MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY

Building A Volunteer Army: The Fort Ord Contribution

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY

BUILDING A VOLUNTEER ARMY: THE FORT ORD CONTRIBUTION

by
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and
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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Foreword

The expiration of authority to draft young men for military service in mid-1973 placed the United States Army on a volunteer footing for the first time since 1948. In preparation for this challenge, the Army had initiated the Modern Volunteer Army Program two and a half years earlier to attract and increase the enlistment of able men and women, raise the quality of Army life, and improve professionalism throughout the rank and file. An important part of the program was Project VOLAR, a field experiment conducted at selected Army installations from 1970 to 1972 to develop methods and procedures for achieving the program's objectives. The methods and procedures that survived this extensive testing and critical evaluation are now being applied Army-wide with significant benefit as the Army makes its transition to a volunteer force.

In the continuing task of maintaining and improving a thoroughly professional, highly motivated volunteer force, the Army stands to profit from knowledge of the VOLAR experiment, its failures as well as its successes. To record the exeprience, the Army has prepared a series of monographs, each an objective and comprehensive account of a particular phase of the experiment, and each prepared by a senior officer who played an important VOLAR role. These studies should contribute to the historical record of the Army and provide the American public with a performance report on an institution it has so long and so well supported.

Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore was commissioned from the United States Military Academy into the Infantry in June 1945. He fought in the Korean War with the 7th Infantry Division and in Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division. General Moore has served on the Army Staff; at the Military Academy at West Point; in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; in the Northern Headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; in airborne units in Japan and the United States; in Eighth Army Headquarters; and as commander of the 7th Infantry Division, the Military Personnel Center, and Fort Ord. He is a graduate of the Infantry School Advanced Course; the Army Command and General Staff College; the Armed Forces Staff College; and the Naval War College. General Moore is presently the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army.

Lieutenant Colonel Jeff M. Tuten entered the Army in 1954 after graduating from the University of Florida as a Reserve Officers' Training

Corps Distinguished Military Graduate. He has since served in various command and staff assignments, including two tours in West Berlin and two combat tours in South Vietnam. He is a graduate of the Infantry Advanced Course and the Army Command and General Staff College and holds a master's degree in History. After a tour with the Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Colonel Tuten was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army.

Washington, D.C.
1 September 1975

PAUL T. SMITH
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Preface

> And very likely the strictly historical character of my narrative may be disappointing to the ear. But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied.
>
> THUCYDIDES

In late June 1971 I received a letter from General William C. Westmoreland, then Army Chief of Staff, asking me to undertake the writing of this monograph. General Westmoreland was concerned over the lack of a comprehensive account of the Army's efforts in the development and support of the volunteer Army concept. In his words, "We need a thorough study of the Army's response to the decisions made concerning the volunteer Army, as well as of the plans and programs that have been initiated during the last three years to revitalize the Army and make the concept a reality. The successes attained and the obstacles that still remain should be fully covered for the benefit of not only those who must carry the task forward, but also the general public." I was asked to cover the role of the training center in developing and promoting the concept. More specifically, the proposed monograph was to focus on Modern Volunteer Army guidance emanating from Washington, and its practical application at Fort Ord. Programs, innovations, and incentives developed and employed were to be covered together with an analysis of the results.

Because the monograph was intended as a historical record it was essential that it be based on meticulous research, using original sources. Lieutenant Colonel Jeff M. Tuten, Infantry, newly arrived at Fort Ord, was selected to head the research effort and co-author the book. He had been sent to command a training battalion and could devote full time to the project during the five months preceding his assumption of command.

Fortunately, extensive records had been maintained on all aspects of the Modern Volunteer Army Program at Fort Ord. More important, the men who had done the actual work were available to furnish a large reservoir of firsthand information. To tap this source, letters were sent to over a hundred men—generals, sergeants, soldiers, and civilians—who

had either taken part in, or been associated with, Fort Ord's efforts to achieve Volunteer Army goals, asking for their experiences, views, and conclusions on what had been done. The response to the letters and the many interviews that followed were of the greatest importance to full coverage of the subject. The generous assistance of all these men is gratefully acknowledged.

This monograph is the product of team effort. Although the names of those who made valuable contributions are too numerous to list here, the volume owes much to the editorial work of Captain Arthur J. McGowan, Second Lieutenant William A. Reynolds, and Mrs. Melinda Hayden. As the manuscript progressed from brief outline to detailed outline and then through eight drafts, it was reviewed at each stage by many individuals who had been involved in Fort Ord's Volunteer Army activities. Their comments and suggestions were integrated into succeeding drafts.

Since this manuscript was essentially completed shortly before my departure from command at Fort Ord on 2 August 1973, it should be understood that the period for which I speak ended on that date, although the process of change and improvement has continued.

In reporting training improvements at Fort Ord during this period there has been little space to devote to the many accomplishments of previous training programs, methods, or personnel at Ford Ord and elsewhere. There is, and has been, a continuous and healthy quest for improvement throughout the training establishment. As new technology becomes available and new insights into the learning process are gained, we can certainly expect additional improvements.

Some background information for readers unfamiliar with Army organization and training procedures has been included. It was also necessary to make some value judgments, particularly in attempting to assess results, but in all cases an earnest effort has been made to base such judgments on an objective appraisal of the facts at hand. It should be clearly undertood that the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of the Army.

Washington, D.C.
1 September 1975

HAROLD G. MOORE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

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All illustrations are from Fort Ord files.

BUILDING A VOLUNTEER ARMY: THE FORT ORD CONTRIBUTION

CHAPTER I

The Army Basic Training System Before 1969

To lead an untrained people to war is to throw them away.
CONFUCIUS

Many Americans think of soldiers as civilians dressed in military clothing, an image that perhaps goes back to the Minuteman of American Revolutionary War days. While there may have been a time in the distant past when a citizen untrained in military subjects could become a sort of soldier by donning a uniform and shouldering his musket, those days are gone forever. The business of soldiering has been overtaken by the complexities of the modern world. Today's soldier operates in an environment which requires ever-increasing knowledge of techniques and technology unknown to his forefathers. At the same time, he must possess and develop those basic qualities that have characterized the good soldier through the ages: strength, both mental and physical, discipline, confidence, and loyalty.

The United States Army continually faces the task of turning citizens into soldiers. The conversion process, basic training, has been developed and improved over the years through research, experimentation, and analysis. As the name suggests, the process consists of training all men who enter the Army in the basics of soldiering. A man may enter to become an aviation machinist, a dental technician, or a supply specialist, but he will first learn the basic skills of the infantryman. A case can be made that the teaching of skills which may not subsequently be employed is wasteful in time and money, but experience has proven the need for basic infantry training. First, there can be no lasting guarantee that the aviation machinist or the supply clerk will not someday be obliged to put aside his wrench or stock book in favor of a rifle and bayonet. American military history is full of such instances, which occur often in guerrilla wars where there is no rear area safe from attack. Second, the thousands of Army noncombatants that support, supply, and sustain the combat troops, who constitute the cutting edge of the nation's military power, do their jobs better if they know firsthand the duties of those they support.

Basic training is frequently arduous, sometimes onerous, and often dangerous. At the same time the new soldier is learning to do things,

NEW RECRUITS AT FORT ORD RECEPTION CENTER *meet their drill sergeants.*

he is learning new attitudes toward people and ideas. The training emphasizes disciplined, confident, individual responsibility but also teaches the importance of group effort. The recruit sees that a team of four can accomplish more than four individuals working separately. Frequently he must modify habits and attitudes that he brought with him and replace them with group-oriented behavior patterns. The American military tradition has always stressed the need for innovative individuals who see the need for disciplined team effort.

The past decade witnessed major changes in American attitudes. "Do your own thing" has been the watchword of the "now generation." Increased freedom, permissiveness, and greater tolerance and acceptance of liberal social behavior have been accompanied by a tide of antiestablishment feeling. Unfortunately, doing one's own thing, exclusive of all else, is the antithesis of the teamwork and self-discipline without which no army can function.

The task, then, of the Army's basic training system is to receive civilians from the mainstream and the byways of America and turn them into soldiers in the space of approximately eight weeks, and to do it under relatively spartan circumstances. At the same time, the task must be accomplished as efficiently as possible in terms of time, money, personnel, and other resources.

RECRUITS ON PARADE SEVEN WEEKS AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL AT FORT ORD

The Army Training Establishment

In the years between the two world wars the Army was an all-volunteer force of relatively small size. In 1938 it numbered 185,000 officers and men. There were no specific training centers per se; new soldiers received their training within the regiments they joined. Recruits entering the military service were assigned to a garrison, which accomplished the initial task of clothing, feeding, and training them in basic infantry skills. A recruit usually underwent six to sixteen weeks of training with his regiment, in a "recruit school," after which he was assigned to normal company duties. If he was other than infantry, he was given additional training in a secondary school; for example, an artillery recruit was given two to four weeks of additional training in horsemanship, basic gunnery, and other subjects he needed. After 1938, with the advent of the Army buildup, this training concept was altered, and the training cycle usually began at a training center, a system that has been continued ever since.

Reacting to the ominous situations developing in both Europe and Asia, the United States began to increase its forces in 1939. The onset of World War II and mobilization generated a massive training effort. By the end of 1945 more than ten million men had undergone Army basic training in centers around the country. After the war, when Army

SOME ASPECTS OF THE ARMY BASIC TRAINING EXPERIENCE *changed very little.*

strength in 1948 fell to 552,000, which was 8,000 below budget authorization, the Selective Service Act of 1948 was passed to provide manpower to fill the ranks. Thus the nation, faced with the challenge of the cold war, opted for an Army whose ranks were to be manned principally by draftees. This system remained in effect until the early seventies.

To provide training for new soldiers the Army set up training centers at various posts around the country. The number of these centers has varied over the years as the Army fluctuated in size. In 1973 there were six U.S. Army training centers providing basic training: Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Ord, California; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and Fort McClellan, Alabama. Most of these training centers provided basic combat training and advanced individual training, either in a specific combat arm or in specialized combat support training courses. All Women's Army Corps basic training was conducted at Fort McClellan. Before joining a field operational unit each new soldier received basic combat training and, with a few exceptions, went on to advanced individual training.

When the new soldier arrives at his assigned Army training center from the armed forces examination and entrance station, he goes to the United States Army reception station where he remains for approximately four days of administrative processing. Here, under the supervision of the drill sergeant, the recruit receives orientation, which includes instruction in the proper wearing of the uniform, saluting, and marching. Identification cards and tags are issued and comprehensive medical examinations and aptitude tests are completed. The recruit receives a personal affairs orientation on allotments, savings programs, dependent care, and commercial life insurance, and is cautioned on credit purchases. He also has an interview during which the Army classification

CHART 1—ORGANIZATION OF TYPICAL BASIC COMBAT TRAINING COMPANY



system is explained and questions relative to future assignments and career patterns are answered. The recruit's initial issue of clothing is fitted and certain medical processing is conducted. He is then sent to a basic training company where he is assigned, along with forty to fifty others, to one of the company's four or five training platoons. (*Chart 1*)

For the next seven weeks the new soldier receives intensive combat training. He is instructed in a multitude of subjects, ranging from the Geneva and Hague Conventions and Law of Land Warfare to weapons training in which he must master the use of five different weapons. Throughout as well as at the end of basic combat training, the recruit is tested on his ability to perform the various skills in which he has been trained. If he can demonstrate competence he goes on to further training. If he fails, he is retrained in the particular subject until he passes before being allowed to go on to training in more specialized subjects. Individuals who appear to be particularly slow learners or who display an inaptitude for military training are sent to the special training company for intensive remedial training.

After successfully completing basic combat training, the graduate may follow one of various paths. He may go directly to his assigned field unit for on-the-job training in a specified military occupational specialty (MOS). On the other hand, if he has a verified applicable civilian skill he may be granted a rating in the corresponding military

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occupational specialty and go directly to his unit for duty in that specialty. If he enlisted under the "unit of choice" plan, the graduate may go to the unit for which he enlisted to receive advanced individual training, provided the unit gives such training. The graduate may attend one of the Army service schools for advanced individual or other training before going on to his assignment with a Regular Army unit. Lastly, he may remain at the training center and receive advanced individual training there before being assigned to a field unit. This advanced training may be either the branch-oriented type, such as infantry, or the combat support type.

Advanced individual training is more specialized than basic combat training. There are advanced courses for the infantry, field artillery, armor, military police, engineer, air defense artillery, and medical branches as well as for combat support qualification. All training centers have an advanced individual training course of some kind. In addition, some posts which do not have training centers do provide advanced individual training. The most common branch course is the infantry course, which provides training in advanced infantry skills and tactics; the graduate is awarded a military occupational specialty which reflects his training. Light weapons infantryman (MOS 11B) is the most common specialty, one that means that the man is a qualified infantryman, familiar with the tools, tactics, and techniques of the rifleman.

Advanced individual training in combat support provides instruction and practice in common skills required in all types of units without regard to branch. The courses train such specialists as clerks, clerk typists, personnel specialists, supplymen, cooks, light vehicle drivers, heavy vehicle drivers, wheeled vehicle mechanics, equipment maintenance clerks, field wiremen, and key punch operators. Combat support courses are taught at most of the training centers and at many other posts as well.

The length of the training process is dictated by a number of factors that include the content of the basic training course, the efficiency with which the various subjects are taught, and the nature of the advanced training which a soldier is to receive after basic training. In any case, Public Law 51 forbids the overseas deployment of U.S. soldiers with fewer than sixteen weeks of training. The total of basic and advanced training may well extend beyond sixteen weeks, but it may not be less. If the basic combat training spans eight weeks, then the advanced individual training that follows must last an additional eight weeks before the new soldier is qualified for overseas assignment.

Which course a graduate of basic combat training will take and when and where he will take it is subject to a host of variables. Some recruits are guaranteed a specific military occupational specialty as an en-

BASIC TRAINING COMPANY PREPARES TO LEAVE COMPANY AREA *for day's training.*

listment inducement. If the Army fails to honor the enlistment contract, they have the right to demand immediate discharge. Others enlist without an assigned specialty. In the case of the unassigned trainee, the aptitude tests previously administered at the reception station are evaluated and the results passed to Headquarters, Department of the Army, where all trainee assignment decisions are made. Shortly before the soldier graduates from basic training he is informed as to when, where, and what the next phase of his training will be.

The number of men involved in the basic training system both as trainees and trainers varies from year to year. Obviously, the size of the Army is a major determining factor. (*Table 1*) In December 1968 the Army's enlisted strength was 1,462,960, while in April 1973 the figure stood at 699,097. Major factors in determining the size of the training task are the component and the term of enlistment of those entering the Army. If all those entering are draftees or two-year volunteers, then the Army must recruit and train replacements for them after only two years, as they reach the end of their service. Conversely, as the percentage of men who enlist for longer terms increases, the number of men who must be processed through the training system decreases. (*Table 2*) Thus, any gain in the percentage of longer service Regulars can be expected to produce substantial savings in total training costs.

TABLE 1—SIZE OF THE TRAINING TASK, 1967–1973
(IN THOUSANDS FOR YEARS ENDING 30 JUNE)

Fiscal Year	BCT	Fort Ord		Army Total		Active Duty Army Strength (Off & EM)
		AIT-INF	AIT-CST	BCT	AIT-INF & CST	
1967.....	30	11	21	475	343	1,442
1968.....	33	16	22	539	361	1,570
1969.....	38	20	21	450	350	1,512
1970.....	33	15	18	371	247	1,322
1971.....	35	11	18	309	188	1,123
1972.....	30	6	10	177	141	811
1973.....	46	1.4	15	—	—	803

Sources: CONARC 919 Reports, Fiscal Years 1966–1972; Selected Manpower Statistics, 1972, p. 21; Office of Director of Procurement Training; Department of the Army; ATTS–49 Report, Fiscal Year 1973.

TABLE 2—FORT ORD BASIC COMBAT TRAINING ENROLLMENT, 1967–1973

Fiscal Year	Regular Army	Army of the United States	National Guard and Army Reserve
1967.....	6,703	11,580	12,189
1968.....	11,026	18,376	4,009
1969.....	15,192	18,990	3,797
1970.....	12,235	10,912	9,992
1971.....	16,268	11,867	7,035
1972.....	20,740	3,259	5,630
1973.....	33,569	6,074	3,469

Source: Office of Training Management, Adjutant General Division, Fort Ord, September 1973.

Fort Ord's Role in the Training Task

Because Fort Ord is both a U.S. Army post and a training center, the commanding general and his staff engage in a host of missions and activities at the post which are unrelated to their training role. The commanding general is responsible, for example, for security of the installation, operation of all post services, and financial management. At the same time he is responsible for all aspects of the training center operation from personnel management to range-scheduling.

In addition to the Fort Ord Army training center, three subinstallations came under the Fort Ord commanding general—the Presidio of Monterey, Hunter Liggett Military Reservation, and Camp Roberts. The Presidio of Monterey, the earliest building on the Monterey Peninsula,

THE MAIN GATE AT FORT ORD

was begun by the Spanish in 1770. It was the site of the first American military post in the area, constructed by members of Battery F, 3d Artillery, after Commodore John Drake Sloat took possession of Monterey for the United States in 1846. Three Army lieutenants destined to become generals in the Civil War, Edward O. C. Ord, Henry W. Halleck, and William Tecumseh Sherman, supervised the building. It is the home of the Defense Language Institute, West Coast Branch, where about thirty foreign languages are taught. Hunter Liggett Military Reservation, one of the largest training areas in the west, is situated about eighty miles southeast of Fort Ord. Its varied terrain served as a field experimentation laboratory for the project teams of the Combat Developments Experimentation Command, which had headquarters at Fort Ord. National Guard and Reserve units also use the reservation as a training area during the summer months. Camp Roberts was placed under license to the California National Guard in March 1971, but is still dependent on Fort Ord for certain logistical support. It is also the site of a Satellite Communications Command station.

Until July 1973 the commander of Fort Ord reported to the Commanding General, Sixth United States Army. Sixth Army closely monitored all Fort Ord activities. That headquarters, in turn, was subordinate to Continental Army Command (CONARC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, whose mission it was to conduct Army training in the continental United

States. All training doctrine, requirements, and techniques fell within CONARC's purview. This centralization of authority and direction was designed to prevent fragmentation of effort and produce qualitative uniformity in both individual and unit training. Continental Army Command co-ordinated closely with Combat Developments Command to insure that the most current tactical and technical doctrine was followed. In actual practice, Continental Army Command delegated much of the authority for developing and applying specific training doctrine to the specialized schools.

The U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, was given "proponency" for all basic combat training, advanced individual infantry training, and various other infantry related courses. The Infantry School, in co-ordination with the Combat Developments Command Infantry Agency, made recommendations to Continental Army Command on the scope, doctrine, and all other aspects of basic combat and advanced individual infantry training. The CONARC staff reviewed the Infantry School recommendations, checked with Combat Developments Command, and then promulgated detailed training programs and directives which were followed by all U.S. Army training centers.

CONARC directives and programs were sent to the U.S. Army training centers through the numbered armies, which supervised and controlled the training centers located within their areas to insure standardization and compliance. On 1 July 1973 Continental Army Command began to phase out as an active headquarters. The training functions were shifted in the month of July to a new headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which by 1 August 1973 had assumed direct command of all Army training centers, including Fort Ord. The Training and Doctrine Command also assimilated the Combat Developments Command, thus becoming the central authority for all Army training and the doctrine which shapes that training. Fort Ord and the other training centers reported directly to Training and Doctrine Command and were no longer subordinated to the numbered army headquarters in whose areas the centers were located.

Each of the various combat support training courses has a proponent agency that performs the same function as does the Infantry School for basic training and advanced individual infantry training. The proponents for the combat support courses taught at Fort Ord were as follows:

Agency	*Course*
The Adjutant General's School Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana	Clerk Clerk typist Key punch operator Personnel specialist

Agency	*Course*
The Ordnance School Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland	Wheeled vehicle mechanic Equipment maintenance clerk
The Quartermaster School Fort Lee, Virginia	Supplyman Cook
The Southeastern Signal School Fort Gordon, Georgia	Field wireman
The Transportation School Fort Eustis, Virginia	Light vehicle driver Heavy vehicle driver

Because of the variety of courses taught, the combat support training brigade faced challenges in course organization, instructional methods, and supervision much greater than those encountered by the other brigades. There are few common subjects that lend themselves to the committee type of instruction.

Organization of Fort Ord Army Training Center

To perform its various missions, the headquarters of the U.S. Army Training Center, Infantry, and Fort Ord was until 1970 organized into four main groups: the command group, the general staff, the special staff, and major units. The command group consisted of the commanding general, the deputy commanding general, the deputy post commanders, the chief of staff, and the command sergeant major. The general staff consisted of the assistant chiefs of staff, G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, and the comptroller. Within their functional areas they served as the principal staff assistants for the commanding general and also exercised control or supervision as designated over certain special staff sections, units, or activities. The special staff consisted of all staff officers of the headquarters not included in either the command group or the general staff. These officers functioned within specialized fields such as public information and provided staff support to the command group and the general staff. The major units included the post headquarters command, the four training brigades, the basic combat training committee group, the U.S. Army Hospital, Fort Ord, and the U.S. Army Reception Station, Fort Ord.

In July of 1970 the staff organization was changed to the directorate system. This change placed most of the special staff sections and the general staff sections in common area directorates. For example, the adjutant general, chaplain, and special service office were placed under the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities, finance under the comptroller, and the aviation officer under the Directorate, Plans and

POST CHAPEL CENTER. *There are fourteen chapels at Fort Ord.*

Training. The engineer and signal functions previously assigned to the G–4 were elevated to the directorate level to become the Directorate of Facilities and Engineering and Directorate of Communications and Electronics. All medical, dental, and veterinary activities were grouped into the Directorate of Medical Activities.

As its name suggests, the basic combat training committee group was charged with the task of providing a committee type of instruction in basic combat subjects and remedial training for physically inept and slow-learning trainees. The committee group became the nucleus of the Instructor Group in December 1970. There were four training brigades, each commanded by a colonel. The 1st Training Brigade and the 3d Training Brigade conducted basic combat training. At one time, as an experiment, they also conducted advanced individual infantry training. The 2d Training Brigade was an advanced individual infantry unit, although for a short time it provided basic combat training as well. The 4th Training Brigade was a combat support training brigade, conducting advanced individual training in eleven different skills.

Each brigade was organized into a number of battalions, each commanded by a lieutenant colonel. In turn, the battalion was organized into a number of companies, each commanded by a captain. At every echelon the commander was charged with the provision of training, as well as command, control, administration, security, supply, and discipline for

all attached and assigned personnel. The battalion staff had a very limited supply capability and in supply matters the companies normally dealt directly with the brigade supply staff (S–4). The 1st Brigade had four battalions of four companies each, while the 3d Brigade had four battalions of five companies each. The 2d Brigade consisted of four battalions, each with four training companies.

Until 1971 the 2d Brigade had its own advanced individual training committee group charged with controlling and co-ordinating the activities of the various teaching committees that provided committee instruction for the advanced infantry training program. In early 1971 this committee was absorbed by the Instructor Group, which was charged with providing both basic combat and advanced infantry instruction. In April 1971 the Instructor Group, commanded by a colonel, became the Training Command (Provisional). In late 1972 infantry advanced training was discontinued at Fort Ord and in February 1973 the 2d Brigade was inactivated and its members were absorbed by the other brigades.

The 4th Brigade expanded from three to four battalions in January 1973, and added a fifth provisional battalion the following month. The 1st Battalion taught basic administration; the 2d Battalion, automotive subjects; the 3d Battalion, supply subjects; the 4th Battalion, field wiring; and the 5th Battalion, food service subjects.

The committee system of instruction used at Fort Ord and the other training centers employed special teams of expert instructors to teach specific subjects. The basic combat trainees were rotated through these instructional committees, with the company drill sergeants acting as assistant instructors. Not all instruction, however, was given by committees; many subjects such as drill and ceremonies were taught by the company cadre without committee participation. In addition, company drill sergeants conducted remedial training.

Considering the great importance of the training task to the Army as a whole, and the vital training role played by the men in the training brigades, particularly, at the company level, it is not surprising that great care was taken in selecting and training men for those positions. At the Department of the Army level, emphasis was placed on maintaining high standards for training center cadre in terms of both quality and quantity. As a result of an extensive study of recruit training conducted by Under Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes in 1963, special drill sergeant academies were established at training centers around the country. These academies were designed to polish the leadership skills of noncommissioned officer volunteers and prepare them for the challenging and important role they would play in the basic training system.

PLATOON DRILL SERGEANT INSTRUCTS HIS MEN *in drill and ceremonies.*

The job of the training center cadreman has always been extremely demanding—the hours are long and the responsibilities are great. It is not unusual for officers and men of the basic combat training battalions and companies to work fourteen hours a day. The following "Drill Sergeant's Creed" was written by a soldier who appreciated the duties and responsibilities of the company cadre.

I am a Drill Sergeant, dedicated to training new soldiers and influencing the old. I am forever conscious of each soldier under my charge, and by example, will inspire him to the highest standards possible.

I will strive to be patient, understanding, just, and firm. I will commend the deserving and encourage the wayward.

I will never forget that I am responsible to my commander, and that the morale, discipline, and efficiency of my men will reflect an image of me.

To help attract volunteers for drill sergeant training and duty, special incentives were instituted in the 1960s and at the same time program entrance requirements were tightened.

In terms of training techniques, the methods of the sixties were basically the tried and battle-proven ones of World War II and Korea. There was considerable reliance on lectures and frequent use of demonstrations. There was of course much training in which the men practiced the skills they had observed—particularly in weapons training. A deterministic, three-point system was used. First, all training was mandatory and all trainees had to receive all the instruction. Second, a test was administered at the end of the cycle with a requirement that the trainee score at least 70 percent in order to graduate and pass on to further train-

ing or to his unit. Third, if the trainee failed to score 70 percent he was recycled, that is, he was sent back to start the training all over again, which entailed his transfer to another unit that was one or more weeks behind his original unit.

It is only against the background of Army training as it was before 1969 that recent experiments and changes can be examined and evaluated.

CHAPTER II

The Quest for Improvement

> Neither a wise man nor a brave man lies down in the tracks of history to wait for the train of the future to run over him.
>
> DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The *Tet* offensive of early 1968 in Vietnam was followed by growing antiwar activism in the United States, and during the presidential election campaign pressure to end the draft intensified. Draft calls had risen from 158,000 in 1962 to 299,000 in 1968, placing a burden on the men and facilities of the U.S. Army training centers. At Fort Ord in 1968 the center trained 71,500 men, who went on to perform well in Vietnam and elsewhere. As more military forces were committed to Southeast Asia, the heavy training load continued into 1969, a year that also brought a searching examination of the system of training at Fort Ord as part of a quest for improvement.

Examining the Old System

In June of 1969 Major General Phillip B. Davidson, who had been Assistant Chief of Staff, J–2 (intelligence), U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, assumed command of the U.S. Army Training Center, Infantry, and Fort Ord. General Davidson was an officer with a strong interest in improving the training system and a willingness to experiment.

Over the years he had developed his own system of organizational analysis and management which he invariably applied to any new job. His method was first to determine the primary mission and then to strive to gain control of the situation relating to that mission rather than allow day-to-day events to gain control. He would then set up a group to study the entire mission, analyzing as well the methods of other agencies or commands that were doing similar work. From the study and visits to these agencies he would develop concepts, make innovations, and take other initiatives. These he tested, rejecting or revising on the basis of the tests and continuing to test until he was satisfied. Finally, it was his policy to keep command pressure constant on achieving excellence in carrying out the primary mission. General Davidson was fond of saying, apropos

RECEPTION STATION BARRACKS (*left*) *and Quartermaster Laundry* (*right*).

of Gresham's Law, "In any bureaucracy, useless labor tends to displace useful labor"—and he charged his study groups with rooting out the useless labor.

In the month following his assumption of command at Fort Ord, General Davidson created the Training Management Evaluation Committee (TMEC). The mission assigned to this committee was "To study BCT and AIT, to determine the weaknesses and the means of correcting these weaknesses, first within our own resources, and second, beyond Fort Ord resources." The committee was to work full time on a special duty basis until its study was completed and recommendations were made, and it was authorized to use the staff and subordinate units for information and assistance. The specific objectives were to improve performance at Ford Ord in every element of the training program and to reduce the costs of training without lowering the level of performance. To chair the committee General Davidson chose the commander of his 1st Brigade, Colonel Martin J. Slominski, an infantryman with combat experience in World War II and Vietnam, who brought to the task a large store of knowledge. Three other field grade officers were assigned to the committee—Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas S. Kotas, Major Laurence G. Mooring, and Major Billy R. Deramus. Like Colonel Slominski, each had combat experience in Vietnam. The committee elected to con-

duct the study in two phases, concentrating on five training factors that would have a major impact on mission accomplishment:

Phase I	*Scope*
Training facilities and support	Ranges, classrooms, field training areas, training aids, weapons and equipment pool, central issue facility, educational television, ammunition, transportation, and medical support.
Trainer personnel	Number, qualifications, assignment, use, motivation, and morale.
Administrative requirements	Type, frequency, time allocation, and impact on training.
Phase II	
Trainee personnel	Morale, motivation, aptitudes, and performance.
Training conducted in basic combat, advanced individual, and combat support training	Program, subject matter, policies, lesson plans, supervision, and effectiveness.

As commandant of the Army Security Agency School, General Davidson had worked closely on a similar project with the director of instruction at the school, Dr. William R. Tracey, whose abilities had impressed him. General Davidson now invited Dr. Tracey to visit Fort Ord to observe the training operation. Dr. Tracey's comments and suggestions were of considerable assistance throughout the work of the Training Management Evaluation Committee and the Experimental Training Program that followed.

Early in the training study, liaison was established with Division 3 of the Human Resources Research Organization at the nearby Presidio of Monterey. The Human Resources Research Organization (known as HumRRO) was established as a nonprofit corporation in 1969 to conduct research in the field of training and education. A continuation of the George Washington University Human Resources Research Office, the Human Resources Research Organization had as its purpose the improvement of human performance, particularly in organizational settings, through behavioral and social science research, development, and consultation. In work performed under contract to the Department of the Army, the organization's mission was to conduct research in the fields of training, motivation, and leadership. This early liaison with Human Resources Division 3 was to grow into valuable co-operation in later phases of the Fort Ord experiment. Under the direction of Dr. Howard H. McFann, Division 3 was to play an important role in shaping training improvements at Fort Ord.

During the course of their preliminary analysis of the Fort Ord operation, the members of the Training Management Evaluation Committee visited Forts Benning, Dix, Jackson, and Polk in an effort to gather new ideas and achieve a broader view of the training problem. On their return in September 1969 they set to work and produced a list of eighteen specific objectives for the improvement of training and reduction of costs at Ford Ord. A task force was appointed to pursue each objective, and a major unit commander or senior staff officer headed each task force to insure that local resistance did not hinder the effort. A November deadline was set for all task forces to complete their analysis and prepare recommendations for the achievement of the objectives. The following is a list of task forces and their assigned objectives.

Task Force	*Objective*
P–1	To improve the qualifications and performance of trainer and instructor personnel.
P–2	To improve the qualifications and performance of supervisors.
P–3	To develop policies and procedures to improve trainee motivation and morale.
P–4	To improve and develop standards for ranges and field training areas.
P–5	To improve the training literature used for each course and type of training.
P–6	To establish criteria for the selection or development and use of training aids and devices.
C–1	To reduce the requirements for trainer and supervisory personnel in major units.
C–2	To reduce requirements and improve utilization of ranges and field training areas.
C–3	To develop standards for classroom and laboratory design to include general purpose instructional facilities, training aids, equipment, and special purpose instructional facilities.
C–4	To determine the length of courses and the order of topic presentation with the intention of reducing training cost.
C–5	To reduce cost by determining a more effective presentation sequence of subjects in basic combat training.
C–6	To reduce the impact on training of administrative requirements associated with guard, fatigue details, burial details, the blood donor program, and medical and dental appointments.

Task Force	*Objective*
C–7	To relate operating hours of post activities to the training mission (minimum activities to be studied included the post exchange, concessions, commissary, central issue facility, weapons and equipment pool, clothing sales store, and clothing issue branch).
C–8	To reduce the cost of training by developing policies and procedures that will accelerate identification of low aptitude trainees in advanced infantry training and combat support training.
C–9	To develop policies and procedures that will reduce trainee attrition in advanced infantry training and combat support training.
C–10	To reduce the cost of transportation and other training support requirements.
C–10A	To develop a plan that will provide adequate medical support to all units engaged in training and at the same time reduce cost.
C–11	To reduce the cost and increase the use of educational television equipment.

Training Management Evaluation Committee Findings

Task Force C–8 concentrated on reducing costs by removing trainees from courses that they were not capable of passing. Early identification of potential dropouts would make it possible to funnel them into less demanding training courses sooner, thus saving training time and money. Company commanders in basic training would also be required to evaluate and report before graduation those trainees who appeared to lack ability to complete their programed advanced training. The reports would be forwarded to the company commanders of infantry training who would then keep these men under close observation. It was hoped that the period of time before reclassification could thus be reduced.

Task Force C–9, working on the reduction of trainee attrition, concentrated on requirements that caused high failure rates and which could be dropped from the course without an adverse effect on Army-wide performance in the field.

In the basic Army administration course, for instance, it was found that some trainees could not achieve the twenty words per minute typing skill required. The task force, therefore, recommended that trainees be allowed to graduate with a typing ability of fifteen words a minute as long as they possessed the other military occupational specialty skills which were more essential than typing to the job in the field.

Two task forces devoted their attention to improving the qualifications and performance of instructors, both officer and enlisted. Upon their recommendations, post headquarters began conducting centralized training in methods of instruction. An officer's orientation course of twenty-nine hours was devised for instructors and commanders, and work started on the development of a more comprehensive course. Through these and other measures, an intensive effort was made to upgrade the qualifications of instructors and trainers at Fort Ord.

Other task forces examined the content and sequence of the basic combat training and combat support advanced individual training courses. The basic combat course was considered adequate, but in some areas improvements could be made. For example, it was in basic combat training that the idea of selective acceleration was first tried. One company was tested during its first week in order to determine if its members already possessed skills that were to be subsequently taught in the basic combat training course. The results were illuminating. (*Table 3*)

In the physical combat proficiency test, the troops saw a demonstration, had a practice test, and then were tested for record, except in the 150-yard man-carry, which was eliminated on the advice of the post surgeon.

The performance of most trainees exceeded minimum standards. The scores revealed that the average American entering military service was in good physical condition. The committee questioned the necessity for men who had passed the minimum standards of Continental Army Command to spend twenty-four hours on scheduled physical training before they again took the regularly scheduled test. The first week trainees had much less success with the graded proficiency test.

In basic rifle marksmanship, the trainees were given only five hours of training before firing the M16 rifle for record. Emphasis was placed on safety, sighting, loading, and immediate action and range procedures. The men then fired the standard course with the results shown. (*See Table 3.*) Weeks later when the company again fired the basic rifle marksmanship course, after the standard forty-two hours of preliminary rifle marksmanship instruction, the scores of the men improved greatly; forty men qualified as experts, eighty-one as sharpshooters, and forty-five as marksmen.

The results of the experimental test suggested to the task force that it might be possible, through early testing and identification, to accelerate the training of certain men in the basic training companies, and thus move them through the course with greater speed or teach them additional skills in the allotted time. This concept was to receive considerable attention in later phases of the Fort Ord experiment.

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TABLE 3—EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TRAINEES IN THEIR FIRST WEEK OF BASIC COMBAT TRAINING

Physical Combat Proficiency Test

Event	Event Minimums	Trainee Average
Low crawl	60	71.85
Horizontal ladder	60	66.20
Run, dodge, and jump	60	61.45
Mile run	60	64.27
150-yard man-carry	60	[a]
Total	300 of 500 points	263.77 of 400 points

Graded Proficiency Test

Subject	Number Passed	Number Failed
Military courtesy & general subjects	49	110
Military justice & code of conduct	60	99
Drill and ceremonies	0	159
First aid & CBR	2	157
Guard duty & reporting	0	159
Hand to hand combat	1	158
Bayonet	0	159
Individual tactical training	0	159

Basic Rifle Marksmanship Test

Category	Number
Expert	2
Sharpshooter	7
Marksman	68
Unqualified	57

[a] Not done.

The task force which investigated course materials found in the content a lack of conformity with doctrine, failure to include current information, and poor format. Since there was no provision for regular review of course materials, General Davidson directed the G–3 to set up such a review program to improve materials.

Five task forces evaluated training facilities that included classrooms, ranges, field areas, educational television, and training aids. Classrooms that were not needed at Fort Ord were closed and equipment was redistributed with a consequent savings of $16,750 per year in maintenance costs. By combining ranges, four were reduced to two, thus saving $6,190 a year in maintenance and transportation costs. The task force which examined the use of educational television reported that Fort Ord's television operating costs were less than those of the other training centers contacted, while the number of program hours at Fort Ord was second only to the number at Fort Dix. Only 50 percent of the available instructional time was being utilized, however, a percentage below the 70 percent prescribed by Continental Army Command.

Two task forces had the objective of reducing administrative requirements on training time, a critical element in the training program. Although administrative requirements can interfere seriously with training, examination showed that guard, fatigue, burial, and other details were being performed efficiently, with negligible effect on the basic combat and combat support trainees and little on enlisted trainers. Administrative requirements occasionally created problems in training units because of the small number of officers assigned, normally only one to a company. In the matter of reports, it was found that although many of those submitted by training companies were outdated and therefore either useless or repetitious, they were being continued because of the lack of administrative expertise and the absence of review and control. Accordingly, heavy emphasis was now placed on upgrading basic administration, and control officers were designated in each major unit to screen reports submitted by subordinate units and to eliminate those which were not needed.

A survey of post consumer facilities and trainer activities showed a conflict in operating hours. Since consumer facilities such as the main post exchange and the quartermaster clothing sales store were not open after duty hours, trainers had to use them during training hours or not at all. The hours of these facilities were therefore immediately changed so that trainers and trainees could have access to them after duty hours.

Task Force C–10 discovered that because of various missions and contingency plans more vehicles were maintained in the motor pool than the post needed. Forty-four trucks with a total acquisition cost of $145,000 fell into this category. Further, annual maintenance costs for these forty-four vehicles totaled $41,000. In the weapons and equipment pool, matériel for which there had been little demand during the previous year was valued at $393,665 and its annual maintenance cost at $1,952. In the audio-visual section, it was discovered that excess projectors worth

OVERHEAD LADDER INTEGRATED INTO THE MESS LINE

$5,770 were on hand. As a result of these discoveries, immediate steps were taken to turn in all of the excess vehicles, equipment, and matériel.

Task Force P–3 investigated trainee motivation and morale. The findings and subsequent activity of the P–3 task force will be discussed in the following chapter.

When the Training Management Evaluation Committee project was completed and the dust had settled, the general consensus was that it had been extremely valuable to Fort Ord. First, it had been of great value in educating and involving the entire post in training, the primary mission. Second, a myriad of small deficiencies which are not discussed here were detected and immediately corrected. Third, considerable attention was focused on the quality of trainer performance, trainee motivation and equipment requirements were reviewed, and equipment excesses were isolated and corrective action was started.

As the Training Management Evaluation Committee effort progressed it began to attract attention from higher commanders. On 10 November 1969, General Davidson was called to the Presidio of San Francisco to present a briefing to Lieutenant General Stanley R. Larsen, Sixth Army commander, and General James K. Woolnough, commander of Continental Army Command. In the briefing, General Davidson covered Training Management Evaluation Committee results at Ford Ord and various areas that he felt warranted additional study. New ideas and experiments in trainee motivation and morale were stressed.

At this point in time it was becoming increasingly apparent that the days of the draft were numbered. Department of the Army was beginning to anticipate the coming problem of attracting volunteers to replace draftees. For this reason, the innovations and experimentation independently organized at Fort Ord came at a time when insights produced by this type of work were in great demand. Fort Ord was to go on to become a sort of field test training center where new ideas, both self-generated and otherwise, were very carefully tried and evaluated.

CHAPTER III

Morale and Motivation

> A competent leader can get efficient service from poor troops, while on the contrary an incapable leader can demoralize the best of troops. JOHN J. PERSHING

In the Training Management Evaluation Committee project, Task Force P–3 was given the mission to "develop policies and procedures to improve trainee motivation and morale." Morale is much talked about in the Army and commanders are frequently judged on the basis of its relative state in their units. Morale, in the Army context, is defined by Webster as ". . . a confident, aggressive, resolute, often buoyant, spirit of wholehearted co-operation in a common effort, often attended by zeal, self-sacrifice, or indomitableness." Morale, a highly subjective concept, has traditionally resisted objective measurement. Over the years Army leaders have tended to gauge morale intuitively or by examining alleged "morale indicators" such as a unit's re-enlistment, absence without leave, and delinquency report incident rates, the assumption being that units with high morale had more men in the first category and fewer in the second two.

The concern with motivation in military training and life is of more recent origin. In earlier, more autocratic days, the word was not much in use. However, as Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben noted while training Americans at Valley Forge, "I am obliged to say, 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and then he does it." In this sense, the need to motivate, to impel the American soldier, has always been with us. Americans are highly independent by nature and perform best when a clear and logical need for a given action or attitude is provided. The problem has always been in selecting the most effective motivational stimulus for the particular task at hand. The complexity of the motivational task is increased by the considerable range of intelligence levels among trainees and the shifting mix of draftees, volunteers, and Reservists on active duty for training, each marching to his own drummer. As with morale, direct measurement of motivational levels and selection of motivational instruments have been more tradition-based than scientific. Each commander, at each echelon, tends to choose moti-

vational incentives based on his own goals and values as well as those of the men he is attempting to influence.

With the shift to a volunteer Army on the horizon, the question of motivation and morale naturally began to draw increasing attention, particularly in terms of re-enlistments. As long as the Selective Service system provided an adequate flow of draftees, recognized deficiencies in service attractiveness, pay, job satisfaction, and related matters could be relegated to the "nice to have" category. It was apparent, however, that if the Army was going to rely on volunteers more attention would have to be given to motivation and morale. Thus, Task Force P–3 faced a complex but highly important task.

The Training Management Evaluation Committee directed Task Force P–3 "to develop policies and procedures to improve trainee motivation and morale." Colonel Llewellyn Legters, the post deputy surgeon, was chosen to head the force. A graduate of the University of Buffalo, Colonel Legters entered the Army as a volunteer in 1957 and served with the 82d Airborne Division and the Special Forces in Vietnam. He had thus added to his scientific training his experience with the soldier in combat. Because he could express his views in a compelling manner, he was to become a powerful and convincing advocate of the various innovations introduced by Task Force P–3. To provide balance and expertise, officers representing the brigades and the basic combat training committee group were assigned as members of the task force.

As the force began to examine the scope of the mission assigned, it became apparent that the advice of a professionally trained behavioral scientist would be helpful, if not absolutely necessary. For this counsel Colonel Legters turned to Lieutenant Colonel William E. Datel, then assigned as Chief Psychologist, Mental Hygiene Consultation Service, Fort Ord, who became consultant to the task force. Colonel Datel, a graduate in psychology at the University of Minnesota, entered the Army's Medical Service Corps in 1952, and received his doctorate in psychology from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1954. He had since held a series of posts at mental hygiene units in military hospitals in the United States and overseas, including that of acting chief of the Department of Clinical and Social Psychology at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. During the course of his work he had become deeply interested in the field of achievement motivation in the military establishment. Speaking of Dr. Datel late in 1972, General Davidson said: "I unleashed him and sometimes I wondered what the hell I'd unleashed although he's a brilliant scientist, a brilliant psychologist, and I don't use that term often. He also had a hell of a lot of common sense and wasn't swept away with these charts and things. He was inclined to give you broad interpretations and then to relate to the real life situation."

As a first step, the task force defined in its own terms motivation and morale. Motivation was summed up as those forces which impinged on the individual from the environment; morale was defined as the individual's state of feeling, or attitude, and was considered to reside within the individual. To place motivation and morale in the context of Army training, the task force designed a systems model that takes into account the existence of components that interact to produce motivation. (*Chart 2*) Within each component there is a range of values from very positive to very negative. Motivation is composed of incentives and aversive (unpleasant) stimuli. Trainee response varies, according to the attributes, capacities, and characteristics of the individual. For example, a trainee with high intelligence will have a response that differs from that of a trainee with low intelligence. Performance is determined by the nature, the strength, and the manner of application of motivational forces and by the morale of the individual, but his own performance may act upon the trainee's morale.

Morale and Motivation Measurements

Having defined their terms and produced a useful systems model, the committee members then sought to develop a set of quantifiable measures so that the model could be put to use. Measurements already existed for the trainee component, including morale, and for the performance component. The task force developed its own measurements for the motivational forces acting on trainees.

While stationed at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Colonel Datel had participated in a series of field research studies conducted at Fort Dix, New Jersey, to examine stress induced by Army basic training on recruits. The measurement device was the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist.[1] Used weekly, this device required trainees to select from a list of 132 words all those that described their feelings during the previous week. Processed by computer, the checklist provided a view of the feeling state, or morale, of an individual or group. Upon his assignment to Fort Ord, Colonel Datel had continued his research in stress and morale among recruits taking basic training and the results were now available to Task Force P–3.

Traditional performance measures were already built into the basic combat training program. They consisted of performance scores on the Physical Combat Proficiency Test, the Basic Rifle Marksmanship Test, and the Basic Combat Training Test, formerly known as the G–3 Training Test.

[1] The Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist is a copyrighted product of the Educational and Industrial Training Service.

CHART 2—SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF ARMY TRAINING



To measure the motivational forces at work during basic training, a list of some two hundred events that could occur in basic training and that covered training requirements, physical needs, information, time off, recreation, harassment and abuse, and awards and promotions was developed. At the end of the training cycle, a randomly selected group of men in basic training from different companies were given the list and told to indicate what they liked and what they disliked, using a seven-point scale ranging from one—"dislike very much"—to seven—"like very much." The men were asked to rate each event in the inventory. They were also asked to rate each item on frequency of occurrence, in other words, to tell the task force how often these things occurred while the men were in basic training. Again, this rating of frequency was on a seven-point scale ranging from one—"never happened"—to seven—"always happened." This form of motivational survey was subsequently refined and standardized under the name Company Evaluation Inventory. (*See Appendix A.*)

As a result of data collected in the three primary areas of morale, performance, and motivation, the task force was able to draw certain conclusions about the nature and strength of these forces in basic training. First of all, the men in training gave most training tasks and most events dealing with personal privacy neutral ratings on the motivational scale. In other words, trainees accepted the responsibilty and legitimacy of military service and training. They did not mind living in barracks nor did they strenuously quarrel with the deprivations that occur in basic training. More to the point, the men felt that there were not enough positive incentives at Fort Ord, such as time off from training and opportunities for recreation. On the basis of its motivational data, the task force concluded that to the men themselves cadre control of trainees at Fort Ord appeared to be based often on threats and punishments, and the approach of the training at Fort Ord was at times perceived as a punitive one. The task force theorized that increased use of positive incentives and reduction in the employment of aversive techniques would act to improve both morale and performance.

In developing recommendations for the commanding general, the task force took into account both the motivational and frequency values of each item on the inventory, devising for the purpose a so-called Action Classification of Events Matrix. (*Chart 3*) Events that ranked high in both frequency and positive motivational value were to be maintained; events with high motivation but low frequency value were to be promoted; and averse events occurring with high or medium frequency were to be eliminated. Aversive events with very low frequency ratings could be ignored since they occurred rarely, if at all. Events that fell into the neutral zone on the motivation scale could also be ignored because they had neither incentive nor aversive value.

CHART 3—ACTION CLASSIFICATION OF EVENTS MATRIX



Using the action matrix as a guide, the task force then recommended to General Davidson that he emphasize incentives, specifically, by (1) stressing the mess management improvement program; (2) providng increased recreational opportunities; (3) providing information about training to the trainees; and (4) relaxing locally stringent meningitis controls. The force recommended that he also de-emphasize aversions by establishing trainee councils, and apply incentives on the basis of performance, developing and testing for feasibility a merit reward system.

A mess management improvement program had been instituted prior to the Training Management Evaluation Committee study. The task force recommended continued command emphasis on the program because of the high incentive values placed by the trainees on food. The recommendations for increased recreational opportunities and provision of more information to trainees about major training events were also based on the high motivational value the trainees attached to these items. The stringent meningitis control measures in effect at Fort Ord restricted



MESS HALL. *Since quality and quantity of food have a great impact on morale, food service receives much command emphasis.*

basic trainees to their company areas during their time at the reception station and throughout the basic training cycle. The task force felt that Fort Ord's control regulations went well beyond those called for by preventive medicine and that they severely restricted the ability of the cadre to provide recreational opportunities. The recommendation for the establishment of company trainee councils was conceived as another means by which the trainee could communicate with the company commander.

The above recommendations were made to General Davidson early in November of 1969. It should be added that they were made with considerable trepidation by Colonel Legters, since he was well aware that they constituted an abrupt, and in some cases revolutionary, change from standard Army policy. To the considerable surprise of both Legters and Datel, General Davidson accepted all of the task force recommendations.

The recommendations concerning mess management, increased recreational facilities and opportunities, and increased information for the trainees concerning their training were fairly simple to implement and the first steps were taken quickly. Implementation of the Merit Reward System and the Company Trainee Council Program required greater and more careful preparation. To accomplish the planning, experimentation, and implementation of these and other related programs, Task Force P–3 under Colonel Legters, with Colonel Datel as a full-time consultant, was continued as a semipermanent staff agency when the Training Management Evaluation Committee was disbanded. Its mission was to plan for and supervise the establishment and testing of the Merit Reward System and the Company Trainee Council Program and to further investigate cadre motivation and morale.

The Merit Reward System

Having conceived the Merit Reward System and convinced General Davidson that it was worth a test, Drs. Legters and Datel now had to flesh out the theory and transform it into a working program. In their early research they had become convinced that the existing basic combat training system took draftees who, in the main, were positive-minded, co-operative, interested recruits and in many cases blunted their positive attitudes. An article published by the two men in the "Journal of Biological Psychology" made the following points:

> Military traditionalists may argue that it is necessary to "break" the recruit to make him into a well disciplined soldier, fully obedient to orders, and totally committed to the service. It is implicit in this view that basic training is primarily an initiation rite. The new recruit must submit, surrender, abjure, and sacrifice to become a full-fledged member.
>
> Ritualistic initiation rites ordinarily involve some kind of suffering, relinquishment, or self abuse on the part of the initiate. In basic training, this requirement is apparently fulfilled by stripping the trainee of his

SILAS B. HAYES ARMY HOSPITAL *with barracks in foreground.*

personal identity, and by constant reminders of his demeaning status. The value or ethic seems to be that the initiation process (with its indignities and devaluations of self) is absolutely necessary to bind the individual to his new reference group, as in the case of baptism, circumcision, fraternity rites, admittance to Alcoholics Anonymous, or "status removal" in sensitivity training, to pick a very contemporary example. If the initiation or "conversion" process is foregone, the argument runs that the soldier will be less fully committed to the military subculture and may renege in the heat of battle.

Our position is otherwise. Our findings suggest that the new recruit already accepts the necessities of military duty and the legitimacy of military service. He enters the Army willingly and in good faith. It is superfluous—but more important, it is psychologically destructive—to undertake a process of forced rededication and commitment.

They found their alternative in the theories of the well-known behavioral scientist, Dr. B. F. Skinner. Specifically, they turned to the "Law of Reinforcement": that "behavior is determined by its consequences." They argued that performance could be improved by improving morale and that both could be improved by modifying the motivational stimuli in current use in the training environment. In addition, performance gains would be accompanied by improved attitudes toward the Army on the part of the trainees and greater possibilities that soldiers would re-enlist. Simply stated, the technique modifies behavior (or attitudes) by consistently rewarding "good" behavior and by withholding reward, or punishing, "bad" behavior. The modified behavior patterns induced

by the reward conditioning tend to persist, even when the rewards come less frequently or cease altogether.

In actual fact, the operant conditioning technique was in use at Fort Ord, but it was not employed systematically. The surveys conducted by the task force revealed that "good" behavior frequently went unrewarded, that rewards which were forthcoming tended to be sporadic, unpredictable, and not suited to the behavior, and that "avoidance conditioning" (do this or else) was commonplace. While avoidance, escape, and punishment conditioning are unquestionably effective means of shaping and maintaining desired behavior, their use was considered and discarded by the task force in recognition of the goal of promoting favorable attitudes toward the Army.

Having settled on the use of positive conditioning, the task force now set about identifying those incentives which could be used as behavior reinforcers, or consequences (rewards), in the Merit Reward System. Earlier surveys were reviewed and additional surveys were made to identify rewards that possessed a high motivational impact. Chief among these were items in the survey which had to do with time-off privileges, which received extremely high incentive ratings. For example, "Being given a three day pass" received the highest incentive rating of all the events in the survey. Promotion was also rated as a strong incentive. The item "Receiving a promotion to E–2" was rated 6.3 on a scale in which a rating of 7.00 was maximum. It was learned that mementos or ceremonies recognizing individual achievement, while definitely incentive, were less powerful motivators than time off and promotion. Rewards allocated on a group basis were found to have less incentive value than rewards allocated on an individual basis. Because of these findings, time-off privileges and promotions were selected as the principal rewards in the Merit Reward System.

The task force now turned to the task of identifying the behaviors that were to be reinforced. They inquired into exactly what was wanted of the soldier undergoing basic training in terms of behavior patterns and learning. General objectives such as "skilled in the fundamentals of soldiering" had to be translated into specific behavioral requirements. These requirements, in turn, had to be assigned a priority. Priorities were required in order to assign rewards logically and fairly. "Are housekeeping habits as important as physical fitness?" "Is training in drill and ceremonies as essential as expertise with the rifle?" These are examples of questions that arose in designing the behavioral portion of the Merit Reward System. The problems of which behaviors to reinforce, how much reinforcement to allocate to each behavioral activity, and what were to be the criteria for whether or not behaviors were actually performed were resolved by soliciting the judgments of a jury of experts—com-

manders and drill sergeants—and by considerable trial and error in constructing reward schedules.

One problem was how expensive the privileges should be. If the rewards were placed out of reach of most of the men, the Merit Reward System as a motivational device would fail. Poor results could also be expected if there was an overabundance of merits in circulation or if the price of the privileges was too cheap. This problem was resolved by establishing different orders of privilege, with the less expensive privileges granting less time off than the more expensive privileges. Further, to become eligible for a privilege, a man had to accumulate a certain minimum number of merits. The better performing trainees thus became eligible for privileges more quickly.

Other essential matters that required attention were establishing a creditable bookkeeping and accounting procedure, communicating the rules of the system to the participants, orienting and training the operators in executing the system, and developing methods for quality control monitoring of the system. All these matters were examined and procedures for their operation devised.

The committee now turned its efforts toward devising a working arrangement which would bring the theories and principles into actual and systematic use. In the original design of the Merit Reward System, an individual merit card, kept in the possession of each soldier at all times, was the means used to record merits earned. Using a railroad conductor's punch with a unique die, the drill sergeant punched out color-coded merits on the card as the soldier earned them. At the end of each week, each soldier's merit earnings were tabulated from the card and recorded in a master platoon log. Informal inventory of the soldier's merit holdings was made weekly; at this time the soldier decided whether to save his merits for a later, higher-order privilege or to spend them for an immediate privilege.

Trainees could earn an absolute maximum of fifty merits a week, except in the eighth week when a maximum of eighty merits could be earned. Used during basic training by the initial Merit Reward System test companies, the punch card method of dispensing the secondary reinforcement merits was found to be unwieldy. Since there were forty to fifty trainees per drill sergeant, an excessive amount of time was spent in punching the cards; then, too, "punching someone's ticket" was not in keeping with the image of the drill sergeant. The merit card system was therefore discarded in favor of a platoon roster. Each soldier's merit earnings, by activity performed, were entered on the roster and posted daily on the platoon bulletin board. The rules of the system were published in considerable detail. A post regulation, dated 2 November 1970, directed the implementation of the Merit Reward System and provided



ACTIVITIES

- MORNING TRAINING FORMATION (MON-FRI)
- DAILY DS EVALUATION (MON-FRI)
- DAILY INSPECTION (MON-FRI)
- SATURDAY INSPECTION AND WEEKLY PLATOON RATING
- WEEKEND TRAINEE LEADER EVALUATION
- MISCELLANEOUS
- PERFORMANCE TESTING

PRIVILEGES

- A WEEKEND MOVIE
- B SATURDAY NIGHT ON-POST (1800-2300)
- C SUNDAY ON-POST (1000-2130)
- D SUNDAY OFF-POST (1000-2130)
- E OVERNIGHT WEEKEND PASS (SAT PM - SUN 2130)
- F CONSIDERATION FOR PROMOTION TO E-2 OR E-3 (TOP 35% OF MERIT EARNERS)
- S SUSPENSION OF CASH-IN

MERIT CARD

over-all guidance to unit commanders. The Drill Sergeant's Manual for the Merit Reward System set forth the rationale and principles of the system and specified the activities for which a soldier could earn merits. It also gave performance criteria for the award of merits and each activity, defined the privileges, listed the merits required to obtain each privilege, and provided specific guidance on how the system was to operate. The Soldier Handbook for the Merit Reward System was an abbreviated version of the Drill Sergeant's Manual but contained sufficient detail to give each trainee a thorough description of how the system worked. The key to the successful operation of the Merit Reward System was the man who administered it—the drill sergeant. It was he who dispensed the reinforcement according to the prescribed schedule and criteria, taught the soldier how to increase his merit earning, and enlivened and interpreted the rules of the system.

The task force had expected considerable resistance on the part of the drill sergeants, and the expectation was realized. The Merit Reward System called for a reordering of the priorities in the role of the drill sergeant and a fundamental change in the relationship between drill sergeant and trainee. Under the new system, the challenge to the drill sergeant would no longer be how best to motivate men by personal give and take, but rather how to operate in a system wherein the motivational elements were already established. To the extent that leaders prefer to apply their own personal and sometimes arbitrary system of rewards and punishments, according to the behavior of the men in their charge, executing the leadership role within the confines of the Merit Reward System could be unpalatable. In effect, the system shifted the location of power from the more personal reward and punishment decisions of the drill sergeant and embodied this power in a formalized, institutionalized set of rules. The drill sergeant was, therefore, being ordered to expand his position and become more of a coach, an instructor, and a technician. At first there was not only consideratble resistance to the Merit Reward System on the part of drill sergeants and company cadre, but also confusion as to exactly how to apply the system. These problems were eventually overcome through hard work, good will, and day-to-day experience; drill sergeants and company cadre who initially disliked the system came to view it as a valuable tool.

The prototype of the Merit Reward System was developed as a result of engineering, re-engineering, and feasibility testing in three basic training companies, beginning in January of 1970. Since the system proved practical and early results in these companies were encouraging, it was decided to test the system further, on a more extensive scale. Permission to do this was sought from Continental Army Command, which



A Platoon Merit Log *was posted in the barracks and kept up to date for each basic training platoon.*

in mid-1970 directed a two-battalion test of the Merit Reward System at Fort Ord, together with a one-company test of the same system at all the other U.S. Army basic training centers. The purpose of the two-battalion test was to determine the practicality of the Merit Reward System in large-scale application, and to examine its effects on performance and attitudes. The experimental design at Fort Ord consisted of thirteen companies using the Merit Reward System and twenty-one control companies not using the system, selected on the basis of criteria specified by Continental Army Command. There were approximately three thousand men in the Merit Reward System group and forty-five hundred men in the control group. When the results of training in the two groups were analyzed, it was discovered that the Merit Reward System companies out-performed the control companies on all indicators except basic rifle marksmanship, and there the scores were very close. It was concluded therefore, that there had been measurable improvement resulting from use of the Merit Reward System in basic combat training. There were still, however, many bugs in the areas of design, execution, operation, and cadre acceptance of the system as a training method. Fort Ord therefore recommended to Continental Army Command that the Merit Reward System not be implemented postwide until the difficulties had been overcome and the system modified. By November of 1970 the alterations had been made and the modified Merit Reward System was instituted in all basic combat training companies at Fort Ord.

From its first application in the test companies, the Merit Reward System was closely monitored to detect instances and areas of faulty operation and to indicate the over-all results and effectiveness of the program. To assist in the analysis a number of measurement devices were employed. These included repetitive surveys using the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist or the more recent Military Morale Inventory; attrition indicators such as absent without leave and recycle rates; the Company Evaluation Inventory; and the analysis of performance scores in basic rifle marksmanship, physical combat proficiency, and the end-of-cycle performance tests. The above devices and tests indicated that trainee morale at Fort Ord had risen substantially since measurements started in early 1970, before the introduction of the Merit Reward System. There was a recorded gain of more than eight points on the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist scale. It is clear that, by and large, trainees liked the system; Company Evaluation Inventory ratings between 6.00 and 7.00 on the seven-point scale were not uncommon for the item "Trainees like the MRS." In terms of attitude change, a gradual upward climb in the inventory item that measures re-enlistment intentions took

A Fort Ord Service Club Complex

place. Since there were many other programs at Fort Ord during this period, however, it is difficult to single out the Merit Reward System as the sole producer of the gains in morale and re-enlistment intention.

Company Trainee Councils

One of the initial recommendations made to General Davidson by Task Force P–3 was the establishment of trainee councils composed of trainee leaders, who would record and report instances of harassment or physical abuse to the inspector general or a board of officers on completion of the training cycle. To this end, a post regulation establishing company trainee councils (later renamed training improvement seminars) was published in February 1970, and the councils were formed in all training companies at Fort Ord.

In their actual form, the trainee councils went beyond the conception of the task force. They became arenas for constructive face-to-face exchange between the company commander and trainee representatives. The normal procedure was to have a trainee leader and one other representative from each platoon meet with the company commander and a recorder periodically. The trainee leaders talked with their platoons prior to the meeting and were charged with bringing to the attention of the company commander constructive comments on all aspects of training. Most company commanders, who were highly skeptical, if not hostile, to the idea initially, came to realize that the information

they were receiving was valuable and helpful to them in their duties. For instance, training center officers have always encouraged trainees to write home regularly and to keep their parents and families informed of their activities. At one of the earliest company trainee council meetings, a trainee representative asked if it might be possible to arrange some system which would allow the trainees to buy postage stamps more easily. Investigation revealed that there were no stamp machines in any of the four training brigades at Fort Ord, and that it was very difficult for a trainee to get stamps unless he had them sent to him by mail. Needless to say, the oversight was quickly corrected, but it might not have been except for the trainee representative at the company trainee council.

At Fort Ord the current regulation setting forth policies and providing guidance for the establishment and conduct of training improvement seminars stated the objectives of the program: (1) to provide a formal means by which trainees can make known to the company commander trainee observations and suggestions concerning improvements in training and unit operations and procedures; (2) to provide an additional means of communication between the company commander and the trainees which will facilitate receipt of trainee observations and suggestions; (3) to provide the company commander with the opportunity to correct possible misunderstandings of trainees as to the reasons for particular training events, policies, and circumstances; (4) to provide a basis for action by the company commander and higher commanders to effect improvements in training and in unit operations based on constructive observations and suggestions received from trainees; (5) to provide company commanders with an additional means to evaluate trainee morale and welfare within the company.

Training improvement seminars were held in the first, second, fourth, and sixth weeks of basic combat training. In the combat support training brigade, meetings were held at monthly intervals. Company commanders presided at all training improvement seminars. The discussion generally focused on the identification of problem areas where improvement in training and unit operations appeared desirable. The company commanders also used the seminars to explain administrative and other policies that were pertinent to the topics being discussed.

Company commanders made full use of the normal company chain of command in investigating and correcting conditions that had generated legitimate trainee complaints or suggestions. Battalion and brigade commanders took prompt action on those legitimate complaints or suggestions which were beyond the scope of the company commander. Further, they forwarded complaints beyond their ability to correct, or suggestions beyond their power to implement, to higher headquarters.

Summary of Morale and Motivation Measurement Devices

Beginning in 1968, and operating with funds provided by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Dr. Datel started to measure trainee morale, employing the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist. As the trainee motivation and morale task force at Fort Ord continued its activities, additional means to measure motivation and morale were devised and employed. In 1971 Dr. Datel devised the Military Morale Inventory to replace the checklist. Operating on the same principle as the checklist, the inventory was tailored to the military environment. After it had been tested, the Military Morale Inventory supplanted the checklist in July 1971. To make morale data comparable over time, equivalence tables were constructed that enabled conversion of checklist scores into inventory scores and vice versa. The Company Evaluation Inventory was designed to serve two purposes: first, it was to be a measurement of soldier attitudes and opinions; second, it was to monitor the implementation of the Merit Reward System. The Company Evaluation Inventory was made up of three parts. Part one was composed of items which monitored the quality and judiciousness of Merit Reward System administration; part two contained items having to do with the soldier's living and training conditions; and part three measured soldier attitude toward the Army. (*See Appendix A.*)

Task Force P–3, subsequently renamed the Volunteer Army Evaluation Group, became increasingly involved in the expanding measurement and evaluation effort, which grew out of both the need to examine the impact and assess the value of the various volunteer Army training innovations, as well as the continuing need to assess the Merit Reward System and training improvement seminars.

The final result of the measurement activity at Fort Ord came in the form of the Unit Analysis Report. This report was first employed in November 1970 and was designed to measure above average training company performance through examination and quantification of unit administration, morale, attrition, and performance.

Although the multiplicity of tests and surveys required considerable manpower to administer and supervise, the results provided the Fort Ord command group and the Volunteer Army Evaluation Group with a "fever chart" which was constantly updated. The impact of various innovations could thus be quickly assessed, and reliance on subjective and intuitive judgments of the impact of various changes could be greatly reduced.

Thus, by early 1970 some of the new ideas and experiments which General Davidson had suggested during the Presidio of San Francisco briefing of November 1969 had not only been effected but had begun to bear fruit. Through the systematic employment of new and improved



MILITARY MORALE INVENTORY

INSTRUCTIONS. Below is a list of words which can be used to describe a soldier's morale or "feeling state."

We want you to summarize your morale for the past week. Blacken in the space alongside the words that best describe the way you have felt during the past week.

Although some of the words may seem similar to each other, please mark all of the words that describe the main feelings you have experienced during the past week.

The results of this inventory are scored by machine, therefore:

- Use the pencil provided (# 2 pencil)
- Keep answer sheet clean
- Erase stray marks and errors completely
- Do not fold or tear answer sheet

There is no time limit. When finished, turn your answer sheet face down.

UNIT
COMPANY
BATTALION
BRIGADE
PLATOON

DATE
DAY
MONTH
YEAR

ADMINISTRATION
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

HOUR

1.	ACTIVE	21.	CROSS	41.	GOOD-NATURED	61.	PEACEFUL
2.	ADVENTUROUS	22.	DISAGREEABLE	42.	HAPPY	62.	PLEASED
3.	AGITATED	23.	DISCONTENTED	43.	HEALTHY	63.	PLEASANT
4.	AGREEABLE	24.	DISCOURAGED	44.	HOPELESS	64.	RELAXED
5.	AGGRESSIVE	25.	DISGUSTED	45.	IMPATIENT	65.	RESENTFUL
6.	ALIVE	26.	DISPLEASED	46.	INSPIRED	66.	SAD
7.	ALONE	27.	DOWNCAST	47.	INTERESTED	67.	SAFE
8.	ANGRY	28.	EMBARRASSED	48.	IRRITATED	68.	SATISFIED
9.	ANNOYED	29.	ENERGETIC	49.	JOYFUL	69.	SECURE
10.	ASHAMED	30.	ENTHUSIASTIC	50.	KINDLY	70.	STRONG
11.	AWFUL	31.	EXCITED	51.	LONELY	71.	SUFFERING
12.	BITTER	32.	FINE	52.	LOST	72.	TENSE
13.	BLUE	33.	FIT	53.	LOVING	73.	TERRIBLE
14.	BORED	34.	FREE	54.	LOW	74.	TORMENTED
15.	CAREFREE	35.	FRIENDLY	55.	LUCKY	75.	UNDERSTANDING
16.	CHEERFUL	36.	FURIOUS	56.	MAD	76.	UNEASY
17.	COMPLAINING	37.	GAY	57.	MERRY	77.	UNHAPPY
18.	CONFIDENT	38.	GLAD	58.	MISERABLE	78.	UPSET
19.	COOL	39.	GLOOMY	59.	NERVOUS	79.	WONDERFUL
20.	COOPERATIVE	40.	GOOD	60.	OFFENDED	80.	WORRYING

THE MILITARY MORALE INVENTORY *was a means of measuring soldier motivation and morale.*

measurement devices, Fort Ord produced important management tools of considerable value to the U.S. Army. Unit morale, which up to then had been the intangible quality most difficult to obtain through existing measurements, was now measurable. How valuable an advance this contribution to soldier management would be, only time would tell. What was certain, however, was that Fort Ord now had the tools to permit an objective evaluation of motivation and morale in every training unit.

CHAPTER IV

VOLAR and Training

The best form of "welfare" for the troops is first-class training.
ERWIN ROMMEL

Following the President's establishment of volunteer armed forces as a national objective, the Secretary of Defense set a zero draft target date of 1 July 1973. Many plans for improvement and change already formulated in the Army now received added impetus. To facilitate the earliest possible implementation of the plans and to encourage the widespread undertaking of other needed improvements, the Army initiated the Modern Volunteer Army Program. The program encompassed all Army actions directed toward strengthening professionalism, generally improving Army life, and acquiring the necessary manpower. To support the program, the Army requested additional funds. These were earmarked in the Project Volunteer proposal presented by the Department of Defense to the Congress, and provided limited augmentations to basic Army program expenditures.

Actually, the Modern Volunteer Army Program was not new, nor in the truest sense modern. Rather, it was a planned re-emphasis of old values which had, to some extent, been weakened by the crisis years of the draft and particularly by the Vietnam War. Greater attention was to be given to professionalism and to the legitimate physical and psychological needs of the men and women who filled the ranks.

One of the major considerations that influenced the Army's efforts was the pressure of time. When the Modern Volunteer Army Program was established by the Chief of Staff in October 1970, the Army was receiving some 20,000 men per month from the draft, most of them intended to meet the needs of the combat arms. If the Army was to maintain its fighting capability without the draft, it had to make the combat army more attractive to young men. Although the Secretary of Defense had officially set 1 July 1973, the beginning of fiscal year 1974, as the date for ending draft calls, the date of 31 December 1972 had been established as the informal target date. It was believed that the intervening six months would give the services an opportunity to determine whether manpower goals could be met before the authority to induct men expired on 30 June 1973. Thus the Army had only twenty-six

"SQUEEZE THE TRIGGER" *is an admonition familiar to generations of American soldiers.*

months to formulate, test, justify, fund, and implement programs designed to provide the required number of men for the peacetime Army then envisioned. The Army budget for fiscal year 1971 was already in execution, and the 1972 budget was in formulation; the 1973 budget was the operative budget to bring the volunteer force into being.

The Army leadership decided that it would be risky to await the passage of the budget for fiscal year 1972 before beginning a testing program to find those measures that would best increase recruiting and retention at least cost. Facts were needed early in order to determine budget requests for the programs of fiscal years 1972 and 1973. It was therefore decided to reprogram certain fiscal year 1971 funds and begin the testing at once. It was clear that every dollar requested for the volunteer force would have to be fully justified before the Department of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress.

For some time before October 1970, the Army staff had been studying measures that would increase the number of recruits and promote their retention. Under the guidance of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, a task force had assembled a list of literally hundreds of actions designed to attract volunteers to the Army. Some were actions that could be taken at no cost, while others were relatively expensive. At the time the Chief of Staff committed the Army to operating without the draft, only a handful

of these test programs had been implemented Army-wide. A few of the Army's major installations were, however, on their own initiative testing certain new measures to improve training, motivation, and conditions of life in the Army for the soldier and his family. These installations, of which Fort Ord was one, subsequently became key centers of the test effort.

The need to improve the image of the Army among the young men it sought to attract was apparent from opinion surveys taken by the Army, the Department of Defense, and commercial firms. These surveys revealed that the Army was rated as the lowest of all the services in terms of opportunity for meaningful work, development of skills, and job satisfaction. They also indicated that the Army was thought to have such negative aspects as poor living conditions, make-work, harassment, and, curiously enough, the lowest pay, although pay is the same for all services. It was clear to the Army's leadership that the reputation of the Army had to be improved and it was equally clear that this would take time. But a public commitment by the Army to improve working and living conditions could be made at once and demonstrated almost immediately. It was essential that the Army show itself willing and able to improve conditions so that its relative standing with the sister services could be improved.

Under the system of a two-year draft and a one-year tour in Vietnam, there had been little opportunity to weld combat units in the continental United States and Europe into effective fighting teams. Field units had large numbers of "short timers"; many squad leaders hardly got to know their men before they or their men were reassigned, or their men ended their term of enlistment. The Army had to find a way to stabilize its people and to provide conditions that would allow leaders at all levels the time and resources needed to mold men into soldiering units with high *esprit de corps*.

The program included three types of measures: professional, life-style, and so-called context measures. The professional measures were policies and procedures designed to improve the job proficiency and job satisfaction of the individual soldier and officer by ensuring better trained, more responsive, and more capable units performing satisfying and meaningful missions. Life-style measures were policies, procedures, and changes of attitude within the Army designed to improve day-to-day life in the Army; they included such benefits as better pay, housing, and educational opportunities for soldiers and dependents. Context measures were actions concerning the Army's relationship with such problems of modern society as drug abuse, racial conflict, and general permissiveness.

In October 1970, the Department of the Army had established the Office of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army and appointed Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe to the post. The long-

THE "SQUAT-BENDER" EXERCISE. *Daily calisthenics gradually increased in scope and duration.*

range plan developed by this office proposed that extensive innovations be tested in depth over a broad front, beginning as soon as practicable, in the areas of recruiting, Army life-style, and professionalism.

Soon after the creation of the Office of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, General Forsythe gathered representatives from the military and from education and the behavioral sciences for a series of planning meetings held at the Pentagon in mid-November 1970. The purpose of these conferences was to develop two of the components of the master plan for the Modern Volunteer Army: determining the scope of changes to Army life-style and formulating an approach to large-scale alterations in the Army training center system.

Project VOLAR: The Army's Experimental Effort

Project VOLAR was the central effort in the development of the Modern Volunteer Army Program. Its primary purpose was to introduce, test, and evaluate two kinds of actions to be taken at selected Army installations: actions directed toward developing professionalism, identification with the Army, and greater job satisfaction among officers and enlisted men alike; and actions directed toward improving the quality of Army life and removing unnecessary sources of irritation and dissatisfaction.

Although the Department of Defense planned to initiate its own program, called Project Volunteer, to begin in fiscal year 1972, the Army elected to push forward without delay. During the second half of fiscal year 1971, therefore, the Army initiated Project VOLAR at Fort Ord, Fort Benning, and Fort Carson. Each of the three test installations was to concentrate its activity in a different, but complementary area, principally in the combat arms: Fort Ord to concentrate on recruit training and management; Fort Benning on the development of non-commissioned officers and officers; Fort Carson on raising the level of combat unit performance. In addition, certain measures would be introduced at all three posts to evaluate the separate and cumulative effects of the experiments. Based on the results of fiscal year 1971 experiment, improvements that had merit were to be extended in fiscal year 1972 to all combat arms posts, training centers, and branch schools (twelve additional installations) in the continental United States for further evaluation. Army-wide application of improvements thus tested would then be programed for fiscal year 1973.

Fort Ord's primary contribution was to be the development of new programs designed to improve substantially the quality of instruction for the incoming basic trainee. The program, as prescribed by General Forsythe's office, would include such innovations in training as individualized self-paced instruction, and performance-oriented assessments of specific skills at various critical points in the instructional process. Phase one of the Fort Ord VOLAR experiment would involve the development and implementation of an improved instructional program for the advanced infantry training "infantry specialty area"—light weapons infantryman, heavy weapons infantryman, and direct fire crewman (military occupational skill 11H). During the second phase planning for the possible extension of infantry training innovations to the armor and field artillery specialities would be undertaken.

Fort Ord's Preparation for VOLAR

The efforts of the Training Management Evaluation Committee and continued command emphasis on training had furnished many insights into trainee motivation and morale that could be used in the new training programs. The carefully kept statistics would supply the Army with a valid assessment of results of the earlier experiments to measure motivation, morale, and performance. Of equal importance were the studies on trainers and other cadre. Such factors as the degree of satisfaction with medical support, the operating hours of post facilities, and unit administrative requirements could be carefully reviewed and analyzed. Updating these data provided an excellent starting point for the evolving VOLAR programs. These early studies had opened the door

for improvements, cost reductions, and innovative developments which were liberally applied and thoroughly tested throughout the period 1969–71 and had, at least psychologically, begun to prepare Fort Ord for Project VOLAR.

Expertise in the sphere of program development for the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program came from two experienced sources, the Human Resources Research Organization and a military task force of training professionals at Fort Ord. The task of the Human Resources Research Organization during this phase of Project VOLAR was to provide technical advice and assistance in support of the conception, development, and field testing of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program. The military members of the task force consisted of a small, carefully selected group from Fort Ord representing the leadership, cadre, and instructors who were actually to conduct the experiment.

The Human Resources Organization's portion of the work was conducted by Division 3 of the Presidio of Monterey, California, under the direction of Dr. Howard H. McFann. Dr. John E. Taylor served as the project leader with the assistance of Colonel Mark F. Brennan, U.S. Army (Retired), and Mr. Eugene Michaels. Military support for their work was provided by the U.S. Army Training Center Human Research Unit, commanded by Colonel Ullrich Hermann.

Colonel Thomas L. Morgan, an armor officer with twenty-nine years experience ranging from World War II to Vietnam, then commanding the 3d Bridgade, was selected by General Davidson to head the military side of an *ad hoc* program development team during the first days of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program. The team was charged both with originating an improved training program and its initial practical implementation. Later as the actual experiment got under way, Lieutenant Colonel F. A. ("Si") Nerone, of the Directorate of Plans and Training, emerged as a primary military expediter and co-ordinator in the development of the program, and the directorate assumed responsibility for military representation.

The first priority was to determine a primary direction of effort. With guidance from the office of General Forsythe, the members of the team defined their respective areas of action. The mission of the military team was to emphasize professionalism in devising a reinvigorated training program. The Human Resources Research Organization was to provide advice and methodology and to evaluate the actions.

After agreement on respective areas of responsibilty had been reached, it was determined that the approach should be that of revising the instructional and testing structure of the conventional basic combat training and advanced individual training in order to create a more inte-

TRAINEES AFTER A "WATERPROOFING" CLASS. *Water survival training was a local innovation of the 4th Brigade and has been adopted Army-wide in advanced individual training, infantry.*

grated and progressive sixteen-week training operation. The planning program consisted of a series of interdependent steps divided between the Human Resources Organization and the military. First the miltary performance specialists would define the absolute skill and proficiency requirements for a specific area of training. Then, the Human Resources Organization would suggest and develop the specific instructional method. As the next step, the military members would define the exact training objectives of a particular period, or block of instruction, and the Human Resources Research Organization would develop the test methodology. As the final step in the whole program, Army instructors would teach the subjects and conduct the testing while the Human Resources Research Organization would provide quality control of the testing and evaulation for each successive period.

The wide range of changes the military members considered essential in modifying the existing basic and advanced training programs was aimed at making the training more individually responsive, and the testing process indicative of individual performance. To accomplish this purpose the Human Resources Research Organization recommended the adoption of a method of instruction that emphasized practical work, and, equally important, tests based on performance of skills actually required.

GAS MASK DRILL. *Trainees must be able to don the mask, clear it, and check for leaks in nine seconds.*

The individualization desired was to be achieved through the use of so-called self-paced instruction.

The Army planners felt that by restructuring the period of instruction they could enhance individual comprehension and retention. In addition they wanted more flexibilty to deal with changes in schedules and other normal variations or conflicts that normally occur during a training cycle. The team also wanted to streamline the rigid functional structure of the basic combat and advanced individual training system itself, in which each brigade taught only one or the other of these training courses. A new "single-track," incremented block training system, consisting of eight weeks of basic combat training subjects followed by eight weeks of military occupational specialty 11B (light weapons infantryman), 11C (indirect fire crewman), and mechanized infantry training was therefore devised.

The use of performance-oriented, self-paced instruction, within a sixteen-week, three-specialty, single-track system, constituted the major innovation of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program. The Human Resources Research Organization introduced the major pedagogical principles employed in the instructional process. The experimental training program was not an atempt to introduce a series of unrelated innovations into the structural matrix of basic combat and advanced individual training. It was, instead, an attempt to revise system-

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atically the instructional and testing structure of conventional basic combat and advanced individual training in favor of a more integrated and progressive sixteen-week training sequence. The traditional instructional methods of lecture-demonstration-practice were to be altered in an attempt to find more efficient methods of skill development in basic combat and advanced individual infantry training. The testing methods previously employed did not guarantee that at the termination of training all men would be proficient in all subjects taught. Moreover, the conventional concept of training made few concessions to the wide variation in learning aptitiudes always found in a training center.

To guide the development of instruction, the Human Resources Research Organization recommended six learning principles, drawn from such varied sources as psychological research on learning, applied research on military training problems, and the basic concepts of instructional technology. They are enunciated in the Human Resources Research Organization's Technical Report 72–7:

(1) Performance-Based Instruction

The premise of this method of instruction is that the most effective learning occurs when the student becomes actively engaged in the process of learning. To bring the student to active participation, the purpose of instruction has to be thought of as equipping him with skills and capabilities. The subject-matter curriculum is inappropriate in this context, because it stresses what information and facts are to be presented to students to digest and memorize. Performance-based instruction translates the subject matter into the skills and capabilities that the student is to acquire as a result of instruction.

(2) Absolute Criterion

When a student has learned to perform a skill, there must be some standard against which his performance is evaluated. For self-evident reasons, partial success in performance of a skill is unacceptable. Either a student knows how to perform a skill or he does not. Under performance-based instruction, the standard is absolute. When a student is unable to perform a skill, he receives additional training until such time as he demonstrates that he is proficient in that skill.

(3) Functional Context

If the conditions for learning are arranged so that the student sees the usefulness of that instruction and can apply it in solving a problem and in relating technical information to application in a concrete setting, that instruction takes place when a student sees the effect of an abstract principle in a specific and actual situation, and when a particular skill is related to its utility in solving a real-life problem. Functional context refers to the application of technical and abstract information in a situation where the student can see its importance and relation to the skill he is learning.

(4) Individualization

One of the main variables in learning is the amount of time allowed for a student to learn. Instruction that permits the student to learn at the rate necessary for him to acquire a skill is termed individualized instruction. The methods of individualized instruction should offer the student the oppor-

tunity to practice, repeat, and review the skill to the extent necessary for him to learn.

(5) Feedback

When the student is actively engaged in learning a skill, he has to handle and practice with the instructional materials. This situation has obvious advantages to the instructor and student. Both know how the student is learning, because there is ready evidence in the nature of the student's performance. Both can easily see where the student is having problems and where additional practice and instruction are necessary. This immediate knowledge of the results of instruction is called feedback.

(6) Quality Control

A training system has to have empirical evidence that the students have learned what was intended for them to learn. Through performance-based instruction, a training system has a direct means of verifying the quality of its instruction. Because students have learned skills, what they are able to do as a result of instruction is readily observable. Data on all students' performance can be gathered so that the strengths and weaknesses of the entire training system can be identified.

The first priority in designing a training system that would translate these six principles into a plan of action was to select the specific skills that men would be required to learn. Once these skills were identified, they had to be analyzed in terms of the steps of learning necessary to acquisition of the skill.

The second priority was to restate the course and subject objectives in terms of performance, breaking down skills into a set of component tasks for instruction, and to use these skills as the performance test given at the completion of training.

Third was the development of specific tests to evaluate the students' performance of the skills they had been taught. It was necessary that these performance tests not only specify the sequence of steps the men must perform to show that they had acquired a skill, but also define the conditions under which the men would demonstrate proficiency and designate the standard of performance the men must attain. The performance test, in short, had to be geared to the course of instruction.

Setting up a training system along these lines necessitated changing the method of instruction. In general the change in instruction was to curtail long blocks of oral presentation, provide a succinct demonstration of the skill by the instructor, and permit men to practice repeatedly until they had acquired the skill.

The final step in the process of translating theory into action was the establishment of quality control measures. Tests are important to the development, validation, and operation of any training system. In a performance-based program such as the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program they became critical. First of all tests were needed to determine the degree of proficiency that the trainee already possessed in a particular skill. Valid and reliable tests were required to determine

TESTING FOR PROFICIENCY IN USE OF THE MAGNETIC COMPASS

whether the instructional strategy was working as intended; to diagnose individual trainee difficulties on required performance so that pin-point remediation could be provided; to validate the instructional system; to establish a soldier's mastery of the required skills; and to determine his readiness to progress to the next teaching area. The Human Resources Research Organization determined that since the skills identified for testing were all essential, the great majority of the tests should be true performance tests, administered and graded on a "go/no-go" basis. The trainee would be required to demonstrate his mastery of the required skills. In the event of failure he would be classed as a no-go and receive remedial instruction, followed by retesting.

Even when other types of tests were used because actual performance could only be simulated, absolute go/no-go standards were established in the form of minimum passing or qualifying scores. With a few exceptions for mandatory skill performance, the actual tests administered were randomly chosen just before a given testing session. The performance data produced by the test were used at each echelon of training management to identify strengths and weaknesses in the training.

With the exception of physical training, all instruction featured integral, end-of-subject testing by the instructors of the training command. But to monitor learning retention and quality of instruction, the Directorate of Plans and Training at various intervals in the training cycle also administered to all companies comprehensive performance-based examinations that tested selected skills in the various subjects which the trainee had mastered in earlier instruction.

The quality control system of the directorate initially embodied a comprehensive performance test (eighth week), and a military occupational specialty 11B comprehensive test (thirteenth week). These tests consisted of performance measures selected from the performance tests used for the individual subjects. From the results of these tests, it was learned that periodic performance reviews increase the level of trainee proficiency. A diagnostic test, given midway in the course, was subsequently introduced to let the trainee know how well he was doing in the performance tests, and to give the training center, training command, and training brigades an independent evaluation of their instruction.

It was considered essential that quality control checks be conducted by an agency not involved in the day-to-day training process—in Fort Ord's case the agency was the Directorate of Plans and Training—in order to secure unbiased diagnostic data on the training program and process, and to insure that trainees received reinforcement training to help them retain earlier acquired skills.

With goals and missions defined, new procedures devised, and administrative questions settled, Fort Ord was now ready to take on the next challenge: conducting and evaluating the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program.

The Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program

The objective of the program was to create a combat arms soldier who was well motivated toward the Army and his career field, physically fit, qualified in weapons, and capable of carrying out all duties required by his military occupational specialty.

The training program was to be more focused on the individual than in the past. The soldier was to follow a single-track, incremented block system, consisting of sixteen weeks of combat training. In place of the old qualification of receiving no military occupational specialty upon completion of basic combat training and then either an 11B (light weapons infantryman) or 11C (indirect fire crewman) from advanced individual infantry training, he would now be able to acquire one, two, or three specialties during the sixteen weeks, depending upon his own ability and learning speed.

The number of trainees entering basic combat training at Fort Ord each week was to be lowered from 1,100 men to 800. Of that number, 320 of the men from each week's input would continue for the full sixteen-week experimental infantry training program, while the remainder would adhere to the traditional schedule. Compared with the normal "fills" of 220 men per company under the standard basic combat and advanced individual training program, 160-man companies were programed.

COMMITTEE INSTRUCTION *on assembly and disassembly of M60 machine gun (above) is reinforced by practice in company area with assistance of drill sergeant (below).*

Most of the experimental volunteer Army instruction was given by instructor groups unconnected with the companies. Rather than use separate groups for basic combat and advanced individual training, these two groups were merged during January 1971 into an organization called the Instructor Group, which was renamed Training Command (Provisional) in April 1971.

In its initial conception, the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program entailed both a controlled input of trainees and directed assignment of graduates. Trainee input at Fort Ord was to consist of soldiers earmarked for an infantry military occupational specialty, and programed for such post-training assignments as the noncommissioned officer education system or officer candidate school; or they were to be assigned to Fort Carson for duty in a combat-ready unit, the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). At Forts Benning and Carson, the men trained by the experimental program were to continue to be evaluated relative to nongraduates. To facilitate these comparison studies, graduates of the program were to be exempted from assignment to the Republic of Vietnam.

Because of worldwide requirements for men, the directed assignment plan was never put into operation. The Commanding General, Fort Ord, was informed by U.S. Continental Army Command in February 1971 that Fort Ord experimental program graduates were eligible for worldwide assignment, and that Fort Ord's part of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program should be modified to include Vietnam orientation training. As a result of this directive, the systematic flow of Fort Ord experimental training graduates into the Fort Benning and Fort Carson components of the VOLAR test was cut off.

The demise of the directed assignment plan had a substantial impact on Fort Ord's conduct of the program. The training time required to accomplish the Vietnam orientation had to be provided and Fort Ord firing ranges could not safely accommodate the weapons of the direct fire crewman's course. Graduates could therefore be qualified in only two skills, 11B and either 11C or mechanized vehicle driver, rather than in all three skills as originally planned.

Under the new Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program, training and performance testing were to be conducted by the instructional committees strictly on an individual go/no-go basis to determine a soldier's capabilities for advancement to the next higher level, or satisfactory completion of a specific subject or block of instruction. Performance criteria were also to be applied to trainee advancement in rank. Department of the Army authority was sought and received to promote those men who demonstrated leadership potential and achieved high proficiency scores. Beginning in April 1971 and extending until 31 De-

cember 1971, Fort Ord received a separate allocation of 100 E–4 promotion quotas for those soldiers who attained dual military occupational specialties. Constraints were established by Department of the Army limiting the number to 100 and the percentage to 35 percent of eligible soldiers who could be promoted to E–4 during a given month. Previous regulations remained in effect, allowing 35 percent of basic graduates to be promoted from E–1 to E–2 upon completion of the twelfth week of advanced individual training. Under the experimental program, however, a soldier could be promoted from E–2 to E–3 upon qualification in 11B in either the twelfth or thirteenth week of advanced individual training. A soldier who had been promoted to E–2 during the twelfth week could be promoted to E–3 the next day, if he achieved an 11B qualification. Any soldier attaining a dual qualification however, could be promoted to E–3 without any number or percentage restriction. In essence, under the experimental training program company commanders could promote E–1 to E–2 and E–2 to E–3, but promotions to E–4 were restricted by a quota established by the Fort Ord adjutant general, usually eight to ten soldiers per company. The E–4 promotion was a definite incentive for superior performance.

Another feature of the program was that it was to be executed on a five-day week; more free time would thus be available in the form of longer weekends. Weekend formations were to be avoided or kept to a minimum.

The Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program concept included such changes to the conventional basic combat and advanced individual training program of instruction as the elimination of review and refresher periods, with the consolidation of training into subject blocks. The experiment differed most significantly from the conventional program, however, in the method rather than the content of training. Heavily performance-oriented in both training and testing, one of the primary objectives of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program was to better adapt the training to the actual duties the men would be called on to perform in field units. This new approach was further strengthened by the application of the guidelines prepared by the Human Resources Research Organization to complement the six teaching principles. The Human Resources Research Organization recommended first a shift from familiarization and orientation training to training that would ensure that the trainee acquired the high-priority skills that he would use during subsequent military service. Instruction in such subjects as rifle marksmanship and physical training that were already oriented toward attainment of skills were left largely unaltered. Subjects that were taught largely by the lecture method were to be drastically revised in favor of

BASIC TRAINEES FIRE AT POP-UP TARGETS ON RIFLE RANGE. *Soldier in foreground is scoring.*

"hands-on" training. The intent was to insure that the men acquired real skills, not larger vocabularies.

A shift was also recommended from alternate forms of standard written and performance tests using a 70 percent passing grade to randomized performance tests using absolute go/no-go criteria. Determining whether an individual has met a specific performance objective requires that he be tested to see whether he can perform to an established standard. If he performs to standard, he is rated go; if not, he is rated no-go. He either meets the standard or fails. The most complete test would evaluate a soldier on every skill that he had learned in the course of training, but because of time limitations such an evaluation was impossible. Midway and at the end of basic training and at various points in advanced training, soldiers were tested on the basis of a random selection of skills learned in each subject area. Skills that had the highest priority in training would not be randomized; the performance of every soldier was to be tested in each of these skills.

The Human Resources Research Organization recommended that instruction throughout the experimental program be performance-based, that lectures be curtailed, and that the soldier be taught by demonstration and practice until he was able to perform without error. He would be permitted to put his hands on the equipment from the beginning of instruction. Technical information was also no longer to be presented in large lecture blocks, but only at the time the soldier could see the relation of the information to the skill he was learning.

It was not feasible, for administrative reasons, to permit a soldier to move at his own learning pace throughout the sixteen weeks of training,

but it was possible to realize intrablock self-pacing. Within a block of training time, each soldier had as much time as necessary initially to learn the skills, and to be checked by the instructor when he felt that he had learned them. Soldiers who learned quickly were to be used as assistant instructors to help others until the entire group had learned the skills.

The instructor was to receive new priorities. He was to demonstrate the skill the soldiers were to learn, so that they could follow his example, present technical information at the time when soldiers could see its utility, and tell the soldiers what mistakes they were making. Finally, he was to check the soldiers' performance to see whether they were proficient. Instead of testing only at the end of basic combat training a checkout was recommended immediately after instruction, a diagnostic test midway through basic combat training, and a comprehensive proficiency test at the end of the course.

Because the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program was composed of a series of different subjects taught sequentially during the sixteen weeks of training, the quality control system had to verify not only that soldiers had initially acquired the skills, but also that they had retained them over time; quality control therefore, had to be exercised at three levels. The soldiers would be checked on all the skills they had learned during the initial block of training, and those who were not proficient in the skills at that time would be scheduled for remedial training. During basic training, a randomized diagnostic test would be given to all companies in the fourth week to show the company cadre how much review was necessary. Comprehensive performance tests would be given at the close of basic and advanced phases of training. Like the fourth week test, these tests were to be based upon a randomized selection of skills taught throughout the phase. Men who demonstrated a lack of proficiency at this time would get further practice, and would be retested until they were proficient in all skills tested.

These periodic tests would generate important information useful to instructors at all levels. The performances of large numbers of men could be summarized to show where specific improvement was necessary in instruction, whether there was a lack of sufficient review time, and whether the entire training system was producing proficient soldiers.

The initial task was to plan a sequenced and integrated program of instruction that would lead to the optimum qualification of the soldier in three basic skills: 11B, 11C, and 11U (mechanized vehicle driver). Using conventional basic combat and individual training programs as a guide, a new program to meet the objectives of these skill areas was outlined. The detailed structuring of the program had as its goal sequencing instruction for a successive mastery of skills. The program started with

the elementary and basic skills and ended with the more advanced and complex skills, integrating subject material wherever possible. Redundancy, lectures, and orientation periods during instruction were eliminated, providing time for skill practice and performance testing. Basic development work then began on the actual subjects to be taught. Each subject in the standard program of instruction was examined in the light of its objective to determine the essential skills, in priority, to be included in the instruction, the time needed for instruction and practice, and the time needed for checkout of trainee skill acquisition on a go/no-go basis.

Conversion of the conventional eight-week basic combat training program to a performance-based system required extensive revision of instructional techniques in every skill area except those few subjects that were inherently performance-based in design, such as weapons firing and physical training. These subjects were not changed except to eliminate lectures and minimize demonstration time. Orientation subjects such as military justice and the code of conduct were changed very little.

The advanced part of the experimental program, the infantry advanced individual training, consisted of four weeks of light weapons infantryman training (11B), three weeks of either indirect fire crewman (11C) or mechanized vehicle driver training, and one week of field training exercise.

In light weapons infantryman training all skill subjects except actual weapons firing had to be converted to performance-based training techniques. Indirect fire crewman and mechanized vehicle driver training subjects, high in skill content, were also converted where required.

The following subjects were converted to performance-based instruction techniques under the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program:

Basic	*Advanced*
First aid	Survival, escape, and evasion
Chemical, biological, and radiological defense techniques	Techniques of fire and tactics
Land navigation	Communications
Guard duty	Land-mine warfare
Rifle functioning	M79/203 grenade launcher
Drill and ceremonies	M72 LAW (light antitank weapon)
Individual tactical training	Pistol, caliber .45
	Machine gun, M60
	Night vision devices
	81-mm. mortar
	Mechanized vehicle training
	Machine gun, caliber .50

A general subjects test in the fourth week and a comprehensive performance test in the eighth week were included.

A comprehensive performance test for the 11B was included.

TRAINEE MASKS A "WOUNDED" COMPANION. *Each man is trained to protect himself against chemical, biological, and radiological agents and to aid other soldiers.*

Since the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program was performance-oriented it had to be based upon precisely stated performance objectives. Since these objectives were not available prior to the development of the program, they had to be formulated. Course content, instructional strategy, time allocations, and criteria were developed from these objectives. Army training programs, Army subject schedules, and supporting lesson plans were inappropriate since they reflected the objectives of the conventional programs. The performance tests associated with the conventional programs were likewise inappropriate and unable to support the new system. Additional work was required to review those blocks of instruction where pretesting was likely to identify men for rapid advancement. New diagnostic mastery tests were developed for the entire sixteen-week training program.

Within the realm of practicality, it was apparent that an immediate and complete change from the conventional training system was not feasible. The time available, lack of appropriate materials and equipment, the small number of men knowledgeable in the new training technology, and the long lead time required to train cadre precluded immediate employment of all the newly developed technology. Orderly incremental change was required.

In order to compress basic combat training, military occupational specialties 11B, 11C, and mechanized driver training into the allotted sixteen weeks, the training planners eliminated most review periods as well as all bayonet and hand-to-hand combat training. Otherwise, little change in content or coverage was made. Extensive use of self-pacing was deferred.

In the development of a course of instruction it is helpful to define accurately the desired objective. The review method generally employed is that of "job analysis." Normally, this is accomplished by sending teams to the field, or working level, to determine the skills required for a particular military occupational specialty, the conditions under which the skills must be employed, and, finally, the standard of acceptable performance. Since the timetable of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program did not allow the many months necessary for exhaustive job analysis, an alternative course of action was used. This method entailed the definition of specific training objectives through use of a jury of experts composed of highly qualified Fort Ord instructors and trainers, as well as representatives of Human Resources Division 3. Once the performance objectives and tests were developed for a subject, they were forwarded to the proponent agency, the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, for comment and validation. The revision program was continuous throughout the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program and cleared the path for further constructive changes even after the termination of Project VOLAR.

Conversion of the Advanced Individual Training, Infantry, Program

Immediate changes to the advanced individual training program of instruction were required to accommodate the development of the single-track training system. There were two primary goals. The first was to institute in basic combat and individual training an instructional method which would be more individually challenging and professionally demanding. Its purpose was to teach more essential skills to the soldier. These skills were arranged in an improved sequence so that they could be taught in a more appropriate functional context. The second goal of the experimental advanced training program was to develop and test future training programs for infantrymen.

The initial approach taken in converting advanced training from the conventional program involved a new training philosophy. The planners of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program reasoned that through employment of the new performance-oriented teaching methods considerably less time would be required to teach the required subjects. The time allotted, however, remained constant. At a conference with the staffs of Continental Army Command and the Special Assistant for the

Modern Volunteer Army in Washington, it was decided to add new subjects to the program of instruction designed to qualify advanced individual infantry graduates in additional specialties. In short the planners opted to teach more in the same time period rather than the same skills in a shorter time. It was decided to qualify advanced individual infantry training graduates for two infantry military occupational specialties. All would receive light weapons infantryman (11B) training or direct fire crewman (11H) training.

A number of factors worked against a smooth conversion from the old to the new training program. The Continental Army Command's decision that graduates of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program would be subject to assignment to Vietnam made it necessary to add forty-four hours of instruction to the program, at the cost of the second week of the scheduled eight-week experimental training program.

Another factor that affected the new program was the decision to substitute mechanized infantry drivers for specialty 11H training. There was relatively little need, Army-wide, for 11H and extensive facilities were required to conduct this type of training, which includes the firing of the 106-mm. recoilless rifle. After consultation with the Infantry Center and the Human Resources Research Organization, Fort Ord therefore determined that performance-oriented training in driving and maintenance of the M113A1 armored personnel carrier would replace the 11H training in the single-track system. This course, new to recruit training in the Army, would award a skill qualification identifier, the suffix "U," to the individual's specialty to indicate driver-qualified. Thus the three military specialties feature of the original single-track system was replaced by a more practical plan to train a man in two specialties plus a widely needed skill.

Conversion to advanced individual training was also affected by a decision to continue a highly successful method of instruction in 11C (indirect fire crewman) called "peer-instruction." Somewhat similar but less refined versions of this technique had been in use for many years under various names, such as "coach and pupil," but it was now being employed in a more ambitious manner. In peer-instruction, the student is not permited to become an instructor until he has been checked out by the cadre instructor in the task or skill to be taught. In the coach and pupil concept, both student and instructor are at the same stage of learning. Peer-instruction had been developed in the 2d Brigade by Major George R. Urcivoli under Colonel James H. Nix during 1970 to teach the so-called Eleven-Charlie skills (11C) to men of widely varying aptitudes, particularly men in Mental Category IV, who had become eligible for service under the Department of Defense's Project 100,000. The

MECHANIZED INFANTRY DRIVER TRAINING *was added under the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program.*

peer-instruction program featured a one-week syllabus, repeated three times during the training. Each student progressed through three distinct learning phases, one each week: watching in the first week, doing in the second week, and testing and teaching another student, a "peer," during the third week, all under the close and continuing supervision of cadre trainers. The fixed time requirement for conducting 11C instruction was three weeks, during which each student mastered gunnery, fire direction, and forward observer techniques.

In effect, one week was allocated for Vietnam orientation and three weeks for military occupational specialty 11C training, leaving four weeks in which to conduct the 11B advanced training. In addition, time had to be found to teach the mechanized infantry program. These factors precluded the conduct of the three-specialty, single-track system, but they led to equally successful results in the ultimate development of a modified program which was more closely related to the actual and future needs of the Army, the capabilities of Fort Ord, and the aims of the training center.

The Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program was to begin formally in July 1971, making available some seven months of lead time for planning, development of materials and techniques, and reorientation of instructors and cadre. The actual lead time allowed for prepara-

TRAINEES EAT LUNCH AT RIFLE RANGE TO SAVE TIME

tion was six weeks. In mid-December 1970 Colonel Morgan took the Fort Ord training plan to Washington and presented it for approval to the Department of the Army and Continental Army Command staffs. Both General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., and General Forsythe personally approved the plan. Preparation time was cut, however, and 11 January 1971 was established as the date to begin.

The actual planning and development time was thus reduced to one month, during which the entire organization for training had to be restructured in order to implement the main principles of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program in time. Representatives from Fort Ord's training staff and the Human Resources Research Organization began an intensive program to convert instruction, testing materials, and techniques from the conventional to the experimental system. Reorientation of instructor and cadre was started with a high-saturation briefing for the cadre, and a thorough information program was organized. Many of Fort Ord's experimental training graduates were expected to join units in combat in Vietnam. For this reason elaborate and extensive tests had to be devised to insure that every soldier was trained to the highest possible standards before graduation. There could be no compromise on this requirement.

The first training cycle under the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program began, as directed, on 11 January, completed its eighth

week of training, the equivalent of conventional basic combat training, on 5 March, and completed its sixteenth week of training, the equivalent of conventional advanced individual training, on 30 April 1971, a full two months before the original programed starting date. By necessity this cycle included only those portions of the full Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program that could be adequately prepared in time for implementation, but the cycles that followed received successively larger and more comprehensively interrelated components of the program until near the end of April, when men entering the program actually trained under a fully developed version of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program.

In order to maintain the highest standards, the matter of quality control was critical. Such matters as development of performance measures, performance testing, and the major change from an evaluation system using normative evaluation to one of skill mastery caused major headaches. The multiple requirements for the re-education and training of cadre and instructors, introduction of new management techniques at the institutional level, and expansion of evaluation systems also created problems of great magnitude. By July these problems had been resolved. The progressive innovation program was instituted.

The program required careful co-ordination among instructors, supervisors, and planners, and received extensive on-the-spot guidance from the Human Resources Research Organization. A field contact team consisting of Dr. Taylor, Colonel Brennan, and Mr. Eugene Michaels actually moved to Fort Ord to provide close guidance, explanation, and assistance to the instructors at the training sites during the first months of the program. There were two immediate and far-reaching effects of the use of the field contact team. First, it brought together the combat-experienced cadre and the behavioral scientists who had done much of the conceptual work, allowing the two groups to talk to each other and to work out problems in actual practice. Each side saw the other at work, and both began to understand each other better, thus reducing cadre resistance to the new teaching methods. The second effect was the direct, empirical evaluation of the field program that was available to the Human Resources Research Organization and the command group. In this respect the members of the contact team acted as enlightened and highly qualified training evaluators. The team provided an immediate field performance data evaluation system, and allowed immediate and thorough review of each step of the training process. This close observation constituted a challenge to the cadre men and presented an interesting and unique incentive for them to perform well. The Human Resources Research Organization had the initiative in this field evaluation procedure and used it effectively in spot-checking for quality control and feed-

back. These early contacts also provided excellent data for followup progress evaluations by the Human Resources Research Organization and the military trainers.

Through the creation of the Training Command (Provisional), a central control point for the implementation of specific changes to individual subjects, periods, and procedures was established. The final need was for a testing system, supervised by the Human Resources Research Organization and the training units, and further checked by the Directorate, Plans and Training, Fort Ord. This system was quickly developed.

As each component of the training system was fabricated it was introduced on a test basis without changing the other elements of the system. In this way only one variable was changed at a time, and the effects of each innovation could be measured and evaluated. In addition, administrative arrangements such as movement of men, records, and documents, and statistical data relating to various aspects of the system could be analyzed.

The specific effect of these actions was to shift subjects, move courses, and consolidate so as to provide better sequencing. Each projected change was processed through the system's quality control apparatus. This was accomplished over a period of several cycles, and the major conversion process was considered complete after seven cycles of training under the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program.

From its inception, the experimental program had included the concept of self-paced instruction, which challenged the faster learners to earn additional specialties and the associated early promotions. These men, the fastest learners and best qualified in the unit, were known as the "forward scatter" group. "Backward scatter" referred to those men behind the pace of the main body of the training unit. At the organizational level, the plan called for instruction by committee and the use of the training company as a "carrier" unit. The term self-paced instruction was shortly changed to individually paced instruction because self-pacing could imply misplaced responsibility and an improper pace selected by the trainee himself. Individually paced instruction was interpreted as instruction that allows a well-qualified individual to supervise a trainee and assist him in establishing and maintaining his best pace. In this type of training there is still scatter, but it is under proper instructional control.

Although the experimental program was implemented at Fort Ord in early January, it was not until March 1971 that a workable method of accommodating the fast learner was devised. During this period some stabilization of the training system was achieved and the parameters of individual pacing were studied in greater detail. The plan finally employed was devised and tested by the 3d Brigade and Training Command

TRAINEES ON BIVOUAC IN SIXTH WEEK OF BASIC TRAINING

before being extended to all basic training companies. Called the accelerated training program, it challenged men capable of more rapid progress through the training sequence by allowing them to forge ahead of their fellow trainees. Those identified as having the necessary drive and intelligence were urged to complete the normal eight-week course in six weeks. This accelerated group then received special instruction in the leadership preparatory course during the "saved" seventh and eighth weeks. Initially, those selected for acceleration were chosen very carefully and only the very top men were allowed to participate. Gradually, experience led to the acceleration of training for larger numbers of men. From the very start, the leaders preparatory course was a success. Accelerated trainees scored as well in the various performance tests as the men who had had two weeks more training. Moreover, their morale, attitude, and re-enlistment intention scores surged ahead. At the same time, the feared adverse impact on nonaccelerated men did not materialize. Of those entering the program, 94.1 percent successfully completed it.

As an added innovation, an alternative accelerated program, the tactical training course, was carried out with 3d Brigade trainees in August and September 1971 to develop leadership through field training under stress conditions. Fort Ord conducted the program on an experimental basis in the fall of 1971, using U.S. Special Forces instructors from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, at the Hunter Liggett Military Reservation. This two-week field course terminated in a seventy-hour multi-

A Field Expedient River Crossing

mission field training exercise. The results were also highly satisfactory, with 91.4 percent of the men successfully completing the course. The subjects selected by the students attending this course as most valuable, rewarding, and helpful in the development of self-confidence were rappelling, raids and ambushes, and patrolling. As a result of the success of these subjects and the interest they aroused, all three were added to the 1972 Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program for all trainees.

The accelerated programs challenged and gave incentive to trainees who might otherwise have been bored with the normal pace of instruction by providing realistic and demanding training, leadership instruction, and advancement ahead of peers. At the same time, the problem of the slow learner was being dealt with by the performance-orientation of the instruction and improved remedial methods using feedback.

Scatter in a training program is a result of the difficulty of the skills or knowledge taught, the diversity of the trainees in terms of aptitude, intelligence, and attitude, and the type of testing applied. If the difficulty level is relatively low (as in the case of subjects taught in the experimental program), the amount of scatter is sharply reduced. If the skills taught involve less verbal instruction, more coaching and demonstration by instructors, and more practical work by trainees, the scatter is reduced still further. In addition, the forward impetus or advantage of the more intelligent trainee is lessened. If absolute mastery tests rather than norma-

tive proficiency tests are the type used in the program, scatter is further reduced. This reduction of scatter was the purpose of the accelerated training programs. With this system and these principles in effect, it was possible to control scatter in the Experimental Volunteer Army Program so that it was forward rather than backward.

Measuring the Results of Experimental Training

The original evaluation plan for Project VOLAR included the objective of determining whether the actions implemented would improve professionalism, enhance career attractiveness, and increase enlistments or re-enlistments. This evaluation was part of the large-scale, three-post, full VOLAR program as initially conceived by the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army. The elements of evaluation were cost effectiveness, military performance measures, attitude surveys, and comparison with basic data developed before and after the experimental program. Fort Knox, Fort Dix, and Fort Riley were designated as the control posts for comparison purposes.

The Human Resources Research Organization had been charged with both developing the program of instruction used at Fort Ord and evaluating its effectiveness. Although there were eventually changes in the whole Project VOLAR evaluation procedure, the research organization was able to continue its initial plan for the experimental training evaluation throughout the program. The actual method of evaluating the program was by analyzing the incrementally blocked subjects which had been performance-oriented. This analysis was done in sequence, reviewing in turn each of the thirty-nine subjects taught during the two eight-week periods. Each subject was examined to evaluate its lesson objectives, method of training, results of instruction, and comments and recommendations of the cadre.

Fort Ord's evaluation of the effectiveness of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program was favorable. The Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army ordered a comparative evaluation of training performance of men who had been trained in conventional basic combat and advanced individual infantry training programs elsewhere with Fort Ord trainees who had undergone the experimental training.

During June 1971 the Infantry School administered performance comparison tests at Fort Ord and Fort Jackson in selected subjects. The school evaluation team prepared the tests, conducted them, and gathered the test data. The basic tests compared trainees' performance in selected skills from seven basic combat training subjects. In five of the seven subjects, Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program graduates showed significantly higher performance. Advanced tests compared trainees' performances on selected skills from nine advanced individual

training subjects. In seven of the nine subjects, graduates showed significantly higher performance. (*Table 4*)

TABLE 4—PERFORMANCE GAIN OF TRAINEES IN EXPERIMENTAL VOLUNTEER ARMY TRAINING PROGRAM, JUNE 1971

Basic Combat Training		
Selected Skill	Percentage of Performance Gain	
First aid	46	
Chemical, biological, and radiological techniques	46 54	(on using protective mask) (on treating nerve agent casualty)
Land navigation	34	
M16 weapon maintenance	20	
Guard duty	12	
Individual tactical training	[a]	
Drill and ceremonies	[a]	

Advanced Individual Training	
Selected Skill	Percentage of Performance Gain
M72 LAW	82
Land navigation	50
M79 grenade launcher	36
Communications	31
Land-mine warfare	30
M60 machine gun	22
NVD (starlight scope)	11
Pistol, caliber .45	[a]
M203 grenade launcher	[a]

[a] No change.

The test samples for basic combat training consisted of men sent from the midwest to both training centers in order to prevent any regional differences from influencing the comparison. The number of men taking the various tests at each post varied, but generally ranged from 140 to 222 with Fort Jackson fielding the larger numbers. From the standpoint of distribution by mental category, the samples were almost identical. Men in each mental category who were trained under the experimental training program performed in a superior fashion to men in the same mental category who were conventionally trained.

In comparing advanced individual training, graduates of Fort Jackson's eight-week military occupational specialty 11B program were com-

pared to graduates of Fort Ord's four-week program in the same specialty. Superior performance was demonstrated by men trained under the experimental program in seven of the eight 11B subjects. Results indicated that the reduction of 11B training to a four-week period in the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program had no adverse effect on the level of proficiency reached. In general, the experimental 11B program produced soldiers with a higher degree of proficiency in the subjects tested within a shorter period of instruction time.

The samples of men used for the advanced 11B tests at both training centers were not controlled as to mental category or geographic distribution. In regard to the Armed Forces Qualification Test, distributions were examined and findings revealed that more men from the upper mental categories were tested at Fort Ord and more men from the lower mental categories were tested at Fort Jackson. The better over-all performance of men at Fort Ord, however, could not be attributed to the influence of the disproportionate number of men in the upper mental categories since inspection of the data showed that performance differences among men in each mental category were in line with over-all performance differences between training centers. Men of all four mental categories trained at Fort Ord generally performed in a superior fashion compared with men trained at Fort Jackson.

Effects of Mental Aptitude

In order to resolve the important question of the effects of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program on men of various mental aptitudes, the Human Resources Research Organization collected information on the performances of the graduates of ten companies, some 1,200 men, on the experimental program's comprehensive performance test administered at the completion of the first eight weeks of training at Fort Ord. The Armed Forces Qualification Test scores of these men were collected and the men assigned to one of the five mental categories.

By comparing the number of men by mental category who passed the test the first time, a significant difference was found. Men in the higher mental categories attained a higher level of performance than men in the lower categories. When the cumulative number and percentage of men passing the comprehensive test on the first or second trial was measured, the statistics again demonstrated that the higher the mental category the higher the instances of successful performance. But evaluation of the number of men by mental category who passed the test after the third trial also showed that of the 5,749 men tested, only nineteen (less than .04 percent) were unable to pass after their third trial.

Though not included in the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program, the combat support training program was influenced by the

introduction and application of the experimental program in advanced individual and basic combat training. Prior to the experimental program the advanced individual infantry and combat support programs at Fort Ord were related instructionally by certain common factors. They were generally taught at equally advanced skill levels, they received many of their trainees from basic combat training at Fort Ord, and they shared common post facilities and support sections. Although course content was naturally different, general instructional methods and facilities were similar.

In advanced individual infantry training, changes were mainly the result of actual combat experience in Vietnam. In combat support training, on the other hand, Vietnam-related skill demands played a part in the development of each of the courses, but the major reason for change was normally the result of a desire to test an instructional technique or new methodology which offered a chance of improvement. A good example of this in combat support training was the long-term project called APSTRAT—aptitude strategy—on which the combat support training brigade and the Human Resources Research Organization had worked with proponent approval since 1968. Aptitude strategy was a teaching concept used initially in the field wireman course and directed toward overcoming the problems associated with wide variations in student aptitudes.

With the introduction of the experimental program, the research organization assumed the role of direct pedagogical leader for basic combat and advanced individual infantry training. The primary educational and psychological techniques and the learning principles used in the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program were, to a great extent, an outgrowth of the ideas developed and employed in the aptitude strategy experiment. The pedagogical changes which were the core of the experimental training program had, in many cases, been tested in actual practice before their large-scale employment. Further, the changes had proved highly successful as applied to combat support training. The experience the research organization had gained with combat support training was applied to basic combat and advanced infantry training. The additional experience generated by the experimental program was subsequently employed as the basis for further experimentation in the various Fort Ord combat support training courses.

Conclusions

There are, of course, many problems inherent in making mass institutional changes in an Army training center. Perhaps the greatest difficulty encountered in such an undertaking is the problem of con-



HANDS-ON TRAINING IN WHEELED VEHICLE MECHANIC COURSE. *Soldier in the white coat is a trainee peer instructor.*

vincing trainers and cadre of the need for the changes and the greater merit of the new system.

The conversion from the standard to the experimental system of recruit training entailed institutional changes of considerable magnitude. Not surprisingly, the numerous adjustments and alterations which were inherent in the experimental system at first generated some uncertainties and doubts among many of the leaders, instructors, and unit cadre at Fort Ord. The experimental training system also required extensive changes in instructional methods on fairly short notice. The men who were responsible for training the new soldiers had themselves been trained under the old system, which they understood and trusted. Some of these men quite naturally doubted the new system and made the necessary changes in their instructional methods and roles with reluctance. All were conscious, however, that the Vietnam War made it vitally necessary to provide the very best training possible.

Comparative evaluation of the conventional training program against the experimental, however, revealed that graduates of the Experimental Volunteer Army Program had achieved better performances in most areas of training, and that there was a steady, gradual improvement in both trainee and cadre attitudes toward the Army and toward training during the experimental period. Establishing a system of evaluation that

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NEW SOLDIERS PRACTICE THEIR COOKING

verified the mastery and retention of skills contributed to this result. Performance tests, structured in such a way as to permit men of different mental categories additional chances to acquire and practice skills, allowed men in the lower mental categories eventually to achieve high performance standards. The same could be said for performance-oriented instruction, which allowed high achievement by men of high and low mental abilities. Although not all the men were able to meet the testing criterion, results conclusively proved that the absolute criterion (go/no-go) could be met by the overwhelming majority. The conversion to a performance-oriented training system was also found to be possible within the normal operating resources of an Army training center.

Another important contribution of the experimental program was the accurate statistical data made available. The continuous flow of information was useful to commanders in evaluating the progress of their troops, and at the same time provided an opportunity to judge the overall quality of training.

Fort Ord, because it was the only training center in the United States to put into action an Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program, became a training test center for the Special Assistant to the Volunteer Army, the Continental Army Command, the U.S. Infantry School, and other agencies. There was a continuous flow of visiting staff members from training directorates and other training posts in the continental

United States. Those who came were generally impressed and subsequently assisted in converting other training centers throughout the country to the new training methods. A tape on the new methods produced by Fort Ord has been put to use Army-wide. Thus the seeds of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program at Fort Ord have borne fruit in the training programs the Army uses today.

CHAPTER V

Project VOLAR and Changes in Army Life

> When one treats people with benevolence, justice, and righteousness, and reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in mind and all will be happy to serve their leaders.
>
> CHANG YU

"The Army takes care of its own" is an old expression which for many years has characterized the traditional attitude of the Army toward the men and women who fill its ranks. It recognizes a responsibility on the part of the Army as an organization to look after the needs and welfare of the members of the organization. It speaks of loyalty downward. At the same time, one of the paramount dictums of the U.S. Army is that mission accomplishment always comes first. Everything else, including life-style, takes second place. The precedence of mission accomplishment is clearly understood by all soldiers. Throughout the last two decades the demands made on the Army were extensive and sustained. World War II was followed by the cold war and the cold war was interrupted by the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict. The Army faced heavy and far-flung overseas commitments. Shifting national and international requirements had the effect of causing soldiers and their families to be constantly on the move. For most of the period, Army pay failed to keep pace with pay increases in the civil sector. Taking care of its own under these circumstances was necessarily difficult for the Army.

During the fifties and sixties, the Army's leadership did not lose sight of the needs of its personnel; it met them wherever possible. Rather, in most cases, some of those needs had to give way to the needs of the nation. The desire to improve the quality of Army life was always present. Lacking were the opportunity and the funds.

In 1970 the situation began to improve. The phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam began to ease the Army's problem with rapid rotation of troops. At the same time, decisions made in the civil political sector pointing toward a volunteer Army carried the implied promise of the funding necessary to build a volunteer Army. Here, two important points should be emphasized. First, the desire for basic and substantive improvements in the quality of Army life was not solely motivated by a desire to create an Army which would be more attractive to the prospec-

tive volunteer. The desire for qualitative improvements in Army life-style was of long standing. Second, the Army's leadership fully recognized that improvements in life-style would have to be accompanied by across-the-board improvements in the quality of leadership and the standards of professionalism within the Army in order to be truly effective.

Given the desire and increased funding to improve the quality of Army life, the next step was to translate the desire into specific acts and policies and to apportion the funds in the best manner possible to bring about maximum favorable results. In order to do this, it was necessary to identify existing sources of dissatisfaction which were amenable to correction, and then to devise specific corrective measures.

An important area which was considered in implementing life-style improvements was that of gearing the improvements to the beneficiaries. That there has been a great shift in American culture patterns in the last twenty or so years seems fully apparent. Particularly among the young, there have been sweeping changes in values, aspirations, and goals. The problem was to identify the direction and end result of these shifting cultural patterns as they related to the young people entering the Army and, where appropriate, take these new factors into consideration when devising life-style improvements. Otherwise, all efforts would be liable to misdirection, and could, in the long run, be counterproductive. In other words, it was necessary to establish a dialogue, to find out "where they were at." At the same time, the attitudes and values of the older soldiers and their families who had perhaps been less affected by shifting cultural currents had to be considered.

The Army's desire to make improvements in life-style was not entirely altruistic; re-enlistment rates had shown an alarming drop. While the downtrend could not be totally attributed to dissatisfaction with Army life, Army leaders reasoned that this factor played a major role. The extent of the problem is reflected in the Army re-enlistment figures for 1965 to 1970. (*Table 5*)

TABLE 5—ARMY RE-ENLISTMENT RATE, FISCAL YEARS 1965–1970

(Percentage of Re-enlistments for Enlisted Men Eligible for Separation)

Fiscal Year	Draftees	1st Term Regulars	Career [a] Regulars	Total Regulars
1965	8. 4	25. 7	84. 1	47. 9
1966	10. 2	28. 0	83. 4	49. 5
1967	20. 8	23. 7	74. 2	44. 1
1968	11. 5	28. 0	67. 6	45. 5
1969	9. 4	17. 4	64. 5	29. 9
1970	6. 9	18. 3	62. 6	31. 1

[a] Career Regulars have served two or more terms of active duty.

ENTRANCE TO FITCH PARK HOUSING AREA

Many of the basic sources of local dissatisfaction with Army life had been singled out by Coloney Slominski and the Training Management Evaluation Committee in 1969. The committee task forces had investigated the attitudes and opinions of trainees and cadre, officers and enlisted men, and the statistics collected formed a useful beginning. The original mission of the committee had been to improve training and reduce costs. The actual effort had gone well beyond these goals, however, and had extended into the improvement of Army life. Without financial cost, various actions had been taken to remove or reduce service irritants, to increase personal responsibility, and to improve services and communications among military men. When the Modern Volunteer Army Program was still over a year away. Fort Ord was already gaining experience in the development of programs and measures to improve service attractiveness. Much of this early experience at Fort Ord was used as a basis for subsequent programs promulgated by the Special Assistant to the Modern Volunteer Army and the Department of the Army.

Since the Fort Ord attitudinal studies were not funded, most of the areas investigated were limited to those in which local improvements could be made at little or no cost. Such early efforts, aimed at cadre and trainee, alike, were naturally not as comprehensive as the later Modern Volunteer Army funded programs.

Although the Merit Reward System had been designed and employed to improve trainee performance, its very nature led to certain

THE WELCOME CENTER *houses a variety of community services.*

improvements in Army life. The use of positive incentives and earned privileges opened the door to a comprehensive re-examination of the manner in which soldiers were treated. Similarly, the training improvement seminar, which had been developed to police the Merit Reward System, was expanded and became a valuable means of communication.

The Training Management Evaluation Committee increased post service and facilities. Night clinics at the hospital were instituted for trainees, cadre, and dependents, and field sick calls were made available for units on bivouac or field training exercises. Complaints of poor medical care subsided. The operating hours of many post facilities, including the post exchange and clothing sales store, were readjusted to suit the users better. Other efforts were directed toward providing more pay phones, post exchange mobile vending trucks, better bachelor enlisted quarters, and increased privacy for cadre living in the barracks.

As a result of information collected by the Training Management Evaluation Committee and the Merit Reward System, several new and potentially far-reaching efforts were made to improve communications among soldiers and within the chain of command. By direction of the post commander, leaders and staff officers on the post met frequently for informal discussions. These were useful in the exploration of attitudes and opinions, and served as a sounding board for the introduction of new procedures and techniques.

The Help Center (originally called Drug Center) was opened to assist soldiers with drug, alcohol, or other serious personal problems. The center offered assistance not only to those individuals referred to it by their commanders, but also to anyone who sought information or help. In cases of infraction of rules in which it was determined that a man had earlier sought advice and conscientiously worked to solve his problems, a limited amnesty program was put into effect.

Cadre attitudes were measured and evaluated and work was begun on a pilot program to survey the opinions of Army wives on Army life. The purpose of these studies was to examine the attitudes of the whole family group toward Army life and to assess their impact on the Army member. How did concern over dependents and the attitudes of his wife affect the way a man thought about staying in the Army? Was there a correlation between marital status and re-enlistment? If so what was it? How did it work?

Gradually the trainers and other cadre and support personnel adjusted to changes, and resistance began to fade as various innovations proved their merit. Slowly, a climate conducive to change was created. These efforts at Fort Ord were not taking place in a vacuum. At the same time, the Army was considering and evaluating relevant information from other training centers in order to establish a basis for comparison.

Visitors to Fort Ord were briefed on the full range of the post's self-improvement efforts. Among the many distinguished visitors who came to observe the efforts at Fort Ord in this period before the Modern Volunteer Army Program was developed were General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., the commander at Continental Army Command, and General Forsythe, later named Special Assistant to the Modern Volunteer Army. Another visitor who was to have considerable influence was Major General Robert G. Fergusson, then Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army for Training Center Activities. General Fergusson made several visits to the post to analyze the Merit Reward System and its effects. Because he was impressed with the system, briefings were presented in Washington explaining the new management techniques being tested. As a result, the various Fort Ord programs began to attract considerable attention throughout the Army.

Directions From the Chief of Staff

In the closing months of 1970, the effort to improve Army life gathered momentum as the Department of the Army began to come to grips with the volunteer Army concept. The Army staff, in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, developed many approaches to achieve its volunteer force goals. The essentials of the pro-

gram were increased emphasis on recruiting to get more men in, and a massive effort to reduce service irritants and keep them in. The financial emphasis of the program was on "putting the money where the problem is"—in combat arms enlistment and retention.

On 23 November 1970, the Experimental Program for a Volunteer Army was designated Project VOLAR. The requirement was quite clear: in order to maintain the Army's combat arms strength on a volunteer basis, enlistment for the combat branches would have to increase greatly over current rates. Later in November General William C. Westmoreland, the Chief of Staff, dispatched a special message to senior Army commanders providing information and guidance on the volunteer Army. The message was then forwarded to lower commanders, quoting General Westmoreland's detailed guidance. The following excerpts are from that message.

1. In view of current public and press interest in the programs of the services to achieve volunteer status this message is for your guidance on this matter prior to our more detailed discussions at the Army Commanders Conference.

2. On 13 October 1970 at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army I firmly committed the Army to an all-out effort to work toward a zero draft and a volunteer force. I said at this time that we would bend every effort to achieve this goal. Extracts from that address are in paragraphs 3 and 4 below.

3. Those of us in positions of high responsibility must attack this problem with all the vigor and imagination and enthusiasm we can muster. We must apply ourselves intensively to that task. We must eliminate unnecessary elements and unattractive features of Army life wherever they exist. At all levels throughout the Army senior officials will be charged personally with the responsibility for increasing retention of good people, both by improving the living standards of their men and families and by an intensive effort to capitalize on the many attractive features of Army service.

4. We will leave no stone unturned. We are willing to part from past practices where such practices no longer serve a productive and useful end. We are reviewing all of our policies and administrative procedures. Nothing is considered sacrosanct except where military order and discipline—the soul of the Army that assures success on the battlefield—are jeopardized. In this we cannot and will not yield. We will continue to hold to the principles that have traditionally guaranteed this country a loyal army.

5. During the past few months there has been a lot of talk about new approaches to many aspects of Army life. As you know I intend to focus our discussions during the Army Commanders Conference on this subject. The purpose of this message is to give you my current thinking on this matter, to aid you in your preparation for the conference and to serve as guidance on the Army position until we have had a chance to discuss it more fully at our meeting together.

6. I applaud and support changes that clearly eliminate unnecessary, irritating and unreasonable demands on the time and effort of our soldiers; clearly contribute to better understanding and motivation; and clearly focus on increasing the challenge and the rewards of true professionalism. Thus

changes are to occur in the area of makework "Mickey Mouse" and harassments. Changes are not to occur in measures that maintain and develop proper discipline and standards of performance. I want to make very clear that we are engaged in a development—not a "giveaway" program. We want to build units around the qualities of competence, confidence and teamwork. Good discipline is essential. We must insure that leaders trying to be "in tune with the times" do not walk a razor's edge between a disciplined and an undisciplined unit by moving blindly off the deep end. This requires the best officers and non-commissioned officers in leadership positions. I have asked Dutch Kerwin to insure that we bring this about.

7. Today our society is in the throes of change and there are real pressures for immediate and drastic changes to the Army. In some areas we are prepared to meet this new environment. These are areas which involve creating conditions where every man can serve with dignity, where we give our individuals a keen sense of job challenge and satisfaction, and where we put our trust in those people who have clearly demonstrated their ability to merit our trust. These are the areas in which we will make changes. On the other hand, we will not make changes by reducing our proper professional standards. We will not tolerate slovenly appearance. We will not condone disrespect or lack of discipline and we will not accept lowered standards of performance. We must always keep in mind that the Army must be prepared to fight, that fighting is tough; and that it takes strong, disciplined and highly motivated men to fight and live. We must build on both. This is the heart of the Army and on this we cannot compromise. I expect all members of the Army to understand this dual goal and support its attainment.

With this guidance to Army commanders, General Westmoreland indicated the wide scope of future Army efforts at improving Army life.

In his address at the Army Commanders' Conference on 30 November 1970, General Westmoreland directed a series of immediate actions designed to enhance service attractiveness and eliminate service irritants. By these measures, the first to be taken Army-wide, mandatory reveille formations were abolished except for special occasions; pass policies were liberalized to eliminate travel restrictions; and the use of pass forms, signing in and out, and bed check were abolished, except as disciplinary measures. An Information Bulletin System for rapid announcement of Volunteer Army information and activities was announced. Regulations concerning beer in noncombat areas were greatly relaxed. A five-day work week was authorized. The Army staff was ordered to revise the command maintenance management system to focus on assistance to units, and the inspector general inspection system was revitalized. Regulations were to be reviewed and simplified. All mandatory training requirements were to be reviewed, and those that were repetitive and nonessential were to be eliminated.

In addition to these specific directions, General Westmoreland wanted basic training upgraded to enhance the soldier's first impression of Army service. He emphasized that noncommissioned officers were to be made aware of their key role in the success of the Modern Volunteer Army.

Finally, he expressed again his desire that the personnel system should become more "personal"—that it should deal with people as individuals, each with his own needs and aspirations.

As the Chief of Staff's message became public, efforts at Fort Ord to improve Army life gained impetus. In addition to the general concepts being discussed in the Modern Volunteer Army Program, the various planners and staff agencies now had specific guidance on which to tailor their programs. On 4 December 1970 General Davidson enumerated seven goals that he particularly wanted Fort Ord to work toward: (1) higher standards of professionalism; (2) increased job satisfaction; (3) increased service attractiveness; (4) elimination of "makework" and blind adherence to training schedules; (5) elimination of the overuse and veneration of statistics; (6) reduction of overemphasis on inspections; and (7) better working conditions. The specific actions fell into three categories: measures currently in effect at Ford Ord; projected actions; and actions requiring authority or funds from higher headquarters prior to implementation.

By 4 December 1970 a plan designed to raise the standards of the service at the post had been developed. In this plan eighteen actions were already in effect, seven actions were being considered for future implementation, and twenty-four actions required Department of the Army approval and support—a total of forty-nine major actions that were either in effect or under consideration. These actions, although titled "actions designed to raise the standards of the service," included measures applicable to one or more of all seven improvement areas studied by the Fort Ord staff. With further refinements resulting from specific guidance received from the Continental Army Command and the Special Assistant to the Modern Volunteer Army, this plan became the original Fort Ord Project VOLAR plan.

On 21 December 1970, the commanding general of the Continental Army Command, General Haines, published a letter announcing immediate actions to be taken by major subordinate commanders in the development of the Modern Volunteer Army. General Haines directed the efforts of all members on the Continental Army Command to "the earliest possible achievement of the goals identified with the Modern Volunteer Army." He ordered sixteen measures to be put into effect immediately.

1. Eliminate daily scheduled reveille.
2. Plan and prepare for required formations, avoid wasting the soldier's time.
3. Institute the routine five-day week.
4. Eliminate regular passes and bed check requirements.
5. Answer personnel questions within twenty-four hours.

6. Discontinue all "makework" activities.

7. Emphasize commander's Open Door policy.

8. Review mandatory training requirements with view toward reduction.

9. Raise CONARC re-enlistment objective from 1 percent to 2 percent of enlisted operating strength.

10. Permit 3.2 beer in barracks and messes on a test basis.

11. Assist recruiting command whenever possible.

12. Revitalize the Army Community Service Program.

13. Increase use of seminars and councils in dealing with problem areas to keep communication channels open.

14. Reduce selected units to zero strength.

15. Orient and acquaint civilian employees with their role in the Modern Volunteer Army.

16. Establish a new type of progress-oriented Modern Volunteer Army information program.

In the conclusion of his letter General Haines stated:

> In summary, a maximum effort by all personnel of the command is required to move toward the goal of obtaining our manpower requirements by voluntary enlistments and retention. Professionalism and service attractiveness will be achieved in a mutually supporting manner. Increasing service attractiveness will be sought without pampering of the individual or catering to whims of the irresponsible. Those traditions and procedures that have been proven valid in the test of time as important to the Army's strength, discipline, and operational effectiveness will not be altered or abandoned. However, as social customs change, institutions must also change to keep pace, and we now find ourselves at the point where the Army must adjust to keep pace with the times. Simply stated, this means the Army must take prompt and bold actions to enhance its professionalism, service attractiveness, and public esteem if it is to attract and retain quality personnel. The objectives are both realistic and feasible. I shall expect personnel at all levels within CONARC to give the Modern Volunteer Army program their immediate and complete support.

To monitor progress, General Haines also established a special reporting procedure for Modern Volunteer Army actions. Army commanders were to report progress, measures taken, and future plans, personally, in nonstatical letters to the commanding general.

Sixth Army published its letter of instruction on 15 January 1971. Sixth Army's program stressed retention, better living conditions, elimination of unnecessary irritants, professionalism, efficiency in operations, and improved communication among personnel. The over-all Sixth Army plan contained 159 actions in the areas of professionalism, service attractiveness, and public esteem.

The Modern Volunteer Army Program focused its efforts on four broad areas in which needless irritants were to be removed and service

attractiveness improved: barracks life, family housing, post services, and pay. Fort Ord was also to direct its efforts toward eighteen specific Department of the Army measures, designed to implement or test elements of the Modern Volunteer Army Program.

1. Hire civilian personnel and purchase the necessary equipment to improve the preventive maintenance programs for barracks, quarters, and troop related facilities.
2. Provide partitions in troop barracks.
3. Establish a welcome and processing center.
4. Provide free quarters and cleaning service for departing families.
5. Extend the operating hours of the commissary and quartermaster sales store.
6. Provide improved laundry service.
7. Provide reimbursements for use of privately owned vehicles used to meet military transportation requirements.
8. Develop a tuition assistance program.
9. Provide quarters allowance rebates to officers and NCO's living in inadequate quarters.
10. Contract charter bus service, free of charge, for enlisted men to and from surrounding civilian communities.
11. Improve lounge areas in company level dayrooms.
12. Improve local transportation services.
13. Purchase sports supplies and equipment.
14. Improve the Army food program.
15. Develop a dependent youth program.
16. Establish a general educational development center.
17. Develop project transition to prepare those leaving the Army for civilian employment.
18. Provide free first haircuts for recruits.

In addition to the eighteen actions specifically ordered for Fort Ord, the post developed other measures designed to accomplish the same ends.

The Sixth Army letter of instruction contained three categories of actions: 81 that were directed; 104 planned, but requiring further work or higher approval; and 5 not applicable at Fort Ord or previously dropped from the Continental Army Command list. By 11 February 1971 Fort Ord was able to report that 52 of the directed actions had been completed and 25 were under way; four actions were still unresolved, not applicable at Fort Ord, or not funded. Two of the actions under way dealt with medical requirements which were already in effect in slightly different forms—a drug center and a local immunization policy. Later in the year, the requirement was rewritten to accommodate Fort Ord's local innovations. One action concerned the wearing of the fatigue uniform off the post. Since it was felt that it would degrade the Army image

to allow the wearing of the fatigue uniform when the soldier was off duty in the civilian community, this was not permitted.

Changes in Army Life at Fort Ord

The Modern Volunteer Army goal of improving barracks life was not restricted to structural changes in the buildings, but applied as well to the development of new attitudes toward the individual soldier. In the Army he was to be treated as a mature adult and his privacy and off-duty time were to be respected. When possible and appropriate, his individual preferences were to be recognized.

The condition of the barracks themselves did, however, receive considerable attention. The 293 World War II buildings at Fort Ord had been constructed in the early 1940s with an estimated life span of seven years. Having been in constant use and not always adequately maintained for lack of funds, by 1970 they had reached a point where standard maintenance procedures could no longer cope with their increasing disrepair. The barracks were of clapboard construction, usually without interior finish. Most were of two stories, with the standard interior arrangement of large open dormitory bays on both floors and communal shower and latrine facilities on the ground floor.

In line with Modern Volunteer Army goals, it was decided to undertake a major renovation program to repair and refurbish many of these so-called temporary barracks. In response to comments by trainees and permanent party soldiers—men assigned to the post—it was further decided to spend a portion of the allocated funds to increase privacy and comfort in the barracks both by installing partitions, fluorescent light fixtures, and electrical outlets, and by giving each man a small room of his own. The program started in 1970 and by early 1973 some $3,159,600 had been spent on, or obligated to, nine major projects. One hundred and twenty-four temporary barracks, including associated mess halls and dayrooms, had been renovated by the end of 1972. Various types of partitioning systems were used at an average cost of $3,000 per building. Sanitary facilities were improved and expanded and finish was applied to the interior of the barracks walls.

Project VOLAR funds totaling approximately $1,000,000 were expended to improve barracks furnishings. Chairs, desks, lamps, and individual rugs were provided. Wider bunks with innerspring mattresses and improved double door wall lockers of a wardrobe type, which had been procured prior to Project VOLAR, were also issued.

The Army's mess improvement program, supported by Project VOLAR funding, led to further changes in the mess halls themselves and better quality and more variety in Army food. Such items as commercial dishwashers, coffee urns, gas ranges, vegetable peelers, and elec-

MOBILIZATION BARRACKS OF WORLD WAR II TYPE *housed 60 percent of troops at Fort Ord in early 1970s.*

tric meat slicers were purchased with VOLAR funds and issued to trainee and permanent party mess halls. In addition to the standard Army daily menu, short order food items were offered. For example, if a soldier did not like liver and onions he could get a hamburger instead. Breakfast service hours were extended and brunch meals were instituted on weekends and holidays. Soft drink dispensers were installed in each mess hall and met with immediate popularity. Previous prohibitions against the consumption of 3.2 beer in the barracks were rescinded and commercial beer-vending machines were placed in many unit dayrooms.

Traditional rules against the use of decorations were relaxed on a test basis in some units to give trainees more freedom to arrange and decorate their barracks. Drapes were hung at windows and colorful bedspreads in some cases supplanted olive drab blankets. In a few instances mod posters, imaginative lighting arrangements, and other interior decorations reflected the individual tastes of soldiers. In this connection, it was said that it was always easy to spot the drill sergeant—he was the man who was gritting his teeth.

Pursuant to directives from Washington, bed checks, sign in and sign out rosters, and the use of pass forms were eliminated. While these changes were welcomed for permanent party soldiers, considerable difficulty was anticipated in the administration of basic combat training and the control of trainees. Time proved that the results of the open pass policy

SOFT DRINK DISPENSERS IN MESS HALLS *proved popular but did not displace milk dispensers.*

were good except in the training brigades, where pass restrictions subsequently were reapplied.

Early in 1970 the operating hours of all post facilities were again reviewed to insure their compatibility with soldier free time. The post exchange hours were extended to Sunday, and night shopping hours were instituted two nights a week. The quartermaster clothing sales store went to Saturday full-day operation. A new post exchange and new post main movie theater, started before Project VOLAR, were completed and opened adjacent to the construction site of a modern new commissary. To get soldiers back to their military duties, almost $70,000 in Project VOLAR funds were allocated in fiscal year 1971 to hire civilians to replace military personnel employed in the ration breakdown facilty, the central meat plant, and the storage and issue section of the commissary.

In the area of transportation improvements, four services were funded. First, commercial buses were hired on a contract basis to replace military buses and trucks to transport troops to and from distant training areas. Second, intrapost bus service, consisting of shuttle buses operating on established routes, was initiated. Third, bus service to Hunter Liggett Military Reservation and the Letterman General Hospital in San Francisco, already in effect, became a contracted service. Finally, funds were allocated and free civilian bus service established to nearby civilian

communities. When these contracts were terminated on 13 August 1971 the services were quickly re-established, utilizing government equipment operated by civilian drivers.

Special services activities were expanded by the increased provision of sports equipment, free tickets to local sporting events, and the purchase of new equipment for post gymnasiums. Post athletic facilities were refurbished, but the emphasis was on traditional sports equipment for games rather than on individual items.

Educational assistance at Fort Ord was greatly increased. Enrollment in classes rose until more than 500 soldiers were taking advantage of opportunities to continue their civilian education while in the service. On post education opportunities included offerings from four colleges and universities in addition to a full range of high school subjects. For the first time, four-year college and graduate programs were offered on post. At the same time, it was made possible for trainees and cadre to attend education center classes during duty as well as off duty hours and enrollment procedures were simplified.

The whole range of reception activities was reviewed and reorganized in an effort to personalize reception procedures. Beds were prepared for inductees before their arrival at the reception station, and they found appetizing hot meals awaiting them. Replacements were handpicked for reception station duties, and every effort was made to make the reception experience as pleasant as possible for the incoming new soldier.

New post services were opened and old ones were expanded and improved. New auto and handcrafts hobby shops were opened and special services opened an entertainment workshop. Active job placement assistance was begun for the military dependents. A new post library was completed in March 1970 and $50,000 in Project VOLAR funds was used to purchase books and equipment during fiscal year 1971. A housing referral service was activated in the Army Community Service Center to assist newly arriving married men in finding quarters for their dependents. The Army Community Service itself was reinvigorated and several new services were added. Post hospital facilities were expanded and eighty-eight professional and administrative members were added to the hospital staff to improve support and laboratory functions.

At Fort Ord efforts have been made continually to take into consideration the attitudes of contemporary American society and institutions and to adjust programs and policies to changing cultural realities. Because the Army is manned by a fairly representative cross section of American society—an important source of its strength—it is also subject to the same social problems that plague civilian society.

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Confronted with growing race relation problems in the late 1960s, Fort Ord undertook a variety of programs and actions designed to promote racial harmony and understanding. The primary effort centered around education and communication in order to modify interracial attitudes and antipathies. Basic to the total effort was the Army's long-standing policy of fair and impartial treatment for all persons regardless of race, religion, color, or origin. At Fort Ord the effort to improve human relations continues.

CHAPTER VI

Project VOLAR: Continuation and Assessment

> Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all.
>
> GEORGE WASHINGTON

The Project VOLAR period, November 1970–June 1972, was one of change and controlled experimentation at Fort Ord. It was apparent to all that the Department of the Army considered the Modern Volunteer Army Program of great importance to the Army and the nation. A sense of urgency permeated the post. Rush programs were common. New programs and projects, policies and procedures were formalized and implemented. Rapid improvement was sought not only in training but also in Army life. By spring 1971 when Major General Harold G. Moore assumed command at Fort Ord, it was possible to begin a measured assessment of what had been achieved and what still needed to be done.

Comprehensive efforts had been made to eliminate needless irritants in service life. There is little doubt that, judged individually, most were sound; however, such measures as the elimination of reveille formations, permitting beer in the barracks, a more liberal policy toward passes, and relaxed regulations in the matter of hair style and saluting had in many cases been construed by officers and noncommissioned officers as a move toward permissiveness. A number of noncommissioned officers saw their traditional role—the enforcement of unit discipline—threatened. Wondering which of the old customs and practices would fall next, some became lax in the enforcement of existing rules and regulations. General Davidson had observed this trend and had begun action to correct it.

When General Moore assumed command, he too sensed the uncertainties that had been created by the rapid changes at Fort Ord. After analyzing the situation he instituted a number of programs to deal with it. First, great emphasis was placed on noncommissioned officer authority, responsibility, and performance. In line with this, training and other operational and administrative authority were decentralized to the maximum extent possible. Since soldiers work directly for noncommissioned officers and are led by them, both on the battlefield and in garrison, the responsibilities and the authority of Fort Ord's noncommissioned officers were greatly increased. Second, more attention was given to maintaining

CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT INSPECTION *in a basic combat training platoon.*

and improving the professional qualifications of commissioned as well as noncommissioned officers. Intensive training courses and refresher schooling were instituted, both to improve leadership skills and to develop technical and administrative abilities. Third, strong emphasis was placed on physical and mental discipline and upon offering a challenge to cadre and trainee alike. Rigorous physical demands were made on all, and traditional Army discipline such as saluting, precision marching, close order drill, proper wearing of the uniform, and related military customs and courtesies were stressed.

The programs were interlocking. Company grade officers, noncommissioned officers, and other small unit and staff leaders received more authority while concurrent action was taken to improve their professionalism through schooling. Accordingly, the education program in general became the subject of heightened interest and received considerable attention. The Fort Ord Leadership Academy became the nucleus of the Training Command's Leadership and Professionalism Training Group. In addition to the Drill Sergeant School and the Sixth Army Noncommissioned Officer School, this group was responsible for the special leader preparation course, the instructor training course, and the basic leader's course prescribed by the Department of the Army. Other short courses were taught as required. Leadership schools were also established for field grade officers and Department of the Army civilians.

Colonels and general officers attended schools on the post, or, for example, went to Fort Lee for the installation management course or to Charlottesville, Virginia, for the senior officers' legal orientation course. Throughout the education program, exacting standards of performance were set.

The Training Program

Early studies had shown that most trainees enter the Army in relatively good physical condition and that they could meet minimum physical fitness standards established by the Continental Army Command without great difficulty. Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program planners searching for training hours in the program of instruction which could be used for other subjects and for hands-on training time, had somewhat reduced the number of hours devoted to physical training and subjects of a physical training type. Hand-to-hand combat training, the confidence and obstacle courses, and speed marches had been dropped. In addition, bayonet training had been taken from the program of instruction. Training results, observations, and command emphasis resulted in reinstitution of these subjects in mid-1971 and renewed emphasis was placed on physical exercise and double-timing to and from instruction. The goal was for every man leaving basic combat training to be in the best physical condition of his life and to know it. The intention was to challenge the soldier physically and mentally—to stretch his mind and his muscles and to assist him thereby in gaining more pride in himself, more self-confidence, and above all more self-discipline.

Along these same lines, new blocks of instruction designed to emphasize discipline, military courtesy, and military appearance were instituted, and concurrently, increased emphasis was given to these subjects by a wide variety of other means. Among these was the addition of a discipline annex to the lessons plan of almost every period of instruction presented at Ford Ord.

The concept of discipline at Fort Ord is illustrated by the poster titled "Professionalism," which has been reproduced in great numbers and is to be found not only at Fort Ord and its subinstallations but in other installations of the Army. The message is simple. The philosophy is that a man who is self-disciplined will have more confidence in his ability to do a job. A unit which has unit discipline will have more team spirit and more confidence in itself as a smooth-functioning team. The men in a unit which has disciplined competent leaders will have more confidence in those leaders. A soldier who is knowledgeable in the handling of the equipment which he works with is better disciplined in the use of that equipment and, therefore, has more confidence in the equipment. The sum of all of these types of discipline and confidence can only lead to better mission accomplishment and improved welfare of troops.



BASIC TRAINEES TAKING PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST. *Bent-leg sit-ups is one of five events.*

In most of the instruction at Fort Ord, the instructing cadre is directed to associate the specific type of discipline which is being achieved by the soldier as he masters the instruction, whatever it may be. For example, in the firing of a rifle at night it is explained to the soldier that if he disciplines his mind and his muscles, his fingers and his brain to handle the weapon in all conditions of field usage—night and day, good and bad weather—and to maintain it properly and keep it clean, he will have disciplined himself in these matters along with the disciplining of his muscles and his eyes in firing accurately. The net result will be more confidence in the rifle.

Trainers avoid associating discipline with punishment. Rather, they emphasize the positive aspects of self-discipline, unit discipline, and teamwork.

Fort Ord's analysis of the results of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program and its recommendations as to content for the new Continental Army Command training program for basic combat and advanced individual training were forwarded to the command and to Fort Benning, the proponent agency, on 15 June 1971. The changes



in the experimental program, stressing challenge in training, and emphasizing discipline, military courtesy, and personal appearance were made after that date. Fort Ord's last revisions, however, were given a forum in early August of 1971 when training center representatives convened at Fort Jackson to review the Army training program for basic combat and advanced individual training which had been prepared for Continental Army Command approval. Fort Ord's views were favorably received and the revised Army training programs and Army subject schedules published by the Department of the Army and Continental Army Command early in 1972 made provision for increased training for physical fitness, discipline, and confidence. The new training directives embodied all the primary learning principles that had been developed and tested during the course of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program. Performance-oriented instruction, hands-on training, peer involvement in the training, and mastery (go/no-go) testing were integral to the Army training program. Though there have been some minor evolutionary changes in subject matter, this new training program is in operation at all U.S. Army training centers. (*Chart 4*)

A comparison of the above program of instruction with the list of subjects converted to performance-based instruction under the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program reveals some of the progress made possible by the experimental program methods. (*See Chart 3.*) In the older basic combat training program of instruction, eight weeks were devoted to a course of instruction that taught only two weapons, the

CHART 4—BASIC COMBAT TRAINING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION, JULY 1973

School of the Soldier
- Inspections
- Drill & ceremony

Responsibilities of the Soldier
- Discipline, morality, & traditions
- Chaplain's orientation
- Code of conduct
- Geneva conventions
- Military justice

Human Relations Instruction
- Human relations
- Alcohol & drug abuse
- Venereal disease

Tactical Training & Combat Skills
- Close combat course
- Individual tactical training
- Bayonet & pugil stick training

Security & Protective Training
- Chemical, biological, & nuclear warfare
- Guard duty
- Survival, escape, & evasion techniques
- Landmine warfare
- First Aid

Tactical Movement
- Land navigation
- Marches & bivouacs

Weapons (individual)
- Basic rifle marksmanship
- M18A1 light antitank weapon
- Hand grenades
- M203 grenade launcher

Weapons (crew served)
- M60 Machine gun

Physical Training
- Physical readiness training
- Confidence course
- Obstacle course

Skill Practice & Testing
- Remedial training & review
- Diagnostic test
- Comprehensive performance test
- Comprehensive performance test retest
- Basic physical proficiency test

Administrative Subjects
- Uniform fitting
- Commander's orientation
- Immunizations
- Equipment turn-in
- Adjutant General records check
- National holiday guard detail
- Military morale inventory & company evaluation inventory
- Finance orientation
- Graduation parade
- Commander's time

rifle and the hand grenade, and did not teach the tactics of survival, escape and evasion, or land-mine warfare. Because performance-oriented methods taught more in less time, it was possible to add new subjects to the basic combat training and still stay within the allotted eight-week training period without lowering performance standards. Thus, the following subjects were shifted from the advanced individual training combat arms course to the basic combat training course: M203 grenade launcher; M72A2 light antitank weapon; M60 machine gun; M18A1 claymore mine; survival, escape and evasion; and landmine warfare. The transfer of these subjects produced both immediate and "downstream" advantages. First, all graduates of basic combat training learned these skills rather than only those who went on to combat arms advanced individual training—an important advantage since the subjects encompass skills needed by other than combat arms troops. Second, the inclusion of the new subjects added challenge, variety, and interest to the basic combat training course. Last, the shift of these subjects allowed

TARGET PRACTICE ON THE MACHINE GUN RANGE

the advanced individual training course to use the freed time to expand instruction in the remaining subjects and to add new subjects, and still stay within the allotted training period.

Improvements in Combat Support Training

Many of the main teaching principles employed in the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program were developed in the aptitude strategy experiment in the combat support training field wireman course. The experimental program, however, concentrated on basic combat and advanced individual infantry courses and the combat support training brigade was not directly involved. In February 1973 Colonel William G. Walby assumed command of the brigade. Shortly thereafter General Haines visited Fort Ord and was briefed by Colonel Walby on the status of combat support training and the possibility of integrating proven Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program methods. General Haines approved the concept on the spot and authorized the Fort Ord combat support training brigade, in co-ordination with the combat support training proponent agencies, to revise and test the combat support courses. With this mandate, Colonel Walby built on Colonel Louis A. Caraplis's earlier programs to improve combat support training courses. Applicable principles and methods, tested and proven in the experimental program, were refined and integrated in combat support instruction. Changes were

introduced, evaluated, and carefully staffed with the proponent agencies.

In the food service course, a jury of experts was convened to review course content and identify skills actually needed. The findings led to the elimination of certain course requirements. Classroom training of the listening and watching type was reduced, or eliminated wherever possible, in favor of actual cooking, and students started using recipes the first day of the course.

The trainees learned to cook under both garrison and field conditions. In the latter case, they moved out to the field and prepared meals for themselves and trainees in other courses who were undergoing field training. Each trainee cook was assigned during his final three weeks to a garrison dining facility, where he further improved his cooking skills under the supervision of experienced mess personnel.

When this was written, in July 1973, representatives of the quartermaster school, the Human Resources Research Organization, and Fort Ord's 4th Brigade were co-operating to revise food service training for Army-wide implementation. The intention was to combine the Fort Ord course with a similar course developed at the quartermaster school. The primary Fort Ord innovations, including peer instruction, self-pacing, and hands-on training, were featured in the new course.

The basic Army administration courses (clerk and clerk-typist) were individually paced so that a student could progress as fast as his own motivation and skill would permit.

The peer instruction format was integrated into the wheeled vehicle mechanic course. Under the watchful eyes of warrant officer and non-commissioned officer supervisors, a one-to-one instructor-student ratio was achieved. When a student mastered a skill and passed the performance test before a cadre examiner, he became a peer instructor himself. His newly acquired skill was then reinforced through teaching a new student to perform the task.

Another change was the concentration on the ¼-ton truck (jeep) in early training. Other engines were eliminated in the live-engine classroom, and the numbers and types of vehicles used as training aids were reduced, with savings estimated to approach $500,000. Where there were differences in size or location of parts or assembles on other vehicles, these differences were demonstrated and explained on specifically designed training aids and mock-ups. During the latter part of the course all trainee mechanics did actual work on the full range of tactical vehicles.

In the drivers course, local modifications were made to convert much classroom instruction to integrated hands-on training. One example of this was the requirement for trainee drivers to perform a number of serviceability inspections during the course rather than learn the proce-

dures in a classroom. Another was for the student to encounter three unexpected ambushes while driving. A critique was held after each ambush to provide immediate feedback to the driver on his reaction and to review appropriate reactions to ambush. Students acquired extensive practical experience in driving common tactical vehicles over all types of terrain. Included was driving in a convoy to Hunter Liggett Military Reservation over approximately eighty miles of civilian highways.

Some military occupational specialties require considerable skill in reading and writing. For these specialties, of which supply is one, a classroom is often the best environment for learning. One step that has been useful in the supplyman course, however, is having the student learn to perform tasks in a simulated environment. Provided with a training facility that resembles a warehouse, the students have been able to see the relationship between requesting and issuing supplies and methods of storage and stock control as they perform each task.

Additional changes were made in the field wireman course by expanding the map and compass training into a meaningful exercise related to the military occupational specialty. Previously taught in garrison, map training was moved to the field, where students conducted a line-route reconnaissance on foot and by vehicle over a 2½-mile course. Along the course, students noted obstacles and listed materials that would be needed to construct wire on the route. The exercise is a challenge that tests the students in many specialty related tasks.

In all field training, stress was placed on the performance of military occupational specialty tasks in a tactical situation. An example of such training was the combined field wireman, cook, and supplyman end-of-course field training exercise. Supplymen established a logistics complex each week, giving many men their first opportunity to erect a tent larger than a shelter tent. The men were trained in unit supply operations and ammunition and fuel storage procedures. Field wiremen ran a wire line approximately five miles to the supply complex, where they established a switchboard and local field phones. Student cooks supported the exercise by establishing a tactical field kitchen.

The systematic application of the proven principles of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program produced the same positive results in combat support training as in basic combat and advanced individual infantry training. All indicators revealed that men showed better motivation, discipline, and morale under this training program. Regardless of the instructional vehicle, individually paced or peer, student reaction to performance-orientation and go/no-go testing was positive. Many of the training improvements of the combat support training bridgade are consequently being considered by the proponent agencies for implementation Army-wide.

CLIMBING IN THE "POLE ORCHARD," *part of the 4th Brigade field wireman course.*

Some promising new training concepts were tried with less success, chief among them the so-called single-track plan. The present Army training program contains no provisions for the sixteen-week single-track system, although the basic concept, with its emphasis on maximum acceleration, is excellent. The problems encountered, which were primarily the result of administrative realities and constraints inherent in the Army's manpower management system, may yet be overcome. The Infantry School and Fort Polk are continuing this work with a combined "thru-put" concept which embodies the single-track system.

The Continental Army Command tested the Merit Reward System briefly at other training centers but did not make it part of the revised Army-wide training program. Apparently other training centers had less success with the system, but it is still valued at Fort Ord and is employed in all basic combat training companies. The Merit Reward System does have the drawback of involving the drill sergeant in extensive paperwork that takes some time from his personal leadership and instructional duties. The system also requires close, continuing supervision to insure uniformity of application, that is, common standards understood by the trainee and his leaders. Unquestionably, the Merit Reward System, with its use of positive incentives and common standards, has much to

recommend it. Recent changes have increased the role of the drill sergeants and strengthened the performance orientation of the system.

The training improvement seminars, or company trainee councils, have been introduced throughout the Army training establishment in all basic combat training, modified basic training, Women's Army Corps basic training, advanced individual training, and combat support training companies at all U.S. Army training centers. Training improvement seminars meet during each training cycle at approximately two-week intervals. Each meeting is conducted by the company commander, who strives to create an atmosphere that encourages the free exchange of information and discussion of problem areas where improvement in training or unit operations appears desirable. Minutes of the meetings are recorded and posted in each platoon area.

Fort Ord's special leader preparation program was also adopted by the Continental Army Command for use at all training centers. The program identifies those basic combat trainees who give evidence of possessing high leadership potential and gives them considerable additional leadership training during the basic combat training course. Accelerated trainees are not pulled from their companies the seventh and eight weeks but are sent to the leadership course early in the training cycle. In this way they gain the leadership skills earlier, and then employ their knowledge in leadership positions during the remainder of basic combat training. Usually twenty-five men from a basic combat training company are chosen, and these men must accomplish their normal training as well. Results at Fort Ord have been excellent. Young men selected for special leadership training have responded well and there has been no loss of morale among those not selected for the program.

Precise performance comparisons are difficult to make because of numerous changes in the administration and content of the various programs and tests. All indications, however, point to the conclusion that trainee performance has held up very well under the new Continental Army Command training program subject schedules, which contain the meat of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program.

The Army now employs a somewhat tougher test of physical fitness called the basic fitness proficiency test. The difficulty level of many of the items on the comprehensive proficiency tests has been increased as well, and testing standards have been made somewhat more stringent. In spite of all this, there has been no decline in successful completion percentages in basic combat or advanced individual combat support training.

Close observation of trainee morale, motivation, and health indexes, particularly with respect to the return to a tougher physical regimen, has continued. There has been improvement in basic combat trainee appre-

TRAINEE PREPARES TO THROW HIS FIRST LIVE HAND GRENADE *under supervision of training command instructor.*

ciation of the need for quality in training and adequacy of physical training, and the importance of military courtesy and discipline. Rates of reenlistment intentions of basic combat trainees have also risen. Correlation studies of data compiled from 1970 to 1973 show clearly that the variables most closely associated with positive trainee attitudes are better leadership, improved professionalism, and good training. These findings explain the sustained good attitude of Fort Ord trainees, even in the face of greater austerity in training.

The five-day work week, one of the major goals of the Modern Volunteer Army Program, was instituted in November of 1970 at Fort Ord, and scheduled Saturday training was eliminated. Later, after the reinstitution of the challenge type of training, it was no longer possible to limit training to five days. The current Army training program requires that the mornings of the first four Saturdays of basic combat training be used, but the final three weeks in the basic cycle are five-day weeks. In combat support training the five-day week is the rule.

Starting with the summer of 1971, efforts to improve professionalism and polish leadership skills were redoubled. Many courses of instruction were developed and cadre of all ranks began to rotate through the various courses. Noncommissioned officers were expected to attend one or all of the following during a normal tour at Fort Ord: noncommissioned of-

TRAINEES FROM COMPANY B, 2D BATTALION, 3D BRIGADE, *talk to Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway, July 1973.*

ficer leadership and professionalism course, drill sergeant refresher course, and drill sergeant recertification course. In addition, the brigades, battalions, and companies organized and ran a variety of short courses such as refresher courses for mess sergeants, cooks, and supply sergeants, the course in rifle marksmanship coaching, and refresher courses in military occupational specialties. A basic leadership course on the post, designed to build leadership skills among junior noncommissioned officers (E4 and E5) was instituted by direction of the Department of the Army and continued until mid-1973.

Junior officers attended the company grade officers' leadership and professionalism course, and various seminars and specialized short courses were run for them by the battalions and brigades. Senior officers attended such courses as the field grade officers' leadership and professionalism course, as well as certain courses at the Department of the Army level, among them the Army management school course at Fort Lee, Virginia, and the senior officers' legal orientation course at Charlottesville, Virginia.

In addition to making use of the military-oriented schooling listed above, soldiers took full advantage of the various educational opportunities provided by the Army education center and on-duty and off-duty college classes on the post. It was not unusual to find a battalion in which

30 percent of the officers and noncommissioned officers were enrolled at any given time. These self-improvement efforts were encouraged and, when possible, course attendance was permitted during some of the normal duty hours. The over-all response to educational efforts was excellent and the results were highly favorable.

Although Project VOLAR and the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program have been concluded, the scientific measurement and evaluation functions formerly conducted by the Training Evaluation Group have been continued by the Quality Control Group of the Directorate of Plans and Training. Administration of the military morale inventory and company evaluation inventory has been placed under the Organization Development Directorate. The information gained by the evaluation effort is expected to continue to form a valuable management tool.

The military morale inventory is filled out by each trainee at biweekly intervals. In this way commanders are able to keep track of morale and attitude trends and to spot problem areas early. The company evaluation inventory, which is filled out by each trainee at the end of the fourth week and again at the end of the seventh week of training, provides more specific information and is another useful indicator of training performance. While the unit analysis report is still employed, its dissemination has been restricted somewhat. Current policy is to compile and analyze the data, but to use it only when specific insights are needed, and then only at the higher command levels.

Fort Ord and the Army Reserves

Fort Ord has for many years provided various training and logistical support services to National Guard and Army Reserve units of the Western states. The advent of the Modern Volunteer Army Program strengthened these ties.

The U.S. Army Reserve has a number of training divisions around the country. Since their mission is to staff and operate additional Army training centers in the event of mobilization, these divisions are organized along the lines of the Army training center. Each has two basic combat training brigades, one advanced individual training individual combat support training brigade. The Reservists who man these units maintain and improve their trainer skills in weekly or monthly drills and during two-week training periods each summer. The 91st Division (Training), U.S. Army Reserve, is such a division. Commanded by Major General Constant C. Delwiche, the 91st has its headquarters at Fort Baker, California, a subpost of the Presidio of San Francisco. The men of the division's seventy-one subordinate units are drawn from California.

Traditionally, the 91st Division has accomplished its summer active duty training at Fort Ord. It has become the practice to attach the officers and men of the 91st to their active Army counterparts, who then stand back and let the Reservists take over. This system allows the men of the 91st Division to sharpen their training skill in actual work with trainees. With the advent of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program there were some misgivings about using this system because of the sweeping changes which were under way in the training process, but it was finally decided to continue the counterpart arrangement during the 1971 summer training period. Drill sergeant teams were sent to various 91st Division units to describe new training methods. In the spring a conference was held at Fort Ord to acquaint key members of the division with the principles of the experimental training program.

During the summer training, the Reservists first observed their active Army counterparts and received instruction in the new methods. As they mastered the new techniques, they were certified by the Fort Ord instructors and allowed to take over. Similar programs were conducted in the various staffs. All in all, the program was successful, and few of the anticipated difficulties were actually experienced. During the fall of 1971 and spring of 1972, the 91st Division improved its grasp of the new methods by sending staff officers and drill sergeant teams to observe the experimental program and the subsequent revised Army training program in operation. By the summer of 1972 these men were prepared for full participation in the training process.

In 1972, in addition to having the 91st Division, Fort Ord was designated host for annual training of the 104th Division (Training), U.S. Army Reserve. This division, commanded by Brigadier General Orville K. Fletcher, U.S. Army Reserve, has its headquarters in Vancouver, Washington, and draws its men from Washington and Oregon. The division combat support training brigade had trained annually at Fort Ord for several years, but 1972 was the first year the entire division had been scheduled. As with the 91st Division, staff visits were exchanged and Fort Ord drill sergeant teams were dispatched to prepare the men of the 104th. Assessing his division's experience at Fort Ord, General Fletcher wrote

> The contrast in attitude and interest generally demonstrated by trainees toward the training program was markedly different in 1972 compared to the previous year. The new techniques of performance-oriented training produced enthusiasm, morale and *esprit* not heretofore observed under conventional methods of lecture, demonstration and conference. The opportunities for participation as peer instructors and the challenge of a self-paced schedule not only provided dramatic motivational factors, but were a part of a distinct shift in the psychology of training young soldiers. . . . Although our observations were limited in duration, there were numerous "yardsticks"

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THE CONFIDENCE COURSE, *requiring strength, stamina, and agility, is popular in basic combat training.*

available to support these conclusions. The number of trainee leaders emerging from the program was several times the figure previously observed. Several examples were also noted in the conduct of performance tests conducted by our G3 test section. . . .

Through the annual training counterpart system, the Army, Fort Ord, and the divisions all benefited, and ties between the active Army and Reserve were strengthened.

Army Life at Fort Ord

It is now generally recognized that many improvements in Army life that are applicable throughout most of the Army are not suitable for the Fort Ord Training Center, which, after all, deals with the soldier for only the first few weeks of his career. All surveys and inventories point strongly to the fact that the trainees themselves understand that the circumstances governing the basic training period are quite different from those they can expect to find in the units to which they are later assigned. They are not particularly interested in more privacy or beer in the barracks because they know that their stay at Fort Ord is short. They would be happy to have more privileges and extra creature comforts but do not consider them essential. Judging by the surveys, what the men want most is good training under good leaders. Their primary expectation is challenge, discipline, and "tough" training. This is supplied in a professional manner and a disciplined environment.

Here it should perhaps be noted that expectation and relief factors play a role. If, for instance, the recruit completes his initial training and never performs kitchen police (KP) duty, then he will not know what he missed. If subsequently he is called on for this duty, it will come as a new and not particularly pleasant experience. Conversely, if he pulls KP during his early training and finds that in his unit of assignment he does not have to, then he perceives this as a gratifying relief.

General Haines had allowed Fort Ord somewhat wider latitude to experiment during basic combat training than was allowed the other training centers. After a time, as test results came in, this authority was withdrawn and General Haines placed more emphasis on challenge and discipline. The position of the Continental Army Command was clearly stated in General Haines' opening remarks at the annual U.S. Army Training Center Commanders' Conference for 1971 held 28–29 September at Fort Jackson, South Carolina:

> Since the introduction of the modern volunteer Army program and the institution of VOLAR experiments, there has been a great deal of talk regarding the implications of these activities on the training centers. I consider that modern volunteer Army benefits, especially those relating to lifestyle measures, should become available progressively to the new soldier. In my view, he should lead a relatively spartan existence during basic

training, receive a modest number of privileges during AIT/CST, and enjoy the full application of MVA measures only after he completes his individual training and is assigned to a unit.

Basic training is designed to be an intensive training phase which leads to the development of disciplined, physically conditioned, and highly motivated soldiers who are skilled in military fundamentals. Basic training must continue to be tough, demanding and austere in nature; our objective is to assure that basic training, in fact, meets these criteria. Thus, MVA high-impact actions should be applied only sparingly during basic training programs.

Inadvertently, the impression had been created that most VOLAR efforts were in the interest of trainees only. In July 1971 in response to a request that they evaluate the various changes made in Army life under Project VOLAR, the four brigade commanders then assigned agreed that more emphasis should be placed on the needs and desires of permanent party and retired personnel. With this in mind, a reassessment of earlier changes was begun with a view toward achieving better balance. Actually, the problem was more in the impression of what had been done than in the reality. Changes in Army life for trainees had received much wider publicity than other improvements. More balanced reporting of achievements went far to rectify the public impression of these changes.

General Haines had never been in favor of making beer available in basic combat training barracks and mess halls but, as an exception, had granted this authority to Fort Ord. The Continental Army Command message which had authorized beer in barracks and mess halls had referred only to basic combat training units at Fort Ord, and Fort Ord was authorized to experiment only under carefully controlled conditions. Although General Davidson also had serious reservations on the advisability of the move, commercial beer dispensers were placed in some, not all, basic combat training day rooms as an experiment. There were a few instances of abuse of the beer privilege, but there were no major problems. Neither was the beer privilege a great success; it turned out that after a hard day's work the average trainee much preferred a soft drink that he could get free in the mess hall. The beer dispensers were removed from both basic combat and advanced individual training dayrooms beginning in the fall of 1971.

Pass forms and sign-out rosters for men in basic combat training were reinstituted. Trainees are restricted to the company area for the first two weeks. At the end of the third week those men who have accrued sufficient merits may elect to spend them for an on-post pass. At the end of the fourth week an off-post pass is available to men with sufficient merits. The advanced combat support trainees enjoy a more liberal pass policy. The return to more stringent regulations of off-duty time does

A Typical Platoon Bay in Temporary Barracks

not appear to have greatly affected trainee morale, and it has improved appearance standards and decreased rates of absence without leave.

The experiment that allowed trainees to arrange and decorate their barracks was terminated in October 1971. Like beer in the barracks, this privilege was never a great point of contention. In most cases when the men were allowed to arrange the furniture in any way they desired, they experimented for a while and then returned of their own accord to the military system. Asked why, platoon members almost always replied that "it's easier to clean this way and everyone gets his fair share of space." As to mod-type posters and pictures on the walls, one man's art is another man's graffiti. They have not been allowed in training companies since October 1971.

Other innovations were tried and discarded. Prohibitions against the wearing of civilian clothes during basic training off-duty hours were relaxed then reimposed on a reduced scale. Hair lengths and styles are as set forth in Army regulations. Many men, getting their first Army haircut, request the barber to cut it extremely short.

Troop housing improvements have been given first priority in the employment of Military Construction, Army, funds, and substantial progress is being made. Plans for permanent buildings initiated some years ago are now reaching the construction stage. Contract negotiations were in progress in 1973 on a permanent barracks complex with a capacity of 1,170 men. A 280-man complex intended for use as bachelor

quarters for noncommissioned officers and a 260-man troop housing project were scheduled for completion in 1974.

The Vietnam War years saw strong emphasis on training and the trainee. Perhaps because of the heavy work load and lack of assignment stabilization which characterized this period, there was little evidence of the close knit camaraderie and friendliness typical of Army posts. To warm the atmosphere and foster community spirit among members of the permanent party, added emphasis was given to selected older programs and new projects were started. In 1971 Fort Ord opened a Welcome Center which houses under one roof all possible facilities and services relating to the arrival or departure of people at the Fort Ord complex. One of these is a single stop service for processing finance and personnel records. Another is an information and registration office for post youth activities, which include a variety of year-round sports and recreational and educational programs designed to appeal to youngsters of all ages. The office of Army Emergency Relief provides financial and other assistance to soldiers and their families, using funds contributed by Fort Ord personnel. The post housing office at the Welcome Center allocates and maintains the 3,370 family dwellings and the many bachelor officer and bachelor noncommissioned officer quarters. Eligibility criteria are scrupulously applied and position on the waiting list is respected to insure fair and impartial allotment of housing. For those who elect to live off-post, a housing referral service is provided to assist in the location of quarters.

Volunteer Army wives staff the Army community services office at the Welcome Center and provide advice and assistance to newly arrived families. One of their helpful services is lending such useful items as pots and pans and playpens to new families who are waiting for household goods to arrive. The center also offers comfortable waiting rooms equipped with television and toys for young children, and provides refreshments as well.

To further ease the problems inherent in the moving process, a strong sponsor program is in effect. Each man on orders to Fort Ord has appointed for him a local sponsor of equivalent grade, normally a member of the unit or staff section which the new arrival is slated to join. The sponsor is responsible for writing or telephoning the new man to offer advance information and assistance, and for introducing him to the post and the Army community. Newly arrived wives are given conducted tours by bus during which they visit various agencies on the post. Emphasis is placed on the attendance of wives of junior officers and enlisted men.

To build and maintain community spirit each housing area has a neighborhood council, which represents the interests of the neighbor-

hood, organizes and conducts projects, and promotes policies that make the community more hospitable and enjoyable.

There are four grade schools and a junior high school on the post, staffed and operated by the Monterey Peninsula Unified School District. Most post high school students attend Seaside High School, located on the edge of the reservation. Effective co-operation has produced excellent relations between parents, teachers, school officials, and post command and staff officers. The past few years have seen a dramatic decline in vandalism and other undisciplined acts.

A matter seriously affecting the lives of all residents at Fort Ord is the discipline of the post. No other improvements in Army life can be truly effective if a safe, disciplined environment is not provided for the soldiers and their families. The era of the Vietnam War had produced by 1970 a post crime rate of considerable proportions. Action to reduce crime at Fort Ord had begun under General Davidson and was continued and expanded under General Moore in a variety of vigorous security measures that produced a drop in the crime rate.

Ecological and environmental activities have been given considerable emphasis. Several thousand trees have been planted at Fort Ord and the Presidio of Monterey, and approximately 28,000 at Hunter Liggett Military Reservation. Part of this effort has been under the Legacy of Trees program started in 1973. Officers and soldiers of all ranks and their dependents have the opportunity to purchase and plant trees and mark them with name tags. In future assignments or visits to Fort Ord they will be able to see their contributions to the beauty of the post.

Improving Public Understanding and Support

On his arrival at Fort Ord, General Moore had been struck by the lack of understanding or misinterpretation of the Army's Project VOLAR programs by the local civilians and the retired military population of the area. It was apparent that the more sensational (and least successful) test programs had received most of the publicity, while the real accomplishments and efforts to improve professionalism and Army life had been largely ignored. As a result, many in the local area questioned whether the bedrock Army virtues of discipline and dedication were being sacrificed to permissiveness. General Moore therefore set out to put the record straight through a comprehensive information effort designed to tell and show what was really happening at Fort Ord.

Since the summer of 1971, several thousand visitors from California and some from neighboring states have come to Fort Ord to see firsthand what is being accomplished. So-called activity days have been instituted

during which men and women of all ages from around the state visit the post for a day to observe training activities. Visitors are encouraged to talk to the trainees themselves. Whenever possible, arrangements are made for them to join the trainees for lunch or dinner in the mess halls, so that they can talk to the troops and sample Army food at the same time. Some visitors represent local and regional civic, educational, veterans, and religious groups, others come as individuals. For those who cannot come to Fort Ord, there are military guest speakers who go to them by invitation. The requests have been gratifying, and the speakers have been well received wherever they have gone. The information program has worked so well that it is being continued.

Human Relations at Fort Ord

Fort Ord is vitally concerned with fostering harmonious human relations among the constantly changing population of some 40,000 military men, dependents, and civilian employees representing various age groups, races, and religions. To realize the magnitude of this task, one must consider the transient nature of the Fort Ord military population. The average tenure for permanent party enlisted men is approximately twenty-four months. The stay for trainees is normally eight to sixteen weeks. Almost 100,000 military men a year, the majority of whom are undergoing their initial Army experience, make up the population of the post.

The human relations leadership task is further complicated by many interrelated problems such as drug and alcohol abuse and the so-called generation gap. While there appear to be no simple solutions to the drug and alcohol problem, the rehabilitative and preventive work started by General Davidson has been continued. Considerable emphasis is given to offering military and dependents a wide choice of positive alternatives to the use of drugs or alcohol.

Fort Ord is a cosmopolitan community. Some 12 percent of the military population is black and 3 percent is of Oriental or American Indian origin. The percentage of Mexican-American and Spanish surnamed troops at Fort Ord is estimated at 12 percent, which is about three times the percentage throughout the Army.

The training population of Fort Ord is made up of American Indians, Caucasians, Negroes, and Orientals. These young men come from highly disparate cultural and ethnic backgrounds—Eskimo, Filipino, Guamanian, Hawaiian, Puerto Rican, Latin American, Mexican, Spanish, Caribbean, Samoan—and are thrust into a totally new environment. Under the circumstances it would be strange if they did not move toward informal, self-imposed racial isolation in order to re-establish known

conditions and surroundings. Unfortunately, these racial "camps," once established, tend to magnify group differences and produce racial tension.

Since 1969 many measures have been taken to foster racial harmony among the military at Fort Ord. For example, post exchange items and services catering to minority groups have been increased. As a result of common complaints and misunderstandings of the promotion system by members of minority groups, The Adjutant General has disseminated widely the criteria and procedures governing promotions of enlisted men. An initial orientation on the Department of the Army policy for equal opportunity and treatment of military personnel is now provided all men arriving at the reception station. Special attention has been given to the activities of the noncommissioned officer club, service club, and youth center to insure that entertainment and programs are well balanced in respect to the needs of the various ethnic members. Post libraries and unit funds have made available more publications relating to minority groups. Since January 1971, a four-hour block of instruction on the subject of race relations has been provided all basic trainees. Locally conducted schools for officers and noncommissioned officers incorporate the study of human relations in their curriculums.

Fort Ord adopted the term human relations to refer to race relations and the fair and equal treatment of all. On 24 November 1971 a study was undertaken of all functioning race relations programs in order to formulate a revitalized program that would fit unique needs of the post.

In January 1972 Fort Ord's Human Relations Handbook was published and distributed to all units and staff sections. It is a guide for the achievement of understanding and fairness through productive personal relationships and is required reading for all cadre leaders. In February every major unit commander and all senior noncommissioned officers received briefings on human relations concepts at Fort Ord and were assured of General Moore's strong support of the program. The Fort Ord Human Relations Office was opened on 23 May 1972. It is involved with both military and civilian equal opportunity programs, and is the central co-ordinating office for all human relations matters and for ethnic educational discussions. The office provides an information and education service and conducts discussion groups for military dependents and civilian employees. It shows ethnic educational films, and stocks a varied ethnic library. In August 1972 a three-week course opened for the purpose of training the human relations teams designated by commanders of brigade-size units and personnel assigned to the Human Relations Office. These teams, which became operational in September 1972, are guided by their individual commanders. A full schedule of seminars and group discussion meetings involving more than 5,500 military and civilian employees has been conducted.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING CENTER, INFANTRY
AND
FORT ORD
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA 93941

COMMANDING GENERAL'S HUMAN RELATIONS
POLICY STATEMENT

Fair and impartial treatment of all persons is a basic principle of positive human relations. I not only fully support this principle but will do everything within my power to see that it is applied at all levels of command and in all staff agencies.

I am convinced that the men who come into the Army want to learn how to live, work and play together in an environment free of tension. I charge every commander and staff officer to individually and collectively provide dynamic and inspiring guidance, sincere interest and the empathetic understanding necessary to maintain and promote racial harmony and fair treatment. We can only accomplish this by insuring the full implementation of positive human relations principles at Fort Ord.

All available means must be used to insure that each individual's rights are recognized and that each person is treated in a manner that allows him to realize fully his self-respect and innate worth and, within appropriate regulations, to rise as high as his talents and energy will take him.

Every commander, leader and staff chief within this command will give this matter his full and continuing attention, honest interest and cooperation. He will create within his area of operation an environment of equal opportunity, fair treatment and understanding and reinforce that environment with imaginative leadership.

Finally, let every person at Fort Ord recognize that I will not tolerate any proven instance of discrimination or unfair treatment, either blatant or subtle, which comes to my attention.

H. G. MOORE
Major General, USA
Commanding

In 1972 the commanding general wrote and published his "Five Principles of the Human Relations Program," which has been widely disseminated.

Every Commissioned Troop Leader
Every Noncommissioned Troop Leader
Every Commissioned Staff Leader
Every Noncommissioned Staff Leader
Every Warrant Officer Leader
Every Civilian Leader
Every Person
must personally, demonstrate that he is honestly, sincerely, and continuously, dedicated to carrying out the five action principles stated below:

1. Professional Accomplishment of Missions and Tasks, with Great Attention to Improving Interpersonal Relationships and Communications Between People.
2. Equal Opportunity—Fair, Decent, Honest Treatment of One Another, Especially by Leaders Toward Subordinates.
3. Better Care of People, to Include Provision of Their Different Ethnic and Minority Group Needs.
4. Better Understanding Between Different "Generations" and Different Grades of the Outlooks and Viewpoints of all.
5. Better Understanding Between the Different Ethnic and Minority Groups of the Outlooks and Viewpoints, Histories, and Cultures of all.

The struggle of minorities for social and economic equality is a prevailing problem in the nation's society. The measures taken at Fort Ord to improve human relations in the Army will, it is hoped, be a useful contribution to the nation's effort toward better understanding among its people.

Fort Ord's Role in the Army

Fort Ord's primary role within the Army's scheme of things has for many years been that of training Army recruits. While a host of secondary functions and missions are assigned to the post, the primary mission is that of the training center. The thousands of young men who annually pass through the training process at Fort Ord join line Army units throughout the world.

Fort Ord was given an important role in the over-all Modern Volunteer Army Program. The principal task assigned was that of substantially improving all aspects of the training center process. The post was first to examine thoroughly the center's training course content, teaching methodology, administrative operation, staffing, and sequence. It was then to employ its own local expertise together with that of agencies such as the Human Resources Research Organization to devise, implement, and evaluate substantive improvements in all areas of the system. New



NEW SOLDIERS PASS IN REVIEW AT BASIC COMBAT TRAINING GRADUATION (*above*). *Family and friends watch graduation ceremonies* (*below*).

methods, techniques, and systems that proved to be of real value in the experimental phase would then be considered for extension to the other training centers of the Army. In addition, Fort Ord was called on to devise, test, and evaluate a number of plans to improve the quality of Army life.

It is too early to measure accurately the value of the contributions made by Fort Ord to the over-all Army effort. This assessment should, in any case, be made by other, more detached, observers. In fairness, however, to the many professional soldiers at Fort Ord of all ranks who worked hard on the program, some account must be given of instances in which success was clearly achieved.

Reports from independent and unbiased observers indicate strongly that efforts in the sphere of training improvement were successful. Many

TOP TRAINEES AND DRILL SERGEANTS ARE HONORED *at graduation ceremonies.*

of the educational methods and training principles employed and tested have been approved by the Army for use throughout the training establishment.

There have been related gains in morale and motivation among those undergoing the improved training. This higher morale and increased motivation carry over and reinforce the training process itself. All of this has been achieved without sacrificing either the discipline or the physical and mental toughness so necessary in the soldier.

One of the unexpected, but nevertheless very important, contributions resulting from the Fort Ord training improvement effort was the advancement in measurement and evaluation techniques. Other Army posts are making increasing use of the insights and information provided by measurement tools and devices pioneered at Ford Ord. Properly employed, the various inventories and other instruments provide an added and valuable means of communication between the leaders and their men.

While value judgments in this area must, of necessity, be partly based on intuition, indications are that professionalism has improved. This was to be expected in view of various Army personnel assignment policies, not the least of which was increased stabilization, or stay time of cadre on station.

Army dependents and members of the local retired military community share the improvements in Army life. The key role played by Department of the Army civilian members of the Fort Ord team is recognized

and these civilians are part of all programs. Also important is the friendly relationship Fort Ord enjoys with the surrounding civilian communities.

No one individual, agency, or group has been responsible for Fort Ord's progress. It has come as the result of dedicated and sincere teamwork on the part of military and civilian professionals in all grades and ranks.

Appendix A

Company Evaluation Inventory

As a soldier in Army training, you are requested to rate your company on how well it managed and conducted your training. In providing this evaluation of your company, it is not necessary for you to identify yourself by name. However, you are requested to do an accurate and conscientious job in making your ratings, since the information you provide is used by your unit and by the Directorate of Plans and Training in monitoring the Army training here.

The Inventory is divided into three parts:

Part I: Merit Reward System Administration
Part II: General Administration and Policy
Part III: Soldier Attitude

There are a total of 50 statements in the Inventory. With each statement you may agree, disagree, or be undecided. If you agree with the statement you are to indicate whether you agree strongly, moderately, or slightly; if you disagree with the statement, you are to indicate whether you disagree strongly, moderately, or slightly. Use the following scale of numerals in making your agree-disagree ratings.

1=Disagree strongly
2=Disagree moderately
3=Disagree slightly
4=Undecided (neither agree nor disagree)
5=Agree slightly
6=Agree moderately
7=Agree strongly

You are to indicate your agreement or disagreement with each statement by choosing one numeral for each item. Use your answer sheet to record your ratings. MAKE NO MARKS ON THIS INVENTORY BOOKLET.

Before you begin, record today's date, your unit, your platoon number and your week of training on the answer sheet in the designated places. Be certain that the item you are rating on the answer sheet corresponds with the item you are reading in the Inventory. Be sure to read each item carefully so that the rating you assign is what you intend.

There is no time limit. Do not omit any items. Try to do the most accurate job possible in rating your company (Parts I and II) and in rating your attitude (Part III). BEGIN.

Part I: Merit Reward System Administration

1. The soldiers liked the Merit Reward System as it operated in this company.
2. The "rules" and "agreements" of the Merit Reward System were observed by the cadre.
3. The soldiers did not understand what was required of them to earn merits.
4. Each soldier's merit earnings were accurately recorded and made known to the soldier on a day-by-day basis.
5. Privileges did become available as promised.
6. How well the soldier performed, and how good his conduct and appearance were, did in fact determine how many merits the soldier received.
7. The weekly merit-earning schedule made clear to the soldiers on exactly what training activities merits could be earned.
8. Detail rosters for weekend duties were published in advance, thus permitting the soldier to plan a week ahead.
9. The soldiers never had a very good idea of how many merits they had.
10. The cadre worked hard at trying to follow common, uniform standards in assigning merits.
11. Whenever there was a change in the week's merit-earning schedule or in the week's privilege availability, the soldiers were informed in advance.
12. Merits were recorded soon after they were earned.
13. When a soldier failed to receive a merit on the Morning Inspection or on the Daily DI Evaluation, he was told what was wrong and how he must improve.
14. Weekend privileges were in fact based upon merit-earnings.
15. Merits awarded for platoon barracks inspections caused soldiers to help each other, thus developing teamwork.
16. It was quite clear that the cadre had respect for the Merit Reward System as a means of rewarding proper behavior and good performance in the soldier.
17. When a soldier with sufficient merits had his weekend privilege withheld, the Drill Sergeant had a good reason for doing so.
18. Weekend privileges were frequently given to soldiers without respect to their merit-earnings.
19. Frequently the Drill Sergeant would tell the soldier when he (the soldier) did an exceptionally good job at something.
20. Soldiers were selected for promotion according to the "upper-35% rule" of merit earners. (Or, if you are in the 9th to 16th week of

infantry training, rate this item instead: "Soldiers were selected for promotion according to how rapidly they advanced in the training.")

Part II: General Administration and Policy

21. There was a lot of harassment of the soldiers in this company.
22. The Training Improvement Seminar was an effective means of communication between the Company Commander and his men.
23. The soldiers always received a complete meal.
24. The dayroom was not regularly available to the soldiers for recreation and relaxation.
25. The training and instruction received were good.
26. The cadre were generally understanding of the needs and problems of the men.
27. It was usually possible to get eight hours of sleep a night.
28. The soldiers were unnecessarily rushed through chow.
29. The Drill Sergeants seemed to really care about how much the soldiers learned and how well the soldiers performed.
30. Military courtesy and discipline met high standards in this company.
31. The plumbing and heating equipment in the barracks were kept in good working order.
32. The food was well prepared and was appetizing.
33. Orderly room personnel readily assisted soldiers with legitimate problems.
34. There was not enough physical training and physical conditioning.
35. The Company Commander really looked after the welfare of his men.
36. The soldiers were treated as men.
37. The soldiers were teased and harassed about going on sick call.
38. The soldiers were able to select their choice of the authorized haircut styles.
39. The company encouraged participation in informal athletics and recreation.
40. Company officers and cadre did a good job of keeping the soldiers informed about training events and policies.

Part III: Soldier Attitude

41. To me, the training has been a worthwhile experience.
42. My morale was high during most of the cycle.
43. I have a better opinion of the Army now than when I first arrived at Ford Ord.
44. I wish now that I were in one of the other Armed Services instead of the Army.

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45. Because of the training, I have developed more confidence and self-respect.
46. My training experience increases the chances that I will choose to stay in the Army beyond my original term of service.
47. The training has caused me to feel discouraged about our nation's Army and the people in it.
48. I have learned lots of new things from the training that will be of help to me later on.
49. I feel lucky to have been assigned to this particular company for training.
50. The training has taken more away from me than it has given to me.

Appendix B

National Guard, Reserve, and Other Organizations Training at Fort Ord, 1971–1973

Unit	*State*	*Year*
National Guard		
53d Military Police Company	Arizona	1973
72d Military Police Company	Nevada	1971–72
270th Military Police Company	California	1973
854th Military Police Company	Arizona	1971
855th Military Police Company	Arizona	1971
856th Military Police Company	Arizona	1971
146th Evacuation Hospital	California	1972
Reserve		
199th Military Police Platoon	Idaho	1971
306th Military Police Company	California	1972
308th Military Police Company	California	1971–72
380th Military Police Detachment	California	1972
381st Military Police Detachment	California	1973
382d Military Police Detachment	California	1973
496th Military Police Battalion	California	1973
742d Military Police Detachment	Arizona	1972
5th Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1972–73
6th Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1971
71st Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1972–73
72d Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1972–73
73d Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1972–73
74th Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1972
76th Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1973
77th Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1973
78th Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1973
82d Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1973
89th Judge Advocate General Detachment	Washington	1971
90th Judge Advocate General Detachment	Washington	1971
221st Judge Advocate General Detachment	California	1973
222d Judge Advocate General Detachment	Oregon	1971
223d Judge Advocate General Detachment	Oregon	1971
226th Judge Advocate General Detachment	Washington	1971

Unit	*State*	*Year*
Reserve (Continued)		
4073d U.S. Army Reserve Reception Station	New Jersey	1971
6218th U.S. Army Reception Station	California	1972–73
6219th U.S. Army Reception Station	California	1971–73
45th Station Hospital	Washington	1973
49th Medical Battalion	California	1971
50th General Hospital Washington	Washington	1972–73
112th Medical Detachment	California	1971
113th Medical Detachment	California	1971
114th Medical Detachment	California	1971
143d Medical Detachment	Utah	1971–72
144th Medical Detachment	California	1971
181st Medical Detachment	Colorado	1973
238th Medical Detachment	Idaho	1971
272d Medical Detachment	California	1971
313th Convalescent Center	Washington	1971–73
313th Reconditioning Battalion	Oregon	1971–73
328th General Hospital	Utah	1971
410th Medical Detachment	Colorado	1973
447th Medical Company	North Dakota	1973
607th Medical Detachment	Washington	1973
807th Hospital Center	Texas	1973
829th Medical Detachment	Utah	1971
830th Medical Detachment	Utah	1971
831st Medical Detachment	Texas	1973
5502d U.S. Army Hospital	Colorado	1973
6253d U.S. Army Hospital	California	1971
78th Division (Training) Supply Committee	New Jersey	1971
84th Division (Training) Supply Committee	Wisconsin	1973
89th Division (Training) Supply Committee	Kansas and Colorado	1973
91st Division (Training) Headquarters Company	California	1971–73
1st Brigade	California	1971–73
2d Brigade	California	1971–73
3d Brigade	California	1971–73
4th Brigade	California	1971–73
Support Battalion	California	1971–73
Committee Group	California	1971–73

Unit	*State*	*Year*
Reserve (Continued)		
104th Division (Training) Headquarters Company	Washington	1972–73
1st Brigade	Washington	1972–73
2d Brigade	Washington	1972–73
3d Marine Brigade	Washington	1972–73
625th U.S. Army Garrison	California	1971
300th Army Band	California	1973
312th Personnel Services Company	California	1973
313th Military Intelligence Detachment	California	1972
359th Engineer Detachment	California	1973
4th Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force (USMCR)		1973
Headquarters Battalion		1971–73
Supply Battalion		1971–73
Headquarters Company, Headquarters Battalion		1972
3d Battalion, 23d Marine Regiment		1972–73
Headquarters Company, Supply Battalion		1972
3d Field Artillery Group (USMCR)		1972–73
Naval Reserve Surface Division 12–23 M, USNR		1971–72
Naval Reserve Surface Division 12–34 M, USNR		1971–72
Naval Reserve Surface Division 12–38 M, USNR		1971
Seabee Subunit 12–17, USNR		1972
Naval Reserve Inshore Underwater Demolition Unit		1973
Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps		
University of Santa Clara	California	1971–73
Stanford University	California	1971–73
University of Nevada	Nevada	1971–73
University of California, Santa Barbara	California	1971
University of San Francisco	California	1971–73
San Jose State College	California	1971–72
University of California, Davis	California	1971–73
University of California, Berkeley	California	1971–73
California Polytechnical	California	1972–73
California State University, San Jose	California	1972–73

Unit	*State*	*Year*
Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps		
Mission High School	California	1971
Tenays Junior High School	California	1971
San Diego City Schools	California	1972–73
Oakland Public Schools	California	1972
Campbell (U.S. Marine Corps)	California	1972–73
California Cadet Corps	California	1972
San Francisco High Schools	California	1973
Reno Consolidated High Schools	Nevada	1973

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