Air Traffic Control: Evolution and Status of FAA's Automation Program
(Testimony, 03/05/98, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-85).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) automation program,
focusing on: (1) how the automation program has evolved from the initial
program to the current one; (2) to what extent FAA has had to implement
costly interim projects and to sustain the older equipment; and (3)
whether the ongoing acquisitions are achieving their cost and schedule
goals.
GAO noted that: (1) in the 1994 restructuring, FAA cancelled segments of
its initial automation program, scaled back others, and ordered the
development of less costly alternatives; (2) FAA still plans to replace
the aging equipment that is increasingly difficult to maintain and to
provide a basis for adding new capabilities at a later date; (3) one of
the cancelled segments from the initial program would have addressed
hardware maintenance problems that are now emerging with the mainframe
computer; (4) the agency expects to incur costs of about $160 million
during fiscal years 1998 and 1999 to replace the mainframe computer
hardware; (5) as a result of the longstanding history of schedule delays
in the automation program, FAA has added four interim projects--costing
about $655 million--to sustain and enhance current automated equipment;
(6) almost all of FAA's facilities that control air traffic at lower
altitudes near airports will be upgraded through these interim projects;
(7) FAA has had mixed results in achieving its cost and schedule goals
for the two major ongoing acquisitions in its restructured automation
program; (8) the Display System Replacement is within budget and on
schedule; and (9) however, the Standard Terminal Automated Replacement
System will likely have schedule delays of at least 6 months largely
because software development has taken longer than expected and the
agency and the contractor lack sufficient time to perform needed
testing.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-RCED/AIMD-98-85
TITLE: Air Traffic Control: Evolution and Status of FAA's
Automation Program
DATE: 03/05/98
SUBJECT: Air traffic control systems
Equipment maintenance
Life cycle costs
Computer software verification and validation
Systems design
Federal procurement
Systems conversions
Air transportation operations
Radar equipment
IDENTIFIER: FAA Advanced Automation System
FAA Display System Replacement
FAA Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure,
House of Representatives
For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
9:30 a.m. EST
Thursday
March 5, 1998
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL - EVOLUTION
AND STATUS OF FAA'S AUTOMATION
PROGRAM
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham,
Associate Director, Transportation Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division
GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-85
GAO/RCED/AIMD-98-85T
(348054)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
FAA -
ATC -
AAS -
IBM -
STARS -
TRACON -
DSR -
ARTS -
PTR -
TAAS -
TCCC -
ACCC -
ISSS -
============================================================ Chapter 0
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the air traffic control
(ATC) automation program of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). Automation and other functional areas such as communications,
navigation, and surveillance are the main elements of FAA's overall
plan for modernizing the air traffic control system. The automation
program, which began in the early 1980s, involves FAA's acquisition
of modern workstations and computers that process radar and flight
data for controllers' use.
Because of severe cost, schedule, and technical problems, FAA
restructured the automation program in 1994. The Advanced Automation
System (AAS) project, divided into 5 separate segments, was the
centerpiece of the program before its 1994 restructuring. In 1983,
FAA estimated the cost to develop AAS to be $2.5 billion and
completion was scheduled for 1996. When International Business
Machines (IBM) was awarded a development contract in 1988, after a
4-year design competition, FAA estimated the project would cost $4.8
billion and be completed in 1998. By 1994, when FAA restructured the
automation program, FAA estimated the cost to develop AAS to be as
much as $7.6 billion with completion as late as 2003.
As part of the restructured program, FAA is undertaking major
acquisitions for two segments of AAS--the Display System Replacement
(DSR) and Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS).
FAA estimates that these acquisitions will each cost about $1 billion
to develop and will be completed by 2000 and 2005, respectively. FAA
will also have to undertake other major acquisitions to provide all
needed capabilities that had been promised under AAS.
Our testimony today, as requested by your Subcommittee, will focus on
(1) how the automation program has evolved from the initial program
to the current one, (2) to what extent FAA has had to implement
costly interim projects to sustain the older equipment, and (3)
whether the ongoing acquisitions are achieving their cost and
schedule goals.
In summary
-- In the 1994 restructuring, FAA cancelled segments of its initial
automation program, scaled back others, and ordered the
development of less costly alternatives. FAA still plans to
replace the aging equipment that is increasingly difficult to
maintain and to provide a basis for adding new capabilities at a
later date. One of the cancelled segments from the initial
program would have addressed hardware maintenance problems that
are now emerging with the mainframe computer--referred to as the
Host--at FAA's facilities that control air traffic at higher
altitudes. The agency expects to incur costs of about $160
million during fiscal years 1998 and 1999 to replace the
mainframe computer hardware.
-- As a result of the longstanding history of schedule delays in
the automation program, FAA has added four interim
projects--costing about $655 million--to sustain and enhance
current automated equipment. Almost all of FAA's facilities
that control air traffic at lower altitudes near airports will
be upgraded through these interim projects.
-- FAA has had mixed results in achieving its cost and schedule
goals for the two major ongoing acquisitions in its restructured
automation program. The Display System Replacement is within
budget and on schedule. However, the Standard Terminal
Automated Replacement System will likely have schedule delays of
at least 6 months largely because software development has taken
longer than expected and the agency and the contractor lack
sufficient time to perform needed testing.
AUTOMATION PROGRAM HAS
UNDERGONE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The evolution of FAA's automation program has involved changes in
both the program's structure and requirements.
CHANGES IN PROGRAM STRUCTURE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.1
The centerpiece of FAA's automation program before its 1994
restructuring was the Advanced Automation System (AAS) project.
Divided into 5 separate segments, AAS was designed to provide new
work stations for controllers and related computer hardware and
software that process radar and flight data for controllers' use. It
was also designed to make possible the consolidation of more than 200
air route traffic control (en route) centers and terminal radar
approach control (TRACON) facilities at 23 locations.\1
By May 1994, when FAA restructured the automation program, the agency
had spent an estimated $2.6 billion on AAS. Our analysis of FAA data
found that the restructured program was able to salvage about $1.1
billion in AAS-developed laboratory facilities and computer hardware
and software. The balance--$1.5 billion--was wasted because the
remaining equipment and work did not contribute to follow-on
projects. (See app. I for more detailed information.)
The 1994 restructuring affected four of the five AAS segments. One
segment was scaled back and renamed the Display System Replacement
(DSR) project. Another was cancelled and replaced by the Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) project. A third
segment was scaled back and eventually cancelled. A fourth was
cancelled and has yet to be replaced. The unaffected segment linked
external systems, such as radars, to the en route centers' computers.
This equipment--called the Peripheral Adapter Modular Replacement
Item--was made fully operational in all of the en route centers by
1993.
-- The segment of AAS called the Initial Sector Suite System was
designed to replace controller workstations and supporting
equipment at en route centers. This segment was scaled back to
more closely replicate existing workstations and renamed the DSR
project. The Lockheed-Martin Corporation is the prime
contractor.\2
-- The segment of AAS called the Terminal Advanced Automation
System was intended to replace controller workstations and
supporting equipment in the TRACONs. This segment was cancelled
in 1994. It was replaced by the STARS project. FAA signed the
contract with Raytheon Corporation to acquire STARS in September
1996.
-- The Tower Control Computer Complex segment would have installed
new workstations for controllers in airport towers. The agency
scaled back this segment in 1994 but cancelled it altogether in
1997 on cost-benefit grounds.
-- The Area Control Computer Complex segment would have replaced
the Host computer in each en route center.\3 These computers
generate aircraft position and identification data for
controllers' workstations. In 1994 FAA cancelled this segment
of AAS and planned to replace the Host by 2005. However, a 1997
FAA analysis raised concerns about the maintainability of the
current Host's hardware past the year 2001. In addition, FAA
has concerns about the Host's ability to be Year
2000-compliant.\4 The agency estimates that it will cost about
$160 million during fiscal years 1998 and 1999 to replace the
Host hardware on an interim basis while continuing to use
existing software for the foreseeable future. FAA is analyzing
its alternatives and expects to make an investment decision in
early March.
--------------------
\1 FAA uses three types of facilities to control traffic. Airport
towers direct aircraft on the ground, before landing, and after
takeoff within about 5 nautical miles from the airport and about
3,000 feet above the airport. Terminal radar approach control
(TRACON) facilities sequence and separate aircraft as they approach
and leave airports, beginning about 5 nautical miles and ending about
50 nautical miles from the airport and generally up to 10,000 feet
above the ground. Air route traffic control centers, called en route
centers, control planes in transit and during approaches to some
airports. Most of the en route centers' controlled airspace extends
above 18,000 feet for commercial aircraft. En route centers also
handle lower altitudes when dealing directly with a tower, or when
agreed upon with a terminal facility.
\2 Loral Corporation, having acquired IBM's division responsible for
the AAS, was the prime contractor at the time of restructuring.
Lockheed-Martin acquired Loral Corporation's division responsible for
AAS.
\3 Also being considered was the replacement of the Direct Access
Radar Channel at each en route center to provide a modern backup
radar data-processing capability.
\4 On January 1, 2000, computer systems worldwide could malfunction
or produce inaccurate information simply because the century has
changed. The problem is rooted in how dates are recorded and
computed. For the past several decades, computer systems have
typically used two digits to represent the year (e.g. "97" rather
than "1997"). In such a format, 2000 is indistinguishable from 1900.
Software and systems experts nationwide are concerned that this
ambiguity could cause systems to malfunction in unforeseen ways or to
fail completely.
CHANGES IN REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.2
When restructuring the program in 1994, FAA relaxed or eliminated six
AAS requirements that were, in the agency's view, unnecessarily
contributing to the project's cost growth. The first major AAS
requirement FAA relaxed was the stipulation that the system could not
malfunction more than 3 seconds per year. For the DSR and STARS
projects, FAA relaxed this "availability" requirement to no more than
5 minutes of malfunctions per year; this level still exceeds today's
requirement of no more than 2 hours of malfunctions per year.
The second major AAS requirement relaxed by FAA was the need for a
separate training system that fully replicates the control room
environment found in today's en route centers and TRACONs. FAA
established this requirement for a so-called "full fidelity
stand-alone" training system so controllers could become certified
without having to train on live systems. Because on-the-job training
remains critical to the training process, FAA decided not to build a
system that fully recreates the control room environment.
When FAA planned to consolidate more than 200 en route and TRACON
facilities at 23 locations, the agency established the requirement
for an "integrated" backup capability to ensure that if any of the 23
facilities were to experience a system failure, the remaining 22
could provide air traffic services for the affected facility. Having
scrapped the consolidation plan, FAA decided to provide independent
("stand-alone") backup systems for each en route center and TRACON.
FAA reconsidered how flight data would be displayed and used by
controllers.\5 FAA had planned to move from paper to electronic
flight strips so the agency could more easily reconfigure airspace
and spread out controller workload. For DSR and STARS, however, the
agency retained the existing paper flight strip technology because
electronic strips were too technically challenging and costly to
develop.
FAA eliminated several AAS requirements:
-- FAA had planned to replace existing single common consoles for
TRACON with dual consoles to meet AAS' availability requirement
that the system could not malfunction more than 3 seconds per
year and to present electronic flight strips. However, FAA
decided to ease the availability requirement for STARS to no
more than 5 minutes of malfunctions per year and not use
electronic flight strips. As a result, FAA now plans to replace
existing consoles on a one-to-one basis.
-- Electronic charts, which present such information as airport
layout maps and navigational maps, were to be generated by AAS'
primary data-processing subsystem. With DSR and STARS,
secondary subsystems will present mapping information to
controllers.
-- FAA eliminated the AAS requirement to play back flight tracking
data at ten times the speed in which they were recorded. This
requirement would have allowed FAA to reconstruct events more
quickly for accident investigation and training purposes. With
DSR and STARS, FAA will provide only a actual-time playback
capability for flight track data.
--------------------
\5 Flight strips provide controllers with basic status information,
such as aircraft routes, altitudes, and air traffic clearances.
Controllers mark up the paper strips to record changes in status.
Each strip provides information on one flight.
DELAYS HAVE LED TO COSTLY
INTERIM PROJECTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Problems with AAS and the added time needed to develop follow-on
automation projects have delayed replacement of FAA's aging
equipment. We compared the milestones established in the 1988 AAS
contract and the preliminary estimates established in 1994 when the
automation program was restructured with the current schedule for the
major components of FAA's automation program. If the 1988 milestones
are used as a basis for comparison, the estimated schedules for all
components of the program (excluding the cancelled tower component)
have slipped substantially--from a minimum of 3.5 years to as much as
8 years. (The extent of these delays by segment are detailed in app.
II.)
The schedule delays have caused FAA to add four interim
projects--costing about $655 million--to sustain and enhance current
automated air traffic control equipment. Three of the interim
projects were designed for the TRACONs and one for the en route
centers.
-- The Interim Support Plan cost about $400 million; this project
was initiated in 1987 and completed in 1997. For 60 large
TRACONs, the Interim Support Plan provided, among other things,
increased data-processing capacity, new displays, and new
software that alerts controllers of potential conflicts between
aircraft.
-- The Automated Radar Terminal System (ARTS) IIIE Upgrade began in
1992 and has cost about $85 million as of January 1998. This
project is upgrading data-processing equipment so that four of
the largest TRACONs can handle an increasing volume of traffic.
To date, two of the four system upgrades are complete. FAA
expects that the remaining two will be completed by September
1998.
-- In 1997, the agency began a third project--called Common
ARTS--that is expected to cost $110 million to upgrade and
sustain current hardware and software at 120 small TRACONs and
at five of the largest ones. The agency expects to complete
this project in April 2000.
-- FAA's only interim project for en route centers is termed the
Display Complex Channel Rehost. It transfers existing software
from obsolete display channel computers to new, more reliable
and maintainable computers at five centers. The project was
completed in 1997 at a cost of $60 million.\6
--------------------
\6 See GAO report on the Display Complex Channel Rehost project: Air
Traffic Control: Good Progress on Interim Replacement for
Outage-Plagued Systems, But Risks Can Be Further Reduced
(GAO/AIMD-97-2, Oct. 17, 1996).
RESTRUCTURED PROGRAM MEETING
SOME COST AND SCHEDULE GOALS
BUT NOT OTHERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
FAA has had mixed results in pursuing the two major ongoing
acquisitions in its restructured automation program. While the
Display System Replacement acquisition for en route centers has been
progressing as planned, the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement
System acquisition for the TRACONs has experienced cost growth and
schedule delays.
DISPLAY SYSTEM REPLACEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1
The DSR project will modernize equipment at en route centers by
replacing 20- to 30-year-old display channels, controller
workstations, and network infrastructure. FAA estimates the cost for
this project to be $1.9 billion, including $1.0 billion for
facilities and equipment and $900 million for operations and
maintenance. Equipment is scheduled to become operational at the
first of 20 sites in October 1998 and at the last site in May 2000.
At this time, FAA does not consider any changes in the DSR project
cost baseline to be necessary.\7 In terms of schedule, FAA expects to
achieve the milestone for making DSR equipment operational at the
first site--the Seattle en route center--later this year. The
agency's Operational Test and Evaluation was completed in July 1997.
Although "program trouble reports" were generated during testing, the
contractor and FAA worked together to close or resolve all
significant trouble (Type I and II) reports.\8 On January 16, 1998,
the government formally accepted DSR for the Seattle center. While
additional on-site testing is planned and updated software releases
are to be incorporated in the Seattle center's equipment, our review
disclosed no reason to question the achievability of FAA's schedule
for DSR.
--------------------
\7 When FAA management establishes an acquisition program, it
approves performance and benefit objectives that are to be achieved
within strict cost and schedule parameters, as defined in its
Acquisition Program Baseline.
\8 Program trouble reports (PTR) are generated to document any
discrepancies or anomalies encountered during testing. Each report
is assigned a priority level to indicate its severity and impact on
the system's operational effectiveness and suitability. Type I PTRs
describe a problem that affects the performance of a critical
function of the ATC system. Type II PTRs describe a problem that
does not preclude the primary mission objective of controlling
aircraft but does have an unsatisfactory impact on key support
functions.
STANDARD TERMINAL AUTOMATION
REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.2
The STARS project will modernize the TRACONs by replacing the
Automated Radar Terminal System (ARTS), which is composed of 15- to
25-year-old controller workstations and supporting equipment. The
STARS' baseline cost estimate is $2.23 billion, including $940
million for facilities and equipment and $1.29 billion for operations
and maintenance. The project's baseline schedule calls for equipment
to become operational at the first of 171 sites in December 1998 and
at the last site in February 2005.
FAA's STARS plan calls for the agency to operate an initial systems
capability at 3 sites in the first phase and a full system capability
at all 171 sites in the second phase. The initial capability is
designed to provide the same functions as the current ARTS equipment,
and the full capability, which is scheduled for installation
beginning in January 2000, would include enhanced functions, such as
allowing controllers to more precisely land aircraft on converging
runways. Another phase was introduced in October 1997 when FAA
decided to also make an early display configuration operational at
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport by September 1998. With
the early display configuration, air traffic controllers will use the
new STARS workstations. Existing ARTS software and STARS emergency
service software will support the workstations.
FAA is now facing difficulties in maintaining the STARS cost
baseline. Costs are increasing because of such unexpected factors as
the need for additional resources to maintain the program schedule,
the deployment of the early display configuration, and the potential
impact of design changes that air traffic controllers called for
after reviewing the equipment. These unexpected factors have led the
STARS program office to seek an additional $29 million in
reprogrammed fiscal year 1998 facilities and equipment funds.
Regarding the STARS schedule, we believe that FAA cannot achieve its
goal of making the first STARS operational in the Boston TRACON by
December 1998, and a delay of 6 months or more is likely. One reason
is that the software development effort for the initial systems
capability--scheduled for completion by September 1997 but not
completed until February 20, 1998--has proven to be problematic.\9 In
a report to the Senate Aviation Subcommittee in January 1998, we
cited several reasons for the delays.\10
First, the estimated size of the software development effort,
measured in source lines of code, was 50 percent larger as of
February 1998 than the original November 1996 estimate. Second,
Raytheon's actual software production rates were much lower than
projected, in part, because Raytheon was slow in staffing the project
and the staff needed time to learn how to use a new corporate
software development tool. In May 1997, Raytheon revised the
software productivity goal from 240 to 180 lines of code per
labor-month. Still, as of February 1998, Raytheon's data show that
software productivity averaged 130 lines of code per labor-month.
Third, there could be a need to further develop the software to
resolve air traffic controllers' dissatisfaction with the STARS'
design. After reviewing the equipment, controllers identified 98
concerns about how controllers work with the computers, such as how a
pull-down menu on the display obscures their view of aircraft
position data.
The December 1998 milestone is unrealistic not only because software
development has run into difficulties but also because FAA and the
contractor lack sufficient time to perform needed testing.
Experience has shown that concern for meeting a schedule at the
expense of a disciplined approach to developing systems and careful
and thorough testing of them is imprudent and unproductive. As
discussed below, the agency's test plan, approved on October 10,
1997, made key assumptions that are no longer valid.
-- The test plan assumed that STARS' development would occur in two
phases. Introduction of the third phase--the early display
configuration--creates additional testing requirements that will
consume staff time and effort.
-- The test plan assumed that the System Readiness Demonstration,
one component of Developmental Test and Evaluation, for the
initial system capability would begin by mid-December 1997.
Before starting the demonstration, FAA requires the closure or
resolution of all significant program trouble reports. However,
as of January 20, 1998, the early display configuration had 80
trouble reports outstanding and the initial systems capability
had 213. A significant amount of additional work will be needed
to close or resolve these trouble reports so the demonstration
can commence. Also, FAA now intends to focus its resources on
the early display configuration and defer testing of STARS'
initial system capability.
A comparison of the schedules for DSR and STARS shows how aggressive
and unrealistic the one is for STARS. The milestone for DSR to
become operational at its first site is October 1998 and STARS'
comparable milestone is December 1998. However, while Operational
Test and Evaluation for DSR was completed in July 1997, it is still
at least several months away for STARS.
As acquisition projects mature and more accurate estimates of cost,
schedule, performance, and benefits become available, FAA's
acquisition policy calls for the project offices to seek approval
from the Joint Resources Council--a group of senior FAA management
offficials--for any needed baseline changes. FAA has not revised the
STARS cost and schedule baselines to recognize expected
controller-requested design changes, the delays and problems
associated with the ongoing software development effort, the
introduction of the early display configuration phase, and pressures
on the testing schedule. With revised baselines, the agency would
reflect the true status of the STARS project, better define its
funding needs by year, provide sufficient time and resources for
disciplined and thorough testing, and avoid spending funds
unnecessarily to get sites ready before the new STARS equipment can
be delivered for installation. According to the Deputy Integrated
Product Team Leader for Terminal Air Trafffic Systems Development,
FAA is holding off reconsideration of the cost and schedule baselines
until the controllers and system developers agree on needed design
changes.
--------------------
\9 We reported a year ago that STARS' implementation--particularly at
the three facilities targeted for operating it before fiscal year
2000--will likely be delayed if FAA and its contractor (Raytheon)
experience difficulties in software development. See Air Traffic
Control: Status of FAA's Standard Terminal Automation Replacement
System Project (GAO/RCED-97-51, Mar. 5, 1997).
\10 Air Traffic Control: Timely Completion of FAA's Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement System Software Is at Risk
(GAO/AIMD-98-41R, Jan. 23, 1998).
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.3
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We will be
happy to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
ADVANCED AUTOMATION SYSTEM (AAS)
PROJECT FUNDS EXPENDED AND
TRANSFERABLE TO RESTRUCTURED
AUTOMATION PROGRAM
=========================================================== Appendix I
FAA's investment analysis group estimates that the agency spent about
$2.6 billion on the AAS project through May 1994. Based on our prior
work and interviews with agency officials, we determined that the
restructured program was able to salvage about $1.1 billion in
AAS-developed laboratory facilities and computer hardware and
software. The balance--about $1.5 billion--was wasted because the
remaining equipment and work did not contribute to follow-on
projects. The following chart details our analysis.
(Dollars in millions)
Explanation for
Funds Funds transferable
expended transferable amounts
---------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------------
Design phase $277 $0 Design phase did
not produce any
AAS hardware or
software that was
transferable to
the acquisition
phase.
Prime contract
PAMRI 46 46 FAA completed this
segment.
ISSS 1006 412 Forty-one percent
of capitalized
project costs--
hardware and
software--was
transferable to
DSR.\a
TAAS 317 0 Project was
cancelled.
TCCC 160 0 Project was
cancelled.
ACCC 19 0 Project was
cancelled.
Laboratory 26 26 Funds were used to
facilities expand FAA's
Technical Center
test laboratory
and to create a
development and
display facility
for conducting
early user
evaluations.
Advanced en 48 42 Most of the AERA
route effort led to
automation MITRE's
(AERA) development of a
conflict probe
capability that
is being tested
at two en route
centers.
Support 259 106 ISSS was the major
contracts thrust of AAS
work. Because 41
percent of ISSS'
capitalized cost
was transferable
to DSR, we
credited the
restructured
program with 41
percent of this
cost.
Implementation 110 83 The current
support program benefited
from $62 million
for site
preparation work
and $21 million
for testing
transferable ISSS
software.
Training 4 0 Only PAMRI--the
least complex
segment of AAS--
was implemented.
En route 377 377 En route center
center modernization was
modernization needed.
======================================================================
Total $2,649 $1,092
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a FAA determined that 44 percent of ISSS costs (i.e., hardware and
software) were capitalized. However, we believe that 41 percent is a
more appropriate capitalization because FAA included costs for
laboratory expansion, and we treated this as a separate line item.
Note: AAS expenditures listed here do not include FAA's personnel
costs. FAA officials estimated that FAA had about 100 employees
assigned to the AAS project at any given time.
CHANGES IN IMPLEMENTATION
MILESTONES FOR AUTOMATION PROGRAM
========================================================== Appendix II
1994 1998
Component of AAS/ 1988 AAS Restructur Program
restructured program Field site contract ed program estimate
---------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
first Jan. 1994 Sep. 1998 Oct. 1998
ISSS/DSR
last Oct. 1995 Jan. 2000 May 2000
first Jun. 1995 Dec. 1998 Dec. 1998
TAAS/STARS
last Mar. 1997 Dec. 2003 Feb. 2005
first Jun. 1995 Apr. 1997 cancelled
TCCC/tower in Feb.
automation 1997
last Jul. 1999 Dec. 2000 cancelled
in Feb.
1997
first Jul. 1996 2002 2004
ACCC/Host replacement
last Jun. 1998 2003 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: DSR's milestones were compared to those of the scaled back
Initial Sector Suite System (ISSS) segment of AAS. STARS' milestones
were compared to those of the cancelled Terminal Advanced Automation
System (TAAS) segment. The Tower Control Computer Complex (TCCC)
segment of AAS was cancelled and ultimately not replaced. The
schedule for Host replacement was compared to the cancelled Area
Control Computer Complex (ACCC) segment of AAS.
*** End of document. ***