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for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**

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Sinai Task Force Leaders at the Infantry Leaders Course

**Margaret S. Salter, Gene W. Fober, Robert J. Pleban,
and Patrick J. Valentine
U.S. Army Research Institute**

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) The senior leaders of the 4-505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Task Force deployed from Fort Bragg, NC, to Fort Benning, GA, from August 26, 1994 through September 23, 1994, to attend the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC). The 4-505 is a composite or "experimental" battalion, both in its composition and in its availability to accomplish the MFO Sinai peace-keeping mission. In leadership positions, half are Regular Army, the other half National Guard or Army Reserve. The ILC, specializing in Infantry doctrine and tactics and collective Infantry skills, was the initial training event for 154 leaders of the newly constituted battalion and their first opportunity to function as a group. Data were collected through written questionnaires, interviews, and first-hand training observations. Research questions focused on training and within unit bonding. Observations confirmed that the composite battalion would be able to conduct its mission; the leaders were trained. Those with skill deficiencies were highly motivated and benefitted most. Early concerns over unit cohesion focused on (Continued)				
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the Active/Reserve mixture and whether the two elements could be combined and work together. Concerns proved unfounded, as the members of the units readily accepted each other as members of the common MFO unit.

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**Sinai Task Force Leaders
at the Infantry Leaders Course**

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FOREWORD

The 4-505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Task Force is a composite battalion comprised of Activate Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) personnel. Its senior leaders deployed from Fort Bragg, NC, to Fort Benning, GA, from August 26, 1994 through September 23, 1994, to attend the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC). This course, specializing in Infantry doctrine and tactics and collective Infantry skills, was the initial training event for the leaders, both officers and noncommissioned officers of the newly constituted battalion, and their first opportunity to function as a group.

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) was tapped as the primary assessor of the training. The Infantry Forces Research Unit (IFRU) element of ARI's Training Systems Research Division, located at Fort Benning, observed the task force leaders' ILC training. The IFRU has had considerable experience in observation and assessment of small unit Infantry training.

The lessons learned about the MFO assignment and training experiences will be of great importance for future rotations as the MFO mission continues and other composite battalions are formed to accomplish the mission. Information contained in this report, one of many focusing on the MFO, has been briefed at all levels, including the Chief of Staff of the Army.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

SINAI TASK FORCE LEADERS AT THE INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

The 4-505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Task Force is a composite battalion composed of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) personnel. In leadership positions, half are Regular Army, the other half National Guard or Army Reserve. It is an "experimental" battalion, both in its composition and in its availability to accomplish the MFO Sinai peacekeeping mission. The purpose of the research described in this report was to document the battalion's initial training event—the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC) at Fort Benning. Specific research questions focused on whether the ILC was able to accomplish its training mission—were the leaders trained to standard and prepared to conduct training? Further, were the leaders able to become a cohesive unit?

Procedure:

Subjects of the research were the 154 soldiers who attended the ILC. There were 11 AC and 11 RC officers and 132 noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel, 63 from the AC and 69 from the RC. Researchers collected data through written questionnaires, interviews, and first-hand training observations throughout the month-long course.

Findings:

Based on all observations, it was apparent that the composite battalion would be able to conduct both its internal training and the MFO mission. Part of this is due to the caliber of the ILC instruction, part due to the high quality leaders in the battalion. Although some portions of the training went more smoothly than others, those who had skill deficiencies when they arrived at the course were highly motivated and benefitted most. Early concerns over unit cohesion focused on the AC/RC mixture and whether the two elements could be combined and work together. Most individuals in each group readily accepted each other as members of the common MFO unit—the AC/RC difference was irrelevant.

Another question centered on the ILC's suitability as a predeployment training event for the MFO. Both course content and the location of the training arose as issues. The pre-course decision to include only Infantry tasks during the ILC disappointed those who expected that they would receive MFO specific training, and the non-desert terrain reduced the face validity of the course. A training venue more similar to the Sinai, with more MFO tasks or vignettes added to the training content, would have been useful to the battalion.

Utilization of Findings:

The lessons learned from this, the first iteration of an MFO-bound battalion at the ILC, were many and will benefit future MFO battalions in their unit training, regardless of the composition of the battalion or the location of their training. The findings will also assist decision makers in preparing units for MFO deployment.

SINAI TASK FORCE LEADERS AT THE INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE

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SINAI TASK FORCE LEADERS AT THE INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE

Introduction

The senior leaders, both officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOS), of the newly constituted 4-505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) deployed from Fort Bragg, NC, to Fort Benning, GA, from August 26 through September 23, 1994, to attend the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC). The ILC, the initial training event for the leaders of this battalion and their first opportunity to function as a group, was intended to prepare the 4-505 leaders to conduct training for their troops later at Fort Bragg. Further training was to occur with the battalion's enlisted soldiers, in October through December, prior to their January, 1995 deployment to the Sinai as members of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Task Force (Rotation 28).

The 4-505 PIR MFO Battalion Task Force

The 4-505 PIR is a composite battalion task force, comprised of a mixture of Active and Reserve Component officers, NCOs, and soldiers, with a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) strength of 583. Within the leadership positions, half are Regular Army, the other half National Guard or Army Reserve. All soldiers below the rank of sergeant are members of the National Guard. The Reserve Component personnel, like most of the Active duty soldiers, volunteered for the MFO-Sinai mission.

This is an "experimental" battalion, both in its composition, and its availability as a unit to accomplish the MFO Sinai peacekeeping mission. The experimental nature of combining Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers under one chain of command, mixing Regular Army, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers within companies, platoons, and squads is obvious, and merits both careful scrutiny and evaluation. Additionally, the MFO mission has heretofore always been conducted by Active Duty battalions--sent for six month tours to the Sinai. The concept of sending a newly formed composite unit, whose readiness status and training level are unknown, is also unusual and warrants assessment.

The U.S. Army Research Institute's Role

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) was tapped as the primary assessor of the experiment. The Infantry Forces Research Unit (IFRU) element of ARI's Training Systems Research Division, located at Fort Benning, GA, was given the mission of observing the 4-505th's ILC training experience. The IFRU has had considerable recent experience in observation and assessment of small unit infantry training. Examples of prior research in the area may be found in

Thompson, Thompson, Pleban and Valentine (1991); Dyer, et al., (1992); Pleban, Thompson, and Valentine (1993); Fober, Dyer and Salter (1994); Salter (1994); Salter (in press); and Thompson, Pleban and Valentine (1994).

The Infantry Leaders Course

The ILC focuses on Infantry doctrine and tactics and collective infantry skills. A "train-the-trainer" course, it is offered by the elite Ranger Training Brigade (RTB) at Fort Benning and has three primary stated purposes: 1) to ensure that personnel are trained on current squad/platoon level collective task doctrinal standards, 2) to ensure that leaders are ready to conduct training to standard in their units, and 3) to promote teamwork and cohesion through shared common experiences. (Full information on the course is found in the U.S. Army Infantry School's Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet SH 21-75-7, 1993.)

For all units, learning the most recent doctrine is important; for the 4-505, this was a critical training goal. The AC/RC configuration of the battalion and the fact that it was a newly formed unit gave greater than normal need to promote cohesion and to ensure that all leaders were prepared to train to the same standards.

The ILC is available for Light and Mechanized Infantry units and other selected agencies. Initial contact is made between the ILC and the unit about six months prior to the start of the course. The unit provides the ILC with its Mission Essential Task List (METL) and together the ILC and the unit develop a tentative training schedule. The training schedule is finalized, with equipment and resources requested 12-14 weeks prior to the start of the course.

Training is based on a 28-day cycle at Fort Benning. However, units have the option of decreasing the duration of the course or even of requesting a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to teach the course at home station. The average training day is 12 hours; usually seven days a week. The emphasis throughout is on developing the ability of each student to train soldiers in infantry skills. The course presumes that soldiers are proficient in the tasks appropriate to their rank and military occupational specialty (MOS), that all personnel, regardless of rank, will participate in all training events.

Normally, maximum course capacity is 104 personnel. Suggested attendees are the battalion commander, three line company commanders, nine platoon leaders and nine platoon sergeants, 27 squad leaders and 54 team leaders. All personnel attending hold at least the rank of sergeant (E5).

The key focus of the course is dismounted small unit (squad and platoon) infantry tactics. The battalion selects the contents of the program of instruction (POI) based on its METL, training status, and any special needs. Training options are based on the seven infantry squad and platoon missions (movement to contact, attack, raid, ambush, reconnaissance & surveillance, defend, retrograde) detailed in the platoon mission training plan (MTP) (DA, 1988a); collective tasks and battle drills are also available. (Field Manual (FM) FM 7-8 (DA, 1992) details doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for infantry rifle platoons and squads.)

Special skills training offered includes such subjects as land navigation, aeromedical evacuation, how to train (develop a training plan) and train the trainer (execute training). The collective tasks and drills are combined into Situational Training Exercises (STXs) and Field Training Exercises (FTXs); the specifics are the decision of the unit.

Training is conducted based on the Army crawl-walk-run philosophy where initial training (learning the tasks) is followed by refresher training (training to standard) and finally, sustainment training (training with realism) (DA, 1988b and DA, 1990). Training events are followed by after action reviews (AARs) (DA, 1991).

Central to the bonding and cohesion portions of the course is the selection of activities from team building exercises: the Camp Darby Confidence Course (obstacles); the Water Confidence Course at Victory Pond (physical challenge above water hazard); rappelling (tower and helicopter); Leadership Reaction Course (small-group problem solving); hand to hand combat; student-led instruction; and Bayonet/pugil stick training.

Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this paper is to document the conditions and constraints of the training that took place while the leadership elements of the 4-505 were at the ILC, and to answer several questions related to the effectiveness and efficiency of the ILC as a training event for an MFO task force.

Specific questions include determination of whether the ILC accomplished its training mission--were the leaders trained to standard and were they prepared to conduct training? Did the leaders bond and become cohesive? What changes were required of the ILC to accommodate the MFO-bound task force?

Method

Four ARI researchers conducted several different activities and collected data designed to answer the overall research

questions articulated above. Information was gathered through written questionnaires, interviews, and training observations. These varied but complementary approaches and data sources are detailed sequentially below. All surveys are reproduced at Appendix A to this report.

Subjects

The 154 personnel from the 4-505 PIR who attended the ILC comprised 74 AC and 80 RC soldiers. The RC included 74 National Guardsmen, five Army Reservists, and one officer from the Individual Ready Reserve. There were 11 AC and 11 RC officers. There were 132 NCOs and enlisted personnel--63 from the AC and 69 from the RC. Some of the original personnel departed before the end of a course; a few personnel arrived late.

Materials

Experience and MFO Unit Preparedness Survey. These instruments were designed to elicit self-assessment of readiness, leadership qualities, and their expectations from the course. The experience survey provided demographic information on the soldiers' AC or RC status, their Combat Training Center experience, and on their Army and professional development training. The purpose of this instrument was to identify variations in training experience within the battalion leadership.

The pre-training questionnaire, MFO Unit Preparedness Survey, asked them to rate themselves on their level of preparedness to train seventeen specific collective tasks (e.g., Disengage, Defend, Cross Danger Area, Reconnoiter Route, Occupy Observation Post) and eleven battle drills, special skills and individual tasks (e.g., React to Ambush, Land Navigation, Aeromedical Evacuation).

A second section asked for self-assessment of leadership skills in need of improvement; the next part asked them to rate their new immediate superior in some broad areas of leadership (e.g., Planning, Supervision).

The final sections asked for ratings on their confidence that the ILC would prepare them to train their subordinates and whether they felt confident, before the course, in their ability to develop and execute unit training plans. The last question asked for the respondent's expectations as to what the ILC course would do for him and his specific unit element.

Prior MFO Rotation Questionnaire. The nineteen personnel (officers and NCOs) who had been on the MFO mission with other units, completed a questionnaire detailing their prior training

and impressions. The first portion of the survey asked about their duties in the Sinai, workload and free time activities. They also described the training their other unit had focused on prior to departure for the Sinai and any tasks they wished they had spent more time on.

The second portion focused on their present situation, including how much MFO specific training they remembered from the prior rotation. They were asked their opinions on whether MFO units need courses like the ILC to prepare for deployment, whether the ILC was the proper course, and whether they perceived any specific problems derived from the use of a volunteer (as opposed to a command selected standard battalion) task force. These questions, all open ended, were designed to elicit "lessons learned" from previous rotations.

ILC Post Training Survey. At the conclusion of the course, the 4-505 leaders completed a questionnaire to assess current levels of performance and changes resulting from their training. They were asked about their confidence in developing and executing training and what other skills or tasks they would have liked to have had included in the POI for the ILC. They gave their opinions about the effectiveness of the ILC course in preparing them to train other soldiers and in promoting bonding within the unit. They also listed strengths and weaknesses of the course. The final questions repeated the leadership skills questions from the original survey, to determine both self-perceptions of leadership growth and whether they had become more aware of the capabilities and shortfalls of their immediate superiors and leaders. Finally, they were asked if, based on the perspective gained from their first full month of MFO training, they would volunteer again.

Infantry Leaders Course End of Course Questionnaire. An additional source of data was the RTB produced end of course critique. The MFO were asked to evaluate each block of instruction (e.g., Land Navigation, Train the Trainer, M249 Familiarization), the STXs, and the overall training--materials, level of instruction, organization and instructors. A final question asked "What was your unit's mission while here at the Infantry Leaders Course?"

ILC MFO Composite Battalion Training Questionnaire. Another source of data was a survey administered to the Fort Benning ILC cadre two months after the MFO battalion had concluded its training. The intent was to solicit input on the MFO experience from the instructors with the perspective gained from the passage of time. They were asked for overall assessment of this battalion in comparison to other battalions and for their personal opinions on how the course should have been conducted or might be used for future MFO battalions.

MFO 4-505 Officers and NCO Survey. This final instrument was administered to the soldiers in the Sinai, about five weeks into the deployment, and five months after the ILC. The intent of this questionnaire was to see if perceptions had changed over time.

Procedures

RTB cadre. Before the MFO Sinai leaders arrived at the ILC to begin their training, the Ranger Instructors (RIs) and staff met as a group with ARI to discuss the overall MFO mission, and typical ILC POI contents, procedures, and outcomes. During this time period, the RIs became acquainted with the ARI personnel and began to understand the types of things ARI was interested in observing and the kinds of information sought from the instructors. We stressed the importance of the individual cadre observations and opinions, as well as the need for candor.

This group interview procedure was repeated at the end of the course as an after action review (AAR). The situation was deliberately kept very informal to elicit as much information as possible from the cadre. For some of the instructors, this ILC had been their first. Others had been RIs for several years. Some had a great deal of information to use as a basis of comparison; others had little. However, all spoke at length and contributed to the overall discussion. Generally they were in complete agreement with each other on the various issues.

MFO Questionnaires. Procedures varied for administration of surveys. On the afternoon the 4-505 leaders arrived at Fort Benning, they were given the experience and pre-training surveys. The soldiers were in one large group, with four ARI personnel present. We introduced ourselves and explained our role in their training experience. We explained that we would be present every day and would sometimes ask specific questions. We said we would at any time welcome comments or questions from them. As with the cadre, we stressed the importance of candor, and assured them that every soldier's opinion was of value.

For the Prior MFO Rotation survey, the respondents answered the questions at their own convenience and returned them to ARI when finished, typically three days later. Instructions stressed that they were to take their time in responding. The post-training survey was planned for group administration by ARI, but the battalion changed its schedule at the last minute and staff personnel distributed and collected the survey. The Sinai questionnaire was administered on site by ARI personnel.

Training observations. Finally, the ARI researchers observed the leaders' training throughout the entire four week period. We saw both classroom and field events and watched the group begin to take shape over time. By our nearly constant

attendance during training (to include road marches and evening and weekend classes), we gained the confidence of the 4-505 leaders. They spoke candidly about their concerns and impressions. These findings, although less rigorous or systematic than the questionnaires, provided excellent information and answers relevant to the previously articulated research questions. They also serve as validation of the questionnaire data.

Results and Discussion

The MFO composite battalion's training at ILC differed in many ways from that of the typical battalion. The tasks selected were quite different from those of most light infantry battalions. The mixture of Active and Reserve Component soldiers was anticipated in advance to be a problem; the newness of the battalion turned out to be a critical issue. Since the unit had no history, no overall training status could be determined in advance. The effects of these and other issues will be detailed below. The questionnaire data are reported first. The logistical impact of 154 students on the training system is discussed next; the training observations are discussed last. The overall guiding research questions are addressed as a part of the Conclusions section.

Questionnaire Data

Experience survey and demographic data. The brief demographic questionnaire elicited student background and experience. Of the MFO leaders (N=154) who responded, 74 were AC soldiers (11 officers and 63 NCOs). The remaining 80 were RC (74 Army National Guard, 6 Army Reserve). Of the RC, 11 were officers, 69 NCOs. Although in the group there were some officers with prior enlisted service and one NCO who had been an officer, data for this and all other surveys were tabulated according to the respondent's present status. Also, because there were a great number of National Guardsmen with prior Active Duty service, it is impossible to verify when (or in what capacity) they attended specific schools.

In terms of both experience and advanced military education, the AC leaders exceeded the RC. This disparity was particularly striking in the elite courses, e.g., Ranger and Airborne Schools. Demographic highlights are shown in Table 1 and full data are at Appendix B.

The Combat Training Center (CTC) experience was somewhat greater for the AC soldiers (see Table 2). The relatively high RC attendance probably reflects the high number with prior Active Duty service. The relatively low percentage for the officers as a whole may reflect the fact that 14 of the 22 officers were

lieutenants who may not have been in service long enough to have had any opportunity to go to a CTC. Of the 154 respondents, some individuals had been to only one CTC, others to several; 31 had been to none.

Table 1

Numbers and Percentages of Soldiers Reporting Attendance at Officer/NCO Courses*

	<u>Active</u>		<u>Reserve</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Total Respondents	11	63	11	69
Ranger	9	12	4	1
Airborne	11	54	6	14
Air Assault	3	34	7	21
CLS	1	29	2	9
PLDC	0	59	0	61
BNCOC	0	34	0	33
ANCOC	0	10	0	12
OBC	11	0	11	0
OAC	4	0	1	0

Note. * Combat Life Saver (CLS), Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC and ANCOC), Officer Basic and Advanced Course (OBC and OAC).

Table 2

Numbers and Percentages of Soldiers Reporting Experience at Each of the Combat Training Centers

	<u>Active Component</u>				<u>Reserve Component</u>				<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>		<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>		<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>		
JRTC	6	55	50	79	5	45	35	51	96	62
NTC	3	27	34	54	1	9	24	35	62	40
CMTC	1	9	10	16	2	18	4	6	17	11
Any CTC	7	64	59	94	7	64	50	72	123	80
None	4	36	4	6	4	36	19	28	31	20

Notes. JRTC, the Joint Readiness Training Center, for light infantry, is located at Fort Polk, LA; NTC, the National Training Center, for armored/mechanized units, is located at Fort Irwin, CA; the CMTC, Combat Maneuver Training Center, for armored/mechanized units, is located at Hohenfels, Germany.

MFO Unit Preparedness Survey results. The pre-training survey documented the MFO task force's pre-course preparedness to train specific tasks. They were asked to rate each of the collective tasks, drills and individual specialty tasks according to whether they felt "very well prepared", "prepared", "somewhat prepared", or "not prepared" to train those tasks before the start of the course. Table 3 shows percentages of the AC and RC officers and NCOs who considered themselves either "prepared" or "very well prepared" to train 17 collective tasks prior to ILC. (Full data are at Appendix C.)

Table 3

Collective Tasks: Percent Rating Themselves as "Very Well Prepared" or "Prepared" to Train Their Soldiers to Standard

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Disengage	82	55	79	48
Hasty Ambush	100	73	84	56
Point Ambush	91	63	87	53
Defend	100	73	85	55
Occupy Assembly Area	82	73	83	67
Move Tactically	100	73	94	80
Cross Danger Area	91	72	92	74
Occupy ORP*	91	82	84	66
Occupy Patrol Base	100	82	84	66
Linkup	72	55	68	36
Cross Defile	45	46	53	20
Recon Zone	100	64	70	51
Recon Route	100	63	75	47
Occupy OP*	100	64	82	64
Surveillance	82	55	80	52
Prepare for Combat	91	82	88	72
Consolidate/Reorganize	90	54	83	67

Note. ORP (Objective Rally Point); OP (Observation Post)

No AC officers and very few AC NCOs admitted to being "not prepared" in any category. Although there were AC soldiers (both officers and NCOs) who admitted being only "somewhat prepared" to train some tasks, many more RC perceived themselves as less than "prepared." Similarly, a larger percentage of the AC soldiers rated themselves as "very well prepared" overall.

There were, however, differences between tasks. For example, every respondent rated himself as at least "somewhat prepared" to train the task move tactically; no one said he was "not prepared." In contrast, the task Cross Defile had more than 25% of the NCOs, both AC and RC, rate themselves "not prepared."

Besides Cross Defile, only three tasks (Disengage, Perform Linkup and Reconnoiter Route) had less than half of the respondents rate themselves as either prepared or very well prepared, and all of these were RC NCOs.

Therefore, prior to the start of the course, more than half of all personnel thought they were already prepared to train other people on the subjects they were about to receive training on. Even though there was no way to measure the accuracy of these self-perceptions, their impact cannot be ignored: many felt ILC was a waste of time. This was coupled with the fact that many felt that they should have been receiving training in the MFO tasks which they did not know. The mismatch between perceived needs and course expectations and the actual conduct and content of the course caused problems (described below) throughout the duration of the ILC experience.

For the four battle drills polled, AC respondents were very confident in their ability to conduct training; 87% of all respondents rated themselves as "Prepared" or "Very Well Prepared" on React to Contact and Break Contact, and React to Ambush, and React to Indirect Fire (see Table 4). In contrast, for the RC soldiers, the highest percentage for any drill was 81%.

Table 4

Battle Drills, Special Skills, Individual Tasks: Percent Rating Themselves as "Very Well Prepared" or "Prepared" to Train Their Soldiers to Standard

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
React to Contact	91	94	64	71
Break Contact	91	89	64	66
React to Ambush	91	87	73	65
React to Indirect Fire	91	95	73	81
Leader Reconnaissance	91	76	64	57
Land Navigation	91	95	64	72
Construct Fighting Posns	91	89	73	68
Aeromedical Evacuation	91	52	55	24
Pathfinder Operations	36	33	46	12
Unaided Night Vision	55	68	50	34
Report Enemy Information	100	94	73	78

The overall pattern (AC more likely to rate themselves prepared or very well prepared than RC) continued for the other tasks and skills, with the exception of the task Pathfinder

Operations where very few of any group felt prepared to train to standard--not surprising given the small number of personnel who had attended Pathfinder School.

Other questions covered leadership abilities. Generally the AC soldiers rated themselves less in need of improvement than the RC did, but differences were small, except in self-perceptions of tactical proficiency. The soldiers were also asked to rate the leadership skills of their immediate superiors. Generally most respondents were fairly favorable about their superior, with the RC slightly more so than the AC. These ratings, at the start of the course, were given with the knowledge that most personnel did not really know their superiors; they were taken as a rough baseline, to assess the change over time. (See Appendix D.)

Three questions asked for soldiers' confidence in their ability to develop and execute training plans, before the ILC, and for their confidence in ILC being able to prepare them to train their subordinates. Percentages are shown in Table 5.

Table 5

Soldier Confidence Ratings in Their Abilities to Develop and Execute Training and in ILC to Prepare Them to Train (Percentages)

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
<u>Can Develop Training Now</u>				
Extremely Confident	46	10	36	6
Very Confident	46	36	9	20
Fairly Confident	9	24	36	36
Somewhat Confident	0	20	9	25
Not Very Confident	0	10	9	13
<u>Can Execute Training Now</u>				
Extremely Confident	36	18	9	6
Very Confident	27	31	36	29
Fairly Confident	36	26	27	36
Somewhat Confident	0	16	18	17
Not Very Confident	0	8	9	12
<u>ILC Will Prepare to Train</u>				
Extremely Confident	9	19	46	18
Very Confident	64	39	46	60
Fairly Confident	27	25	9	21
Somewhat Confident	0	10	0	0
Not Very Confident	0	7	0	2

Generally, the AC soldiers were less confident in the ability of the ILC to meet their needs than were the RC. The RC over all were also less confident in their pre-course ability to develop and execute training, although many NCOs, both AC and RC, admitted not being overly confident in their ability to execute training.

The final question asked the leaders' expectations from the course, given their unique mission and make up of the unit. The question was open ended; some did not answer, others gave more than one response. Responses clustered in five broad categories. One was bonding, cohesion and team building; it was the item most stressed by the battalion commander ("...put people from different units all on the same sheet of music"). Another category focused on assessment of unit strengths and weaknesses ("...identify the strong team players"). A third response category highlighted specific skills and refresher training ("I expect ILC to reinforce skills that have already been taught in previous courses. It will allow us to take those skills and redefine them to our MFO mission"). A fourth category covered troop leading procedures (TLPs) (This course should teach us to be teachers and to be able to lead and train our troops"). The fifth category was one of negativity (responses of "nothing" or "not much").

Percentages are shown in Table 6. Second responses (if any) are shown in parentheses. Differences in expectations appeared to be more between officers and NCOs, than between AC and RC soldiers although, as before, the RC officers and NCOs were highly focused on refresher training and TLPs.

Table 6

Percent of Soldiers Reporting Specific Expectations from the ILC: First and (Second) Responses

	<u>Active Component</u>				<u>Reserve Component</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>		<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>	
	<u>#1</u>	<u>#2</u>	<u>#1</u>	<u>#2</u>	<u>#1</u>	<u>#2</u>	<u>#1</u>	<u>#2</u>
Bonding	55	(25)	22	(21)	10	(50)	17	(21)
Assessment	0	(25)	16	(16)	0	(0)	6	(0)
Skills	27	(13)	31	(26)	60	(0)	35	(38)
TLPs	18	(38)	17	(32)	30	(50)	37	(38)
Not Much	0	(0)	14	(5)	0	(0)	5	(4)

Prior MFO experience survey results. Three officers and sixteen noncommissioned officers had been on the MFO mission before, and two, twice before. Ten were volunteers for this rotation; nine were not. They were asked to look back at their

earlier rotation (for some only 6 months prior; for others nearly 10 years) and answer questions based on their experiences. They said that they remembered most of the MFO precis items (reports, identification), but 15 admitted that they needed/desired refresher training.

In response to a question about train up tasks other than MFO tasks their prior unit had used, 11 of the nineteen reported MFO tasks anyway. Others mentioned common task training; there was little consensus on this question or one which asked what they wished they had spent more time on. Asked what, based on their experiences, most units need to train on, other than MFO tasks, eight again cited the need for MFO tasks. This continuing emphasis on MFO tasks ("vehicle, aircraft and license ID; first aid because of the civilian accidents over there"), by those who had already been on the mission, no doubt intensified feelings that the ILC was not focused on the right kinds of training, especially as they talked about their experiences with their peers. Two specifically mentioned the desirability of Arabic language training.

A critical question asked whether MFO battalions need the ILC or something like the ILC. Nine said yes, they needed something like the ILC; six said no; the other four hedged with yes and no. Fifteen indicated that something else (i.e., not ILC) would have been useful; nine thought that tasks from the long range surveillance course might be beneficial.

Asked what problems they perceived as coming from using a volunteer force, nine said none ("You have people who want to be here"); five focused on uneven ability levels. Five mentioned the possibility of volunteering for the wrong reasons or of RC personnel being able to change their minds after they had started. On the other hand, asked about the benefits of using volunteers, 15 commented on the high levels of motivation. Eleven felt that unit cohesion could easily be developed under the present circumstances; five said no, and three were unsure. One said "I wish we had more than one month." Ten said that cohesion was not a problem to begin with.

The perceived worst parts of the Sinai deployment were confusion brought by the mission and some chain of command issues. The leaders also commented on the hardship of being away from their families. The best part of the deployment was the training or "travel and culture." Some mentioned opportunities for personal growth, getting to know other people, or "belonging to a good squad or team."

Asked their opinions on whether the MFO mission should be conducted by AC units, RC units or a mixture, eleven opted for the combined composition. Six added that such a mixture would be of benefit to both the Reserve and Active Components. In

response to the final question which invited any overall comments they cared to make about the MFO mission, nine volunteered that the MFO is a good mission ("Great tour but not to be taken lightly"). One suggested that it be made a one year tour.

ILC end of course critique results. This survey was developed and administered by the RTB. There were only 144 respondents; most of the missing were officers. Although it asked for Active, Reserve, or National Guard status, some RC personnel identified themselves as "active" based on current status. Thus AC/RC differences in responses cannot be documented with certainty.

Eighty seven percent of the respondents said the ILC training was beneficial; 75% said it had been presented at an appropriate level for them. Over 90% said the training was given in an organized manner and that the instructors were professional. Soldiers made comments, however, on individual instructors or specific blocks of instruction which they felt did not meet their expectations.

They were asked to rate the cadre-lead instruction on a scale of "Excellent", "Very Good", "Satisfactory", "Adequate", and "Poor." The top rated classes were Unaided Night Vision, Pathfinder/Sling Load, How to Train/AAR, and Rappelling, with excellent or very good ratings from 85%, 75%, 70% and 68% of the respondents. (The rating on the Unaided Night Vision class is problematic to interpret because it was only offered to 33 soldiers and 59 provided ratings for it.) The lowest rated classes were M16 Zero/Qualification (20% said adequate or poor), the STXs (18%), Aero Medevac (15%), and Land Navigation (13%). The only complaint offered on the Medevac class was that the weather curtailed the helicopter operation.

No ratings were requested for the MFO student-lead collective tasks and battle drills. Based on observations of this training and the peer group behaviors during training, most of these classes would probably have been rated only adequate or poor. The actual execution of the tasks was better than the "training," due no doubt to the fact that all of the students had received prior training on the tasks. Few of the student instructors did very well, and they had little support from the class.

ILC post-training survey results. This questionnaire was administered on the final day of training. Only 147 of the original 154 soldiers responded to this questionnaire, 70 from the AC, 77 from the RC. Missing were 2 AC officers and 5 NCOs (two AC and three RC). Also, and of unknown impact on results, the battalion changed its schedule and administered the questionnaire without ARI personnel present as was originally intended. A final caution on interpretation of these data is

that by the end of the STXs and at the end of the month, all personnel were eager to get home and not particularly interested in training or in answering any questions about the ILC.

Highlights of the survey are detailed below. The first two questions paralleled the pre-training survey and asked how confident respondents were in their ability to develop and execute training plans. Table 7 shows the numbers and percentages of respondents selecting each confidence level at the end of the ILC.

Table 7

Soldiers Reporting Confidence in Their Abilities After the ILC

	<u>Active Component</u>				<u>Reserve Component</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>		<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>	
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Develop Training Plans After ILC</u>								
Extremely Confident	6	75	23	41	3	27	12	19
Very Confident	1	13	24	43	3	27	34	54
Fairly Confident	0	0	9	16	2	18	12	19
Somewhat Confident	1	13	0	0	1	9	4	6
Not Very Confident	0	0	0	0	2	18	1	2
Total =	8		56		11		63	
<u>Execute Training Plans After ILC</u>								
Extremely Confident	7	88	24	43	3	27	17	27
Very Confident	1	13	22	39	3	27	30	48
Fairly Confident	0	0	8	14	2	18	11	17
Somewhat Confident	0	0	2	4	1	9	3	5
Not Very Confident	0	0	0	0	2	18	2	3
Total =	8		56		11		63	

Two of the primary purposes of the course were to enhance the soldiers' ability to develop and execute training plans. Both AC and RC described themselves as "very" or "extremely" confident that they could develop (AC 84%, RC 70%) and execute (AC 84%, RC 72%) training plans for their units.

In a direct comparison of these results with the pre-training ratings, most overall confidence ratings appear to have increased after the course. Table 8 shows the comparisons. NCO shifts toward greater confidence over time indicate that the course, despite difficulties, had the desired effect for those who were actually going to be responsible for daily training.

An open ended question asked which other specialized skills or tasks should have been included in the ILC POI; many did not answer. For those who responded, first responses clustered into five categories: MFO tasks in general (39), specific MFO tasks (20), other 11 series tasks (11), troop leading procedures (5), and, again, responses indicating overall bad attitude (4). The focus on the MFO tasks remained strong. One volunteered "I don't think ILC was suited to our unit's mission. We have one week until our soldiers arrive. We need to be studying and having classes on our MFO precis..."

Table 8

Confidence Ratings: Comparison of Pre and Post Training Ratings (Percentages)

	<u>Active Component</u>				<u>Reserve Component</u>				
	<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>		<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>		
	<u>Pre</u>	<u>Post</u>	<u>Pre</u>	<u>Post</u>	<u>Pre</u>	<u>Post</u>	<u>Pre</u>	<u>Post</u>	
<u>Develop Training</u>									
Extremely Confident	46	75	10	41	36	27	6	9	
Very Confident	46	13	36	43	9	27	20	54	
Fairly Confident	9	0	24	16	36	18	36	19	
Somewhat Confident	0	13	20	0	9	9	25	6	
Not Very Confident	0	0	10	0	9	18	13	2	
<u>Execute Training</u>									
Extremely Confident	36	88	18	43	9	27	6	27	
Very Confident	27	13	31	39	36	27	29	48	
Fairly Confident	36	0	26	14	27	18	36	17	
Somewhat Confident	0	0	16	4	18	9	17	5	
Not Very Confident	0	0	8	0	9	18	12	3	

The next two questions asked about the effectiveness of the ILC in preparing the unit to train to standard, and in promoting leader bonding. The ratings are shown in Table 9. Approximately half (48% to 58% of each group) thought the course was "effective" or "very effective" in preparing them to train. Most soldiers--officers (AC 77% and RC 81%) more than NCOs (AC 48% and RC 58%)-- thought it was "effective" or "very effective" in promoting bonding. The negativity of two RC officers is reflected in the "Very Ineffective" training response.

Another question asked how useful the 4-505 felt the ILC was in preparing units like theirs for MFO missions. Only 22% of the AC officers and 40% of the RC officers thought that the ILC could be rated as very useful or better; the AC NCOs (25%) and the RC NCOs (23%) were similarly unconvinced. The high percentages for "Not Very Useful" or "Not at all Useful" undoubtedly reflect the

Table 9

Soldier Ratings of Course Effectiveness and Usefulness

	<u>Active Component</u>				<u>Reserve Component</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>		<u>Officer</u>		<u>NCO</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Prepare to Train</u>								
Very Effective	1	13	8	13	0	0	10	15
Effective	3	38	26	44	6	55	28	43
Somewhat Effective	2	25	13	22	3	27	22	34
Somewhat Ineffective	2	25	6	10	0	0	4	6
Ineffective	0	0	4	7	0	0	1	2
Very Ineffective	0	0	2	3	2	18	0	0
<u>Promote Bonding</u>								
Very Effective	3	33	14	23	4	36	17	26
Effective	4	44	15	25	5	45	21	32
Somewhat Effective	2	22	21	34	2	18	20	30
Somewhat Ineffective	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3
Ineffective	0	0	4	7	0	0	4	6
Very Ineffective	0	0	5	8	0	0	2	3
<u>Preparing for MFO Missions</u>								
Extremely Useful	1	11	5	8	1	10	3	5
Very Useful	1	11	10	17	3	30	12	18
Somewhat Useful	6	67	19	32	2	20	31	47
Not Very Useful	0	0	16	27	3	30	16	24
Not at all Useful	1	11	9	15	1	10	4	6

mismatch between perceived needs and course content for this particular battalion.

Table 10 shows numbers and percentages of responses to the question "Should the ILC continue to be used to train MFO Battalions like yours for future rotations?"

Table 10

Should the ILC Continue to Be Used to Train MFO?

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Yes	7 (78%)	27 (47%)	5 (56%)	40 (63%)
No	2 (22%)	30 (53%)	4 (44%)	24 (38%)
n =	9	57	9	64

In explanation of their ratings, most who were positive noted that the ILC and the RTB, are the standard, the best of Infantry training, and that any training they provided would be of benefit ("Yes, because regardless of mission, ILC trains units on standards of training and how to train"). Others mentioned the teamwork opportunities fostered by the environment. Those who were not in favor of the course focused on the lack of MFO specific classes, and noted their opinions that a Fort Bragg-based course (specifically the Airborne Leaders Course), could have done as well or better ("Could have done the training at Bragg with MFO oriented tasks and classes more specific to our mission").

Table 11 shows responses and percentages for the questions which asked if, given the makeup of their battalion, team building and/or training could have been accomplished better somewhere else. The battalion was about evenly divided with respect to bonding. However, 68% of those who answered said that the training could and would have been done more cost effectively at home station; very few overall were supportive of ILC's location. These responses echo an overall dissatisfaction with the ILC as conducted. Several mentioned the economic aspects of having moved so many personnel from one location to another. The high number of uncertain, undecided or "yes and no" responses shows that many could see benefits to the training focus of, for example, being away from home or away from the other home station training distractors. As before, several mentioned the ILC as a mini-deployment and a test of the battalion's internal logistics system.

Table 11

Personnel Favorable to a Change of Location

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
<u>For Team Building</u>				
Yes	4 (50%)	29 (52%)	8 (80%)	32 (57%)
No	4 (50%)	27 (48%)	2 (20%)	24 (43%)
n =	8	56	10	56
<u>For Training</u>				
Yes	4 (44%)	47 (77%)	8 (73%)	40 (63%)
No	2 (22%)	7 (11%)	0 (0%)	3 (5%)
?	3 (33%)	7 (11%)	3 (27%)	21 (33%)
n =	9	61	11	64

The next two questions asked opinions on the major strengths and weaknesses of the ILC. Strengths of the ILC responses again clustered into predictable categories, as shown in Table 12.

Table 12

Strengths of the ILC: Frequencies of Response in Each Category

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Instructors	1	7	0	10
Team building	5	26	7	41
Skill evaluations	2	21	3	21
Away from distractors	2	2	4	0
Bad attitude	1	6	1	5
n =	7	50	11	59

Note. See text for explanation of descriptors. Several respondents offered more than one response.

For both AC and RC, the major benefit of the ILC was team building or confidence enhancement. Refresher training and "reblueing" on Infantry skills were also praised. One noted: "ILC kind of shook people up and put them into the military mode." As before, a few could find nothing positive to say (bad attitude); however, several made more than one good comment. For these, only the first two responses were tabulated.

Similarly, identified weaknesses are shown in Table 13. They focused on communication problems, primarily the lack of within battalion communication of commander's intent ("...coordination, and use of downtime"). The mismatch between the student expectations and the RTB course content created confusion and dissention based on the absence of MFO specific material and the perceived lack of insurance that the soldiers' needs were being satisfied ("ILC instructors hands were tied too much. The course was weak for our needs because it was not MFO related"). Some noted that the instruction was "OK for the Guard" or otherwise too basic; others repeated the bad attitude responses ("nothing good about it").

Two questions focused on leadership skills. The questions were identical to those on the first pre-training questionnaire. Overall, no one said that leadership skills improved much. For perceived self-improvement, the critical areas of concern are those which parallel the aims of the course: team building and tactical and technical proficiency. Table 14 shows perceptions for these areas; other data are at Appendix E. Only respondents who had indicated on the first survey that they needed

improvement in these areas were included in the tabulation. For these, "Improved" or "Did Not Improve" responses were counted. Overall, therefore, the self-assessment numbers are very small.

Table 13

Weaknesses of the ILC: Frequencies of Response in Each Category

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Communication	4	7	1	5
No MFO tasks	2	8	3	9
Content;logistics	1	8	2	7
Level of instruction	1	11	3	14
Bad attitude	0	13	2	13

Note. Frequencies total more than the number of respondents because several offered more than one response.

Table 14

Numbers of Soldiers Reporting Perceived Improvements in Team Building, Tactical Proficiency or Technical Proficiency

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
<u>Team Building</u>				
Needed Improvement	2	15	3	26
Improved	2	9	1	14
Did not Improve	0	6	2	12
<u>Tactical Proficiency</u>				
Needed Improvement	3	21	4	40
Improved	1	10	4	28
Did not Improve	2	11	0	12
<u>Technical Proficiency</u>				
Needed Improvement	2	20	7	45
Improved	0	7	3	31
Did not Improve	2	13	4	14

They also rated their immediate superior on seven specific leadership dimensions (see Appendix F). Since they performed this rating at the beginning and at the end of the course, it is instructive to look at the changes in ratings over time. Pre- and Post- survey response percentages are as shown in Table 15.

Table 15

Pre and Post Course Ratings of Skills of Immediate Superiors
(Percentages Selecting Each Rating)

	n =	Active Component				Reserve Component			
		Officer		NCO		Officer		NCO	
		Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
		11	9	63	61	11	11	69	66
Planning									
Excellent		0	33	15	15	27	75	15	14
Very Good		55	67	21	29	36	0	29	46
Good		36	0	26	24	36	0	29	17
Adequate		0	0	25	20	0	13	20	17
Weak		9	0	13	13	0	13	8	7
Job Knowledge									
Excellent		20	67	14	22	36	75	20	31
Very Good		40	33	27	27	55	0	36	27
Good		40	0	29	18	0	13	27	25
Adequate		0	0	19	20	9	0	14	10
Weak		0	0	12	13	0	13	3	7
Warfighting									
Excellent		20	75	9	15	20	67	16	24
Very Good		60	0	15	17	30	17	19	30
Good		20	25	41	27	20	0	44	24
Adequate		0	0	15	23	20	0	19	14
Weak		0	0	21	17	10	17	3	8
Communication									
Excellent		9	17	11	20	27	50	14	26
Very Good		36	17	26	23	46	13	27	28
Good		9	33	26	18	9	13	30	21
Adequate		46	0	19	23	18	13	17	17
Weak		0	33	18	16	0	13	13	9
Supervision									
Excellent		10	17	10	20	10	43	16	26
Very Good		30	50	24	24	60	29	33	31
Good		40	17	35	17	30	0	30	17
Adequate		20	0	14	28	0	14	13	19
Weak		0	17	17	11	7	14	8	7
Decision Making									
Excellent		9	50	18	18	46	50	18	19
Very Good		46	17	21	20	36	0	32	31
Good		0	33	26	27	18	13	24	25
Adequate		36	0	19	22	0	13	17	17
Weak		9	0	16	13	0	25	9	9
Team Building									
Excellent		30	50	19	18	27	57	27	26
Very Good		40	17	17	31	55	29	19	33
Good		20	17	28	16	9	0	25	19
Adequate		0	0	22	20	9	0	16	14
Weak		10	17	15	15	0	14	13	9

Leadership skills of immediate superiors were in both cases rated on a five point scale. The NCOs, both AC and RC, made full use of the scale, with responses overall fairly favorable but with some rating of superiors as only adequate, or weak, on both the initial and final surveys. For NCOs, no pre-post rating difference was twenty percentage points or higher. Both AC and RC officers showed an overall increase in favorable ratings, many with as high as 20% or greater percentage point increases.

The final question on the post training survey asked the 4-505 leaders if they had volunteered for the MFO Sinai mission. Although it had been stated in advance that all MFO personnel were volunteers, comments during training gave rise to indications that this was a false perception and, additionally, that some of those who were volunteers were having second thoughts about it. Only five of the nine AC officers responding said that they were volunteers, and one admitted that he was no longer convinced that it had been a good decision. All of the RC officers were volunteers; one said he was no longer sure about wanting to stay.

For the AC NCOs responding, however, only half said they were volunteers; of those 31, nine said they would like to rethink the decision. For the RC respondents, only one said he did not volunteer for the mission, but twelve who did said that they would like to reconsider. There is no way to determine the cause for the dissatisfaction, whether it was ILC dependent or, probably more likely, due to other factors. (One RC soldier, for example, was known by his peers to have changed his mind, even before his arrival at ILC.)

ILC MFO composite battalion training questionnaire results.
Of the ILC cadre who had participated in training MFO leaders, 21 were still available two months afterwards and completed a final survey. The number of prior ILC classes each had taught varied from one to twenty-one. For three, it was their first class; two had over 20 classes; the mean was seven.

Table 16 shows cadre ratings of what their expectations had been of the MFO battalion's technical and tactical proficiency before they arrived at the course, at the beginning of the course, and at the end of the course.

Table 16

ILC Cadre Expectations of MFO Performance

	<u>Excellent</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Adequate</u>	<u>Weak</u>	<u>Poor</u>
Prior to Arrival	0	4	8	8	1
Beginning of ILC	0	0	4	11	6
End of ILC	0	4	8	9	0

It is apparent that the battalion, on arrival, was less proficient than had been expected but did improve somewhat over time. Asked about this battalion's performance in relation to the other units whom they had observed before, seven said "about the same," nine said "worse," three said "much worse," and two had no answer. One ILC instructor noted "National Guards have always been weak. Some of the Active Component NCOs were lazy. With good NCOs lots of problems could have been avoided."

They were asked to give their opinions on what should be done to train the leaders of future MFO battalions. Several gave more than one answer but the majority (13 of 21 responses) indicated that the MFO should "deploy to a desert terrain using a mobile training team of ILC cadre." Two suggested remaining at home station with an ILC team; three said to repeat what had been done for the 4-505th battalion.

The primary concern that surfaced, however, was the need to make sure that both the battalion and the ILC were clear, in advance, as to the exact intent of the course. Some suggested that no MFO tasks should be included and that the decision be publicly stated before the start of the course ("Units need to understand that the ILC is not MFO oriented", "ILC is not mission prep", "There should be a clear understanding that there will be no attempt to relate to or simulate MFO experiences or MFO specific missions while at the ILC."). Others thought ILC should be tailored to the MFO mission ("They would be better served by doing tasks that apply in the desert", "Conduct an MFO tailored ILC in the desert environment with MTT of ILC cadre"). The primary concern was the need to publicize the decision.

Several commented on the need for everyone to participate in training and the morale problems that occurred when senior leaders did not train, but watched. Comments included: "The entire unit needs to be focused when attending, including officers--be prepared to play the game"; "4-505 lost an opportunity for team building and establishing an effective chain of command from the start"; "Chain of command and leadership problems created a major training distractor."

These attitudes were reflected in the final two open-ended questions where the cadre reiterated what the battalion had said. Either ILC as a traditional ILC course or the ILC adapted to include MFO tasks would have been acceptable as long as everyone had been apprised of it in advance. Changing focus in the middle, or not having a focus at all, was a source of great frustration for the cadre, and the frustration impacted on their attitudes and performance as well as on their impressions of the battalion.

MFO in the Sinai questionnaire results. Of the original 154 soldiers who attended the ILC, only 74 could be reached to

complete this survey. Since all four line companies and HHC were tapped for respondents (the number per company ranged from 8 to 24), the data are probably adequately representative, although limited. The sample contained 9 officers (4 AC, 5 RC) and 64 NCOs (31 AC and 34 RC). Approximately 70% of the respondents were either team or squad leaders; 17% were in traditional company level leader jobs--company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader or platoon sergeant.

Although other comments were collected, the primary intent of this survey was to determine if there were any tasks that the MFO soldiers wished they had spent more (or less) time on during the ILC. They were first asked for open ended responses, and then later to rate the actual tasks from the POI. The five point rating scale consisted of "Way too much time", "Too much time", "About the right amount of time", "Not quite enough time", "Not nearly enough time." (See Appendix G for full data.)

A sizeable percentage of the soldiers felt comfortable with the amount of time allocated to each of the 29 rated tasks. The highest percentage in this group was for the task After-Action Review where 60% of the respondents marked "about the right amount of time." Land Navigation (59%), Use of Hand and Arm Signals (58%), and Self-Extraction from a Minefield (54%) also scored high in this category. All of these tasks can be considered tasks which may be performed during the MFO mission.

There were also several tasks with high ratings for "too much time" or "way too much time." The tasks with the highest incidence of this perception were Ambush (64%), Cross Danger Area (62%), Occupy an Assembly Area (60%), Move Tactically (58%), Occupy a Patrol Base (58%), Objective Rally Point (56%), and Perform Linkup (53%). These tasks are traditional infantry tasks.

Conversely, some tasks received high "Not enough time" and "Not nearly enough time" ratings although there were far fewer of these. Most nominated tasks were Aeromedical Evacuation (60%) and Perform Sling Load Operations (42%). These tasks are especially important to successful performance of the MFO mission.

There were only limited differences between the AC and the RC in their perceptions, although AC tended to more frequently select "Too much time" or "Way too much time" for their responses. The only task which showed a large difference between the two groups was M249 Squad Automatic Weapon Familiarization. For the AC, 41% said there was too much training, where only 16% of the RC felt that way. This is easily explained by the fact that for many RC soldiers this was their first experience with the M249; most AC soldiers were familiar with it, and many had fired it.

The other issues and concerns apparent during the ILC itself had not diminished at the time of this survey. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents still rated the course as having been somewhat ineffective, ineffective or very ineffective. The negativity was slightly more pronounced for the AC than the RC. As in previous surveys, the majority of the soldiers felt that more MFO tasks should have been included in the ILC. These included aircraft identification, reporting procedures, MFO rules of engagement, OP operations, and Arabic classes. A very few respondents felt that emphasizing basic infantry tasks was the correct approach; a similar number noted that ILC was acceptable as a means of building teamwork and evaluating soldier competency in infantry skills. Several expressed the opinion that the Ranger instructors had been underutilized.

The final question solicited the soldiers' help in planning for future MFO rotations. As before, the majority of the responses focused on three themes: the ILC as developed for this particular rotation was a waste of time; not enough time was spent on MFO specific tasks; and the training could have been done more cheaply and more effectively at Fort Bragg. One said that although the ILC was to have been a Leader Course, they had been "treated like basic trainees." One commented that "more time should have been spent on leadership, how to train, train the trainer and troop leading procedures."

Impact of Class Size and Structure

Personnel. Within this class, in addition to most of the personnel suggested by the ILC, there were many others present. The stipulated 104 man class size was not adhered to; neither was the requirement that all personnel attending be of the rank of sergeant and above. There were 154 soldiers present; they ranged in rank from Lieutenant Colonel (the battalion commander) to Private First Class (his driver).

Typical battalions bring the commander, three or four company commanders and the platoon leaders. The MFO had a major (the S3), and additional captains (S3 shop, legal officer) who participated in training only occasionally. Each of the four companies had only two platoon leaders; however there were six additional lieutenants assigned to HHC (staff, finance) and occasionally present for training. The command sergeant major attended some training, as did all four company first sergeants. There were extra NCOs (not slotted specifically as platoon sergeants, squad or team leaders) as well as several specialists and corporals. Some were assigned to HHC; others to the maneuver company rosters.

HHC maintained a tactical operations center (TOC) which included the Commander, the S3 and the S-3 Air, several officers who worked on battalion specific items, a financial officer, the

JAG officer, and at times, the command sergeant major. There were several MPs, an NBC officer, several corporals/specialists, the commander's driver and one of the battalion's two linguists.

Resources. The oversubscription to the course taxed resources available. The requirement to house so many extra personnel forced one company to live in an about-to-be condemned barracks; two buildings had no air conditioning, a problem in Georgia's late summer climate. The RTB did everything possible to make the MFO comfortable, but other personnel were also located in the general RTB area, including a large class of Ranger Course students. This created long lines at the common dining facility and coupled with the limited shower facilities, created early morning logistics problems due to requirements for large throughput in a short time. Problems also occurred in, for example, the use of laundry facilities where the number of washers and dryers usually adequate to accommodate 104 students became barely sufficient for 154.

Transportation was an issue. Normally the battalion marched to the Todd Field training site; long distances to training, however, required bus transportation. Mismatches between student load and numbers of buses and trips per bus delayed training on several occasions. Although the battalion learned to deal with these problems and with long lines for telephones or breakfast, these conditions became overall training distractors.

Class structure. The personnel who arrived at the ILC were generally divided into training platoons based on their four line company designations, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie and Delta. Some of the extraneous HHC personnel participated in training only on an erratic basis. Some, like the MPs, were arbitrarily assigned to specific platoons.

Throughout much of the course, student-lead instruction was the norm; generally the lowest ranking personnel were tasked to teach classes to the rest of their platoon members. The student as the teacher did not work well at all. Typically, the most junior man was selected (usually one or two days prior) to teach a course; this meant that he had in his audience not only the other team and/or squad leaders in his company but all of the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants and frequently his company commander and first sergeant. Occasionally the battalion commander, CSM or S3 observed as well.

The senior leaders in each company had already received training on these tasks--they were long past the "crawl" stage prior to attending the course. This tended to emphasize any disconnect between the junior leader's presentation abilities and the abilities of his target audience, and it highlighted any shortcomings of the RC personnel, many of whom were selected as student instructors. The inadequacies of the well-meaning but

inexperienced junior leaders were made to seem more important than they actually were because of the boredom (and lack of something specific to do) experienced by the rest of the company.

Additionally, because so many in the chain of command were present at training, internal company leaders (platoon sergeants and first sergeants, company commanders) often intervened to assist the platform instructor; this reduced the roles of the RTB ILC cadre to AAR critique personnel, rather than coach or teacher. Although it was important for the chain of command to make itself known within the company, some perceived it as wasting the RI skills, and undermining the benefits of the course. This contributed to an impression that training could as easily have been done in another location.

The course is usually conducted to insure that each person is actively involved in training every day; with so many extra people, there was little for many of them to do on a daily basis. This was particularly true for the officers; most of the HHC personnel stayed at the TOC except during the confidence building events. Erratic participation caused morale and organization problems.

Training Observations

Training schedule/content. The overall training schedule and POI content (see Appendix I) were finalized before the company commanders and first sergeants reported to the battalion, and no company driven changes occurred after the class started. Company leaders said they felt that they were at the ILC with little to do. Most just stood (or sat) and watched training; only a few platoon leaders actually role-played rifleman within the training events. The published training schedule times were not adhered to, often because of longer than typical throughput problems or because the battalion declined to continue training into the evening or weekend.

A further and probably more important consequence of the lack of widespread input to the training schedule was that the overall intent of the training was lost to almost everyone outside the battalion staff. For example, the NCOs had expected practice in MFO specific tasks; such expectations were evident from initial questionnaire data and from daily conversations with the soldiers. Although the 4-505th Battalion had never planned for ILC to include MFO specific training, the student soldiers did not learn it until well into the second week of training. By then they had begun to question course content and push for changes. The training, all light infantry oriented, was perceived by most of them as nearly irrelevant to their MFO mission; they did not know that RTB had not been asked to include MFO tasks and that MFO tasks would be the focus when the unit returned to Fort Bragg.

The cadre also suffered from the communication problem. They could have planned training with an MFO slant but had not been requested to do so and could not change focus in the middle of the course without specific instruction. This tended to create confusion and dissent and reduced the face validity of the course as a precursor to the MFO mission. Another detractor was that the wooded areas of Fort Benning do not look like the Sinai.

Team building events. The commander's METL included "form an Infantry Task Force (receive, organize, equip and train the force)." A major element of this task was the cohesion and team building required to make a unified battalion from the diverse group of the soldiers who arrived at the ILC. Team building, always important, was perceived as critical for the MFO in the integration of Active and Reserve Component soldiers.

Several classes were held to enhance cohesion. The first was the Water Confidence Course where all personnel were required to perform tasks requiring a public display of courage. These involved a climb to the top of a 30 foot tower, a slide down a pulley line across water, and an over-water walk across an eight inch wide "log" pathway. This event provided an excellent beginning for the battalion; spirits were high, and the soldiers encouraged and cheered each other on, rallying behind those who found the task especially difficult.

The second confidence and team building event was held on the first full training day. The Leaders Reaction Course (LRC) was offered by the Combined Arms and Tactics Branch of the U.S. Army Infantry School. The officers, first sergeants and platoon sergeants did not participate; if present they joined the RTB cadre as observers. The soldiers were not assigned according to their unit element, but were divided into eight man groups.

The course consisted of seventeen stations, ten involving water hazards, seven so-called dry stations. At each station the soldiers were presented with a problem or scenario. The intent was to force the group to come up with creative solutions to the problem and to work together as a team. There were several possible ways to solve each problem, but each required that the personnel cooperate and rely on each other. This training event was very well received; laughter and high spirits were very apparent. Between group competition was high, and within group motivation appeared to be good.

The final scheduled teamwork and bonding event, rappelling, from both low and high platforms and from a helicopter, was held at the end of the second week. Bad weather precluded the helicopter portion, but the entire battalion participated in the rappelling. Some were experienced rappellers; others had never done it before. Again, this was a very spirited event, with considerable overall competition and camaraderie.

Although these classes were generally excellent bonding and teamwork exercises, all three suffered from having too many participants. There was considerable waiting time, sometimes described by the soldiers as wasted time. This compounded perceptions that some personnel were selective in their participation in training, that senior personnel primarily attended the team building events, not the daily routine training.

Physical training. The RTB had planned a physical training (PT) program for the MFO. Occasionally, MFO personnel led exercises; more often the RTB cadre led instruction. There were complaints that the PT program was less strenuous than that previously established at Fort Bragg, with less running and less stamina building. However, further "toughening" was accomplished through the unit's marching, by company element, from the Ranger cantonment area to the daily training sites. Additionally, there were early morning tactical road marches of four, five or six miles, with soldiers in complete uniform with load carrying equipment, rucksacks and weapons.

Classroom instruction. The classroom/bleacher instruction was generally presented by the RTB instructors to the MFO battalion as a whole. The success of the instruction varied; some classes, like Train the Trainer, After Action Reviews, How to Train, and How to Brief, were well received; another, Troop Leading Procedures, was extremely popular and received considerable praise from almost everyone, particularly the RC soldiers who said they were "rusty." For these classes, most of the NCOs were present; the officers attended only irregularly.

An opportunistic class on principles of Unaided Night Vision was offered one evening as an experimental class to 33 personnel from the battalion. This class was one of the most popular and was highly praised. Other classes, e.g., Land Navigation, were called too basic, too long, or just not relevant. Pace count and compass check, while a refresher for some, were considered boring for most. Classes on the Global Positioning System (GPS) varied; the validity of the class was questionable because the GPS system used in the Sinai was not the one available for training.

Weapons training. The M16 rifle live fire and weapons classes were completed in one day, at three different ranges. The soldiers zeroed their rifles, qualified, and then fired on the advanced rifle marksmanship (ARM) ranges. The ranges were very slow, due to the large number of people using the same firing line and because the students were assisting as range controllers. Controversy arose when the soldiers were not permitted to score their own zero targets as many, thoroughly experienced in running ranges, resented being treated like "basic trainees."

One cause of slow zeroing was that while the AC soldiers were all familiar with the M16A2 rifle, most RC had fired only the M16A1. The two rifles have slightly different zeroing procedures; this caused delays until those who had not fired the M16A2 before became familiar with the process. The computerized ARM range had target malfunctions; the soldiers, by then very hot and very tired, voiced their irritation at the equipment and blamed performance deficiencies on the range. Another factor causing general dissatisfaction with the training was that some battalion senior leaders left the site early, while the more junior leaders did not have that option.

Another part of a day was devoted to familiarization with the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). This training was very well received, as many of the soldiers had never seen the SAW before. However, they did not have a chance to fire it.

Collective training and STXs. Week two began training on the previously selected collective tasks. In contrast to the previous week's procedures, most training was presented by student instructors to the rest of the unit. The tasks covered were: move tactically, consolidate and reorganize, react to contact, break contact, disengage, react to indirect fire, cross danger area, cross defile, perform leader reconnaissance, occupy an observation post, occupy a patrol base, sling load/cargo net, use arm and hand signals.

The MFO students prepared these classes one or two days prior, using manuals and materials provided by the cadre; they lead their platoons through performance of the activities using the Army's "crawl, walk, run" method. After a short period of time when they explained the task to be performed, the instructor and an assistant demonstrated the actions or elicited student demonstrators and talked them through the steps (crawl phase). The unit practiced several iterations of the task, with critiques (walk phase), and finally performed the task from start to finish without interruption (the run phase). This was followed by a student-led AAR, then by a cadre critique for the student instructor. The classes varied according to the skills of the student instructor, and, as noted previously, according to the presence and attitudes of more senior leaders.

Student-led field exercises continued in the third week. Tasks included self-extraction from a minefield, occupy an observation post, perform surveillance, and make a terrain model. For the last of these, the RIs had constructed an example, and after discussion, each of the training platoons broke down into small groups and constructed their own terrain models.

The final portion of the third week set the stage for the fourth week's situational training exercises (STXs). The battalion practiced reconnaissance (area, zone, and route) and

surveillance as a part of and in preparation for the fourth week's defend mission. There were numerous complaints that training time was wasted by having the platoons march to the training site--that more time should have been spent in actions on the objective, with focus on consolidation and reorganization.

Based on complaints late in the third week that some personnel were no longer attending training, a directive was given that everyone would participate. However, there was little for the senior leaders to do, and when they were on site but unoccupied, unit morale deteriorated. That factor, coupled with the leaders' overall fatigue, made the entire STX process less than beneficial as a culminating training event.

Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of the MFO composite battalion at the Infantry Leaders Course. Caveats which have been included all along, however, must be remembered, as well as the fact that this was, in effect, the first iteration of a pilot experiment. The lessons learned, by everyone, will be important for future rotations.

Training Infantry Skills

The first research question dealt with whether the ILC was able to accomplish the training mission, whether the MFO leaders were trained, to standard, and prepared to conduct training of their own troops upon their return to home station. Although as noted, some portions of the training went more smoothly than others, generally, the answer is yes, the MFO leaders were trained and will be able to conduct internal training.

Part of the success is due to the caliber of the RTB cadre who were directing much of the training, part to high quality performers in the volunteer battalion. The ILC cadre are experienced in training leaders; they are aware of not only the doctrinally correct standards and procedures but also the pitfalls experienced by other units. The good qualities of the volunteers of the MFO composite battalion helped to overcome any performance based inequalities between the RC and the AC. Those who had skill deficiencies when they arrived at the course were highly motivated and generally benefitted most. Some AC leaders adopted mentoring roles and helped their RC counterparts where possible.

However, a larger training issue arose because of the pre-course decision not to have MFO specific tasks included. This decision, in line with the ILC's mission statement which focuses on rebuilding infantry skills, was perceived as wrong by much of the Sinai Task Force leaders who had expected that they would

receive MFO training. Those who knew of the intent in advance did not appear, by their comments, to be happy with it; those who were unaware of the decision until it became apparent on its own were even more dissatisfied. The dissension caused by the varying perceptions on what should have been taught interfered with the training itself--some blaming the ILC cadre, others blaming the 4-505th chain of command.

Teamwork and Bonding

The second major question, of primary concern to the 4-505th, focused on the unit's ability to become a cohesive unit. Most of the original concerns about this issue dealt with the AC/RC mixture aspect of the question--whether two disparate elements could be combined and work together. However, very early in the course it became obvious that most personnel in each group accepted each other as members of the common MFO unit and that the AC/RC difference per se was irrelevant. Some AC soldiers admitted to being pleasantly surprised by the capabilities of individual RC members. Cohesion was personality dependent, and somewhat dependent on the specific situation. A company might unite in irritation at what was perceived as wasted training time when a class started late, or at the absence of MFO specific tasks, but be totally divided when it came to perception of leader effectiveness.

The only way to answer the bonding and teamwork question becomes: it varied. Some of the unfortunate aspects of the course (confusion about the mission, over crowding, perception that leaders were not really working very hard) interfered with bonding. In a more well-defined training environment, the month long course could have promoted a strong within-unit bond; as it was, the results were more piecemeal and variable from day to day. One indication that traditional bonding had not yet occurred was that there was very little friendly competition observed, either within the battalion or between companies. There was little banter and camaraderie between soldiers.

Impact of MFO on ILC

Another major question asked what changes were required to the ILC to accommodate the MFO. The logistic problems have been detailed at length. The primary impact of so many personnel was that they could not all be usefully employed in the training day--or that they did not interpret themselves as being effectively utilized. The ILC intent, as stated in the prospectus and understood by the cadre, is for everyone to train; the MFO battalion had planned for some to serve as permanent TOC personnel, not attending training. Additionally, some personnel participated in training only sporadically. This created dissatisfaction, and dissension within the battalion and between the battalion and the ILC.

Is the ILC the Place for the MFO to Train?

A final question was whether the Fort Benning located ILC is an appropriate pre-deployment training event for the MFO. This question must be separated into various aspects--content of the course, the face validity of the location, the RTB instructors and the advantages of being away from home station.

Any battalion derives benefit from an external evaluation of its training; when the evaluators are of the professional caliber of the RTB, the advantages can be very great. The MFO composite battalion profited from the evaluation of unit readiness, strengths and weaknesses.

The location of the training is more questionable. The terrain was primarily wooded, or grassy with open spaces. Signs of the Fort Benning civilization (telephone and electrical wires, roads, installation signs) were never far from the training sites. While these aspects of Fort Benning did not interfere with training, they reduced the face validity of the course, primarily for those who had expected an MFO-related course. A training venue which was more nearly representative of the area where the battalion was going for its mission would have increased the palpability of the course.

Similarly, the decision to include no MFO specific classes should be reevaluated before another iteration. Although there is no need to have all training MFO specific, inclusion of some of the MFO-related tasks or training vignettes would have helped, and student concerns could be allayed by reiteration that time at home station would be allocated to MFO specific tasks.

Although there were comments from soldiers who wanted to be anywhere in the world except at the ILC, and an overall question as to why their training was not being conducted at Fort Bragg, most admitted that being away from the distractors of home station was a good idea and helped promote unity. Some also recognized it as a test separation for National Guardsmen who had not been deployed recently. It also served as a preliminary test of the battalion's operations and logistics functions (payroll, mail, communication with the rear detachment, emergencies, etc.).

Many MFO students insisted that an already existing course given at Fort Bragg, the Airborne Leaders Course (ALC), would have been more appropriate for them. However, this suggestion appeared to be made primarily by those persons already stationed at Fort Bragg, who had not wanted to leave there, and without regard for whether the course was appropriate in terms of POI contents or logistics. Some also commented on the high cost of the temporary duty (TDY) to Fort Benning. However most of the comments reflected battalion unhappiness at what they perceived was happening (or not happening) in the course itself.

Recommendations

Final recommendations on what kind of course would be most useful and its best ultimate location may not be determined until the 4-505th has finished its deployment. It does seem clear, however, that whatever course is given, the content thereof must appear to be related to the unit's objectives and METL.

A composite unit, or any all volunteer force not previously battle rostered, needs some form of training experience like the ILC (but not necessarily the ILC) to assess readiness status. The ideal situation would probably have a special mobile training team of RTB or similarly qualified instructor cadre, training the unit in a desert-like environment, teaching a mixture of core infantry and MFO specific tasks. Some MFO related tasks must be included to maintain the Army's philosophy of METL training and to "train as you fight" (or peace keep). The precise location would depend on other resources available and possibly on the locations from which most of the personnel are drawn.

Ideally, too, the unit should have everyone on site far enough in advance to have begun unit bonding before the start of the actual training, regardless of location. The plan to have senior leaders observe and gauge junior leader performance translated into some persons not participating in training and concomitant leadership problems. There is very little for the senior level leaders and staff to do at the ILC. The leader's role in the Sinai is considerably different from a normal mission environment; direct command and control are dispersed, and lower level leaders have more autonomy than in a typical environment. The time to start the independence of the junior leaders is during their initial training event, and it is important, for unit spirit, for the senior leaders to avoid the appearance of failing to participate. With the RTB as instructors, within battalion senior leaders could be utilized in preparing for and welcoming the enlisted personnel into the battalion at home station, permitting all platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders and team leaders to participate in training.

What to do with the senior leaders also addresses the issue of the number of personnel being trained. The logistic and administrative strain of 154 trainees outweighed any possible benefit to the battalion of having these individuals present. Staff officers could begin to run their TOCs at home station, rather than taking up training slots. Extraneous personnel could create professional development classes on culture, customs, tours, etc., to further promote unit cohesion when the lower level leaders have returned to the battalion. Linguists, rather than taking ILC slots, should be available and encouraged to help build spirit by teaching battalion personnel to begin to, for example, read and count in Arabic.

Training objectives must be identified early on, and the training schedule developed accordingly. The schedule must then be executed according to the plan--with cognizance, compliance and cooperation of all personnel. The schedule was based on team building, identifying leader strength and weaknesses, and improvement of squad level drills and collective tasks. When it became apparent that there was interest in a shift of emphasis from training infantry leaders to training peacekeepers, the end result was training objectives that did not match the training schedule.

It is important also to utilize the strengths of the training cadre, whoever they are. The ILC cadre's acknowledged strength is Infantry doctrine. They are sufficiently competent and flexible to learn to teach related skills. It was therefore perceived (by the ILC themselves and by the MFO leaders) as a waste of RTB skills not to use them regularly as the primary trainers. Clarifying training objectives prior to initiation of training would assist in resolution of these problems.

The lessons learned from this first iteration of the MFO Sinai at the ILC were many, often learned the hard way, at considerable cost. Unit performance data may address the question as to how useful the ILC actually was and the wisdom of hindsight plus the passage of time may change the evaluations of the ILC as the unit bonds through time in its common mission. The ILC lessons will, however, if noted, enable future MFO battalions to have a more effective and focused training experience.

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Appendix A

Questionnaires and Surveys

- A-1 Infantry Leaders Course - Experience
- A-2 Infantry Leaders Course - MFO Unit Preparedness Survey
- A-5 Infantry Leaders Course - Soldiers With Prior MFO Experience
- A-8 End of Course Critique
- A-10 Infantry Leaders Course MFO Post-Training Survey
- A-13 MFO Composite Battalion Training Questionnaire (Cadre)
- A-15 MFO 4-505 Officers and NCO Survey

Infantry Leaders Course - Experience

SSN (last four) _____

1. Please indicate your service status (prior to 4/501). (Mark only one)

- Regular Army
- Army Reserve
- Army National Guard
- Individual Ready Reserve

2. At which Combat Training Centers have you participated in a rotation? (Mark all that apply)

- Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
- National Training Center (NTC)
- Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)

3. Indicate your Army and professional development training. (Mark all that apply)

- Ranger
- Airborne
- Pathfinder
- Air Assault
- Sniper
- Combat Life Saver
- Bradley Fighting Vehicle Leader Course

- Primary Leadership Development Course
- Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course
- Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course
- Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officers Course
- Battle Skills Course (RC)

- Officer Basic Course
- Officer Advance Course
- Combined Arms Services Staff School
- Command and General Staff College

- Other (please specify)

INFANTRY LEADERS' COURSE
MFO UNIT PREPAREDNESS SURVEY

SSN (last four) _____

Tactical and Technical Proficiency

1. During the ILC you will receive refresher training in how to conduct training to standard on selected infantry squad and platoon collective tasks. Please use the matrix below to indicate your level of preparedness. Put an X in the appropriate column to show how prepared you feel to train the following tasks at the present time (i.e., before the ILC).

COLLECTIVE TASKS	Very Well Prepared	Prepared	Somewhat Prepared	Not Prepared
Disengage				
Hasty Ambush				
Point Ambush				
Defend				
Occupy Assembly Area				
Move Tactically				
Cross Danger Area				
Occupy ORP				
Occupy Patrol Base				
Linkup				
Cross Defile				
Reconnoiter Zone				
Reconnoiter Route				
Occupy OP				
Surveillance				
Prepare for Combat				
Consolidate and Reorganize				

BATTLE DRILLS/ SPECIAL SKILLS/ INDIVIDUAL TASKS	Very Well Prepared	Prepared	Somewhat Prepared	Not Prepared
React to Contact				
Break Contact				
React to Ambush				
React to Indirect Fire				
Leader Reconnaissance				
Land Navigation				
Construct Fighting Positions				
Aeromedical Evacuations				
Pathfinder Operations				
Unaided Night Vision				
Report Enemy Information				

Leadership Skills

2. Based on your own self-assessment, please indicate the particular leadership skill(s) that you feel need to improve. Check as many as apply.

- Setting goals and objectives.
- Developing strategies.
- Establishing priorities.
- Delegating duties.
- Technical proficiency.
- Tactical proficiency.
- Conveying facts and requirements.
- Listening and comprehension.
- Task monitoring.
- Providing feedback.
- Problem identification.
- Developing and analyzing solutions.
- Making timely decisions.
- Involving others in the planning/decision making process.
- Team building.

3. Please use the scale below to rate your immediate superior's skills in the following areas. We understand that this is a newly formed unit and your knowledge may be limited.

- 1 = Excellent
- 2 = Very good
- 3 = Good
- 4 = Adequate
- 5 = Weak
- 6 = Cannot rate

- _____ Planning
- _____ Job Knowledge
- _____ Warfighting
- _____ Communication
- _____ Supervision
- _____ Decision Making
- _____ Team Building

For questions 4-6 use the scale below.

- 1 = Extremely confident
- 2 = Very confident
- 3 = Fairly confident
- 4 = Somewhat confident
- 5 = Not very confident
- 6 = Not applicable/Cannot rate

4. _____ How confident are you that the ILC will prepare you to train your subordinates in the tasks/drills listed in item 1?

5. _____ Given the unique nature of your mission and the makeup of your unit, how confident are you that you could develop training plans for your unit element right now?

6. _____ Again, considering your unique mission and the makeup of your unit, how confident are you that you can execute training plans for your unit element right now?

* * * * *

7. The purpose of the ILC is to "reblue" cadre in the skills required to lead soldiers, train them, and fight to win. Given the unique nature of your mission and the makeup of your unit, what do you expect this course to do for you and your specific unit element?

Infantry Leaders Course - Soldiers with Prior MFO Experience

SSN (last four) _____

Name - OPTIONAL _____

PLEASE TAKE YOUR TIME IN ANSWERING - GIVE TO ME WHEN DONE.

ANSWER FOR THE LAST TIME YOU WERE ON THE MFO MISSION (not 4/505)

1. How many times have you been on the MFO Task Force before this one? [If more than once, give dates and units for all.]

When? What unit(s)?

2. What was your duty position for your most recent rotation?

3. Looking back, what did you do most of the time in Sector Control Centers or OPs or at check points (or wherever you were)?

Was your workload too heavy? too light?

Did you have more or fewer responsibilities than you had expected?

4. Lower level leaders have more independence and responsibilities in the MFO than they normally do. How well did this work?

5. What kinds of things did you do to keep occupied while you were off duty or on R&R? Were you bored?

6. Did you take any educational courses? Do you plan to this time?

7. Other than the MFO Precis tasks, what kind of special or refresher training did your other unit do to get ready before you went to the Sinai?

6. What tasks (other than MFO Precis tasks) do you think soldiers getting ready to go to the MFO need to practice on before they go?
7. Do MFO battalions need something like the ILC to make sure that the leaders are ready to train their troops?

Should it be ILC, or something else? Why?

Would MFO soldiers benefit from the Long Range Surveillance (LRS) course?

Should there be more LRS tasks included in the ILC?

8. What do you see as the major problems, if any, in using volunteers for MFO task forces?

What are the major advantages?

9. Can unit cohesion be built fast enough for this composite battalion to execute its MFO missions as well as you would like?

Is cohesion a problem with this type of volunteer unit?

10. In the future, should MFO Task Forces be Reserve Component units or Active Component units or, like this one, a mixture?
Why did you choose the answer you did?

11. What else would you like to say about MFO?

THANKS!

ILC -- END OF COURSE CRITIQUE

RANK: _____ UNIT: _____ DUTY POSITION: _____
YEARS SERVICE: _____ STATUS: ACTIVE NG RESERVE IRR
MILITARY SCHOOLS: _____

Evaluate the instruction using the following scale:

- A. EXCELLENT
- B. VERY GOOD
- C. SATISFACTORY
- D. ADEQUATE
- E. POOR

1. HOW TO TRAIN/AFTER ACTION REVIEW	A	B	C	D	E

2. BASIC LAND NAVIGATION	A	B	C	D	E

3. M-16 ZERO/QUAL/ARM	A	B	C	D	E

4. TRAIN THE TRAINER	A	B	C	D	E

5. M-249 FAMILIARIZATION	A	B	C	D	E

6. SLING LOAD/CARGO NET	A	B	C	D	E

7. RAPPELLING	A	B	C	D	E

8. AERO MEDEVAC	A	B	C	D	E

9. UNAIDED NIGHT VISION

NA A B C D E

10. TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

A B C D E

11. STXs

A B C D E

12. WAS THE TRAINING YOU RECEIVED BENEFICIAL?

YES

NO

COMMENTS:

13. WAS THE MATERIAL PRESENTED ON A LEVEL APPROPRIATE FOR YOU?

YES

NO

COMMENTS:

14. WAS THE INSTRUCTION PRESENTED IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER?

YES

NO

COMMENTS:

15. DID THE INSTRUCTORS PRESENT THEIR TRAINING IN A PROFESSIONAL MANNER?

YES

NO

COMMENTS:

16. WHAT WAS YOUR UNITS MISSION WHILE HERE AT THE INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE?

INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE
MFO POST-TRAINING SURVEY

SSN (last four) _____

ILC Training Assessment

For questions 1-2 use the scale below.

- 1 = Extremely confident
- 2 = Very confident
- 3 = Fairly confident
- 4 = Somewhat confident
- 5 = Not very confident
- 6 = Not applicable/Cannot rate

1. _____ As a result of your participation in the ILC, how confident are you now that you could develop training plans for your element?

2. _____ Based on your participation in the ILC, how confident are you that you could execute training plans for your unit element?

3. Are there any other specialized skills or tasks which should have been included in the course to help you better prepare for your unit's mission? If yes, please list those skills or tasks.

Use the scale below for questions 4-5.

- 1 = Very effective
- 2 = Effective
- 3 = Somewhat effective
- 4 = Somewhat ineffective
- 5 = Ineffective
- 6 = Very ineffective
- 7 = Not applicable/Cannot rate

4. _____ Overall, how effective do you think this course was in preparing you to train your unit to standard on the tasks presented in the ILC?

5. _____ How effective do you think this course was in promoting unit-leader bonding and cohesion in your unit element?

6. _____ Having completed the ILC, how useful do you think this course is in preparing units like yours for MFO missions? Use the scale below for your response.

- 1 = Extremely useful
- 2 = Very useful
- 3 = Somewhat useful
- 4 = Not very useful
- 5 = Not at all useful

7. In your opinion, should the ILC continue to be used to train MFO battalions like yours for future rotations? _____ Yes _____ No. If yes, why? If no, why not?

8. Given the makeup of your battalion, could team building be done more efficiently or effectively through other courses or training than through the ILC? _____ Yes _____ No. If yes, please explain.

9. Could some of the training you received be taught more economically/effectively somewhere else? _____ Yes _____ No _____ Not sure. If yes, list what could be taught at other sites.

10. What were the major strengths and benefits of the ILC?

11. Were there any weaknesses in the ILC? If yes, please list.

Leadership Skills

12. Based upon your participation in the ILC, please indicate which of your leadership skills you feel improved over the course. Check as many as apply.

- Setting goals and objectives.
- Developing strategies.
- Establishing priorities.
- Delegating duties.
- Technical proficiency.
- Tactical proficiency.
- Conveying facts and requirements.
- Listening and comprehension.
- Task monitoring.
- Providing feedback.
- Problem identification.
- Developing and analyzing solutions.
- Making timely decisions.
- Involving others in the planning/decision making process.
- Team building.

13. As a result of your participation in the ILC, how would you currently rate your **immediate superior's** skills in the following areas. Use the scale below for your responses.

- 1 = Excellent
- 2 = Very good
- 3 = Good
- 4 = Adequate
- 5 = Weak
- 6 = Cannot rate

- Planning
- Job Knowledge
- Warfighting
- Communication
- Supervision
- Decision Making
- Team Building

14. Did you volunteer for this mission? Yes No. If you answered **Yes**, have you had any second thoughts about your decision? Yes No.

MFO COMPOSITE BATTALION TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE

Number of ILC rotations since you were assigned to E Company _____.

For questions 1-3 use the scale below.

- 1 = Excellent
- 2 = Good
- 3 = Adequate
- 4 = Weak
- 5 = Poor

___ 1. Based on your expectations before seeing the MFO Battalion, rate what you thought their technical and tactical proficiency would be.

___ 2. In your opinion, rate the MFO Battalion's level of technical and tactical proficiency on at the beginning of the ILC.

___ 3. In your opinion, rate the MFO Battalion's level of technical and tactical proficiency at the end of the ILC.

4. Using your past experience with other units training at the ILC, rate the performance of the MFO Battalion in relation to other units. Please check the response that best reflects your opinion.

- ___ Much better
- ___ Better
- ___ About the same
- ___ Worse
- ___ Much worse

5. Other composite battalions will follow this one. They will need to train for the MFO mission. In your opinion, should they ___?

- a. Do the same as this one (come to Ft. Benning, ILC).
- b. Remain at home station using a mobile training team of ILC cadre.
- c. Deploy to desert terrain using a mobile training team of ILC cadre.
- d. Go to a different course. If so, what course? _____
- e. Other. _____

6. Even if you feel another MFO battalion should not attend the ILC, what changes would you make to the ILC if you had to train another MFO composite battalion?

POI or procedural changes _____

What duty positions should attend _____

7. Do you have any additional comments?

If you did not attend the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC) in August/September, 1994, do not complete this survey. If you did attend ILC, please answer all the questions!

MFO 4-505 Officers and NCO Survey

SSN (last four) _____

Officer ___ NCO ___

Regular Army ___ National Guard, Reserve or IRR ___

1. Is this your first rotation on an MFO-Sinai Task Force? YES ___ NO ___
2. What is your duty position here? (e.g., TL, SL, PAC NCO, CO CDR) _____
3. Are your experiences matching the "job preview" you were given? Explain.

4. What is the worst part about this MFO deployment so far?

5. What is the best part?

6. How effective was the training you received at ILC in preparing you for this mission?
Please check the appropriate response.

___ Very Effective	___ Somewhat Ineffective
___ Effective	___ Ineffective
___ Somewhat Effective	___ Very Ineffective
7. Looking back on your ILC trainup for this mission, were there any tasks or activities that you wish you had spent more time on? Please be specific!

8. The ILC POI covered all of the tasks listed below. Now that you have been here on the MFO mission for a month, and based on what you know now, assess the amount of time you spent on these tasks while you were at the ILC. Use the following scale:

- 1 = Way too much time
- 2 = Too much time
- 3 = About the right amount of time
- 4 = Not quite enough time
- 5 = Not nearly enough time
- X = I did not attend this part of the training

- Prepare for Combat
- M-16 Zero, Qualification, Advanced Rifle Marksmanship
- M-249 Familiarization
- Occupy Assembly Area
- Land Navigation
- Move Tactically
- Cross Danger Area
- Perform Self-Extraction from a Minefield
- Linkup
- React to Contact
- Break Contact
- Disengage
- Ambush
- Consolidate and Reorganize
- Aeromedevac Procedures
- Sling Load/Cargo Net Operations
- Use Arm and Hand Signals
- Occupy an Objective Rally Point
- Occupy a Patrol Base
- Occupy an Observation Post
- Perform Surveillance
- Perform Area, Route, Zone Recon
- Defend

- Troop Leading Procedures
- How to Train
- After Action Reviews
- Train the Trainer

- Rappelling
- Unaided Night Vision

9. Help us help future rotations: in retrospect, is there anything else you would like to say about ILC?

Appendix B

Demographic Data

Active includes Active Component (AC) personnel (74); Reserve includes all the Reserve Component (RC) personnel-- National Guard (74), Army Reserve (5), and Individual Ready Reserve (1). OFF represents officers (Lieutenant through Lieutenant Colonel) and NCO represents all others (Private First Class through Sergeant Major).

	<u>Active</u>		<u>Reserve</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Total Number of Respondents	11	63	11	69
Ranger	9	12	4	1
Airborne	11	54	6	14
Pathfinder	1	8	2	2
Air Assault	3	34	7	21
Sniper	0	8	1	2
Combat Life Saver	1	29	2	9
Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) Leader Course	0	2	1	0
Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)	0	59	0	61
Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC)	0	34	0	33
Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC)	0	10	0	12
Battle Staff NCO Course (RC only)	0	0	0	1
Battle Skills Course (RC only)	0	0	0	4
Officer Basic Course (OBC)	11	0	11	0
Officer Advance Course (OAC)	4	0	1	0
Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS ³)	3	0	0	0
Command and General Staff College (CGSC)	2	0	0	0
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)	6	50	5	35
National Training Center (NTC)	3	34	1	24
Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)	1	10	2	4
Any Combat Training Center (CTC)	7	59	7	50
No Training Center Experience	4	4	4	19

Appendix C

Preparedness to Train Collective Tasks, Battle Drills, Special Skills and Individual Tasks

Active includes Active Component (AC) personnel (74); Reserve includes all the Reserve Component (RC) personnel-- National Guard (74), Army Reserve (5), and Individual Ready Reserve (1). OFF represents officers (Lieutenant through Lieutenant Colonel) and NCO represents all others (Private First Class through Sergeant Major).

	<u>Active</u>		<u>Reserve</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Total Number of Respondents	11	63	11	69
Disengage				
Very Well Prepared	4	14	1	4
Prepared	4	36	5	29
Somewhat Prepared	2	10	5	25
Not Prepared	0	3	0	11
Hasty Ambush				
Very Well Prepared	4	17	2	4
Prepared	7	36	6	34
Somewhat Prepared	0	9	2	25
Not Prepared	0	1	1	5
Point Ambush				
Very Well Prepared	4	16	3	3
Prepared	6	39	4	33
Somewhat Prepared	1	7	3	25
Not Prepared	0	1	1	7
Defend				
Very Well Prepared	4	16	2	11
Prepared	7	38	6	26
Somewhat Prepared	0	7	2	24
Not Prepared	0	2	1	6
Occupy Assembly Area				
Very Well Prepared	4	22	2	14
Prepared	5	30	6	31
Somewhat Prepared	2	10	3	22
Not Prepared	0	1	0	1
Move Tactically				
Very Well Prepared	6	34	6	21
Prepared	5	25	2	33
Somewhat Prepared	0	4	3	14
Not Prepared	0	0	0	1

	<u>Active</u>		<u>Reserve</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Cross Danger Area				
Very Well Prepared	6	33	4	19
Prepared	4	25	4	32
Somewhat Prepared	1	5	3	17
Not Prepared	0	0	0	1
Occupy Objective Rally Point				
Very Well Prepared	6	20	3	7
Prepared	4	33	6	38
Somewhat Prepared	1	10	1	18
Not Prepared	0	0	1	5
Occupy Patrol Base				
Very Well Prepared	6	17	4	6
Prepared	5	36	5	39
Somewhat Prepared	0	10	2	19
Not Prepared	0	0	0	5
Linkup				
Very Well Prepared	3	9	0	5
Prepared	5	34	6	20
Somewhat Prepared	3	17	4	39
Not Prepared	0	3	1	4
Cross Defile				
Very Well Prepared	0	4	0	1
Prepared	5	32	5	12
Somewhat Prepared	6	21	3	33
Not Prepared	0	5	3	20
Reconnoiter Zone				
Very Well Prepared	4	15	2	5
Prepared	7	29	5	30
Somewhat Prepared	0	18	2	22
Not Prepared	0	1	2	11
Reconnoiter Route				
Very Well Prepared	3	15	3	4
Prepared	8	32	4	28
Somewhat Prepared	0	14	2	27
Not Prepared	0	2	2	9
Occupy Observation Post				
Very Well Prepared	1	25	1	9
Prepared	10	36	6	34
Somewhat Prepared	0	12	3	23
Not Prepared	0	0	1	1

	<u>Active</u>		<u>Reserve</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Surveillance				
Very Well Prepared	1	20	0	10
Prepared	8	30	6	25
Somewhat Prepared	2	11	4	27
Not Prepared	0	2	1	6
Prepare for Combat				
Very Well Prepared	4	25	1	16
Prepared	6	30	8	34
Somewhat Prepared	1	8	1	18
Not Prepared	0	0	1	1
Consolidate/Reorganize				
Very Well Prepared	5	27	1	14
Prepared	5	25	5	31
Somewhat Prepared	1	11	4	20
Not Prepared	0	0	1	3
React to Contact				
Very Well Prepared	7	25	3	10
Prepared	3	34	4	38
Somewhat Prepared	1	3	4	18
Not Prepared	0	1	0	2
Break Contact				
Very Well Prepared	6	25	3	12
Prepared	4	31	4	32
Somewhat Prepared	1	6	4	20
Not Prepared	0	1	0	3
React to Ambush				
Very Well Prepared	7	27	5	10
Prepared	3	27	3	33
Somewhat Prepared	1	8	3	23
Not Prepared	0	1	0	0
React to Indirect Fire				
Very Well Prepared	7	27	5	16
Prepared	3	33	3	39
Somewhat Prepared	1	3	3	12
Not Prepared	0	0	0	1
Leader Reconnaissance				
Very Well Prepared	5	19	3	7
Prepared	5	29	4	32
Somewhat Prepared	1	13	4	24
Not Prepared	0	2	0	5

	<u>Active</u>		<u>Reserve</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Land Navigation				
Very Well Prepared	7	29	3	18
Prepared	3	31	4	31
Somewhat Prepared	1	2	4	18
Not Prepared	0	1	0	1
Construct Fighting Positions				
Very Well Prepared	4	21	3	13
Prepared	6	35	5	33
Somewhat Prepared	1	6	1	21
Not Prepared	0	1	2	1
Aeromedical Evacuation				
Very Well Prepared	1	10	1	2
Prepared	9	23	5	14
Somewhat Prepared	1	21	2	27
Not Prepared	0	9	3	25
Pathfinder Operations				
Very Well Prepared	1	7	1	1
Prepared	3	14	4	7
Somewhat Prepared	5	22	3	20
Not Prepared	2	20	3	40
Unaided Night Vision				
Very Well Prepared	2	17	1	3
Prepared	4	26	4	20
Somewhat Prepared	4	12	2	35
Not Prepared	1	8	3	10
Report Enemy Information				
Very Well Prepared	3	31	3	18
Prepared	8	28	5	36
Somewhat Prepared	0	4	3	14
Not Prepared	0	0	0	1

Appendix D

Pre-Training Ratings of Immediate Superiors (Percentages)

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Respondents	11	63	11	69
Planning				
Excellent	0	13	27	15
Very Good	55	18	36	28
Good	36	22	36	28
Adequate	0	21	0	19
Weak	9	11	0	7
Cannot Rate	0	16	0	4
Job Knowledge				
Excellent	18	11	36	19
Very Good	36	22	55	33
Good	36	24	0	25
Adequate	0	16	9	13
Weak	0	10	0	3
Cannot Rate	9	18	0	7
Warfighting				
Excellent	9	5	18	7
Very Good	27	8	27	9
Good	9	22	18	20
Adequate	0	8	18	9
Weak	0	11	9	1
Cannot Rate	54	46	9	54
Communication				
Excellent	9	10	27	13
Very Good	36	24	46	25
Good	9	24	9	28
Adequate	46	18	18	16
Weak	0	16	0	12
Cannot Rate	0	10	0	7
Supervision				
Excellent	9	10	9	16
Very Good	27	22	55	32
Good	36	32	27	29
Adequate	18	13	0	13
Weak	0	16	0	7
Cannot Rate	9	8	9	3

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Decision Making				
Excellent	9	16	46	17
Very Good	46	19	36	30
Good	0	24	18	23
Adequate	36	18	0	16
Weak	9	14	0	9
Cannot Rate	0	10	0	4
Team Building				
Excellent	27	16	27	25
Very Good	36	14	55	17
Good	18	24	9	23
Adequate	0	19	9	15
Weak	9	13	0	12
Cannot Rate	9	14	0	9

Appendix E

Leadership Skills

Leadership Skills in Need of Improvement - Pre ILC (percentages)

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Set Goals & Objectives	27	21	18	39
Developing Strategies	36	33	36	44
Establishing Priorities	27	27	55	22
Delegating Duties	27	10	46	26
Tactical Proficiency	18	33	64	68
Technical Proficiency	27	37	36	61
Convey Facts/Requirements	36	18	27	33
Listening & Comprehension	36	18	9	26
Task Monitoring	55	11	55	23
Providing Feedback	27	18	9	33
Problem Identification	27	19	9	28
Develop & Analyze Solutions	27	19	18	42
Making Timely Decisions	27	13	27	23
Involve Others in Planning/ Decision Making Process	55	25	46	44
Team Building	18	25	27	41

Leadership Skills Improved - Post ILC (percentages)

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Set Goals & Objectives	0	14	18	38
Developing Strategies	9	24	27	32
Establishing Priorities	18	17	27	35
Delegating Duties	9	17	18	32
Technical Proficiency	9	33	45	57
Tactical Proficiency	27	40	54	55
Convey Facts/Requirements	18	21	9	29
Listening & Comprehension	9	16	9	30
Task Monitoring	9	16	18	25
Providing Feedback	36	27	18	35
Problem Identification	9	24	27	26
Develop & Analyze Solutions	9	29	18	30
Making Timely Decisions	9	14	9	38
Involve Others in Planning/ Decision Making Process	18	33	45	54
Team Building	73	46	45	68

Appendix F

Post-Training Ratings of Immediate Superiors (Percentages)

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Respondents	9	61	11	64
Planning				
Excellent	22	13	55	13
Very Good	44	26	0	42
Good	0	21	0	16
Adequate	0	18	9	16
Weak	0	11	9	6
Cannot Rate	33	10	27	8
Job Knowledge				
Excellent	44	20	55	28
Very Good	22	25	0	25
Good	0	16	9	23
Adequate	0	18	0	9
Weak	0	11	9	6
Cannot Rate	33	10	27	8
Warfighting				
Excellent	33	13	36	19
Very Good	0	15	9	23
Good	11	23	0	19
Adequate	0	20	0	11
Weak	0	15	9	6
Cannot Rate	56	15	45	22
Communication				
Excellent	11	18	36	23
Very Good	11	21	9	25
Good	22	16	9	19
Adequate	0	21	9	16
Weak	22	15	9	8
Cannot Rate	33	8	27	9
Supervision				
Excellent	11	18	27	23
Very Good	33	21	18	28
Good	11	15	0	16
Adequate	0	25	9	17
Weak	11	10	9	6
Cannot Rate	33	13	36	9

	<u>Active Component</u>		<u>Reserve Component</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>NCO</u>
Decision Making				
Excellent	33	16	36	17
Very Good	11	18	0	28
Good	22	25	9	23
Adequate	0	20	9	16
Weak	0	11	18	8
Cannot Rate	33	10	27	8
Team Building				
Excellent	33	16	36	23
Very Good	11	11	18	30
Good	11	15	0	17
Adequate	0	18	0	13
Weak	11	13	9	8
Cannot Rate	33	26	36	9

Appendix G

Post-Deployment Ratings of Tasks Trained During the ILC
(Frequencies and Percentages)

Ratings: Too Much Time/Way Too Much Time (Too Much)
About the Right Amount of Time (OK)
Not Enough Time/Not Nearly Enough Time (Too Little)

See Appendix A, Final Questionnaire, for Task Names

Task	Too Much			OK			Too Little			N
	AC	RC	N	AC	RC	N	AC	RC	N	
Prep for Combat	19 54%	13 33%	32 48%	9 26%	14 36%	23 35%	6 14%	6 15%	11 17%	66
M16 Zero, Qual, ARM	7 20%	9 23%	16 24%	16 46%	14 36%	30 44%	11 31%	11 28%	22 32%	68
M-249 Familiariz.	14 40%	5 13%	19 29%	12 34%	12 31%	24 36%	8 23%	15 38%	23 35%	66
Occupy AA	23 35%	18 46%	41 60%	9 26%	11 28%	20 29%	2 6%	5 13%	7 10%	68
Land Navigation	10 29%	7 68%	17 25%	21 60%	19 49%	40 59%	3 9%	8 21%	11 16%	68
Move Tactically	24 69%	16 41%	40 58%	9 26%	16 41%	25 36%	1 3%	3 8%	4 6%	68
Cross Danger Area	22 63%	21 54%	43 62%	10 29%	11 28%	21 30%	2 6%	3 8%	5 7%	69
Self-extract. Minefield	7 20%	5 13%	12 18%	14 40%	22 56%	36 54%	12 34%	7 18%	19 28%	67
Linkup	21 60%	15 38%	36 53%	11 31%	14 36%	25 37%	2 6%	5 13%	7 10%	68
React to Contact	18 51%	14 36%	32 46%	11 31%	17 44%	28 41%	5 14%	4 10%	9 13%	69
Break Contact	18 51%	14 36%	32 47%	12 34%	15 38%	27 40%	4 11%	5 13%	9 13%	68
Disengage	18 51%	13 33%	31 46%	13 37%	18 46%	31 46%	2 6%	3 8%	5 7%	67
Ambush	22 63%	20 51%	42 64%	10 29%	10 26%	20 30%	1 3%	3 8%	4 6%	66

Task	Too Much			OK			Too Little			N
	AC	RC	N	AC	RC	N	AC	RC	N	
C&R	17 49%	13 33%	30 44%	15 43%	18 46%	33 48%	2 6%	3 8%	5 7%	68
Aeromedevac	1 3%	2 5%	3 4%	14 40%	10 26%	24 35%	18 51%	23 59%	41 60%	68
Sling Load/ Cargo Net	3 9%	5 13%	8 12%	20 57%	12 31%	32 46%	11 31%	18 46%	29 42%	69
Use Arm & Hand Signals	13 37%	9 23%	22 32%	18 51%	22 56%	40 58%	2 6%	5 13%	7 10%	69
Occupy Obj. Rally Point	21 60%	18 46%	39 56%	12 34%	15 38%	27 39%	1 3%	2 5%	3 4%	69
Occupy Patrol Base	22 63%	18 46%	40 58%	10 29%	15 38%	25 36%	2 6%	2 5%	4 6%	69
Occupy Observ. Post	17 49%	9 23%	26 38%	13 37%	19 49%	32 46%	4 11%	7 18%	11 16%	69
Perform Surveillance	11 31%	6 15%	17 24%	14 40%	19 49%	33 47%	9 26%	11 28%	20 29%	70
Recon	17 49%	11 28%	28 41%	12 34%	15 38%	17 25%	5 14%	9 23%	14 20%	69
Defend	19 54%	13 33%	32 47%	13 37%	13 33%	26 38%	2 6%	8 21%	10 15%	68
TLPs	8 23%	6 15%	14 20%	15 43%	18 46%	33 48%	11 31%	11 28%	22 32%	69
How to Train	8 23%	7 18%	15 21%	14 40%	20 51%	34 49%	12 34%	9 23%	21 30%	70
After Action Review	9 26%	5 13%	14 20%	1 51%	24 62%	42 60%	7 20%	7 18%	14 20%	70
Train the Trainer	9 26%	7 18%	16 23%	16 46%	19 49%	35 49%	10 28%	10 26%	20 28%	71
Rappelling	17 49%	7 18%	24 35%	14 40%	17 44%	31 45%	3 9%	11 28%	14 20%	69
Unaided Night Vision	14 40%	13 8%	17 26%	13 37%	15 38%	28 42%	7 20%	14 36%	21 32%	66

(These numbers are not valid because only 33 (16 AC and 17 RC) personnel took the unaided night vision class.)

Appendix H
Training Calendar and Schedule

MFO

27 AUGUST - 24 SEPTEMBER

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
August 21	August 22	August 23	August 24	August 25	August 26	August 27
PT CWST WCT How To Train AAR	August 29 PT Test (Diagnostic) LRC Basic Land Nav	August 30 PT M-16: Zero, Qual ARM (Malone 11, 15, 16, 18)	August 31 PT: Rd. March (4 mi) Land Nav Test Pace / Compass Chk Land Nav D&N(Furman) MILES P.U.	September 1 PT MILES Issue Land Nav D&N(Arkman)	September 2 PT Train the Trainer M-249 famli Sling Load (Cargo net)	September 3 CDRS TIME
September 4 CDRS TIME	September 5 PT Move Tactically Consolidate/Reorg React to Contact Break Contact	September 6 PT Disengage React to Indirect Fire Cross Danger Area Cross Defile	September 7 PT: Rd. MARCH (5 mi) LDR's Reconnaissance ORP PB	September 8 PT Rappelling Helo Rappelling Pahfinder Ops	September 9 PT Aero Medevac Sling Load PE	September 10 CDRS TIME
September 11 CDRS TIME	September 12 PT Mines/Self Extraction Occupy OP / Perform Surveillance Unaided Night Vision	September 13 PT TLP's	September 14 PT: Rd March (6 mi) Terrain Model How to Brief TLP's	September 15 PT Recon: Area, Zone, Route	September 16 PT STX: SURVEILLANCE	September 17 PT Defend
September 18 CDRS TIME	September 19 PT STX: DEFEND	September 20 STX: RECON	September 21 STX: SURVEILLANCE	September 22 STX: DEFEND	September 23 STX	September 24 Clear Barracks Student Critique Graduation

(dst-ccplus, doc-mfostrman 6/3/94)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL
 FORT BENNING, GEORGIA 31905
 TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE

EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF SCHEDULE:
 FROM 27 AUG THRU 23 SEP 94

MFO

PREPARATION DATE:
 23 AUGUST 1994

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
SAT 27 AUG DAY 0 -/-/A						
1300	ALL	ARRIVAL	CAMP ROGERS		A	RBIL 01
1500-1600	ALL	INPROCESS	BDE CLSRM		A	RBIL 01
1600-1700	ALL	MED CONSIDERATIONS	BDE CLSRM		A	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	
SUN 28 AUG DAY 01 A/C/A						
0530	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS		D	
0600-0730	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0730-0830	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	DFAC			
0830-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (HC-POOL)		A	
0900-1200	ALL	CWST	HC POOL		A	RBIL 32/1
1200-1230	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE VICTORY POND		A	
1230-1300	ALL	LUNCH	VICTORY POND		A	
1300-1700	ALL	WCT	VICTORY POND		A	RBIL 32/2
1700-1730	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		A	
1730-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	

1800-2000 AAR Bde C&S Am

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
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MON 29 AUG. DAY 02 A/C/A

'0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0530-0730	ALL	PT TEST (DIAGNOSTIC)	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0730-0830	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	DFAC			
0830-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE (DIXIE VILL)		A	
0900-1600	ALL	LRC	DIXIE VILLAGE		B	RBIL 37
1600-1630	ALL	LRC (MAINT)	DIXIE VILLAGE		B	
1630-1700	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	
1800-UTC	ALL	BASIC LAND NAV	BDE CLSRM		A	RBIL 47

TUES 30 AUG DAY 03 A/C/C

'0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0830	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST/ WPNS DRAW	DFAC/BLDG 5012			
0830-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE (MALONE 11)		B	RBIL 69
0900-2100	ALL	ZERO/QUAL/ARM	MALONE-11/16/15/18		B	RBIL 73/
2100-2130	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
2130-UTC	ALL	WPNS TURN IN	BLDG 5012 ARMS RM		A	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
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WEDS 31 AUG DAY 04 (A/A/C)						
'0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0530-0700	ALL	PT-RD MARCH 4mi	HC-AREA		D	RBIL 33
0700-0850	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	BARRACKS/DFAC		A	
0900-1130	ALL	LANDNAV TEST REVIEW	BDE CLSRM		A	RBIL47
1130-1230	ALL	LUNCH	DFAC		A	
1230-1300	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (FURMAN RD)		B	
1300-1400	ALL	PACE/COMPASS CHK	FURMAN RD		B	
1400-2330	ALL	LAND NAV D&N	FURMAN RD		B	RBIL 48
2330-UTC	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	

THURS 01 SEPT DAY 05 (A/A/C)						
'0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0850	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	BARRACKS/DFAC		A	
0900-1130	ALL	CMDRS TIME	BDE CLSRM		A	RBIL 47
1130-1230	ALL	LUNCH	DFAC		A	
1230-1300	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE (ARQMAN)		B	
1300-2330	ALL	LANDNAV D&N	ARQMAN		B	RBIL 48
2330-0001	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
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FRI 02 SEPT DAY 06 (A/C/A)

'0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0800	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	DFAC			
0800-0830	ALL	WPNS ISSUE-M249 ONLY	BLDG 5012		A	
0830-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)		B	
0900-1000	ALL	ITC-TTT	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 75
1000-1400	ALL	M249-FAMIL	TODD FLD		B	
1200-1300	ALL	LUNCH	TODD FLD		B	
1400-1600	ALL	SLING LOAD-CARGO NET	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 76
1600-1700	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)/WPNS T/I	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS) BLDG 5012		B	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	
1800-UTC	ALL	MILES ISSUE	BLDG 5012		A	

SAT 03 SEPT DAY 07 (A/A/A)

'0001-2400	ALL	CMDRS TIME	BARRACKS			
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SUN 04 SEPT DAY 08 (A/A/A)

'0001-2400	ALL	CMDRS TIME	BARRACKS			
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DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
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MON 05 SEPT DAY 09 (A/C/A)

'0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0830	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST WPNS DRAW	DFAC/BLDG 5012		A	
0830-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)		B	
0900-1630	ALL	COLLECTIVE TASK: MOVE TACT. CONSOL/REORG REACT TO CONT. BREAK CONT.	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 51
1200-1230	ALL	LUNCH	TODD FLD		B	
1630-1700	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	
1800-UTC	ALL	GPS	BDE CLSRM		A	

TUES 06 SEPT DAY 10 (A/C/A)

'0500	ALL	FIRST CALL				
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0830	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST WPNS DRAW	DFAC/BLDG 5012		A	
0830-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)		B	
0900-1630	ALL	COLLECTIVE TASK: DISENGAGE REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE CROSS A DANGER AREA CROSS DEFILE	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 51
1200-1230	ALL	LUNCH	TODD FLD		B	
1630-1700	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	
1800-UTC	ALL	GPS	BDE CLSRM		A	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
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WED 07 SEPT DAY 11 (A/C/A)						
DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
0500	ALL	/TIMEDATE	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION		
0530-0700	ALL	PT-5mi ROAD MARCH	HC-AREA		D	RBIL 33
0700-0830	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST WPNS DRAW	DFAC / BLDG 5012			
0830-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)		B	
0900-1630	ALL	COLLECTIVE TASKS LDR'S RECON ORP PB	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 51
1200-1230	ALL	LUNCH	TODD FLD		B	
1630-1700	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	
1800-UTC	ALL	GPS	BDE CLSRM		A	

THUR 08 SEPT DAY 12 (A/C/A)						
DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
0500	ALL	FIRST CALL				
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0800	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	DFAC			
0800-0830	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)			
0830-1030	ALL	RAPPELLING	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 26
1030-1130		PATHFINDER OPS				42
1200-1700		HELO/RAPPEL				46
1130-1200	ALL	LUNCH	TODD FLD			
1700-1730	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
1730-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC			
1800-UTC	ALL	GPS	BDE CLSRM		A	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
FRI 09 SEPT DAY 13 (A/C/A)						
'0500	ALL	FIRST CALL				
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0800	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	DFAC			
0800-0830	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)			
0830-1000	ALL	AERO-MEDEVAC	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 43
1000-1200		SLING LOAD P.E.				84
1200-1230		LUNCH				
1230-1330	ALL	ARM/HAND SIGNALS HELO	TODD FLD			
1330-1700	ALL	SLING LOAD P.E. w/ AC	TODD FLD			
1700-1730	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)			
1730-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	
1800-UTC	ALL	GPS	BDE CLSRM		A	
SAT 10 SEPT DAY 14 (A/A/A)						
'0001-2400	ALL	CMDRS TIME				
SUN 11 SEPT DAY 15 (A/A/A)						
'0001-2400	ALL	CMDRS TIME				

MON 12 SEPT. DAY 16 (A/C/A)

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM*
0500	ALL	FIRST CALL				
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0830	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST DRAW WPNS	DFAC			
0830-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)			
0900-1630	ALL	COLLECTIVE TASKS MINES-SELF EXTRACT OCCUPY-OP/PERF. SURV.	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 51/54
1200-1230	ALL	LUNCH	TODD FLD		B	
1630-1700	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	TODD FIELD		B	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER/WPNS TURN IN	DFAC/BLDG 5012			
1800-2000	ALL	UNAIDED NIGHT VIS.	BDE/BN CLSRM		A	

TUES 13 SEPT. DAY 17 A/A/A

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM*
0500	ALL	FIRST CALL				
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0840	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	DFAC			
0840-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (BDE CLSRM)		A	
0900-1200	ALL	HOW TO TRAIN RAR TLPS	BDE CLSRM		A	RBIL 41 59
1200-1300	ALL	LUNCH	DFAC		A	
1300-2100	ALL	HOW TO TRAIN RAR TLPS	BDE CLSRM		A	RBIL 41 59
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM*
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WED 14 SEPT DAY 18 A/C/A						
0500	ALL	FIRST CALL				
0530-0700	ALL	PT-RD MARCH 6mi	HC-AREA		B	RBIL 33
0700-0840	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST	DFAC			
0840-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)		B	
0900-1630	ALL	TERRAIN MODEL HOW TO BRIEF TLPs	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 41 51
1630-1700	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
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THUR 15 SEPT DAY 19 A/C/C						
0500	ALL	FIRST CALL				
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI FLD		D	RBIL 33
0700-0840	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST WPNS DRAW	DFAC/BLDG 5012 ARMS RM			
0840-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)		B	
0900-2400	ALL	RECON: AREA ZONE ROUTE	TODD FLD		B	RBIL 23 24 25
2400-0030	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
0030-0100	ALL	WPNS TURN-IN	BLDG 5012 ARMS RM		A	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCAL	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PRELIM #
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FRI 16 SEPT DAY 20 A/C/C						
0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRAC			
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVE		D	R BIL 33
0700-0845	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST WPNS DRAW	DFAC/BLDG			
0845-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROD (FLD)		B	
0900-2300	ALL	STX SURVEILLANCE	TODD 2,3		B	R BIL 54
2300-2330	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROD (CGIR S)		B	
2330-2400	ALL	WPNS TURN-IN	BLDG IS RM		A	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCAL	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PRELIM #
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SAT 17 SEPT DAY 21 A/C/C						
0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRAC			
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVES		D	R BIL 33
0700-0845	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST WPNS DRAW	DFAC/BLDG 5'			
0845-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUT (FLD)		B	
0900-2200	ALL	DEFEND (SQUAD)	TODD 2,3		B	R BIL-51/8
2200-2230	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUT (CGIR S)		B	
2230-2300	ALL	WPNS TURN-IN	BLDG 5'		A	

SUN 18 SEPT DAY 22 A/A/A						
0001-2400	ALL	CMDRS TIME				

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
MON 19 SEPT DAY 23 A/C/C/						
0500	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0530-0700	ALL	PT	MALVESTI		D	RBIL 33
0700-0845	ALL	PERS HYG/BREAKFAST WPNS DRAW	DFAC/BARRACKS/ BLDG 5012			
0845-0900	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)		B	
0900-2200	ALL	DEFEND (SQUAD) STX	TODD FLD/Q-1,2,3,		B	RBIL-51/8
2200-2230	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
2230-2300	ALL	WPNS TURN-IN	BLDG 5012		A	

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
TUES 20 SEPT DAY 24 A/C/C/						
0530	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0600-0700	ALL	WPNS DRAW	BLDG 5012-ARMS RM		A	
0700-0800	ALL	BREAKFAST/BARRACKS MAINT.	DFAC/BARRACKS		A	
0800-0830	ALL	MOVEMENT (FOOT)	ENROUTE (TODD FLD)		B	
0830-0001	ALL	FTX-RECON	TODD FLD/Q-1,2,3,4,5 6,7,-B-2,3,4,5,		B	RBIL 81

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
WED 21 SEPT DAY 25 C/C/C/						
2400-0001	ALL	FTX-SURVEILLANCE	Q-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, B-2,3,4,5,		B	RBIL 81

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
THUR 22 SEPT DAY 26 C/C/A						
2400-1400	ALL	FTX-DEFEND	Q-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, B-2,3,4,5,		B	RBIL 81
1400-1600	ALL	DEFENSE SITE MAINT.	Q-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, B-2,3,4,5,		B	
1600-1630	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE (CAMP ROGERS)		B	
1630-1700	ALL	EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY	BLDG 5012 AREA		A	
1700-1800	ALL	DINNER	DFAC		A	
1800-UTC	ALL	EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY/MAINT.	BLDG 5012 AREA			

DATE/TIME	UNIT	TRAINING MISSION	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	UNIFORM	PROBLEM #
FRI 23 SEPT DAY 27 A/A/						
0600	ALL	FIRST CALL	BARRACKS			
0700-0800	ALL	BREAKFAST	DFAC		A	
0800-1045	ALL	BARRACKS	BARRACKS MAINT.		A	
1100-1200	ALL	GRADUATION	BDE CLSRM		A	RBIL 89
1200-1300	ALL	LUNCH	DFAC		A	
1300-UTC	ALL	MOVEMENT (BUS)	ENROUTE TO FT BRAGG		A	