

**FORCE, STATECRAFT AND GERMAN UNITY:
THE STRUGGLE TO ADAPT INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES**

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For Earlene

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Thomas-Durell Young

Select Glossary

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg)	Federal Ministry of Defense
Bundestag	Federal Parliament
Bundeswehr	Federal Armed Forces
Bundeswehrplanung	Federal Armed Forces Master Planning Document
Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU)	Christian Democratic Union
Christlich-Sozial Union (CSU)	Christian Social Union
Innere Führung	"leadership and civic education"
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)	Free Democratic Party
<i>Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr</i>	<i>Conceptual Guideline for the Future Development of the the Federal Armed Forces</i>
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)	Social Democratic Party of Germany
Sonderrolle	special role
Sonderweg	special way
Staatsbürger im Uniform	citizen in uniform
<i>Verteidigungs politische Richtlinien (VPR)</i>	Defense Policy Guidelines

FOREWORD

German Statecraft and Arms at the End of the 20th Century

Surely the beginning of this little collection on German security and defense policy should contain some reflections about the past, present and future of an issue that excites strong sentiments and much confusion in the Atlantic world. The bloodless unification of Germany in 189-1990 led observers of Central Europe to recall earlier, yet fundamentally different, events in 1870-1871. For a generation of Germans raised in the Borussia school of Prussian-German history (e.g., the historical works of Heinrich von Treitschke), the unification of the empire in 1871 was embodied in a heroic canvas by the Prussian academician and court artist, Anton von Werner. His *Proclamation of the German Reich*, set in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, France, existed in several versions painted from 1877 until 1885. The artist depicted the moment in which Chancellor Bismarck had just finished reading the statement establishing the empire and the assembled officers and officials respond to the call of the Grand Duke of Baden for three cheers for the new Emperor William I. The ensigns behind William lift high the battle flags and standards of their regiments; the officers and officials beneath him raise their spiked and plumed helmets and sabers toward the ceiling as they cheer. As the scholar of German politics and culture, Peter Paret, writes of this painting in his *Art as History*, "unification and the empire were announced in enemy country, with the ceremonial trappings of war. The new state was born on the battlefield, a fact and an image that were to remain powerful in the history of the empire to the day of its dissolution." Unity in the nineteenth century and the German statecraft that followed from 1890 until 1945 were joined with the fortunes of mostly unlucky or downright disastrous politicians, diplomats and generals. Unity further combined with the troubled character of military institutions in a rapidly industrializing society amid a turbulent international system of states.

The diplomacy of crisis and war that brought Prussian-German unity-in-arms in 1871 contrasts with the statecraft of the Federal Republic from its foundation in the spring of 1949 until the existential crisis of the German Democratic Republic and the onset of the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations in 1989-1990. The latter series of events led to whirlwind unification and to disarmament along the old Atlantic/Warsaw battle lines in Central Europe.

Most important, however, for the subject of this volume, at midnight on October 2/3, 1990, soldiers in uniform were nowhere to be seen in front of the Reichstag as the German black-red-gold flag was hoisted and Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker

read the new preamble to the German Basic Law amid cheers and popping champagne corks. Nor did there follow, as the late Erich Honecker had so often warned in his glory days, a Bundeswehr victory parade of massed battle standards and military bands through the Brandenburg Gate and up Unter den Linden along a path of past victorious Prussian-German armies. All could be thankful that unity in 1990 had proceeded without a latter-day equivalent of the battle of Sedan beforehand.

Sadly, however, the dissolution of the Soviet imperium has brought forth no "perpetual peace," as many had hoped in 1990-1991. Instead, the reappearance of European warfare has revived the worst of the 17th and 19th centuries and challenged the diplomacy of the *fin-de-siecle* western democracies to adapt rapidly.

This process of diplomatic, strategic, and indeed collective-psychological readjustment has affected Germany in particular, as this volume attests. The future of war and peace in Europe and the fate of security and defense policy as an expression of Germany's aspirations in the world system of states are subjects for those responsible for Germany's statecraft in parliament, the ministries of government, the political parties, the press, and the armed forces.

Have the euphoria of unity, the vanishing of Cold War restraints, and the return of war to Europe all driven the makers of German external policy to embrace neo-Wilhelmine strivings for world power? Since 1990, critics deplore what they see as a "militarization" of German foreign policy, with soldiers playing far too prominent a role in external affairs--such figures as General Klaus Naumann loom in their view as a kind of latter day General Friedrich von Bernhardi (author of the 1912 work, *Germany and the Next War*). Or, conversely, has a flaccid and inward looking Germany, indifferent to its responsibilities and envious of Swiss neutrality, grown so effete that Atlantic collective defense teeters on the brink? In the years since 1990 this set of issues became identified in the public mind with the phrases "out-of-area" and "Germany's responsibility," with the security and defense clauses of the German Basic Law, and with "new mission for the armed forces." All this would have remained quite abstract to, and remote from, the broad public had not Iraqi missile barrages at Tel Aviv during the 1991 war and the televised suffering of millions in the war of Yugoslav succession startled Germans out of their complacency.

In a 1994 volume of essays on Germany's new foreign relations from the German Foreign Policy Society, Professor Helga Haftendorn, an outstanding expert, described the Federal Republic as a "Gulliver in the middle of Europe." Germany is hemmed in not only by the immutable circumstances of its geography, namely the

deutsche Mittellage (a situation of "being in the middle" that now applies to other central European countries, too), but by the moral and ethical burdens of the past, by their weight on German political culture, and by the fog of peace that obscures the way forward for the continent as a whole.

Yet, from the perspective afforded by six years of the new strategic era, the German Gulliver appears to have freed itself somewhat from the encumbered state that particularly affected external policy in, say, 1991-1993. The 1994 Constitutional Court ruling on the collective security clauses of the Basic Law (Article 24 versus Article 87a) and the 1995-1996 German contribution to the NATO Bosnian Implementation Force stand out in this regard. However halting and incomplete such progress might seem to hard-boiled American observers of strategy who desire a more muscular German bearing of the collective defense burden in its pan-European dimension and beyond, this effort nonetheless deserves recognition in the United States. Such a generalization applies especially to members of the U.S. armed forces, who are likely to read these lines and to have a vital interest in the subject matter.

One can venture the following historical-political observation: the evolution of German security and defense policy since 1989--with its stops and starts--has more or less adhered to a pattern of making-strategy-in-a-democracy which has been visible since the beginning of the republic in 1949. In this regard, the Federal Republic has distinguished itself greatly from the ill-fated first German republic of 1918-1933, which never achieved a harmony between the elements of mass politics, statecraft, and armed force--something, in the end, which eluded the German Democratic Republic, as well.

The transformation of German defense since 1989 sparked a great, albeit incomplete, debate in government, society, and the military (the latter surely apart from neither government nor society) about power in the state, the efficacy of armed force, the legacy of war and totalitarianism, and Germany's role in collective security and collective defense. This process has resulted in a series of "small steps" (and perhaps a few missteps) by the Kohl government toward a more "responsible" security and defense policy, with a reform of the Bundeswehr in line with new NATO strategy and operations that has been anything other than a "militarization of German foreign policy." Even among those skeptical about such changes of arms and the state, a rough convergence of views has emerged in the society of 1995-1996 about the necessity for a new German role within United Nations (UN) collective security and North Atlantic Treaty Organization/West European Union (NATO/WEU) collective defense. This generalization applies particularly to certain leading personalities of the Left.

To be sure, specific circumstances of this strategic debate after 1989--national unity, the disappearance of the NATO/Warsaw Pact hosts, reductions in German force structure amid a widening extra-European strategic horizon, and, most important, a reappearance of actual warfare--differ from earlier episodes. This most recent debate about force and statecraft has brought into play actors in state and society within a general pattern of domestic strategic interaction, if one can wield such a cumbersome phrase. This pattern of interaction has been present at least in four earlier instances. In their sum, these five episodes characterize Federal German statecraft and strategy before 1989 and after. This subject in its full dimension is not fully exhausted by the now popular term "policy of reticence."

The first of these great strategic episodes arose from the foundation and subsequent armament of the Federal Republic of Germany in the era 1949-1955. This period corresponded to the multinational effort to add the "O" (that is, organization) to the North Atlantic Treaty. The forging of the practices of Atlantic collective defense marked the first trials of the second German democracy. The Bonn government avoided the perils that befell the men and women of Weimar. The Adenauer government embraced the integration of Federal Germany into the West by means of a union of policy, arms and society that held up despite national division, life on the nuclear front line and the weight of the Nazi past.

Indeed, no sooner had this first, opening phase passed, than a second period of trial and debate (1956-1961) ensued about the Anglo-American nuclear strategy of massive retaliation as it applied to continental Europe and dual-use weapons for the Bundeswehr. This episode, too, ended without a Weimar-style parliamentary crack-up with worrisome implications for Federal Germany's position in Europe. Rather, a kind of national and international consensus about security emerged from the smoke and noise at the end of the 1950s. This agreement was only to be tested yet again by a series of civil-military events in the 1960s that concerned the spirit of the army, the mission of the Bundeswehr, and aspects of the alliance's nuclear and conventional strategy of "flexible response." The strategic interaction of state, society and arms underwent continual testing from the latter half of the 1970s until the mid-1980s in strife that resembled rather too closely the first episode of 1949-1955.

A brief third phase of debate surrounding the neutron bomb struggle of the Carter/Schmidt years (1976-1977) immediately preceded the fourth instance, where nuclear weapons once again caused West Germans to reflect and debate their country's role in Atlantic security. The last great nuclear confrontation of the

Cold War erupted in the late 1970s over NATO Intermediate Nuclear Forces. This event greatly unsettled Federal Germany, and, in a fateful way, East German society. The episode ended in the steadfast solidarity of the West, with the failure of Soviet nuclear intimidation in the mid-1980s, and with the rise of enduring, popular opposition in the German Democratic Republic that bulked large as an agent of change. The full repercussions of the struggle--the 1988-1989 fight over the Follow-On-To-Lance missile--were felt in Germany until shortly before unification itself.

The fifth episode that followed unity has roughly conformed to the above pattern. The external strategic circumstances, as delineated above, have surely changed, but the basic questions of war and peace, of national purpose and conscience, and of the role of force in policy generally recall the earlier episodes that have been marked by a great soul-searching, a slow crafting of democratic consensus, loud protest by dissenters, and the embrace of multilateral, multinational interest. With certain exceptions, the groups in a united Germany that pose these questions and those who proffer an answer display more continuity with the world before 1989 than they betray some radically new approach to policy and strategy. Manifestly, all concerned show none of a neo-Wilhelmine, neo-Tirpitzian or neo-Ludendorffian longing for world power on the old scale *à la* 1900; nor is there visible a neo-Seecktian policy that pits both sides against one another as in the darker moments of the Weimar Republic. The debate on new missions for the Bundeswehr since 1990, and the nature of war and peace in Europe and beyond, has a somewhat familiar ring to anyone who has reflected on the civil-military conflicts of the Federal Republic and the making of Atlantic strategy since 1949.

This generalization should form a source of confidence to skeptical Americans, who as a rule have little familiarity with the events described above. Since the early 1960s, too few American observers of policy have given enough attention to the workings of diplomacy and strategy amongst the Atlantic democracies. While such alliance studies enjoyed some pride-of-place in the first decade and a half of the Soviet-American antagonism, they were later dwarfed by the superannuated enterprise of Cold War Moscow numerology. The latter came to over-value the role of technology, to ignore sources of Western strength, and to forget that great power competition in the Euro-Atlantic realm remains prone to such historical forces as the role of personality, contingency, and exhaustion. Granted that the problem of relations amongst the leading democracies has assumed a centrality in today's collective security and collective defense in the face of actual warfare, the contributors to this volume deserve great credit for their constancy and intelligence in putting these issues of force and

statecraft before a wider audience.

Donald Abenheim

Introduction

Thomas-Durell Young

Since the unification of Germany on October 3, 1990, the question of how Bonn will conduct its foreign and defense policies continues to be posited. Gone are the days when Paris "led" Western Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany tacitly accepted its supporting role. The Federal Republic now has all the composite elements to be a Great Power, with the exception of its own nuclear arsenal. Nonetheless, Bonn possesses the largest economy and population in Western and Central Europe, and plans to maintain the largest peacetime military establishment east of the Bug River. Even if Germany were to eschew any Great Power ambitions, it no longer has the luxury of denying either to itself or its allies that it does have important international responsibilities to which it must be prepared to contribute.

One would expect that given the return of full sovereignty from the wartime powers to the Federal Republic at unification, Bonn's foreign policy and defense planning would have changed to reflect Bonn's new status. In fact, some well-regarded German analysts have written that Germany is on the path to normalizing its foreign policy¹ (as evinced, some would argue, by the recent consensus in Bonn to participate in peace support operations under the aegis of the United Nations).² Yet, since unification Bonn's foreign and defense policies have not exhibited a significantly new independent character. In fact, German officials have been slow to cast off their cautious approach to foreign affairs and defense policy.

The Federal Republic continues to insist on formulating its foreign and defense policies within the confines of the North Atlantic Alliance and the emerging European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Simply stated, a closely integrated approach with its NATO allies when exercising national power (as has been the case since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949), continues overwhelmingly to characterize German foreign and defense policy making. Moreover, Bonn exhibits no indications of changing its traditional, and at times cumbersome, consensus policy-making process in security and foreign affairs.³ At the same time, German policies and attitudes toward the use of its national power have slowly changed since 1990, however subtly. While perhaps a unique example, Bonn's approach toward the recognition of the republics of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 demonstrates that Bonn is capable of pursuing national policies, which may be at variance with its allies.⁴

It is this uneven, and at times confusing, record of German

foreign and defense policy formulation and policies exhibited since unification that requires study and reflection. The intended purpose of the essays included in this compendium is to address specific aspects of German statecraft and the use of national power in the post-Cold War era. If there is any consensus amongst the authors of the essays presented here, it is that the Federal Republic has yet to come fully to terms with its new status in Europe and the world. Indeed, the modalities and approaches to external policy practiced by Bonn often seem familiarly reminiscent of those of the Federal Republic pre-1989. By this, among many politicians and officials, one can discern a residual degree of uncomfotableness in even acknowledging, let alone dealing effectively with, Germany's new status. The protracted debate within the Bundestag leading up to the December 1996 decision allowing the Bundeswehr to participate in the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia is a clear manifestation of the lingering difficulties the Federal Republic faces when addressing the use of military force.⁵

The first essay by Franz-Josef Meiers assesses the domestic political debate in Bonn over the issue of German participation in "out-of-area" military operations. He provides an informative survey of German policy prior to unification (its Sonderrolle in Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance), followed by an assessment of the events of the early-1990s which transformed the German debate on security matters. Dr. Meiers next explains, in detail, Bonn's difficulties in addressing efficiently the question of participation in UN-sanctioned peace support operations. Based on his case study, he concludes that Germany is not yet ready to be a "partner in leadership" due to its lack of internal political consensus on Germany's future role.

Karl-Heinz Kamp addresses the all-but-ignored issue of German policy toward nuclear weapons in Europe. That an issue which so dominated the German domestic political debate for so long is now largely publicly ignored, is remarkable. The author first assesses the highly complex history of German nuclear policy dating back to the 1950s. Dr. Kamp then reviews current official German views on European initiatives and policies for nuclear cooperation and identifies possible future German policies toward nuclear forces in Europe. He concludes that even if the Federal Republic finds itself without a credible US or European nuclear deterrent, Bonn would not be likely to develop nuclear weapons unilaterally. Given the extreme sensitivity in Germany to military power in general, and nuclear weapons in particular, Bonn could be expected simply to redefine what constitutes the necessary basis for a credible deterrent guarantee.

In my own contribution to this compendium, I address how the ruling coalition has conducted defense planning. The

essay argues that since 1992 the government has undertaken to restructure the Bundeswehr for new missions, absent a needed review of the armed forces' bases for legitimacy in German society. Fundamental to my criticism of the current coalition government's policies are the problems facing the future viability of conscription, its role in ensuring the Bundeswehr remains closely tied to German society, as well as its implications for current defense planning. In short, the government's incremental approach toward participation in peace support operations has not been matched with an equally important policy of addressing the armed forces' "spiritual" legitimizing basis in German society. The ensuing result of this failure to build new consensus is the growing unwillingness on the part of young men to undertake military service.

Robert Dorff presents an in-depth analysis of the recent German debate over participation in peace support operations. He examines the stated policies of the ruling coalition, the principal influences on policy, and the key political and institutional actors in the Federal Republic on this issue. Dr. Dorff concludes that German policy toward, and public support of, participation in these new military missions have moved Germans toward an acceptance of the need to undertake such operations. However, he cautions against reading too much into this observation. The Bosnian crisis, which has largely forced Bonn and the German public to decide on participation in such operations, is somewhat unique (i.e., Bonn's early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 being a contributing factor in creating the conflict). Given continued German uneasiness in addressing directly such military missions, Bonn's decision to join multilateral peace support operations will only occur on a case by case basis, with full participation by the Bundestag in reaching consensus for such a decision.

The last essay is a translation from the original German of Michael J. Inacker's "Macht und Moralität: Über eine neue deutsche Sicherheitspolitik" (Power and Morality: On a New German Security Policy). His message is that Germany can no longer avoid confronting the fact that, as a sovereign nation, it must begin to address openly the question of its own national interests and security objectives. Moreover, as a product of this needed reflection, Bonn must address concomitantly the need for a national defense policy. In a word, the Federal Republic's "singularization" of the Cold War has become a self-imposed constraint and that must be lifted. An important aspect of this essay is its forthright admonishment of German officials for not publicly articulating national interests, as well as understanding the use of military power. While uncomfortable for many, particularly readers in Germany, such a reasoned thesis needs circulation in the non-German-speaking world so as not to encourage its misunderstanding, which could imply a call for a

return to nationalistic atavism. In short German "national interests" and "patriotism" are not, by definition, inimical to greater Western values and interests.

From a review of the above *précis* of these essays, one can make two general observations concerning Bonn's ongoing attempt to adapt institutions and practices. First, confusion in German policy making is clearly a manifestation of officials largely navigating in a little-known policy milieu. *Realpolitik*, let alone *Machtpolitik* (either as mere terms, let alone as concepts) are neither freely used in "polite" political discord in Germany, nor widely contemplated. As a result of a wide-spread political culture governed by self-restraint, confronting difficult issues in their proper context has made decision making frequently complicated and confusing to outside observers. What we are presently witnessing is a learning period in German external policy making, with all of its attendant errors. It is an open question how long this educational process will last or if the German body politic is prepared for such straight forward discussion.

Second, perturbations in policy formation are partly a result of Bonn's approach to foreign and security policies which remains *exclusively* defined and expressed by the German government in the context of the North Atlantic Alliance and the emerging European Security and Defense Identity.⁶ Indeed, there is no sizeable political bloc in the Federal Republic that argues otherwise. In consequence, there is no evidence that Bonn is prepared to consider adopting a national approach to national security.

In sum, German statecraft has the unenviable task of legitimizing its new national status, not only before its allies and neighbors, but also before a skeptical German public. Given the history of statecraft in a unified Germany, this will surely be a difficult and potentially time-consuming process. To the Federal Republic's credit, one must recall that, unlike previous historical experiences, contemporary German democratic traditions and institutions are universally accepted in Germany, and they have been tested. Thus, the key challenge to German officials is to exercise effectively national power, and thereby contribute to the growing domestic and international legitimacy of Germany's new status.

Notes

Author's note: I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Robert Dorff for his excellent comments made on a draft of this chapter.

1. See, for example, the essay of Philip H. Gordon, who

argues that the process has already begun in the Federal Republic. Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy, *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 241.

2. See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Contribution to Peacekeeping: Issues and Outlook*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, pp. vii-viii.

3. For an excellent study of this fundamental characteristic of German foreign and security policy making, see Clay Clemens, "A Special Kind of Superpower? Germany and the Demilitarization of Post-Cold War International Security" in Gary Geipel, ed., *Germany in a new Era*, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institution, 1993, pp. 199-240.

4. For background on this issue, with particular emphasis on the role played in German calculations by internal political considerations, see Hans-Jurgen Axt, "Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? Mythen und Fakten zur Aussenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands," *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 48, No. 12, June 25, 1993, pp. 351-360.

5. *The Washington Post*, December 16, 1996.

6. See der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungs-politische Richtlinien*, Bonn, November 26, 1992, point 8, pp. 4-5; Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 1994: White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr*, Bonn, April 5, 1994, point 312, p. 41.

GERMANY'S "OUT-OF-AREA" DILEMMA

Franz-Josef Meiers

One of the most contentious issues in the debate over Germany's new foreign and security policy is how a unified Germany should define its national interests and its international role. Germany's changing role within the traditional Euro-Atlantic base raises the question whether the Germans are willing to assume a greater international role and to bear the burden of these new global responsibilities even though the country lacks a tradition as an exporter of security and has a strong aversion to military means.

Contrary to the rather optimistic assessment of an "emerging new consensus in favor of a German military role" that makes "German participation in future peace support operations as well as combat operations beyond Germany's borders no longer a question of whether but 'when, where and how',"¹ I will argue that Germany is still far from being a "normal" international actor. The public, political parties, and the government are still uncomfortable with the country's leading international security role. There is a deep-seated aversion in Germany to power politics in general and the use of military force in particular. Politically and psychologically, Germany is not yet suited to take on the role and the responsibilities placed on it by its partners and allies. It will take a long time before Germany reconciles itself to the eventual use of military force in the post-Cold War world. The 1994 Constitutional Court's ruling notwithstanding, Germany's geopolitical maturation will be a domestically controversial process because the Federal Republic emerged precisely with the aim of abstaining from global engagement. As the reaction to the war in Bosnia demonstrates, Germans are still very reluctant to exercise military power in UN-authorized peacekeeping missions.

The End of Germany's "Sonderrolle"

Post-unification Germany has maintained the foreign and security policy orientation and principles of the old Federal Republic, dating back to the 1950s, i.e., firm integration in a Euro-Atlantic framework. At the same time, unification has left the country at the center of Europe with the daunting challenge of defining its new role within these multilateral structures. The old Federal Republic was more a beneficiary of the Cold War's global security and stability than a contributor to it. Situated on the fault line of East-West confrontation, Germany's defence posture was geared heavily towards Alliance integration and Soviet containment. Since NATO's principal *raison d'etre* was the

same as West Germany's security goals (protection from the Soviet threat), Bonn's security policy became synonymous with Alliance policy. As its security interests were limited to self-defense within the NATO framework, it lacked a global view of security policy and did not develop security interests beyond the defence of its homeland. The Cold War allowed the Federal Republic to survive in a kind of geopolitical cocoon, sheltered from having to deal with broader security and geopolitical issues dealt with by its major allies. Bonn's foreign policy, therefore, was guided by the notion that the world expected nothing more from it than to keep a low profile in crises and to remain peaceful.

The end of the Cold War and unification have forced Germany to rethink basic assumptions that have guided the Federal Republic's foreign policy for more than four decades. First, united Germany is no longer the front-line consumer of security. For united Germany, the end of the Cold War means the end of a convenient dependence upon others. Because of its economic strength and geographic position Germany is no longer the consumer but potentially the major producer of security in Europe.

Second, the traditional parochial security policy limited to self-defense no longer complements Germany's commitment to multilateral security structures. Multilateralism has ceased to be a pretext for national abstention. Unified Germany has to define its international role and responsibility in different terms from that of the pre-1990 Federal Republic.

Third, while Germany's external dependencies have been decisively reduced, the external demands on it have grown. German foreign policy is approaching a period in the 1990s in which it has to accept broader international responsibilities commensurate with its economic and political weight.² Thus, Germany has to prepare itself for 'fair participation'³ in international affairs. It can no longer play a 'free-rider' role, as President Roman Herzog pointed out in a speech in Bonn on March 13, 1995, "Germany belongs to the concert of the great democracies, whether it likes it or not; and if one of these democracies stands aside, it is inevitably not only doing harm to the others but in the end to itself."⁴

The central message from President Clinton during his Berlin visit in July 1994 was that Germany should play an active and constructive role on the world stage. Echoing many of the themes set out in a speech by his predecessor George Bush in Mainz in late May 1989, he expects Germany to take on the burdens of this new leadership role, "I do hope that we will have the benefit of the full range of Germany's capacities to lead." He said in an interview, "I do not see how Germany, the third biggest economic nation in the world, can escape a leadership role . . . [it] has

no other choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its responsibility."⁵ The US Senate, in a resolution adopted by 96-1 on 1 February 1994, insisted that Germany should "participate fully in international efforts to maintain or to restore international peace and security."⁶

Several events have seemed to confirm the expectation that the Bonn Government is prepared to assume a wider German role in international security affairs:

- The *Defense Planning Guidelines* of the Bundeswehr (November 1992)⁷ and the *Defence White Paper* (April 1994) define the main role of the Bundeswehr in crisis and conflict management situations as going beyond the remit of the present NATO zone.⁸

- The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe (July 1994) removed "any constitutional objections" to German participation in UN authorized peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. It clarified the constitutional basis for the participation of Bundeswehr troops above and beyond the defence of Germany and the NATO area.⁹

- Chancellor Helmut Kohl, speaking at the final departure of Allied troops from Berlin in September 1994 said,

We will never forget what our American, British and French friends have done for us. You, in turn, can rely on us. Germany will not stand on the sidelines where peace and freedom in the world are at stake. We Germans are aware of our responsibility and will fulfil it alongside our partners.¹⁰

- The CDU/CSU/FDP "Coalition Agreement for the 13th Legislative Period of the German Bundestag" stipulated, "In the future Germany will, in principle, take part in international community measures aimed at maintaining world peace and international security within the scope of collective security systems."¹¹

The Culture of Restraint

The Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994 freed Germany from constitutionally mandated military abstention, but it raised a political dilemma at the same time. Although German troops are cleared to join international peace missions, the legal ruling does not necessarily translate into wider political and popular support in Germany for sending soldiers abroad. The government must now decide what the Karlsruhe decision means in practical terms. For whom and with what military means should responsibility be assumed? Which priorities and national interests are worth defending in UN-authorized military missions?

The irony of the Karlsruhe decision is that it has been greeted with far more caution within Germany--on both sides of the political spectrum--than among Germany's allies.

The contentious debate over Germany's new international role and responsibilities has evolved around two opposing ideas: on the one hand, the insistence that Germany must accept a leadership role and on the other, what German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, has termed its "culture of restraint", the reluctance to use military force at all in the pursuit of goals beyond national self-defense.

The political parties and the public remain very cautious about the circumstances in which German troops can and will be used in the future in support of UN peace operations. Kinkel summed up the deep-seated reluctance of Germans to use force,

the culture of restraint which we displayed in our foreign and security policy after the Second World War, must absolutely be kept. There will be no militarization of German foreign policy: the culture of restraint will be maintained. Foreign and security policy normalization does not mean playing the role of world policeman, it does not mean that German soldiers will be sent everywhere where it is burning. There will be no automatism for German participation. Its military options will remain limited in factual and political terms.¹²

As in the past, "Germany should pursue a primarily 'non-military' foreign policy".¹³

No other issue demonstrates Germany's enduring military reticence than the reluctance of the Kohl government to send German troops to Bosnia. They also reveal deep splits within the Kohl government, notably between the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry, and a lack of consensus among Germany's main political parties about Germany's military role in the post-Cold War era.

The Bosnia Dilemma

Only six months after the Karlsruhe ruling the Kohl government was approached by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General George Joulwan to provide troops for the eventual withdrawal of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops from Bosnia. The Bosnia issue revealed a cautious use of the new-found freedom by the Kohl government to deploy the Bundeswehr abroad. The major opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), used the Bosnia debate to rule out any Bundeswehr participation in peace enforcement operations and to propose a

highly restrictive policy for a participation of the Bundeswehr in international peacekeeping operations. Finally, the Bosnia episode also brought to the surface a widespread apprehension within the public against the use of military force.

On December 21, 1994, the German government announced that it would, in principle, be willing to provide German forces if a NATO evacuation of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia proved necessary. The Kohl government qualified its pledge by noting that it would only provide logistical assistance and combat air cover. No German ground troops would participate in such an operation.¹⁴

The dramatic deterioration of the situation in Bosnia since May of 1995 confronted the Bonn government with a dilemma which it tried to avoid with its limited diplomatic means: it made German military engagement in former Yugoslavia inevitable. This dilemma raised a fundamental question about the ultimate intention of the Kohl government: is it truly committed to protecting the withdrawal of allied forces from Bosnia under any circumstances, or did it accept the commitment only on the premise that a continued UNPROFOR presence in Bosnia and Croatia would render its troop offer no more than a promissory note? In other words, is the real goal of German foreign policy to prevent a situation emerging in Croatia and Bosnia that would force it to honor a commitment it never thought would become reality?

The renewed hostilities throughout Bosnia turned the calculation of the Bonn government upside-down. At a far earlier moment than envisaged the Kohl government found itself compelled to pledge military assistance for the regrouping and reinforcement of the UN blue helmets in Bosnia in order to keep a more robust UNPROFOR there.¹⁵ The government's \$240 million plan includes the transfer of a dozen transport planes and 14 military jets to the NATO base in Piacenza in northern Italy. A force of 1,000 maintenance crewman, support personnel and pilots accompanied the aircraft to Italy, while another 500 German military medical personnel, together with French troops, have set up a field hospital at the Croatian port of Split. No German ground troops were sent to Bosnia in support of the UN Reaction Force.¹⁶ In a historic vote, a parliamentary majority approved the cabinet's decision on June 30, 1995; 386 parliamentarians voted in favor of the government's proposal, 258 against it and 11 abstained.¹⁷

Even though the German electronic combat and reconnaissance (ECR) Tornados were fully integrated into NATO air forces, the actual use of German fighter jets was severely restricted by two important parameters.

First, the mission of German ECR Tornado jets was limited to secure the restructuring of UN forces in Bosnia and, when

necessary, to take out Serb surface-to-air missiles sites if ordered by the UN and agreed by NATO. German Tornado jets could not participate in any "muscular" air-strikes against Bosnian Serb positions or in any other UN-authorized operation like Operation DENY FLIGHT. The mission was strictly confined "to protect and assist NATO warplanes flying close air support for the UN Reaction Force" of French, British and Dutch troops in Bosnia, as the Bundestag resolution of June 30, 1995 stipulated. Air Force General Walter Jertz was the government's watchdog in Piacenza to make sure that the parliament's restrictive condition was painstakingly observed.¹⁸

Second, the strict rules for Germany's first postwar combat involvement insisted that warplanes "protect and assist" the UN Reaction Force only when attacked and not when engaged in offensive operations against a war party, i.e. the Bosnian Serbs, in retaliation to a provocation. Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruhe, in a speech to the Bundestag on June 30, 1995, reaffirmed that German Tornados would "only" be used "if there is an aggression on the ground, namely an attack against the blue helmet troops." German Tornados would then "protect" fighter jets of other nations requested to defend the blue helmets on the ground. He added, "protection and escalation exclude each other."¹⁹

In addition, the German government was anxious to avoid the prospects of German aircrews being drawn into more intense hostilities. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel warned against military operations that would make matters only worse. "It is not so easy to resolve this situation and so we must above all keep calm," he said.²⁰ When the German Tornado jets arrived in northern Italy on July 21, 1995, he declared that German fighter jets would not participate in NATO air strikes aimed at protecting the UN safe zone of Gorazde. "German Tornados will be involved in actions of the UN Reaction Force. This could be the case in Sarajevo."²¹ The use of German Tornados in air strikes against Serb positions threatening the UN safe zone of Bihac were "apparently excluded" as well, an unnamed source in the Federal Ministry of Defense declared.²² The successful Croatian offensive in the Kraijna region ended the siege of the UN-designated safe zone and thus rendered NATO air strikes a remote possibility. As Kinkel concluded, "NATO has extended the red line to Bihac. It must be seen if it becomes relevant because the Croats together with the Bosnians . . . have partly ended the long siege of Bihac."²³

Thus, the narrowly defined circumstances under which German fighter jets were allowed to participate in NATO-run air raids raised questions whether they would ever take part in operations other than "exercises" as Ruhe announced during a visit to the NATO airbase in northern Italy on August 9, 1995.²⁴ Given the

uncertainty surrounding a potential combat mission of German ECR Tornados in Bosnia, NATO commanders ordered allied fighter jets to accompany German fighter jets over Bosnia. Given these restricted circumstances under which Germany ECR Tornados would be engaged, NATO commanders ordered allied fighter jets to accompany German fighter jets over Bosnia.²⁵ They would have taken over the task assigned to the Tornados in case German aircrews had to veer off for political reasons.²⁶ Coming as no surprise, NATO planners did not call for German fighter jets to support an extended and protracted air campaign against Serb military sites across Bosnia on August 30, 1995. Had NATO commanders asked for ECR Tornados, Air Force General Jertz would have had no other choice than to decline such a NATO demand because the mission of NATO fighter jets was not to protect the UN Reaction Force but to strike independently against Serb military sites.

The irony of NATO's operation called DELIBERATE FORCE was that it left the German ECR Tornados with no mission. NATO fighter jets largely wiped out Serb air defense radars and surface-to-air-missiles sites in Bosnia--the principle targets of German ECR Tornados. As Admiral Leighton W. Smith said, "We have been very effective in reducing the effectiveness of their integrated air defense systems."²⁷

While public attention was exclusively concentrated on potential ECR Tornado combat missions, it missed the primary importance NATO attached to the six reconnaissance Tornados. Two reconnaissance Tornados, together with three supporting ECR Tornados, were called by NATO commanders on September 1, 1995, to fly the country's first combat mission since World War II taking reconnaissance photos over Serbia, but not firing any shots. Instead of supporting for the UN Reaction Force, the ECR Tornados' mission in effect was limited to protecting German reconnaissance Tornados flying surveillance flights over Bosnia under combat conditions since August 7, 1995.²⁸

Confronted with the question of whether or not German ground troops should participate in the peace Implementation Force (IFOR) under NATO command in Bosnia, the Kohl government opted for a policy that put quantitative and qualitative restrictions on any potential German ground involvement in former Yugoslavia, which, as in the past, emphasized the risk-minimizing role of German troops. Referring to Germany's historical burden, Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruhe opposed the dispatch of German ground combat forces because they would be exposed to greater risks than troops from other countries. He did not, however, exclude a supporting role for the Bundeswehr outside of Bosnia. If a peace implementation force were to be sent to Bosnia, "Germany will no doubt demonstrate solidarity, but in the appropriate form." Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel opposed the dispatch of German ground combat forces to Bosnia as well,

although he could conceive of a mission for German transport, logistical, and engineer units in Bosnia. "We will not say no. But we will contribute what is possible for us," he said.

On October 24, the Cabinet approved the deployment of about 4,000 logistical, medical and airborne troops in the Bosnian peace implementation force which would be stationed outside Bosnia, but could, if necessary, operate within Bosnia. The troops would be sent for a period of twelve months. Federal Defense Minister Ruhe characterized the German contribution as follows, "It is crucial that no German soldiers will be stationed between the conflicting parties in Bosnia; instead they will provide the logistical support for NATO troops from the rear. By that German soldiers will not bear an extra risk and will not become the problem. Logistically, they will play a decisive role for NATO."²⁹

Following the recommendations of NATO defense ministers and the North Atlantic Council, the Kohl government, on November 28, 1995, approved the deployment of 4,000 troops as part of the 60,000-strong multinational peacekeeping force; depending on the situation on the ground, "additional forces could be provided." They are largely made up of logistical, medical, engineer, and transport units, stationed in northern Italy and Croatia. They would enter Bosnia occasionally to transport the wounded to the Merna-run hospital near Split and to provide the peacekeeping troops in the British sector with supplies.

NATO can only make use of German troops on the basis of bilateral agreements between Bonn and Brussels. The Alliance has been granted competencies connected with "operational control" and not with "operational command," which is directly exercised by the Federal Defense Minister. The German involvement will be limited to one year. It will not include ground combat missions.³⁰ In response to a remark of General Klaus Naumann who characterized the Bundeswehr mission in Bosnia as "a combat mission", Ruhe clarified, "We don't go to war. At issue is the enforcement of the Dayton peace accord. It is essentially a logistical task we assume. We will fight when attacked."³¹

In opposition to the vote on June 30, 1995, there was a broad consensus among the major political parties about the need to contribute to NATO's efforts to enforce the Dayton peace accord in Bosnia. Following a calm debate, the Bundestag, on December 6, 1995, backed by a large majority the deployment of 4,000 German troops in former Yugoslavia. The government resolution was carried by 543 of the 656 votes cast.³²

The main opposition party in the Bundestag, the SPD, seemed to have moved in the direction of the government's position on the participation of German troops in a NATO-led peacekeeping

operation in the former Yugoslavia. After a broad majority of the SPD parliamentary group had voted against the government's proposal of sending German troops to former Yugoslavia in support of the newly set up UN Rapid Reaction Force, SPD deputies began to reconsider their position.³³

The new position was set out in a position paper of the SPD parliamentary group entitled "On the Participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Peace Process in Former Yugoslavia." The paper stated, "The Federal Republic will support the military enforcement of the peace accord with medical, engineer, and logistical troops as well as transport and reconnaissance airplanes. The German units will not be given a combat mission."³⁴ The paper was an attempt to smooth over the cracks within the party. By having deliberately excluded the controversial ECR Tornado issue, the paper left the fundamental problem unresolved: If and to what extent could military combat operations become instruments of Germany's foreign and security policy?³⁵

The eventual compromise formula that allowed SPD parliamentarians to back the government's position promises to be more a "rhetorical smoke screen" than a clear answer to the fundamental question of whether the Bundeswehr can eventually participate in UN-authorized peace enforcement operations in and outside of Europe. Instead, the SPD insisted that the role of the Bundeswehr should be strictly limited to traditional consensual peacekeeping missions under a clear UN mandate and the territorial defense of the Federal Republic. It is still opposed to a move toward German participation in peace enforcement operations and other non-Article V missions.

Hence, a broad majority within the SPD still embraces the notion of Germany as a civilian power that could eschew traditional military power and turn its "culture of restraint" into a political asset. The position taken by an overwhelming majority within the SPD in the Bosnia debate is the culminating point of a process which had started with the dispute over the deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe in the mid-1980s. It has resulted in a systematic de-legitimation of central elements of German security policy.³⁶

A more activist role on the world stage also clashes with a widespread sentiment among the German public that is opposed to seeing the country ever develop a military role or a power projection capability again. Major segments of the public harbor a deep aversion against everything that smacks of power politics and show a clear preference for non-military instruments of a civilian power, i.e. for compromise and multilateralism.³⁷ Public support for an international leadership role is still defined in terms of "Switzerlandization." Switzerland is the preferred role

model for Germany, demonstrating its twin desires to promote the values of a civilian power and strict military abstinence.³⁸

A recent RAND survey clearly documented both the traditional narrow view of NATO's purpose and the deep-seated "culture of restraint" in the German mind. There is still a widespread notion within the public that the Alliance is designed to protect Germany against an external threat. While a majority supported NATO involvement in new crises on Europe's periphery (74 per cent), more than half of those polled (55 per cent) agreed that the Bundeswehr's role should remain limited to territorial defense and that Germany's allies must assume responsibility for such missions themselves. The public prefers a division of labor whereby Germany assumes greater responsibility but refrains from any military involvement other than self-defense, which is left to the allies, notably the United States. One survey participant stated, "War is something we leave to the Americans."³⁹

Another nation-wide poll, conducted by "Infratest Burke Berlin" for the RAND Corporation and the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation after the October 1994 elections, revealed strong support (up to 75 per cent) for using military force for humanitarian and traditional peacekeeping. Support for action declined, however, when specific scenarios, including combat missions, were put to Germans. The public and the leadership support "engagement in principle, but seem to shy away when presented with involvement in specific scenarios."⁴⁰ A survey conducted by "Infratest-Studie" for the *Suddeutsche Zeitung* in 1995 revealed a clear majority of Germans (63 percent) were still opposed to the use of military power for any purposes whatsoever. The results imply that a decision by any government to send German troops abroad "will meet strong resistance with the public."⁴¹

In sum, the Karlsruhe ruling notwithstanding, the government, the main political parties and the public remain very reluctant and reticent when confronted with external demands to contribute German troops to international peace missions as the reaction to the war in Bosnia aptly demonstrates. Like the Clinton administration, the Kohl government tried to satisfy two audiences with diametrically opposed goals--the NATO allies and the German public. In the end, the Kohl government restricted German military engagement in former Yugoslavia in such a way as to minimize its potential fall-out at home.

In short, neither the Kohl government (which is too concerned about preserving its diminished power base at home), nor the SPD (with its strong aversion to power politics and the use of military), are willing to support the "full participation" of German forces "in international efforts to maintain or restore international peace and security,"⁴² and to reconcile the

country's new international responsibilities with a public still clinging to the notion of a civilian power.

On the Way to Geopolitical Maturation?

Germany's foreign and security policy still has to overcome a number of structural hurdles at home and abroad if it is to assume the new international leadership role commensurate with its political and economic weight as well the expectations of its allies. The challenge for Germany is to reconcile external expectations with internal preparedness to accept its changing international role.

The closer Germany moves toward military involvement, the more it will be confronted with problems familiar to other Western governments, i.e., the gnawing questions about exactly where and when to use its armed forces in out-of-area missions. Countries that have fewer constraints on their global role, like the United States, have also been reluctant to use military force to tackle conflicts confronting the international post-Cold War agenda. A pattern is emerging in the post-Cold War world where there is an unwillingness among Western countries to get bogged down in conflicts where no compelling vital security interests are at stake.⁴³ Germany shares with its partners, notably the United States, the problem of having to redefine its foreign policy priorities at a time when the public is more concerned about domestic problems.

Three conclusions can be drawn for Germany's future foreign and security policy:

First, Germany will only assume a larger share of responsibility for solving international problems and settling conflicts within the context of Euro-Atlantic integration. Because of its past history and its geography, Germany can only act in concert with its partners in NATO and the EU, never alone. Thus, the normalization of German foreign and security policy, even half a century after the end of the Second World War, does not mean that Germany will become similar to France or Great Britain in the political-military field. "We must find our own style," Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruhe said when visiting the German hospital in Split in late August 1995. "We cannot copy the French or the British."⁴⁴

Second, Germany's evolving role in international peace missions follows the position set out by international organizations, such as the UN, or its partners in the Alliance. Germany's leadership role is reduced to reactive behavior. It will be slow to take the initiative and it will only respond to external demands. If allied governments are hesitant to engage, Bonn will follow suit. As a corollary, German forces can only

participate in UN authorized peace missions in conjunction with allied forces, never on its own or with non-NATO countries.

Third, only when the German government feels a higher purpose is at stake, such as Germany's reliability and credibility or the cohesiveness of the Alliance, does it feel compelled to commit German troops for international peacekeeping missions, but on a quantitatively and qualitatively limited scale, and only then in a risk-minimizing role, as in the case of a regrouping of UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia or to support their possible withdrawal.

Conclusion

United Germany is not a prime candidate for a "partner in leadership." Neither the Kohl government (which is too concerned about preserving its diminished power base at home to engage in a broad discussion about Germany's new military tasks abroad), nor the SPD opposition (with its strong aversion to power politics and the use of military force), are prepared to exercise leadership at home and reconcile the growing external demands with the deep-seated culture of restraint within broad parts of the public. The reaction to the inquiries for Bundeswehr participation by the SACEUR and UN Secretary-General demonstrate how reluctant and reticent the government and the major opposition party are when confronted with external demands to contribute German troops to international peace missions.

Adopting a passive strategic role as during the Cold War will not be a cost-free policy. It will have serious ramifications for Germany's foreign and security policy and its ability to influence its external environment.

- It will diminish Germany's influence within NATO and relegate it to observer status; "decisions are taken by political players, not by political observers," as Ruhe observed.⁴⁵

- It may evoke Germany's "Sonderrolle," which might be perceived as a return to a historically precarious "Sonderweg," reawakening fears amongst its neighbors that Germany is striving for national independence of action again.⁴⁶

- It will cast both the political and strategic rationale for NATO's new role in the post-Cold War world and the deepening of the EU's integrative processes into question, notably the development of a common foreign and security policy. A constructive role played by Germany is essential to the realization of both ambitious processes.⁴⁷

In short, Germany's evolving international role will be exercised in different terms from the parochial "trading state"

of the Cold War. The country of 80 million people in the center of Europe can no longer shy away from the military responsibilities imposed on it as a normal power.⁴⁸ This "normalization" confronts Germany with a double task: to accept the risks and burdens resulting from these broader tasks, and to reconcile this activist international role with a public still clinging to the notion of a civilian power.

The Bonn government can no longer ignore the necessity to assume a greater share of new international responsibilities commensurate with its resources and geopolitical position. Germany's international credibility, reliability and predictability will suffer seriously if the country remains in a cocoon and leaves it to its allies to bear the burden and to accept the sacrifices of making the post-Cold War world safe for democracy, human rights and peace, the core principles of Germany's value-oriented foreign policy.

Notes

1. Ronald Asmus, *Germany's Contribution to Peacekeeping - Issues and Outlook*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, pp. viii, xii, 2. Prof. Michael Sturmer, Director of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, a think tank in Ebenhausen near Munich, concludes, "We have moved a great deal and I think that this battle (of changing public attitudes) is almost won." Quoted in Joseph Fitchett, "Germany Adjusts to New Role for Armed Forces," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), April 3, 1995. See also Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, esp. p. 241; Josef Joffe, "With Its Western Alliance at Stake, Germany Becomes Responsible," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), December 22, 1994; and, Elizabeth Pond, "Wer spricht noch vom Schnecken tempo?" *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), September 15, 1995.

2. See Timothy Garton Ash, "Germany's Choice," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, July/August 1994, pp. 72-73.

3. Volker Ruhe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 130.

4. See Roman Herzog, "Die Globalisierung der deutschen Aussenpolitik ist unvermeidlich," *Bulletin*, No. 20, Bonn: Presse- und Informationamt der Bundesregierung, March 15, 1995, p. 162.

5. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), July 4, 1994.

6. See US Congress, *Congressional Record Proceedings and Debates of the 103d Congress, 2d Session*, Cohen Amendment No. 1318, Department of State Authorization Act, Washington, DC: US

Government Printing Office, January 31, 1994, pp. S399-S402, S424-S426.

7. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*, Bonn, November 26, 1992.

8. See *Weissbuch 1994*, Bonn, BMVg, 1994, esp. pp. 88-96.

9. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 13, 1994; and, Klaus Kinkel, "Peacemaking Missions: Germany can now play its part," *NATO Review*, Vol. 42, No. 5, October 1994, p. 3.

10. For the Kohl address see, *Europa Archiv*, Vol. 49, No. 19, October 10, 1994, D. [Documentation], pp. 562-564.

11. *Coalition Agreement for the 13th Legislative Period of the German Bundestag*, Chapter VIII: "European and Foreign Policy, Security and Defense, Part C. Federal Armed Forces," Bonn, November 1994.

12. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 18, 1994, and July 13, 1994; and Kinkel, "Peacekeeping Missions," p. 4.

13. Wolfgang Ischinger and Rudolf Adam, "Alte Bekenntnisse verlagern neue Begründungen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 17, 1995. Mr. Ischinger is the new Political Director within the German Foreign Office and former head of the Planning Staff; Mr. Adam works for the Planning Staff.

14. For a detailed account see Franz-Josef Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Autumn 1995, esp. pp. 85-87.

15. Under pressure of Germany's major allies, France and Great Britain, the government changed its mind and offered Bundeswehr troops to protect a regrouping of UN blue helmets in Bosnia. Days before the government had reaffirmed its original position to send German troops only to former Yugoslavia to protect the retreat of UN blue helmets from Bosnia. See *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), May 30, 1995, and June 1, 1995; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 2, 1995, June 3, 1995, and June 9, 1995.

16. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), June 22, 1995; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 22, 1995; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 22, 1995; and, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 27, 1995.

17. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 1, 1995; *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), July 1-2, 1995, "Bundeswehrsoldaten koennen nach Ex-Jugoslavien," *Woche im*

Bundestag, Vol. 25, No. 13, July 5, 1995, p. 53; and, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 18, 1995.

18. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 27, 1995; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 27, 1995; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), July 20, 1995; August 4, 1995; and, August 31, 1995; and, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 31, 1995.

19. See *Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht*, 48th Session, Bonn, June 30, 1995, p. 4000 (B).

20. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), July 19, 1995.

21. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), July 24, 1995.

22. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), August 2, 1995.

23. See *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, August 9, 1995; and, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 1, 1995.

24. See *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), August 10, 1995; and, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), June 17-18, 1995.

25. "NATO Planug für politische Hindernisse beim Einsatz deutscher Tornados," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 12-13, 1995; and, "Deutsche wurden nicht angefordert," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), August 31, 1995.

26. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 12-13, 1995; and, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), August 31, 1995.

27. See *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), September 1, 1995; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), August 31, 1995; and, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 31, 1995.

28. See *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), September 2-3, 1995; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 2, 1995; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), September 2-3, 1995; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 2-3, 1995; *Le Monde* (Paris), September 3-4, 1995; "Peitsche und Zuckerbrot," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), September 4, 1995, esp. pp. 22-23; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 4, 1995; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), September 4, 1995 and September 5, 1995; and, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 5, 1995.

29. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 25, 1995; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 25, 1995; *Le Monde* (Paris), October 25, 1995; and, *Fernsch- und Hörfunkspiegel Inland I, Press- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, No. 205, Bonn, October 25, 1995, pp. 1-2.

30. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 29, 1995, and December 13, 1995; *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munche), November 29, 1995; and *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, November 29, 1995.

31. In a "ZDF" interview General Naumann said, "This is clearly a military mission. This is a mission based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter and thereby that what we call a combat mission." Ruhe qualified the general's assessment as "misleading" because the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, as opposed to "Operation DESERT STORM," has been endorsed by all three conflicting parties. General Bagger, who succeeded General Naumann in early February 1996, declared that the Balkan mission would "a priori not be a combat mission." Following Ruhe's statement, he underlined that German troops would be part of an international peace force and not a party to the conflict. See *Fernseh-Hörfunkspiegel I*, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, No. 234, Bonn, December 5, 1995, p. 13; and No. 235, December 7, 1995, p. 2; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 6, 1995; and, *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, December 22, 1995.

32. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 7, 1995, *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munche), December 7, 1995; *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, December 5, 1995; and *Woche im Bundestag* (Bonn), No. 23/1995, p. 49.

33. During the debate in the Bundestag, Gunter Verheugen, deputy head of the SPD parliamentarian group, accused the Kohl government of bringing Germany into a "pre-Vietnam situation," in which the country "could slip ever deeper into the grey zone between peacekeeping and warfighting." See *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), July 1-2, 1995; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 26, 1995.

34. "SPD Stimmt Regierungspolitik zu," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 26, 1995.

35. "Das militärische fortmarginalisiert," *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munche), October 26, 1995.

36. See Hartmut Soell, "Die inneren Blockaden bei der SPD," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 18, 1995.

37. The term "civilian power" describes a set of foreign policy roles which includes a general willingness to accept international interdependence, a strong preference for multilateral security arrangements, the settlement of conflicts by negotiation, compromise and mutual adjustment, and a general orientation towards economic means and goals in external relations. See Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5, Winter 1990/91, pp. 91-106.

38. See Peter Meroth, "Den Staat, den wir uns wuenschen," *Suddeutsche Zeitung Magazine* (Munchen), December 16, 1990, p. 8ff.

39. See Ronald Asmus, *Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Reticence*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992; *idem*, *German Strategy and Public Opinion After the Wall 1990-1993*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994; and, Hans-Viktor Hoffmann, *Demoskopisches Meinungsbild in Deutschland zur Sicherheits-und Verteidigungspolitik 1993*, Academy of the Bundeswehr for Information and Communication: Strausberg, Germany, 1994, esp. pp. 148-156.

40. Ronald Asmus, *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Public Opinion and Security Policy in 1994*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 1995, p. 48. For public support of Bundeswehr participation in a series of hypothetical conflict scenarios involving specified countries, see pp. 41-46. See as well, *idem*, "Kein Kult der Zuruckhaltung mehr," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 11, 1996; and, *idem*, "In Germany the Leadership's Vision Goes Beyond the Border," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), April 14, 1996.

41. See Kurt Kister, "Kriege sollen die anderen Fuhren," *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munchen), January 19, 1996.

42. See Cohen Amendment No. 1318 to the State Department Authorization Act, *Congressional Record*, January 31, 1994.

43. Stanley Sloan, "From US Deterrence to Self-Deterrence," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), May 3, 1994; and, *idem*, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence?*, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 20, 1994.

44. Quoted in Stefan Kornelius, "Die Entdeckung des Feldherrn," *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munchen), August 30, 1995.

45. Volker Ruhe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 130.

46. "Welche Rolle fur Deutschland," *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, June 25-26, 1992.

47. Defense Minister Ruhe described Germany's plight as follows, "There will never be a common foreign and defense policy, nor a European Defense nor an effective crisis management policy in the Alliance so long as Germany must regularly note its reservations regarding the use of force." Volker Ruhe, "Deutsche

Sicherheitspolitik vor neuen Aufgaben," Speech before the annual Kommandeurstagung, Mainz, October 1993, in *Bulletin*, Press- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bonn, October 8, 1993.

48. See Karl Kaiser, "Das vereinigte Deutschland in der Weltpolitik," in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull, eds., *Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, Band 1: Grundlagen*, Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994, esp. pp. 8-14. See also Wilfried von Bredow and Thomas Jäger, *Neue deutsche Aussenpolitik. Nationale Interessen in internationalen Beziehungen*, Opladen, Germany: Leske + Buderich, 1993, esp. pp. 85-91; and, "Vor einer neuen deutschen Aussenpolitik," *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 50, No. 4, April 1995, esp. pp. 12-21, 26-50.

GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Karl-Heinz Kamp

Notwithstanding the fact that nuclear weapons have lost much of their relevance in the post Cold War era, they are still the object of heavy disputes on both sides of the Atlantic. One central issue is the question whether nuclear weapons should have a future role at all. The strategic community in the United States is particularly eloquent in arguing the pros and cons of nuclear deterrence as a means of maintaining stability in a world with an increasing number of nuclear players.¹ A second dimension of the current nuclear debate is the problem of how to arrange nuclear deterrence in the future. This is of particular importance for the European nuclear and non-nuclear states. The ongoing process of creating a true European Union, including a European Security and Defense Identity, will lead sooner or later to the question of how to integrate the "nuclear element" in a future European security structure.

Europe's nuclear powers, France and Great Britain, have already debated on higher political levels the idea of a coordinated European nuclear defense posture quite frequently. Since 1989, French officials have brought up the concept of a European nuclear capability time and again. They have focused their argument primarily on the necessity to have an alternative if the United States should reduce its (nuclear) commitments for the European allies, and also to some extent to prevent Germany from acquiring nuclear capacities of its own.² Great Britain has approached the concept of European nuclear cooperation, not as an alternative to the existing American nuclear umbrella, but as a supplementary contribution to the overall capacities of the Western Alliance.³

In July 1993, President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister John Major announced a decision to make permanent an Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, a body that had been established on a provisional basis the previous autumn. But the European "nuclear question" is not limited to Europe's nuclear powers alone. Fundamental changes in the European security landscape make a broader debate inevitable. Such a wider discourse has to include the non-nuclear weapons states as well since the concept of *extended deterrence*, i.e., the nuclear umbrella provided by nuclear powers for their non-nuclear allies, will require some fundamental redefinitions. This holds particularly true for Germany because no effort to build a Western European defense identity can disregard Bonn.

In Germany itself, however, nuclear weapons and their role

in the framework of a common European defense structure have been a non-issue, at least since unification in 1990. There has been hardly any speculation--let alone a substantial debate--on the future of nuclear forces in European security, neither in the public, nor in political or academical circles. The few official statements from the governing parties only point out that Germany, as a non-nuclear state, will continue to rely heavily on the nuclear protection by US extended deterrence capacities.⁴ In addition, the parliamentary opposition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Greens is still heading for a nuclear-free world and, therefore, opposes any concept of nuclear cooperation in Europe in principle. Not even the 1995 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) extension conference and the question of whether Germany should opt for an indefinite extension of the NPT, which would further cement Germany's non-nuclear status, has found significant interest in the public. In fact, there has been a broad consensus amongst the major political parties in favor of an indefinite extension of the nonproliferation regime.⁵

Such a harmonious decision is surprising for a country, which had in the mid-sixties expressed more reservations towards the NPT than any other of the approximately 100 non-nuclear signatory countries of that treaty. What is even more surprising is the fact that, at present, hardly any Germans care much about nuclear weapons: this in a country that had faced bitter nuclear controversies and public uproar throughout the 1980s. In light of this present "nuclear apathy," it is hard to discern any evidence that Germany's allies and neighbors, might sooner or later try to bolster its political status by striving for a national nuclear weapons posture.⁶

These concerns, sometimes expressed in semi-official political statements, are not only based on the fact that Germany, as a highly industrialized country, has all the technical capabilities and skills necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons, but also on political and historical considerations.⁷ Notwithstanding Germany's constant pledges to stick to its non-nuclear status, Germany's past nuclear policy always tried to keep the "nuclear option" within a broader European framework. This had been one major reason for the German hesitance in joining the nonproliferation regime. No other non-nuclear weapons state had exercised so much influence on the formulation of the NPT during its negotiation phase. But, this alleged nuclear ambition did not correspond with the "nuclear allergy" which became virulent in German society not too long after the beginning of violent protests against civil nuclear energy in the 1970s.

German unification could by no means overcome this ambivalence. Indeed, it even augmented this by creating a dichotomy of nuclear allegations from abroad and strict nuclear

renunciation at home. On the one hand, Germany's newly gained sovereignty and its growing awareness of increased leverage in international politics nourished the suspicions of those who were afraid of a nuclear-armed Germany as the dominating power in Western Europe.⁸ But, on the other hand, the integration of 17 million Germans from the former German Democratic Republic, indoctrinated over decades against (Western) nuclear forces by communist propaganda, surely increases the overall nuclear skepticism within the German society.

This essay will consider Germany's possible future "nuclear policy," particularly with regard to the role of nuclear weapons in a more integrated Europe. In order to throw light on this complex and contradictory issue, this article will start with an analysis of Germany's past nuclear policy. A second section will deal with the present German views on European nuclear cooperation. Finally, some hypotheses will be developed on the future German position toward nuclear forces in Europe.

Germany's Nuclear Policy

Right from its inception as a state, the security of the Federal Republic of Germany was crucially dependent on the North Atlantic Alliance and thus primarily on the political, military, and economic power of the United States of America. The guiding principle of Western security policy has been the idea of nuclear deterrence, i.e., the idea of convincing a potential opponent that the costs of any aggression in terms of nuclear destruction are likely to exceed any benefits that might follow. But this concept of nuclear deterrence is plagued by a couple of inconsistencies and paradoxes, which made it vulnerable to harsh criticism by its opponents. Most importantly, nuclear deterrence not only provides the chance of preventing political conflict from turning into military violence, but it also implies the possibility of destruction and devastation on a global scale. Both possible outcomes are opposing sides of the same coin.

But for Germany, the dilemmas have been even more specific. On the one hand, the nuclear umbrella of US-extended deterrence was of paramount importance for West Germany's security, but at the same time Germany would become a prime nuclear target in any major East-West campaign. Because of its geostrategic position any Soviet nuclear strike against the West would have hit Germany first of all. It was an undeniable fact that even a conventional war in Europe would have cataclysmic consequences for a highly industrialized and densely populated country like Germany. This led to a long held German policy on a strategy of the early and massive use of nuclear weapons, in spite of all the catastrophic ramifications of such an option.

Moreover, Germany insisted on a massive American nuclear

presence in Europe, including the deployment of a substantial number of nuclear weapons on German soil, because this was seen as increasing the credibility of the US nuclear commitment.⁹ But at the same time, some observers suspected that US nuclear weapons might be used to execute "limited nuclear options" against the Warsaw Pact, with the possible result of a limited Soviet nuclear retaliation confined to Europe.¹⁰ Hence, it remained unanswerable, whether American nuclear weapons on German soil were a means of transatlantic *coupling*, or would have in fact *decoupled* American and European security in the sense that Germany had become the "nuclear playground" for a superpower conflict.

These contradicting and paradoxical implications of nuclear deterrence caused somewhat ambivalent reactions on the German side and led to a two-layered nuclear policy. Given the very special situation as a divided country, located at the frontline between East and West in a bipolar world, Germany's nuclear policy constantly manifested itself in two different strings: *nuclear renunciation* on the one hand and the desire for *nuclear participation* on the other. The categorical plea to stick to a non-nuclear status was a logical consequence of Germany's post-war position as a destroyed and occupied country. The constant request for at least some influence on the nuclear policy of its allies, however, stemmed from the realization of being the first victim of a major conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact.

In the late 1940s it became obvious to the West that the military challenge of a strong and hostile Soviet Union required the embedding of a rearmed Germany in a common Western defense structure. But it was clear, right from the beginning, that any German military contribution could only be a conventional one. Not only because there was by far not enough confidence in the new nation that emerged from the ruins of Nazi-Germany, but also because the United States at that time tried to retain its nuclear monopoly as long as possible, and steered a strict course on nonproliferation. From the very moment the Soviet Union broke the US nuclear exclusiveness, American efforts of hedging the spread of nuclear weapons became directed against the European allies and China.

In the course of the negotiations on Germany's membership in NATO, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer made a significant speech at the London Nine Powers Conference in October 1954, stating that Germany would not produce atomic, biological or chemical weapons on its territory.¹¹ This was much less an expression of intentions than a mere description of facts, since Germany had no realistic prospects of producing these devices in the following years anyway. But it was a necessary precondition for Germany's admission to NATO in May 1955.

On closer look, the German plea was a limited one, which only inhibited the *production* of atomic weapons in West Germany and not the possession of these devices in general. That sophisticated distinction became relevant, when in late 1957, France suggested Franco-German-Italian nuclear cooperation including military nuclear research. In the course of these negotiations, the three partners agreed that a cooperative production of nuclear weapons on French or Italian soil would not be barred by existing armament restrictions on Germany. Even when that project failed in the end, mostly due to French domination in the triad and American opposition, it was a clear-cut signal that a German nuclear option was at least theoretically possible.¹²

Allied fears of the implications of Germany coming close to the nuclear "button" were also at stake in the controversy on NATO's Multilateral Force (MLF), officially suggested by the United States to NATO in February 1963. For Germany, the American proposal to create a integrated nuclear structure by assigning Polaris A-3 nuclear missiles to a multinational NATO fleet opened two compelling options. First and foremost, the MLF could fasten the ties between Europe and the United States by bolstering NATO's cohesion and it might also enhance the credibility of the US commitments for their Western allies. Second, multinational nuclear forces could increase German political influence in NATO and on US nuclear planning procedures.

It is important to note, however, that the goal of gaining leverage in nuclear matters was seen more as a side effect of the predominant German interest in solid transatlantic relations being a crucial precondition for Germany's overall security.¹³ Some allies, though, notably Great Britain, expressed quite bluntly their reservations to a German finger close to the nuclear trigger. This skepticism to Germany "entering the nuclear club from the back door" seemed to be all the more strange, since the MLF was originally designed by the United States exactly to prevent Germany from demanding its own nuclear posture. In any case, the fact that MLF failed in the end was not the least due to subliminal objections to a German voice in nuclear matters among its alliance partners.

The question of the "German nuclear option" also came up during the German domestic debate on the Nonproliferation Treaty in the second half of the sixties. Notwithstanding Germany's support of the idea of nonproliferation in principle, there was substantial resistance to a American/Soviet/British accord on limiting the number of nuclear weapons states to the existing ones. Four major reservations came up against the NPT from different segments of the German political spectrum:

- 1) There was general skepticism amongst the Europeans toward

any major superpower agreement. Every accord fuelled old and subliminal anxieties that the United States and the Soviet Union might come to some tacit arrangement to limit any major East-West conflict to the European battlefield by deliberately excluding their own territory.

2) The fact that the NPT aimed at codifying permanently the inferior status of the nuclear "have nots" led to some overreactions from some Germans, who misinterpreted the NPT as a "second Versailles" that would discriminate against Germany--the third largest industrial power in the world.

3) With regard to its non military implications, the NPT was hysterically characterized as another "Morgenthau-Plan," controlling Germany's nuclear fuel supply and presumably hampering the German nuclear power industry.¹⁴

4) There was some anxiety that a non-proliferation regime might preclude further European integration which envisaged a "United States of Europe" requiring the option to set up a European nuclear posture.

These German concerns, some of them justified, some simply overinterpreted, were constantly communicated to the US administration. In the course of the transatlantic debate, some of these concerns made their way into new drafts of the treaty. When Germany finally signed the NPT on November 28, 1969, the German government added a set of clarifications and prerequisites to the NPT which were not disputed by the other signatory countries.¹⁵ Among other things, Germany stated that it would expect further protection by NATO, and presumed that the NPT would not hamper further European integration. This was a clear hint to the nuclear aspects of European integration, i.e., the possibility that a United Europe might become a nuclear player.¹⁶

With these German amendments it became evident that the German renunciation of nuclear weapons, albeit undisputed, was seen as conditional.¹⁷ In addition, a German nuclear option, at least in a European framework, had been retained.¹⁸ With regard to this conditionality it has been frequently argued that German insistence on the possibility of a European nuclear option was nothing else but a fig leaf for the hidden desire for a national nuclear weapons capacity.¹⁹

But such a conclusion seems to be inconsistent with the fact that the so-called "European clause" within the NPT was supported throughout the political spectrum involved in the ratification debate in the German Bundestag. It will be difficult, however, to label former-Federal Chancellor Willy Brand (SPD) and Gerhard Schröder of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), who was a former German foreign minister and then chairman of the

Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Relations, both of whom cooperatively drafted the official declaration of the German government to the NPT and to the European nuclear option, as proponents of an independent German nuclear force.

Even under the assumption that at least some German politicians at that time thought in terms of keeping the national nuclear option open, this view has changed significantly over the years, particularly because of the anti-nuclear movements throughout the 1980s. As a result, when Germany, in the course of the "Two-plus-Four Negotiations" on German unification in 1990, repeated its pledge to refrain from the production and possession of weapons of mass destruction, it referred to the conditions formulated in connection with Germany's adherence to the NPT in 1990 and thereby confirmed the "*de jure* conditionality" of Germany's non-nuclear status. There is no doubt, however, that the 1990 declaration on Germany's nuclear abstinence is much more restrictive when compared to the statement by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer more than three decades earlier. While Adenauer asserted in October 1954 that Germany would not produce ABC-weapons *on its territory* (without explicitly excluding the at least theoretical option to produce nuclear devices elsewhere), the "Two-plus-Four Formula" states clearly that Germany will neither produce nor possess nor control nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. This leaves hardly any politically realistic legal loophole for an independent German nuclear force, at least in currently foreseeable circumstances.

The second string of German nuclear policy, the continuing German desire for nuclear participation, was a logical consequence of Germany's perceived position as a potential nuclear battlefield. The first American nuclear weapons were deployed in Germany in 1953 without the immediate knowledge of the German government. But the real "nuclear shock" came for the German public and for the government just after Germany's admission to NATO. In 1955 NATO executed the exercise CARTE BLANCHE in Europe, assuming the detonation of 355 nuclear weapons on German and French soil. The devastating results were extensively reported in the German press: 1.7 million people immediately killed and 3.5 million seriously injured, if the nuclear use really had been executed.²⁰ For the first time the German public and decisionmakers were painfully forced to realize the German nuclear dilemma. Unlike previous German assumptions that in case of war nearly all of the Western nuclear warheads were aimed on targets in Eastern Europe or within the Soviet Union, people realized the horrible dimension of any military conflict fought with short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

It is worth noting, however, that the traumatic *carte blanche* experience did not lead the Adenauer government to state a fundamental disapproval of American nuclear weapons on German

soil. The reasons for the ongoing support for the "nuclearization" of Germany (in geographical terms) at least in the government were manifold. On the one hand, American military strategy had put more and more emphasis on nuclear weapons, thus determining the strategies of its European allies. On the other hand, nuclear weapons promised to provide "more bang for the buck" for all NATO countries. This was important for a conventionally armed country like Germany, already facing tremendous problems to meet NATO's force goals.

The announcement of the "Radford Plan" by the US Administration in 1956, to reduce US Army troops in Europe and the United States by 800,000 men due to budgetary reasons convinced the Europeans, particularly the Germans, of the idea to replace (costly) manpower by nuclear firepower.²¹ But this forced the German public to confront a crude reality: to be endangered most directly by those weapons which were preferred for political and economical reasons. For the German public the easiest way out of such a paradoxical situation was psychologically to repress the bitter truths of nuclear deterrence.

This nuclear indifference is documented in the fact that from the end of the 1950s no public protest or criticism against NATO's nuclear posture came up in Germany for nearly two decades. This is even more astonishing as Germany constantly had to bear the brunt of NATO's nuclear strategy. Even in the early 1980s, the partly violent agitations of the German "Peace Movement" against the deployment of intermediate nuclear forces were directed primarily against a comparably small amount of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles, while thousands of tactical nuclear weapons continued to be stationed on German soil without causing much fury. Obviously, most of the critics had not yet understood the real dimension of nuclear deployments in Germany (or refused to do so).

But one important and lasting effect of CARTE BLANCHE was the German insight that it needed to gain influence on US European nuclear strategy to take any nuclear war, if it should ever occur, to the aggressor's territory. In the following years Germany constantly tried to realize two goals with regard to American nuclear weapons on German soil:

1) To maximum information on the numbers and structure of US nuclear forces in Germany.

2) To participate broadly in all questions of nuclear planning and decisionmaking relevant to Germany.

In retrospect, Germany has been quite successful in pursuing these principles. By setting up the Nuclear Planning Group in 1967, NATO created a forum for transatlantic consultation on

nuclear issues.²² What in the beginning might have been regarded as a sedative for hysterical Europeans, turned out to be a success story, at least from the German viewpoint. The NPG became the cornerstone for European nuclear participation and it gained considerable influence in the evolution of NATO's nuclear strategy in Europe. This included the development of specific "Guidelines for Nuclear Consultation" in 1969 and the definition of detailed procedures for the first use of nuclear weapons and some clarifications on how to execute follow-on nuclear operations in the 1970s.²³ In each of these steps, the Europeans were increasingly able to insert their ideas and principles in the process of strategy evolution. The remarkably obvious European and German "touch" in the 1986 "General Political Guidelines" for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe clearly revealed the substantial influence of the nuclear "have not" Germany in NATO's nuclear planning.²⁴

Notwithstanding the pro-nuclear stand of large parts of Germany's political elites in the past, German society is presently characterized by deeply rooted antinuclear emotions. What is more, the group of supporters of nuclear deterrence within the political elites has become smaller. When in 1983 hundreds of thousands were protesting against NATO's "Dual Track" decision on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), a majority of German policymakers, namely the governing conservative-liberal coalition, supported the deployment of US nuclear missiles in Germany and helped to maintain the cohesion of the Western Alliance. Only a couple of years later, in the debate on the modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear forces, parts of that coalition joined the group of nuclear skeptics in Germany and expressed their concerns in the somewhat silly catchphrase "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans."

This anti-nuclear mood is not only visible with regard to military applications of nuclear energy but with respect to non-military nuclear power as well. The 1986 Chernobyl accident has stirred up the German public more than any other Western country, and it is currently nearly impossible to get public support for new civil nuclear reactor programs. One major party in Germany, the SPD, is publicly arguing in favor of discontinuing the use of civil nuclear energy.

In sum, the current German position towards nuclear weapons is quite ambivalent. Unlike for instance in France, where atomic weapons are admired as a key symbol for national grandeur, Germany, at best, regards nuclear forces as a necessary evil. This holds even more true, since the future role of NATO's nuclear forces in Europe needs to be redefined in the years to come anyway. In addition, post-war Germany has traditionally held deep reservations about military power as a political instrument. To change this attitude will take considerable time, as one can

see in the German out-of-area debate, which has been dragging on for years.

Germany's Views on a European Nuclear Cooperation

To a certain extent, the creation of a European nuclear deterrence posture lies in the logic of the process of the European political integration. If the politico-strategic entity of a true European Union is ever to be achieved, the nuclear dimension, i.e., the question of how to include the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain in that respective entity, must be addressed sooner or later. Interestingly, in spite of the very dynamics of European integration, which are now already extending the "Europe of the Twelve" to a "Europe of the Fifteen,"²⁵ the nuclear question still remains on the backburner. However, taking on that issue seems to be all the more urgent, since the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States might not necessarily be taken for granted by the European members of NATO. It is particularly the problem of the durability and solidity of NATO's nuclear deterrence framework which is advanced by many proponents of a European nuclear cooperation. These advocates (particularly in France) consider the increasing renationalization of US nuclear strategy as an unavoidable consequence of the end of superpower conflict in Europe. In the wake of these tendencies of an American "nuclear disentanglement," institutions for exerting a European influence in NATO's nuclear matters, like the NPG, will increasingly lose their importance. In perspective, the United States might *de facto* (albeit not formally) retract its nuclear commitments to Europe--a scenario for which the Europeans need to be prepared.

Leaving alone the extremely ambitious and remote scenario of a fully fleshed out "United States of Europe" with a centralized structure of political decisionmaking, a nuclear deterrence arrangement for the European Union is imaginable in at least two principal ways. The one is based on the concept of extended nuclear deterrence in a more traditional sense and would have to include three main features: a European Union system for political and military consultation on decisions concerning the use of French and British nuclear weapons; a common European nuclear strategy and nuclear doctrine; and the possible deployment of French and British nuclear forces on the territory of other non-nuclear weapons states of the Union.

The other European deterrence blueprint would be based on the idea of *existential nuclear deterrence*, which holds that it is the mere existence of nuclear weapons itself and not their specific deployment which provides deterrence. Here, the three factors (European command and control, nuclear strategy, and deployment outside Europe's nuclear powers) would be less relevant than in the traditional model described above, but not

totally irrelevant. Some nuclear coordination and cooperation would suffice to cause a deterrence effect on potential aggressors. However, both the traditional and the existential design have in common the fact that in both cases substantial political commitments by the nuclear weapons states to the security of European Union, and thereby to non-nuclear powers, would be crucial in order to be perceived as sufficiently credible.

It cannot be further discussed which of the two models would be the more appropriate one for the specific requirements of the envisaged European Union.²⁶ But for the purpose of this analysis it is more relevant to ask, why even the quite moderate existential version of European nuclear cooperation meets with no response in Germany?²⁷ The already-mentioned increasing tendency of anti-nuclear moods within German society, combined with the fact that, unlike in some other nuclear countries, Germany cannot instrumentalize nuclear weapons for national identity or political self-consciousness, is only one component in the complex mesh of possible explanations. At least three other factors, albeit interrelated, can be extracted.

First, Germany (and most of the other non-nuclear West European states) has manifested little interest in a joint West European nuclear deterrent, because of its confidence in US nuclear capabilities and commitments, which still seems to be higher than its confidence in British and/or French nuclear assets and assurances. In that sense, American nuclear guarantees were always regarded not only as a nuclear umbrella protecting Europe from atomic destruction or nuclear blackmail, but beyond that as a cornerstone of US overall commitments for Europe. These commitments have been visibly documented by the deployment of American nuclear and conventional forces on European soil.

From that perspective, any European alternative to US nuclear guarantees would be not only plagued with problems of credibility, but would also lack the advantage of linking a superpower to the European security landscape.²⁸ This holds all the more true since the United States is the only remaining superpower after the Cold War and since the Europeans are obviously unable effectively to coordinate a course of action in the field of security policy.²⁹ From the US point of view, nuclear commitments for Europe need not necessarily be regarded only as an "entangling burden."³⁰ They have had also a self-serving effect by preserving significant US influence in Alliance matters and by bolstering American interest in preventing nuclear proliferation. Credible nuclear guarantees are designed to persuade non-nuclear allies that aspiring to a nuclear status is unnecessary.³¹

Second, a contributing factor to Germany's "nuclear apathy" is the fact that large parts of Germany's political elite seem to

consider any wider debate on the future of nuclear weapons as counterproductive to the already shaky acceptance of nuclear deterrence in general. The governing conservative-liberal coalition still regards NATO's nuclear posture, extended deterrence, and the regime of inter-alliance nuclear consultation as crucial for Western security, even if the Soviet threat has disappeared. But any new debate on such a disputed issue might lead to a further erosion of the already fragile German nuclear consensus. Consequently, the present discretion of German policymakers in nuclear issues could be described as a "don't rock the boat" approach that tries to preserve nuclear deterrence in a era of political unpredictability.

This "low profile" approach is all the more understandable, since the variety of economic and social problems, more or less related to German unification, tend to exhaust most of Germany's political energy and public attention. Pressing economic and social problems are regarded as much more important than "exotic" reflections on nuclear weapons in an era in which a direct military confrontation between major powers has ceased to exist. It is presently not clear against what types of threats and dangers Western nuclear deterrence should be directed. On the one hand, Russia remains as the only power which might be able significantly to change the present political configuration in Europe by military means. In that sense, Western nuclear forces are deemed to counterbalance Russian military power. On the other hand, Russia is currently far from posing any direct threat against Western security interests. Instead, at least the present Russian leadership is trying to follow the path toward reform and democratization. As regards to nuclear weapons, however, things might change unexpectedly.³²

The third factor is related to the process of European integration itself. When the Berlin Wall came down and Germany's neighbors in Eastern and Western Europe realized the perspective of a unification of the two Germanies, suddenly historical apprehensions of German dominance and German nationalism developed again. To dispel these suspicions, Chancellor Helmut Kohl explicitly pursued a strategy of anchoring German unification in an increased process of European integration. This was one of the major motives of the common Franco-German initiative to complement the envisaged European Economic and Monetary Union by a second track of creating a European Political Union, both of which finally led to the Treaty of Maastricht. But the German desire to prove itself as a "Model European" (and the French intention to see Germany as firmly embedded as possible in a European Union) has finally led to a tendency to postpone critical questions concerning European integration, instead of debating them.³³ Thus, one explanation why the problem of the future role of French and British nuclear weapons in Europe had found hardly any resonance in Germany (as well as in other

European countries) is that it could not be answered quickly and that it might have interfered with the ambitious time-tables of European integration.

Now that support for the European Union has declined significantly, even in Germany, it seems to be even harder to find any attention directed toward the European nuclear question. Differing views on the depth and speed of European integration, the growing impact of "national interests" in foreign policy issues, and an eye-catching European impotence in dealing with security policy matters (e.g., the Gulf War and Bosnia) has caused a severe sputtering of the European motor. It becomes more and more apparent that the European Union is crucially lacking a political identity, and that it has been limited in the past primarily to an economic substance. Hence, at least in public, the question of how to integrate nuclear weapons in a common European foreign and security policy has lost much of its urgency.

All problems of a European nuclear force, like for instance, the hypothetical difficulties of devising politically satisfactory multilateral nuclear control mechanisms among sovereign governments, do not seem likely to become practical problems as long as the whole project of a European nuclear deterrent remains confined to exploratory dialogues between Great Britain and France.³⁴ Even these bilateral talks seem still to remain at the surface of the problems of European nuclear cooperation since the participants, at least for the time being, appear to be hesitant to go beyond purely exchanging national views and positions. For the purpose of broader nuclear cooperation in Europe, it might be imaginable to enclose non-nuclear countries in such a dialogue on European nuclear issues. With regard to Germany, however, such an option would face two major obstacles. On the one hand, a German voice in nuclear matters might fuel the habitual fears among its allies of Germany coming close to the nuclear trigger. This might, on the other hand, lead to something like a "preemptive compliance" on the German side in a sense that Germany will leave nuclear discussion to its nuclear allies.

Germany and Nuclear Weapons: The Way Ahead

Given that for years to come the US commitment to Europe appears reasonably credible and reliable, discussions about West European nuclear deterrent cooperation may remain abstract and can be deferred to an uncertain future, at least from a German viewpoint.³⁵ But what if, for whatever reason, the United States should significantly diminish its engagement in Europe, i.e., by reducing its conventional military presence down to zero and/or by the complete withdrawal of its air-launched nuclear forces presently deployed on European soil on NATO's Dual Capable

Aircraft. Would this lead to a "leadership vacuum" in Europe, to a certain pressure on Germany to fill this gap by assuming a leadership role in European security, and to "an independent German nuclear force . . . at the end of this road," as predicted in a prominent US analysis?³⁶ Would not a withdrawal of all US forward-based nuclear forces from European soil *de facto* put an end to European (German) nuclear participation within NATO? And would such an essential reduction of German leverage force Germany to go for a national nuclear capability?

Any evaluation of these questions must necessarily remain highly speculative since there seem to be too many unknowns in the equation.³⁷ One thing can be said, however. With respect to the last consequence of a nuclear capability, present political trends and historical experiences render such a possibility extremely unlikely. In light of the present anti-nuclear tendencies in Germany, combined with the cautious attitude toward military power in general, the possibility of a majority of Germans striving for a nuclear weapons capability comes close to nil.³⁸ It is worth noting that there is not a single voice in the German political spectrum, not even on its extreme ends on the right and on the left, arguing for such a decisive step. Instead, in light of past public debates on extended deterrence in Germany, another possibility seems to be much more plausible. If Germany should perceive an impending US disengagement from its nuclear commitments and, therefore, gets the impression of a significant decrease of the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, it might simply *redefine* the criteria for that respective credibility, as it did in the past.

Extended deterrence *per se* is plagued with a credibility problem. But credibility, i.e. the question of whether a non-nuclear country believes in the commitments of its nuclear ally, depends, by definition, on the perception of those under the nuclear umbrella (and, of course, on the perceptions of the party being deterred). The non-nuclear allies finally define (or redefine) whether they regard nuclear insurance as reliable, or whether they require further formal or informal measures like other force postures, different nuclear weapons deployment modes, or additional command and control procedures. For instance, the deployment of INF in the early 1980s served the purpose militarily to implement NATO's Selective Employment Plans, but politically to reassure the European allies of NATO's ability to hold Soviet territory under risk with European based nuclear weapons. This was seen as a basic requirement particularly by the Germans to minimize their credibility problems with regard to US extended nuclear deterrence capabilities. But when the superpowers agreed mutually to withdraw their Pershings, Cruise Missiles, and SS-20s, Germany redefined its conditions for nuclear credibility, by arguing that the remaining Pershing IA missiles (with a range below 500 kilometers) would suffice for

extended deterrence purposes. When these weapons were also included in a comprehensive INF Treaty and needed to be dismantled as well, Germany redefined its criteria for credibility again by asserting itself that NATO's air-launched nuclear weapons would be a reasonable symbol for the US nuclear commitment. If these systems would be also withdrawn, Germany is likely to go further in its habit of redefining extended deterrence by stating that the US nuclear umbrella might be reliable even without American forces deployed on European territory.

Germany might bank on the fact that the ongoing process of nuclear reductions in East and West will significantly reduce the US nuclear vulnerability and will therefore increase the dependability of the American assurances. Germany might, perhaps, advocate a concept of "nuclear reconstitution," i.e., the *ad hoc* transfer of US nuclear forces to Europe in an emergency case, even if the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe in the wake of a major crisis would be a highly escalatory measure and, therefore, extremely difficult to implement in reality.³⁹ Such a more "defensive" German behavior seems to be much more plausible than any attempt to "go nuclear."

Conclusions

If the preceding analysis of Germany's nuclear policy proves to be correct, then the perspective of active German participation in a debate on West-European nuclear cooperation seems to look rather dim. The author is far from arguing that such German indifference is desirable, since a fundamental European nuclear debate cannot be avoided in the longer run anyway. The future of the nonproliferation regime, the question of extended nuclear deterrence, and the problems of nuclear status and nuclear legitimacy need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. But, in their present disposition, political elites and the public in Germany appear to be disinclined to such a dialogue. It is worth noting that the perception of nuclear instabilities in the former Soviet Union, with respect to the disposal of the nuclear legacy of the Cold War (nuclear smuggling, nuclear terrorism etc.), has raised public interest in Germany concerning the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear forces, but it has not fueled a German interest in European nuclear cooperation.

Obviously, those who endorse a new nuclear strategy debate in Europe have to face the fact that Germany, after years of harsh domestic battles on nuclear issues, now pays much more attention to a wide spectrum of other questions in the field of foreign and security policy and to a variety of domestic problems. However, the positive side effect of the present German passiveness in the debate on the future of nuclear weapons is

that the US nuclear weapons deployed on German soil are no longer an issue of public uproar or even violent protest. This gives those in Germany who still believe in the necessity of a nuclear deterrence capability as a means of insurance in an era of transition the chance to proceed in their strategy of "don't rock the boat," and to keep the American nuclear weapons as long as the political unpredictability, particularly in Russia, remains.

Notes

1. See for instance, Selig S. Harrison, "Make the World Less Nuclear, With Zero as the Goal," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), February 18, 1995. For the opposing view see Kathleen Bailey, "Why We Have to Keep the Bomb," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 51, No. 1, January/February 1995, pp. 30-37.

2. See David S. Yost, "Nuclear Weapons Issues in France," in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., *Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China*, San Diego: IGCC Publications, 1994, p. 40.

3. See Malcolm Rifkind, "The British Defence Strategy: What Role for Nuclear Weapons?," Speech delivered at the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London, November 16, 1993.

4. See for instance, the new party platform of the governing Christian Democratic Union.

5. In February 1995, a diplomatic initiative by the German government to convince the still hesitant members of the United Nations to agree to the indefinite extension of the NPT was strongly supported by the Social Democratic Opposition. For one of the few critics of that position, see Uwe Nerlich, *Toward a New Nuclear Weapons Retime*, Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1993.

6. Indications for these concerns are, for instance, the US decision not to export even small amounts of weapons-grade nuclear material for a German research reactor, or the skepticism on the French and British side when Germany joined the Western efforts to provide technical assistance for dismantling nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

7. There were reports in early 1992 of a leaked draft of a US Defense Planning Guidance document that implied that Germany might choose to seek nuclear weapons. See David S. Yost, *Western Europe and Nuclear Weapons*, Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, CSTS, 1993, p. 17.

8. At the same time Germany was urged by its allies to leave

its "observer status" in world politics and to show more international responsibility by permitting its armed forces to take part in combat operations beyond NATO's traditional boundaries. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The German Bundeswehr in Out-of-Area Operations: to Engage or Not to Engage," *The World Today*, Vol. 49, August-September 1993, p. 165.

9. It should be recalled that it was a German request to the United States to deploy Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe, indirectly formulated by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his famous speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in 1977. When it came to a US-Soviet agreement on the withdrawal of these weapons in 1987, it was Germany that was the most concerned of these nuclear reductions.

10. See Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma," *Orbis*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 1975, pp. 46-476.

11. Reprinted in *Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit* (Documentation on Disarmament and Security), Vol. 1, Bonn: Siegler, 1966, p. 79.

12. It is worth noting that Great Britain was excluded from this project. For more details, see Peter Fischer, "Das Projekt einer trilateralen Nuklearkooperation" (The Project of a Trilateral Nuclear Cooperation), *Historisches Jahrbuch*, München: Alber, 1992, pp. 143-156. See also the memoirs of the former German Federal Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauß, *Erinnerungen*, Berlin: Siedler, 1989, p. 313.

13. See Robert E. Osgood, *The Case for the MLF: A Critical Evaluation*, Washington DC: The Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1964, p. 37.

14. US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau proposed a plan in 1945 for dividing Germany into several small de-industrialized agrarian states. Such a "pastoralization" would, he argued, prevent Germany from becoming once again a threat for the United States.

15. Parallel to the signature, the German government published two documents on the NPT--an official note and a declaration--in which particular German interpretations of the NPT were codified. Reprinted in *Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit*, Vol. 7, pp. 427-428.

16. It is worth noting that a draft version of the German NPT-declaration mentioned above contained an explicit reference to the nuclear components of a Western European defense. For political reasons, this reference was dropped in July 1968 by the German Inter-Ministerial Working Staff. See Mathias Kuntzel, *Bonn*

& *the Bomb*, London: Pluto Press 1995, p. 123.

17. See Helga Haftendorn, *Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik*, Dusseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1974, p. 180.

18. The US administration had assured Germany that an all-European federal state would not be bound by the NPT. This was implicitly stated in the declaration by the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in a Senate hearing on the NPT on July 10, 1968. See *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1970, p. 5.

19. For such an argumentation, see Kuntzel, p. 166.

20. According to a close observer, *carte blanche* stirred the German press and the Bundestag more than any previous maneuver involving nuclear weapons, or any statement on the atomic defense of Europe. See Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War*, New York: Row, Peterson & Company, 1957, p. 182.

21. After harsh protest by the American military and by the European allies, the "Radford Plan" was finally cancelled.

22. See the fundamental study by Paul Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983.

23. For an authoritative source, see Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983.

24. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, *Die nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen der NATO 1945-1991: Strategie und Politik* (NATO's Short Range Nuclear Forces 1945-1991: Strategy and Politics), Sankt Augustin, Germany: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1993.

25. According to the results of the referendum of November 1994, Norway will not join the European Union as originally scheduled.

26. As an advocate of the more existential model, see Frederic Bozo, "A West European Deterrence Posture: Prospects and Issues," in Thomas J. Marshall and Jérôme Paolini, eds., *What Future for Nuclear Forces in International Security?*, Paris: Institut français des Relations internationales, 1992, p. 81. For the traditional view, see Roberto Zadra, "European Integration and Nuclear Deterrence After the Cold War," *Chaillot Papers No. 5*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1992, p. 29.

27. One of the few exceptions: Florian Gerster and Michael Hennes, "Minimalabschreckung durch die Kernwaffen Englands und

Frankreichs" (Minimum Deterrence with France's and Great Britain's Nuclear Forces), *Europäische Wehrkunde*, Vol. 34, August 1990, p. 443.

28. It was France, now one of the major advocates of a European nuclear deterrent, that rejected the idea of extended deterrence right from the beginning. From the French perspective, nuclear weapons were only suitable to protect the nation which had the full command and control over the weapons. For decades the French credo had been the catchphrase "La nucléaire ne se partage pas." However, there are signs that the French position is changing.

29. A recent example is the performance of the European Union in the war in the Balkans which came down to a minimalist approach as the "lowest common denominator," which has been limited by and large to humanitarian assistance. See Michael Brenner, "The EC in Yugoslavia: A Debut Performance," *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1992, p. 586.

30. On this issue, see the fundamental analysis by Robert E. Osgood, *NATO--the Entangling Alliance*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

31. In that sense, US nuclear commitments, combined with the nuclear nonproliferation regime, have intended to freeze the given distribution of nuclear weapons, and firmly and formally to render NATO into an alliance of nuclear unequals.

32. "Let me remind you that Russia has little prospect of returning to the kind of conventional force structure that they had at the height of the Cold War due to the collapse of their economy and the change in their political situation. It is a less expensive and less demanding matter for them to return to a much more aggressive nuclear posture. If something goes wrong in Russia, it is likely that it is in the nuclear forces area that we will face the first challenge." John Deutch, former-US Deputy Secretary of Defense, press conference news release by the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, DC, September 22, 1994, p. 7.

33. This holds particularly true for Germany, where there has been hardly any controversy on Germany's European course between the government and Social Democratic opposition.

34. Yost, *Western Europe and Nuclear Weapons*, p. 17.

35. It is telling that in the new White Paper of the German Ministry of Defense, European Nuclear Cooperation is not even mentioned.

36. Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, *The Franco-German Corps and the Future of European Security: Implications for US Policy*, Washington DC: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1992, p. 2.

37. One of the "unknowns" is the question whether Germany at all in the future perceives at least a "residual threat" in Europe that needs to be contained by nuclear forces. In an (admittedly most unlikely) scenario of a comprehensive democratization of the European continent with successful institutions and structures of collective security, the importance of the nuclear question would decrease significantly. If a contrasting long term scenario should materialize, ending up in a significant increase in nuclear weapons states all around the globe, the German position toward nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence might be completely different. However, this would require a fundamental change in German perceptions on nuclear weapons.

38. According to a recent public poll in Germany conducted by the American RAND Corporation, only 14 percent of the Germans polled wanted their country to have its own nuclear capability. See *Wall Street Journal*, February 16, 1993.

39. As an advocate of that concept see Karl Kaiser, "From Nuclear Deterrence to Graduated Conflict Control," *Survival*, Vol. 32, No. 6, November 1990, pp. 483-496.

**DEFENSE PLANNING
AND THE BUNDESWEHR'S NEW SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY**

Thomas-Durell Young

Recent developments would apparently manifest significant successes for the efforts of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Socialist Union (CSU)/Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition government to reach a greater degree of "normalization"¹ in the defense structures and policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Perhaps most significantly, on June 30, 1995, the Bundestag endorsed the government's decision to send elements of the Bundeswehr to participate in United Nations' (UN) peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.² That this act followed almost eight months of, at times, partisan debate which resulted in the end in sizeable support for the government from defectors from the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens, can be assessed as a major development in the evolution of German defense and foreign policy.

Moreover, the publication in July 1994 of a key defense planning document, immediately following the decision by the Constitutional Court which supported the government's contention that Bundeswehr participation in UN-sponsored peace support operations was legal,³ outlined the government's plans to restructure the Bundeswehr for the post-Cold War security environment.⁴ These developments evince, according to one well-regarded American observer of German security policy, that a new "political and strategic rationale for the Bundeswehr has been embraced" and that a new German attitude has developed toward fulfilling Bonn's security responsibilities as a member of the Western Alliance.⁵ Given that (according to one press report) the Luftwaffe in August 1995 was involved in combat air operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina, this thesis would appear to be the case.⁶

However, a review of other less well-known and understood aspects of the ongoing German defense debate could lead to other conclusions. While fully acknowledging that Bonn has made major strides in its ability to exercise its reestablished national sovereignty, significant challenges to transforming the Bundeswehr remain to be addressed. Specifically, these issues include continuing problems in effective defense planning and an, as yet, incomplete political debate and agreement over the future of conscription.

Closely related to these two problems is a potentially greater impediment to effective long term German defense planning: the lack of debate over the need to review the basis of

the Bundeswehr, i.e., its institutional legitimacy in German society. While perhaps seemingly inconsequential to some, in reality, such a debate is of overwhelming importance for the Bundeswehr, since its creation and until unification, it was founded with the sole mission of securing the defense of Germany. As such, to cite Wolfgang Schlör, ". . . the Bundeswehr has always been less a manifestation of statehood than a means of defending against the Soviet threat. With this threat gone, the very existence of the German military is in question."⁷

What is disturbing about recent defense plans presented by Federal Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe, is that the coalition government has launched what will surely be the most fundamental restructuring of the Bundeswehr in its short history, to enable it to participate in peace support operations which it has heretofore not undertaken. This reorganization is taking place without the necessary political debate to garner multiparty support for this ambitious transfiguration of the Bundeswehr. Rather, the government has followed a slow, incremental policy of participating in new military missions, while transforming elements of the armed forces. While perhaps politically prudent, in the short term, this policy has enabled the government to avoid addressing two fundamental and sensitive questions closely tied with this reorganization: the Bundeswehr's institutional legitimacy and the future of conscription.

This essay will argue that the largest and most modern allied military force on the European continent is being restructured, absent political consensus in the Bundestag. In consequence, given that the Bundeswehr and the military profession have not enjoyed wide public acceptance in the Federal Republic,⁸ German post-Cold War defense planning is being based upon dubious premises. The purpose of this essay is to assess and critique post-Cold War German defense planning and examine the significant domestic political limitations to the Federal Republic exercising national military power outside its borders. This holds true both for Bundeswehr participation in peace support and power projection operations.⁹

Defense Planning: Prospects and Problems

An initial assessment of current defense planning in the Federal Republic reveals what appears to be forward thinking and rational plans for restructuring the Bundeswehr. All but forgotten are the painful memories of the ill-fated *Bundeswehrplanung 94* (*Federal Armed Forces Master Planning Document*).¹⁰ Published in December 1992, this master planning document was envisaged to provide the basis for the post-Cold War restructuring of the armed forces to a peacetime strength of 370,000 as denoted in the "Two-plus-Four Treaty." Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however, disavowed this structural plan in February

1993, because of publicly acknowledged financial shortfalls (and a privately-admitted, unanticipated increase in conscientious objectors) which invalidated many crucial planning assumptions.¹¹ As a result, German defense planning entered into a state of purgatory from which it truly did not reappear until July 1994.¹²

Inconsistent government financial and personnel end-strength guidance complicated long term defense planning after February 1993 (the latter point will be discussed below). Financial expenditures declined from DM 53.6 billion in 1991 to a projected DM 48.4 in 1996, which has been further reduced by an additional DM 1.4 billion for 1997.¹³ The need for the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung--BMVg (Federal Ministry of Defense) to expend sizeable sums of money for capital-intensive projects associated with unification (i.e., disposal of enormous East German armament stocks and the need to renovate dilapidated eastern military facilities) further exacerbated financial planning. Given that the size of the Bundeswehr fell from approximately 480,000 in 1991 to below 370,000 in 1994, one could argue the logic for financial reductions. However, a more revealing indicator of this financial impact upon Bundeswehr planning is the percentage of capital acquisition in the defense budget, which has dropped from a Cold War level of 30 percent to a current figure of 21 percent.¹⁴

Whereas consistent long term financial guidance has been lacking, interestingly, conceptual guidance for restructuring the Bundeswehr has been relatively consistent. Shortly after unification, the BMVg announced a number of service reorganization plans, e.g., *Heeresstruktur 5* (Army Structural Plan 5). These plans envisaged shifting resources and personnel from the traditional emphasis of the Bundeswehr, i.e., territorial defense, to the creation of reaction forces. While the force sizes outlined in these plans essentially became irrelevant following the demise of *Bundeswehrplanung 94*, their conceptual emphases remains very much in effect in their successor service development plans. In other words, there was little question that the Bundeswehr would be restructured with the aim of preparing part of it for new missions outside of the Central Region, as recognized by the Alliance's New Strategic Concept.¹⁵

Specific policy guidance for this shift in the Bundeswehr's orientation has been stated in key defense planning documents. Generally overlooked, but possibly the most influential post-Cold War defense planning document has been the *Verteidigungs-politische Richtlinien--VPR* (Defense Policy Guidelines), published in November 1992.¹⁶ These were the first defense policy guidelines issued by a German government since 1979, and importantly, they are unclassified. The document is important because it openly addresses the security policies of a unified

Germany and defines German national interests in the post-Cold War world.¹⁷ From a planning perspective, the VPR, therefore, should constitute the primary document for all subsequent force structure planning.¹⁸ Thus, from the VPR, the *Militärpolitische Zielsetzung (Military Policy Objective)*, the *Bundeswehr Konzeption (Federal Armed Forces Concept)*, and finally *Bundeswehrplanung* should be developed.¹⁹

While broad in scope but short in detail, the key planning thrust of the VPR is to lay the basis for the future force structure of the Bundeswehr, particularly the need to raise reaction forces.²⁰ This force structure guidance was continued in the much more publicized document, *White Paper 1994*.²¹ Reflecting the evolution in the political debate over the future missions of the Bundeswehr since the publication of the VPR, the *White Paper* explicitly stated the Bundeswehr would participate in peace support operations under the auspices of the United Nations.²² Information regarding force size are stated only in a broad sense and little mention is made of the future outlook for main defense forces.²³

Viewing these documents as the conceptual skeleton, the *Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr--KLL (Conceptual Guideline for the Future Development of the Federal Armed Forces)* constitutes the flesh in terms of detailed force planning. The KLL provides the government's intentions concerning the projected strength of the Bundeswehr, the role that conscription will play, and the organization of combat forces. On the first point, the KLL stated that force planning would be predicated upon a total force of 340,000.²⁴ To man this force conscription would be continued. But, the term of service would be reduced from 12 to 10 months, except for volunteers choosing to serve in reaction forces, who must agree to serve for 13 months.²⁵ Significantly, the KLL announced that the bulk of the Bundeswehr would retain its traditional main defense mission, but specific organizational structure would be finalized later. Fifty thousand personnel (professionals and volunteer conscripts) would be slated for service in the reaction forces, consisting of:

Army: 5 1/2 brigades

Air Force: 6 squadrons of attack, air defense, aerial reconnaissance and dual-capable aircraft; 2 mixed air ground-based air defense units; and, 2 to 3 air transport groups

Federal Navy: 2 high-sea operational groups.²⁶

The government further clarified its intent on March 15, 1995, with the release of *Ressortkonzept zur Anpassung der Streitkräftestrukturen, der Territorialen Wehrverwaltung und der Stationierung (Departmental Concept for the Adaptation of the*

Armed Forces' Structures, Territorial Defense Administration, and Stationing) which outlined how main defense forces would be organized.²⁷ This document provided additional force structure reductions (e.g., under the army's structural plan--*Army for New Tasks*--it loses a total of 35 battalions)²⁸ after which the army will consist of 22 brigades (organized in 7 divisions). However the army will have the ability to expand to 26 brigades in crises.²⁹ The Luftwaffe and Bundesmarine were saved from any major reductions or reorganizations.³⁰

The above *précis* of post-Cold War German defense planning outlines the basic structural changes of the Bundeswehr. What is less widely known and understood is the bureaucratic backdrop against which these documents were developed. A minor criticism could be made that these documents did not follow the traditional form of long-standing planning processes.³¹ Given the end of the Cold War and the massive changes the Bundeswehr had to undergo to adjust itself to the new security environment (*and* to conform to NATO force structure changes), a strong argument can be made that the modalities employed to effect this reorganization and subsequent results are justifiable. For example, in view of prevailing financial limitations, it is clear that there are insufficient funds to field a Bundeswehr of 370,000, as some officials in the FDP insisted upon maintaining (for unclear political reasons) in 1994.³² To do so would have produced a defense force with severe operational limitations and would have inhibited modernization efforts.³³

However, these new planning modalities and results do point to a less complimentary assessment of the coalition's, or more specifically Federal Defense Minister Ruhe's, handling of this affair.³⁴ In effect, the Bundeswehr experienced four major restructuring and stationing concepts within almost as many years. These circumstances indicate a lack of far-sighted planning guidance on the part of the ruling coalition. So severe were these problems that in 1993 the civilian and military personnel committee of the Bundeswehr and BMVg sent an open letter to the Bundestag criticizing chaotic military planning and failures in senior political leadership.³⁵

The BMVg's senior political leadership also developed these plans in a vacuum. When details of the *KLL* (with its controversial reduction in military service and overall force structure) were leaked to the press in April 1994,³⁶ a major political storm erupted *within* the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition.³⁷ The sensitive proposal to reduce personnel to 340,000 and conscription to 10 months had not been discussed in the coalition, let alone briefed to the Bundestag defense committee. The issue of the reduction in the term of military service was not well-received by many CDU/CSU Defense Committee members, because of their fear that such a reduction would undermine

conscription and lead to the creation of a professional army.³⁸

Given the political uproar surrounding the *KLL* and the ensuing bureaucratic tempest which struck the BMVg, two important observations are in order. First, apparently these plans were developed without the full expertise and assistance from the responsible division (VI) for force development in the Central/Joint Staff (Führungsstab der Streitkräfte--Fu S VI).³⁹ Second, and perhaps most significant for this paper, the *KLL* in particular was developed in *isolation* from the Defense Committee of the Bundestag. The plans, which were eventually and grudgingly accepted by CDU/CSU/FDP defense experts,⁴⁰ failed to take into consideration prevailing political sensitivities over the continuation of conscription. Given the power that the Bundestag and its Defense Committee exercise in the defense decision-making process, that the committee was unaware of the proposals contained in the *KLL* is surprising, to say the least.

To summarize, the coalition government has effected a number of far reaching planning initiatives to change the structure of the Bundeswehr to meet new post-Cold War missions. However, inconsistent financial guidance, *inter alia*, has resulted in fractured planning guidance. Equally disruptive and less well understood, has been the inability of the coalition government to come to closure on the end-strength of the Bundeswehr. To be sure, this question is dependent upon finances. Nevertheless, the numerical size of the Bundeswehr is also very much a function of conscription. And, it is to this political Pandora's box that this essay must next turn.

Staatsbürger im Uniform

That there has been an intense debate in the Federal Republic over the Bundeswehr's potential participation in peace support operations there can be no disagreement. As Robert Dorff describes elsewhere in this compendium, the issue of German participation in these new missions has resulted in a far reaching debate over a unified Germany's place in the world and has produced some interesting domestic alignments in the political constellation of the Bundestag. Yet, while the defense debates have been heated over the issues of finances and the ultimate peacetime size of the Bundeswehr, what has been missing is a discussion on a deeper and more fundamental matter, the future of conscription and *who* serves and for *how* long.

Writing in 1991, Geoffrey Van Orden presciently observed that "The debate over conscription goes to the heart of the contemporary German dilemma over the function of the armed forces."⁴¹ In addition to serving as a cost-effective means of raising manpower, conscription has come to play a pivotal political role in the Federal Republic. Importantly, it has also

served as a crucial legitimizing agent for the Bundeswehr. During the planning for the creation of a defense force, officials of the Federal Republic could find no suitable examples in German history of military institutions serving a democracy which encouraged emulation.⁴² The only other army that served a German democracy, the Reichswehr, did not present a suitable model because of the fundamentally anti-democratic attitude of its leadership. Thus, the creation of the first conscript army under a German democratic government served two key roles: to mitigate against the Bundeswehr's isolation from German society and, perhaps most importantly, to ensure that the Bundeswehr would reflect West German societal values.⁴³

Given Germans' skepticism of previous German military institutions, gaining acceptance as a legitimate institution in the Federal Republic has been no easy task. It was decided that the key to maintaining a close relationship between the Bundeswehr and German society was for the former to embody the precept, "Staatsburger im Uniform" (citizen in uniform). Modern German military reformers (e.g., Generals Ulrich de Maiziere, Johannes Steinhoff, and Wolf von Baudissin) envisaged that conscription would play an integral part of what was to become the institutional spirit of the Bundeswehr: *Innere Fuhrung* ("leadership and civic education"). By combining the liberal traditions of German military history and 19th Century Prussian reformers, Bonn hoped that the Bundeswehr would embody the institutional spirit of the state, uphold the immutable human rights of those serving it, and recognize soldiers' responsibilities to a higher purpose--all in the pursuit of national defense. In essence, *Innere Fuhrung* seeks to overcome the undemocratic traditions and ways of thinking of previous German militaries.⁴⁴ Conscription in the Federal Republic, therefore, has a Janus-like characteristic: the "spiritual" (*geistig*), i.e., providing the institution with domestic legitimacy and public acceptance, and the physical, i.e., inexpensive manpower.

Conscription has presented a delicate problem for the German political debate for a variety of reasons. Fundamentally, it has never been terribly popular. A public-opinion poll in 1993, for instance, showed that 66 percent of respondents were in favor of replacing conscription with a professional army.⁴⁵ In spite of its unpopularity with the German public, the principal political parties in Germany have long shared the view that it is important, albeit for different reasons. Conservatives supported conscription because Bonn could meet its collective defense commitments to its Western allies, whereas Socialists were assuaged that a large number of conscripts would ensure a strong and consistent democratic influence over the professional military. Conscription, or rather national service, has also come to provide the government with a large pool of inexpensive labor

for Germany's large (and expensive) social and health-care system--yet another compelling political reason for its continuation.⁴⁶

Of course, conscription's general unpopularity resulted in an understanding amongst political parties not to revisit the issue in public too frequently, out of fear of undermining its fragile support. For instance, it is not surprising that none of the principal political parties was anxious to bring up the issue of the continuation of conscription as a major issue in the fall 1994 federal election campaign. At the same time, one can cynically question the defense planning *imperative* of the coalition government reducing military service from 12 to 10 months, given that Ruhe announced this policy in the *KLL* only three months prior to the Federal elections.

From a defense planning perspective, conscription enabled the creation of a modern military establishment and an extensive wartime reserve structure, within acceptable financial limitations. Although during the Cold War the Bundeswehr was largely perceived as being a "conscript army," in reality draftees made up only 45 percent of its strength. This required approximately a 200,000-man annual intake to maintain a force level of 495,000. Given, for example, a registered cohort of 470,000 in 1990, this did not present an insurmountable challenge. Unification and a peacetime force level of 370,000 to be met by 1994, as "mentioned" in the "Two-plus-Four" Treaty, ended defense officials' immediate problems with sharply declining demographic trends.⁴⁸ Indeed, the problem which faced German defense officials following unification was how to maintain a viable and equitable system of conscription while reducing the size of the Bundeswehr (with former East German Army personnel) from 538,000 to 370,000 by 1994.⁴⁸

German officials, however, currently face a convergence of declining demographic trends and a growing disinclination by young men *willing* to serve in the Bundeswehr. These two developments present Bonn with a major problem of maintaining the Wehrgerechtigkeit (equity in the application of the draft) with all of its potentially explosive societal implications. The governing coalition has acknowledged that demographic trends continue to point downward, bottoming out in 1994 (350,000 19-year-olds) and not rising to 400,000 until the year 2000.⁴⁹ In order to maintain a projected force structure of 340,000, the government requires an annual intake of 160,000.⁵⁰ Yet, not all who are qualified for military service necessarily serve: currently only 38 percent of those eligible actually undertake military service.⁵¹ Ominously, military service is increasingly unattractive to young men, according to the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner (or Ombudsman). In his 1994 report, the Defense Commissioner found a growing inequity between those who perform

military service and those who opt for alternative national service.⁵²

Not surprisingly, this negative perception of military service among the public has encouraged an increasing number of individuals to claim conscientious objector status and perform alternative national service. Current defense personnel plans of 160,000 conscripts *assumes* a conscientious objector rate of 28 percent.⁵³ Yet, by early 1995, this rate of conscientious objectors already has risen to over 30 percent--a tripling over ten years.⁵⁴ This trend has led CDU defense expert Klaus Dieter Reichardt to predict that his own party's defense plan of a Bundeswehr of 340,000 will soon fall short by 20,000.⁵⁵ Given these projections, one can almost predict that the *KLL* will repeat the failure of *Bundeswehrplanung 94*, which was eventually rejected, in part, due to an unanticipated increase in the number of conscientious objectors.⁵⁶ Thus the question needs to be posed: can current defense plans be fully implemented with a force of 320,000, or will defense planning return to its previous purgatory.

A Two-Class Army?

One can observe that conscription is losing popularity among the German public, yet to replace it with a professional army is not a politically viable option. The creation of a professional army would severely attack the institutional legitimacy of the Bundeswehr. Simply put, the Bundeswehr was not created upon the "spiritual" basis of being a professional military, with all of its negative connotations to many Germans. From a domestic political perspective, reorganizing the Bundeswehr is necessary; otherwise how can its budget, let alone its mere continued existence, be justified in the post-Cold War Europe?

At the same time, the government is clearly aware of the need to match its consistent statements stressing its unwavering adherence to meet its responsibilities to the Atlantic Alliance, with concrete defense reforms that enable the Bundeswehr to respond to multilateral peace support and power projection missions.⁵⁷ It is little wonder that Federal Defense Minister Ruhe has consistently stressed the need for the Bundeswehr to develop reaction forces to be capable of participating in these new post-Cold War missions in order to maintain Bonn's *bona fides* with its allies.

For these compelling domestic political and allied considerations, defense planning since *Bundeswehrplanung 94* has provided for the creation of reaction forces. At present, the coalition government envisages the reaction forces to compose 53,600 personnel.⁵⁸ Although this figure is for the entire Bundeswehr, this delineation between reaction and main defense

forces will be most strongly felt in the army, where five and one-half out of 22 brigades are designated for these missions. In consequence, these units will be made up of professionals and conscripts who volunteer for this duty which requires 15 months of service.⁵⁹

Whereas the defense policy *objectives* of this planning would appear to make sound sense, the political *implications* for the Bundeswehr, and for the fragile national defense consensus which presently exists, is less encouraging. As currently planned, the reaction forces (approximately 15 percent of personnel and 25 percent of army brigades) will receive the bulk of new matériel, funding for training, and the most proficient and motivated NCO and officers. On the other hand, the bulk of the army will be in the main defense forces. It will be made up largely of short-term conscripts and have less funding for training and exercises and, consequently, lower training standards.⁶⁰ According to the BMVg, this deficiency in funding for main defense forces reached the point in 1994 that they were unable to hold two requisite 7- to 10-day exercises. Insufficient training was noted by the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner who stated that a lack of funding was having a severe impact upon motivation and leadership in the Bundeswehr.⁶¹

The Bundeswehr, therefore, is inevitably becoming a two-class military. The net result of this training shortfall, according to Florian Gerster, a former SPD defense expert, is that individual soldiers in main defense units will have little opportunity to train realistically at the company, let alone battalion, level.⁶² As the respected defense correspondent Karl Feldmeyer noted, conscripts in the Field Army ". . . will be trained with weapons that are often older than they themselves-- not exactly an experience that inspires confidence" (particularly in a conscript army). Feldmeyer goes on to speculate that this will only increase the number of young men unwilling to perform military service since it is unlikely under these circumstances that even main defense missions can be accomplished.⁶³ When combined with the fact that fewer individuals are willing to perform military service, it is apparent that the Bundeswehr is increasingly becoming isolated from its tenuous roots in German society. Indeed, there are indications that German society is pushing it out.

Reformation of the Bundeswehr's Legitimacy

The obvious question is how has the coalition government allowed this potentially damaging planning to take place? One explanation is that defense officials have attempted to meet two key, but almost mutually-exclusive objectives. First, the government has agreed to NATO's New Strategic Concept and concomitant force structure reorganization plans. Therefore,

there is a stated national requirement to raise and equip reaction forces capable of operating outside of the Central Region, a capability the Bundeswehr has never before been required to field and, until unification, had never even considered. Second, CDU/CSU defense experts have argued adamantly for the continuation of conscription, as well as against Federal Defense Minister Ruhe's move to reduce the time of service from 12 to 10 months.⁶⁴ Reducing the length of obligatory military service, these conservative parliamentarians have argued, only encourages the declining popularity of serving in the military.⁶⁵

In short, a major deficiency in defense policy has been the failure to find an acceptable balance between the need to create reaction forces, while maintaining sufficient resources and numbers in the Field Army so as not to undermine further public support for conscription. From an assessment of events to date, Ruhe's planning has placed too much emphasis on creating reaction forces, which has resulted in some unforeseen implications.

One of the prime motivations behind creating reaction forces in both the Alliance and the Federal Republic was to enable all nations, but particularly Central Region armed forces, to effect intra-regional reinforcement of the flanks.⁶⁶ Following the Oslo Ministerials in June 1992, the Alliance declared itself prepared to undertake peace support operations within the political and legal context of the United Nations.⁶⁷ As Europe has become progressively focused on events in the former-Yugoslavia and Alliance operations there, the allied intra-regional rationale for reaction forces has been lost in the public debate to that of peace support missions.

In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, two unforeseen problems have developed as a result of the current focus on peace support operations. First, as observed by Michael J. Inacker, the legacy of former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher remains strong in the Federal Republic. Over the years Genscher contributed to ensuring that Bonn's foreign policy is an "international social policy." Reinforcing this policy characteristic is what Inacker refers to as the postwar tradition of "military nonresponsibility," where Bonn reacts not to national interests, but rather to pressure from its European partners. The result of this foreign policy "image" is that it has become fashionable in the Federal Republic to refer to "humanitarian operations" as a legitimation for the Bundeswehr.⁶⁸ Yet, there has been no debate over this controversial proposal. In any case, how one could justify the primary existence of a military largely on the basis of humanitarian missions, particularly one that is based on the concept of *Staatsbürger im Uniform* and conscription, is difficult to grasp.

Second, Federal Minister Ruhe discovered, to his surprise,

that the development of a large reaction force created an unanticipated conflict within the ruling coalition. When UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Bonn in January 1995 seeking a German contribution to the proposed stand-by UN peace operations formations, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel effusively supported the initiative. Ruhe, on the other hand, opposed the proposal on a variety of grounds, not the least of which that he felt such a open-ended commitment on the part of Germany could take the Bundeswehr out of its primary geographic area of concern, the Euro-Atlantic.⁶⁹ However, how does one justify the expense of creating such a large 50,000-man reaction force if elements of it cannot be earmarked for such peace support operations? Perhaps Federal Minister Ruhe has come to understand the potential political liabilities of his reorganization efforts, which explains his surprise decision in May 1995 not to pursue building a multirole support ship, which would be ideal for peace support operations distant from the Central Region.⁷⁰ His more recent call for the modernization of main defense forces may also be an example of his growing awareness of these problems.⁷¹

At the same time, the Federal Republic cannot ignore allied force structure guidelines and the altered security environment in order to maintain unchanged the Bundeswehr's original "spiritual" foundations. The coalition government needs to initiate a debate in the Bundestag over the future legitimizing basis of the Bundeswehr in view of its new out-of-area missions (i.e., not strictly defensive) with a potential for combat. Whether the current incremental policy of the coalition of participating in peace support operations, step by small step, will have the same result is problematic. While this may well habituate the German public to these types of operations, it does not address the issue of the Bundeswehr's legitimizing bases. Hence, it simply is not good enough to argue, as had Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces General Klaus Naumann, that Innere Führung "is increasing Bundeswehr soldiers' motivation to act for the protection of freedom and democracy even beyond Germany's borders."⁷² While such an interpretation may ring true to some,⁷³ the fact that young men increasingly refuse to undertake military service is indicative of the weakening of the Bundeswehr's support in German society.

In essence, despite the difficulty of the undertaking, the simple question "why the Bundeswehr?" has yet to be addressed in the Federal Republic. Without addressing this fundamental question, it will be difficult to find a new consensus amongst the main political parties over the difficult questions of the future of conscription and alternative national service. Indeed, only after these questions have been addressed, should the composition of force structure truly be assessed. Depending upon the result of this debate, there will then be sufficient guidance

for the Bundeswehr to revisit the bases of its societal legitimacy, thereby enabling it to make the liberal traditions of Germany's military history applicable in a post-Cold War armed force.⁷⁴

Conclusion

As currently framed, the Federal Republic of Germany's defense reorganization is incomplete. In consequence, it is still premature to conclude that Bonn has found a new political consensus concerning the future employment of the Bundeswehr outside of traditional NATO Article V (defense of NATO territory) missions. Notwithstanding a variety of government statements on restructuring the Bundeswehr and German participation in NATO peace support operations in the former-Yugoslavia, should projected increases in those unwilling to serve in the Bundeswehr come to pass, proposed organizational structures could require substantial revision.

It is indeed this phenomenon of young men opting not to serve in the Bundeswehr that points to a larger problem, i.e., the future viability of conscription. Should the percentage of conscientious objectors continue to increase, not only will the current force structure plan outlined by Federal Defense Minister Ruhe fail, but this new "ohne mich" (without me) movement reminiscent of the 1950s, will call into question the very basis of the Bundeswehr and its anchor in German society. But, more important is the need for reviewing the basis of the Bundeswehr's legitimacy as an institution, in order to begin its transformation for post-Cold War military missions and to enable it to serve the needs of the post-Cold War German state.

Given these serious planning shortcomings and institutional challenge facing the Bundeswehr, the accuracy of predicting future German participation in peace support operations, let alone power projection missions outside of NATO Article V missions, must be assessed as being problematic. Until such time as there is a full debate in the Federal Republic over issues such as conscription and the provision of a new spiritual basis for the Bundeswehr, accurate predictions of the likelihood of future German participation in military operations will be difficult.

Given these severe limitations on the very basis of potential German national power, one can make two general observations. First, Bonn has not yet ended completely its tradition of nonresponsibility in military affairs. The coalition's incremental approach to defense normalization, which may be successful in the long run, has allowed Bonn to ignore growing problems in contemporary defense planning. The fact that there has been little debate over these fundamental determinants

of German defense policy evinces a lingering inability to confront the need to speak openly and honestly to the German public of Bonn's new status in Europe. One can only hope that it does not take a national catharsis, i.e., a German "Vietnam," before these shortcomings are addressed and corrected.⁷⁵

Second, the lack of a debate over defense policy fundamentals in the Federal Republic should be seen by the Federal Republic's allies as a crucial indicator of the distance that Bonn still needs to travel before it has arrived at a new and stable basis for a post-Cold War Bundeswehr. Thus, there remains a residual degree of unreliability that will influence Bonn's ability to participate in either peace support or power projection missions.

In short, a focus solely on defense planning ignores the fact that there remains a fragile political consensus within the Federal Republic over defense policy, and significant elements of German society are questioning the long-standing legitimacy of the Bundeswehr. Albeit perhaps impolitic to state as much, it would appear that sociologist Ulrich Beck's observation that the Bundeswehr is a "pacifist army in a pacifist society" still remains to be transcended.

Notes

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1. Prior to unification on October 3, 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany did not possess full sovereignty, nor did it opt to exercise its full range of national powers. With unification and the return of its full sovereign powers by the Four Powers, one refers to the process of Bonn reasserting its sovereignty, no matter how cautiously, as "normalization."

2. See *The Economist* (London), July 1, 1995, pp. 39, 42.

3. See *The New York Times*, July 13, 1994.

4. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Informationsstab, *Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr* (henceforth *KLL*), Bonn, July 20, 1994.

5. ". . . German participation in future peace support

operations, as well as combat operations beyond Germany's borders, is no longer a question of whether but when, where, and how." See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Contribution to Peacekeeping: Issues and Outlook*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, pp. vii-viii.

6. See *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), September 3, 1995.

7. Wolfgang F. Schlör, "German Security Policy: An Examination of the Trends in German Security Policy in a New European and Global Context," *Adelphi Paper No. 277*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1993, p. 18.

8. For example, "A 1992 public-opinion poll revealed that 57% of Germans believe military careers to have a low or rather low reputation. 50% stated that military officers were not important or were even superfluous to society." *Ibid.*

9. For an excellent assessment of German reservations toward participating in peace support and power projection operations see, Clay Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation? Redefining Germany's Military Role Outside of NATO," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Winter 1993, pp. 231-251.

10. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 16, 1992.

11. See *The Washington Post*, February 6, 1993.

12. Defense officials acknowledged in 1993 that "reliable and future-oriented planning for the Bundeswehr [is] impossible." See *Die Welt* (Hamburg), December 17, 1993, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Western Europe (henceforth FBIS-WEU)-93-242*, December 20, 1993, pp. 26-27.

13. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 6, 1994; and, *DPA* (Hamburg), September 21, 1995 in, *FBIS-WEU-95-184-A*, September 22, 1995, pp. 4-5; and, the interview with Minister Ruhe in *Focus* (Munich), June 10, 1996.

14. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 22, 1995.

15. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991. For a *précis* of the planning objectives of these plans, see my essay, *The "Normalization" of the Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1992, pp. 13-17.

16. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* (henceforth *VPR*), Bonn, November 26, 1992.

17. The VPR were not translated into English and analysis of the document has been limited. For background, see my essay, "Nationalization or Integration? The Future Direction of German Defense Policy," *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1995, pp. 109-120.

18. In the past, the VPR established a binding basis for subsequent Bundeswehr planning and force development.

19. Young, "Nationalization or Integration?," p. 112.

20. VPR, point 51, p. 32

21. Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 1994: White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr* (henceforth *White Paper 1994*), Bonn, April 5, 1994.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

24. *KLL*, p. 9.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

27. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Ressortkonzept zur Anpassung der Streitkräftestrukturen, der Territorialen Wehrverwaltung und der Stationierung*, Bonn, March 15, 1995. For base closures see pp. 15-17. Of political importance, this document identified which military bases would be closed down in this reorganization. This information was either not determined, or not publicly released in the *KLL* in July 1994, because of the politically negative implications it would have for the October federal elections.

28. For information on the restructuring of the army see, Fu H IV I [Army Staff, Department 4: Organization] "Das deutsche Heer," Bonn, BMVg, June 12, 1995, particularly points I-V. I am indebted to Jack Houchouer for providing me with a copy of this document.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-10.

30. For example, the Bundesmarine in its "Marine 2005" structural planning concept will lose the organizational level of squadrons.

31. See Fu S VI [Joint/Central Staff, Department VI: Department of Force Development/NATO Planning Branch], "Armed Forces Planning and Programming Procedures," Bonn, BMVg, n.d.
32. See *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), October 30, 1994.
33. As argued by Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, General Klaus Naumann, *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), April 23-24, 1994.
34. For an overview of the damage this controversy caused Ruhe, see *Focus* (Munich), July 24, 1994.
35. See *The Financial Times* (London), February 17, 1993.
36. See *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), April 10, 1995.
37. See *Bild* (Hamburg), April 18, 1994, in *FBIS-WEU-94-075*, April 19, 1994, pp. 7-8.
38. For an assessment of the cold shoulder the KLL received from the CDU/CDU Defense Group in the Bundestag, see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 21, 1994.
39. See *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), July 1, 1994; and, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 1, 1995.
40. It is important to note that Ruhe claims that his defense restructuring proposals had been outlined in the defense white paper which had been accepted by the coalition government. Nonetheless, the April meeting between Ruhe and the CDU/CSU in Siegen to reach consensus on these matters did not, in the words of Paul Breuer, CDU/CSU defense policy spokesman, go well. See *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), April 26, 1994.
41. Geoffrey Van Orden, "The Bundeswehr in Transition," *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 4, July/August 1991, p. 364.
42. For an excellent discussion on the subject of military institutions in German society and German history, see Gordon A. Craig, *The Germans*, New York: Penguin Books, 1982, pp. 237-260.
43. Van Orden, p. 363. For the best overall treatment of the role of spirit, tradition and conscription in the creation and development of the Bundeswehr, see Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
44. See Abenheim, pp. 121-122, 231-255; *idem*, "The Citizen in Uniform: Reform and its Critics in the Bundeswehr," in Stephen Szabo, ed., *The West German Armed Forces and Western Defense*, London: Macmillan, 1980; and, Eric Waldman, *The Goose Step is*

Verboten: The German Army Today, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 62-66, 101-130.

45. See *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), July 11-12, 1993.

46. For an excellent discussion on this point, see Schlör, p. 19-20.

47. The limit of 370,000 in the Bundeswehr was announced by officials of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic at the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Vienna on August 30, 1990 and acknowledged in Article 3 (2) in the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany," Moscow, September 12, 1990.

48. See Van Orden, pp. 363-364.

49. *White Paper 1994*, p. 93.

50. See *KLL*, p. 9.

51. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 18, 1994.

52. See *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), May 1, 1994.

53. Klaus Naumann, "Bundeswehr vor neuen Herausforderungen," *Soldat und Technik*, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 1995, p. 14.

54. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 18, 1994.

55. See *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), June 7, 1995.

56. Information provided by German defense officials.

57. "Germany will not enjoy a secure future in peace and freedom unless we continue to make our contribution, as a member of the Euro-Atlantic community of shared values with a common fate, to preventing war and averting dangers and to building a just and stable international order in which human and minority rights are effectively protected." See "Foreword by the Federal Chancellor [Helmut Kohl]," *White Paper 1994*, p. vi.

58. See *DDP/ADN* (Berlin), June 14, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-115*, June 15, 1995, p. 9.

59. *KLL*, pp. 6-8.

60. See Michael J. Inacker's interview with General Klaus Naumann in *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), December 11, 1994.

61. See *Die Welt* (Berlin), August 27, 1994, in *FBIS-WEU-94-*

167, August 29, 1994, p. 19.

62. See *Frankfurter Rundschau*, April 6, 1994 in *FBIS-WEU-94-068*, April 8, 1994, p. 25.

63. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 18, 1994.

64. These officials have been at odds with Ruhe over a number of key defense issues, but probably not as much as this one. For a biting assessment of Ruhe's poor working relationship with his CDU/CSU Parliamentary colleagues, see *Focus* (Munich), July 25, 1994, pp. 18-20.

65. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 21, 1994.

66. See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept."

67. See Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Oslo, June 4, 1992, Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(92)51, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, June 4, 1992.

68. See Michael J. Inacker's op-ed piece in *The Wall Street Journal Europe* (Bruxelles), July 3, 1995.

69. See *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), January 23, 1995, pp. 25-27.

70. See *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), May 3, 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-087*, May 5, 1995, p. 16.

71. See Volker Ruhe, "Auf dem Weg in eine gesicherte Zukunft," *Das Parlament*, No. 36-37, September 1-8, 1995.

72. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 8, 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-111*, June 9, 1995, pp. 18-19.

73. Although the government has acknowledged that the changing security environment has had a major change in a serviceman's "self-image," it appears unwilling to initiate a formal review of Innere Führung with the aim of revising it to support future missions of the Bundeswehr. See *White Paper 1994*, pp. 132 and 133-134.

74. To be sure, such a debate will not be easy. When an otherwise moderate official such as former SPD federal manager Gunter Verheugen argues that the SPD should gain public profile by portraying itself as a party of "peace" (in contrast to the ruling coalition), one can be assured that finding consensus on this matter will be difficult. See *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), July 26, 1995.

75. See *The Wall Street Journal Europe* (Bruxelles), July 3,

1995.

GERMAN POLICY TOWARD PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Robert H. Dorff

Few countries were as profoundly affected by the changes in the post-Cold War international system as the Federal Republic of Germany. While the overall international trend has been toward fragmentation and disintegration, with countries like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia dissolving, Germany grew larger with unification. Moreover, the end of the Cold War brought a formal end to the occupation of Germany by the World War II victors, in effect restoring full sovereignty to the rehabilitated German state. This restored sovereignty combined with the sweeping changes in Central and Eastern Europe to press the Federal Republic of Germany very quickly, perhaps too quickly, into the limelight of international foreign and security affairs. Germany's geopolitical position, as well as its obvious economic strength, guaranteed a central role for it in the unfolding events. The only questions concerned the precise form and nature of that emerging role.

A central purpose of this collection of essays is to examine that role, specifically in the context of the emergence of Germany as a "normal" actor in the post-Cold War international system.¹ Because the re-emergence of a fully sovereign Germany coincided with the explosion of peace support operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), attention quickly focused on the role Germany would play in such operations. This particular chapter addresses the emergence of Germany as a normal international actor from the perspective of its evolving policies regarding peace support operations.

The focus on peace support operations is important because it affects issues related to United States and allied military operations. Military leaders from these countries need to know more about what to expect from Germany in future contingencies. It is also important to the strategic community because it is at the heart of a perplexing set of issues currently on the international agenda, namely the kinds of conflicts generating a need for such operations and the appropriate responses and requisite capabilities to address them.

In the context of a general examination of German peace support operations, this essay argues that it is a mistake to draw sweeping conclusions from the June 1995 Bundestag decision to contribute to the UN Reaction Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is occurring in Germany today is a serious and profoundly difficult debate about its new identity and what the world expects from it. External forces and events are pushing Germany

at a time when its leaders and people would prefer to go much more slowly. The real world will not allow them that luxury, and hence we see a policy process that is filled with tensions and even contradictions. Those outside Germany must understand something of the mix of external and internal forces at work in order to understand what to expect from Germany today and in the near future.

Background

As post-Cold War conflicts began to appear, Germany initially had an easy answer to the questions about the role it would play. Its constitution (Grundgesetz or "Basic Law") prohibited it from actively participating in military operations outside of Germany and NATO. So while it might contribute a substantial sum of money in support of the coalition allied against Saddam Hussein,² it would not have to debate whether it should send troops. Yet even then, most observers felt that the constitutional issue would be rather quickly resolved, at which time the debate about the new German role in international security affairs would begin in earnest. And indeed, on July 12, 1994, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe handed down its ruling that would, in future, allow for the use of the Bundeswehr in "out-of-area" operations. And, rather than putting an end to the debate, the Court's ruling was actually the starting point; now the issues would have to be discussed, debated, and decided in the domestic political arena without the protection of a constitutional prohibition on which to fall back. The issue had been fully joined. What views would the German government articulate on the use of military force in international affairs generally and in support of peace operations specifically?³

The events in Yugoslavia played a significant role in the debate. Feeling the economic, social, and political effects of the transformations in Eastern Europe perhaps more acutely than any other West European country, Germany under Chancellor Helmut Kohl had moved quickly to articulate its views about the necessity of expanding Western institutions, such as the European Union (EU), eastward. Eager to express its support for liberal international principles such as self-determination, and perhaps somewhat frustrated by the slowness of its European allies to respond to the very real threat of massive refugee movements, Germany was the first to grant formal recognition to Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991.

A wave of criticism and analysis followed. Was this the sign of the new, independent Germany? Would it press its foreign policy desires unilaterally? While in retrospect much of this debate appears exaggerated and a bit alarmist, the repercussions for Germany have been apparent. As the crisis in the former

Yugoslavia worsened, and the calls for Western intervention intensified, Germany found it increasingly difficult to hide behind its constitutional prohibition. If the new Germany was going to take foreign policy initiatives on its own (so went the logic at the time), then it would have to become a full partner in all international affairs, including paying the full costs (not just financial) of political-military follow-ons to those initiatives. Whether the Germans wanted to or not, the shroud of the constitutional prohibition would have to be lifted. It was not simply a matter of domestic politics; the issue had been fully internationalized.

Official Policy Statements

Although written prior to the Federal Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994, the *White Paper 1994* contains the most current and comprehensive official statement of German policy concerning peace support operations.⁴ Yet, there is no section devoted solely to that topic. In fact, there is no chapter or sub-chapter heading referring to such operations or even to crisis management. Rather, one finds references to such operations interwoven throughout the discussions of the contemporary international situation, the concept of German security and defense policy, and the role of Germany as a country firmly committed to, and embedded in, a set of multilateral security institutions. The search for official German policy on peace support operations begins with this document.

In their Forewords to the *White Paper*, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Federal Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe both acknowledge the importance of peace support operations to German security policy by pointing to the contributions already made by German forces.⁵ Both make overt references to the manner in which those contributions have been received by the international community. Notably absent is any clear reference to German security interests served by these operations. Further evidence of the extent to which the issue of German involvement in such operations had been internationalized appears throughout the *White Paper*, most obviously in the frequency with which it acknowledges the new and broader role that Germany must play in international security affairs.⁶ The language is clear, if not direct: Germany is "called upon" and "expected to" contribute to and share in the responsibility.

Yet the regional analyses, as well as important qualifying language throughout the document, make it clear that German interests are primarily, if not exclusively, located in Europe.⁷ Although responding to external pressures to assume greater international responsibility, German security policy seems to be laying the groundwork for limiting that responsibility to Europe and circumscribing the possible range and scope of operations

into which the Bundeswehr might be drawn. It is as though Germany is defining a role for itself as a willing, but not too able, partner.

This broader tension is evident throughout the document. On the one hand, rhetoric abounds about the need for more effective and comprehensive international conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms, including the possible use of military force.⁸ On the other hand, qualifications about the German role in such international mechanisms appear with equal regularity. At times they appear to contradict the argument that Germany will now play the role it is "called upon" or "expected to" play, either by limiting that role geographically or in kind.⁹

Finally, there is an inherent tension in the approach toward crisis and conflict management and prevention as advocated and the procedures Germany would employ in arriving at a decision to participate in peace support operations. The *White Paper* implies that Germany would use essentially the same criteria for deciding as are required for similar Western European Union (WEU) decisions. This includes provisions that a WEU resolution be unanimous, and that each member state remain "free to decide on the basis of its constitution whether or not to participate."¹⁰ It is hard to imagine how such procedures can be used in support of a crisis management system; timely, decisive action is the hallmark of successful crisis management, a commodity rendered virtually unattainable in such a system of individual political decision-making. Each member will review any proposed action on a case-by-case basis, and that review will include a full domestic debate and decision. For Germany, already seeking to set limits on its contributions, the process almost guarantees that the Bundeswehr will not be "ordered into action under WEU command" any time soon.¹¹ By implication, German participation in peace support operations will occur only after intense public deliberation.

In sum, the *White Paper*, as a formal statement of German policy in regard to peace support operations, contains unresolved tensions and perhaps contradictions. There is ample acknowledgement of the changing nature of international conflict in the post-Cold War world. The proliferation of ethnic and religious conflict, and its emergence in the form of civil wars and the collapse of governability, represent increasing threats to international security and the security of Europe and Germany. Similarly, the discussions frequently address the need for more effective systems of conflict and crisis management to deal with such threats, including the willingness and capability to use force if necessary. And finally, there is substantial awareness of the growing expectation that Germany must play a greater role in, and share the responsibility for, the operations that support such systems. However, the caution in circumscribing just what

that role might be for the Federal Republic of Germany in general, and the Bundeswehr specifically, seems at times to run counter to the acknowledgement that Germany must assume its full share of the responsibilities. Because this document was written prior to the Federal Constitutional Court decision of 1994, it is necessary to examine what has happened since that decision was announced to see if some of the potential tensions have been resolved or clarified.

The Tornado Controversy

The decision by the Federal Constitutional Court was announced on July 12, 1994. For supporters of an expanded German role in international security affairs, the decision represented a completion of the transition to full sovereignty which was begun with the unification process and the "Two-plus-Four" agreement. To others more critical of such a role, the decision opened the way to a "remilitarization" of German foreign policy.¹² Two subsequent developments deserve attention, the first a general development in the debate about German military involvement "out-of-area" and the second a specific policy issue that arose late in 1994.

The general development was already in evidence prior to the Court's decision, but became more apparent in the months thereafter. This was the increased use of the "history" argument against German involvement "out-of-area," especially in the former Yugoslavia. The argument, expressed simply, is that the reappearance of the German military would be counterproductive and potentially disastrous for peace efforts in parts of Europe occupied by the Wehrmacht during World War II. Initially referring specifically to the Serbs in the Bosnian crisis,¹³ this argument grew and expanded over time. By June 1995, there was a recognition that this had become for many the substitute for the constitutional prohibition argument. As one member of the Bundestag put it, in words used nearly verbatim by a retired senior Army officer and former member of the Defense Ministry staff one day later, such an argument would mean that "there would be virtually no place in all of Europe that the Bundeswehr could be deployed."¹⁴ Although this argument has apparently lost some of its resonance recently, SPD politician Rudolf Scharping observed during the June 30, 1995 parliamentary debate on allowing German combat planes to be sent to Bosnia that ECR-Tornados with the Iron Cross would only heat up the conflict rather than diffuse it.¹⁵ The reference to the "history" argument was clear.

The specific policy issue resulted from a request made by the SACEUR, General George Joulwan, for Luftwaffe Tornados.¹⁶ On November 30, 1994 General Joulwan approached the German government about providing six electronic combat and

reconnaissance Tornados to be used by NATO. The Serbs had a growing surface-to-air missile capability around Bihac, and the Tornados offered a favorable counter-threat capability. But Bonn was not yet prepared to deal with such a request. Following the Karlsruhe decision, there was no attempt to initiate a broad-ranging discussion of the appropriate roles and missions for the Bundeswehr in peace support operations. In fact, political leaders generally wanted to avoid such a discussion. The political climate at the time made some of that reluctance understandable; national elections coming up in October cast long shadows, making members of all the major parties unwilling to risk an emotional and divisive debate. And for a country new to such debates, the example of the US anguish over the Haiti decision could not have offered much encouragement. Why launch such a debate if no concrete situation made it necessary?

What ensued was a very interesting, even entertaining, exercise in creative diplomacy. In effect, the German government chose not to respond to General Joulwan's request. Classifying Joulwan's action as an "informal inquiry" rather than a formal request from NATO, Bonn simply gave no answer. This removed any immediate necessity to initiate a debate, either within the government or in parliament. And to bolster the non-decision further, members of parliament and the government pointed out that NATO was unlikely to order any military mission involving the German Tornados; therefore, as the CDU/CSU parliamentary group leader Wolfgang Schäuble stated, a "decision in reserve" was unnecessary.¹⁷

What is clear from these developments is that the question of German participation in peace support operations had become fully politicized. Under the oft-cited constraints of the constitutional question, Germany could avoid the perplexing debates about whether to participate in such operations and, if so, under what conditions. Once the legal issues were clarified, it was only natural that political considerations would take over. The question then is whether the political debate will be a full and open one or more like that which followed General Joulwan's request in November 1994. In that debate a host of political considerations led to some amazing antics on the part of the German government to avoid giving any clear answer at all. The "history" argument was simply one of many justifications offered up as a logical, non-political explanation for what is and always will be a very political (and difficult) decision for any country.

Current Policy Perspectives

This section examines the perspectives of several key players in the German policy-making process, including the military, the political parties, the government, and public

opinion. The purpose is to provide a brief sketch of the views that obtain within each grouping; this is not an attempt to present a thorough delineation of all views, nor to decide which view currently prevails.¹⁸ This section begins with the defense planning community, turns next to an overview of public opinion, and finally examines the contemporary political landscape.

The Ministry of Defense. It is not surprising that some of the clearest statements and policies on German peace support operations are found among the military and the civilian planners within the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg). The German defense planning system requires thinking on such issues to develop without a highly publicized political debate. Of course, once those policies are outlined and presented to the cabinet, prior to a recommendation going to the full parliament, they become the object of intense public scrutiny, and political leaders are identified as being responsible for them. But prior to that point policy discussions often occur in relative quiet. This helps explain why some of the clearest statements about emerging security policy, including potential problems, exist within the BMVg.¹⁹

One document in particular provides an interesting overview of current BMVg thinking on German peace support operations. Written in July 1994 and circulated publicly, it is entitled *Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr (Conceptual Guidelines for the Future Development of the Federal Armed Forces)*.²⁰ The KLL attempt to build a bridge between the wide-ranging analysis of the 1994 *White Paper* and actual force planning. It distinguishes between two missions for the Bundeswehr: traditional territorial defense and crisis reaction. The document points out that while the traditional defense mission remains an important focus of German defense planning and force structure, it is ironically the greatest threat but the least likely contingency in the post-Cold War security environment to which the Bundeswehr might have to respond. On the other hand, crisis reaction is the most likely operation, but the one for which the Bundeswehr is the least well prepared.²¹ It then discusses the kinds of changes anticipated in reconfiguring the Bundeswehr to meet the requirements of a fundamentally changed strategic situation. Particularly significant is the assessment that the current strategic environment allows for a noticeable reduction in the forces-in-being devoted to territorial defense, and hence their re-allocation to the crisis reaction mission.²² Although not released until after the Karlsruhe Court ruling, the thinking behind this document obviously was underway well before the constitutional issue was clarified.

The most recent BMVg thinking was evident in interviews and discussions in June 1995, and undoubtedly appeared in some form in the Bosnian policy recommendation and subsequent debate later

that same month.²³ Referencing "interests and objectives of German foreign and security policy," as well as German "responsibilities as an alliance partner," several individuals referred to what can be stated as basic principles underlying emerging German policy. First, everyone interviewed made clear references to a case-by-case decision process, always involving public debate and parliamentary approval. Obviously, domestic political processes will dominate; there will be no automatic formula for German participation. Second, some of the views are carryovers from previously articulated guidelines, such as the general limitation of German support to conflict management in the European region, and the requirement for multinational participation and international mandates in support of such operations. Third, there must be a clear, credible political strategy that leads or contributes to the resolution of the conflict, and the military operation must have a definable end state and exit strategy. Fourth, there must be compelling reasons for the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the threat to German security, European stability, or international peace must be evident. Finally, there is a strong rejection of the "history" argument against German participation, at least as a *sui generis* limitation. On the surface at least, current BMVg thinking appears to reflect significant progress in the development of Germany as a "normal" international actor, reacting to significant changes in the international security environment and attempting to define some criteria to be used in reaching decisions about where, when, and how to participate.

However, some caution is in order about this interpretation, and it relates directly to the role and influence of the BMVg in the overall political processes. In short, it is difficult to say in advance how much of the BMVg staff view will prevail in the end. As Catherine Kelleher observed more than ten years ago, the German defense organization is quite idiosyncratic and most often dominated by the personality and style of the Defense Minister.²⁴ Certainly Ruhe has demonstrated a willingness to go outside the established bureaucratic procedures when he deems it necessary or desirable, which means that he may or may not accept his own Ministry's positions and arguments. Moreover, he must ultimately convince the Federal Security Council of the Cabinet and the parliamentary Defense Committee, which may require substantial modification of the original BMVg views.²⁵ And historically, the BMVg (as distinct from the Defense Minister) has not been especially powerful or influential in determining overall policy.²⁶ So, despite the generally high quality of the work being done there, one should be cautious in assessing the significance of BMVg thinking for the future of Germany as a "normal" international actor. The key will be how much influence such thinking has on Ruhe and the Government.

Public Opinion. Analyses and commentaries frequently point

to the reticence of the German public to accept any departure from the traditional "culture of restraint" in post-WWII West German foreign and security policy. This has generally included maintaining a low profile for Germany in the power politics of international affairs, particularly in crisis management, and especially in the use of force. One of the central issues in the question concerning Germany's evolution into a "normal" international actor, then, is whether public opinion will allow or accept such a change. For the purposes of this chapter, it is necessary to examine public opinion briefly as it pertains to the role of Germany in international peace support operations.

The skepticism of the German public about an activist international role for their country is well documented, as is a pervasive aversion for power politics. In the recent debate concerning German participation in the UN Reaction Force, numerous references were made to what the public would or would not support, with members of the coalition and the opposition frequently citing the limits of public support as justification for their positions.²⁷ While the public remains generally skeptical of such operations, recent evidence suggests that subtle, but important, shifts in public attitudes and opinions are underway.

Support for continued German ties to NATO is very strong; a recent Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach survey found that 69 percent considered NATO membership important compared to 70 percent at the beginning of the 1980s (arguably at the height of the Cold War).²⁸ In fact, the escalating instability and crisis situations in the former Soviet Union have increased public desires for NATO to remain both intact and strong, going from 57 percent in 1991 to 71 percent today. And Meiers notes that 74 percent of the public support "NATO involvement in new crises on Europe's periphery."²⁹ However, 55 percent of those same respondents "agreed that the Bundeswehr's role should remain limited to territorial defence and that Germany's allies must assume responsibility for such missions [crisis management] themselves."³⁰

The same Demoskopie survey found that the participation of German soldiers in international peacekeeping troops of the United Nations was supported by a majority only in the former West Germany; in the former East Germany only 29 percent favor such participation whereas 52 percent are opposed.³¹ Meiers also cites the results of a poll conducted by Infratest Burke Berlin after the 1994 national elections in which as many as 75 percent of the German public supported the use of military force for humanitarian purposes and traditional peacekeeping missions. However, he observes that this support declines "when specific scenarios including combat missions were put to Germans."³² In principle the German public supports peace support operations,

including the use of military force if necessary; in practice, however, they seem less inclined to support specific operations and especially Bundeswehr involvement in them.³³

Yet it appears that German public opinion has begun to acknowledge, at least in part because of all the media coverage of crises, civil wars, and human tragedy around the globe, that the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact do not mean that the world is necessarily a safer place. This shows up most clearly in the reversal of public attitudes about military service. Whereas a majority of the German public had by 1993 concluded that obligatory national service was more important to society than military service (i.e., conscription), by 1995 this view had shrunk to 32 percent in the former West German Länder (from 50 percent) and to 33 percent in the former East German Länder (from 60 percent).³⁴ The trend is toward a view of the world and German society that on the surface seem compatible with a more activist international role for Germany, including, if necessary, the use of military force. However, there is still a prevailing view that such military action can be left largely to Germany's allies, especially the United States.

Nonetheless, current opinions suggest there are increasing opportunities for German leadership to convince the public that "out-of-area" peace support operations are necessary and that they support German and European interests. But, the necessity for Bundeswehr participation in such operations, whether to protect those interests or to respond to external calls for greater German responsibility and burdensharing, seems to have registered only weakly in the minds of the public. This represents the challenge for German political leadership: to convince the public, which is increasingly inclined to see the dangers and threats of post-Cold War conflicts (especially those close to home), that the Bundeswehr is "called upon" and "expected to" participate in operations to meet those threats and counter those dangers. Is German political leadership up to that challenge?

The Political Landscape. One word summarizes the overall political landscape in Germany in the realm of peace support operations: divided. As one senior retired Bundeswehr officer put it, the "main problem is that there is no unified German position" on what policy should be. These divisions exist not only between the coalition and the opposition, but within the coalition itself, within the government and the ministries, and even within the individual parties. Given the historical emphasis on consensus decisions, and the special requirement for overwhelming consensus when it comes to issues involving the possible use of military force, it is hardly surprising that Germany has found it so difficult to devise a policy with clear guidelines.

The Government. Although the Kohl-led CDU/CSU/FDP government has taken the lead in forging some consensus on peace support operations generally and the Bosnian policy specifically, the road to this consensus was anything but smooth. Rifts have appeared within the coalition and even within the Chancellor's own party. Policy has appeared to vacillate and change dramatically almost over night. Kohl has been variously characterized as, on the one hand, craftily leading Germany down a path toward militarizing German foreign policy and, on the other, as allowing German policy to drift aimlessly as he plays games with the allies, desperately seeking ways in which to avoid making any commitments or giving any clear answers. Neither statement is accurate, for the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes. Simply put, Kohl's political margin for error is so narrow following the 1994 parliamentary elections that he cannot afford a major policy disaster. Particularly in an area fraught with so many emotional time bombs as this, being caught too far out front or too far behind elite and mass opinion could seal the coalition's, as well as Kohl's own, political fate. At the same time, the external pressures from allies, bound together with questions about the future of NATO and the EU, also place stresses and strains on the government. Extreme caution is the guiding principle behind the Kohl approach.³⁵

The political problems within the coalition are illustrated by the challenges facing the FDP, a coalition partner. It is not only divided on the issue of peace support operations, it is badly split over a variety of key issues. In fact, the FDP is in the throes of a struggle for its very political survival. Having watched its support in the national elections dwindle dangerously close to the minimum threshold of five-percent for remaining in parliament, it faced a series of embarrassing losses in state elections in early 1995. Its performance in elections in North-Rhine Westphalia and in Bremen were so poor that they prompted Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to resign as party leader. Kinkel continues to serve as Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor, but at a time when he will need to be a forceful spokesperson for any future deployment of the Bundeswehr in peace support operations, the precarious situation of the FDP works strongly against him and his ability to provide that much-needed support.³⁶

The FDP's problems are also problems for Kohl, who must be concerned about the coalition's future. The risks involved in peace support operations generally are magnified by these political risks, creating an environment in which such operations will be carefully scrutinized for their potential political impact at home and on the coalition. Given the divisions within the government and the parties, it will not be easy to forge a clear, common policy approach to peace support operations in the near future.

Within the cabinet, differing views on peace support operations have also emerged. For example, at least until early 1995 there was a very apparent difference between the views of Foreign Minister Kinkel and Defense Minister Ruhe. Kinkel has generally espoused a view of German peace support operations that is broader and more global than Ruhe's. When Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Bonn in January 1995, he asked the German government to contribute Bundeswehr troops to a stand-by UN peace operations unit. Kinkel reacted positively to the request, and in a number of public statements indicated that Germany was ready, willing, and able to make such a contribution. In late-1994 he had stated as much, writing that "the Bundeswehr can in future fully participate in UN, NATO and WEU missions" and that "[t]his is not limited only to peacekeeping missions but also clearly includes peace-making operations."³⁷

Ruhe was typically more guarded, and he opposed the assignment of Bundeswehr soldiers to the UN. His opposition rested on the grounds that the Bundeswehr was not yet ready for such missions, and that German interests and responsibilities lay in Europe and jointly with its Euro-Atlantic allies. A general commitment of German troops to the UN would mean that they might be sent anywhere in the world, far exceeding what Ruhe felt was a legitimate mandate for their use. In the end the Ruhe position won out and Germany did not provide the UN Secretary-General with a list of earmarked troops.³⁸ In retrospect one can see that these events in mid-January led to the closing of ranks around the criteria for Bundeswehr participation in peace support operations.³⁹

Of course, in June 1995, Kinkel and Ruhe appeared much more unified in their presentation and defense of the government proposal to support the UN Reaction Force.⁴⁰ Both made strong statements to the Bundestag in support of the proposed policy. Yet the points of emphasis of each speech suggest that the differences have not disappeared. Kinkel stressed the need for Germany to show solidarity with the UN Security Council, NATO and the EU; the German interests that are involved; the need to expand the concept of security in German thinking; and the expectation that Germany would "actively share in protecting the international order"⁴¹ Ruhe emphasized the limiting features of the policy: the mission was to help people and nothing more; the collapse of the UN mission must be prevented; and the ECR Tornados would be used only in the event of an attack against the Blue Helmets--and then only to protect the aircraft of other countries.⁴² While Kinkel continued to suggest much broader reasons for German participation in such operations, Ruhe seemed to be concerned with delineating the limitations on this mission so that no broader implications could be drawn. This is a fundamental difference of views that is unlikely to disappear

soon, not only between these two cabinet ministers but within Germany generally.⁴³ Moreover, the current political realities confronting the FDP are likely to exacerbate such differences on security and foreign policy, given Kinkel's tenuous position within the party as well as the party's tenuous position among the electorate.

Within the CDU parliamentary group, similar differences have appeared. Although nearly all agree with the official government position on peace support operations, there is disagreement on the implications of that policy, as was evident in the aftermath of the vote on the UN Reaction Force. Karl Lamers, CDU/CSU Bundestag Group spokesman on foreign policy, indicated in a radio interview that if Germany were now asked by NATO to provide ground troops in support of a UN withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia, it "would be obliged to do so" In his view, there were wider-ranging implications of the UN Reaction Force decision that set precedents for future actions. Yet at the same time, Paul Breuer, CDU/CSU Bundestag spokesman for defense policy, took a sharply different view, warning against "demanding too much from German public opinion and the Bundeswehr with further military missions." For Breuer the immediate mission was enough and "everything else would be unwise."⁴⁴

Social Democratic Party (SPD). Although the SPD enjoys a stronger electoral position than the FDP, it is badly divided on three different levels. The first level is overall party leadership, where there is a serious, acrimonious, and public challenge to party leadership.

But the challenge goes beyond infighting between Oskar Lafontaine, Gerhard Schröder and Rudolf Scharping. Polls show that since the middle of May 1995 support for the SPD among voters is eroding; from the 36 percent level of last year's parliamentary elections, it is now rapidly approaching 30 percent. A recent survey conducted by Emnid at the end of June 1995 indicated that among voters Scharping is viewed as less competent, less effective, less creative, and more hesitant than Schröder. Only 25 percent want to see Scharping continue as Party Chairman, and 40 percent view Schröder as a better choice. Even among his own party members Scharping barely enjoys an advantage over Schröder (38 to 36 percent).⁴⁵ The SPD membership, therefore, is divided not only on the issue of peace support operations but on party leadership as well.

The SPD parliamentary delegation, the third level in this analysis, is also divided. The divisions were apparent in the parliamentary debate on the German contribution to the UN Reaction Force, as they have been in all of the discussions about German peace support operations. For more than two years a small but significant minority within the SPD has sided more with the

coalition government than its own party on the issue. Karsten Voigt, former-SPD party spokesman on foreign affairs, is one of the more visible and vocal members of this group. Considered by some to be one of the few "realists" in contemporary German politics, Voigt openly expresses his views on the need for Germany to take on a more internationalist role and for the Bundeswehr to be a part of that role in peace support operations. Although a minority, Voigt saw his party leadership role as pushing that minority position within the SPD until it eventually evolves into a majority position.⁴⁶

In the days leading up to the parliamentary vote of 30 June 1995, all of these splits within the SPD were in evidence. On June 27, "69 SPD deputies made it clear that, contrary to their party and Bundestag group's position, they would also vote for the deployment of Tornado aircraft to support the European Rapid Reaction Force." In effect, this meant that "well over one third of the 150 or so SPD deputies present complied with the government position."⁴⁷ Although some SPD members are opposed to any German combat troop involvement in Bosnia or other peace support operations, the party position is that each case must be reviewed and decided on its own merits. In this case, Scharping stated the party view that Germany should contribute only medical and logistical support for the UN Reaction Force.⁴⁸ The party position continues to reflect the "history" argument against the deployment of the Bundeswehr.⁴⁹ And finally, the SPD position opposes the use of conscripts in peace support operations unless they have specifically volunteered. This whole issue concerning the use of conscripts is under review and has not been formally decided, although the government's proposal on Bosnia did not exclude their use. In the final Bundestag vote, 45 members of the opposition voted with the government, and 35 SPD delegates publicly acknowledged their defection.⁵⁰

The Alliance 90/Greens. Although there is general opposition among the Alliance 90/Greens group to the use of the Bundeswehr for anything other than strictly humanitarian operations, the situation in Bosnia has proven difficult for them, too. The reason is that the ongoing war and associated atrocities have become a human rights issue for many of their members. And the picture of the West, including Germany, standing on the sidelines and not using force to stop the aggression against innocent civilians runs counter to even a pacifistic sense of what is right.⁵¹ In the run-up to the Bundestag debate, the group decided to reject the deployment of combat units and instead to call for "'massive German support' by nongovernmental organizations for humanitarian aid shipments."⁵² The leader of the Alliance 90/Greens group, Joschka Fischer, was apparently relieved that this decision avoided a major dispute by satisfying those who wanted to support humanitarian aid by the Bundeswehr. But three members of the group voted against this "common policy" position,

and in the final Bundestag vote three members openly acknowledged that they voted with the government.⁵³

The growing tension and division finally surfaced officially in early August 1995 when Fischer circulated a policy paper in which he called "for a redefinition of the Greens' foreign policy principles." He spoke "openly in favor of an expansion of UN involvement in Bosnia," including "surface and aerial protection for the remaining UN safe zones."⁵⁴ He personally believes that it is time for the party to move away from rigid opposition to the use of force. At a minimum the Fischer paper will ensure a bruising debate within the party on this fundamental question, and the divisions are likely to grow before they begin to disappear. At the same time, it is clear that the party's desire to be a genuine force at the national level, including as a possible coalition partner for the SPD, requires a more generally applicable and acceptable approach to foreign policy than a simple renunciation-of-force policy will allow.⁵⁵

Assessment of the Political Landscape. All of the major parties are therefore split to varying degrees on issues pertaining to peace support operations generally and Bundeswehr support of the Blue Helmets in Bosnia specifically. Further, the entire electoral environment is highly uncertain for the CDU, the FDP, the CSU, the Greens, and the SPD. When combined with the (at best skeptical) attitude of the German public and the still-prevailing "culture of restraint," this electoral uncertainty creates a situation in which any bold, new policy initiative in the area of peace support operations is highly risky with unclear benefits. The result is that all of the parties and their major personalities will probably continue to be extremely cautious in developing policy, choosing general statements and case-by-case delimiters over broad, clear policy directives or guidelines. Careful coalition building will prevail. Building consensus and compromise reduces the opportunities for opponents to exploit any public perception of a policy that is out of step with German opinion. In that environment, it seems highly unlikely that the leadership required to forge a broad public consensus on peace support operations will be forthcoming any time soon. This does not mean no progress will occur; rather, it suggests that German policy will develop slowly and incrementally, and the case-by-case approach will be preferred by almost all of the political players.

Conclusions

This overview of German policies for peace support operations indicates that external influences have moved Germany subtly but noticeably toward a clearer and more forthright recognition of the need for military power in the post-Cold War international system generally, and for a German contribution to

that capability. Among those external influences, the ongoing tragedy in the former Yugoslavia is certainly paramount. The German public and political elites have seen constant images of the atrocities, and they have witnessed the recurrent and complete failure of all attempts to control the violence through non-military means. These failures in Europe's own backyard have helped push the debate in the direction of recognizing the need for an effective international military capability. Among the military and political professionals, one hears frequent and blunt references to the failures of the UN, and especially the "dual key" approach of NATO military power serving UN operations. Such criticism was virtually unheard of as recently as two years ago.

The external pressure from allies and international opinion has also continued. The frequent references to what Germany is "expected" and "called upon" to contribute provide ample evidence. The US decision to remain significantly on the sidelines in the Bosnian crisis, at least until the NATO air strikes began in earnest in late August 1995, certainly contributed to the pressures on Europe generally and on Germany specifically. It is painfully evident to many Germans today that the days of American military action making German action unnecessary are gone, unless there is a happy coincidence of interests.⁵⁶ As frustrations with the lack of effective action to counter the violence in Bosnia have grown, they join with the humanitarian argument for the justifiable use of military force. This in turn is reinforced by German desires not to be isolated from its allies and to demonstrate solidarity with them. Moreover, the perhaps idealistic view that the UN can be an effective guarantor of international security, thereby continuing the trend toward de-nationalizing security policy, gives Germany few alternatives but to try to strengthen the flagging image of that organization. There seems little doubt that all of these factors were at work in the decision by the Bundestag on June 30, 1995, approving Bundeswehr participation in the UN Reaction Force.

Does all of this mean that Germany is now a "normal" international actor, or at least well on its way toward becoming one? This conclusion remains at best premature. The decision to participate in the UN Reaction Force, although significant, still includes many conditions and qualifications that are hardly "normal." Only time and the specific unfolding of events will reveal the extent to which Germany is both willing and able to make a genuine and significant contribution to peace support operations in the post-Cold War world.⁵⁷

Yet it would also be unfair and inaccurate not to acknowledge the movement of Germany in the direction of "normalcy." For one thing, Germany is attempting to develop

policies and procedures for participating in multinational peace operations at a time when the world's only superpower, the United States, appears to be disengaging itself from such operations. It hardly seems appropriate to judge Germany as not having done enough when the United States is itself paralyzed by domestic politics and a lack of consensus on foreign and security policy. Moreover, there has been a detectable shift in the substance and the rhetoric of the debate in Germany. Although the Kohl government has been careful to continue the consensus-building, coalition approach to policy making that has long characterized German foreign and security policy, one hears more references to "German interests" and the concepts of power politics than at any time in the recent past.⁵⁸ And even the Greens have apparently launched an internal debate about the possible irrelevance of their party's rigid principle of non-violence for post-Cold War international affairs, certainly another indicator of movement toward "normalcy."

But German policy in the realm of peace support operations will continue to be characterized by considerable tension and even contradiction. How it evolves will be determined to a large extent by the perceived success or failure of German participation in the UN Reaction Force specifically and Western policy toward Bosnia generally.⁵⁹ Others in the West must not expect too much, too soon from a country whose domestic inclinations and political forces make it very difficult to break with strongly held convictions about its role in international affairs. Yet it would be equally, and perhaps more misguided to expect too little. The domestic situation in Germany is such that external expectations and pressures are absolutely essential to the further evolution of that country as a "normal" international actor. The process Germany intends to use for deciding on participation will make it very difficult for it to respond in a timely and decisive manner, and its allies need to recognize this fact and work to influence the process. But as one member of the SPD confidently put it, Germany will eventually assume a full role in support of international peace operations. "It will go slower than many, especially the US, want to see. But German policy will and already is moving in that direction."⁶⁰

In the end, however, the events reviewed here suggest that the German decision on Bosnia is not a general indicator of evolving German policy on peace support operations. The sequence of events and decisions that comprise the "Bosnia policy" of Germany is remarkable and unique. German decisions on Bosnia have been heavily driven by external factors and pressures, made all the more possible by a sense both outside and inside the country that the German decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was at least partly responsible for the current mess.⁶¹ And as current attempts to lay out some guidelines for that policy indicate, German participation in peace support operations will

be decided on a case-by-case basis and with the full participation of the parliament. Those features alone should make us skeptical of any attempt to discern a general German policy, and especially to predict just what kinds of actions Germany will take in the future. For some time to come, Germany will continue to be caught, as Clemens observed in an earlier period, "between its commitment . . . to demilitarization and its growing recognition that military strength can contribute to a more stable, humane post-Cold War order."⁶²

Finally, this analysis makes it apparent that an understanding of current and future German policy in peace support operations requires an understanding of external and internal factors and processes. No systemic-level explanation focusing solely on German national interests and structural characteristics of the international system will provide even a reasonably accurate, let alone full understanding of German actions. Much the same can be said of the general research question about the emergence of Germany as a normal international actor. The external events and forces acting on Germany are indeed significant, but so, too, are the domestic forces. For those who wish to understand the future role of the Federal Republic of Germany in international peace support operations and its development as a normal actor, the answers lie in that nexus between international events and domestic political exigencies.

Notes

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1. Gordon describes the "normalization" of German foreign policy as "the gradual attenuation of the particular restrictions that have influenced and constrained Germany's international actions since, and because of, World War II." See Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 225.

2. For a wide-ranging and thorough analysis of the different dimensions of the German contributions to the Gulf War alliance, see Michael J. Inacker, *Unter Ausschluss der Öffentlichkeit: Die*

Deutschen in der Golfallianz, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991. Inacker places the total German contribution at DM 17 billion (p. 106).

3. The potential limiting effects of this prohibition on German support of its allies had long been recognized and debated conceptually in the context of NATO and "out-of-area" operations. However, until the end of the Cold War simultaneously reinstated full German sovereignty and refocused international attention on conflicts requiring peace support operations, this debate was largely "academic." The Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 first raised the issue in the context of a full and fair share of international military responsibility for a Germany now seen by many as a major power.

4. *White Paper 1994: On the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr*, Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defence, 1994.

5. Chancellor Kohl observes: "In international peace missions, the exemplary conduct, personal dedication and skill of our soldiers, sailors and airmen have enhanced Germany's standing in the world." *Ibid.*, p. vii. Ruhe notes that the Bundeswehr ". . . is participating with great success in international peace missions" . . . and "has greatly enhanced its reputation by its activities in Cambodia, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia." *Ibid.*, p. ix.

6. For example, ". . . Germany must assume new international responsibility. By virtue of its political and economic strength, it has a key role to play in the development of European structures and is called upon to make a contribution to the resolution of future problems throughout the world." *Ibid.*, p. 24. And in reference to strengthening collective security through the United Nations and its worldwide peacekeeping task: "Germany is rightly expected to bear its share of responsibility and to participate. The Federal Government is prepared to assume this responsibility." *Ibid.*, p. 43.

7. So the statement, "Today, Germany has greater international responsibility, especially as far as security in and for Europe is concerned." *Ibid.*, p. 40.

8. Consider the following statements: <R> ". . . conflict prevention and crisis management in a widened geographical setting, with a mandate legitimizing such activities under international law, must be at the forefront of preventive security measures." *Ibid.*, p. 37.<R> "In a political framework that aims at solving crises and conflicts by tackling their roots and causes, it may also be necessary to employ military means to prevent, confine or terminate violence or war." *Ibid.*, p. 37.<R> "Even after the end of the East-West conflict, lasting peace

cannot be guaranteed without the possibility of employing armed forces if necessary." *Ibid.*, p. 43.<R> For a country that has consistently denied or played down the role of force in international relations, these references are no small matter. See, for example, the discussion in Clay Clemens, "A Special Kind of Superpower? Germany and the Demilitarization of Post-Cold War International Security," in Gary L. Geipel, ed., *Germany in a New Era*, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1993, pp. 199-240. See also the arguments by Franz-Josef Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 82-103.

9. Geographically, "Germany has greater international responsibility, especially as far as security in Europe is concerned." *Ibid.*, p. 40. In kind, "Even after the question of conformity with the constitution has been settled, Germany's contribution towards the preservation of peace will continue to be primarily of a political and economic character, and not of a military one." *Ibid.*, p. 65.

10. See the discussion of the WEU in *White Paper 1994*, p. 59. Further stipulations require harmonization with provisions in the UN Charter and with the military obligations of the Atlantic Alliance.

11. It is interesting, and perhaps telling, in this light to examine this statement on p. 59: "The Federal Government is committed to the idea that the WEU be just as capable of managing crises as NATO." Given the opinion held by some policy makers and analysts about the inadequacy or incapacity of NATO in this area, particularly as it relates to the pre-Dayton phases of the Bosnian crisis, this statement may ring true but in a very ironic way!

12. This was the criticism most frequently cited by members of the opposition, especially in late-1994 and early-1995, and was pointed out to the author in several interviews in June 1995. Evidence that the criticism had some impact is found in one of German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's earliest public statements about German foreign policy after the Karlsruhe decision. Arguing that defense of the international order sometimes requires the use of force, Kinkel quickly added, "This does not, however, mean a militarization of German foreign policy; the culture of restraint will be maintained." See Klaus Kinkel, "Peacekeeping missions: Germany can now play its part," *NATO Review*, Vol. 42, No. 5, October 1994, p. 4.

13. In fact, Foreign Minister Kinkel expressed this view in the aftermath of General Joulwan's request for German Tornados (see the following discussion), and it was subsequently referred to as the "Kohl Doctrine." See "Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet," *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), December 5, 1995.

14. From an interview with the author on June 19, 1995.
15. See *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 3, 1995, p. 26.
16. See the discussion of the Joulwan request in Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," especially pp. 85-87.
17. Schäuble is quoted in Meiers, p. 86, note 16, citing Udo Bergdoll, "Aus Bonn ein vernebeltes Nein," *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), December 8, 1994, and "Bonner Versteckspiel im Tornado-Dilemma," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, December 9, 1994.
18. Much of this section is based on interviews conducted by the author between June 15-June 24, 1995, in Germany.
19. It is also a reason why one must be extremely cautious in imparting too much significance to BMVg views. Precisely because the policies have not yet been subjected to the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary phases of debate, policies at this stage may hardly resemble what eventually emerges. As Clemens observes, "analysts who approvingly or disapprovingly cite the readiness of Bonn's military establishment to prepare Germany for the role of a 'normal' power in world affairs may underrate the political obstacles blocking such a policy in the first place." Clemens, "A Special Kind of Superpower?," p. 200.
20. *Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr*, Bonn: Informationsstab, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, July 12, 1994. This document was made public immediately after the Karlsruhe decision, a conscious effort by Ruhe to preempt the public debate.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
22. The text reads, "Die strategische Lage erlaubt es, die Präsenz der Streitkräfte für die Landesverteidigung deutlich zu verringern." *Ibid.*, p. 4. It goes on to argue, of course, that this conclusion is based on the assumption that there will be adequate warning time to shift some of the crisis reaction forces back to homeland defense should the need arise.
23. Some of those interviewed at the BMVg indicated that a new document was in the works with a tentative title "Guidelines for the Use of the Bundeswehr in the Framework of International Peace Missions." It was apparently not written as part of the Bosnia decision of June 30, 1995, but this document would certainly reflect the thinking and analysis going on at that time. The reader should recall that the groundwork was being laid for a cabinet recommendation to parliament (subsequently made on June 26, 1995) that Germany contribute to the protection of the

UN Blue Helmets in the former Yugoslavia, including the assignment of 14 ECR Tornados.

24. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told Tale," in Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace*, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985, pp. 82-107. Kelleher observed: "Until now, the German central defense organization has functioned more often as an 'unstructured structure,' dependent more on the harmonization of personalities and political styles than on formal rules for ultimate decisions." *Ibid.*, p. 83.

25. See the caution in this regard by Clemens, cited earlier in note 20.

26. This is the result of both design and the personal policies of past Defense Ministers. See Kelleher, especially pp. 91-96.

27. See, for example, the interview with CDU/CSU defense policy spokesman Paul Breuer in *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), July 9, 1995, in the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Western Europe* (henceforth *FBIS-WEU*)-95-132, p. 7. See also the speeches to the Bundestag by Foreign Minister Kinkel, June 30, 1995, *FBIS-WEU*- 95-126, pp. 13-16, and by SPD party leader Rudolf Scharping, June 30, 1995, *FBIS-WEU*-95-127, pp. 10-14.

28. The results of this recent survey are discussed in an article by Dr. Renate Koecher, "Unerwartete Wende," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 14, 1995, p. 5.

29. Meiers, p. 84.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Koecher, p. 5.

32. Meiers, p. 85.

33. The same Demoskopie survey found a similar kind of agreement in principle but disagreement in specifics concerning the expansion of NATO. Thirty-three percent favor expansion generally, 25 percent are opposed, and a very high 42 percent are undecided. When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are specifically mentioned as candidates for admission, support climbs dramatically to 47 percent while opposition declines to 20 percent. However, the same survey found that the public does not make the connection between including these countries in NATO and being bound to go to their defense if they are attacked! When

this point is made, support for NATO expansion drops precipitously, so much so in fact that 41 percent are now opposed and only 27 percent in favor of NATO expansion. Apparently the public is willing to support efforts to address some of the post-Cold War challenges to international security, but only so long as there are no real demands made on Germany! Koecher, p. 5.

34. *Ibid.* Similar statements about the public and parliamentary perceptions of the Bundeswehr and military missions generally can be found in Rick Atkinson, "Luftwaffe's Wings Clipped in First Action Since 1945," *Washington Post*, August 19, 1995.

35. This view was evident in almost all of the comments of people interviewed in the foreign and security policy community, including the CDU staff.

36. This point was made in more than one interview, including one member of the German Foreign Ministry.

37. Kinkel, p. 3.

38. In fact it was reported that the Deputy Chief of the German Mission to the UN, Ambassador Gerhard Henze, was forced to cancel a speech at the last minute in which he was to announce German willingness to provide troops for future UN peace operations. The embarrassment was magnified by the fact that the text of the speech had already been made public. For this and other details of the request by Boutros-Ghali and the differing views of Kinkel and Ruhe, see "Ganz heiss," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), January 23, 1995, pp. 25-27. See also the discussion in Meiers, pp. 92-94.

39. See the previous discussion of the Ministry of Defense.

40. One article observed that the two presented the government case "with rare harmony." "Letzter Versuch," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 3, 1995, p. 26.

41. Kinkel, in *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, pp. 13-16.

42. This latter point has not been very widely discussed in the US. According to the parameters established in the government recommendation and approved by the Bundestag, the Tornados can be used only in very specific circumstances. As reported in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), these conditions do not "fit with Ruhe's statements about solidarity" with the allies. For example, the article notes, a British request for the Tornados to accompany transport planes carrying powdered milk to Sarajevo would be denied. So, too, would a request to provide security for a rescue mission should another US pilot be shot down. As one CSU

politician put it, "Woe be unto us if an American pilot is shot down because then the mood [of the NATO allies] will turn against us." "Letzter Versuch," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 3, 1995, p. 26. See also Atkinson, "Luftwaffe's Wings Clipped", *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1995.

43. Of course, one should note that these differences are logically related to the two offices and the different perspectives they have. Kinkel, as Foreign Minister, is expected to articulate the broader foreign policy views and to be subjected to more of the external pressures from his foreign affairs counterparts. Ruhe rightly views himself as the "protector" of his soldiers, fighting to limit the scope and range of operations they might be called upon to perform. This is probably the more fundamental source of the differences as opposed to pure personality or political philosophy.

44. *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), July 9, 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-132*, July 11, 1995, p. 7.

45. For example, Schröder recently observed, "Sometime the people will ask themselves which elections the SPD has won with Scharping as the [party] Chairman." *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 3, 1995, p. 28.

46. From an interview with the author on June 19, 1995. It is worth noting, however, that Voigt failed in his attempt to be directly reelected to parliament in 1994. Having been rejected by his own voters, he was only able to remain in the Bundestag through the efforts of the party to get him on the party list of candidates. Those efforts were not without detractors. The point is that Voigt became the focus of some controversy precisely because of his views on security issues, and he was eventually unable to maintain support among his constituents. Voigt's influence within the SPD may be limited not only by this political weakness, but by the fact that he has also opposed other key party positions.

47. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), June 29, 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, June 30, 1995, p. 16.

48. For this position see the discussion in *The Week in Germany*, "Bundestag Approves German Participation in UN Rapid Reaction Force," July 7, 1995, p. 2.

49. See the speech to the Bundestag by Scharping, ZDF Television Network (Mainz), June 30, 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-127*, July 3, 1995, p. 13.

50. See *The Week in Germany*, July 7, 1995, p. 1.

51. This became obvious in the group discussions leading up to the parliamentary debate, as discussed below, and was mentioned by a member of the CDU foreign policy staff in an interview.

52. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), June 29, 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, June 30, 1995, p. 16.

53. See *The Week in Germany*, July 7, 1995, p. 1.

54. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), August 1, 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-147*, August 1, 1995, p. 13.

55. See *FBIS Media Note*, in *FBIS-WEU-95-167*, August 29, 1995, pp. 10-11.

56. One editorial bluntly stated, "The bitter lesson: The American World policeman will swing its billyclub only when its national security interests are threatened. And they are evidently not for the Americans in the Balkans." *Bild-Zeitung* (Hamburg), July 19, 1995, as quoted in *Deutschland Nachrichten*, July 21, 1995, p. 3.

57. It appeared that Germany faced a dilemma similar to the United States. A withdrawal by the UN would conceivably bring an unqualified request from NATO for Germany to honor its commitment to provide forces in support of that action. Therefore, it would continue to do whatever is necessary to ensure that its "bluff" would not be called. In a somewhat ironic twist of policy fate, Germany had to contribute to the UN Reaction Force in part to increase the likelihood that the "Blue Helmets" would remain in Bosnia and thereby obviate the need for Germany to provide Bundeswehr forces in support of a large-scale NATO action (a UN withdrawal). President Clinton tried to make a similar point to the Republican opposition in Congress that pressed for a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government; lifting the embargo would lead to a UN withdrawal which the United States was committed to support, including the provision of large numbers of ground forces.

58. Kinkel's address to the Bundestag on June 30, 1995 is notable in this regard. "But what is asked in the decision we have to make today is not only solidarity, but this is also about our very own German interests and the consistency and credibility of our German policy It is we who would have to take in the major flow of refugees in the event of a withdrawal of the UN troops." ZDF Television Network (Mainz), June 30, 1995, reported in *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, June 30, 1995, p. 14. While no one, least of all this author, argues that *Realpolitik* is the driving force behind German peace support policy today, the unwritten taboo on talking about German national interests is weakening, a point

made by more than one individual in interviews.

59. A reasonably successful outcome of German participation in NATO operations in Croatia and western policy generally will reinforce positive developments in Germany, whereas a clear failure or disaster could well result not only in the defeat of the policies and the government that enacted them, but in an anti-internationalist backlash that would see Germany close itself off even more from the power politics of the West. One hopes that leaders in the United States and other western countries see such a development as profoundly not in their best interests, and definitely as something to be avoided. To date they have not demonstrated such an understanding.

60. This statement was made in an interview on June 19, 1995, well in advance of the Bundestag vote on the UN Rapid Reaction Force, and even prior to the cabinet recommendation.

61. Scharping minced no words on this issue in his speech to the Bundestag on June 30, 1995, in which he stated, ". . . the course that was set in 1991 was wrong, and it damaged the trust in Europe and toward Germany. The policy of quick and early recognition put pressure on the states in the EU to follow the German example. That contributed to the failure of the Yugoslavia policy and the messed-up situation in Bosnia." ZDF Television Network (Mainz), June 30, 1995, reported in *FBIS-WEU-95-127*, July 3, 1995, pp. 10-11.

62. Clemens, p. 228.

**POWER AND MORALITY:
ON A NEW GERMAN SECURITY POLICY**

Michael J. Inacker
(translated by Daniel Weisbaum)

German foreign and security policy has suffered a painful loss since 1989. This has been the loss of inter-allied security, i.e., the end of the German national anomaly. Germany can no longer hide behind the illusion of collective defense and, in this connection, Bonn must now take responsibility for its own security and politico-military affairs. While the German political class has gradually become aware of these external changes, they are still a long way from drawing the proper conclusions for the determination of a *sovereign* German policy and discerning national interests which support it. Directly related to this is the concomitant necessity of recognizing the changed basis of German defence policy, as well as Germany's relations with its own armed forces, the Bundeswehr.

Until 1989, German security policy limited itself to a sort of "contribution policy," Germany rendered first and foremost contributions to the West's common interests. These contributions were in the form of solidarity pronouncements, the Bundeswehr's commitment (but perhaps not the *will* to actually use it in battle), and of placing its own territory at the disposal of allied armed forces. German foreign policy was, in large part, nothing more than the co-administration of Alliance policy.

In terms of security and politico-military affairs, divided Germany was mostly just along for the ride. This Cold War mentality of "non-responsibility" was at first encouraged by Bonn's alliance partners and international security organizations; later, though, it was only tolerated. The Gulf War showed that other capitals were no longer inclined to accept Germany's ducking when military decisions had to be made. Also, in July 1994 the Constitutional Court ended the Social Democratic Party's (SPD) and the Free Democrat Party's (FDP) living a lie in foreign policy, i.e., that the Bundeswehr could not participate in military operations outside the NATO area.

Germany was, and still partially is, also on probation in terms of foreign and security policy, since it is consistently under external and internal political pressure of having to prove its peacefulness. German and European history have been first and foremost, wrote Thomas Kielinger, the history of political rehabilitation. "The probationer from time to time makes soothing and reassuring avowals, which served to signify that he has used his probationary period well and has become a thoroughly changed

and reformed member of the 'Family of Man.'"¹ If the well-groomed, pin-striped pacifism of German diplomacy was, until the end of the Cold War, a prerequisite for the international acceptance of the growing economic power of Germany, this became, in the second half of the 1980s, more and more of a collective excuse as far as the assumption of military responsibility is concerned.

Uncomfortable truths, allegedly contrary to the contemporary mood, are still kept from the nation. The impression, moreover, of dishonesty intrudes, especially in connection with Germans' attitude toward the acceptance of their own military responsibilities in the Balkans War. Because German soldiers caused so much harm and suffering in the Balkans during World War II, a deployment there was supposed to be taboo, or is now--after the deployment of German fighter aircraft to Italy and a medical unit to Split--still sensitive. Yet, by this argument, any future Bundeswehr deployment could not be justified *anywhere* in and around Europe, and these regions are the most important for German security. In short, the German political class inflates "guilt" in order to decline military participation. Only the Germans, as a partner in the Western Alliance, allow themselves this absurdity, according to the historian Hans-Peter Schwarz. "After almost 50 years since the end of the war Germans are vulnerable to propaganda about the war and still psychologically blackmailable. More precisely, they are not blackmailed, but rather they blackmail themselves by constantly raising the specters of the Second World War."² The fact is, however, what happens and can happen in war is always deplorable and hideous. But, as the basis of a new German defense policy, it remains extremely questionable, as Hans-Peter Schwarz goes on to write, "to allow contemporary foreign policy to be influenced by collective feelings of long-past occurrences, in which our grandfathers' generation was involved."³

Above all, the younger generation is more receptive than published opinion would have us believe. At least, it is difficult to get across to them why, of all countries, the one that was partly established with the avowal "never again" stands aside when once again states' right of self-determination (as in Kuwait) or the human rights of ethnic groups (as in former Yugoslavia) are disregarded. "The lesson of our history cannot be that we content ourselves with bewilderment . . . when other nations on our continent are prepared to act collectively to maintain peace or protect threatened lives" writes the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, General Klaus Naumann.⁴

It is required, therefore, to begin by picking up the threads of "positive orientation points" of German history, as described by the contemporary historian Karl Dietrich Bracher,

The negative lessons from the period 1933-1945 were certainly decisive for the older generation, foremost as negative lessons of an earlier period of history. They were motivating to make efforts to do it better; they stood in constant contrast to the experiences of the Weimar Era and the German dictatorship. Of course, the same does not apply to that majority of the population that has since been born. The majority has another historical-political frame of reference. Their different breadth of experience coincides with the natural desire to want positive orientation points, even in a fractured history.⁵

For German security policy, this means finding a way back to the dignity and composure with which the political classes in Great Britain, France and the United States are wont to act in times of crisis.

The very foundation of the Bundeswehr was not based, or only partly, on patriotic legitimation. German defence policy and the Bundeswehr owe their legitimacy to the West's collectively-perceived threat from the East Bloc. The Bonn jurist Josef Isensee, an expert in constitutional law, pointed out the purely functional legitimation. The establishment and mission of the Bundeswehr, wrote Isensee, were

not ascribed to the Federal Republic as an individual state, but rather to the Western alliance, in which the Federal Republic was included from the outset. Whatever remained of the Federal Republic's decision-making powers, her armed forces were subject to supranational control from the beginning; the Bundeswehr always existed in a supranational context. The Bundeswehr was not created for the sake of the Federal Republic; rather, for the sake of the West.⁶

With that, the question of national self-assertion and the identity crisis brought on by Germany's own divided statehood was resolved in the framework of worldwide alliances and conflicts. Yet to the extent that this global conflict has been overcome and replaced by a web of international power and national interests of a rather classical character, to the extent that normal statehood has been created for the Germans, substantial prerequisites have been met for the normalization of the consideration of defense policy matters in Germany.

It is correct, of course, that the heroic pathos of national sacrifice be worn out. A hedonistic society has become unfamiliar (the Bundeswehr was created under the slogan *Primat der Politik*--the primacy of politics--domesticated and even pacified) with the former interpretation that military force is not just a means of

keeping external order, but at the same time, the moral engagement itself of the nation. Yet, absent such a national conscientious, the political class and citizens are dependent on the understanding of their country as a strong democracy which is necessary to protect and maintain society.

The Bundeswehr is, and will remain, the instrument, and above all the symbol, of a protective and self-maintaining society. It gives the nation its external form; as a society with a common fate (according to Wolfgang Schäuble, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) faction in the Bundestag) and--as the *ultima ratio* of politics--its main virtue. At the same time, the political philosophical concept of a strong democracy for the individual citizen becomes visible and tangible in the armed forces. The Bundeswehr removes the abstraction from the ideas of self-maintenance and risk-sharing and makes it a vivid process. The belief in the state as a society bound by fate can also give political power back to the concept of patriotism. It can also promote the public association and helps to convey to the people, as the pillar of a democracy, the sense of unity. This, of course, presupposes the renunciation of the negative patriotism of the old Federal Republic, which was chiefly coupled with the flight from national self-preservation, and questioning the legitimacy of the Bundeswehr by advocates of such a creed.

Of course, in a time of increasing potential for conflict at the edges of Europe, of modern long-range missile technology and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, national self-preservation remains firmly tied with NATO and an alliance with the only remaining superpower and most faithful friend of the Germans, the United States. Only in an alliance of like-minded nations sharing common values can the global-strategic dangers to national sovereignty be overcome. This necessitates an equal partnership within the Western Alliance; i.e., neither privileges for one, nor special rights of abstention for others. The inclination toward self-preservation is not, therefore, a means for a nationalist-isolationist German defense policy. Rather, the first requirement for an equal and sovereign Germany is participation in international politics through active participation in key security organizations, i.e., NATO, European Union and United Nations.

Nation-Europe-Western Alliance: Germany's foreign and security policies follow from this triad. General Naumann formulated this connection in the following manner: "The Germans need...a healthy measure of patriotism, to hold their own in the international community. We can guarantee integration and multinationality of the armed forces only if we acknowledge ourselves as Germans."⁷ Yet, this inclination towards self-assertion, writes Hans-Peter Schwarz in his book on the forgotten

use of power amongst German elites, presupposes just such a "love of the Fatherland."

That is also the willingness to sacrifice and take risks. Where the old republican virtues are forgotten, however, where they are only cause for mockery or concern, it cannot be expected that a people stands firm in the maelstrom of power politics in the long run.⁸

Germany is a steadfast member of the Western Alliance. Without NATO, every German government would lack the foundation for sovereignly-designed foreign and security policies. Both as a non-nuclear power and a medium military power in the centre of Europe, Germany remains dependent on a common and partially integrated security and defence policies.

But do the armed forces and command organizations of NATO and the Bundeswehr accurately reflect the altered political landscape? Will Germany, measured by its military contributions to Alliance defence, be treated as an equal amongst equals? Or, are not adherents of the old school of thought to be found, primarily in the armed forces, whose views are stamped by mistrust of the democratic maturity of Germans and therefore integrate the Bundeswehr more into NATO formations, even more than is militarily necessary, than all other armed forces in the Alliance?

NATO was organized multinationally at the command and control level for good reason. With the end of the Cold War, command and control should have been assigned to the largest western formation, the corps; when necessary, at the division level. However, neither in NATO's Southern nor in the Northern Command Regions is there any sign of multinational corps being organized; only in the Central Region <F"NewBrunswick">--<F255> in Germany. Although multinationalism is advocated by all NATO members, Germany remains the only country in Europe in which foreign ground troops are stationed in great numbers. The result is that on the territory of the old Federal Republic, the Bundeswehr no longer has a single corps designated solely for national use. Only in the new eastern states, and then only as an interim measure, does an all-German combined army/home defence corps exist, due to the "Two-plus-Four" Treaty. Germany,

has fallen into a situation which the federal government always wanted to avoid: Germany being the odd man out. Only in Germany do large numbers of foreign troops remain stationed, and only German corps lose their homogeneity through the resolution to establish multinational corps.⁹

Other nations within NATO are giving up their national corps organizations, but these are without exception countries with small land armies. In this context of multinationality, the Bundeswehr adheres to one future principle above all else: contributions to large multinational units. These large units are the ones which other nations, having radically reduced their own ground forces, allow themselves to occupy General Officers' positions that, based on the size of their armies, they have no claim to. No other army in NATO has their units in such a confusion of attachments to other units as the Bundeswehr. This means that the German army, besides having to deal with the reduction from formerly 42 to 22 standing brigades, must also accomplish the mission of the hitherto organized 12 divisions and three purely German army corps.

The Bundeswehr also has to deal with a military multiculturalism, which goes to the core of the armed forces' conviction. Just as parts of the Maastricht Treaty consider Germany's integration for its own sake (and to reassure other European countries following unification), and thus place a burden on Germany for the thoroughly-reasonable idea of "European unification," there exists a similar situation regarding military integration. The Bundeswehr will be so integrated that it is threatened with losing its own German identity. In essence, the Bundeswehr has become not an instrument of the alliance and for the sovereign reshaping of German foreign policy and interests; rather, it is part of an anonymous and opaque military apparatus.

This all results in a weakening amongst the troops (and especially in the officer corps) of the conviction of service to the Fatherland, of serving in an important institutional part of society. Whether the Bundeswehr, already financially strapped, can attract those people it would like to recruit is questionable. There is a similar concern about the convictions of society. The further the Bundeswehr is detached from society's purpose of national self-preservation and is internationalized, the more its underlying social ethos and patriotic foundation will be weakened.

The question of militarily-superfluous integration of the armed forces also implies a further question, namely, the national command capabilities of the Bundeswehr. During the Cold War, when only the Bundeswehr's deployment as part of NATO in the Central Region was imaginable, there was no need for extensive national command and control. Yet here, too, the decisive turning point in 1989 brought with it a drastic change. In the meantime, international deployments of the Bundeswehr in the Gulf region, in aiding the Iraqi Kurds, in Cambodia, and Somalia make clear that the Bundeswehr needs its own planning and command organizations in addition to the NATO integrated command structure. It is simply incomprehensible that the largest

industrial nation in Europe conducts its operations outside NATO from various sections within the Ministry of Defense, without a standing "J-3" operational staff. The individual services have, in the meantime, established operational commands of their own, but a command organization encompassing all branches of service, better known as a General Staff, is lacking. Also missing are extensive strategic reconnaissance capabilities. For the sake of Germany's ability to act internationally, politicians must finally come to grips with the question of a central, national armed forces command (i.e., a J-3) with a national military commander at its head.

In a system threatened by power, an opposing power is indispensable for self-preservation and stability. The use of force and power in the protection of freedom places an obligation on a democracy, is an integral part thereof, and belongs to European tradition since the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 1789, whose twelfth Article states: "The guarantee of human and civil rights requires military forces. This authority is thus to be employed for the common good, not for the private use of those in command of this authority." The German constitution, or Basic Law, has incorporated this tradition by making all governmental authority, including military power, serve to protect the dignity of man.

This part of the tradition of enlightenment and humanism, the descendants of which they like to characterize themselves as, was disavowed by the German Left and the FDP with their Parlor-Progressiveness. The former Foreign Minister and leading FDP politician, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Bonn's foreign minister for fair-weather international politics), especially tried to construct a distinction between bad "power politics" and good "responsible politics". This distinction was cultivated to the limit by a political class that has forgotten the use of power. Moreover, the desire for self-preservation, the protection of national interests, and a sovereignly-designed security policy are tightly bound up with an enlightened and normal understanding of responsible power politics.

Such power politics do not mean a return to inept "Wilhelmine" German statecraft, but rather to an orientation of one's own development of power toward the values of peace, freedom, and human-rights, as well as the protection of the outer shell of sovereign freedom, i.e., the state and therewith the maintenance of national and alliance self-determination. To this extent, patriotism and constitutional patriotism should merge to form the foundation of society's right to act. Patriotism and the concept of a stable democracy externally and internally derived from "constitution patriotism," love of one's own liberal constitution, complement one another. Then primarily this conviction of democratically legitimate stability, taught and

cultivated in schools and universities and protected from the irresponsible media, is the non-waiveable basic condition of life in all open societies.

In international relations, only legitimated power can create and secure the conditions of a nation's own liberty, in which rules are made and enforced so that the liberty of one state can co-exist with the liberty of another. This requires a renunciation by the political class of the concept of the state as a domesticated leviathan, from considering it as a collective colony of sharecroppers. The political class needs to return to that democratic strength that is characteristic of all historically-anchored democracies, as it, and it alone, can protect a society from extremism, whether internal or external.

But as long as security policy is managed primarily with a small-group mentality, a new German attitude towards the politics of power is not possible. Hans-Peter Schwarz writes in his analysis of Germans' understanding of power that

small-group mentality and morality have, of course, their high, positive significance; in family circles, amongst friends, in the neighborhood, in the work place, in the company of those politically like-minded or of the same faith. But their naïve transference has a corruptive effect on political institutions, on the state and on relations between states. There, a different ethos is required: watchfulness, battle-readiness, capability of enforcement, a sense of justice and power relations and rationality, prudent assessment, imperturbability.¹⁰

These principles, within the framework of a new German security policy, need to be transmitted to society. The extent to which substantial portions of the pertinent university education, of so-called "peace research," of political education, of the churches and their affiliated institutions, predominantly develop and pass on moralizing, unrealistic, distorted ideas about international power cannot be overlooked.

Germany needs a clear voice regarding real-life balance of power, the risks to its existence, and the necessity of developing its own power nationally and in the European-Transatlantic alliance. If the broadest possible consensus about the foundations of policy, with the balance of power at its centre, can be attained, then the acceptance of the resulting defence burdens, the deployment of the Bundeswehr, as well as the deployment and preservation of the Western Alliance, can also be attained. For example, a public convinced of the need for a military operation in Bosnia may be more likely to accept increased levels of flight training or other military exercises

in their own country.

Alas, one hesitates to speak of uncomfortable things. This is why a large segment of the political class in Germany has lost the understanding of war as an *ultima ratio*, as sometimes the only remaining alternative to the impotent tolerance of foreign aggression. Just as with George Orwell's New-Speak, all military terms and even allegedly-military symbolisms are embellished, demilitarized and in part made taboo. With the Neue Wache (the national memorial) in Berlin, a game of hide-and-seek is being played with the Bundeswehr and an honor guard. A national command bunker, such as all normal countries possess, is now thought to be superfluous by SPD and CDU politicians; even the conservative Defence Minister Volker Ruhe prefers to speak not of defense policy and politico-military affairs, but (in the spirit of the times of political-correctness) of a "defense culture." Perhaps in the future the idea of military operations, of the fight for one's own existence on the field of battle, will be changed to the phrase "battle culture"?

This changing phraseology reveals the warped self-esteem of German security policy: the Germans are responsible for peace and other nations for war. Faced with conflicts beyond its own horizons, German foreign policy, especially those on the German Left, reacts charitably and rhetorically; usually, resolutions are demanded from international organizations, as well as aid for the victims of violence and the population suffering from war; i.e., international humanitarian aid. Amongst the German political class, wars are understood as catastrophes, not as a process whose causes and the inherent test of forces often make a peaceful settlement impossible. Accordingly, German policy searches for peaceful solutions even in those cases where only soldiers can help to end the violence.

This German idiosyncrasy, to understand foreign policy as a sort of international "social work," has just as negative an effect on the political understanding of the use of military power as it does on the self-esteem of the Bundeswehr. More and more, "humanitarian operation" is spoken of as a pretence for the existence of the Bundeswehr, while its primary military mission and the consequences of its use are suppressed. The result is that the Bundeswehr is increasingly becoming a sort of technical relief organization in battle dress. Such an understanding of the Bundeswehr is morally extremely chic; humanitarian "troops" settle the conscience of those politically responsible ("We sent German soldiers to the aid of the suffering") and simultaneously relieves politicians of the perhaps difficult but necessary decisions of war and peace. Humanitarian aid, however, presupposes a certain amount of order which, in turn, cannot be established by humanitarian means.

The misfortune of humanitarian aid for the victims of war in the recent past is that some third parties do not want to bring about order, but only to help in "humanitarian" ways. The trend is growing stronger to use the armed forces to air-drop supplies, procure them by ship, and distribute them by soldiers. Yet the cause for this operation, aggression, is something no-one wants to directly oppose.

In short, the phrase, "the armed forces on a humanitarian mission" is nothing more than an expression to help the Left and Bundeswehr-critics, but which causes needless confusion; armed forces exist, as the name implies, for fighting in armed conflicts. They can provide assistance through technical means after natural catastrophes, which one could call "humanitarian." When third parties intervene in armed inter- or intranational conflicts to end the war, this can only be understood in a further sense of "humanitarian intervention." But if traditional German foreign policy shrinks away from that and wants the Bundeswehr to do solely charitable work, then this is nothing more than a flight from responsibility and the realities of international politics and a denial of the essential role of armed forces--to use force to deter war or bring about a decisive end to the conflict.

Beyond that, a break with another taboo is necessary for a new German defense policy: the assertion that having national interests is something for morally second-class nations. Especially in the German Left, the impression is aroused that the use of military force is legitimate only when it no longer follows from national decision-making, but rather results from a collective organization. The United Nations especially, by this argument, receives the rank of a supranational court of justice. Undoubtedly, the UN remains an important international influence on potential hot-spots. Yet, the main point is that, whoever sets his stock in "world domestic policy" and demands a UN resolution for every Bundeswehr and NATO out-of-area operation must know to what and to whom he is making his policy hostage. The concept of a "world domestic policy" means, in the final analysis, forgoing the essence of one's own sovereignty in foreign and security policy, as Raymond Aron has defined it. According to Aron, sovereign states are political units, which claim the right to be their own judge and sole master of the decision to fight or not to fight.¹¹ Certainly, German membership in the European Union and NATO means the transference of sovereignty in foreign and security policy to an international organization, yet here it is considered much more as a democratic legitimation, the possibility of exerting influence and control, as well as sharing a fundamental identity of values, and especially interests.

But in the course of a "world domestic policy," Germany would be laying its freedom of decision-making about the

protection of German and Allied interests in a body in which, of the almost 180 members in the General Assembly, the majority represent dictators and authoritarian regimes, and in whose Security Council such potentially difficult nations as Russia and China can use their veto at any time; their veto against measures that could possibly be of great importance to German, European, or transatlantic interests. What is thus required is the removal of the UN from its pedestal, and the enlightenment of the German public that the UN is nothing more than a body for the channeling of diverse interests on the basis of an international law inclined toward euphemism. But in this game, only he who has a clear idea of his national interests can participate and co-determine the rules.

If, nevertheless, one listens to the Leader of the Opposition in the Bundestag, the SPD politician Rudolf Scharping, then only "other nations undertake specific interventions out of national interests." Germany, however, according to the SPD politician, who assumes the attitude of a morally-pure politician, "ought to differ from this."¹² Thus, according to this view, national interests are, in principle, reprehensible. One can thus awaken uneasiness and fritter away one's international reputation as a reliable alliance partner; then the international uneasiness about German policies that arises from time-to-time comes from the suspicion that an excess of idealism in politics is either a sign of being out of touch with reality or a strategy of camouflaging interests that one does not really want to talk about.

It is an old German phenomenon to hold itself politically and morally above its alliance partners, who are corrupted by their interests and political pragmatism. Alliance partners are especially disconcerted by this verdict and react with mistrust to a Germany that rejects that normality, as British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd has characterized it for his country: "British foreign policy has the task of protecting and promoting British interests. Despite the changes in the world, this fundamental truth has not changed. The question, what Britain's interests are, must be answered by each generation anew."¹³

This normality, in the context of its own interests, is central to the understanding of German security policy and politico-military affairs. That this normality has not yet been reached is less a question of morality, but rather fear of the possible consequences; the determination of national interests leads to the necessity of actively shaping the international surroundings, on which the security and prosperity of the Germans depends. It also leads to the necessity of having to act or decide on a sovereign basis, including the risk of making the wrong decision. The determination of national interests leads directly to a changed understanding of military power and the use

of the armed forces, as well as how they are to be equipped and financially supported. Such a new German defense policy will be more expensive; this is what deters a nation that draws its sense of self-worth from the growth-rate of its leisure time, and from the recognition of its political normality.

Notes

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