

**THE CINCs' STRATEGIES:  
THE COMBATANT COMMAND PROCESS**

**William W. Mendel  
and  
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.**

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The authors dedicate this study in memory of

**Colonel Corson L. Hilton III,**

an outstanding strategic thinker, U.S. Army Special  
Forces soldier, and mentor to military strategists.

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## FOREWORD

The essence of strategic art is the skill of the strategic leader in communicating a clear view of his strategic intent. A coherent military strategy document, which effectively coordinates military and interagency activities, is a key command and control instrument for our combatant commanders. In this monograph, the authors report their observations of the different ways combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) produce a strategy document, and suggest that new joint doctrine is needed to bring a degree of regularity and orderliness to the CINCs' strategic planning process.

Today our combatant commanders serve multiple roles as strategic leaders, practitioners, and theorists. It would seem evident that if the *strategic military leader* is going to be able to impart his vision for success within his domain and inspire subordinates to think and act in supporting and congruent ways, the leader's thoughts ought to be regularly recorded in a strategy document. Yet, in practice, the authors report that the exigencies of current operations can distract the *strategic practitioner* from developing and promulgating needed strategy documents. The lessons of experience and important thoughts of the *strategic theorist* can be lost if they are not captured in a formal document—the CINC's strategy, for example. The strength of these lessons can dissipate when strategy guidance is spread across numerous speeches, articles and briefings instead of becoming a central focus for the command strategy process.

*The CINCs' Strategies: The Combatant Command Process* provides a brief look at the CINCs' strategy objectives and concepts in order to place the planning process in context. The focus of the study, however, is on the process itself as it exists and could be further developed. With our National Security and National Military Strategies so clearly directed toward shaping the international environment, effectively responding to crises, and preparing for major theater warfare and smaller-scale operations, the unified actions of our joint forces can be

greatly enhanced by joint doctrine which guides military planning for the strategic level of war. This monograph is an effort in this direction.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

WILLIAM W. MENDEL is a senior analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Before his retirement from active duty as a U.S. Army Colonel, he served as a tenured faculty instructor at the U.S. Army War College where he held the Maxwell D. Taylor Chair of the Profession of Arms. His military duties included infantry and general staff assignments in the United States, Korea, Vietnam, and Germany. He is coauthor of three Strategic Studies Institute reports, *Campaign Planning* (1988), *Campaigning Planning and the Drug War* (1991), and *Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat* (1997), and *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations*, National Defense University Press, March 1995. He authored the articles "New Forces for Engagement Policy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1995-96, and "Operation Rio," *Military Review*, May-June 1997.

GRAHAM H. TURBIVILLE, JR., is a senior analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office. Before joining FMSO, he was Chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Soviet/Warsaw Pact Strategic Operations Branch, and served in a variety of other DIA assignments dealing with combined arms operations, strategic mobility, mobilization, and regional conflict. Dr. Turbiville's work has appeared in numerous military journals and books. He is the editor of *The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials From the Soviet General Staff Academy*, a multivolume series addressing a range of strategic, operational, and tactical issues, and is also the editor of the international journal, *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*.



## SUMMARY

As the United States approaches the 21st century, fundamental transformations of regional and global security environments are placing new importance on the strategic concepts and responses developed by the Combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). In assessing the strategy development process of the Combatant Commanders in detail, this study addresses both traditional planning considerations and highlights new factors and circumstances that shape CINC perspectives and approaches. Drawing upon interviews with CINCs' planning staffs, briefings, and national and command-level documents, the study reviews the formative guidance influencing strategy development; conducts command-by-command assessments of the process whereby each CINC develops and articulates his strategic vision; and concludes with a series of key judgements suggested by the CINCs' strategy development process.

Dominating CINCs' assessments are two variables—strategic guidance from senior echelons and evaluations of the threat environment. National-level strategy and planning documents aid directly in the development process by providing basic conceptual guidance for producing assessments and strategies. Understanding the dangers to U.S. interests within a CINC's domain is a central factor influencing the CINC's appreciation of his strategic situation. In every region, security challenges are complex, diverse, often nontraditional, and frequently interconnected. These challenges range from the conduct of major regional contingencies, dealing with internal threats to friendly regimes, addressing a host of transnational dangers, supporting large-scale disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have strong interagency and international dimensions that evolve in an environment characterized by change, uncertainty, and surprise.

National-level guidance and assessments of complex security challenges are points of departure for the central part of the study which considers how geographic CINCs—U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)—together with selected functional CINCs—U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)—develop their respective strategies.

Principal among the questions considered in the course of this command-by-command review are the following:

- Do all combatant commands have a current strategy?
- Where do the CINCs look for strategic guidance?
- What is the doctrinal guidance?
- Why are the CINCs' strategy documents important?
- What is the planning process?
- Is there a common theme to the CINCs' strategies?
- Have the CINCs' strategies accommodated to new threats and security concerns?
- Do strategies effectively link ends, ways, and means?
- Who participates in writing a strategy and who approves it?

At each combatant command headquarters, these and other questions were addressed by enthusiastic and knowledgeable joint planners, skilled in the art of military strategy. Yet, the review suggested that joint doctrine on this subject is incomplete, and that authoritative guidance encouraging a coherent system of combatant command strategies is needed. This view of the CINCs' processes identifies an approach that is incompletely defined and structured, reflecting the pretermission of the U.S. joint

doctrine community. It argues for the promulgation of joint procedures and doctrine to guide strategy development, and measures for at least some form of review and coordination of final products.

The study argues also for the inclusion of common tenets that are considered in the development of a CINC's strategy. Until direction concerning the process for writing these strategies is institutionalized, the issue will remain the source of debate and confusion. CINCs should be held to some standard for current and coherent strategies affecting their combatant commands.

This is critically important for five principal reasons. First, a strategy provides the CINC's vision and guidance for a myriad of activities that protect U.S. interests within geographic or functional areas of responsibility. Commanders of subordinate theaters of operations or subregions can benefit from the unifying action of a theater strategy. Second, because of the way our nation has organized its joint forces to fight under the command authority of the geographic CINCs, a strategy is needed to integrate the many U.S. and multilateral regional activities involved. CINCs, for example, must account for U.S. policy and interests, alliances, economic and political issues, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), new technologies, and information warfare, among other considerations.

Third, a strategy is useful in pulling together the U.S. interagency cooperation and support that a CINC often will need for mission success. Knowing where the command is headed for the long haul, how peacetime activities are meant to support warfighting plans, and what government and nongovernment agencies can buttress the CINC's strategic concepts can assist combatant staffs and subordinate commands as they develop campaign plans. Fourth, CINCs' strategies are critically necessary as a basis for cooperation among the combatant commands. The doctrinal imperatives of "supporting to supported" relationships, which planning for the major regional contingencies demands, suggest this in particular, as does the requirement to address emerging transnational

dangers and nontraditional threats that defy classical notions of territorial boundaries—or Areas of Responsibility (AOR).

Finally, a complete set of the CINCs' strategies—developed on the basis of common criteria—is important to the Joint Staff and service staffs. This would provide staffs with the means of accessing the current strategic concepts of combatant commanders and ensure that the staffs fully understood the range of CINC support requirements. If a complete strategy includes the ends, ways and means of strategic vision and intent, then the CINCs occupy the primary echelon of what can properly be called military strategy. This analysis, based on primary research through 1996, provides a view of how the CINCs go about writing a strategy and offers suggestions about the process.

# CHAPTER I

## PLANNING FOR A NEW THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Unless you have a crystal ball, there is no real need for a theater strategy.

Chief, Plans Division, J5  
U.S. Unified Command  
January 1995

### INTRODUCTION

Why do the Combatant Commanders need a strategy, and where do they find the guidance for such a document? Is there a prescribed process, and who approves these strategies?

This study asserts that a formal, written strategy is critically important for setting the primary themes of unified action within a Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) mission area. The study describes the methods used by the unified commands to develop strategy documents and places particular emphasis on the planning processes employed by combatant commands. Overall, this monograph provides an appraisal of the strategy development process that readers can use to make their own judgements about the status of U.S. planning for unified action of the armed forces some 10 years after Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.<sup>1</sup>

To provide an adequate sample of strategic planning activities, the authors conducted research with the field grade officers who write the strategies in seven combatant commands. General or Flag officers also were interviewed, on occasion, to improve understanding of the strategy process. The authors' intent was to record the experiences of the strategic planners who were most directly involved in


writing the CINCs' strategies—to the extent that these strategies existed. The central focus of the story was the process used to develop a CINC's strategy, the key players who participated in the process, and what the product looked like.

## **Adjusting to a Changing World.**

The CINCs' strategy documents promise to be even more important command and control instruments now that we have moved into a post-Cold War period of transformation in regional security environments. Regional wars and other dangers such as nuclear proliferation—exacerbated in the wake of the USSR's dissolution—are subject to closer analysis now, as are an array of newly perceived transnational and nontraditional dangers.

As defined by the National Command Authorities, the post-Soviet security environment has significantly affected military strategies for protecting U.S. interests around the world. The CINCs have moved quickly from the global warfighting scenario to orient their planning efforts regionally. Joint planners now have only three resourced and fully maintained numbered warplans; these are plans for two regional contingencies (Korea and Iraq), plus a supporting nuclear employment plan (SIOP).<sup>2</sup>

The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) double-tasks the CINCs: to “thwart aggression” through their deterrence and warfighting capabilities, and concurrently to “promote stability” in their domains through constructive interaction and regional cooperation.<sup>3</sup> The scope of these two mission areas demands that a CINC provide a theater framework for establishing strategic priorities and objectives, integrating multiple capabilities, and synchronizing peacetime engagement with warfighting preparedness activities. That framework is the CINC's strategy document. It provides the central themes within the CINCs' Areas of Responsibility (AOR—see Figure I-1) by which the unified command staff and components conduct



**Figure I-1.**  
**CINCs' Geographic Areas of Responsibility.**

Source: Unified Command Plan, 17 January 1996 (Map modified 6 January 1997).

engagement activities to encourage regional stability, or to pave the way for “fighting to win.”

**Fighting to Win.**

The unified commands must be prepared to fight or support two theater wars at about the same time, and maintain an ability to deter and defeat attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>4</sup> The two “major regional contingency” (MRC) requirement was confirmed in 1993 during a sweeping budgetary analysis called the “Bottom-Up Review” and again addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997.<sup>5</sup> The rationale for maintaining a two war capability well into the future was provided by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin:

First, we need to avoid a situation in which the United States in effect makes simultaneous wars more likely by leaving an opening for potential aggressors to attack their neighbors, should our engagement in a war in one region leave little or no force available to respond effectively to defend our interests in another.

Second, fielding forces sufficient to win two wars nearly simultaneously provides a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary . . . might one day confront us with a larger-than-expected threat.<sup>6</sup>

In this regard, geographic CINCs will have to maintain a power projection capability to deploy forces within their respective theaters as well as augment or establish U.S. presence in a different theater. At the same time their strategic concepts must address unconventional and nontraditional perils, to include the transnational dangers (terrorism, insurgency, arms and drug trafficking, environmental damage, and so on). Unrestrained by borders and international protocols, these new dangers threaten the classic nation-state as surely—if more subtly—as regional wars and WMD.<sup>7</sup>

### **Supporting Engagement in Peacetime.**

During President Clinton's first term, his *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* made it clear that the United States would not back away from dangers threatening regional stability, even as we deter and defend against conventional war:

Our nation can only address this era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs.<sup>8</sup>

This theme continues in Clinton's second administration in his *National Security Strategy for a New Century*. There he asserts that “We can only preserve our security and well being at home by being actively involved in the world. . . .” The President’s Strategy thrice lists six “strategic priorities” that directly affect the CINCs’ strategic objectives and concepts: foster a democratic, peaceful Europe; forge a strong and stable Europe; continue U.S. world leadership as a force for peace; support an open world trading system; increase cooperation in confronting transnational security threats; strengthen the military and diplomacy.<sup>9</sup>



## The CINC's Strategy—A Full Rucksack.

To champion this widely ranging list of strategic priorities the CINCs must carry a full rucksack. A formal listing of the CINCs' tasks are found in the classified Unified Command Plan, but generally they are responsible for these kinds of activities: preparing joint forces for nuclear and conventional combat; keeping their component commands engaged throughout the AOR to deter war and encourage regional stability; devising new ways to counter the proliferation of WMD in their AORs; and finding practical means to counter the transnational phenomena that place democratic countries at risk. In addition, the CINCs must be armed with a cogent rationale for demanding the military resources needed for theater operations. A coherent, coordinated CINC's strategy document is a critical command and control instrument. If this is so, then what should be expected of a CINC's strategy?

A first look suggests (*a priori*) that a CINC's strategy needs to be consolidated in some type of document available to the entire command. It needs to provide specific guidance and objectives for the entire AOR, and for activities in peacetime, crises, and war. It should be written to protect U.S. national interests in the CINC's domain, and provide for the expansion of U.S. influence. The strategy should outline strategic objectives and concepts for peacetime engagement, deterrence, regional conflicts, contingencies, security assistance, and support for civil authorities in countering transnational and other nontraditional threats.

By its strategic objectives, the strategy should provide a certain link with the President's *National Security Strategy*, the Secretary of Defense's regional U.S. security strategies, and the Chairman's *National Military Strategy*. And it should provide the rationale for resourcing the CINC's strategic objectives and concepts. There may be other things a CINC's strategy needs to do, and research with the CINCs' planners who write the strategies and related documents can provide this insight.

## **CINC's Appreciation.**

The CINC's appreciation (or assessment) of the strategic situation is a critical step in the process of developing a strategy. The CINC and his key planners must conceptually assemble many parts and considerations into a cogent strategy. It takes a certain intellectual competence and courage to assimilate many diverse factors to form a vision for the required military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of force to achieve strategic objectives—and to do that for the mid-term years ahead.

A myriad of variables must be received and processed through the filter of the strategist's experience, education and training, and his biases. For instance, national policy guidance, personalities of leaders, command relationships, the geography of a region, military resources, the proliferation of WMD, host nation support, security assistance, and peacetime combined exercises can be such disparate subjects that their integration within a strategy becomes more art than science. No computer can compete with the human skill required to assimilate the sweep of factors to be considered.

Dominating the strategy assessment process are two variables common to geographic and functional unified commands—strategic guidance from senior echelons and the threat environment. An appreciation of these two variables—beginning with strategic guidance—is instructive for understanding the CINC's strategy development process.

## **THE FORMATIVE GUIDANCE**

Most Joint Staff officers come in contact with the CINCs' strategies along the course of joint assignments, and they are well-prepared to contribute to the design of strategic concepts and command and control structures for a strategy. But where does one find the guidance for the process and content for a plan of strategy? This section discusses some antecedents of current military thought,

identifies the official, top-down strategic guidance, describes the joint doctrine recently available, and suggests informal guidelines for writing the CINCs' strategy documents.

### **Theory: The Growing Interest in Military Strategy.**

American military theory has drawn from an eclectic mix of thinking to inform U.S. strategy and doctrine. Such classical theorists as Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, Upton, Douhet, Mitchell, Liddell Hart and the like have contributed to U.S. strategic thinking.<sup>10</sup> And the military student has readily at hand a number of excellent anthologies of military theory and history. Witness Colonel Art Lykke's contemporary view of *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War*, and *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Peter Paret. These are writers and books of great ideas, even philosophy, which serve to prime the pump of the military thinker, but most do not contribute guidelines for writing a CINC's strategy in the contemporary strategic environment. Fortunately, a string of historical military events over the past 30 years have provided insight.

Lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War made clear the relationship of strategy to operational art on the battlefield. The war was a vivid illustration of Clausewitz' assertion ". . . that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means."<sup>11</sup> The 1973 War experience became one basis by which the U.S. military recaptured some fundamentals of military thinking, and then applied them to the European theater in the closing years of the Cold War.

In 1976 a new translation of Carl von Clausewitz' *On War* became readily available to military readers in the command and staff and war colleges. It served Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. as a framework for analysis in his 1981 study, *On Strategy*, concerning U.S. policy during the Vietnam war.<sup>12</sup> Summers' work rekindled interest in the fundamentals of strategy and thinking about war as a

continuation of policy.<sup>13</sup> The convergence of influences described above, along with recently unveiled Russian military theory found in the writings of Major General Aleksandr A. Svechin and in the *Voroshilov Lectures* of the Soviet General Staff Academy have underscored the importance of military strategy as the conceptual construct for the preparation for war and the conduct of war.<sup>14</sup>

The process of revitalizing doctrine in the post-Vietnam period has been put at risk by recent shifts in the strategic environment. Momentous events in Central Eurasia and East Europe, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, have undermined the political-military stasis that existed in Eurasia from the 1950s. The dismantling of the Berlin Wall (November 1989) symbolized the need for new thinking about strategies that once were appropriate for warfighting in Central Europe, but now face a multidimensional array of regional dangers to U.S. interests.

The regional approach to strategic planning renewed during the Bush administration was “. . . the first change in national strategy in over forty years and a commitment to restructuring the armed forces. . . .”<sup>15</sup> It signaled to the CINCs a new sense of confidence in their ability to responsibly provide the military strategic vision and direction for a major region of the world (or a key functional area).

Then as the Gulf War began to unfold, President Bush announced the new defense strategy in a speech at Aspen Institute in Colorado: it would orient on regional contingencies and provide for a peacetime presence (visibility of U.S. forces) instead of permanently forward deployed and stationed forces. In any event, the Gulf War reconfirmed the validity of the idea that preparation for war and conduct of war are the two necessary interrelated parts of an overarching strategy for a CINC.

Without the years of preparation (prepositioning of matériel, access to ports, combined exercises encouraging interoperability, and cross-cultural interaction) under the policy of peacetime engagement in the region, U.S.

CINCCENT's wartime operations would have been decidedly more difficult. The Gulf War experience seems to confirm Aleksandr Svechin's counsel (and Clausewitz's idea) of two categories, preparation for war and war proper, as a useful, if generalized, construct for a CINC's strategy.<sup>16</sup> This is practical insight from the theorists for the strategic planner, yet it merely provides the frame for the CINCs' strategies. Is there more guidance to be found?

While sizing-up the lessons from contemporary events of military history, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began the process of incorporating military lessons learned into a revitalized series of joint manuals. This renaissance in strategic thinking and joint doctrine writing was hastened along by a vote of Congress—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

As a result of Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff became singularly responsible for developing joint doctrine. In 1987 a Joint Doctrine Division was formed within the Joint Staff, and by 1988 a Joint Doctrine Master Plan (JCS Pub 1-01) was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>17</sup> It was intended to identify critical warfighting doctrine voids.<sup>18</sup> Now with the hindsight from the Vietnam War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Gulf War and a number of military operations other than war (Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti), the Chairman has promulgated two capstone, six keystone, and over a hundred other Joint Publications (Joint Pubs). Just what do they say about the CINCs' strategies? Quite surprisingly, they do not offer much help to the strategic planner for writing the CINC's strategy.

### **Doctrine: The Capstone Principles.**

*Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Joint Pub 1) provides the Chairman's guidelines to the joint forces. It addresses military values and analyzes the fundamentals of joint warfighting. The pub concludes with a chapter on the joint campaign. Forgetting about the utility of strategies altogether, the pub advises that "Campaigns of

the Armed Forces of the United States are joint; they serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare.”<sup>19</sup> Neither the *National Military Strategy* nor the CINCs strategies play a role in the construct of this manual.

Of much greater impact than Pub 1 is Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action of the Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. It is the bible of the unified forces, providing doctrine for directing joint forces, establishing joint commands, and describing command authority and relationships. This is the publication that provides the general functions of a combatant commander. Though it identifies a CINC's responsibilities as “Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out the missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics . . .” it does not address the CINCs' strategies.<sup>20</sup>

### **Keystone Concepts for Joint Doctrine.**

*Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0, is the most important manual of the lot. It discusses the CINCs' strategic environment, principles and planning guidelines for joint operations, and considerations for multinational operations. While its section on low intensity conflict (called therein military operations other than war–MOOTW) relies on threadbare concepts of counterinsurgency, it has excellent sections providing guidance for traditional (Gulf War style) joint operations.<sup>21</sup> It offers some hint that CINCs' strategies are part of the planning process. For example, it states that “Based on the direction from the NCA, combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and [operation] plans to accomplish the missions assigned by higher authority.” It later states that, “Supported by the strategic estimate(s), combatant commanders develop strategies consistent with national policy and plans.”<sup>22</sup>

Pub 5, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, acknowledges the CINCs' strategies. It advises that:

The combatant commanders plan at the strategic level of war through participation in the development of national military strategy, the development of theater estimates, and theater strategies. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both U.S. national strategy and operational activities within the theater.<sup>23</sup>

Pub 5 goes on to explain that combatant commanders are responsible for producing joint operation plans, conducting strategic estimates, participating in the development of the *National Military Strategy*, developing campaign plans for large-scale military operations, and “formulating theater or functional strategies in conformance with national strategic plans.”<sup>24</sup>

### **Additional Key Doctrine.**

Echoes of the above doctrine can be found in subordinate level joint manuals such as *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Joint Pub 3-07), *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Joint Pub 3-08), and *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (Joint Pub 3-16). Among these lower echelon manuals, good insight for the CINC concerning a regional strategy is found in *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Joint Pub 3-05), which advises:

The theater CINC refines broad national or alliance strategic guidance into theater military strategy. That strategy identifies broad concepts and courses of action for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and apportioned U.S. forces . . . and the forces of allied nations, to achieve national and alliance strategic objectives.<sup>25</sup>

Still, this overlooks the functional CINCs (e.g., Transportation Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic Command) and it says little about the specifics of a CINC's strategy, such as how to write it, a recommended format, who to include in the process, and so on. A search of some 16 joint publications using the Joint Electronic Library on CD-ROM will reveal 89 instances where the term “theater strategy” is used, but without much definition. The

service manuals add little to the information about CINCs strategies, focusing primarily within the domain of service forces at the operational and tactical levels of war.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (PL 99-433) set the stage for integrating national military strategy and the CINCs' strategic planning by establishing the requirement for a *National Security Strategy* (NSS). Planners in all the combatant commands now depend on a series of national-level documents that begin with the NSS, and serve as the formative base for their strategies and plans.

### **Top-down Strategic Guidance.**

Washington-level policy and strategy documents establish basic conceptual guidance that assists the CINCs in developing assessments and strategies. This comes to the CINCs via the NSS, *National Military Strategy* (NMS), the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), and other documents such as the Department of Defense regional strategy reports.<sup>26</sup> These are available to provide general direction in the form of policy goals and concepts. In addition, specific national level strategic plans (e.g., nuclear weapons employment, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation) provide more specific strategic guidance.

Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry provided a series of strategies to the planning community. These *United States Security Strategy* reports amplify the NSS on a regional basis and are produced by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA).<sup>27</sup>

The NMS is central to the CINCs' strategic planning. By means of the NMS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises the President and Secretary of Defense about the military strategy and forces needed to accomplish the objectives of the President's NSS. The NMS assists with the military resource development process outlined in the Defense Planning Guidance and it provides a mid-range strategic basis for developing the JSCP. Thus, strategic



planners can use the NMS as an NCA-approved statement of general security policy, objectives and broadly defined strategic concepts.

Many of the necessary specifics for implementing *National Military Strategy* are available in the JSCP. The JSCP is a statement of "current national military strategy" based on military resources available in the near term (about 2 years). Thus, the JSCP has become a primary document for strategic guidance affecting near-term operational missions and service functions.

The JSCP gives the CINCs strategic objectives and other tasks and general planning guidance. Because JSCP objectives and tasks are based on currently available military resources and capabilities, the JSCP apportions the combat forces and intertheater transportation assets needed in the CINCs' planning for warfighting and power projection capabilities. JSCP annexes give detailed guidance for specific functional areas such as intelligence, logistics, military deception, psychological operations, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Top-down strategic guidance plays a central role in defining threats to U.S. interests and objectives. When developing a picture of the threat for use in strategy formulation, planners draw on the broad national guidance set out in the aforementioned President's NSS, the Secretary of Defense's Planning Guidance, the Chairman's *National Military Strategy*, Chairman's Guidance, and the JSCP. As stressed by a number of planners interviewed, the JSCP plays a particularly important role in threat definition at the CINC strategic planning level. The assessments of dangers to U.S. interests contained in the JSCP and other documents are quite general, however, and while providing a threat baseline for strategy development, may require further elaboration and assessment for specific regions and types of activities. This has been provided in part—at least in broad context—by the OASD/ISA *United States Security Strategy* publications.

Periodically, a new or newly important challenge to U.S. interests may arise that requires immediate incorporation into theater planning considerations. Such a particularly important security problem may be addressed in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)—typically prepared by the National Security Council and often classified in whole or part—to highlight and define a security threat or concern and direct that actions be taken to address or counter it. The issuance of a PDD is often followed by Department of Defense implementing guidance. The issues of drug trafficking in the late 1980s and WMD proliferation in the early 1990s are two cases in point, with both of these security problems subsequently included as important elements of strategy for those CINCs most affected.

Additional top-down guidance comes from the comprehensive appraisals of regional and global threats contained in national-level intelligence documents. These are intended to inform CINC planning and intelligence staffs about a spectrum of international, regional, and transnational threat issues. In this regard, National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) and Special NIEs constitute the most authoritative, nationally-coordinated intelligence assessments, while appraisals of specific issues prepared by member-organizations of the Intelligence Community individually and jointly (in standing or ad hoc fusion centers or task forces like the CIA Counterproliferation Center), are all available to develop a threat picture for planning purposes, and to supplement appraisals prepared by the CINCs' own intelligence staffs. Other national-level documents such as the President's *National Drug Control Strategy* also contribute to strategy development by defining or prioritizing threats that have military dimensions.<sup>28</sup>

Threat assessments themselves may differ in judgement or emphasis—e.g., between the JSCP and a given NIE. Such differing judgements occasionally generate assessment difficulties that require resolution of some type, though planners in general appeared to regard the issue as a relatively minor one. Indeed, as one planner pointed out in

regard to the development of a CINC's strategy, the "threat portrayed was so broad that such differences were not usually a problem."<sup>29</sup>

In spite of the need for a structured theater strategy development process as suggested above for writing a CINC's strategy, former U.S. Pacific Command strategist Rear Admiral Michael A. McDevitt provided a different point of view. "In writing the PACOM strategy," he said, "it is an iterative process—keeping in mind what's going on in Washington. There is no 'let's turn out the 1995 Strategy.' I think that is by design—most CINCs do not want a lot of rudder orders."<sup>30</sup>

### **Change, Uncertainty, and Surprise.**

For every CINC, the transitional nature of key states and the diversity of security challenges have created an environment where *change*, *uncertainty*, and *surprise* are themselves substantial factors in the development of theater strategies. These include such considerations as: a number of long-standing friends and former enemies are in the process of fundamental transition; traditional relationships and alliances are being critically examined for current relevance; uneven economic change to include sharp growth and decline; trade and economic competition and tensions; the presence of ideological and power vacuums in a number of areas which foster general disorder, extreme nationalism, and a potential turn to authoritarianism; high levels of political, criminal, and random violence; and the unknown, long-term impact of burgeoning international organized crime and corruption on democratic institutions. All are identified in every theater to one extent or another.<sup>31</sup>

In every region, security challenges are complex, diverse, often nontraditional, and frequently interconnected. These challenges—which blur traditional distinctions among military, law enforcement, and other roles and missions—have strong interagency and international dimensions that evolve in an environment

characterized by profound ambiguity. Military planners are challenged to address requirements across the spectrum of conflict and in peacetime, with disparate missions ranging from the conduct of major regional contingencies under threat of WMD employment, to humanitarian assistance operations.

As suggested earlier, then, each CINC has “a full rucksack” both in terms of the demanding responsibilities assigned to each command, and in regard to the many variables of national policy guidance, command relationships, regional geography, military resources, shifting security challenges, and other factors. The following chapter addresses the planning processes used by the regional and functional commands in their efforts to integrate these disparate factors into strategy documents.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER I

1. U.S. Congress, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99-433, October 1, 1986. Interestingly, Section 104 requires that the President “transmit to Congress each year [on the day he submits the budget] . . . the National Security Strategy of the United States.” The language of the act requires the report to include U.S. interests, objectives, and strategic concepts (“short-term and long-term uses of . . . national power”). The Act placed no requirement on the CINCs to produce a similar strategy at their strategic level, but it significantly strengthened their hand via the command authority of “combatant command.”

2. The plans are USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002, USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027, and USCINSTRAT OPLAN 8044. The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is a nuclear target list supporting military operation plans. In the post-Soviet era, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) responsibilities include support to regional strategies, contingency operations and counterproliferation actions. The SIOP is no longer a stand-alone document prepared by the (former) Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff; rather, it has been transformed into a numbered OPLAN now prepared by the STRATCOM Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, and is a target list integrated into the Joint Staff's *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP).

3. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, Washington, DC: February 1995, p. 4.

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

5. Les Aspin, former Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1993, pp. 27-31.

6. *Ibid*, p. 19.

7. For example, see Graham H. Turbiville, "Operations Other Than War: Organized Crime Dimension," *Military Review*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 1994, pp. 35-47. Also find a series of articles concerning gray area phenomena and OOTW in the Cass Publications international journal, *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*

8. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996, p. iv.

9. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997, p. iii. Strategic priorities are listed at pp. i-ii, 2, and 29.

10. For example, Jomini was influential for his structured, geometric approach to organizing the battlefield. He influenced American thinking in the Civil War and beyond. Clausewitz proffered psychological aspects of war and strategy, and the concepts of war as an instrument of policy; also the important relationship of the government, the people, and their army. He became very influential in American military thought after the Vietnam War. Mahan, was a sailor, Annapolis graduate of 1859, and historian. He was influential for his concepts of naval superiority to command the sea (seapower) and assure open maritime commerce. He was influenced by Jomini's concepts of concentration, interior lines and logistics. Major General Emory Upton was influential at the turn of the century for his wrongheaded notion that civilian government should not interfere with operations of the army in the field—a set-back for strategic thinking. Events of the Korean war illustrate Upton's influence on the U.S. military (MacArthur). Giulio Douhet, an Italian General, advocated massed bombing against enemy centers of industry to intimidate the population, and the three dimensional aspects of air war. U.S. General William Mitchell suggested centralized control of air assets to take advantage of the fundamental nature of air warfare. British officer and historian B.H. Liddell Hart (critical of Clausewitz) suggested an indirect approach in strategy to achieve victory on the battlefield. Of these, Clausewitz has been the most influential in recent years. But his writings have not been very helpful in developing new ideas for military operations other than

war and expanding military thought to encompass the new strategic environment of the 21st century.

11. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 87. In the 1973 war, Arab strategic objectives were to regain honor lost in the 1967 war, and to bring Israel to the bargaining table over the issue of the Sinai and Suez Canal. The Egyptian military objective was to gain a lodgement across the Suez Canal, stoutly defend, and set conditions for negotiations. This was a clear case of linking national policy with military strategic objectives. See Saad el Shazly, Lieutenant General, Egyptian Army, "Planning," in *The Crossing of the Suez*, San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980.

12. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 1981.

13. By 1984 some of the drift of Summers' teaching appeared as U.S. policy in the form of the "Weinberger Doctrine." Former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger provided an architecture for the use of military force to achieve political objectives. The "Doctrine's" key points were that if the U.S. commits forces to combat, then there should be vital national interests in the balance; there should be a clear intent on winning and providing all the forces needed to do the job; there must be clearly defined political and military objectives; there must be a sensible relationship between the objective and the size of the committed force; and there must be reasonable assurance of the support of the American people and their Congress. The Weinberger Doctrine made problematic using military force in numerous operations other than war, but it nicely supported concepts for fighting campaigns with conventional forces.

14. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, *The Voroshilov Lectures, Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy* ed. Graham Hall Turbiville, Jr., Vols. 1-3, Washington: National Defense University, 1989. Vol. 3 provides a description of Soviet thinking on "Issues of Operational Art." Also, Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy*, ed. Kent D. Lee, Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992. *Strategy* is based on Svechin's work at the Military Academy of the RKKA (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army) in the 1920s, and these writings are parallel to current U.S. Army doctrine found in FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1993.

15. Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992* Washington: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.d., p. 50.

16. Aleksandr A. Svechin was a veteran of the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, where, as a staff officer, he witnessed the failure of Russian leadership to effectively link national policy, theater strategy

and major operations into a cohesive plan for war. As a distinguished professor at the Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, he was well-versed in the writings of Clausewitz, but it was Svechin's own views that significantly contributed to the development of concepts for operational art. Clausewitz' famous quote is: "To sum it up: we clearly see that the activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparations for war, and war proper. The same distinction must be made in theory as well." *On War*, p. 131.

17. Steve Senkovich, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, The Joint Staff, J7/Joint Doctrine Division, Washington, DC, letter to authors, January 11, 1996. The Joint Doctrine Master Plan (JCS Pub 1-01) is now titled the "Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program," with Change 1, dated September 14, 1993.

18. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*, Washington, DC: May 1995, pp. 83-84.

19. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Pub 1, Washington, DC: January 1995, p. IV-1.

20. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Joint Pub 0-2, Washington, DC: February 24, 1995, p. II-14.

21. Chapter V on Military Operations Other Than War fails to squarely address the transnational phenomena that threaten the nation-state system today. These issues are addressed in Chapter III of this study.

22. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0, Washington, DC: February 1, 1995, p. I-8.

23. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 5-0, Washington, DC: April 13, 1995, p. I-2.

24. *Ibid.*, I-7.

25. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Revised Final Draft), Washington, DC: 1990, p. IV-5.

26. LTC Michael J. Kazmierski of the War Plans Division (DAMO-SSW), Army Staff, has noted that "The National Security Strategy is not a strategy; regardless of its name, the NSS is a policy document." James W. Hill, Chief, Office of Security Review, Department of the Army Public Affairs, Pentagon, Washington, DC, to Colonel Charles E. Johnston,

Director, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 3, 1996.

27. The first of these useful publications to be issued was William J. Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, East Asia and Pacific Region, USDP/ISA/AP, February 1995. As of this writing, other series titles include a *United States Security Strategy for the Middle East*, May 1995; *Europe and NATO*, June 1995; *Sub-Saharan Africa*, August 1995; and the *Americas*, September 1995.

28. William F. Clinton, *National Drug Control Strategy*, Washington, DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy, February 1995.

29. Interview with USCENTCOM J-5 staff planner (LCDR Larry Barton), MacDill Air Force Base, January 17, 1995.

30. Michael A. McDevitt, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director for Strategy, Planning, and Policy, J5, USPACOM, interview by authors, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, January 31, 1995.

31. For one good, forward-looking example of theater change and resulting complexities from a special operations perspective, see the briefing, 10th Special Forces Group, "Peacetime Campaign Plan in EUCOM," Fort Devans, Massachusetts, April 13, 1994. While focusing in large measure on the role of special operations forces in dealing with these peacetime challenges, the presentation sets out many of the little-considered but increasingly important dangers that characterize the EUCOM area of responsibility and interest.



# Chapter II

## STRATEGY PROCESS

An effective U.S. theater strategy was indispensable in the Gulf War. By theater strategy is meant the purposeful integration of military resources in the theater of war to achieve the military objectives set by the president and his secretary of defense. This integration is achieved largely by concept, structure, and process: concept in providing a clear design for the combined actions of the forces deployed; structure by establishment of a command and control organization capable for achieving the concept; and process in the development of a common plan for all forces to serve as the basis of all subsequent actions.<sup>1</sup>

Richard M. Swain  
"Lucky War,"  
Third Army in Desert Storm

How do the CINCs go about writing a strategy? Each CINC's domain is unique, but each has the common challenge of maintaining a coherent strategy—one that provides an effective linkage of ends, ways, and means to address U.S. policy objectives. This chapter offers a view of the strategy planning processes and products of geographic combatant commands alongside those of two functional combatant commands. In each section, the mission and strategy of each command is briefly introduced in order to place the process in context.

### **U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND (USACOM)**

The 1993 Unified Command Plan merged the Army's Forces Command, the Atlantic Fleet, the Air Combat Command, and Marine Corps Forces Atlantic into a single combatant command—U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM)<sup>2</sup> located at Norfolk, Virginia. The mission of USACOM includes providing "ready and available forces" to the

warfighting commands in regions of conflict.<sup>3</sup> Its responsibilities include joint training, force packaging, and force deployment during a crisis.<sup>4</sup> In these ways, USACOM supports other CINCs and the NATO commands. USACOM's area of responsibility (AOR) includes 45 million square miles of Atlantic Ocean from the North Pole to the South Pole.<sup>5</sup> The Commander in Chief of USACOM (USCINACOM) also continues to serve as NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). As a NATO commander, SACLANT is tasked to maintain security in NATO-designated regions of the Atlantic and provide support to Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

USACOM's *Strategic Plan 1994* was a refinement of its Implementation Plan for transitioning USACOM to its new missions.<sup>6</sup> The *Strategic Plan* was a management strategy for guiding the command to its expanded role as a unified command. It had these major goals: stand-up USACOM and empower the Executive Board (meaning the service component commanders); streamline, simplify and stabilize routine processes and procedures to maximize flexibility and efficiency; reduce nonessential duplication; engage the gearwheels of the multi-agency and multinational processes.<sup>7</sup>


After *Strategic Plan 1994* was promulgated, USACOM planners began an assessment process for a draft "USACOM Theater Strategy." (This name was changed in late 1995 to "USACOM Strategy" to reflect the functional aspects of the command.) The release of the *National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy* (both dated February 1995) had made evident the need to revise the old 1992 USCINCLANT Theater Strategy.<sup>8</sup>

The strategy is intended to be a long-range (c. 15 years) guidance document. Its strategic objectives, promoting stability and thwarting aggression, were introduced in mid-1995 to match the goals of the *National Military Strategy*. Central strategic concepts are maintaining the combat readiness of joint forces; positioning forces to protect U.S. interests and foster a stable, secure environment; and

remaining engaged in partnership activities with allies and friendly countries.

### Process.

The USACOM strategy process was initiated by an informal planning directive from the Chief, Strategy Division to elements of the USACOM strategy and policy staff. The memorandum identified basic assumptions and provided some initial guidelines (no more than 20 pages, unclassified for wide dissemination, take a long-term view of 10-20 years). It identified the documents that “. . . form the foundation upon which the strategy is developed.”<sup>9</sup> These included the *National Security Strategy*, *National Military Strategy*, *Defense Planning Guidance*, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, *Unified Command Plan*, and the *USACOM Strategic Plan 1994* (Figure II-1).



**Figure II-1.**  
**USACOM Strategic Planning.**

Source: USACOM J5, January 1995.

A strategy development timeline from the J-5 (similar to the CENTCOM timeline in Figure II-2) identified staffing events for 1995. After a rough draft was developed by the J-5 planners, it was coordinated within the USACOM Headquarters, then sent to the USACOM Component Commanders for comments. Final USACOM staff

coordination took place before briefing the strategy to the CINC for his approval.

- **June 1994**
  - Staff decides to update strategy for new CINC
  - Reviews: NSS, NMS, JSCP, DPG, CPG and PDDs
- **October 1994**
  - Initial draft sent from CCJ-5 to CINC
  - CINC provides planning guidance
- **November - December 1994**
  - Staff rewrite; staffing to CENTCOM staff and components
  - Informal discussions with Joint Staff and Interagency (DOS)
  - CENTCOM strategy review conference for General Officers and Colonels (no components)
- **January 1995**
  - Final draft to CINC for approval
  - Strategy presented and discussed at Annual Component Commanders' Conference
  - Posture Statement Briefing
- **February 1995**
  - Dissemination
  - Strategy becomes a source document for Operation Plans
- **Mid-1995** - Staff begins to update strategy based on new CINC guidance

**Figure II-2.**  
**USCENTCOM Theater Strategy Process.**

Source: USCENTCOM J5, January 1995.

**Participation.**

The revision of the USACOM strategy is a result of an initiative taken by staff officers in the Plans and Policy Directorate, J5. Principal staff officers, Component Commanders, and the CINC participate in the strategy's development as the strategy development timeline runs its course.

**Product.**

The final product of the USACOM writing effort is a single volume with chapters covering the strategic environment, strategic objectives, strategy, and military capabilities. In addition, three annexes cover the sub-regions within the area of responsibility. The broad objectives and concepts described above will be encompassed by functional areas of the CINC's

responsibilities: regional warfighting; nation assistance; counterdrug; counterproliferation. This iteration of the strategy was promulgated during fiscal year 1996.

## **Conclusions.**

Crises concerning Cuba and Haiti, new guidance in the National Security Strategy about transnational dangers and peacetime engagement policy, and new responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan required new strategic thinking. The idea was to “provide a coherent vision for planning and execution of the CINC’s assigned missions and show a clear linkage to its parent documents, the NSS and NMS.”<sup>10</sup>

Readiness and force packaging requirements, and the Haiti contingency, had an impact on the availability of the USACOM staff to update the CINC’s strategy. As staff resources were used to support contingency requirements, the result was an extension of the USACOM Strategy Development Timeline.

## **U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)**

The Central Command (USCENTCOM) mission is to ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources (oil), assist friendly countries to provide their own security, contribute to collective regional defense, and deter threats from hostile regional states.<sup>11</sup> CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes 19 nations of the Middle East, Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa in a region that contains 70 percent of the world’s oil reserves.<sup>12</sup> Sea lines of communication in the AOR are a vital link from oil source countries to the world’s industrial nations.

The current CENTCOM regional strategy began to take form in 1988 after it became apparent that the Soviet Union was disintegrating. “We switched to Iraq as the principal regional threat in August of 1989,” recalled a CENTCOM planner.<sup>13</sup> This change came in time to encourage development of an operations plan for the defense of the

Gulf, which served the command well during the Persian Gulf war of 1991.

After the war, CENTCOM continued to develop a strategy emphasizing the concept of “forward-presence” to deter aggression and protect U.S. interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Marine General Joseph P. Hoar, former CINCCENT, described a “Three-Tier” framework in his strategy:

[Former] Secretary [of Defense Dick] Cheney sees three tiers for defense in the region. Tier I envisions that each nation participate as best it can individually; Tier II is regional cooperation; Tier III envisions a large coalition with western help.<sup>14</sup>

The concept continues today as the basis of the CENTCOM strategy.

Objectives are to protect international access to oil; discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); deter hostile actions against U.S. interests; promote a regional military balance; assist friendly states to defend themselves; encourage regional defense cooperation; strengthen regional stability; reduce threats of terrorism to U.S. interests; and stem the flow of illegal drugs through the region.<sup>15</sup> The peacetime part of the strategy supports national self-defense and regional collective defense (Tiers I and II). The wartime strategy stresses a power projection capability, force readiness, and “flexible deterrent options” to forestall hostile actions. The warfighting concept is to use overwhelming U.S. and coalition forces to rapidly end any conflict.

## **Process.**

CENTCOM's regional strategy has seen considerable re-development since the Persian Gulf War. Following is a composite narrative of the strategy process under CENTCOM's two recent Commanders-in-Chief during the 1991-94 timeframe. Seminal documents for guiding the planning process consistently have been the *National*

*Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.* In spite of disruptions to the nation's strategic planning cycle caused by the Gulf War and the transition from the Bush to Clinton administrations, top-down guidance was sufficient for regional planning.

In developing its strategy, the CENTCOM staff assessed the threat picture within the CINC's AOR as well as his area of interest—an arc of countries beyond the AOR that could affect the CENTCOM mission. These additional areas included Chad, Libya, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, India, and others.

This assessment used Washington resources such as Joint Staff documents, DIA and CIA assessments, and consultations with regional experts at National Defense University. CINCCENT wanted the staff to conduct an independent assessment. Research techniques such as literature searches and interviews were used to assess U.S. vital interests and threats to those interests. By this procedure the J5 Directorate “reexamined the CINCCENT strategy to see if it was still good or needed adjustment. In this regard, the [Joint Staff's] Joint Strategy Review helped.”<sup>16</sup>

Based on the threats to vital interests, strategic objectives were identified or confirmed for the whole region, and then for sub-regions (e.g., Persian Gulf, South Asia, Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Horn of Africa-Red Sea).

Strategic concepts to implement the strategy were designed (by the J5 staff) to support the three-tier security structure. For example, to support Tier I (each country responsible for its own defense), CENTCOM plans a security assistance regime which includes mobile training teams, technical assistance field teams, the international military education and training program, foreign military sales and financing—all to build military capabilities and confidence for the host nation. Tier II objectives (for regional collective defense) are implemented by a combined exercise program which includes ground and air mobility training,

special operations exercises, exercise related construction and even battle staff training for regional military staff officers. The idea is that all of these activities would support the Tier III warfighting requirements of an extra regional coalition.

As a part of implementing the strategy, the CINC develops his integrated priority list of resources needed to optimize the strategy over the long haul. Needed support items (such as strategic sea lift) are proffered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for future resourcing.<sup>17</sup> The CINC also hosts a conference each year with the security assistance officers to discuss the regional strategy and apportion resources for security assistance programs.

A description of the process for the 1994 revision of the CENTCOM strategy is shown in Figure II-2. The staff began the process in June 1994 with a review of principal guiding documents. These included the NSS, NMS, JSCP, Defense Planning Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance, and several Presidential Decision Directives. By October, the staff provided a draft of the strategy to the CINC, General Peay. After General Peay provided his guidance, the staff rewrote the strategy, and then sent it to the CENTCOM staff, service components, and SOCCENT for staffing. During the November 1994 time-frame, CENTCOM staff officers conducted informal staff coordination with the Joint Staff and interagency points of contact (especially Department of State).

In December 1994 a meeting was held at an off-site conference center for the colonels and general officers of the CENTCOM staff in order to assure a timely exchange of information and create a consensus about the new strategy. The components did not attend. In January 1995 the final draft was sent to the CINC for his approval. A component commanders' conference in late January provided the forum for presenting the strategy in final form. Thereafter, the strategy was formalized in the 1995 posture statement and in the new CENTCOM command briefing. It was disseminated to the joint community in March 1995.<sup>18</sup>



The CINC-approved strategy is not forwarded to the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. No part of this strategy development process is connected to the Joint Staff's Joint Strategic Planning System (Memorandum of Policy 7). As several planners advised, let the CINCs decide the regional strategy process and format on their own; each CINC has his own view of strategy and will make sure the final product complies with the Chairman's guidance and the *National Security Strategy*; there is no need to have it approved. But another planner suggested:

If you are the primary theater, it is not necessary to seek approval of your regional strategy. If you are a secondary theater, you might like to have your strategy as a part of the Joint Strategic Planning System to get more resources.<sup>19</sup>

## **Participation.**

Commander and staff were represented during the planning process. The staff planning group for the strategy revision consisted of three officers from Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5 and additional planners from other Directorates: Intelligence, J-2; Operations, J-3; Logistics and Security Assistance J-4/7. As one senior staff officer recalls of General Hoar:

The CINC participated in the assessment process, we first spent two hours with the CINC. The CINC spends a lot of time on planning. We had in-process reviews with the CINC twice.<sup>20</sup>

The interaction with General J. H. Binford Peay III was described:

We went to General Peay and received guidance on his vision for the region. In the discussion he emphasized concepts like promote peace, deter conflict, trained regional forces ready to defend, access [to facilities in the region], and enhancement of CENTCOM's warfighting capabilities. He wanted to establish conditions that would enable him to wage joint warfare throughout the spectrum of conflict.<sup>21</sup>

As the strategy evolved, the staff planning group coordinated key aspects with the staff at large and with the CENTCOM components. On some occasions, coordination was made with other agencies of the U.S. Government (such as Departments State and Commerce) concerning specific points within the strategy.

### **Product.**

The final products have been General Hoar's and then General Peay's posture statements presented annually to the Congress. These posture statements are supplemented with the CINC's command briefing—the up-to-date version of the CENTCOM regional strategy. Future versions of the CINC's strategy will likely be published in a stand alone document called the “Strategic Plan.”

### **Conclusions.**

The U.S. CENTCOM theater strategy has both peacetime activities and warfighting components. Recent CINCs have been directly, personally involved in the development of the theater strategy. U.S. Government agencies were consulted about specific issues within the strategy, but no formal effort was made to staff, or coordinate, the strategy with agencies outside DOD. Service components played a modest, coordinating role in the development of the CINC's theater strategy.

### **U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND (USEUCOM)**

For over 40 years, EUCOM's strategic objectives focused mainly on supporting NATO's general defense of Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion. Now EUCOM is fixed on immediate needs to provide combat-ready forces for an expanding NATO and multilateral operations in the Balkans while supporting the planning requirements for regional contingencies in other AORs.

The EUCOM mission is to protect U.S. interests; provide combat ready forces to the NATO integrated military

structure; and support the plans and operations of other U.S. unified commanders. The EUCOM AOR encompasses some 83 countries of over 160 differing cultural, ethnic and religious predilections. It does not include the Former Soviet Union. U.S. European Command directs its missions from a headquarters in Patch Barracks at Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany. Its service components are also located in Europe.<sup>22</sup>


The "USEUCOM Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness," was based on the U.S. NSS and the NMS. It was written to provide authoritative guidance to the USEUCOM staff and subordinate commands in the planning process.<sup>23</sup>

The strategy divides the AOR into four main theaters of operation: Western Europe and NATO; Central and Eastern Europe; Middle East and the North Africa Littoral; and Sub-Saharan Africa. It identifies objectives for "promoting stability" and "thwarting aggression" (objectives of the *National Military Strategy*). The ways (strategic concepts) the CINC plans to accomplish these objectives are through peacetime engagement, crisis response and fighting to win. It is a strategy in terms of ends, ways and means (although the resources section lacks sufficient detail to be helpful to planners).

### **Process.**<sup>24</sup>

The process for developing and executing the CINC's theater strategy is detailed in EUCOM's "Theater Security Planning System" (TSPS), Directive Number 56-10, which applies to all USEUCOM staff and component commands. The TSPS facilitates planning by guiding the use of military resources to mold a stable security environment in the AOR. It also addresses military preparedness—the "Fight to Win" concepts. The TSPS provides direction for developing the CINC's strategy along with a series of supporting campaign plans: a Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) that translates the CINC's strategy into operational objectives and sets priorities for the four regions in the AOR; Regional

Campaign Plans which denote regional policy, establish priorities for countries, and allocate resources for engagement activities in the region; and the Country Campaign Plans (CCP) which identify the CINC's goals for a country and allocate resources for engagement activities. Thus, the TSPS provides the CINC's vision and guidance for his AOR. Then, it implements this vision by way of a series of campaign plans which translate strategic objectives into operational actions in subordinate theaters and separate countries (Figure II-3).



**Figure II-3.**  
**USEUCOM Theater Security Planning System.**

Source: USEUCOM J5, TSPS Briefing.

The purpose for developing the TSPS was to provide a system that would link EUCOM theater activities with U.S. *National Security Strategy* objectives on the one hand and the Ambassadors' country plan objectives on the other. The idea was to implement a CINC-approved theater strategy that was derived from the *National Military Strategy*, and that could fully coordinate activities among the EUCOM staff, service components, and other government agencies operating in the AOR. The strategy development process

was designed to establish CINC priorities for engagement and preparedness activities and link them to the planning, programming and budgeting system. The principal instruments for providing strategic direction are the theater strategy and campaign plans. The staff procedure for their development involves two steps: a policy development phase, then a resource allocation phase.

*USEUCOM Policy Development.* The theater strategy guides the writing of the CINC's policy guidelines for the theater campaign plan. The Policy and Plans Directorate (J-5) prepares the policy sections of the Theater Campaign Plan, then forwards the plan through the Regional Working Groups (RWG), the SSG and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. When approved by the CINC, the policy section of the Theater Campaign Plan is sent to the Joint Staff for informal comment.

The policy sections of the four regional campaign plans (Western Europe, Central Europe, Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa) are similarly developed. CINC-approved policy sections of the regional plans are passed to the Joint Staff for informal comment. They are then used to develop the country campaign plans (CCP).

The development of the CCP differs somewhat from the theater and regional campaign plans. The J-5 country desk officers prepare the CCP in coordination with EUCOM peacetime engagement activity managers, country team representatives, and governmental and nongovernment agencies that operate in the country. The desk officers forward the completed policy section of the CCP through the appropriate regional working group (RWG), secure staff and service component coordination, then pass the CCP to the Director, J-5 for his approval.

*Preparedness Guidance.* In parallel with the series of campaign plans described above, preparedness guidance documents (PGD) are developed by the EUCOM staff with input from the service components. The PGD establish EUCOM policy in these functional areas: medical, training, personnel readiness, logistics, operations planning,

communications, and reserve component support. The PGD contain functional missions, CINC's intent, theater goals, and the CINC's guidance for the functional area.<sup>25</sup>

To place the campaign plans into action, military resources are required. The development of engagement activity and assessment annexes mark the resourcing phase of the TSPS.

*Resource Allocation.* The resource allocation phase of TSPS applies the funding, infrastructure and military units to the campaign plan concepts. Engagement activity managers (responsible for the categories of security assistance, traditional CINC programs, exercises, and the Marshall Center), working with country desk officers develop allocations for resources based on the theater strategy and theater campaign plan strategic objectives, concepts and priorities. The activity managers also consider other U.S. agency allocations and activities along with EUCOM and component staff expertise to determine the distribution of resources. Conflicting resource issues are decided by the RWG and the synchronization steering group (SSG). The resulting engagement activity annex (to a campaign plan) is sent through the RWG to the SSG for approval. The merging of the engagement activities annex(s) into the theater campaign plan results in a completed plan. Data from the engagement activities annexes is also used to complete the four regional campaign plans and the country campaign plans.

Final approval for completed theater and regional campaign plans is given by the CINC (or his Deputy). The country campaign plans are signed by the Deputy CINC (DCINC) after informal coordination has taken place with the Ambassadors' country teams. In addition, an assessment annex (measures of effectiveness to evaluate campaign success) is prepared by the J-5, passed through the SSG and DCINC, and approved by the CINC.

## **Participation.**

Participating in the development and execution of the theater strategy are general officers and staff principals of the EUCOM staff directorates, the CINC's Political and Legal Advisors, and the service component commanders. These officers participate in the SSG, chaired by the EUCOM Chief of Staff. The SSG addresses security related issues for the AOR and reviews the campaign plans. These senior officers also provide representation to various RWG. The RWGs are chaired by a J-5 regional division chief. The RWGs recommend regional policy and review regional campaign plans. The theater and regional campaign plans are initially written by the J-5 staff, with the country desk officers providing the initial draft of the country plans. Activity managers throughout the EUCOM staff have responsibility for writing the assessment and engagement annexes of the campaign plans to further implement the strategy. Additional officers write the preparedness guidance documents which establish policy for both the strategy and campaign plans in functional areas that enhance EUCOM readiness: training, personnel readiness, logistics, operations planning, communications, and reserve component support. Component commanders and staff participate both in the policy development fora (SSG and RWG) and contribute from the bottom-up by coordinating with country desk officers and preparedness guidance action officers. Thus, the TSPS captures a wide range of commanders and staff officers who participate in the EUCOM strategic planning process.

## **Product.**

The result of the TSPS is a series of strategic and operational level documents. They include the theater campaign plan, regional campaign plans for four theaters of operation, and country campaign plans. Preparedness guidance documents provide direction for making the force ready to fight. Finally, the engagement activities annexes allocate resources for the peacetime engagement concepts of

the theater strategy and campaign plans. Although the TSPS identifies the CINC's theater strategy as the beginning of the security planning process, and assigns responsibility for developing it to the J-5, it does not provide specific guidelines for writing the theater strategy.

## **Conclusions.**

The USEUCOM Theater Security Planning System (TSPS), Directive 56-10, is a planning system designed to facilitate execution of the CINC's theater strategy of engagement and preparedness. While the CINC's theater strategy is the keystone document of the TSPS, the directive provides no guidance for writing the strategy. Rather, it guides development of supporting strategic documents. As savvy strategists have suggested, the key to the USEUCOM strategic planning process is the complex interweaving of various feedback loops inherent in the TSPS that decides theater ends, ways and means—and ultimately determines the strategy.<sup>26</sup>

## **U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (USPACOM)**

The mission of U.S. Pacific Command is to foster peace, democracy and freedom in the Asia-Pacific region. It maintains positive relations with Asia-Pacific nations and supports political, economic and security cooperation. USPACOM deters conflict by the forward presence of U.S. and allied forces and maintenance of ready forces capable of terminating conflict on terms favorable to the United States.<sup>27</sup>

The Pacific Command's AOR is the largest of the Unified Commands. Its 105 million square miles include 45 countries, 10 territories of other countries, eight U.S. territories and Alaska and Hawaii. PACOM Headquarters is located at Camp H. M. Smith, overlooking Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. The command has four service components, four subordinate unified commands, and three standing joint task forces.<sup>28</sup>



The Pacific Command Strategy traces its origins to the Cold War period when the regional strategy was aimed at containing communist expansion, or, if necessary, defeating Soviet forces simultaneously throughout the AOR. In 1989 (as Gorbachev proceeded with his program of perestroika and glasnost), a PACOM strategic assessment pointed the way toward a new regional strategy. *USPACOM Strategy for the Year 2010*, the result of an informal series of brainstorming sessions by PACOM strategists, was a white paper which provided the key concepts now present in the current PACOM strategy.<sup>29</sup> These were: need for forward deployed forces and activities to assure our allies of U.S. interests in their security; our reliance on a coalition of democracies to preserve peace and thwart enemies; the need for strong bilateral relationships, and the need to maintain a contingency capability for rapid deployment of forces.


The current CINC's strategy of "Cooperative Engagement" carries the themes of reassurance of U.S. commitment to regional security, deterrence through readiness, and compellence of our enemies in war. Strategic objectives are to maintain a U.S. military presence in the Pacific; combat the proliferation of WMD on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia; enhance regional security; and support democratic reform. The strategy has three principal strategic concepts: forward presence, strong alliances, and crisis response.

The details concerning these strategic concepts are found in CINCPAC's statements to Congress and his command strategy briefing, both providing the up-to-date vision for the command. This is institutionalized in USCINCPAC INST 3050.6, the "Red Book." The Red Book is a 3-ring binder notebook which places the Pacific Command strategy into operation via specific warfighting tasks; and it includes peacetime activities organized by country. The Red Book provides the CINC's vision for the theater along with guidance for peacetime activities, lesser regional contingencies, major regional contingencies, and global war. Appendices detail forward presence operations with

instructions for each country in the AOR organized by sub-region: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Indian Ocean, and South Pacific. The planning goal for this series of CINCPAC strategic concepts is to provide "a single, uninterrupted strategy from peacetime activities, through crisis actions, to warfighting."<sup>30</sup>

**Process.**

The PACOM strategy process involves reviewing the current national policy, strategy and intelligence assessments; preparing or updating the CINCPAC testimony to Congress (usually a posture statement), Pacific Command strategy briefing and Red Book; and putting the strategy into action by way of direction to the PACOM components (Figure II-4). Assessments are accomplished using feedback from exercises, exchange and training programs, and bilateral and multilateral activities. This assessment process is facilitated by a management tool called the cooperative engagement matrix.



**Figure II-4.**  
**USPACOM Strategy Process.**

Source: COL Bill Moran and LTC George Kailiway, USPACOM J5, April 1995.

In looking at national-level guidance, “We took the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy*, analyzed them for changes and rolled the new ideas into the Red Book,” advised a PACOM strategist. The Defense Planning Guidance and Contingency Planning Guidance were also important in updating the strategy because of their influence on the NMS and *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

While reviewing the current guidance, the PACOM staff makes an effort to “input at the top,” by contributing to the writing of the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* and other Joint Staff documents to influence the Joint Staff planning guidance. This is helpful to influence national-level direction to the CINC concerning command arrangements and statements of objectives, concepts and resources.<sup>31</sup>

The strategy planning cycle begins informally as the staff assists the CINC for his annual testimony to the Congress, which usually takes place in late winter. The update to the Pacific Command strategy briefing (as well as posture statements when written) sets forth the latest strategic concepts approved by the CINC. This sets in place the renewed framework for PACOM Strategy.

In June the J-5 begins its update to the Red Book. Using National Intelligence Estimates, JSCP threat analysis, and input from the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, J-5 desk officers send draft copies of the strategy to CINCPAC representatives assigned to the ambassadors' country teams. After incorporating input from the country teams, the staff provides the strategy to the PACOM components, usually in conjunction with a component commanders' conference. The conference is used to present the Pacific Command strategy briefing and selected elements of the Red Book. Also included are reviews of topics such as cooperative engagement and multilateral military activities, and confidence-building measures.<sup>32</sup> Unless there is a significant change to the strategy, the yearly update is not formally coordinated with the component commanders.

With 45 countries in the AOR, a management tool is necessary to deconflict joint and service activities and to optimize cooperative efforts with host countries. The cooperative engagement matrix (CEM) depicts all forward presence activities in a single glance using a computer spreadsheet program. The purpose of the CEM is to assist the CINC's management of apportioned resources for the Pacific Command strategy.

In this matrix (or spreadsheet), nations are placed in one of three groups based on the CINC's judgement about the nation's relationship to his prioritized strategic objectives. Influencing the CINC's decisions are considerations of U.S. national interests country by country, as coordinated with the Ambassadors' country teams. Figure II-5 is an extract from PACOM's cooperative engagement matrix, which shows activities of several countries from Priority Group I.

At a glance, some results of the CEM management process can seem anomalous. For example, the small nation of Laos was placed in Group II (of three priority groups), even though this mountain nation has only 4.7 million people and might logically be placed in Group III. Yet at the time of that decision, Laos was a critical player in JTF full accounting activities—the accounting for the remains of U.S. servicemen missing from the Viet Nam War. Thus, it was logical to give Laos a high priority for resources to support the full accounting project.

An additional spreadsheet is maintained for each country in the AOR. By country, the CINC can track activities such as high-level visits, multilateral seminars and conferences, exchange and training programs, and bilateral activities to see how well operational activities are supporting his strategy.

The J-5 coordinates the CEM with the PACOM components every calendar quarter; then it is passed to the CINC for his review. In this way the CINC can adjust the resources supporting his strategy to meet changing priorities. After the CEM is revised, the CINC sends it to his subordinate commands by means of a command letter.

Fiscal Year 94	Aus	India	JA	Phil
Subcategory				
Defense Reps				
DATT	X	X	X	X
SAO/JUSMAG	X	X	X	X
USCINCPAC Rep	1		X	1
HIGH LEVEL VISITS				
USCINCPAC	94-2,4		94-1,2,4	94-2
MULTILAT SEMINARS				
Pac Armies Mgt Seminar	JAN 94	JAN 94	JAN 94	JAN 94
	SEP 94	SEP 94	SEP 94	SEP 94
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS				
Functional Expert Exchan	1		11	
SME Exchanges	2	8	10	4
Bilateral Staff Talks	3	3	4	15
TRAINING PROGRAMS				
US Mil at Foreign Schools		5	1	
Foreign Mil at US PME	5	5	10	1
Observer Training	2			1
EXERCISES				
Unilateral Exercises	X	7	30	2
Joint/Combined Training	34	2	17	4
Small Unit Exercise	1	1	2	1

**Figure II-5.**  
**USPACOM Cooperative Engagement Matrix.**  
**Source: USPACOM J5, January 1995.**

Included are narrative guidance, the matrix with work sheets for each country, and descriptive charts which track how well U.S. interests are being supported by PACOM.

The CEM is the primary means used by the CINC to guide the application of limited resources for his strategic concepts of forward presence and strong alliances, and crisis response. By preparing the AOR in peacetime through cooperative engagement activities, the CINC is positioning the command for the warfighting parts of his Pacific Command strategy.

### **Participation.**

The players assisting the CINC with the PACOM strategy are the Director for Strategic Planning (J5) and his staff, predominantly officers of the Policy and Strategy (J51) and Strategic Plans (J54) Divisions. By its close proximity to the CINC, the Executive Assistant staff (J001) participates in writing the speeches and congressional testimony that affect PACOM strategy.<sup>33</sup> PACOM component commanders also play a role in providing input to the strategy development process; however, because PACOM has a well-developed strategy, much of the routine updates or adjustments to the strategy are effected within the J5 staff and approved by the CINC—without much formal staffing throughout the unified command.

### **Product.**

The PACOM strategy is found in several products, which, when assembled, represent the ends, ways and means of USCINCPAC's strategic thinking. The Pacific Command strategy brief is the most up-to-date version with the CINC's latest strategic thought. Useful insight concerning the command is also found in congressional testimony (especially the Posture Statement when written). The "Red Book," USCINCPAC INST 3050.6, Pacific Command Strategy, has chapters concerning peacetime and war, and it has tasks concerning each country in the AOR.

## **Conclusions.**

At the time of the author's visit to the command, the staff placed the greatest importance on the CINC's command strategy briefing because he was personally involved in writing and presenting this briefing. The PACOM strategy is reviewed and updated based on changes in national policy guidance and new strategic concepts developed by the CINC. A formal process for annual review and update of the strategy is not conducted, except that forward presence operations concerning the separate countries (found in Appendices C through F of the Redbook) are revised each spring. Rather, the strategy is seen by the staff as a living document that is updated throughout the year. The cooperative engagement matrix is updated quarterly to keep resources in line with current priorities.

Participation in developing and maintaining the strategy involves the CINC, speech writers, and the J5 Strategy, Planning and Policy staff. Subordinate commands and Ambassadors' country teams provide input upon request.

## **U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM)**

The mission of USSOCOM is to prepare SOF for worldwide special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations in support of the geographic combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors and other U.S. Government agencies.<sup>34</sup> When directed by the National Command Authorities, SOCOM plans for and conducts special operations, but its main effort is to provide forces to the geographic CINCs for their employment.

USSOCOM is responsible for joint SOF training and doctrine, and it oversees the acquisition and development of special operations matériel, equipment, and services. USCINCSOC (working in cooperation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-

Intensity Conflict–ASD SO/LIC) provides the unifying SOF policy direction.

USSOCOM acts as a service staff by way of its mission to submit program and budget proposals for Major Force Program (MFP) 11 for congressional approval. This ensures the viability of SOF programs during the programming and budget process. The Program Objective Memorandum for MFP 11 makes USSOCOM unique among unified commands, and it explains the unusual strategic planning system developed by USSOCOM. When employed overseas, SOCOM forces are routinely task organized and placed under the combatant command of supported geographic CINCs.<sup>35</sup>

The concept for the Special Operations Command Strategic Plan was initiated by General Wayne A. Downing during the fall of 1993 in discussions with his senior commanders. At that time, the strategic plan was intended to guide USSOCOM efforts “over the next few years and [it is] the first step in a process called Total Quality Leadership.”<sup>36</sup> The strategic plan provided an overall vision for the command, the general mission (stated above), and the command goals.


The CINC's view was that his strategy should include commitment, customer/supplier focus, involvement, improvement, fact-based decisions, a team approach, and winning in war. He provided the strategic vision of “quiet professionals” building an integrated, combat-ready Special Operations Force. The vision was reinforced by a list of “values” concerning people, creativity, competence, courage and integrity.<sup>37</sup>

The essential usefulness of the strategic plan was that it established the CINC's management and leadership concepts and an ethical intonation for USSOCOM worldwide activities, and for its statutory functions which are realized through the “USSOCOM Core Processes.” These core processes are acquisition, resourcing, operations support and strategic planning.



## Process.

The objective of the USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process is to “provide a list of capability-based programs, over a range of constraints, that allow POM [program objective memorandum] decisionmakers to satisfy SOF mission needs and proactively guide the development of SOF resources in the future.”<sup>38</sup> Thus, the Planning Process is a means for ensuring that development, operations and maintenance, and procurement programs for SOF are resourced through a deliberate process. It determines how USSOCOM intends to spend limited resources across valid, but competing claimants such as air and maritime mobility, weapons, C<sup>4</sup>I, survival, mission support, and military construction.<sup>39</sup> The process has three phases: guidance development, assessment, and resource constrained prioritization (Figure II-6).



**Figure II-6.**  
**USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process.**

Source: USSOCOM J5, July 1995. BOD: Board of Directors; CBPL: Capabilities Based Programs List; POM: Program Objective Memorandum (of DoD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System).

*Guidance Development* steps define the planning environment (threat, strategic guidance, assumptions,

legal requirements, etc.), identify SOF tasks and current capabilities, and develop draft planning guidance (refined during war gaming seminars and simulations) for approval by the USSOCOM Board of Directors.<sup>40</sup> The wargaming seminars are a forum for building consensus about command tasks, required capabilities, and priorities. It ensures that Board of Directors' views are incorporated into the strategic planning guidance document—the final product of the Guidance Development phase.

*Assessments* of SOF capabilities serve as a basis for SOCOM concepts for writing the POM—the program for building the resources that SOF forces will need in future years to do their job. Based on input from the guidance development phase, SOJ5 assessment directors (mentioned earlier) coordinate with a common talent pool of joint and component staff experts to determine SOF capabilities and needs in five areas: strike, engagement, mobility, support, and C<sup>4</sup>I. Assessment steps are conducting a capability analysis; developing potential solutions to deficiencies; and compiling a proposed capabilities based program list for approval by the Board of Directors. Within each assessment area on the program list, an order of priority is identified—mission essential, enhancement, or complementary. The board-approved capability based program list is the principal output of this phase.

*Resource Constrained Prioritization* is the final phase of the USSOCOM strategic planning process. Here, the program list is subjected to fiscal constraints and political considerations. Also, normative decisions based on “seasoned military judgement” affect the configuration of the final resource constrained-capabilities based programs list. Upon CINC approval, the list is transformed into the USSOCOM POM, using Office of the Secretary of Defense formats for narratives and tabulated data.

The USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process produces a management “strategy” for building the capabilities needed by SOF forces. It is a process involving a wide range of USSOCOM commanders and staff.

## **Participation.**

The USSOCOM staff is involved in the strategic planning process throughout its phases. The war game seminars and simulations provide a good opportunity to enjoin the active participation of numerous staff officers of diverse expertise. More important, still, the strategic planning process is designed to involve the USSOCOM board of directors from start to finish. These are the leaders of the command who can provide timely input to keep the process rolling: the service and joint component commanders (USASOC; AFSOC; COMNAVSPECWARCOM; JSOC); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SO-LIC); and the CINC.

## **Product.**

The final product of the strategic planning process is a program for investing in U.S. special operations forces of the future. It is a program that seeks to enhance SOF effectiveness through training, technology and corporate innovation in areas such as maritime and air mobility, weapons and munitions, C<sup>4</sup>I, survival and mission support, and military construction.

## **Conclusions.**

The supporting role of USSOCOM and its unique development (Major Force Program 11) tasks have caused the CINC to write a nontraditional strategy and planning process for the command. This is a business-type management strategy.

Congress has assigned management tasks to USSOCOM that make it unique among unified commands. For this it developed a unique strategic planning system. The strategic plan is a three-page statement of the CINC's vision, mission, values, and goals that establishes the guidelines for managing Major Force Program 11. The strategic planning process has three phases (guidance

development, assessments, resource constrained prioritization) which lead to the development of the USSOCOM POM.

## **U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND (USSOUTHCOM)**

SOUTHCOM maintains operational direction over U.S. military activities throughout Latin America from its headquarters at Quarry Heights, Panama. SOUTHCOM mission areas include: reducing inter-state and regional tensions; encouraging military accommodation to civilian control, human rights and the rule of law; engagement with regional nations and their military establishments; and supporting national drug control.<sup>41</sup>


The SOUTHCOM AOR of Central and South America is strategically significant for its maritime characteristics, with 23,000 miles of coastline and major river systems that are navigable for thousands of miles by ocean-going vessels. It contains 19 sovereign nations (but not Mexico). Operating in the region are SOUTHCOM's service components, a special operations component, and two joint task forces.<sup>42</sup>

Contemporary versions of the Southern Theater strategy first began to take form in June 1987 through the development of a strategic analysis by General Fred Woerner, then the newly appointed CINC. The analysis, called "Missions, Tasks, and Responsibilities," covered some 500 CINC responsibilities, and it became a starting point for U.S. Southern Command's theater strategy. This set the basis for the regional security strategy published in 1987 and 1988.<sup>43</sup>

The strategy development continued under General Max Thurman who saw to it that the strategy included a resources component that logically matched objectives and concepts, and that the strategy was implemented with campaign plans for Central America, Andean Ridge, and Southern Cone subregions. Thurman made an effort to talk with and understand key civilian leaders in Washington and the U.S. ambassadors in his region. He conducted subregion planning meetings with his Military Assistance

Group commanders to ensure that military plans reflected support for the ambassadors' country plans. Thurman included a marketing plan as a way of informing the interagency leadership about the strategy and gaining their support. In addition, the U.S. ambassadors' country plans were an integral part of the strategy formulation process.

The maturing of the strategy was briefly interrupted in 1989 by Operation JUST CAUSE. In August 1990, General Thurman recruited four strategists from each branch of the armed services to establish his Strategy Division. They arrived as he went into the hospital to battle cancer, but with the blueprint he left to them (Figure II-7), they produced the USSOUTHCOM theater strategy in the spring of 1992. At that time theater strategy was not coordinated within the SOUTHCOM staff because the strategic direction and course corrections came directly to the Strategy Division from the new CINC, General George Joulwan.



**Figure II-7.**  
**USSOUTHCOM 1990 Strategy Development Process.**

Source: USSOUTHCOM J5, March 1990.

The objectives of this strategy have continued in force until the present: enhance military professionalism in regional democracies; promote peace and stability to encourage economic development and growth of democracy; support counterdrug activities; implement the Panama Canal treaties.

The remarkable thing about the strategy was its influence on how resources were then expended in the theater. Sent to every Chief of Mission, Chief of Security Assistance Office (SAO), and leading U.S. agencies in the theater, the strategy incorporated the needs and plans of the interagency group. The strategy's objectives found their way into the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy*, an interesting twist on the "cart before the horse."<sup>44</sup>

In 1994, General Barry McCaffrey began the process of updating this strategy to bring it in line with subsequent versions of the NSS and NMS. His regional strategy rested on a set of principles for U.S. military behavior in the region rather than upon a traditional framework for regional military strategy. These principles (or general goals) were described as: building regional cooperative security; developing military roles and missions for the 21st century (human rights and subordination to civilian authority); supporting the National Drug Control Strategy; restructuring SOUTHCOM for the future.

## **Process.**

General McCaffrey worked with his command group, especially his special assistants to the CINC, in developing his strategic concepts. These five staff officers assist the CINC with developing high-level documents such as the annual statement to the Congress, speeches to international audiences, and policy direction to the command. Typically, the CINC's policy and strategy statements are coordinated with DoD. For example, the CINC's remarks about his strategy given to the Ministers of Defense of the Hemisphere at the Williamsburg Defense Ministerial of the

Americas on July 24, 1995, were first briefed to then Secretary of Defense William Perry. The Perry-approved remarks outlined the CINC's strategic concepts concerning military confidence and security building measures, defense cooperation, and his vision for the role of the armed forces in the 21st century. In this manner, the CINC added to his portfolio of strategic concepts found in other speeches and reports, the sum of which constituted SOUTHCOM's regional policy. General McCaffrey's departure from the command in the spring of 1996 prompted a new strategy assessment, and the cycle of building a "strategy" began anew.

### **Participation.**

While the principal strategist is the CINC, he receives input from his component commanders as well. Staff officers (and component staffs) contribute to the SOUTHCOM strategy process as requested. As an illustration, in September 1995, DoD published the *United States Security Strategy for the Americas*, a 35-page document establishing general strategic guidelines for military actions throughout Latin America. Although the *Strategy for the Americas* is a DoD document, staff officers of SOUTHCOM participated in its development.

### **Product.**

The *United States Security Strategy for the Americas* of September 1995 is an encompassing vision for the region provided by former Defense Secretary William J. Perry. SOUTHCOM's strategic documents under the tenure of General McCaffrey consisted of the CINC's command briefing, statements before the U.S. Congress, and other official speeches and articles. Some examples are the CINC's "Statement Before the House National Security Committee," March 8, 1995; the USSOUTHCOM Human Rights Policy (PM 1-95) of June 16, 1995; Williamsburg remarks to the Ministers of Defense of the Hemisphere, July 24, 1995; a speech, "Partners in Regional Peace and

Security," given at the annual National Defense University-SOUTHCOM Strategy Symposium in Miami, April 25, 1995; and the article "Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations" in the Hispano-American edition of *Military Review*, January-February 1995.

## **Conclusions.**

Southern Theater strategy and operations are focused on military operations other than war. The 1992 USSOUTHCOM strategy, finally published under General Joulwan, provided a useful example for other combatant commands because it was not based on Cold War assumptions. Rather, the strategy addressed dealing with nontraditional (transnational) threats, overcoming the scourge of drugs, and strengthening socio-economic reforms as ways to strengthen democratic institutions.

The strategy of the early 1990s was set aside during the command of General McCaffrey and replaced with a set of principles and policy guidelines. The SOUTHCOM staff is now reassessing strategy requirements in light of the movement of the command from Panama to Miami in 1998 and the guidance from the new CINC.

## **U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)**

The Strategic Command mission is to "deter a major military attack on the United States and its allies and, should deterrence fail, employ forces."<sup>45</sup> This includes conducting worldwide strategic reconnaissance and ensuring command, control, communications, and intelligence for strategic force employment. STRATCOM plans operations in designated areas such as parts of the former Soviet Union. Another aspect of the STRATCOM mission is to support the nuclear planning of the geographic CINCs.

USSTRATCOM is located at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska. In the peacetime environment, CINCSTRAT exercises his full combatant command



authority over single purpose nuclear forces through the two STRATCOM Air Force components, Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Force Space Command. Dual-purpose forces (nuclear and conventional capable aircraft) are not assigned to STRATCOM in peacetime.

In wartime, CINCSTRAT would establish his command and control of nuclear forces through commanders of task forces (CTF). According to Brigadier General Orin L. Godsey, former STRATCOM Deputy Director of Operations and Logistics, "we would deal directly with a bomber task force commander, a tanker task force commander, and [land and sea] missile task force commanders."<sup>46</sup>

U.S. strategic nuclear forces are among the most powerful and decisive instruments of military strategy and national grand strategy. Therefore, the CINC's strategy largely reflects the guidance found in Presidential directives, NCA policy documents, Joint Staff directives, and it accounts for conditions set forth in international agreements concerning strategic arms limitations (e.g., START II) and nonproliferation.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), conducted by DoD through the summer of 1994 has had a direct influence on STRATCOM's nuclear strategy. The NPR recognized that Russian reform could fail, and that Russian retention of some 25,000 nuclear weapons would require a "nuclear hedge."<sup>47</sup> Hedging as a strategy has been defined by STRATCOM as maintaining ". . . approximate strategic capability relative to extant nuclear forces in the former Soviet Union and . . . sufficient readiness on the part of U.S. nuclear forces to respond to the rapid pace at which adverse political change could take place."<sup>48</sup>

STRATCOM's responsibilities extended beyond central nuclear warfighting, and the command now supports regional strategies, contingency operations and counterproliferation actions. Thus, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is no longer a stand-alone document prepared by the former Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff; rather, it is now prepared by the

STRATCOM Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, and is a target list integrated into the Joint Staff's *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP). As one CINC put it to USSTRATCOM, "I want a nuclear 'hired gun' so I can pick up the telephone, call, and have STRATCOM do everything else."<sup>49</sup>

The STRATCOM staff has developed a strategic war planning system (SWPS) to provide a timely and adaptable war planning capability against a wide variety of contingencies. The process provides multiple options to National Command Authorities to meet unforeseen circumstances, and it communicates selected options to nuclear-capable forces in the field.<sup>50</sup> The SWPS was developed because of the changed nature of the threat, increased planning requirements for rapid response, and the significant reduction in the U.S. nuclear force structure.

### **Process.**

In December 1992 a 10-person planning team called the Strategic Planning Study Group was organized and tasked to conduct a comprehensive review of strategic planning. This is the group that created the SWPS.<sup>51</sup> A planning process was needed which could rapidly develop a flexible SIOF to meet new threats such as regional instability, the rise of hostile regional powers, proliferation of WMD, and the residual nuclear capability of the republics of the former Soviet Union.<sup>52</sup>


The J-5 planners reviewed procedures concerning deliberate and crisis action planning and compatibility with the geographic CINCs' strategies. Then planners examined requirements for the SIOF, crisis action procedures, non-strategic nuclear forces and support for strategic conventional forces.

An important consideration in the strategy planning process was the use of credible computer-aided modeling techniques to speed-up the planning process. The "software" had to be acceptable to the Joint planning community and

flexible enough to respond to changing warfighting requirements.

The result of STRATCOM's initiative to streamline strategic planning has been a process dubbed the "Living SIOP" by former CINCSTRAT, Air Force General George Lee Butler. The living SIOP evolved from an appreciation of a threat environment which could demand small and rapid changes to targeting, even updated on a daily basis. Substantial changes in U.S. nuclear force structure or in targeting will require a major plan revision lasting several months.

As a part of this planning process, STRATCOM provides supporting documents that can become counter-WMD sections (or annexes) to the supported CINCs contingency plans. Figure II-8 illustrates the Theater Planning Support Process.



**Figure II-8.**  
**USSTRATCOM Theater Planning Support Process.**

Source: USSTRATCOM J5, April 1995.

### **Participation.**

Because the nuclear mission and forces of USSTRATCOM are a central and conspicuous part of U.S. national strategy, leaders at the top levels of government contribute toward the development of the CINC's strategic

concepts. About 20 Presidential Decision Directives, and additional Secretary of Defense guidance such as the Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan (NUWEP), provide National Command Authorities' guidance to the STRATCOM staff.<sup>53</sup> Sometimes the impact of Presidential decisions on strategic planning is dramatic, such as the Presidential Nuclear Initiative of September 1991, which withdrew nuclear weapons from the theater CINCs' areas of responsibility (except for gravity bombs in Europe).<sup>54</sup> The President and Secretary of Defense directly participate in the approval sequence for some STRATCOM planning, particularly the SIOP.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, national fora involving Congress, government officials, and the informed public have directly influenced STRATCOM's force structure and strategic planning. For example, results from the Secretary of Defense's 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 1994 Nuclear Posture Review determined, in great measure, the resources to conduct the STRATCOM mission.

The SIOP is now being incorporated into the JSCP (Annex C) according to Chairman JCS Instructions 3110.3. Thus, planners on the Joint Staff have a contribution to make towards the development of CINCSTRAT's strategic plans.

CINCSTRAT plays a direct role in developing his strategic concepts and writing a "vision" statement for OPLAN 8044 and the like. In addition, he "enjoys" considerable help from outside sources in the U.S. Government because of the sensitive and important role that nuclear weapons play in national military strategy. The key staff player assisting the CINC is his J5.

## **Product.**

The result of CINCSTRAT's strategic planning initiatives has been a new form of SIOP developed by the Strategic War Planning System that was designed to respond to changes in the strategic environment and to

quick-action tasking from the National Command Authorities.

An annual posture statement, prepared to inform Congress, is the single document which provides an overview of the CINC's strategic concepts. Beyond that, the CINC's operation plans and operation plans in concept format provide specific direction to subordinates. CINCSTRATCOM does not produce a written strategy document in the manner of the geographic CINCs.

### **Conclusions.**

Leaders at the top levels of government contribute strategic objectives and concepts that guide STRATCOM operations. CINCSTRAT does not have a traditional strategy. Rather, he keys on other combined and unified command strategies for input because he is tasked to provide nuclear support to the geographic CINCs. National fora including government officials and the public have also influenced STRATCOM's planning and force structure.

### **CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS**

Because the U.S. CINCs key on the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* as base lines for their strategic planning, there is a degree of continuity among the combatant commands planning processes—at least in terms of the general security policy. However, the extent to which planning staffs systematically use the range of threat assessment resources available clearly varies from command to command. Also, the planning processes, scope, formats, and currency of the CINCs' strategy documents vary widely within commands—based on the CINCs' interests and what they want to do about strategic planning.

In some cases a combatant command is without a current CINC-approved strategy document. Still, there is a need for coherent and up-to-date strategy documents to provide guidance to subordinates and to facilitate

interagency coordination. The following chapter suggests a need for new joint doctrine for the unified commands' strategic planning process.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER II

1. Richard M. Swain, "Lucky War," Third Army in Desert Storm, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994, p.329.

2. Paul David Miller, "A New Mission for the Atlantic Command," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 1, Summer 1993, p. 80. Other major components and units are: Special Operations Command, Atlantic (SOCLANT); U.S. Forces Azores, Lajes Field, Azores; Iceland Defense Force, Keflavik, Iceland; contingency joint task forces (e.g., TF 120, TF 140); counterdrug Joint Interagency TF East (JIATF-EAST) at Key West; counterdrug Joint Task Force Six at El Paso.

3. *Air Force News*, October 5, 1993, via Internet, <William\_OMalley@rand.org>, October 6, 1993, item 726.

4. U.S. Atlantic Command, Strategic Plan 1994, Norfolk, VA: 1993, p. 4.

5. William J. Clinton, "Commanders' Area of Responsibility [unclassified map]," *Unified Command Plan*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 1997.

6. Doug Rodgers, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Command, J-54, to authors, Fort Leavenworth, January 9, 1996.

7. Strategic Plan 1994, p. 5.

8. The USCINCLANT Theater Strategy was a detailed strategy for guiding operations in the Area of Responsibility, but it did not cover the added missions of joint force integrator and provider.

9. James F. Knight, Colonel, USA, Chief, Strategy Division, Memorandum, "Development of USACOM Theater Strategy 2010," Norfolk, VA: USACOM J5, November 30, 1994, p. 1.

10. *Ibid.*

11. U.S. Central Command Briefing, "Theater Strategy," MacDill Air Force Base, FL: January 17, 1995, Figure 5, USCENTCOM Mission.

12. *Unified Command Plan.*

13. Colonel Bryan A. Sutherland, U.S. Army, Chief, Plans Division, CCJ5-P, interview by author (Mendel) at Headquarters, USCENTCOM, Tampa, FL: August 27, 1992.

14. Joseph P. Hoar, General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, interview by author (Mendel), Headquarters, USCENTCOM, Tampa, FL: August 27, 1992. These tiers are described as “national self defense, regional collective defense, and support by an extra-regional coalition” in CINCCENT’s 1993 Posture Statement, p. 35. In his *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: January 1993, p. 9, Cheney provides the operative guidance: “Should the states of the region be unable to deter threats to our mutual or critical interests, the United States must be prepared to dispatch decisive force to the region to contain or reverse potential aggression.”

15. U.S. Central Command Briefing, Slide CB08031L6/23/93:J3g and briefing to authors, Tampa, FL: January 17, 1995.

16. Sutherland interview. The Joint Strategy Review is designed to begin the 2-year cycle of the U.S. Joint Strategic Planning System. It is the process for gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of the [national military] strategy, operational planning, and program assessments. See Chairman, JCS Memorandum of Policy 7, Joint Strategic Planning System, 1st Revision, Washington, DC: JCS, March 17, 1993.

17. The JROC process provides program recommendations and budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense. “JROC has emerged as a principal forum in which senior military leaders (VCJCS and the service vice chiefs) address requirements from a joint perspective.” See Admiral William A. Owens, U.S. Navy, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1994, pp. 55-77.

18. Commander Larry S. Barton, U.S. Navy, Plans Division, CCJ5-PL, interview by authors, at Headquarters, USCENTCOM, Tampa, FL: January 17, 1995.

19. Interviews with J5 officers at Headquarters U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL: August 27, 1992, and January 17, 1995.

20. Sutherland interview.

21. Colonel Larry C. Franks, U.S. Army, Chief, Policy and Strategy Division, J5, interview by authors, Headquarters U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL: March 31, 1995.

22. USEUCOM service components are: United States Army Europe (USAREUR) at Heidelberg, Germany; United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) located at Ramstein Air Base, Germany; United States Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) located in London. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) is a sub-unified command of USEUCOM.

23. Discussion based on George A. Joulwan, General, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, USEUCOM Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness (USEUCOM), Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany, February 1995.

24. U.S. European Command Directive Number 56-10, "USEUCOM Theater Security Planning System," Plans and Policy Directorate, ECJ-5, USEUCOM, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany: n.d., pp. 1-13.

25. Douglas J. Murray, Colonel, U.S. Army, U.S. European Command, Plans and Policy Directorate, ECJ5, "Theater Security Planning System (TSPS), Planning Regional Security into the 21st Century," briefing slides, USEUCOM, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany: n.d., Slide 13.

26. Suggested by U.S. Army War College analysts James O. Kievit and Douglas C. Lovelace.

27. "U.S. Pacific Command at a Glance," Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, J01PA, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, n.d., p. 1. Document from USPACOM J-5, January 17, 1995, Camp Smith.

28. The subunified commands include U.S. Forces Japan at Yokota Air Base, U.S. Forces Korea in Seoul, Alaskan Command at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and Special Operations Command Pacific at Camp Smith, Hawaii. PACOM Joint Task Forces include Joint Interagency Task Force West for counterdrug support located at March Air Force Base, California; Joint Task Force Full Accounting for prisoner of war accountability located at Camp Smith; and Joint Task Force 510 for the conduct of selected missions in the region. USCINCPAC also exercises combatant command through his assigned service component commanders.

29. Karl Eulenstein and others, U.S. Pacific Command, USPACOM Strategy for the Year 2010, Camp Smith, Hawaii, October 11, 1989, pp. 59-62. "In recent months, we conducted a number of strategy brainstorming sessions with members of the USCINCPAC staff. The ideas that came out of those sessions have in large part become study recommendations."



30. James Fondren, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Policy and Strategy Division, J-51, Directorate for Strategic Planning and Policy, J-5, U.S. Pacific Command, interview with authors, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, January 31, 1995.

31. Edward Hoffer, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Strategic Plans Division, J-54, Directorate for Strategic Planning and Policy, J-5, U.S. Pacific Command, interview with authors, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, January 31, 1995.

32. Confidence-building measures included in the strategy reflect the CINC's desire to create transparencies in regional military affairs. These include white paper exchanges, conferences, disaster relief meetings, participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum and other activities that encourage dialogue among regional militaries.

33. David Fastabend, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Executive Assistant, J001S, U.S. Pacific Command, telephone call interview from Mendel to Fastabend at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, April 13, 1995.

34. Wayne A. Downing, General, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM, *U.S. Special Operations Command, Strategic Plan*, Tampa, Florida, February 1994. Also, 10 USC 167 provides mission mandated by Congress.

35. H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and Wayne A. Downing, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement*, Washington, DC: ASD/SO-LIC, 1994, Appendix B, Force Structure. Component commands include: Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, near San Diego, California; and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), also under the command authority of USCINCSOC, is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

36. Wayne A. Downing, General, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, "Memorandum for All Members of Special Operations Command, Subject: Special Operations Command Strategic Plan," Tampa, Florida: USSOCOM, February 11, 1994, p. 1.

37. Downing, "Special Operations Command Strategic Plan."

*People*—our command is centered on people; training them, equipping them, and caring for them. *Creativity*—accomplishing our demanding missions with innovative and

original solutions to complex problems. *Competence*—our missions demand we constantly maintain the highest levels of tactical and technical competence—continuous improvement is our trademark. *Courage*—our service requires uncompromising moral and physical courage under all conditions. *Integrity*—our nation expects a force that can be trusted with the most sensitive missions, can be relied on to guard the Nation's values, and will operate to the highest moral standards.

38. Corson L. Hilton, Colonel, U.S. Army, Deputy Director for Policy, J5, U.S. Special Operations Command, "USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process" briefing to authors, Tampa, Florida, January 18, 1995.

39. For example, the SOF budget for FY 95 in \$millions was \$3047.5 distributed this way: Personnel (in service accounts), 1281.1; Operations and Maintenance, 996.9; Procurement, 518.9; Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation, 215.5; Military Construction, 35. See Holmes, *Posture Statement*, p. c-1.

40. The SOCOM Board of Directors is the decisionmaking body of the strategic planning process, and the Board is the key player in the CINC's wargame. The Board consists of the CINC, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the component commanders of USASOC, AFSOC, NAVSPECWARCOM, and JSOC.

41. Barry R. McCaffrey, General, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Statement before the U.S. Congress, House National Security Committee, Washington, DC, March 8, 1995, p. 1. Also, United States Southern Command, Fact Sheets, "Profile of the United States Southern Command," March 24, 1992; and "Panama Canal Treaties of 1977," Quarry Heights, Panama: USSOUTHCOM, SCPA, January 27, 1992.

42. Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo), located at Soto Cano Air Base, near Comayagua, Honduras has a mission of operating a C-5 aircraft capable air base and supporting contingency, counterdrug and nation assistance operations. *Joint Interagency TF South (JIATF-South)*, located at Howard Air Force Base, supports the National Drug Control Strategy and the National Drug Interdiction Plan.

43. John T. Fishel, Professor of Security Strategy, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "The US Military and Security in Latin America in the Clinton Era," Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, 1993, p. 7.

44. David G. Bradford, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE), and former command strategist for USCINCSAC, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM, letter to authors, February 22, 1996.

45. "United States Strategic Command, Strategic Deterrence . . . Foundation of America's Security," pamphlet, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Strategic Command, 1994.

46. James W. Canan, "The New Order in Omaha," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1994, p. 28.

47. William J. Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Remarks to the Henry L. Stimson Center, September 20, 1994; *CINCSTRAT Newsgram*, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Strategic Command, Autumn 1994, p. 1.

48. "Nuclear Forces Post 1994," CINCSTRATCOM Staff Group, J004, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Strategic Command, July 12, 1994, reprinted in *CINCSTRAT Newsgram*, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Strategic Command, Autumn 1994.

49. Interview by the authors with USSTRATCOM planners, April 25, 1995, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

50. Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, United States Strategic Command, "Posture Statement," before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 23, 1995, *CINCSTRAT Newsgram*, Winter 1995, p. 8.

51. George Lee Butler, General, U.S. Air Force, former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, "Reengineering Nuclear War Planning," U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: December 16, 1993, p. 4. Butler paper provided authors by STRATCOM Public Affairs Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paula L. Hoffman, April 26, 1995. Description of planning process is based on General Butler's paper.

52. The Cold War SIOP took about 18 months to build; today it takes about 6 months, and there are adaptive planning options for developing new courses of action within 24 hours.

53. William R. Coy, Jr., Commander, U.S. Navy, USSTRATCOM J513, interview by authors, April 25, 1995, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

54. John T. Parsons, Deputy Chief, Contingency Planning Cell, J534, interview by authors, April 25, 1995, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Also, Coy interview.

55. According to Joint Staff administrative guidelines (MOP 132 and 133), most OPLANS are approved at the level of the Deputy Operations Deputies, Operations Deputies, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Chairman, JCS.

# CHAPTER III

## THE CINCs' STRATEGIES

The Germans won many operations in the World War but lost the last one, and with it the entire war. Ludendorff, who had made outstanding achievements in operational art, was unable to combine a series of operational successes to gain even the slightest advantages when Germany concluded peace, and ultimately all his successes did not do Germany the slightest bit of good.

Strategy is the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by the war. . . .

Aleksandr A. Svechin  
General-Major, Red Army  
Moscow, 1927

Should there be a binding joint doctrine for preparing a CINC's strategy? In this chapter, the authors assess the planning environment, summarize their observations, and offer some recommendations for change. The imprint of experiences gained during the course of research with the CINCs' staffs are traced here. In spite of the inevitable change in strategies and processes caused by the assignment of new faces to planning staffs, or new direction from the CINCs since the writing of this study, these insights afford useful generalizations. They suggest a basis for developing service and joint doctrine concerning a CINC's strategy document.

### **ASSESSING THE PLANNING ENVIRONMENT: THE CURRENT STRATEGIES**

While not all CINCs have a formal, focused planning effort with a product, every combatant command has a strategy of some sort. But this is a generous observation. The problem is that some strategies are not formed into

coherent documents that staff, service components and the larger military community can use as a resource for planning and coordination. And, strategies can lapse into a period of intermission, until interest in strategic planning is renewed. There are a number of explanations.

## **Do All Combatant Commands have a Current Strategy Document?**

Command strategies are often published as part of the CINC's annual series of reports to Congress—in the posture statements. In some commands, the only current and approved “strategy” is seen as the last edition of the command briefing. Elsewhere, the staff finds the CINC's vision and intent in the series of statements to Congress, command briefings, speeches, and published articles. In a practical sense, these kinds of presentations and documents are not readily available to staff and component planners, or to the interagency actors with whom the command must deal.


CINCs new to the job are captured by the demands of urgent, “real world” issues. Staff officers commonly perceive that the strategy process is “personality driven,” and that the CINCs' do not require “any rudder orders” to tell them when to write a strategy. As one Joint Staff planner remarked, “The CINC's strategy is his own, he works for the President and SECDEF, and sends us a copy of his strategy as a courtesy.”<sup>1</sup> The end result of the current mode of strategic planning is that the CINCs' strategies are found in varying states of currency or relevance to the stratetgic environment.

## **Where Do the CINCs Look for Strategic Guidance?**

Without exception, the U.S. CINCs look to the *National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy* for policy and strategy guidance to develop command strategies. Even though these documents can be criticized for their generalizations and often vague references to the means (resources) of strategy, these two basic documents have

proven their worthiness as a policy foundation for military strategy.<sup>2</sup>

That strategic planners in all the commands depend on these documents to set the stage for regional and functional assessments is testimony about the central importance of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (PL 99-433), which established the requirement for the NSS. Figure III-1 shows the general relationships of the CINCs' strategies to other key documents and processes.



**Figure III-1.**  
**CINC's Strategy and National Strategic Direction.**

Source: Authors, *Parameters*, December 1988.

The importance of these documents for maintaining the continuity of strategic military planning cannot be overstated. Military planners rely on policy statements and strategic goals to establish the major themes under which they will plan. The criticality of this strategic framework was seen in the empty period of February 1993 through July 1994 when a current NSS did not exist, and about the same

period (through February 1995) when a new NMS did not exist.<sup>3</sup> Early in 1995 a unified command strategic planner remarked, "The fact that we didn't have an NSS or NMS has made our strategy process very difficult . . . there is no common theme for writing a theater strategy. . . ." <sup>4</sup> Now, sufficient guidance is available.

The series of regional strategies provided to the planning community by the former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry amplifies national security policy on a regional basis. Because the CINCs' staffs participate to varying degrees in the development of these documents, these strategy reports have potential for unifying strategic thinking among policymakers in Washington and the combatant commands in the field. This is a new series of documents and combatant command staffs are beginning to make use of them. As yet, DoD has not extended this open report series to functional areas such as counter-proliferation, power projection (especially intertheater transportation), and counterdrug support. It would be helpful if DoD would continued to update and promulgate this series of documents.

Adding to these guidance documents, strategic planners are informed by the series of documents inherent in the Defense Planning Systems, especially the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).<sup>5</sup> The JSPS is largely seen by planners in the field as the Chairman's system, helping him to discharge his duty to provide strategic plans and direction for the armed forces. But within the Chairman's Joint Strategic Planning System are the mid-range *National Military Strategy* and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP) of current military strategy. Both documents have proven themselves to be fundamental building blocks for the CINCs strategies and operation plans.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) indirectly contributes to the CINCs strategies by guiding the process for developing the plans and orders that will accomplish strategic objectives. JOPES provides the standing procedures to support putting the CINCs'



strategies and campaign plans into operation (but it has little to do with writing a strategy).<sup>6</sup>

As can be seen, the CINCs' strategic planners make use of a number of guiding documents ranging from the broad policy of the NSS to the specific near-term tasks of the JSCP. What, then, are the doctrinal guidelines?

## **What is the Doctrinal Guidance?**

If doctrine is defined as fundamental principles by which the military guides actions in support of national objectives, then slim as it is, there is some doctrinal reference to the CINCs' strategies.<sup>7</sup> The fact that the CINCs have and make use of strategies that connect operational activities in the field with national strategy is acknowledged in the Joint Pubs.<sup>8</sup> But, while there is reference to the "CINCs strategies" running through joint doctrine, there is no specific guidance for what a strategy might look like, how it should be kept current, who might review (indeed, approve) a combatant command strategy, and what might be the basic elements of such a strategy.

That there is no specific guidance concerning the CINCs' strategies suggests that a new Joint Pub about strategy would be helpful. Or, perhaps a Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures manual would be useful in outlining actions and methods for writing a CINC's strategy.<sup>9</sup>

## **Why are the CINCs' Strategy Documents Important?**

Why should CINCs write a strategy at all? After all, some would contend that the national-level documents described above provide ample policy guidance, objectives and strategic concepts—and they do it by region.

Even with the presence of a controlling national military strategy which relates political goals to theater missions, the CINCs need a strategy too. Beginning with those U.S. national interests that pertain to his theater, each CINC draws upon his own regional assessment in formulating his strategy to meet the particularized needs of his command.

In addition to the NMS, he considers the current national military strategy as set forth in the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP).<sup>10</sup> With a need to account for a number of operation plans and programs, it seems logical that a strategy could bind disparate actions within a common theme.

The interactive, supporting-supported relationships that exist among the CINCs also demonstrate the importance of having up-to-date strategy documents. This strategic interrelationship requires CINCs to know and consider adjoining theaters and those that may require support and reinforcement. Apart from the assignment of tasks in the JSCP, the exchange of combatant command strategy documents could offer insights about adjacent commanders' vision and intent for accomplishing strategic objectives.

The CINCs' strategies apply to their entire areas of responsibility throughout periods of peace, crisis, and war. (See Figure III-2) Because some portions of a geographic CINC's area may remain at peace while others experience warfare or some level of conflict, a theater strategy must be of grand scope—setting the stage for a variety of political-military endeavors. It serves to establish conditions that will support deterrence, facilitate military operations in regional war, and war termination at the end of active warfighting.

A CINC's strategy can set broad conceptual guidance for smaller conflicts, as well as direction for security assistance, support for treaties and agreements, the development of good relations with nonaligned nations, and expanding U.S. influence throughout the theater. These actions suggest a collateral or bonus function of interagency coordination that can be leveraged from such a strategy.

The CINCs' strategies are the locus of national effort in time of war, but they lack any direct authority over affairs of state and commerce (particularly in peacetime). Nevertheless, the geographic CINCs' strategies have the potential for linking all the elements of national power

THE CINCs' STRATEGIES			
COMMAND	STRATEGY	AREA	PROCESS
ACOM	Strategic Plan (1)	AOR	Staff Coord
CENTCOM	Posture Statement	Gulf Focus	Directive, Conference
EUCOM	"Engagement & Preparedness"	4 Th of Opns	EC Dir 56-10 "TSPS"
PACOM	"Cooperative Engagement"	6 Th of Opns	CP Inst 3050.6
SOUTHCOM	(Engagement, Coop Regional Security) (1)	3 Sub Regions	(1)
SOCOM	"Total Quality Leadership"	SOF Unique Resourcing (2)	SOCOM Strat Pin Process
STRATCOM	"Hedging" "Living SIOP"	Global Support	SWPS

Notes: (1.) New strategy/process/formats under development; (2.) SOF functional areas of operations and maintenance, and procurement programs for equipment, systems, facilities; SIOP: Single Integrated Operational Plan; SWPS: Strategic War Planning System; TSPS: Theater Security Planning System.

**Figure III-2.**  
**Summary of Strategies.**

(political, economic, informational, military) into a coordinated whole to achieve some specific national policy objectives in a region. Perhaps the practical utility of this notion can be seen in peacetime, in functional areas of national policy.

For example, the drug interdiction parts of U.S. Southern Command's regional strategy provides the integrating objectives, concepts and resources for U.S. and combined initiatives in the Southern Region. U.S. Special Operations Command could contribute to the issue of CONUS defense against WMD use by non-state actors. Both commands could provide coordinating centers to integrate U.S. interagency activities and provide the command and control support during a crisis.

The CINCs' strategies look ahead to influence the Defense programming and budgeting systems and provide the long-range guidance for command activities. The strategies provide the reasons for asking the services to program (and Congress fund) the types and amounts of military resources needed to execute the strategy with a reasonable assurance of success.

Since 1984, the CINCs' submissions of Integrated Priority Lists to the Defense Planning Resources Board has given the combatant commands a voice in the program review process. In the past few years, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has become a significant venue for prioritizing military resources. With justification cogently stated within a compelling strategy document (and in subordinate operation plans), a CINC can better win the support of these forums, which meet to review conflicting service positions on program budget decisions alongside the CINC's requests.

## **What is the Planning Process?**

The processes for developing and maintaining the CINCs' strategies are all different, and in some cases a formal process is not in place. As often as not, the process is one of developing the CINC's annual (usually February) statement to Congress, then using this testimony as a basis for updating the command briefing. In a practical sense, the command brief becomes "the CINC's strategy" for some combatant commands.

In some commands (described in Chapter II), specific strategy processes are firmly embedded in the planning routines of commanders and staff. A good example of this is found in the combined effect of EUCOM's *Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness* and its *Theater Security Planning System* (Directive Number 56-10). And PACOM's *Command Strategy* is directed by *USCINCPAC Instruction 3050.6*, a long-standing framework for the Pacific Region military strategy. Still, except for PACOM, these directives place their emphasis on implementing the strategy more

than on the process of developing and maintaining a strategy document. Oftentimes a strategy document bubbles-up from the bottom of the planner's caldron when the CINC's interest increases the heat.

In fact, there is no established standing procedure for developing and maintaining a combatant command strategy document. Now that U.S. military strategy has moved from global warfighting to regional scenarios, the Defense Secretary's series of Regional Strategy Reports may prove fortuitous in lending some structure to the strategy process—especially in guiding the major regional themes used by geographic CINCs.

### **Is There a Common Theme to the CINCs' Strategies?**

If the planning process for developing the CINCs' strategy documents sounds cacophonous, there is a great deal of harmony in the substance of the CINC's strategies. Because the CINCs focus on the NSS and NMS, there tends to be a uniformity in the common strategic objectives and concepts of strategy.

The *National Military Strategy* objectives of “promoting stability” and “thwarting aggression” are found throughout the CINCs' strategies, as are its three major strategic concepts: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting to win. When it comes to the core objectives and concepts of National Military Strategy, the CINCs are on the same sheet of music.

After the major themes are acknowledged, each combatant command accommodates to different environments and tasks. Most geographic CINCs have conceptually structured their strategies with subregions to facilitate command and control. And combatant commands have functional sections of their strategies for tasks such as managing security assistance, supporting national counterdrug policies, and countering the nontraditional threats such as proliferation of WMD.

## Do the CINCs' Strategies Recognize the Full Range of Security Challenges?

Identifying and evaluating new and enduring threats to U.S. interests is a formidable task for strategic planners. While a number of traditional security problems remain of great concern—e.g., the rise of regional hegemons and a requirement to conduct major regional contingencies—less well-defined dangers have assumed new and sometimes prominent places in theater planning considerations. The CINCs' peacetime engagement tasks have brought most of the combatant commands face-to-face with these nontraditional threats. These dangers to U.S. interests defy the *National Military Strategy's* central themes of fighting to win with clear objectives and decisive force. The combatant commands' strategies have placed strong emphasis on peacetime engagement activities such as counterdrug and counterterrorism support operations, peace operations, nation assistance, and disaster relief. Thrust into the new strategic environment which defines the post-Cold War era, the CINCs' strategies acknowledge the challenges presented by military operations in ill-defined situations such as U.N. Operations for Somalia (UNOSOM II) (1993); the Rwanda humanitarian crisis operation, Support Hope (1994); the invasion of Haiti, Operation Restore Democracy (1994); and continuing operations in Bosnia and Macedonia.

Deterring the use of WMD by unfriendly countries, fighting in a WMD environment, and countering the proliferation of WMD are common strategy concepts. Typically, the specific tasks to accomplish these concepts are integral parts of numbered operation plans and plans for various contingencies. Counterproliferation initiatives at CINC level are often seen as part of established contingency planning procedures, though this is not always the case. There is an understanding of the shortcomings in the interagency process for responding to WMD crisis, and regional planners see the first line of defense as political and policy initiatives taken at high levels of government to discourage or preclude WMD proliferation.

## Do Strategies Effectively Link Ends, Ways, and Means?

Several of the unified commands have developed management tools for maintaining an effective linkage of ends-ways-means. USEUCOM has a resource allocation methodology that is integral to its theater security planning system (TSPS). EUCOM engagement activity managers (officers responsible for exercises, traditional CINC's programs, security assistance, and so on) develop annexes to support campaign plans. These engagement activity annexes help to ensure that resources are expended in line with the CINC's strategic intent and priorities. USPACOM uses a system of spread sheets called the cooperative engagement matrix. This allows the CINC to review the resource allocation for each country activity in his AOR.

USSOCOM has a strategic planning process for programming SOF-unique equipment, systems, and facilities. Much as a service staff, SOCOM also supports SOF training and doctrine development. In this unique case, the SOCOM "Total Quality Leadership" strategy is one of military resource management.

In some cases, command resource allocation is based on historical data (the usual expenditures) and overseen by resource managers. The positive linkage of resources to strategic priorities, phasing, objectives, and concepts is not always evident.

Without effectively linking ends and ways to means, strategy becomes hopeful thinking. Yet this seems to be the most difficult part of building a strategy. Commands that involve all staff directorates in the strategy planning process are likely to be more successful in linking *ends* and *ways* to *means* than those which confine strategy development to a few strategic planners or to the Command Group.

## **Who Participates in Writing a Strategy, and Who Approves It?**

Participants in the process for designing a strategy document vary widely among the combatant commands—and it is not a safe assumption that the CINC is personally and routinely involved. As a generalization, two patterns of staff behavior are evident. In some cases the strategy document is developed much as if it were an operation plan guided by the JOPEs deliberate planning process. Here, command assessments, planning directives, staff meetings, and planning conferences are techniques which apply.

In other cases, the strategy is developed by the CINC with the help of a few trusted agents, who then coordinate the nearly final product with staff and service components. Thus the strategy is at times a significant consensus building document for promulgating vision and intent, and it can also be little more than a proclamation of current policy.

The approving authority for a CINC's strategy document is the CINC. There is no requirement to write a strategy and no place to submit it. There is not an established timetable for routine updates to it. The CINC's strategy document is not part of the *Unified Command Plan* or the JSPS, and it is not required by the *Unified Action Armed Forces*, the CINCs' doctrinal guidelines for combatant command.<sup>11</sup>

### **SUMMING-UP: A NEED FOR THE CINCS' STRATEGY DOCUMENTS**

With so much as prologue, let us now identify the several compelling reasons why every CINC should develop a strategy document to carry the overarching themes for his command. First, a strategy provides the CINC's vision and guidance for a myriad of activities that protect U.S. interests within geographic or functional areas of responsibility. Commanders of subordinate theaters of operations can benefit from the unifying action of a theater strategy. As a statement of ends, ways and means, such a



strategy is broad and all-encompassing—it ties things together.

Second, because of the way our nation has organized its joint forces to fight under the combatant command of the geographic CINCs, a strategy is needed to integrate the many U.S. and multilateral regional activities involved. CINCs must account for U.S. policy and interests, alliances, economic and political issues, WMD, new technologies, and information warfare. And the gigantic scope of strategic fundamentals such as time (peacetime activities, crisis periods, wartime) and geography (theaters of war, theaters of operations) demands the unifying structure of a strategy document. This is especially true of commands with functional responsibilities (e.g. SOCOM, STRATCOM and Transportation Command) because they must plan globally while supporting the geographic CINCs.

Third, a strategy can be useful in pulling together the U.S. interagency cooperation and support that a CINC often will need for mission success. Knowing where the command is headed for the long haul, how peacetime activities are meant to support warfighting plans, and what government and nongovernment agencies can buttress the CINC's strategic concepts can be very helpful to combatant staffs and subordinate commands as they develop campaign plans.<sup>12</sup> Subordinates cannot deal effectively in the interagency and combined arena until they have a good understanding of the CINC's vision and intent. That the CINC's strategic wisdom might be found in his latest speech to Congress or to the Lions' Club is not sufficient: planners need a strategy document from which to draw the CINC's strategic vision.

Fourth, CINCs' strategies are critically necessary as a basis for cooperation among the combatant commands. The doctrinal imperatives of "supporting to supported" relationships suggest that the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Transportation Command (using CINCTrans as one example) would benefit from ready access to the CINCCENT and CINCPAC strategies—to have at hand those CINCs' current vision and intent for their theaters.


Other considerations are the emerging transnational dangers and nontraditional threats which tend to defy classical notions of territorial boundaries. Insurgencies, migrations, illicit drug trafficking, natural disasters, and terrorism insolently cross national frontiers (and the CINCs' AORs) without regard for international protocols. To effectively counter threats of this type, the CINCs must understand each other's strategic concepts to find ways for integrating joint effort among combatant commands.

Finally, a complete set of the CINCs' strategies would be useful to the Joint Staff and service staffs as a way of accessing the current strategic concepts of the combatant commanders. This would contribute toward a Pentagon-level understanding of the CINCs' intent. But our system of military strategies is incomplete, and there is not an integral file-set of CINCs' strategies from which to plan.

What now exists is a strategy system incompletely defined and structured, reflecting the prepermission of the U.S. joint doctrine community. Within the scheme of U.S. joint doctrine, JSPS and JOPES, the CINCs' military strategies seem to be developed willy-nilly, without regard for any formal timetable, oversight, or integration with other strategic processes. Figure III-3 suggests some possible tenets for developing a CINC's strategy document.


## **RECOMMENDING CHANGE: VIEWS ON MILITARY STRATEGY**

In spite of the development of an extensive series of new joint publications which define joint doctrine, there has been no consensus about what constitutes a CINC's strategy. But adequate guidelines exist. Colonel Art Lykke had it right in 1987 when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee ". . . that in order to talk about strategy or write about strategy, you must discuss three things: ends; ways; and means."<sup>13</sup> Figure III-4 is his definition of a military strategy. The combatant commands that have followed this formulation have produced coherent strategy documents.



**Figure III-3.  
Tenets for a CINC's Strategy.**

The Lykke formula is replicated by a definition from the same time-frame by analyst Carl Builder, who suggested that "Commanders-in-Chief's strategies [are] . . . concepts for relating the JCS-assigned means to JCS-approved ends, the latter presumably consistent with the national security strategy."<sup>14</sup> This definition hints of involvement by the Joint Staff in the development of the CINCs' strategies. In fact, there is little interaction among the Joint Staff and combatant command staffs in the development of the



**Figure III-4.  
Military Strategy.**

CINCs' strategies. Thus, the Joint planning and execution community might consider several possibilities for increasing coordination and integrating military strategic concepts among commands.

The Unified Command Plan should require that the CINCs' provide a strategy for their assigned geographic and functional areas. Doctrinal aspects can be addressed in Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF). Guidance should suggest that the CINC's strategy document be produced (updated) on a routine basis—perhaps every other year.

The CINCs' strategies should be proffered to the National Command Authorities for periodic review. The palliating notions that the CINCs “don't need rudder orders” and they “work directly for the NCA” cloud the real importance of having a coherent, current command strategy document acknowledged by higher authorities. It ought to be a strategy that enjoys the blessing of the NCA and that can serve as a baseline for cooperation and support among military commands and within the interagency arena.

The importance of the CINCs' strategies to multiagency cooperation cannot be overlooked—especially for overseas actions. By providing a long-range vision and operating dynamic for achieving national policy objectives, a well-coordinated CINC's strategy can effect a “pulling-along” of other agencies that lack the capability for liaison, planning, integrating capabilities, and providing the logistics pipeline.

The format for a CINC's strategy document is not too important—it is the content that counts. The strategy formats in the Appendix will be helpful to the planner. Most critical for writing a solid strategy, however, is that it include an assessment of the strategic environment; military objectives; military strategic concepts; and military resources.

Dissemination of the CINCs' strategies should include their routine introduction at fora such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff World Wide Strategy Conference. Largely

unclassified, they can be widely distributed within the military community and to the U.S. agencies and nongovernmental organizations that play important roles in the end-ways-means of the CINCs' strategies.

This review of the CINCs' strategies, their themes and processes, argues for the promulgation of joint procedures and doctrine to guide strategy development. Until direction concerning the process for writing these strategies is institutionalized, the issue will remain the source of debate and confusion. Just as private soldiers are held accountable for rifle marksmanship, Commanders-in-Chief should be held to some standard for current and coherent strategies affecting their combatant commands.

At the combatant command headquarters visited by the authors during the course of research, they found enthusiastic and knowledgeable joint planners, skilled in the art of military strategy. Yet, the wide variety of the products they produced suggests that the joint doctrine on this subject is incomplete.

What is needed now is the authoritative guidance that will encourage a coherent system of combatant command strategies.

### **ENDNOTES - CHAPTER III**

1. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, The Joint Staff, J-5, Washington, DC: July 27, 1994, nonattribution interview by author (Mendel). On the day of the author's visit to the Joint Staff, the J-5 strategic planner could find only the PACOM strategy document in the office.

2. Perhaps the NSS and NMS would be aptly named the National Security Policy and the National Military Policy because they are central security policy documents.

3. The last Bush administration *National Security Strategy* was published in January 1993; the Clinton administration NSS was published in July 1994. The *National Military Strategy* published in January 1992 (when General Powell was Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff) was updated by General Shalikashvili in February 1995.

4. Commander, U.S. Navy, U.S. Unified Command, Policy and Strategy Directorate, J-5, January 1995, non-attribution interview by authors.

5. Defense Planning Systems include the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System; the Joint Strategic Planning System; the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System; and the DoD Acquisition System. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is guided by the Chairman, JCS Memorandum of Policy 7. MOP 7 describes a system for key national-level actions: assessing the strategic environment (the *Joint Strategy Review*); recommending to the NCA a military strategy based on fiscal restraints (the *National Military Strategy*); amplifying the Military Strategy with concise tasks, programming priorities, and functional guidance to support Defense Planning Guidance (the *Joint Planning Document*); assigning tasks to the CINCs and Service Chiefs based on current military resources (the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*); and assessing Defense Department and service programs' ability to support the National Military strategy and other strategic plans (*Chairman's Program Assessment*).

6. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System is a standardized way to develop and document the operation plans and orders by which a CINC accomplishes the objectives of his strategy and other assigned tasks. JOPEs is guided by these Joint Publications: Vol. I (JP 5-03.1), *Planning Policies and Procedures*, for deliberate and crisis planning (with Supplement, *Execution Guidance and Procedures*, JP 5-03.11); Vol. II (JP 5-03.2), *Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance*, gives guidance and formats for operation and concept plans (with secret supplement for classified parts, JP5-03.21); Vol. III (JP 5-03.3), *ADP Support*.

7. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02, Washington, DC: March 23, 1994, p. 120.

8. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 5-0, Washington, DC: April 13, 1995, p. I-2.

9. The *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02, describes Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) as "The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine. . . ."

10. The *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*(JSCP) is the most specific tasking document affecting planning by the combatant commanders, setting forth military tasks based on projected capabilities and conditions in the immediate future. The JSCP is the primary source

book for writing the numbered operations plans (e.g., Defense of Europe, OPLAN 4102-86).

11. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Joint Pub 0-2, Washington, DC: 1995.

12. See William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, *Interagency Cooperation*, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1995, for a discussion of the method used by USCINCSOUTH to encourage and support multiagency cooperation.

13. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *National Security Strategy*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 132.

14. Carl H. Builder, *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process*, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corp., 1987, p. 74.

# APPENDIX A

## SUGGESTED CINCs' STRATEGY FORMATS

No specific format for a strategy has been prescribed in Joint Publications, and each CINC has taken a different approach for dealing with the theater environment. Some strategies are found in the CINCs' posture statements, while some posture statements are not strategies. These formats are provided to assist the strategic planner as he writes a strategy. They are not prescriptive, but provide a touchstone by which planners can cross-check existing strategies and processes. \*\*\*\*\*

### SUGGESTED FORMATS

#### A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING A MILITARY STRATEGY "Strategist's Estimate of the Situation"

1. Mission [National Policy (Guidance),  
National Interests/Objectives]
2. Situation [Region]
  - a. Area of Operations
    - (1) Military Geography
    - (2) Transportation
    - (3) Communications
    - (4) Other
  - b. Relative Combat Power [Military Resources]
    - (1) Enemy Capabilities  
and Vulnerabilities
    - (2) Friendly Capabilities  
and Vulnerabilities
3. Courses of Action [Military Objectives]



- a. Enemy [Military Strategic Concepts]
- b. Friendly
- c. Analysis and Comparison

#### 4. Decision [Military Strategy]

Source: Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1993, p. 10. See also: *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0, Appendix B, "The Estimate Process," p. B-1.

## **REGIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIC APPRAISAL**

### 1. EXAMINATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

#### A. U.S. National Interests within the Region

- (1) Survival interests
- (2) Vital interests
- (3) Major interests
- (4) Peripheral interests

#### B. Significant Regional Factors Affecting U.S. Interests

- (1) Political
- (2) Economic
- (3) Social
- (4) Geographic
- (5) Informational
- (6) Etc.

C. Significant Regional Military Factors Affecting U.S. Interests (Note: consider military capabilities of nations within region, and of nations capable of projecting power into the region. Do these capabilities affect U.S. interests? Are there any threats and is the U.S. vulnerable?)

- (1) Factors external to region
- (2) Internal factors

2. MILITARY OBJECTIVES (What U.S. military forces should do. Include objectives for space forces and nuclear forces as appropriate.) Start with ACTION verbs:

- A. Assure . . .
- B. Defeat . . .
- C. Defend . . .
- D. Deter . . .
- E. Promote . . .
- F. Maintain . . .
- G. Prevent . . .
- H. Contain . . .
- I. Provide . . .
- J. Etc. . . .

3. MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS (How U.S. military forces should attain the objectives. Include concepts for Strategic and/or Theater Nuclear Forces, Space Forces, Special Operations Forces, and countering proliferation of WMD.) Example:

A. To support regional stability and protect sea lines of communication through the Western Pacific [objectives], USCINCPAC will forward station in Japan one Carrier Battle Group, one Amphibious Ready Group (with helicopter and Harrier capability), and one composite land-based air wing (CAS, Counterair, Recce capable); one composite wing (Tanker/Cargo) and one bomber wing for theater offensive missions will be stationed in Guam.

B. U.S. Joint task forces will conduct joint-combined military exercises with the military forces of selected ASEAN nations during Fiscal Years 97, 98, and 99 to demonstrate support and concern for the stability and progress of democratic nations in the region and to demonstrate U.S. ability to rapidly respond to a crisis in concert with friends and allies.

4. MILITARY RESOURCES (In broad terms what will it take in the way of resources [numbers and types of units, materiel, strategic lift, etc.] to implement the strategic concepts?)

- A. Land Forces
- B. Naval Forces
- C. Air Forces
- D. Strategic Mobility Forces

E. Security Assistance

(1) Foreign Military Sales and/or Grants

(2) Training

F. Space Forces

G. Nuclear Forces for Theater Employment

I. Chemical Forces

J. Special Operations Forces

Note: The appraisal can cover peacetime activities (preparation for war) and wartime activities (conduct of war) as two separate sections or volumes, or integrated within one volume. The appraisal should reflect the CINC's view for the mid-term (about 3 to 10 years ahead), and it should be updated at least annually. This format can serve as the CINC's strategy, or as a formative basis for a larger narrative style strategy with enclosures for specific countries, functions, and resource management.

Source: Format based on "An Aid to Formulating a U.S. National and Military Strategy," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, June 11, 1990, p. 24.

# APPENDIX B

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