teams tested various methods of digging hide-positions in the desert, finally arriving at the use of a pre-fabricated cover over which they laid the material excavated from the hide.⁸¹ The soldiers perfected reporting procedures and mastered the technical use of a new antenna. And the entire LRS company continued its regular physical-fitness regimen in the desert.

The commander of 207th MI Brigade, which had OPCON of the corps LRS company, briefed General Frederick Franks on courses of action for employing his LRS teams. While General Franks knew his LRS soldiers were tactically competent in their surveillance and communications tasks, he was aware of their training shortfall, and that of his own staff, in the use of aviation assets. The briefing also informed him of the difficulty in constructing undetectable hide-positions. Because he felt that the LRS teams could not provide him intelligence he would be unable to acquire from any other source, Franks determined that VII Corps LRS assets would not be employed in the doctrinal manner, deep in enemy territory. In his final analysis, the risk of LRS failure outweighed the possible benefit of their use.

F-51st Infantry was subsequently split into two parts: 10 teams were retained under 207th MI Brigade control and two teams were attached to 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (16 February 1991). Four VII Corps LRS teams were truck-inserted into hide-positions on the border berm in late January 1991.⁸² The teams were actually dropped south of the berm and walked to their positions several hundred meters north of the berm. Their mission was to provide surveillance of the terrain in front of the corps and report any sightings through their base station located at the corps TAC CP. While corps units in the area (in late January the 1st Infantry Division cavalry screen) were aware of this mission, these units did not know the exact locations of the hide positions.

Due to a misunderstanding between a single LRS team and its base

station on the procedure for using a duress code, the base station concluded that this team was under duress. Unable to communicate with the team using its assigned operating frequency and also an emergency frequency, the base station apprised the MI brigade TOC of the problem. After several hours of concerted effort by the MI brigade staff and elements of 1-4 Cavalry Squadron of 1st Infantry Division, the team was found intact and unharmed. On order of the VII Corps commander, all four deployed LRS teams were pulled out about 24 hours after their insertion. The 10 teams under VII Corps control were not redeployed before G-Day.

After G-Day, the VII Corps LRS Company performed two missions. A small number of teams were attached to maneuver units on the corps right flank and placed out during the advance as pickets, with the mission to detect possible Iraqi forces withdrawing from Kuwait. These teams reported to the division in whose area they were operating. The other mission performed by the VII Corps LRS Company was to provide ground security for Task Force *Sand Hawk*. This force was comprised of an engineer unit, a tank platoon, a group of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight-control personnel, and the LRSC. The engineer platoon constructed a 1,600-foot airstrip in Iraq behind the advancing American forces; the strip was to be used for the Pioneer UAV to extend its range deep into Iraq. While guarding this air strip, the LRSC took custody of, and built a makeshift cage for about 350 EPW.

The LRS unit of 1st Infantry Division, D Company of 101st MI Battalion, arrived in theater in mid-January 1991 and was assigned to Combat Command Carter in the desert north of Log Base Echo.⁸³ After arriving in its assigned sector to the division's front, D Company spent several days conducting rehearsals in the desert to the south, training its soldiers how to use the recently issued global positioning system (GPS) devices, and testing communications equipment to determine the best time for use and best frequency for AM radio transmissions. The company commander was determined not to replicate the experience of the VII Corps LRSC.

On 29 January Major General Thomas G. Rhame, the 1ID commander, met with the commanders of the LRS company, 101st MI Battalion, and 1-4th Cavalry Squadron, and the division G2, chief of staff, and General Carter (ADC-M) to discuss two issues: operational subordination of the LRSU and its readiness to perform its assigned combat mission. After listening to a variety of suggestions, Rhame authorized the LRSU to continue in its operational subordination to the divisional cavalry squadron (1-4 Cavalry Squadron) and approved the detachment's operational plan.

The first two 1st Infantry Division LRS teams were inserted by M-3 Bradleys at last light on 1 February. The LRS soldiers were dropped off about three kilometers south of their hide-positions on the border berm and walked forward to these positions in darkness. They remained in position until picked up by M-3 Bradleys some 32 hours later, on the morning of 3 February. During their designated communications séances, these teams sent encrypted reports by AM burst-transmission radios to the company operations center, operated by the company executive officer, which was collocated with the DMAIN. The company commander was located with the other base station in the TOC of the 1-4 Cavalry Squadron, the unit that would provide direct and immediate support if a team was compromised. The six teams of D/101st MI Battalion executed a total of 14 missions along the border berm from 1-23 February, providing the division and corps early warning capability while they organized in the desert for combat. All teams were picked up by Bradleys except the two teams that were out at the time G-Day was announced. These two teams were recovered by UH-60s from an air troop of the divisional cavalry squadron. Upon return to their operating base, all teams were debriefed by the company XO in the presence of a representative from the division G2 staff.

For the duration of the 100-hour war, LRSU soldiers of this division rode forward in the long column of support vehicles, halting on one occasion to assemble several score of EPWs into a manageable formation and issue them meals, ready-to-eat (MREs). After combat had ended, D Company/101st MI Battalion was tasked to provide long-range communications for the division support command (DISCOM) with one of its base stations while the division consolidated and reorganized for redeployment back to Fort Riley, KS.

To the left of 1st Infantry Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment was slated to screen the west flank of VII Corps with XVIII Corps and to the front (along with the 1-4 Cavalry Squadron from 1st ID), and in the attack to lead 1st and 3d Armored Divisions. 2d ACR arrived in tactical assembly area (TAA) Richardson, about 35 miles south of Tapline Road, on 20 January 1991.⁸⁴ F Company (LRS), 50th Infantry (-) was attached to 2d ACR effective 160600 February. The company commander arrived in the 2d ACR area with several surveillance teams and two base stations just a few days before the 2d ACR's displacement forward to its assigned area of operations forward of Tapline Road.

The LRS detachment was subordinated to the regiment G2, with the assistant G2 acting as the staff LRS coordinator.⁸⁵ The LRSC commander and

staff LRS coordinator together planned and coordinated the employment of LRS teams in the 2d ACR area sector before G-Day. Using his organic transportation (high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle [HMMWV]), the LRSC commander would insert two or three teams in hide-positions on the border berm in 2d ACR sector, each team remaining in place for three to four days. Together, the two officers would select the general locations for these teams based on map reconnaissance, and the LRSC commander would make the final position determination at the time of insertion.

The staff LRS coordinator was responsible for coordinating with 2d ACR support elements: aviation units for emergency aerial extraction and ground (armored) units for a QRF. The LRSC commander would conduct insertions, resupply (primarily of water), and extractions using his organic vehicles. The LRSC surveillance teams linked up with the squadrons in whose sector they would operate on 17 February to accomplish final coordination, with the regiment's forces now closed on forward assembly area (FAA) Garcia.⁸⁶ The LRSC teams were inserted that day or the next and submitted negative reports of enemy activity twice daily thereafter to a base station collocated with the regimental main command post (RMAIN). A resupply of the LRS teams in position was accomplished on 22 February, the same day they reported a tracked vehicle to their rear. It turned out to be a 1st Infantry Division M-88 tracked recovery vehicle, lost in the desert.⁸⁷ When the 2d ACR crossed the line of departure on 24 February, the LRS teams were recovered by their commander and the LRSC fell in the column of advancing vehicles behind the RMAIN. About 24 hours into the advance, the LRSC was released from attachment to 2d ACR and returned to the control of VII Corps.

This detachment executed no missions across the FLOT for at least three reasons. General Franks, the VII Corps commander, had decided early in the operation that no VII Corps LRS assets would be employed across the FLOT; the commander of 2d ACR, Colonel Leonard R. Holder, had an adequate intelligence picture of the terrain in his axis of advance from other sources, in particular from regular UAV flights; and the rapidity of the regiment's advance outstripped the planning time required to execute any further LRS missions.

Post-DESERT STORM Organizational Changes

The years immediately following Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM were tumultuous for the long-range surveillance community as a whole. Several LRS detachments disappeared with the inactivation of their parent divisions beginning in 1991: 2d and 3d Armored Division,

and 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 24th Infantry Divisions. New LRS units emerged from the remnants of inactivating units. The flag for F Company (LRS), 51st Infantry (the LRSC of VII Corps) was transferred to XVIII Corps in 1993 after the inactivation of VII Corps. The LRSC of I Corps at Fort Lewis was formed with the personnel from the 9th Infantry Division LRS Company when its parent unit, the 109th MI Battalion, was inactivated in late 1991. The new corps-level LRS company was assigned to the 14th MI Battalion.⁸⁸ A new LRS company was activated in III Corps at Fort Hood in 1995.⁸⁹

Other LRSU were inactivated during this same period as a result of total army analysis (TAA) force structure reviews in 1991 and 1995. These included the LRS detachments of all the remaining heavy divisions: 1st, 3d, and 4th Infantry Divisions, 1st and 3d Armored Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division. These divisions' requirements for LRS support were to be met by detachments from their corps LRSC. While that arrangement worked for V Corps divisions in Germany, which had a LRSC, both I and III Corps lost their active-component LRSCs in 1997 based on TAA-based force reductions. The LRS mission for these two corps was handed off to the Army National Guard.⁹⁰ Thus, as a result of force reductions and unit inactivations, in 1999 the active component of the Army had two LRSCs (V and XVIII Corps) and five LRSDs (2d and 25th Infantry Divisions, 10th Mountain Division, and 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions). The 101st Airborne Division LRSD was subsequently inactivated in a 2004 reorganization of that division's intelligence assets.

Doctrinal Adjustments

In October 1995, more than four years after Operation DESERT STORM and amid wholesale reallocation of LRS assets throughout the Army, the Infantry School published a new edition of FM 7-93, *Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations*.⁹¹ The doctrine contained in this new manual was less a departure from the previous doctrine than a further elaboration of the same doctrine. It contained some new material that reflected changes in how the Army was being used by the national command authority and also reflected advances in communications and other technologies.

Following the less than totally successful across-the-board doctrinal employment of LRSU during Operation DESERT STORM, and the dissatisfaction with LRSU doctrine expressed in postwar after-action reviews, one might have expected some degree of retrenchment in the specific areas of LRSU organization, subordination, command and control, and mission.⁹² This notion was further reinforced by the inactivation of LRS

detachments in armored and mechanized divisions during this time period, ostensibly undertaken solely for reasons of resource constraints.

However, the doctrine of LRSU organization and subordination remained unchanged, while command and control and mission employment changed slightly to reflect the contemporary operating environment (COE). LRS teams were still enjoined from conducting direct-action missions—surveillance remained their primary mission.⁹³ The LRS company remained in the corps and was subordinated to the MI brigade.⁹⁴ The LRS detachment remained in both heavy and light divisions and was subordinated to the division MI battalion.⁹⁵ Mission requirements for LRSC and LRSD in wartime were still determined by the corps and division G2.⁹⁶

Given the new field manual’s nod toward operations other than war, it is not surprising to see changes to the list of possible targets of LRSU surveillance. These new potential targets included: “economic activity, political and propaganda activity, drug-processing or drug-growing activity, and refugee flow.”⁹⁷ It does not take an overactive imagination to postulate that “economic activity” could be “smuggling” or “possession and movement of contraband,” “political and propaganda activity” could be “insurgent information operations,” “drug-processing or drug-growing activity” could be “narco-terrorism resource development,” and “refugee flow” could also be “infiltration of border areas by illegal aliens,” “refugee-smuggling activity,” or “clandestine infiltration of human high-value targets via refugee flow.” All these new potential surveillance targets represent PIR reflective of the complex nature of the COE in 1995. They also reflect actual or potential employment of LRSU abroad in contingency operations and in the United States in support of federal law-enforcement agencies.⁹⁸

In 1987, the corps and division G2s sat atop the process of formulating missions for LRSC and LRSD. Doctrine in 1987 was silent on the issue of who approved LRSC and LRSD missions. In practice in Operation DESERT STORM, corps and division commanders reserved to themselves the right of approval of LRSU missions. That command prerogative was written into the 1995 doctrine: corps and division commanders “normally” approved LRSC and LRSD missions.⁹⁹ The list of missions appropriate for surveillance teams expanded from the age-old surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and damage assessment to also include terrain and weather reporting and “collateral activities.”¹⁰⁰ The latter is a catch-all phrase for disaster relief, coalition support, combat search and rescue, and pathfinder operations. As a matter of fact, combat search and rescue and pathfinder operations are traditional LRRP/LRS activities conducted both

in USAREUR in the early 1960s and in Vietnam.

Chapter 2, “Fundamentals,” contains a new section titled “Task Organization.” While the concept of subordinating a LRSD or a portion of a LRSC to a brigade is not new, having been practiced frequently in Vietnam, it is new in the post-Vietnam era. The context of this section is that LRSU may come under operational control of a brigade task organization during a contingency operation or in an operation-other-than-war environment. At the time this doctrine was written, the LRSC of V Corps was the only LRSU remaining in Europe. It was not unusual for this unit to provide LRS teams to various units deploying from central Germany to the Balkans.¹⁰¹

Reflecting the growing complexity of detailed planning for LRS missions, FM 7-93 lists 19 *essential details* [emphasis in original] of a LRS team plan, as compared to 12 in 1987. New elements include situational information; clearly stated PIR and associated SIR, and IR and associated SIR; mission statement and commander’s intent; plans for evasion and escape; actions to take in the case of captured enemy personnel and equipment; uniform and equipment for the team; and abort criteria for each phase of the mission.¹⁰² Chapters 3 (Operations) and 4 (Support) were not substantially altered from the 1987 edition of the field manual.

The new manual contains two entirely new chapters: Chapter 5, “LRS in Operations Other Than War” and Chapter 6, “Infiltration and Exfiltration.” Chapter 5 is just two pages in length and lists four general categories of activities for possible LRS employment in operations other than war: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peace enforcement, and peacetime contingency operations. The variety of missions a LRSU might have to perform in this environment is best illustrated in the following passage:

The primary differences between the activities of a LRSU in operations other than war and war consist of the targets it observes and the information it reports. It may observe a coca or marijuana field to discover who comes to tend or harvest the crop. It may observe a terrorist group’s safe-house to identify people who meet there. It may observe and report on economic activity such as land use, flooding, drought, salinization, forest-clearing, and similar activity. It may report on demographic activity such as migration of peoples, legally or illegally, or the racial or religious makeup of a political subdivision.¹⁰³

This text wisely contains a warning to the LRSU commander to consult with a staff judge advocate before beginning any mission that may have legal restrictions or requirements.

Chapter 6 is a lengthy (41 pages) exposition of methods of infiltration and exfiltration using waterborne (rubber boat and helicopter), helicopter airborne (rappelling, SPIES, fast roping, and traditional air-assault insertion), airborne (static-line or free-fall parachute), stay-behind, vehicle, and foot-movement operations.¹⁰⁴ It describes TTP developed over time by a variety of conventional and unconventional military units. The stay-behind method of insertion is as old as LRRP doctrine itself, having been used by LRRP teams in USAREUR in the early 1960s and as well by many LRRP teams in the Vietnam War.

Table 1

Page Count	1987 Appendices	Page Count	1995 Appendices
		2	Personnel Recruitment and Selection (A)
		5	Long-Range Surveillance Reconnaissance (B)
3	Operational Environments (A)	5	Geographic Environments (C)
6	Communications and Electronic Warfare (B)	19	Communications (D)
2	Team Standing Operating Procedure Format (C)		
		13	LRSU Hide and Surveillance Sites (E)
		5	Tracking and Countertracking, Evasion and Escape, and Survival (F)
		10	Intelligence (G)
		22	Orders (H)
4 3	Briefback Format (D) Debriefing Format (E)	12	Briefback and Debriefing Formats (I)
		12	Movement Techniques and Battle Drills (J)
		9	Night Operations (K)
18	Total	114	Total

Much of FM 7-93's increase in size and content in 1995 came from the enlargement and addition of appendix material. The above table illustrates

the greater than six-fold appendix page-count increase from 1987 to 1995 and the nature of the new material.

Appendix A, “Personnel Recruitment and Selection,” addresses a long-standing problem of LRRP and LRS units—how to recruit and select qualified personnel. This appendix recommends, with the cooperation of the G1, a 30- to 60-day assignment probationary period for soldiers recruited to LRS units. The screening standards desired in a potential LRS recruit in 1995 were:

- airborne qualified (specialist four or corporal and below)
- airborne and ranger qualified (sergeant and above)
- GT score of 110 or above
- must agree to volunteer for airborne and Ranger schools (if applicable)
- meet US Army height and weight or body fat standards
- no prior disciplinary problems
- no history of drug or alcohol abuse
- graduate One-Station Unit Training without waivers
- have at least two years of retainability in the unit

During the probationary period, the prospective LRS soldier was to meet the following minimum standards:

- pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (Ranger school standards)
- pass the Combat Water Survival Test
- complete a five-mile run within 40 minutes
- complete a 12-mile road march while carrying 35 pounds within 3 hours
- pass a written land navigation test
- complete a day and night land navigation practical exercise
- demonstrate proficiency in several listed basic LRSU team skills
- pass a comprehensive examination by the unit selection review board

Without any reference to the recruitment or retention standards themselves, this field manual addition is evidence the Army had become sensitive to personnel problems that had emerged since the creation of LRSUs in 1986.

Appendix B, “Long-Range Surveillance Reconnaissance,” hearkens back to an earlier age of LRRP—Vietnam. The authors of this appendix

clearly understood and stated the risks associated with reconnaissance of an area, zone, or route. The appearance of this appendix suggests that the mission of LRSU in 1995 had already or would soon expand to encompass more ground movement, which entailed greater risk of compromise.

Contingency Operations

This is a difficult area to discuss simply because while everyone in the LRS community knows that LRSU have been deployed in contingency operations in the decade between the end of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 and the launching of the Global War on Terrorism in September 2001, the exact nature of LRSU missions has been kept well hidden from public disclosure or discussion. There have been, however, limited references to LRSU deployments and activities in official Army publications in both print and Internet formats.

In August 1996, soldiers of E-51st Infantry (LRS), V Corps conducted a three-week joint military exercise, *Operation Whetstone*, with Hungarian army airborne soldiers.¹⁰⁵ This exercise, designed to assist LRS soldiers in maintaining their airborne skills, culminated with a jump from CH-47D helicopters. The E Company soldiers deployed to the exercise from Steel Castle Base Camp, Tuzla, Bosnia, where they were operating in support of 1st Armored Division in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

A guarded glimpse of this unit's activities in Bosnia comes from a soldier who participated in these operations for several months in 1997-98.¹⁰⁶ A surveillance platoon (six teams) plus command and control elements of the company deployed from its Germany base to Bosnia. Their mission was covert surveillance of specific point targets, assigned by the division commander through his G2. The teams used light wheeled vehicles for insertions and extractions, with helicopters available for emergencies. Satellite communications (SATCOM) were the primary means of communication and long-wave radio was the backup. Teams were inserted with a basic load of ammunition, sleep and camouflage gear, special surveillance equipment, and several days' supply of food and water. Mission duration was generally from three to five days. This source estimates that 80 percent of missions were accomplished without compromise.

While a portion of E Company's soldiers were in Bosnia, others back in Germany upheld a long-standing LRRP/LRS tradition and went parachute jumping with a foreign army. In September 1998, a group of soldiers from E Company took part in three days of parachute jumps at Wiesbaden Air Base, west of Frankfurt, with soldiers from France and Belgium.¹⁰⁷ The

French soldiers belonged to the 13th Parachute Regiment and the Belgians to their army's LRRP detachment. The unit had plans, according to the article, to travel to France, Belgium, and Italy for a series of similar events. More germane to this discussion, however, is the article's statement that over half of the company was deployed to Bosnia at the time of this jump (September 1998).

About 20 months later, in May 2000, elements of E Company deployed to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo to support Task Force *Falcon* (the US force component of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, the NATO presence in Kosovo or KFOR).¹⁰⁸ The mission of E Company surveillance teams was to "provide data to the TF by conducting reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations."¹⁰⁹ Over a period of six months, nine teams conducted more than 21 LRS operations, consisting of 48 team missions. Specific missions conducted by this unit include: surveillance of a suspected cache location and surveillance of indirect fire weapons being used inside the ground security zone (GSZ). Other indications of the unit's mission in Kosovo come from this statement by Brigadier General Dennis Hardy, the former commander of TF *Falcon*:

The LRS detected and . . . documented a wide variety of real-time, subversive activities, including actual cross-border, guerrilla-type offensive operations, weapons and small unit training exercises, illegal smuggling and weapons caches.¹¹⁰

Clearly LRSU have an important mission to perform in the COE.

Materiel Issues

Materiel issues in the post-Vietnam LRSU era tend to fall into neat piles. The dearth of assigned vehicles to provide mobility to LRSU for both administrative and tactical needs is a long-standing problem that has already been mentioned. Recent experience in Southwest Asia has reinforced the need for additional vehicle support to LRSU, and apparently help is on the way. As long ago as Operation DESERT STORM, tactical commanders sought ways to provide LRSU wheeled tactical mobility for insertions and for reconnaissance in zone. That concept remains viable in many minds, particularly in the desert and mountain environment of Southwest Asia where LRSU are currently operating.¹¹¹

A second discernible materiel issue is the development and procurement of ever-more-sophisticated surveillance and communications equipment. These two types of gear, once separate, have now literally merged with

the appearance of digital observation devices (still and video) that can be linked to satellite communications devices to transmit continuous, live-feed pictures during or immediately following surveillance. LRSU has the challenge, when using these devices, of accommodating for their weight and volume and of considering their electronic signatures when planning whether to purchase and use them.

A third materiel issue that has serious doctrinal implications is weaponry. For almost 20 years, conventional LRS surveillance teams have been equipped with standard small arms intended only for self-defense use. Squad automatic weapons and light machine guns in the TOE of LRSU have been assigned to headquarters elements and base radio stations for their static defense.¹¹² A latent tendency has always existed in LRRP and LRS circles to desire a more powerful array of weapons for patrols and surveillance teams, whether they be pump-action or semi-automatic shot-guns, silenced pistols and submachine guns, belt-fed light machine guns, grenade launchers, or sniper rifles.¹¹³ All of these and more were commonly carried and used by LRRP patrols in combat in the past. That wheel is coming around again, as evidenced by discussions at the 2004 LRS Conference. The RSLC staff at Fort Benning has committed to support TOE changes that will authorize a light machine gun (SAW) in the surveillance team and medium and heavy machine guns at the company.

The RSLC staff is also proposing that sniper team(s) be added to LRS units, another idea whose time has come, again.¹¹⁴ As this study was being prepared, elements of the 42d Infantry Division were deploying to Iraq to support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).¹¹⁵ Among the deploying units is the 173d Infantry Detachment (LRS) of the Rhode Island Army National Guard. In preparation for this mission, selected members of the unit attended the four-week National Guard Sniper School at Camp Robinson, Arkansas. Upon completing this training, the unit was issued an undisclosed number of M-21 sniper systems.¹¹⁶ The mission of the LRSD during this deployment, as described by its commander, will be “to observe areas for improvised explosive devices and indirect fire activity and, if ordered by the combatant commander, eliminate insurgents with their sniper rifles.”

Doctrine Redux

As of this writing, the US Army Infantry School is in the middle of preparing a new doctrinal field manual (FM 3-55.93) for LRSU. The new manual was released in a preliminary draft version for comments in November 2003 and is scheduled for camera-ready copy to be submitted for

publication in December 2005. FM 3-55.93 does not contain revolutionary new doctrine for LRSU, but rather evolutionary changes to current doctrine.

These changes fall into two general areas: expansion and elaboration of current LRSU mission descriptions and increased content pertaining to the survivability issues of exfiltration, evasion, and recovery. The standard LRSU missions of surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and damage assessment remain as the basic mission-essential task list (METL) tasks.¹¹⁷ Special missions, for which LRSUs can be used by virtue of their specialized training, still include combat search and rescue (CSAR), pathfinders, NBC reporting, special escort, sensor emplacement, terrain and weather reporting, and stability and support tasks.¹¹⁸

An example of this new manual's expanded level of detail is the section titled "Combat Assessment," a mission traditionally called damage assessment.¹¹⁹ Whereas both the 1987 and 1995 versions of FM 7-93 describe this mission in single sentences, the 2003 FM 3-55.93 uses almost 14 pages.¹²⁰ The bulk of this expanded text explains to the LRS soldier the assessment criteria for specific objects: bridges, buildings, bunkers, dams and locks, distillation towers, military equipment, ground-force personnel, fuel-storage tanks, powerplant facilities, railroad facilities, roads, airfield facilities, satellite dishes, sea vessels, steel towers, transformers, and tunnel fixtures (entrances and air vents).

Not surprisingly, given the contingency experience of LRSU in the Balkans in the 1990s and subsequent deployments in Southwest Asia, FM 3-55.93 contains a substantial new section on the use of LRS teams in the urban environment.¹²¹ Surveillance remains the primary mission for LRS soldiers in urban terrain, followed by reconnaissance. "Operations Other Than War" was a standalone chapter of two pages in 1995. In 2003 it is a section retitled "Stability and Support" and contains 18 pages of text.¹²² This section has the added task "arms control," with specific reference to reconnaissance and surveillance of places where weapons of mass destruction could be stored.¹²³

Chapter 6, "Communications," is an enlarged (from 19 to 26 pages) and technically updated version of Appendix D from the 1995 field manual. The goal of LRSU communications remains to ensure secure transmission of near-real time information over both digital and analog systems. Chapter 7, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield," brings material forward from Appendix G of the 1995 manual.

Chapter 8, "Evasion and Recovery," is a nine-page chapter of material

pulled up and revised from Appendix F of the previous manual.¹²⁴ This chapter defines terms, identifies the evasion-recovery chain of command, and discusses basic principles of evasion. It is buttressed with a four-page Appendix M (“Evasion and Recovery”), which contains a sample evasion plan. The increased emphasis on this subject in the new draft field manual addresses a primary concern of all high-level commanders who approve LRSU missions—the safe return of LRSU soldiers from a mission. It clearly is an attempt by the LRS community to reassure high-level commanders—we have knowledge, we have a plan, and we will return.

Table 2

Page Count	1995	Page Count	2003
2	Personnel Recruitment and Selection (A)	3	Personnel Recruitment and Selection (A)
22 12	Orders (H) Briefback and Debriefing Formats (I)	48	Orders and Briefs (B)
		6	Mission Folder (C)
		4	Isolation Area Procedures (D)
5	Geographic Environments (C)	4	Geographic Environments (E)
		3	Contingencies (F)
		6	Coordination for Army Aviation (G)
13	Hide and Surveillance Sites (E)	6	Hide and Surveillance Sites (H)
12	Movement Techniques and Battle Drills (J)	7	Battle Drills (I)
		7	Reports (J)
16	Tracking and Counter-Tracking, Evasion and Escape, and Survival	8 6	Tracking and Counter-Tracking (K) Evasion and Recovery (M)
9	Night Operations (K)	10	Night Operations (L)
		7	Fieldcraft (Z)
5	Long-Range Surveillance and Reconnaissance (B)	8*	Material moved to Chapter 4
19	Communications (D)	26	Material moved to Chapter 6
10	Intelligence (G)	10	Material moved to Chapter 7

*Page count will increase when illustrations are inserted.

Table 2 compares the appendices for the 1995 and 2003 versions of the LRSU field manual. While the overall size (page count) of the appendices of both manuals is the same (125 pages), note that subjects covered in Appendices B, D, and G in 1995 have been moved into the body of the 2003 draft manual, and replaced by new or enlarged appendices. It is understood, of course, that page count provides only a quantitative, and not a qualitative, measure of the expansion of LRS doctrine. If page counts mean anything at all, the doctrine for the employment of LRSU continues to expand as the capability of these units is tested in the COE.

From the Cold War to the COE

Having been consigned to the dustbin of history at the end of the Vietnam War, LRRP units re-emerged during the mid-1980s with a new name (long-range surveillance units) but still with the traditional primary missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. The doctrinal focus of these new units was decidedly HUMINT collection on a Cold War linear battlefield. Organizationally, the LRSU looked much like their forebears, although no longer encumbered with motor pools and mess halls. LRSU have had access to a much broader array of communications and surveillance gear than their predecessors, while their weapons have largely remained conventional. Training looks similar as well, with a solid institutional foundation provided by the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course at Fort Benning.

LRSU trained in Operation DESERT SHIELD and fought in Operation DESERT STORM with success in some missions to be sure, but also with frustration at the low frequency and brief duration of doctrinal missions. This was followed in rapid order by the inactivation of most division LRSDs and also of three active-component LRSCs, resulting from both the drawdown of the Army and the shifting of two corps-level LRSC missions into the reserve components. Small parcels of LRSU soldiers from various commands shuttled in and out of the Balkans during the 1990s, doing their work quietly and, by the few accounts available, effectively. Doctrine written in 1987 was revised in 1995 and is currently in revision again. Left in the active component on the eve of the GWOT were two LRSC (V Corps in Germany and XVIII Corps at Fort Bragg) and five LRSD (2d, and 25th Infantry, 10th Mountain, 82d Airborne, and 101st Airborne [Air Assault] Divisions). These units, minus the 101st Airborne detachment that was inactivated in 2004, soldier on in relative obscurity, seeking missions where they can find them and hoping to survive the on-going reorganization of the Army.

Notes

1. Company O was reactivated at Fort Richardson, Alaska largely to serve as a QRF to protect the recently discovered oil reserves and subsequently constructed facilities in Alaska. See Stanton, 255-61.
2. *Organization, Missions, and Command and Control of Special Forces and Ranger Units in the 1980s* (Unclassified) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1979). Lieutenant General Meyer's tasking letter is Appendix A of the study.
3. *Ibid.*, 104-5.
4. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-42, *US Army Operational Concept for Long-Range Surveillance Units* (Fort Monroe: VA, 26 October 1984), 3-4.
5. *Ibid.*, 16; and Field Circular (FC) 7-93, *Long Range Surveillance Unit Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1985), vi.
6. This date is from Lanning, *Inside the LRRPS*, 185. This assignment of the LRSU to the MI battalion was first suggested 20 years earlier by Major Ellis D. Bingham, veteran communications officer of the VII Corps LRRP Company in 1961-62 (mentioned in Chapter 3).
7. See Major David P. Anders, "Long-Range Surveillance Unit Application in Joint Vision 2010," MMAS Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 9.
8. *Ibid.* I was unsuccessful in finding and reviewing a copy of this agreement, signed by Major General Michael F. Spigelmire for the USAIS.
9. US Army Field Manual (FM) 7-93, *Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 9 June 1987), paragraph 1-2 on pages 1-1 and 1-2.
10. FM 7-93, paragraph 1-3.b.(2) on page 1-3.
11. In the Vietnam era, only the two Field Force LRP companies (E-20th and F-51st) and the 173d Airborne Brigade LRRP Detachment and their Ranger-designated successor units were maintained on jump status (in addition to the Ranger companies back in the United States).
12. FM 31-18, 1968, paragraph 3-7 on page 15; FM 7-93, paragraph 1-7.d on page 1-7.
13. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-2 on pages 2-1 through 2-3.
14. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-3 on page 2-4.
15. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-2.a on page 2-2. I used the word "example" because the source text indicates that it identifies "some" of the targets.
16. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-8 on page 2-15.

17. FM 7-93, paragraph 3-5.b., c., and d., on pages 3-18 to 3-20.

18. FM 7-93, paragraph 4-12.d. on page 4-8.

19. The staff study was initiated by Captain Russell A. Grimm, son of Colonel Philip D. Grimm, commander of the first VII Corps provisional LRRP company in early 1960. See DA Form 2496, Subject: Division Reconnaissance Detachment, dated 9 July 1981, with accompanying notes, Grimm collection. Captain Grimm had just moved up to the division staff from the 2d Battalion, 75th Rangers. In developing this proposal, he consulted with his then-retired father and several ex-LRRP members of the 2-75 Rangers who had served in B Company (Ranger) at Fort Carson. E-mail, Russell A. Grimm to author, 8 August 2005.

20. The division G3 at this time was Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. Shelton, future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shelton, who had special forces combat experience in Vietnam, in his nonconcurrence acknowledged the need for HUMINT collection, but believed the long-range reconnaissance mission belonged to the Ranger battalions, one of which was stationed at Fort Lewis. He also cautioned against stripping well-motivated soldiers from conventional units.

21. Captain Grimm's Officer Efficiency Report that closed out on 31 October 1981 confirms, in both the rater's and senior rater's narratives, the formation of the division reconnaissance detachment during the period covered by the report; Grimm collection.

22. Headquarters, 2d Battalion (Ranger) 75th Infantry, Subject: Tips of the Trade/Lessons Learned, dated 5 April 1979, Grimm collection. The information contained in this document was, in essence, TTP developed by LRRP/Ranger companies in combat in Vietnam. The quoted passage appears on the cover page.

23. Recall that the last Vietnam Ranger company (H Company, 1st Air Cavalry Division) was inactivated in August 1972.

24. This discussion of the 82d Airborne Division's provisional reconnaissance platoon is based on author interviews with General (Retired) James J. Lindsay, 25 January 2005, at Fort Leavenworth, KS; by e-mail with Major General Richard J. Quirk, III, 19 March 2005; by telephone with Colonel (Retired) Thomas O'Connell, 20 April 2005; by telephone with Colonel James A. Davis, 21 April 2005, and on several documents provided by Colonel Davis that will be cited as the "Davis collection." General Lindsay commanded the division from 6 February 1981 to 24 June 1983, Colonel O'Connell was the commander of 313th MI Battalion, General Quirk was his battalion S3, and Colonel Davis was the initial platoon leader of this reconnaissance platoon, assigned to it on 1 June 1983.

25. Letter, subject line: Airborne Division Reconnaissance Platoon, Major General James J. Lindsay, 21 June 1983. The quoted passage is from page 1 of an 8-page inclosure to the letter that describes the manning and equipping of this unit. At the time, the division's organic "eyes" were its AN/PPS-5 ground-surveillance radars (GSR), with a maximum detection range of six kilometers for personnel and 10 kilometers for moving vehicles.

26. General Lindsay's experience with cavalry units "evidently convinced him that non-intelligence units had been too quick to misuse these kinds of units. . . . He believed that assignment to an MI unit would provide the highest assurance that the unit would engage in intelligence collection" (Quirk interview). General Lindsay had served as both an infantry battalion commander and the division G3 in the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam.

27. Letter, subject: 82d Airborne Division Reconnaissance Platoon Goals for FY 84, First Lieutenant John A. Davis, 1 September 1983, pages 6-7, Davis collection.

28. DA Form 2496, subject: Request for Authorization of "Expert LRRP Patch," with attachments, First Lieutenant John A. Davis, 20 January 1984. An additional DA Form 2496 among the inclosures, dated 6 February 1984, indicates awarding of this patch to 13 individuals out of 26 tested, Davis collection.

29. Letter, subject: Lessons Learned—Operation URGENT FURY, First Lieutenant John A. Davis, 06 January 1984, Davis collection.

30. This statement is based on Ronald Matty, "Memorandum from the Office of Infantry Propriety, United States Army Infantry School, to Major General Carl Ernst, Commandant, United States Army Infantry School, November 1997," cited in Major David P. Anders, "Long-Range Surveillance Unit Application in Joint Vision 2010," MMAS Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 11. The actual date of activation or inactivation of each LRSD was a function of when the TOE for this unit was authorized to or withdrawn from the parent MI battalion. This information, while available in the files at the Center for Military History, was not accessed for this study.

31. E Company (LRP), 51st Infantry was activated in Vietnam in December 1968 as the LRP company for the 23d (Americus) Infantry Division. Soldiers currently assigned to E Company (LRS) in V Corps trace their lineage to that earlier unit, and honor a Medal of Honor recipient of the follow-on G Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry. The Pruden Competition is a tactical field-skills competition for the unit's soldiers. It is named after Staff Sergeant Robert J. Pruden, who was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his actions on 29 November 1969 while assigned to G Company. Pruden is buried at Fort Snelling National Cemetery in Minnesota; Pruden Hall, which houses the Ranger Hall of Fame at Fort Benning, was named in his honor.

32. Survey completed by Master Sergeant (Retired) Mark S. Elliot, a member of this unit from 1986-89, survey received 25 January 2005.

33. Captain Stephen Powell and Captain William Soderberg, "Eyes Behind the Lines," *Military Intelligence* 14 (July 1988): 44-5.

34. Major Thomas M. Jordan, "Improving the Division LRSU," *Infantry* (January-February 1990): 11-2. Major Jordan commanded the 3d Infantry Division's LRSD for almost 30 months during this period.

35. Jordan, "Improving the Division LRSU," 12.

36. The Army did authorize an executive officer, operations sergeant, supply sergeant, and armorer in subsequent LRSD TOEs, but did not enlarge the detachment to eight surveillance teams or upgrade the rank of the detachment sergeant. See TOE 07209C000, Long-Range Surveillance Detachment, 21 January 1993, at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/toe/07209L000.htm; last accessed on 31 January 2005.

37. One of the roots of this problem was the necessary training and designation of large numbers of infantry soldiers to serve as drivers, track commanders, and gunners on Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. These soldiers carried the MOS identifier 11M.

38. Lieutenant Colonel John Schatzel, former commander of the LRSU of 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley before Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, stated that while he was able to acquire NCOs from the two mechanized infantry battalions at Fort Riley, almost all of his soldiers came directly from the replacement stream. Their initial selection was made on the basis of physical appearance, records screening, and volunteerism. Schatzel interview, 18 January 2005. General Lindsay stated that during the mid-1990s every infantry soldier assigned to Fort Hood, Texas was viewed as a potential LRS soldier. Lindsay interview, 25 January 2005. See Major Thomas M. Jordan, "Improving the Division LRSU," *Infantry* (January-February 1990): 12. In his 30 months as commander of the LRSD of 3d Infantry Division, Jordan had to recruit for 11B positions among both soldiers and NCOs who lacked adequate light infantry experience.

39. Jordan, "Improving the Division LRSU," 12. Captain John A. Schatzel, "RSD: Adapt, Improvise, and Overcome," *Infantry* (January-February 1993): 38-41, 38. The Army also made this change later in the TOE.

40. 110th MI Battalion, Memorandum, Subject: LRSD Manning and Support, dated 29 April 1991, Grimm collection.

41. Long Range Surveillance Detachment (Airborne), 110th MI Battalion, Memorandum, Subject: Manning the LRSD, dated 5 September 1990, Grimm collection.

42. Long Range Surveillance Detachment, Memorandum, Subject: Strengths/Weaknesses in the LRSD, undated, Grimm collection.

43. Jordan, "Improving the Division LRSU," 12.

44. After 1st Infantry Division LRS teams were extracted from their OPs on the border berm, they were transported in the advancing division logistic column in a borrowed five-ton dump truck. Schatzel interview.

45. This description of the genesis of the Long Range Surveillance Unit Leader Course is from an e-mail exchange with a participant, Arthur A. Durante, 26 January 2005. In 1985 Mr. Durante worked in the S3 section of the Ranger Department at Fort Benning.

46. An excellent description of this early course is in William Lyde, Jr.,

“LRSU Course,” *Infantry* (November-December 1986): 37-8. Five active-component and five reserve-component courses were scheduled for FY 1987.

47. Major Curtis L. Devan, “The HUMINT Connection: LRSD and the Heavy Division,” *Military Intelligence* 13 (October 1987): 43-4, 43. MI branch’s primary concern was that LRS soldiers be able to identify equipment and systems that analysts considered to be high-value targets (HVT).

48. This exercise sometimes was conducted in support of Joint Task Force *South* along the southwestern border to observe drug-smuggling operations. Durante e-mail.

49. Over a period of about 30 months, from November 1989 to mid-1992, not a single LRSU commander rotating through the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk was a Fort Benning LRSCLC (leaders course) graduate. During the same time period, about one-half of surveillance team leaders had attended training at Fort Benning. See Captain David A. McBride, “Selecting and Training Long Range Surveillance Unit Commanders,” *Infantry* (July-August 1992): 42-4, 43.

50. See the course Internet site at www-benning.army.mil/RTB/New_LRSC/default.htm; last accessed on 31 January 2005.

51. Schatzel interview, 18 January 2005. Also see Captain John A. Schatzel, “LRSD: Adapt, Improvise, and Overcome,” *Infantry* (January-February 1993): 38-41.

52. After achieving parachute qualification, the unit’s soldiers were permitted to conduct on-duty training parachute jumps from military aircraft, but were not officially on jump status and did not receive the commensurate jump pay.

53. The event was named in honor of Specialist 4th Class Robert D. Law, a posthumous Medal of Honor recipient from the 1st Infantry Division’s I Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry during the Vietnam War. Specialist 4th Class Law threw himself on an enemy grenade during a firefight and was killed on 22 February 1969. He is buried in Mount Olive Cemetery, Fort Worth, Texas.

54. Captain Christopher Paul McPadden, “LRS Unit METL Training: The JTF-6 Solution,” *Military Intelligence* (January-March 1993): 29-30. McPadden commanded the 1st Infantry Division LRSD after Operation DESERT STORM.

55. Survey, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Hyneman, 15 November 2004. Hyneman commanded the LRSD of 6th Infantry Division (C/106th MI Battalion) for 12 months as a captain.

56. Memorandum, 107th MI Battalion, Subject: Command and Control of the 7ID(L)’s Long Range Surveillance Detachment, dated 6 June 1991, Grimm collection.

57. Telephone interview, Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn, 24 January 2005.

58. Survey, Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn, received 11 February

2005. The Oregon activity would have been under the auspices of Operation GHOST DANCER, a joint federal law enforcement agency and state National Guard activity to eradicate drug crops cultivated on federal land.

59. Exercise reports from the combat training centers (CTC) are prepared in two copies—one that is kept on file at the CTC for historical reference by the observer/controllers (OCs) to monitor trends, and the other that is provided to the unit commander. Only the training unit commander can release the exercise report for his unit.

60. Telephone interview with LTC (Retired) Thomas P. Odom, military analyst in the JRTC CALL Cell at Fort Polk, 15 March 2005.

61. An example of the latter is attendance at a special-operations course conducted by the 23d Regiment of the British SAS. Master Sergeant Mark Elliot survey, 25 January 2005.

62. XVIII Corps did not have an organic LRSC at this time and received the LRSD from 522d Military Intelligence Battalion, 2d Armored Division (which was in the process of deactivating) on 26 September 1990. This unit was attached to 525th Military Intelligence Brigade for the duration of the operation.

63. Charles Lane Toomey, *XVIII Airborne Corps in DESERT STORM: From Planning to Victory* (Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press, 2004), 292.

64. This description is from two sources: a postwar oral interview conducted by LTC Richard J. Quirk, III, who was the division G2 before and during the operation described; and a study Colonel Quirk later wrote when he was a student at the US Army War College: *Intelligence for the Division—A G2 Perspective* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 27 April 1992). This document contains many references to the 24th Infantry Division's LRSU performance during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

65. Quirk describes the run up-to-war period in *Intelligence for the Division*, 116-9.

66. Ibid., 116, 201.

67. Ibid., 116, 216-7.

68. Ibid., 118, 202.

69. Ibid., 119, 202.

70. Ibid., 151.

71. Ibid., Quirk describes this process in detail on pages 218-22.

72. Ibid., 219.

73. Ibid., Quirk describes this process in detail on pages 220-1.

74. In prior assignments, General Scott had commanded a Ranger battalion and the Special Operations Command in Europe.

75. In his postwar interview, LTC Quirk mentioned an EF-111, “Radar Jammer Birds,” and Wild Weasels (F4G Phantom), along with an Army “quick fix helicopter” (EH-60A Blackhawk) for jamming and intelligence capability while inserting the LRS teams, page 49. See also Quirk, *Intelligence for the Division*, 290.

76. This time approximation is the author’s estimate based upon secondary accounts of when each position was secured by friendly forces. These times are shown in Toomey, 352-5. Quirk, in *Intelligence for the Division*, 290, uses the more general expression “for two to four days.”

77. Toomey, 294.

78. This account of the corps LRSD’s training and mission is in Toomey, 294-5.

79. A brief description of this mission is in Toomey, 298-9.

80. The author conducted three interviews to inform this discussion of VII Corps LRS use: Brigadier General (Retired) Stanley F. Cherrie (formerly the corps G3) on 17 January 2005; Colonel (Retired) Gary E. Phillips (formerly the S3 of 207th MI Brigade) on 20 January 2005, and Major (Retired) Kendall D. Gott (formerly the 2d ACR Assistant S2) on 20 January 2005.

81. During this training in building a desert hide, the soldiers discovered that camels could smell water, even if it was in containers stacked in the hide-position. This further increased the danger of compromise by herdsmen. Phillips interview.

82. In the sector of 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment on the corps left flank, this insertion date was 26 January. See Kendall D. Gott, *In Glory’s Shadow: In Service With the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment During the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991* (Leavenworth, KS: by the author, 1997), 107. (A copy of this document is available from the special collections section of the Combined Arms Research Library [CARL] at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.)

83. The location and actions of this combat command are described in Stephen A. Bourque, *Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2002), 149-53. This description of the actions of the LRS detachment is based on an oral interview conducted with its former commander, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Schatzel, on 18 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

84. This date is from Gott, *In Glory’s Shadow*, 100.

85. This staff officer was then-Captain Kendall Gott, with whom the author conducted an oral interview on 20 January 2005.

86. Gott, *In Glory’s Shadow*, 128.

87. Ibid., 133.

88. Interview (telephone) with Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn, 24

January 2005. SGM Chunn was command sergeant major of the 109th MI Battalion at the time and then command sergeant major of the 14th MI Battalion.

89. I cannot confirm, but suspect that the III Corps LRS Company was built from the remnants of inactivating LRS detachments from other Fort Hood units, such as 1st Cavalry Division and 2d Armored Division.

90. As of this writing, the I Corps mission is assigned to F Company, 425th Infantry (LRS) of the Michigan Army National Guard and the III Corps mission is assigned to H Company, 121st Infantry (LRS) of the Georgia Army National Guard.

91. FM 7-93, *Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 3 October 1995).

92. Here are some sample recommendations culled from Operation DESERT STORM after-action review comments: “The LRSD should either be removed from the division TO&E or be placed as a subordinate unit with the divisional cavalry squadron.” “Consider elimination of LRSU in heavy divisions. Retain LRSU in light, airmobile, and airborne divisions. . . . If the decision is made to retain LRSU in the heavy division, . . . move LRSU from the CEWI battalion to the cavalry squadron.” “The LRSD should either be removed from the division TO&E or be placed as a subordinate unit of the divisional cavalry squadron. . . . there is a serious question as to whether this element is really needed at division level.” “Look at removing from Div MI Bn, place Corps LRSD with Regimental Cav organizations.” “LRSDs at the Corps level need to be under the control of the Corps cavalry regiment.” CALL Restricted Archives, Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, various sub-files made available to author under subject heading “Long Range Surveillance Units in Desert Shield/Storm,” 18 January 2005.

93. FM 7-93, paragraphs 1-2.b and Chapter 1, Section II.

94. FM 7-93, paragraph 1-6.

95. FM 7-93, paragraph 1-7.

96. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-1.

97. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-2.a. These items are at the end of a list of 14 possible targets.

98. The LRSD of 1st Infantry Division participated in counter-drug missions with Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) in 1992. See McPadden, “LRS Unit METL Training: The JTF-6 Solution,” 29-30. Similarly, the LRSC of I Corps supported federal law-enforcement agencies in drug-enforcement activities in California and Oregon during the same time period. Chunn interview, 25 January 2005.

99. FM 7-93, paragraphs 2-2.a.(1) and (2).

100. *Ibid*, paragraphs 2-3.a through f.

101. This conclusion is based on anecdotal evidence. One can find occasional references in print and on the Internet to deployment of teams from E-51st Infantry

(LRS) (the V Corps LRSC) to the Balkans, but these references do not clearly indicate the actual mission performed. When I have interviewed participants, they did not disclose specific LRS activities, citing classification issues.

102. The statement of “actions to take in the case of captured enemy personnel and equipment” may reflect the experience of one XVIII Corps LRS team in Operation DESERT STORM, which took control of five deserting Iraqi soldiers and was recovered along with its prisoners. But the mission to capture EPW and their equipment was commonly assigned to LRRP teams in Vietnam.

103. FM 7-93, paragraph 5-3.

104. SPIES is an acronym for “special patrol infiltration/exfiltration system.” This emergency-extraction system includes a purpose-built harness for the soldier and equipment to anchor a single long rappelling rope into the floor of a helicopter. One rope with multiple hook-up points is dropped from the helicopter to a team properly positioned on the ground. Each soldier hooks up to a primary and alternate hook-up point. When all team members are hooked to the rope, the signal is given to the SPIES master in the helicopter who instructs the pilot to ascend. When the lowest soldier on the rope is at a safe altitude, the helicopter transitions to horizontal flight. Use of this system is fully explained in Training Circular 21-24, *Rappelling*, 24 September 1991 and subsequent editions.

105. Sergeant Andrew Aquino, “Airborne Soldiers Drop into Hungary,” *The Talon* 2, no. 35 (13 September 1996): 6.

106. Survey A, received on 4 January 2005.

107. “Partnership Jump,” V Corps PAO at www.army.mil/soldiers/sep1998/news/news07.html; last accessed 19 January 2005.

108. The unit’s participation in this operation is discussed in some detail in Major Robert L. Chamberlain and First Sergeant Ralph Kluna, “Long-Range Surveillance Operations in Kosovo—Complementing Existing Capabilities,” *Military Intelligence* 27 (January-February 2001): 47-52.

109. Ibid., 48-9.

110. Ibid., 52.

111. The mobility issue was discussed at a recent LRS Symposium at Fort Benning. The RSLC staff is working with the Infantry Center on proposed TOE changes that will result in light-medium tactical vehicles (LMTV) and ground mobility vehicles (GMV) at the unit level and all-terrain vehicles (ATV) at the team level. See “Commander’s Corner” at the LRSC Internet website: www-benning.army.mil/RTB/New_LRSC/Commander%20Corner.htm, last accessed on 31 January 2005.

112. The earliest TOE for LRRP companies in Europe made provision for Browning M2 heavy-barreled machine guns in the company HQ and base radio stations and one M79 grenade launcher in the company HQ. See TOE 7-157E,

“Infantry Long Range Patrol Company” 28 September 1964.

113. This tendency was amply discussed in the Vietnam section of this study. In the current era, it publicly surfaced as long ago as 1990. See Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” 12. There, Jordan recommends “a silenced weapon for each team.”

114. See “Commander’s Corner” at the RSLC Internet website: www-benning.army.mil/RTB/New_LRSC/Commander%20Corner.htm; last accessed on 31 January 2005. The use of sniper teams and weapons with LRRP units in Vietnam is well documented and has been discussed earlier in this study.

115. Staff Sergeant Raymond Drumsta, “Rainbow Division Trains Intelligence-Snipers,” Army News Service. This article can be viewed at www.42id.army.mil/newsstory/marksman_story.htm; last accessed on 19 January 2005.

116. Ibid. While the text of this article repeatedly uses the descriptor M14 for the sniper rifle, the accompanying photograph shows an M21 sniper rifle minus scope being fired from a bipod at a Fort Drum, New York training range. The M21 sniper system, based on the M14 semi-automatic rifle, was used by the US Army from 1969 to 1988, when it was replaced by the bolt-action M24 sniper system.

117. FM 3-55.93 (Preliminary Draft), *Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations* (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, November 2003), paragraph 1-5.a.

118. Ibid., paragraph 1-5.b. There is no further elaboration in the new field manual about the special escort and sensor emplacement tasks.

119. Ibid., Section IV of Chapter 4.

120. “The LRS team members are trained and equipped to conduct tactical damage assessment,” FM 7-93, 1987, paragraph 2-3.d. on page 2-4; FM 7-93, 1995, paragraph 2-3.d. FM 3-55.93, Section IV, pages 4-25 through 39.

121. FM 3-55.93, Section VI of Chapter 4, pages 4-41 through 48.

122. FM 7-93, 1995, Chapter 5, “LRS in Operations Other Than War.” FM 3-55.93, Chapter 4, Section VII. “Stability and Support,” pages 4-48 through 67.

123. FM 3-55.93, paragraph 4-48.b.

124. FM 7-93, 1995, Appendix F, “Tracking and Countertracking, Evasion and Escape, and Survival,” paragraph F-2.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

This study has examined US Army long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) doctrine and experience in three periods and environments: USA-REUR from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, Vietnam during the period of 1966-72, and the post-Vietnam era from approximately 1984 to the eve of the Global War on Terrorism in September 2001.¹ The paradigm around which the study was conducted—DOTMLP—will also serve as a road-map for this concluding analysis.

Doctrine

LRRP doctrine in the periods studied has been reflected in a series of field manuals published in 1962, 1965, 1968, 1987, and 1995, with another revision due for publication in late 2005. The published doctrine has remained remarkably stable, despite its expansion from a 26-page field manual in 1962 to more than 225 pages in the current (1995) field manual. The bulk of this expansion has been devoted to elaborating on the TTP LRRP units have developed over time to perform their missions and survive on an increasingly lethal battlefield.

The mission list of LRRP units has been less stable, reflecting the tendency of local commanders to employ their assets as required by each unit's mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). During the USAREUR period, from 1961 and lasting just under a decade, LRRP companies and detachments in 3d Infantry Division, SETAF, V Corps, and VII Corps were primarily focused on deep surveillance and target-acquisition tasks on a linear battlefield. If "mission creep" occurred in USAREUR, that label may apply to the VII Corps LRRP company's brief mission to monitor the Czech border, the mission to deliver atomic demolition munitions assigned to both V and VII Corps LRRP companies, and perhaps the V Corps LRRP company's mission to act as aggressor troops in large exercises. The European experience was particularly important in establishing communications procedures and structures that remain a vital component and strength of current LRRP operations.

In the Vietnam War, the mission list of LRRP units was expanded greatly. The phrase "mission creep" does not do justice to the gross enlargement of LRRP missions that occurred during the course of the war. LRRP units and soldiers were subject to a broad spectrum of doctrinal and non-doctrinal uses, from the traditional reconnaissance and surveillance tasks of an intelligence

nature to mundane security activities in and around base camps, along with myriad other tasks normally assigned to standard infantry units. LRRP soldiers also performed combat search and rescue (CSAR), sensor planting and servicing, missions to confirm sensor-derived intelligence, POW-camp raids (or training for such raids), damage assessment after B-52 Operation ARC LIGHT missions, and raids to destroy active radio transmitters, to name just a few. Over time, the mission emphasis of LRRP operations in many units shifted from intelligence gathering to offensive combat operations. This increasingly became the case after units were Ranger-designated in early 1969. Late in the war, heavy-team and even platoon-size missions were not unusual in some divisions, belying the intelligence-gathering roots of early LRRP doctrine.

Doctrine in the post-Vietnam era returned initially to the 1960s USA-REUR model—linear (deep) and intelligence-focused—but after Operation DESERT STORM broadened to encompass a variety of less-traditional missions. The testing grounds for these new missions were right here in the United States, in the forests and deserts of the West and Southwest where soldiers worked for federal counter-narcotics agencies, and in the Balkans where they supported peace-enforcement operations. In some ways, this expansion mirrors the broadening of LRRP employment doctrine that occurred in the Vietnam era, from rather narrow intelligence-focused missions in USAREUR in the 1960s to manifold intelligence and direct-action missions in Vietnam within the same decade. These alterations to LRS missions in the 1990s occurred in response to changing controlling-unit missions and, simply, to changes of controlling-unit commanders. Just as their Vietnam-era predecessors did 40 years ago, current LRSU commanders and soldiers are adapting and adjusting to an expanded mission list. If they are to remain viable as a force, future LRSU will have to continue to adapt and adjust to non-traditional and sometimes non-doctrinal missions.

Organization

LRRP unit organizations have changed remarkably little over the three examined periods. Remove the mechanics and cooks from a 1960s USA-REUR LRRP company and, minus the uniform changes, it looks much like a full-strength, 1968 LRP company in Vietnam or a LRS company at Fort Bragg in 1998. The foundation elements of the LRRP unit have always been, and remain, a small headquarters command-and-control element, a communications section or platoon, and two to four patrol platoons comprised of six to eight teams of generally six men each. If the LRSU of

the next generation receive the vehicles they seek for administrative and tactical mobility, their organizations will look more, not less like the USA-REUR LRRP companies of 40 years ago.

Training

The USAREUR LRRP companies, out of necessity, survived on their own internal training programs. Other than the airborne schools run by Fort Benning and the 8th Infantry Division in theater and communications classes taught by neighboring signal units, the V and VII Corps LRRP companies had to plan and execute most of their own training. They took this responsibility seriously, as illustrated by the training program established in the VII Corps company. Largely based on the USAREUR experience, LRRP doctrine in 1965 and still in 1968 was predicated on the premise that it took about eight months to produce a well-trained LRRP soldier.

The Vietnam-era LRRP units all developed unit training programs that were both modeled after and in support to the training provided by the MACV Recondo School. Because of constant personnel turnover, unit training in Vietnam was near continuous and focused on the tasks required to send soldiers on combat patrols as soon as possible. Many, but by far not all, LRRP soldiers in Vietnam were privileged to attend the MACV Recondo School. Whether a soldier went to Nha Trang or not, he was trained to a standard using a curriculum largely derived from the MACV Recondo School. It is doubtful any Vietnam LRRP soldier was ever afforded eight months of training before he was sent out to do battle with the enemy.

The modern equivalent of MACV Recondo School, but expanded and improved, is the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) at Fort Benning. The institution that operates this course, which was established in 1985 and now has a 20-year history of operations, is currently responsible for LRSU doctrine and leader training. It therefore is both repository and disseminator of all knowledge about LRRP activities in the modern era. This course is an important stabilizing force in the LRSU community; its entrance and graduation requirements serve to shape LRS unit training throughout the Army. Its importance to the development and propagation of LRS TTP cannot be overstated. LRSU in the future cannot exist without a CONUS training institution like the RSLC.

At least three LRSUs in the modern era (of the 1st, 7th, and 9th Infantry Divisions) used counter-narcotics operations with federal agencies as training opportunities. As long as the legal requirements of our Constitution are observed (they are addressed in current doctrine), this practice may

continue. In addition, there may be future training opportunities of a similar nature in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security. There does not appear to be much difference between the TTP for conducting surveillance on a forest road or trail in Kosovo and in Vermont, for that of a desert or mountainous border region in Iraq and in Texas, or for surveilling along the Iraqi/Syrian border and along an Arizonan or New Mexican border.

Materiel

The operative phrase in this realm is “technological advances.” LRRP soldiers of all three eras have been the users of much new technology, particularly in the areas of communications and surveillance devices. Where the LRRP soldier in Vietnam may have carried an Olympus Pen-EE half-frame, semi-automatic camera, with film needing several hours to develop and process, the current and future LRS soldier may be equipped with a digital still or video camera and the supporting communications equipment to feed live or near-live images to commanders and analysts in the rear. LRRP soldiers have never been in competition with technology, but rather have been complementary to technology. That will not change in the future.

The LRRP soldier’s worth independent of his equipment was never more evident than in Vietnam, where LRRP soldiers were sent out to deliver and service sensor devices, to confirm acquisitions made by “sniffer” helicopters, or to find an enemy radio transmitter identified and generally located through technical means. Current and future LRS soldiers will perform similar missions to confirm information acquired by these and other far more advanced technical means. The constant in this equation is that commanders will nearly always require confirmation by a soldier on the ground. There is no better soldier in our inventory to accomplish that confirming mission than a LRRP soldier.

The standard weaponry of LRRP units over the three eras has remained relatively static: M14s, then M16s and variants thereof, and M79s and their successor M203s in the patrols; heavy and light machine guns plus the 3.5-inch rocket launcher/M72 LAW/AT-4 at the base stations and company headquarters. When given the opportunity, Vietnam LRRP units expanded this list to include friendly and enemy weapons of every caliber, size, and shape, as much out of indiscipline as in response to mission requirements. That small-arms proliferation tendency does not appear to be evident in the current era. But just recently an effort has been announced to reintroduce light machine guns and sniper rifles to surveillance teams.

Young infantry soldiers, however well-disciplined and trained they are, will have a tendency to use these weapons if they are issued. The addition of such offensive weapons to surveillance teams suggests the mission pendulum might be moving back toward offensive combat.

The other materiel constant of LRRP organizations across three eras is a shortage of vehicles at the unit level for both administrative and tactical use. This became so acute in the Vietnam era that LRRP soldiers frequently resorted to “misappropriation” of other units’ equipment, something that would not be tolerated currently. The problem surfaced again in Operation DESERT STORM, where one LRS unit found itself riding in the back of a dump truck. Modern LRSUs are assigned to MI battalions that lack support platoons and therefore do not have excess vehicles to parcel out on a regular basis. No one is expecting LRSU to have their own helicopters, but certainly future force designers must give greater consideration to providing LRSU with adequate transportation in order to move both administratively and tactically.

Leadership

This study has examined the tactical role of leaders in LRRP units and identified core tasks that leaders have performed across the three eras of LRRP activity. These tasks fall into the general areas of receiving missions from controlling headquarters and issuing appropriate planning guidance to subordinate leaders, receiving brief backs from patrol and team leaders before mission execution, supervising the insertion and routine or emergency extraction of patrols, monitoring and often controlling the minute-by-minute actions of a patrol in contact, and receiving post-mission briefings from returning patrols. With the exception of Vietnam where a few platoon leaders and platoon sergeants went on or, in rare cases, led patrols, the practice was not common in USAREUR, nor is it standard today. The leader most responsible for mission accomplishment has always been and remains the patrol or team leader, a middle-grade NCO. The US Army has traditionally produced outstanding NCOs with excellent tactical skills and leadership ability, and will continue to do so.

Personnel

From the very beginning of LRRP in Italy and Germany, the two primary skill sets required of soldiers wanting to be LRRPs were infantry and communications. While there have long been low-density-MOS soldiers in LRRP units of all three eras (supply, maintenance, and medics, for example), infantry and communications soldiers have remained the building

blocks of LRRP units through Vietnam and into the modern era. These soldiers have almost always been volunteers, coming both from other units and out of the replacement stream. During the Vietnam War, unit recruiters and first sergeants frequently had the luxury of looking over a soldier's MOS if he met other qualifications and was a willing participant.

What kind of soldier made a good LRRP? In 1964, coming out of the USAREUR experience, Major Ellis D. Bingham said that success would depend, in part, "on personnel so effectively trained, physically qualified and mentally inured, that they possess the ultimate degree of self confidence."² Just four years later, in Vietnam in 1968, General Peers expressed similar requirements using expanded prose:

The psychological qualifications to be a member of a LRP are extremely difficult. You need somebody out there who has nerves of steel, who can stay in there along the side of a trail, can sit there and watch that trail with a large enemy formation going by and not have the slightest inclination to stand up and fire a rifle or even move. . . To do this, he has to be qualified mentally and physically.³

And in 1991, about a year after the conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM, the former G2 of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Quirk, said this about LRRP soldiers:

What you're looking for are feisty, young characters who are willing to take their life in their hands. What you train them to be is very mature, quiet, soft-spoken guys. It's a strange conversion that takes place when a man becomes a LRS surveillance soldier, a good one.⁴

These passages describe the essence of a LRRP soldier across all three generations of the organization's existence. To be sure, LRRP soldiers in the future will have to be as comfortable with digital devices as they have been with small arms in the past, given the advances of technology.

Future of LRSU

While the doctrine writers are currently working toward a final text of the new field manual, force developers are evaluating the need for LRSU and their place in the structure of the future force. The discussion about the utility of LRSU centers around three key issues: the increasing capability of alternate means (technical devices and systems) of reconnaissance and surveillance, high-level commanders' concern for the battlefield

survivability of LRSU, and the age-old problem of resources. In the case of LRSU, the resource problem is exacerbated by the long-standing split propensity between Infantry and Military Intelligence branches. The US Army Infantry School has been the proponent for LRSU doctrine since the revival of LRSU in 1985, but the personnel spaces for LRSU soldiers are found in MI battalions, whose doctrine and organizational structure are controlled by the US Army Military Intelligence Center and School.

Since their first fielding as provisional units in the mid-1950s and into the Vietnam era, LRRP units were employed to compensate for gaps not covered by technical means, to confirm information derived from technical means (for example, to find and destroy radio transmitters or confirm “sniffer” reports), or to deliver and service the technical means (as in the case of ground sensors). Used in this way, LRRP units were not competing with technology but rather complimenting it. The provisional LRRP platoon of the 82d Airborne Division that was fielded in 1983, a decade after Vietnam and two years before the advent of LRSU, was specifically created to cover a gap in technical reconnaissance and surveillance means identified by the division commander. In the ensuing two decades, LRSU soldiers routinely embraced emerging observation and communications technologies. In the same manner that these soldiers, no matter how well trained and physically fit, have never replaced technology, neither should technical means alone be viewed as the sole provider of timely and accurate battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance. This important principle was revalidated in recent military operations in Southwest Asia involving small ground-reconnaissance teams.⁵

Approximately seven years elapsed between the appearance of the first LRRP unit in Italy in 1957 and an approved TOE in 1964. The USAREUR-based capability remained on scene in Germany and in the United States until 1974. The second generation in its three permutations (LRRP/LRP/Ranger) was born in Vietnam in 1966 and died six years later in 1972. The current generation, LRSU, also required about seven years of gestation to birth, from 1978 to 1985; it has now matured to the ripe age of 20 years.

The authors of *On Point* correctly surmised that one of the key issues in LRSU employment, both in 1991 in Operation DESERT STORM and more recently in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, was the environment. This study has shown that all three generations of LRRP, whether in the highly urbanized broken terrain of central and southeast Europe, in the variegated terrain of southeast Asia, or in the forested and desert terrain of the continental western United States, have proven that small teams of men can

perform the deep reconnaissance and surveillance mission and survive. At this time, our Army's leaders do not know where future operations in the Global War on Terrorism will be conducted. It should not be assumed they will be in relatively unconcealed areas such as southwest Asia. If GWOT operations occur in any other theater where more concealment is available, LRSU will be an important combat multiplier. The LRS mission, however it evolves in doctrine to meet the requirements of the COE, is unlikely ever to go away. The Army must retain long-range surveillance units and soldiers to perform this critical mission.

Notes

1. To facilitate ease of discussion in this chapter, the terminology “long-range reconnaissance patrol” and the acronym “LRRP” will be used as a descriptor for all of the soldiers, units, and activities described by the acronyms LRRP, LRP, and LRS, and Rangers as applied to long-range patrol units in the Vietnam era.
2. Major Ellis D. Bingham, letter to Major Jean Burner, 6 October 1964; Bingham collection.
3. Lieutenant General William R. Peers, “Presentation of LTG Peers,” 7.
4. Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Quirk, III, draft transcript of oral interview conducted on 16 April 1991 with Major William H. Thomas, 317th Military History Detachment.
5. On 1 March 2002, in Operation ANACONDA, a US Navy SEAL ground-reconnaissance team (Mako-31), while moving into its observation position, spotted a tent and a DShK .51-caliber heavy machine gun sited where it could have destroyed the CH-47 Chinook helicopters of TF *Rakkasan* flying into the Shahikot Valley the following day. The enemy weapon was on terrain that had purportedly been overflowed and photographed in preparation for the operation. “This was a lesson for anyone who thought the U.S. military’s billions of dollars’ worth of spy satellites and surveillance aircraft obviated the need for ground reconnaissance,” Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda* (New York: Berkley Books, 2005), 173-4. Two days later, on 3 March, an MH-47E Chinook carrying another SEAL ground-reconnaissance team was disabled by small-arms fire and subsequently made a forced landing on Takar Ghar peak. The pre-battle overhead imagery of this position showed it suitable to land the large helicopter, but did not enable the team leader to see the DShK .51-caliber heavy machine gun sited there nor the enemy soldiers who manned and supported it. See Charles H. Briscoe, et al, *Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 297-8.

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“Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Donn R. Pepke, CG, 4th Infantry Division, Period 30 Nov 68 to 14 Nov 69 (U),” dated 19 December 1969, paragraph 4 of Inclosure 9; accessed as DTIC AD506705.

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Major (Retired) Kendall D. Gott on 20 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

General (Retired) James J. Lindsay, 25 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Colonel (Retired) Gary E. Phillips on 20 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Schatzel, 18 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

(Telephone)

Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Scott Chunn, 24 January 2005.

Robert Clark, 3 May 2005.

Colonel John A. Davis, 21 April 2004.

Gary Linderer, 2 December 2004.

Colonel (Retired) Thomas W. O'Connell, 20 April 2005.

(E-mail)

Colonel (Retired) Ellis Bingham, 30 December 2004, 11 February 2005.

Roy Boatman, 15 December 2004.

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The collected papers of Colonel (Retired) Ellis D. Bingham.

The collected papers of Richard Cole.

The collected papers of Colonel John A. Davis.

The collected papers of Colonel (Retired) Philip D. Grimm and Major (Retired) Russell Grimm.

Surveys

Completed information questionnaires were received from the following individuals on the dates indicated:

Dennie Callahan, 23 December 2004; F Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.

David J. Casey, 9 December 2004; LRRP Detachment, D Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division.

Scott C. Chunn, 14 February 2004; 109th MI Battalion, 9th Infantry Division.

David C. Cummings, 27 January 2005; N Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade.

Ronald L. Elliff, 23 February 2005; F Company (LRP), 50th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.

Mark S. Elliot, 25 January 2005; E Company (Airborne), 51st Infantry (LRS), V Corps.

Michael L. Feller, 11 December 2004; O Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

Kirkland H. Gibson, 12 November 2004; US Army Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company (Airborne) 3780, VII Corps.

William J. Houser, 9 December 2004; F Company (Airborne), 51st Infantry (LRP), II Field Force, and O Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

Kevin Hyneman, 15 November 2004; C Company (LRSD), 6th Infantry Division.

Robert T. Murphy, 30 November 2004; D Company (Airborne), 17th Infantry (Long Range Patrol), V Corps.

Johnny B. Starnes, 7 January 2005; E Company (Airborne), 51st Infantry (LRP), 23d (Americus) Infantry Division.

Thomas J. Nash, 4 February 2005; LRRP Detachment, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

Victor D. Valeriano, 4 February 2005; LRRP Detachment, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

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
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About the Author

James F. Gebhardt retired from the US Army in 1992, having served as an infantry enlisted man, armor officer, and Soviet foreign area officer. He fought in the Vietnam War as a rifleman in a mechanized infantry platoon and as a long-range patrol team leader, then was a drill instructor at Fort Dix. After commissioning through ROTC in 1974, he served in armor units at Fort Benning and Mainz, Germany, where he commanded an M-60A3 tank company in 1982-3. In his last active duty assignment he escorted Soviet military, scientific, and diplomatic personnel throughout the western United States to conduct disarmament inspections for the On-Site Inspection Agency.

A native of Grand Forks, North Dakota, Mr. Gebhardt earned a B.A. in political science from the University of Idaho in 1974 and an M.A. in history from the University of Washington in 1976. While assigned to the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) in 1986-88, he researched and wrote Leavenworth Paper No. 17, *The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944*. His other published works include several book-length translations about Soviet army and navy operations in World War II, a series of translated technical manuals for Soviet-era small arms, and numerous Internet-based article-length translations on Soviet military history subjects. He rejoined CSI as a civilian contractor in 2004 and researches and writes historical studies of current interest to the Army. His first study in the Global War on Terrorism series was Occasional Paper 6, *The Road to Abu Ghraib: US Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience*, published in March 2005.



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