

# **TOWARD AN AMERICAN WAY OF WAR**

**Antulio J. Echevarria II**

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## FOREWORD

The American way of war has been much written about over the years. That literature is remarkable for its explicit and implicit consensus regarding the overriding characteristics of the American approach to warfare--aggressive, direct, and focused on achieving decisive victory. A way of war implies thinking about conflict holistically, from prewar condition-setting to the final accomplishment of one's strategic objectives. Unfortunately, American thinking about war tends to put more emphasis on coercive operations--the destruction of an opponent's regular forces on the field of battle--than on what is loosely known as war's "aftermath." Yet, it is in the aftermath where wars are typically won.

In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria examines the principal characteristics and ideas associated with the American way of war, past and present. He argues that Americans do not yet have a way of war. What they have is a way of battle. Moving from a way of battle toward a way of war will require some fundamental rethinking about the roles of the grammar and logic of war, about the nature of U.S. civil-military relations, and about the practical resources necessary to translate military victory into strategic success.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.  
Director  
Strategic Studies Institute

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II, an Army lieutenant colonel, currently is assigned as the Director of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981, was commissioned as an armor officer, and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States; he has also served as an Assistant Professor of European History at the U.S. Military Academy; Squadron S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox; as an action officer at the Army After Next project at HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA; and as a speechwriter for the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in History from Princeton University. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria is the author of *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War*, published by the University Press of Kansas (2001). He also has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals to include the *Journal of Military History*, *War in History*, *War & Society*, the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *Parameters*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, *Military Review*, and *Airpower Journal*.

## SUMMARY

Understanding of the American approach to warfare begins with historian Russell Weigley's classic work, *The American Way of War*. He concluded that the American style of waging war centered primarily on the idea of achieving a crushing military victory over an opponent. Americans—not unlike many of their European counterparts—considered war an *alternative* to bargaining, rather than part of an ongoing bargaining process, as in the Clausewitzian view. Their concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success, and hence was more a way of *battle* than an actual way of war. Unfortunately, the American way of battle has not yet matured into a way of war.

The subject is important not just for academic reasons, but for policy ones as well. Assumptions about how American political and military leaders conceive of war and approach the waging of it tend to inform their decisions in matters of strategic planning, budgeting, and concept and doctrine development. The assumptions underpinning Defense Transformation, for example, appear to have more to do with developing an ever exquisite grammar than they do with serving war's logic.

### A Way of War Uniquely American?

Much of what Weigley said about the American way of war would apply to the German, French, or British methods of warfare as well. Yet, the picture he presents is incomplete. Hence, one would do well to consider Max Boot's *Savage Wars of Peace*, which contends that Americans actually practiced another way of war with regard to history's "small wars"—such as the Boxer Rebellion and the Philippine Insurrection—that did not necessarily involve wars for the complete overthrow of an opponent. In the final analysis, Boot rounds out the picture of the American approach to warfare, thereby augmenting Weigley's thesis rather than overturning it.

## **A Way of Battle.**

While these two interpretations approach the American tradition of warfare from different perspectives, they agree in one very critical respect: the American way of war tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs, whether on the scale of major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic successes. This tendency is symptomatic of a persistent bifurcation in American strategic thinking—though by no means unique to Americans—in which military professionals concentrate on winning battles and campaigns, while policymakers focus on the diplomatic struggles that precede and influence, or are influenced by, the actual fighting. This bifurcation is partly a matter of preference and partly a by-product of the American tradition of subordinating military command to civilian leadership, which creates two separate spheres of responsibility, one for diplomacy and one for combat. In other words, the Weigley and Boot interpretations are both important for implicitly revealing that the American style of warfare amounts to a way of battle more than a way of war.

## **A New American Way of War?**

A growing amount of defense literature refers to a so-called new style of American warfare that emphasizes “precision firepower, special forces, psychological operations, and jointness,” rather than overwhelming force. The characteristics bear a conspicuous resemblance to the qualities of “speed, jointness, knowledge, and precision” that underpin the model of the new American way of war currently championed by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Unfortunately, the new American way of war seems headed for the same trap that snared both the Weigley and Boot versions of the traditional one, that is—it appears geared to fight wars as if they were battles and, thus, confuses the winning of campaigns or small-scale actions with the winning of wars.

## Whose American Way of War?

OSD recently took unqualified possession of the emerging American way of war, and began supplanting the traditional grammar of war with a new one. However, this new grammar—which focuses on achieving rapid military victories—was equipped only to win battles, not wars. Hence, the successful accomplishment of the administration’s goal of building a democratic government in Iraq, for example, is still in question, with an insurgency growing rapidly.

### Toward a Way of War.

To move toward a genuine way of war, American military and political leaders must address two key problems. First, they must better define the respective roles and responsibilities of the logic and grammar of war, and, in the process, take steps that will diminish the bifurcation in American strategic thinking. Second, political and military leaders must habituate themselves to thinking more thoroughly about how to turn combat successes into favorable strategic outcomes. Such thinking is not new, but it is clearly not yet a matter of habit. Failure to see the purpose for which a war is fought *as part of war itself* amounts to treating battle as an end in itself.

Until Americans clarify the roles of grammar and logic and develop a habit of thinking about war that goes beyond battles, they will have a way of war in name only.



## TOWARD AN AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

Serious inquiry into the American approach to waging war began in the early 1970s with the publication of Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War*.<sup>1</sup> Examining how war was thought about and practiced by key U.S. military and political figures from George Washington to Robert McNamara, Weigley concluded that, except in the early days of the nation's existence, the American way of war centered on the pursuit of a crushing military victory—either through a strategy of attrition or one of annihilation—over an adversary.<sup>2</sup> U.S. military men and political leaders typically saw the destruction of an opponent's armed might and the occupation of his capital as marking the end of war and the beginning of postwar negotiations. Thus, Americans—not unlike many of their European counterparts—considered war an *alternative* to bargaining, rather than part of an ongoing bargaining process, as in the Clausewitzian view. In other words, the American concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success. Consequently, the American approach to war was—to take the liberty of rephrasing Weigley's argument—more a way of *battle* than an actual way of war. Unfortunately, despite the existence of a theoretical foundation and a vast transformation effort that is gaining considerable momentum, the American way of battle has not yet matured into a way of war.

The phrase "way of war" as it is used here refers to general trends in the conduct of, and preferred modes of thinking about, war.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, in an American context, it reflects the fundamental ideas and expectations, albeit modified in practice, that the U.S. military profession and U.S. political leadership have, or have had, about war, and their respective roles in it. These ideas and expectations, in turn, contribute to the assumptions that inform political and military decisionmakers in matters of strategic planning, budgeting, and concept and doctrine development. Assumptions currently underpinning Defense Transformation, for example, appear to be aimed at developing an ever exquisite grammar that quite overlooks the centrality of war's logic.

## A Way of War Uniquely American?

Much of what Weigley said about the American way of war would apply to the German, French, or British methods of warfare as well. The German way of war as thought about and practiced by the elder Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prusso-German General Staff from 1857-88, for example, shares much in common with the American approach described by Weigley. Moltke equated grand strategy with policy—which he considered the discrete province of statesmen—and insisted that, while policy had the right to establish the goals of a conflict, even changing them when it saw fit, it had no right to interfere with the conduct of military operations.<sup>4</sup> In Clausewitzian terms, then, Moltke acknowledged the initial importance of the logic of war, but insisted that its grammar took precedence during the actual fighting. This kind of reasoning also existed in many of the French and British military writings published during Moltke’s time and into the late 20th century.<sup>5</sup> Hence, despite some evident exceptions, Moltke’s segregated, grammarian approach to war—rather than Clausewitz’s view of policy and war as a logical continuum—seems to bear the greater resemblance to the American tradition of warfare.<sup>6</sup>

Accordingly, while one might expect to see more differences than similarities in national styles of war, in the Western context at least, the opposite is true. American, British, French, and German military writers all studied the campaigns of Napoleon, and later of Moltke, drawing many of the same lessons from those studies. They saw battles and campaigns in a similar light, believing, for instance, that winning wars meant winning battles, and that doing so would accomplish most, if not all, of one’s wartime objectives. They also faced many of the same fiscal, manning, and organizational challenges, nurtured similar traditions regarding the warrior spirit, and kept comparably abreast of new developments in military technology, tactics, and operational concepts. While Western military establishments occasionally adopted different strategies, tactics, or operational paradigms, particularly in the period of reorganization before World War II, they did so mainly in response to the specific challenges of their geo-strategic and socio-political situations.<sup>7</sup> In terms of seeing the fundamental object of war as the destruction of

the enemy's armed might by the best possible route, however, they were largely of one mind.

Such common denominators support the case for the existence of a larger Western way of war. Noted authors, such as Victor Davis Hanson, in fact, have made such a case. In *Carnage and Culture*, published in 2001, Hanson argued that some of the underlying values of Western culture, namely, its traditions of rationalism, individualism, and civic duty, led not only to a decided technological dominance, as eminent historians such as Geoffrey Parker have contended, but also to significant—even decisive—advantages in military “organization, discipline, morale, initiative, flexibility, and command.”<sup>8</sup> These advantages made Western armies and navies more successful in combat than their counterparts in other cultures. To his credit, Hanson does not insist that Western values have survived unadulterated over the years or that military cultures perfectly mirror the cultures of their parent civil societies. Rather, he persuasively maintains only that in each of the clash of cultures that he examines—such as Cortés’s conquistadors versus Cuauhtémoc’s Aztecs in the battles that took place for the city of Tenochtitlán (1520-21)—those values were more evident in the Western force than in that of its adversary. To be sure, Western military cultures often campaigned vigorously against the spread of free thinking or individualism—the underpinnings of initiative and flexibility, for example—because they were thought to undermine a soldier’s corporate identity and his will to fight.<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, U.S. and European military institutions were influenced more by such ideas than were their foes.

Significantly, Hanson also demonstrates the predominance of the concept of annihilation—which he defines broadly as the idea of “head-to-head battle that destroys the enemy”—in each of the clashes of arms he examines and, by extension, in Western military thinking in general. Like Weigley, he also underscores the view that Westerners saw war principally as a means of “doing what politics cannot.”<sup>10</sup> Hanson thus agrees with Weigley that, in most of Western strategic thought, politics brought war into being, but war existed as a violent alternative to politics, rather than as its logical extension. Hence, the commonalities that the American style of warfare shares with the Western way of war show that Weigley’s

interpretation, though flawed in some respects, is—to take minor license with a celebrated German motto—"greater than it seems."<sup>11</sup>

Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that Weigley's description of the American approach to warfare is marred by shortcomings in at least two respects: in the errors he makes in military terminology; and in his tendency to oversimplify the complexities of American military thinking, though generalizations are to be expected in a work that spans the better part of 2 centuries. With regard to terminology, he incorrectly defines the strategies of annihilation and of attrition, describing the former as seeking the complete "overthrow of the enemy's military power" and the latter as pursuing lesser objectives by means of an "indirect approach," which he mistakenly says is characterized primarily by the gradual erosion or exhaustion of an opponent's forces.<sup>12</sup> His misuse of military terminology caused some readers to conclude, incorrectly, that the American approach to warfare was characterized by applying overwhelming "mass and concentration" in a slow, grinding strategy of attrition as General Ulysses S. Grant did in the Civil War.<sup>13</sup>

Regarding his errors of oversimplification, Weigley overlooked the considerable amount and variety of American thinking concerning the importance of deterring an invasion of the continent, which played a key role in the development of U.S. coastal artillery and provided a rationale for the long-range bomber, and which both reflected and reinforced U.S. attitudes toward isolationism into the early 20th century. These criticisms, however, do not substantively undermine Weigley's thesis—that Americans saw the primary object of war as the destruction of an opponent's armed might rather than as the furtherance of political objectives through violent means—so much as they qualify it. They merely highlight the exceptions that ultimately prove the rule.<sup>14</sup> Weigley's view thus remains a valid way of looking at the American style of war as it was thought about and practiced for nearly 2 centuries.

However, one recent counterargument to his thesis deserves consideration. Max Boot's *Savage Wars of Peace*, published in 2002, contends that, whatever their preferences, American military and political leaders have actually practiced more than one way of war.<sup>15</sup> Boot maintains that U.S. involvement in history's "small wars"—such as the Boxer Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection,

and contemporary interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia—actually outnumbers its participation in major conflicts and is, therefore, deserving of inclusion in any description of the American style of warfare. Between 1800 and 1934, for example, U.S. Marines made 180 landings on foreign shores, more than one per year. During roughly the same period, the U.S. Army deployed numerous small contingents in actions virtually all over the globe. Likewise, the U.S. Navy, though small, was involved in many actions at sea over the same time span that, both directly and indirectly, assisted the British Royal Navy in keeping the oceans open for commerce.

Boot also maintains that the U.S. military became involved in such small-scale actions not to protect or advance vital interests, but for lesser reasons that centered on inflicting punishment, ensuring protection, achieving pacification, and benefiting from profit-making.<sup>16</sup> For example, the armed expedition launched in 1916 by President Woodrow Wilson to capture Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa was clearly punitive in nature. The U.S. Navy's involvement in the Barbary Wars (1801-05, and 1815) provides an illustration of wars fought for protection, in this case to ensure the protection of American merchantmen sailing along the coast of North Africa. U.S. interventions in Haiti (1915-34) and the Dominican Republic (1916-24) represent attempts at pacification, or modern-day nation-building, but they also furthered America's policy of dollar diplomacy.<sup>17</sup> Finally, U.S. participation in a multinational expedition to Peking during the Boxer Uprising (1900) was as much about liberating captive emissaries as it was protecting America's small, but growing economic interests in China from European colonial ambitions.

Furthermore, Boot contends that these small-scale conflicts—which he also calls “imperial wars”—contributed significantly to the rise of the United States as a world power, even though they did not directly involve vital interests.<sup>18</sup> Hence, he not only calls for the recognition of a hitherto uncelebrated small-war tradition in U.S. military history, he insists that the American military embrace this tradition in an effort to prepare for the wars of the present and of the future.<sup>19</sup> In the final analysis, Boot augments Weigley's thesis rather than overturning it; he thus rounds out the picture of the American way of war, which—after combining both interpretations—looks much like the proverbial coin with two sides.

## A Way of Battle.

In some respects, these two faces are at diametrical odds with one another. One side of the coin—Weigley’s interpretation—helps explain the intellectual background that ultimately gave rise to the Powell doctrine, which, briefly stated, holds that wars should be fought only for vital national interests and must have clear political objectives and popular support. It further emphasizes that the military should be allowed to use decisive force and that the political leadership must have a sound exit strategy for bringing the troops home.<sup>20</sup> Put simply, the Powell doctrine tends to constrain how and why political leaders employ military force. Some might argue that this approach leaves the grammar of war to dictate its logic, a clear perversion of one of Clausewitz’s key dictums. Others would maintain, as Powell himself does, that use of such a doctrine as a form of wartime grammar makes perfect sense; the point of grammar, after all, is to ensure that the logic behind the message is conveyed intact (how it is perceived is another matter).<sup>21</sup>

In contrast, Boot’s interpretation describes a way of war that runs completely counter to the principles of the Powell doctrine: America’s involvement in the so-called savage wars of peace rarely concerned vital interests, clear political goals, popular support, or overwhelming force, and routinely required committing U.S. troops abroad for extended periods of time.<sup>22</sup> Unfortunately, the track record of such interventions—despite Boot’s attempt to prove otherwise—is not encouraging. The United States had to occupy the Philippines, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic many times, and for many years at a time, in order to impose any kind of lasting stability. Sometimes, even after long occupations as in Haiti (1915-34) and the Dominican Republic (1916-24), stability quickly collapsed after U.S. forces departed. Thus, while the U.S. military’s preference for fighting major wars may have compromised its ability to succeed in small ones, it is also clear that the nation-building tasks it was typically asked to perform tended to prove too complex for the military tool alone.

The approach that Boot advocates—in which potential interventions are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and which claims that no alternative to the Powell doctrine is “possible or desirable”—

comes close to dismissing the grammar of war altogether.<sup>23</sup> To be sure, the Powell doctrine imposes constraints on the use of military force. However, the absence of a doctrine brings problems of its own. A strategic doctrine sends messages both domestically and abroad about the extent to which the United States will go to protect its interests, vital or otherwise.<sup>24</sup> A critical part of that domestic audience is, of course, the military itself. Certainly, the Powell doctrine sends the message that the military need only concern itself with major wars: it will not have to do “windows,” or nation-building, for example. However, the absence of a doctrine suggests that the political leadership does not know what it is about—where it is headed or what its priorities are. Without such priorities to guide it, the military will most likely default into preparing only for the kinds of wars it prefers to fight.<sup>25</sup> Hence, the absence of doctrine does not necessarily create a better situation than trying to implement a poor one.

Yet, in one very critical respect, the Weigley and Boot interpretations agree: the American way of war tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs, whether on the scale of major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic successes. This tendency is symptomatic of a persistent bifurcation in American strategic thinking—though by no means unique to Americans—in which military professionals concentrate on winning battles and campaigns, while policymakers focus on the diplomatic struggles that precede and influence, or are influenced by, the actual fighting. This bifurcation is partly a matter of preference and partly a by-product of the American tradition of subordinating military command to civilian leadership, which creates two separate spheres of responsibility, one for diplomacy and one for combat. In other words, the Weigley and Boot interpretations are both important for implicitly revealing that the American style of warfare amounts to a way of battle more than a way of war.

## **A New American Way of War?**

While Boot’s work clearly complements that of Weigley, his writings go further than just describing an unsung aspect of the American way of war. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*

in 2003, for example, he established himself as one of the leading advocates of a so-called new style of American warfare.<sup>26</sup> An emphasis on “precision firepower, special forces, psychological operations, and jointness”—as opposed to the purported traditional dependence on overwhelming force, mass, and concentration—and the resultant qualities of “speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise” characterize this so-called new approach.<sup>27</sup> Boot claims, moreover, that the new American way of war makes it possible for the United States to wage the “savage wars of peace” more effectively *and* more efficiently, thereby enabling it to enlarge its “empire of liberty”—by which he means the “family of democratic, capitalist nations” that benefit from America’s largesse. This expansion, in fact, the United States is morally obligated to do because of its tremendous military and economic might.<sup>28</sup>

The characteristics that Boot describes bear a conspicuous resemblance to the qualities of “speed, jointness, knowledge, and precision” that underpin the model of the new American way of war currently championed by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).<sup>29</sup> This model reflects a crude blend of terminology extracted from Complexity theory and air-power theory, particularly John Warden’s notions about launching a series of precise, parallel strikes at an adversary’s so-called centers of gravity in order to inflict a certain strategic paralysis on him.<sup>30</sup> Its origins seem to stem from the initial spate of ideas that emerged after Operation DESERT STORM, and gained considerable momentum through the 1990s, about America’s new style of warfare. These ideas highlighted an air-centric approach that appeared to promise quick results with minimal cost in friendly casualties and collateral damage. Noted defense analyst, Eliot Cohen, pointed out that the potency of contemporary American air power gives the American way of war a certain “mystique” that U.S. diplomacy would do well to cultivate, though he cautioned that air power was hardly a silver bullet.<sup>31</sup> However, his warning did little to curb the enthusiasm of air-power zealots, such as one-time historian at the Smithsonian Institute, Richard Hallion, who claimed that the results of Operation DESERT STORM proved that U.S. air power had literally—and almost single-handedly—revolutionized warfare.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, according to some briefings circulating in the Pentagon at

the time, air power was not only America's asymmetric advantage, it was the future of warfare. Thus, for a time, the new American way of war seemed to involve only one service.

Shortly after the end of the conflict in Kosovo, Cohen summed up the salient impressions circulating among defense intellectuals about the new American way of war. With views similar to those of Weigley and Boot, Cohen saw the traditional U.S. approach to war as characterized by a certain aggressiveness or desire to take the fight to the enemy, by the quest for a decisive battle, by an explicit dislike of diplomatic interference, and by a low tolerance for anything but clear political objectives. In contrast, the new style of warfare reflected a decided aversion to casualties, typified by a greater preference for precision bombing and greater standoff, and it seemed willing to step away from the restrictive Powell doctrine and to participate more in coalitions, even those created only to address humanitarian concerns. The reduced risk of U.S. casualties, in turn, made such wars for less-than-vital interests more palatable. Cohen also expressed concern, however, that this new way of war increased military authority at the expense of civilian control by permitting the combatant commander, in this case General Wesley Clark, to become the focal point for strategic decisionmaking.<sup>33</sup>

Critics quickly responded that, in its most important aspects, this new style of war was already passé—operating in a world where its premises were “no longer valid.”<sup>34</sup> In light of the thousands of lives lost on September 11, 2001, Americans seemed willing to return to an aggressive style of warfare and to bear whatever costs were necessary, even in terms of significant U.S. casualties. Indeed, the U.S. military’s campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were to prove that the capability for waging the close fight, even if based more on precision than mass, remained indispensable for achieving favorable combat outcomes.<sup>35</sup> Those campaigns also demonstrated that civilian control over the military was alive and well when a strong civilian personality, like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, has the helm.

The major differences between the new American way of war as understood by defense intellectuals and that conceived by OSD lay in the latter’s emphasis on the characteristics of jointness and knowledge, which the former regarded as little more than rhetorical excess. Defense intellectuals preferred to see the new U.S. way

of war in terms of how it played itself out within the context of modern conflict, while OSD tended to project a list of desired (some would say ideal) capabilities into the future. This is not to say that OSD's model was entirely divorced from current events, for it later morphed to accommodate the Bush administration's emerging doctrine of strategic preemption.<sup>36</sup> OSD now asserts, for example, that future military operations overall will have to "shift from being reactive (i.e., retaliatory and punitive) to largely preventative."<sup>37</sup>

The chief similarity in the views of defense intellectuals and OSD resides in the lack of emphasis on the end game, specifically, on the need for systematic thinking about the processes and capabilities needed to translate military victory into strategic success. As retired U.S. Marine General Anthony Zinni remarked, the U.S. military is becoming more efficient at "killing and breaking," but that only wins battles, not wars.<sup>38</sup> OSD's model acknowledges the importance of "interagency constabulary forces," for instance, but it does so *not* with the intent to achieve a better result in the end game, but with the goal of freeing up "elite forces" for further combat operations.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, the new American way of war seems headed for the same trap that snared both the Weigley and Boot versions of the traditional one, that is—it appears geared to fight wars as if they were battles and, thus, confuses the winning of campaigns or small-scale actions with the winning of wars.

However, if the history of strategic thinking is any guide, this trajectory is not necessarily inevitable. After reaping the fruits of its so-called golden decade, and after years of self-examination in the wake of Vietnam, for instance, U.S. strategic thought generally acknowledged that, in the long run, the winning of battles counts for much less than the accomplishment of one's strategic objectives.<sup>40</sup> U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers' account of his conversation with a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) colonel has been cited often—and with good reason—to illustrate the point that winning battles does not suffice for winning wars. When Summers confronted his counterpart with the fact that the NVA had never defeated U.S. forces on the field of battle, the NVA colonel replied, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."<sup>41</sup> Summers' account, of course, maintains that American soldiers did their job, but U.S. political leadership failed to do its. In other words, the grammar was right, but the logic was

wrong. Almost in spite of itself, however, the account also reinforces the point that accomplishing one's strategic objectives serves as the ultimate measure of success in war.

A debate of sorts that took place from the 1950s to the 1970s over the practicality of using military force as a rational extension of policy actually foreshadowed this point.<sup>42</sup> Robert Osgood, perhaps America's leading theorist of limited war during this period, maintained that, even in an age laboring under the shadow of nuclear escalation, the use of military force as a rational extension of policy still had a place, providing one measured success "only in political terms and not purely in terms of crushing the enemy."<sup>43</sup> Osgood also warned that, to approach the use of force in this way, Americans would have to overcome some strong tendencies in their traditional way of war, the most important being the bifurcation in strategic thinking that separates the spheres of "power and policy."<sup>44</sup> Similarly, Thomas C. Schelling, a leading theorist of the nascent concept of coercive diplomacy, argued that one could apply military force not just to achieve the complete overthrow of an opponent as in World War II, but in more controlled and measured ways—to coerce, intimidate, or deter an adversary—and thereby to accomplish any number of aims short of total victory.<sup>45</sup> Both theorists thus contributed to shifting the general thinking about war toward strategic objectives, that is, away from a predominant focus on grammar and toward broader concepts of logic.

On the other side of the debate, decorated military commanders, such as Admiral J. C. Wylie, countered that war creates new political dynamics that change the diplomatic landscape and generally render prewar policy "invalid."<sup>46</sup> In a book entitled, *Military Strategy*, he underscored the difference between the terms "policy" and "politics," which confused many who attempted to use Clausewitz's model of political primacy, and contended that war may indeed be an extension of politics—meaning the perpetual struggle for power—but it was not really the "continuation of policy."<sup>47</sup> In actuality, the very fact that war has broken out usually means that one policy has collapsed, and another must take its place. Failure to adjust policy according to the changing circumstances of conflict, Wylie maintained, can lead to defeat as well as other negative consequences.

Although a practical military man, Wylie actually succeeded in developing a general theory of military strategy that centered not on the pursuit of decisive victory, but on the idea of employing military force in ways that would exert “control” over what he termed the “centers of gravity” (critical aspects) of any particular conflict, and thereby compel an opponent to comply with one’s strategic objectives.<sup>48</sup> American strategic theory had thus begun to move beyond battles, *per se*, to explore other ways of using force to serve policy effectively. Thus, both civilian and military theorists, though divided on some issues, came to similar conclusions about the imperative to measure success in war not by the winning or losing of battles alone, but by the accomplishment of one’s strategic objectives. In other words, the central idea was not how well the grammar was adhered to, but how well the logic was served.

Unfortunately, the outcome of the Vietnam conflict obscured such thinking. Overall, the U.S. military tended to dismiss the theories of academics, in particular those of Osgood and Schelling, and to resent policymakers who attempted to apply them.<sup>49</sup> Such academic thinking seemed to ignore the grammar of war altogether and to approach warfare as a sterile, one-sided activity in which the enemy had no vote. Summers’ study concluded by insisting that military men must “once again become masters of the profession of arms.”<sup>50</sup> The grammar, in other words, must re-assert itself as the function that owns the conduct of war.

## **Whose American Way of War?**

Interestingly, while the debate appeared caustic at times, soldiers, policymakers, and academics actually agreed on more than they realized. All maintained, for instance, that military victory on at least some scale was a prerequisite for strategic success. They also saw war in general, and the military tool in particular, as an imperfect means for achieving that success, though the military blamed the lack of attention to the grammar of war for any failures, while policymakers and academics saw the rigid and narrowly focused military mind as the problem. Unfortunately, it was never clear who had responsibility for crafting and nurturing the American way

of war—those who directed it toward some political end, or those who developed the operational doctrine and did the fighting. The American tradition of preserving civilian authority over military command seemed only to exacerbate the problem by encouraging power and diplomacy to occupy separate spheres.

Notwithstanding Summers' plea that the military take back the profession of arms, the U.S. military's senior service colleges currently instruct students in a model of strategy that comes closer to the ideas of Osgood, Schelling, and Wylie, than to those of Summers. For example, students are taught to derive military objectives from strategic ones. They are also taught to identify the center of gravity—a military force, an alliance, national will or public support, a set of critical capabilities or functions—that they must capture, neutralize, or otherwise deal with in order to ensure accomplishment of strategic objectives.<sup>51</sup> One can debate the accuracy of the doctrinal definition of center of gravity, but the central point is that military operations are presented as means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves.

Despite the theoretical foundation provided by Osgood and Wylie and the efforts of senior-level professional military education, such thinking has evidently not yet taken root in the American way of war. The recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, are examples of remarkable military victories. However, those victories have not yet culminated in strategic successes.<sup>52</sup> As one scholar pointed out, the center of gravity in conflicts in which the strategic aim is regime change “lies not in the destruction of the old system, but in the creation of the new one.”<sup>53</sup> The new American way of war appears to have misidentified the center of gravity in each of these campaigns, placing more emphasis on destroying enemy forces than securing population centers and critical infrastructure and maintaining order.

One explanation for this apparent failure is that planning for post-conflict operations was inadequate because the enemy in each case collapsed faster than expected and, hence, planners did not have sufficient time for planning.<sup>54</sup> In the major conflicts of the past, such as World War II, planners had time to conduct post-conflict planning while the campaigns were still underway. With modern U.S. forces

executing operations more rapidly, however, this luxury of time no longer exists. The obvious solution is to begin planning for post-conflict operations at the same time that planning commences for combat operations.

Yet, this explanation overlooks the fact that post-conflict planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, albeit imperfect, was already well underway before combat operations began.<sup>55</sup> While the specifics of the resultant post-conflict scenario could not be known, the basic outlines were; political and military leaders might have disagreed on the details, but all expected a rapid collapse of organized Iraqi resistance. Moreover, post-conflict operations were not new to the American way of war, as a study published by the Army War College pointed out; the study even went so far as to list many of the tasks that would have to be accomplished in the aftermath of decisive operations in Iraq.<sup>56</sup> The extent of the undertaking was thus no surprise. However, its critical nature and inherent difficulty were either misunderstood or, worse, wished away.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was, in a manner of speaking, a case in which the logic of war was flawed or, more precisely, the administration could not resolve the conflict between two competing trains of logic. The first train of logic was the overall goal of effecting regime change in Iraq, which, as history shows, requires a labor-intensive and time-intensive effort.<sup>57</sup> This train of logic ran counter to a second one, namely, the desire to win the war quickly and on the cheap. The administration, in fact, downplayed the possibility that the overall financial cost of the war would be high, even going so far as to fire White House chief economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay, who stated publicly that the conflict could cost between \$100 and 200 billion.<sup>58</sup> It low-balled the total number of U.S. troops and other personnel that might have to be put in harm's way to get the job done, and how long they might have to remain deployed. The administration evidently hoped to address any fiscal and military shortfalls with support from the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly for the stabilization and reconstruction phases of the conflict, though how much assistance might be forthcoming was unclear.

In addition, the new American way of war—which in practice amounted to small, mobile attack forces augmented by special

operations forces and liberal, if precise, doses of air power—seemed, at least to those who wished to think so, to offer the possibility of winning the war quickly and relatively inexpensively.<sup>59</sup> However, while this emerging way of war looked to employ new concepts, such as shock and awe and effects-based operations, designed to win battles quickly, it had no new concept for accomplishing the time-intensive and labor-intensive tasks of regime change more quickly and with less labor.

For their part, senior military officials argued that, while a small coalition force moving rapidly and supported by adequate firepower might well defeat the Iraqi army, a larger force would still be necessary for the ensuing stability operations. Yet, just as they had with the services' initial objections to some of the underlying assumptions of Defense Transformation in general, OSD and other administration officials dismissed such arguments as "old-think" or perceived them as foot-dragging by a military perhaps grown too accustomed to resisting civilian authority. They countered with the claim that coalition troops would be welcomed as liberators, and thus fewer forces would actually be needed to win the peace than to win the war.<sup>60</sup> It did not help matters that, over the preceding years, the U.S. military had been portrayed repeatedly in defense circles as the proverbial "900-pound gorilla" that refused to change; its professional credibility had suffered as a result. Put differently, while military professionals were to prove correct about requirements for the post-conflict situation in Iraq, they were not able to convince enough policymakers beforehand to make a difference.

OSD took unqualified possession of the emerging American way of war, and began supplanting the traditional grammar of war with a new one. However, the hoped-for support from the UN and NATO failed to materialize, and the coalition force that invaded Iraq proved insufficient to provide the stabilization necessary for political and economic reconstruction to begin. The successful accomplishment of the administration's goal of building a democratic government in Iraq is, thus, still in question, with religious extremists, terrorists, criminals, Saddam loyalists and other anti-U.S. factions contributing to an apparently growing insurgency.<sup>61</sup> Admittedly, logistical challenges in the initial stages of the conflict prevented putting as

many boots on the ground as coalition commanders desired. Still, the prevailing assumption—that those troops either would not be needed or would come from multinational organizations like the UN or NATO—proved wrong, as the administration itself essentially admitted later when it appealed to the international community for both financial and military support. Hence, OSD’s new and—still very theoretical—grammar proved incapable of compensating for the underlying flaw in the war’s logic. That fact notwithstanding, by making appropriate adjustments now, especially by recognizing the kind of war it is in and by committing to see it through, the United States might still accomplish its strategic objectives.

Much like its predecessor, the current American way of war focuses principally on defeating the enemy in battle. Its underlying concepts—a polyglot of information-centric theories such as network-centric warfare, rapid decisive operations, and shock and awe—center on “taking down” an opponent quickly, rather than finding ways to apply military force in the pursuit of broader political aims. Moreover, the characteristics of the U.S. style of warfare—speed, jointness, knowledge, and precision—are better suited for strike operations than for translating such operations into strategic successes. Defense Transformation concentrates primarily on developing concepts and capabilities for getting to the fight and for conducting combat operations once there.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, the capabilities-based approach to defense planning, which underpins Defense Transformation, focuses chiefly on the hardware needed to move, shoot, and communicate across a global battlefield; in other words, capabilities-based planning is about winning battles—not wars—in the information age.<sup>63</sup>

## **Toward a Way of War.**

To move toward a genuine way of war, American military and political leaders must address two key problems. First, they must better define the respective roles and responsibilities of the logic and grammar of war, and, in the process, take steps that will diminish the bifurcation in American strategic thinking—what Osgood called the disassociation of power and policy.<sup>64</sup> Professional military education in the United States teaches the Clausewitzian approach, in which

war is seen as pervaded by politics.<sup>65</sup> However, in the field, the U.S. military prefers Moltke's method, in which war is seen as governed by a grammar that is all but inviolable.<sup>66</sup> Ironically, it is Moltke's approach—not Clausewitz's—that contributes most to preserving civilian authority over the military because it prevents the military from assuming a dominant role in political decisionmaking, and restricts its purview to the actual conduct of war. However, it also inhibits thinking about war holistically and thus hampers the translation of military victory into strategic success. Thus, a tension exists between preserving civilian control, on the one hand, and closing the gap between power and policy, on the other.

For some historians and political scientists, the inefficiency created by the separation of power and policy is an acceptable price to pay for the preservation of civilian control over the military. Some maintain that the standard for civilian control must, in fact, be as absolute as possible in order to prevent its gradual erosion over time.<sup>67</sup> Included in this absolute standard is the right for civilians to be “wrong.”<sup>68</sup> Similarly, others contend that, in order to keep the conflict on course and to preserve civilian control, the logic of war must aggressively and continually question and challenge the grammar, even to the extent of frequently intervening in technical matters.<sup>69</sup> While such an absolute standard will surely preserve civilian control, it might also call into question the need for a military profession, since amateurs or part-time soldiers would suffice if the body of knowledge dealing with the grammar of war is so suspect that political leaders must frequently intrude in order to ensure that the conflict remains on course.<sup>70</sup> Thus, solving this problem will require reexamining some fundamental assumptions regarding U.S. civil-military relations along with current notions of military professionalism to ensure they are not in conflict.<sup>71</sup>

The second problem is an off-shoot of the first: political and military leaders must habituate themselves to thinking more thoroughly about how to turn combat successes into favorable strategic outcomes. Such thinking is not new—with some foundational literature on the topic going back to the early 1970s, for instance—but it is clearly not yet a matter of habit.<sup>72</sup> Current U.S. military doctrine also addresses the topic, defining the process of translating military victory into strategic success in two parts: conflict termination, or

the formal end of fighting; and conflict resolution, which involves resolving the causes of the conflict.<sup>73</sup> However, the new American way of war considers such post-conflict operations not as a part of war itself, but something belonging to its aftermath. This unhelpful distinction obscures the fact that the principal condition for strategic success in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was the establishment of a political (and to a certain extent an economic) order favorable to the United States.<sup>74</sup> Failure to see the purpose for which a war is fought *as part of war itself* amounts to treating battle as an end rather than a means. Decisive strategic victory may be back in vogue, as Colin Gray argues, but it will only occur when the powers pursuing it are prepared to go beyond military success.<sup>75</sup>

Clearly, thinking about how to achieve the strategic aims of a conflict will require devoting more attention to the processes and resources needed for what analyst Anthony Cordesman called “armed nation building.”<sup>76</sup> One recent informative study along these lines recommends, among other things, creating a force specifically trained and equipped to conduct nation building and stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations.<sup>77</sup> One can debate the merits of this proposal, particularly in terms of cost, but, at present, the Department of Defense has no real metric or analytical standards for determining requirements for such operations.<sup>78</sup> By comparison, it has several ways of measuring the forces required for combat operations. There is no getting around the fact that, if the global war on terrorism and other strategic endeavors require the United States to intervene more frequently in failed and failing states, it will need more practical capability in nation building and stability and support operations to achieve its strategic aims.

Identifying a problem may well be the hardest part of solving it, but recognition is still a long way from implementing practical solutions. Until the United States clarifies the roles of grammar and logic and develops a habit of thinking about war that goes beyond battles, we will have a way of war in name only.

## ENDNOTES

1. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 475.
3. For a similar definition, see F.G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War*, Westport: Praeger, 1996, p. 1, which defines way of war as the “military’s orientation and preferred operational style.”
4. Helmuth von Moltke, “Über Strategie, 1871,” in Großer Generalstab, ed., *Moltkes Militärisches Werke*, 14 Vols., Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1892-1912, here Vol. IV, Part 2, pp. 287-293. It is worth noting that by treating policy as a discrete, almost living, thing as he does in this essay, Moltke avoids overstepping his bounds as Chief of the General Staff and insulting those German statesmen, including Chancellor Bismarck and Emperor William I, responsible for shaping policy. For an English translation, see Daniel Hughes, *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993.
5. See Antulio J. Echevarria II, *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War*, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000, which compares the ideas of German, French, British, Russian, and American military writers from 1871 to 1914.
6. Perhaps the most significant counterexample is U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, who repeatedly “interfered” with the conduct of the Civil War in order to ensure his objectives were met. See Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, New York: Free Press, 2002.
7. Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Germany, and Britain between the World Wars*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
8. Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*, New York: Doubleday, 2001, pp. 20-22. This work expands his earlier study, *The Western Way of War: The Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, New York: Knopf, 1989, by examining the West’s performance in the battles of Salamis, 480 BC; Gaugamela, 331 BC; Cannae, 216 BC; Poitiers, 732 AD; Tenochtitlán, 1520-21; Lepanto, 1571; Rorke’s Drift, 1879; Midway, 1942; and Tet, 1968. Geoffrey Parker, *Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, argues that Western dominance stems from its attitude toward and exploitation of technology, as evidenced by the fact that Western culture experienced and made the most of an industrial revolution, whereas other cultures did not.

9. Antulio J. Echevarria II, "On the Brink of the Abyss: The Warrior Identity before the Great War," *War & Society*, Vol 13, No. 2, October 1995, pp. 23-40.

10. Hanson, *Carnage and Culture*, p. 22.

11. The motto is: *Mehr sein als scheinen*, which roughly translated means to be greater than one seems. It appeared in German literature at the end of the 18th century and was initially ascribed to Prussia, a small state surrounded by powerful neighbors. It was later made popular in the German general staff by the elder Moltke.

12. Weigley, *American Way of War*, p. xxii. Weigley borrows from the original definitions of the German historian Hans Delbrück as they were explained by Gordon Craig in "Delbrück: The Military Historian," in Edward Meade Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, New York: Atheneum, 1966, pp. 272-275. Strictly speaking, one can use either a strategy of annihilation or of attrition to achieve the complete overthrow of an opponent or to attain lesser objectives; they are merely *ways* in the ends-ways-and-means equation. For example, one could argue that the Allies fought World War II with an overall strategy of attrition—aimed at the complete overthrow of the Axis powers—that employed a series of campaign strategies centered on achieving decisive battles or battles of annihilation, such as those fought at Midway, Stalingrad, and El Alamein. Abraham Rothberg, *Counterattack: Eyewitness History of World War II, Stalingrad, Midway, El Alamein and the Turning of the Tide*, New York: Bantam, 1966. The primary difference between a strategy of annihilation and one of attrition or erosion lies not in the ends, but the ways; the former strategy typically attempts to achieve victory rapidly, through one or two decisive battles, while the latter generally takes a more gradual approach. A strategy of exhaustion, in contrast, is not really a sub-strategy of attrition, but a discrete strategy in its own right where the primary object is to wear down a foe—usually an aggressor—psychologically (and to a certain extent materially) in an effort to convince him that his goals are not worth the time, energy, blood, and treasure they will likely cost him. Accordingly, a strategy of exhaustion works best as a defensive strategy against an adversary who is not willing to risk everything. The strategy of attrition that Weigley attributes to George Washington during the War for Independence was really a strategy of exhaustion in which he hoped to drain British patience and persuade the crown to abandon the war by depriving its military of an opportunity for a decisive victory. While Weigley admits that the term "attrition" does not accurately describe Washington's strategy and offers the term "erosion" in its place, erosion differs in substance from attrition. Weigley, *American Way of War*, Chap. 1. Nor, is the strategy of the indirect approach, popularized by military theorist Liddell Hart, a sub-strategy of attrition; it seeks to strike in an unexpected, or asymmetric, manner in pursuit of either decisive victory or a negotiated settlement. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, *The Strategy of the Indirect Approach*, London: Faber & Faber, 1941. Winston Churchill's idea of attacking the

Axis powers through the “soft underbelly” of Europe is an example of a strategy of the indirect approach.

13. For an example of this error, see Mackubin T. Owens, “The American Way of War”, Editorial, *The Jerusalem Post*, December 2003; <http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/owens/03/wayofwar.html>. In contrast, General Richard B. Meyers, “The New American Way of War: Keeping the Legacy Alive,” speech delivered at the Navy League Air Space Exposition, Washington, DC, on April 16, 2003, gets it right. One can forgive Weigley’s errors regarding military terminology, which frequently changes, and not always for the best. The military art course books in use at the U.S. Military Academy in the 1970s and 1980s define a strategy of annihilation as seeking the “complete destruction of the enemy army,” while a strategy of attrition connotes that the enemy force is “slowly being destroyed,” and a strategy of exhaustion aims not at the enemy’s force, but “gradually to destroy his will and capacity to resist.” U.S. Military Academy, “Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art,” West Point, New York, 1979, p. 8. In contrast, a more recent edition inserts the term “combat power” into the definitions and does not even approach the strategies at the same level: it defines a strategy of annihilation as the “complete and immediate destruction of the enemy’s combat power,” while a strategy of attrition is the “gradual erosion of the combat power of the enemy’s army,” and a strategy of exhaustion seeks the “gradual erosion of the enemy nation’s will or means to resist.” U.S. Military Academy, “History of the Military Art Course Book 2001-2002,” p. 8. Adding to the confusion, the Department of Defense (DoD) dictionary and current Joint and Army doctrine manuals do *not* use the terms annihilation, attrition, or exhaustion in conjunction with the word strategy. The DoD dictionary defines attrition as the “reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel.” It does not define annihilation or erosion.

14. The best critique of Weigley’s thesis is Brian M. Linn, “*The American Way of War Revisited*,” *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 66, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 501-530. Linn criticizes Weigley for misusing the terms annihilation and attrition, for not discussing the American tradition of deterrence, for overstating the influence of annihilationist thought in U.S. military thinking since the Civil War, and for omitting the “propensity for improvisation and practicality” seemingly evident in the American practice of war. (Linn suggests that, if there is an American way of war, *per se*, it lies in a utilitarian blend of operational considerations, national strategy, and military theory as it is understood historically.) Weigley more or less conceded these points in Russell F. Weigley, “Response to Brian McAllister Linn,” *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 66, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 531-533. For other critical reviews, see E. M. Coffman, “A Review of *The American Way of War*,” *Journal of American History*, Vol. 60, March 1974, pp. 1090-1091; J. C. Snell, “A Review of *The American Way of War*,” *Annals of the American Academy*, No. 410, November 1973, pp. 224.

15. Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 2002.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. xv-xvi.

17. Dollar diplomacy stood for the early 20th-century policy of making loans to countries whose resulting indebtedness could then be used to promote U.S. interests.

18. Boot, *Savage Wars*, p. xvi.

19. In so doing, Boot opens himself up to the criticism that he produced a "potted history" designed merely to advance his own neo-conservative views. Benjamin Schwartz, "The Post-Powell Doctrine: Two conservative analysts argue that the American military has become too cautious about waging war," *New York Times Book Review*, July 21, 2002, pp. 11-12.

20. The Powell doctrine emerged in 1991-92, as a modification of the Weinberger doctrine, developed by Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger in 1984. The Weinberger doctrine consisted of six points: 1) commitment of U.S. forces to combat should only be done to protect vital interests, 2) the United States should enter such conflicts with the clear intention of winning, 3) commitment of U.S. forces to combat overseas demands clearly defined military and political objectives, 4) the commitment of U.S. forces must be continually reassessed and adjusted based on the changing conditions of the conflict, 5) commitment of U.S. forces is contingent on the support of the American public, 6) commitment of U.S. forces to combat should only occur as a last resort. Casper Weinberger, Speech delivered at the National Press Club, on November 28, 1984, reprinted in *Defense*, January 1985, pp. 1-11. Powell discusses the timing and rationale behind his doctrine in Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey: An Autobiography*, New York: Random House, 1995.

21. "Powell's Doctrine, in Powell's Words," *The Washington Post*, October 7, 2001, p. B-2, transcript of an interview with Tim Russert.

22. Boot, *Savage Wars*, pp. 318-319.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 352. Boot argues for the case-by-case approach. He has recently done an about-face, however, and embraced the Bush doctrine, which he defends in Max Boot, "The Bush Doctrine Lives: The Kay findings point to its importance, not its demise," *Weekly Standard*, February 16, 2004.

24. One could also argue that in a democracy built on the Lockean tradition of holding government accountable, as opposed to the Hegelian tradition in which government remains above accountability, some mechanism should exist to

prevent political leaders from abusing power, whether that power be military or something else and whether it be wielded domestically or abroad. For differences between the Lockean and Hegelian traditions, see Marvin Perry, *An Intellectual History of Modern Europe*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993, pp. 113-117, 190-197.

25. To be sure, strategic documents like the *National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy* might provide guidelines that prevent the military from freely interpreting its role. However, the point is that without clear guidance, the military will likely default to what it prefers to do. Philip Bobbitt, "How to Decide When the U.S. Should Go to War," *London Financial Times*, January 28, 2004, argues that the Bush doctrine is not a doctrine in the proper sense because it does not establish a "neutral, general principle" of action that would apply to any presidency and to more than one situation, as the Monroe doctrine did. In contrast, the so-called Bush doctrine only outlines what might happen if a particular situation occurs.

26. Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 82, No. 4, July/August 2003, pp. 41-58.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

28. Boot, *Savage Wars*, p. 352. For his description of the American empire, see Max Boot, "Everything You Think You Know About the American Way of War Is Wrong," Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 12, 2002, p. 5, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/americawar.20020912.boot.americanwayofwar.html>.

29. Summary of Lessons Learned, Prepared Testimony by SECDEF Donald H. Rumsfeld and GEN Tommy R. Franks, presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 9, 2003. See also the remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney, "A New American Way of War," to the Heritage Foundation, May 1, 2003, which ascribes many of the same characteristics to a new style of American warfare.

30. Admiral (Ret.) Cebrowski, Director of OFT, in fact, recently used terms—such as "lock out" and "self-synchronization"—drawn from Complexity theory along with Wardensque terms like "precision effects" to describe several of the characteristics of OFT's version of the new American way of war. Arthur Cebrowski, Speech to the Heritage Foundation, delivered May 13, 2003, reprinted in *Transformation Trends*, May 27, 2003. For Wardens' views on air-power, see John A. Warden III, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1988; David R. Mets, *The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists*, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1988; Daniel Gouré and Christopher M. Szara, eds., *Air and Space Power in the New Millennium*, Washington, DC: CSIS, 1997; Col. Phillip Meilinger, USAF, ed., *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1997.

31. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1, January/February 1994, pp. 109-124.

32. Richard P. Hallion, *Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War*, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1992; Richard P. Hallion, "Airpower and the Changing Nature of Warfare," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 1997-98, pp. 39-46; Daniel T. Kuehl, "Thunder and Storm: Strategic Air Operations in the Gulf War," in *The Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996; Lt. Col. John F. Jones, USAF, "Giulio Douhet Vindicated: Desert Storm 1991," *Naval War College Review*, No. 45, Autumn 1992, pp. 97-101; Col. Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, "Giulio Douhet and Modern War," *Comparative Strategy*, No. 12, July-September 1993, pp. 321-338.

33. Eliot A. Cohen, "Kosovo and the New American Way of War," in *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, ed. by Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 38-62. Studies by industry think tanks also reflect similar views with regard to trends in coalition partnering and precision-standoff capabilities. See Christopher J. Bowie, Robert Haffa Jr., and Robert E. Mullins, *Future War: What Trends in America's Post-Cold War Military Conflicts Tell Us About Early 21st Century Warfare*, Washington, DC: Northrup Grumman Analysis Center, 2003.

34. Stephen Biddle, "The New Way of War?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3, May/June 2002, pp. 138-144. Official views within the military also highlighted the importance of ground troops. See The Kosovo After Action Reviews of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and "A View from the Top," brief by Admiral James O. Ellis, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe; Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe; and Commander, Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL. Also, Admiral Bill Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*, New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2000, pp. 181-183, stated that expectations that precision bombing alone could bring about the defeat of Milosevic were "absolutely wrong" and resulted in a 78-day campaign that severely tested the NATO Alliance.

35. Robert A. Pape, "The True Worth of Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2, March/April 2004, pp. 116-130; Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," *Policy Review*, No. 120, August-September 2003, pp. 3-27; Stephen Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 2, March/April 2003, pp. 31-46; and his statement before the House Armed Services Committee, "Operation Iraq Freedom: Outside Perspectives," dated October 21, 2003.

36. The advantages and disadvantages of the Bush doctrine are evaluated in Larry Korb and Michael Kraig, "Winning the Peace in the 21st Century," A Task Force Report of the Strategies for U.S. National Security Program, The Stanley

Foundation, October 2003. Christopher S. Owens, "Unlikely Partners: Preemption and the American Way of War," in *Essays 2003*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2003, pp. 1-16.

37. Arthur K. Cebrowski and Thomas P. M. Barnett, "The American Way of War," *Transformation Trends*, January 13, 2003, p. 3.

38. General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, "How Do We Overhaul the Nation's Defense to Win the Next War?" Special transcript of a presentation delivered at the U.S. Naval Institute, September 4, 2003.

39. Cebrowski and Barnett, "American Way of War," p. 3.

40. Colin Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. 2. This is one of several works to refer to the period of about 1955-66 as the golden decade of American strategic thinking. See also, Weigley, *American Way of War*, pp. 474-475.

41. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995, p. 1.

42. The debate is described in Weigley, *American Way of War*, pp. 474-477.

43. Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 22. See also Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War Revisited*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979, which reevaluates limited war theory in light of the U.S. failure in Vietnam.

44. Other traits Osgood ascribed to the traditional American way of war include a cultural aversion to violence, pugnacity, a failure to appreciate power politics, a "long" antimilitarist tradition, and a lack of experience with combining military power and foreign policy. Osgood, *Limited War*, pp. 28-42.

45. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 16, 34. See also Weigley, *American Way of War*, pp. 474-475.

46. Admiral J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1989<1967>, pp. 67-69. Weigley also supports this view; see Russell Weigley, "The Political and Strategic Dimensions of Military Effectiveness," in *Military Effectiveness*, Vol. 3, *The Second World War*, ed. by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988, p. 341.

47. Wylie, *Military Strategy*, p. 68.

48. Note that Wylie specifically refers to the centers of gravity of the particular kind of war one is fighting, continental, maritime, air, guerilla, or a combination, not of the individual belligerents. Wylie, *Military Strategy*, pp. 77-78.

49. Harry Summers' Foreword, dated June 1, 1995, is representative. Summers, *On Strategy*, pp. xiii-xiv.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

51. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*: Joint Pub 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1, 1995, p. GL-4.

52. Strategic success, in fact, seems a long way off. Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House International Relations Committee, warned that the drug trade in Afghanistan not only undermines the country's stability and reconstruction, but contributes to terrorism; Hearing held February 10, 2004. See also General (Ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey, "Afghanistan's Newest Challenge: U.S. effort will fail unless link between terror, drugs overcome," *Armed Forces Journal*, January 2004, pp. 8-11. Ivo H. Daalder, "Fix What's Broken in Iraq," *The Boston Globe*, February 16, 2004, maintains that Iraqi's security problems are beyond the capabilities of its security forces.

53. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," p. 10.

54. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2003.

55. Planning and coordination were still inadequate, however. In each case, shortages existed in combat support and combat service support units, and difficulties repeatedly occurred in turning over certain functions and responsibilities to civilian agencies. In Iraq, in particular, no vetting programs for "de-Baathification," or for restructuring, re-equipping, or re-manning the Iraqi military had been worked out in advance. The role of the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Activities (ORHA) was unclear and, in any case, it appeared insufficiently resourced to accomplish its many Herculean tasks. While military planners within the Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) had focused primarily on Phase III, Decisive Combat Operations, ORHA concentrated on Phase IV, Stability Operations. Unfortunately, little coordination had occurred between the two. Conrad Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," January 8, 2004, briefing developed from a study of post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

56. Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-conflict Scenario*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003.

57. For historical summaries, see Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, pp. 6-12.

58. James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 293, No. 1, January/February 2004, p. 60, discusses Lindsay's firing. Of course, such tactics are not uncommon in a war of choice in which the justification is not entirely apparent. Patrick E. Tyler, "Panel Faults Bush on War Costs and Risks," *The New York Times*, March 12, 2003.

59. Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey stated as much in an address at the Brookings Institute, November 21, 2002.

60. For more on the debate between senior military officials and OSD, see James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," pp. 52-70.

61. Steven Metz, "Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Iraq," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2003-04, pp. 25-36; Patrick J. McDonnell, "Iraqi Insurgency Is As Lethal As Ever Since Hussein's Capture," *Los Angeles Times*, February 4, 2004, p. 1. Jim Krane, "U.S., Iraq Can't Put A Face On Insurgency," *Seattle Times*, February 16, 2004, reports that rebel attacks against Americans rose from 18 per day in January 2004 to 20-24 per day in February 2004.

62. Director, Force Transformation, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2003, contains absolutely no mention of the need for post-conflict thinking or capabilities. To be fair, however, OFT did have the broadness of mind to sponsor a study (discussed below) designed to look into the problem. Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," *Washington Post*, November 24, 2003, p. 16.

63. Neither the draft National Military Strategy dated February 4, 2004, nor the draft Defense Strategy dated January 30, 2004, addresses this shortcoming.

64. History shows, in fact, that rather than power and policy coming together in times of war, the nature of their individual functions often works to keep them apart, though that separation is generally less apparent in wars for total victory where military and political aims frequently tend to coincide.

65. This view, though popular in professional military education and in political-science literature, actually downplays the role that Clausewitz assigned to the grammar of war. Clausewitz's statement that war's "grammar may be its own, but not its logic" has led many scholars to conclude, wrongly, that he believed that political considerations must always outweigh military ones. However, this conclusion is somewhat misleading, shaped perhaps by the liberal-democratic values of those historians and political scientists who translated and interpreted

Clausewitz rather than by a thorough analysis of his work and of the political context in which he wrote. His caveats concerning political control over the use of force—such as that policy can influence operations for the worse if it attempts to use war for purposes foreign to its nature, and that military commanders are entitled to require that “policy shall not be inconsistent with [war’s] means”—are actually more limiting for policy than they might appear at first blush. LTC A. J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz and Political Control over the Use of Force: A Reconsideration,” paper presented to the Society for Military History, May 3, 2003.

66. It is also in accord with the classic work of Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.

67. This is the message in Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp. 9-60.

68. Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, 1996, p. 154.

69. Eliot A. Cohen, “The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force,” in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 429-458. Frank G. Hoffman, “Ghost Busting: Civil-Military Relations and the Ghosts of Vietnam,” forthcoming *Proceedings*, supports this view, but proposes more of a cooperative arrangement between soldier and statesman.

70. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, “Introduction,” in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., *The Future of the Army Profession*, New York: McGraw Hill, 2002, pp. 3-18, affirm that expertise and the knowledge underlying it are the hallmarks of a profession. The client (society) in turn validates the expertise and extends trust to the profession. However, the fact that political leaders must meddle in military operations suggests that this trust does not exist, or at least does not extend very far. This lack of trust, in turn, indicates that the body of knowledge upon which the profession is based is not considered valid enough to warrant a military profession; hence, an amateur military would suffice.

71. Don M. Snider, “America’s Postmodern Military,” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 47-54.

72. See, for example, Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

73. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: Joint Staff, September 10, 2001, p. III-24; see also William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters*, Vol. 33, No. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 95-112.

74. A point also reinforced by Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters*, Vol. 33, No. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 85-94. Schadlow advocates defining activities related to the political and economic reconstruction of a state as "governance operations," and, contrary to current doctrine, recommends that the military, specifically the U.S. Army, act as the lead in those operations until the strategic objectives are achieved.

75. Gray, *Decisive Victory*, pp. 1-2.

76. Anthony Cordesman, "What is Next in Iraq? Military Developments, Military Requirements and Armed Nation Building," Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2003, p. 5.

77. Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. It is worth pointing out that the study was commissioned by OFT.

78. The NDU study suggested sizing S&R forces to cope with one large S&R operation or two-medium-sized ones, which translates into two S&R division-equivalents (one active and one reserve) with joint assets; key capabilities would include military police, construction engineers, civil affairs, and combat troops. In at least one important respect, the study's recommendations fall short, however. It states that professional military education is not doing enough to shift U.S. military culture to accept the importance of S&R operations. Accordingly, it recommends that PME institutions "incorporate more courses and lectures on stabilization and reconstruction operations, civil-military cooperation, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations." While any curriculum has room for improvement, changing the culture of the U.S. military—assuming that PME is a valid way to do that—is only half of the problem. Just as the American way of war involves more than the predilections of military professionals, the benefits of a greater education regarding S&R operations must extend to the political leadership as well. Binnendijk and Johnson, *Stabilization and Reconstruction*, pp. 8, 9, 11-12, 91-93.