Federal Management: Addressing Management Issues at the Department of
Transportation (Testimony, 05/21/97, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-97-172).

GAO discussed critical management issues at the Department of
Transportation (D0T) and actions the Congress, Department, and affected
parties can take to solve them.

GAO noted that: (1) ensuring the safety and security of travelers on the
nation's airways, highways, and waterways is of paramount importance;
(2) although the Department has made improvements, there are still
opportunities to reduce deaths and enhance the safety and security of
the travelling public; (3) to enhance air safety, GAO has consistently
identified the need for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
improve how it targets inspections to the areas of highest risk; (4) a
key to reducing highway deaths is a strong partnership among federal,
state, and local governments; (5) many components of the nation's
transportation infrastructure need modernization, renovation, or new
investment; (6) major transportation projects for air traffic control
modernization, highways, and public transit have been plagued with cost
overruns and schedule delays; (7) DOT can do more to improve the
management of its aviation and surface transportation programs to ensure
that limited federal funds are effectively and efficiently used; (8) FAA
needs to adopt disciplined investment management and system acquisition
processes, as outlined in recent legislation and promised under the
agency's new Acquisition Management System; (9) serious problems in
long-term financing for FAA and Amtrak need to be addressed; (10)
deciding among various financing alternatives for FAA will involve
tradeoffs among factors such as the efficient use of the airport and
airway system, fairness to system users, and the effect on competition;
(11) Amtrak's financial condition is still very precarious and Amtrak
will continue to require substantial federal financial support well into
the next century; (12) the Congress could reassess Amtrak's mission and
direct that Amtrak or a temporary commission make recommendations and
propose options for providing service within available funding; (13)
DOT's ability to effectively address many of these management and
financial issues depends on having a supportive organizational structure
and improved management and financial data; (14) DOT faces several
challenges to address its financial management problems, including fully
implementing new federal accounting standards; (15) the organizational,
information, and financial problems that DOT faces are serious; (16)
their solutions require a commitment from the highest levels of the
Department so that change can be manifested throughout the Department; *

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED/AIMD-97-172
     TITLE:  Federal Management: Addressing Management Issues at the 
             Department of Transportation
      DATE:  05/21/97
   SUBJECT:  Federal aid for transportation
             Transportation safety
             Strategic information systems planning
             Systems conversions
             Federal agency reorganization
             Intergovernmental fiscal relations
             Safety regulation
             Financial management
             Federal agency accounting systems
             Congressional oversight
IDENTIFIER:  FAA Safety Performance Analysis System
             FAA Acquisition Management System
             FAA Air Traffic Control Modernization Program
             DOT Intelligent Transportation System Program
             
**************************************************************************
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO        *
* report.  Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles,       *
* headings, and bullets are preserved.  Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are           *
* identified by double and single lines.  The numbers on the right end   *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline.  These numbers do NOT correspond with the page       *
* numbers of the printed product.                                        *
*                                                                        *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure    *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble     *
* those in the printed version.                                          *
*                                                                        *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document    *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your        *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015,             *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time.                                    *
**************************************************************************


Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S.  Senate

For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
9:30 a.m.  EDT
Wednesday
May 21, 1997

FEDERAL MANAGEMENT - ADDRESSING
MANAGEMENT ISSUES AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Statement of John H.  Anderson, Jr.
Director, Transportation Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-97-172

GAO/RCED/AIMD-97-172T


(340647)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOT -
  FAA -
  ATC -
  OIG -
  TWA -
  CIO -
  FHWA -
  ITS -
  DOD -
  FTA -
  NHTSA -
  SPAS -

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss critical management issues
at the Department of Transportation (DOT) and actions the Congress,
the Department, and affected parties can take to solve them.  With
more than $39 billion provided through its fiscal year 1997
appropriations act, DOT is responsible for ensuring the safe and
efficient movement of people and goods and cost-effective investment
in the nation's transportation infrastructure, including its highways
and transit systems, airports, airways, ports, and waterways.  Our
testimony today is based on reports we have recently issued as well
as ongoing work for the Congress.  In summary, we have found the
following: 

  Ensuring the safety and security of travelers on the nation's
     airways, highways, and waterways is of paramount importance. 
     Although the Department has made improvements, there are still
     opportunities to reduce deaths and enhance the safety and
     security of the traveling public.  For example, in 1996, 380
     people died in major airline accidents, the highest number in 11
     years.  To enhance air safety, we have consistently identified
     the need for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
     improve how it targets inspections to the areas of highest risk. 
     A recent FAA study, completed after the crash of ValuJet Flight
     592, similarly recommended that FAA target its inspections.  The
     Department can also improve safety on the nation's highways,
     where over 40,000 people are killed annually.  A key to reducing
     highway deaths is a strong partnership among federal, state, and
     local governments.  We have pointed out that lives can be saved
     by the greater use of safety belts, and we have suggested, for
     example, that the Congress encourage states to enact primary
     enforcement laws allowing police officers to stop and ticket
     vehicles when occupants are not using safety belts, even though
     no other traffic violation has occurred. 

  Many components of the nation's transportation infrastructure need
     modernization, renovation, or new investment.  Major
     transportation projects--for air traffic control (ATC)
     modernization, highways, and public transit--have been plagued
     with cost overruns and schedule delays.  DOT can do more to
     improve the management of its aviation and surface
     transportation programs to ensure that limited federal funds are
     effectively and efficiently used.  For example, on numerous
     occasions, we have reported problems in FAA's
     multibillion-dollar ATC modernization program.  FAA needs to
     adopt disciplined investment management and system acquisition
     processes, as outlined in recent legislation and promised under
     the agency's new Acquisition Management System.  FAA also needs
     to change its organizational culture so that employees become
     strongly committed to mission focus, accountability,
     coordination, and adaptability.  Similarly, improved cost
     management and comprehensive finance plans are needed for large
     highway projects. 

  Serious problems in long-term financing for FAA and Amtrak need to
     be addressed.  We reported that FAA faces significant future
     funding shortfalls.  To assist in finding solutions to FAA's
     long-term financing needs, the Congress formed the National
     Civil Aviation Review Commission, which is scheduled to make its
     recommendations by August 1997.  Deciding among various
     financing alternatives for FAA will involve tradeoffs among
     factors such as the efficient use of the airport and airway
     system, fairness to system users, and the effect on competition. 
     To effectively design any new financing system, FAA needs better
     cost data to appropriately allocate costs among users.  However,
     the agency does not plan to implement its new cost-accounting
     system until October 1997.  With respect to Amtrak, we recently
     reported that Amtrak's financial condition is still very
     precarious and that, as currently constituted and funded, Amtrak
     will continue to require substantial federal financial support
     well into the next century.  The Congress could reassess
     Amtrak's mission and direct that Amtrak or a temporary
     commission make recommendations and propose options for
     providing service within available funding. 

  DOT's ability to effectively address many of these management and
     financial issues depends on having a supportive organizational
     structure and improved management and financial data.  DOT has
     begun to examine what efficiencies it can realize from
     colocating some of its nearly 400 field offices.  However, DOT
     needs to consider whether reorganizing its surface
     transportation modes under one administration and consolidating
     its field office structure would enable it to achieve more
     cost-effective delivery of services.  Moreover, to support its
     targeting of resources such as inspectors and its management of
     ATC modernization projects, and to improve its overall financial
     accountability, DOT needs better financial and operating data
     and a cost-accounting system.  DOT's efforts to develop more
     results-oriented, performance-based management information, as
     required by the Government Performance and Results Act, should
     provide an incentive to develop quality data.  Furthermore, in
     accordance with the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, DOT's
     Office of the Inspector General (OIG) identified numerous
     problems with the Department's financial information.  DOT faces
     several challenges to address its financial management problems,
     including fully implementing new federal accounting standards to
     effectively meet federal financial management goals. 

The organizational, information, and financial problems that DOT
faces are serious.  Their solutions require a commitment from the
highest levels of the Department so that change can be manifested
throughout the Department.  This commitment requires stable
leadership to actively promote change and a strong partnership
between the Department and the Congress. 


   IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
   TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND
   SECURITY PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Over the years, we have identified areas in which DOT can do more to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its transportation safety
and security programs.  In recent reports and testimonies, we have
reiterated the need to better target limited inspection resources and
improve the reliability of safety data in programs covering aviation
and marine safety.  We have also reported on the vulnerabilities in
the overall aviation security system. 


      AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.1

The crashes of ValuJet Flight 592 and TWA Flight 800 have heightened
concerns about the safety and security of our aviation system.  We
have reported that FAA can improve its oversight of aviation safety
and security by (1) targeting limited inspection resources, (2)
enhancing the reliability of safety data, (3) improving inspector
training, and (4) addressing the security vulnerabilities of our air
transportation system.\1 Targeting inspection resources is important
because of the magnitude of FAA's inspection responsibilities--about
2,800 FAA inspectors are responsible for inspecting about 7,500
scheduled commercial aircraft and thousands of charter aircraft,
repair stations, and aviation schools.  As early as 1987, we reported
that FAA could develop criteria for targeting safety inspection
resources at high-risk areas and recommended that DOT make
productivity improvements in its safety programs.  Over the years, we
have suggested that FAA focus its resources on such areas of concern
as new entrant and commuter airlines and aging aircraft.  The
Congress has recognized the need for more inspectors and has
appropriated additional funds to hire and train them. 

To appropriately target inspections, FAA also needs accurate,
complete safety data.  We have found that FAA needs to improve its
Safety Performance Analysis System--a system being developed to
integrate and analyze information within other databases--so that it
contains reliable information that can be used by inspectors and
managers to target the areas of greatest risk to safety.  I will
return to data issues later in this testimony. 

Protecting the security of the traveling public is one of FAA's most
challenging and difficult tasks.  Although all modes of
transportation are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, our work has
focused on improving aviation security.  Over the past several years,
we have made recommendations about vulnerabilities in the aviation
system--checked and carry-on baggage, mail, and cargo--and steps that
could be undertaken to improve security.  The White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security (the Gore Commission), formed after
the crash of TWA Flight 800, made more than 30 security
recommendations in February 1997. 

We believe that the Gore Commission's recommendations are a good
start toward an evolutionary process of reaching agreement on goals
and objectives for improving our aviation security system.  These
recommendations' effective implementation requires the various
federal agencies, local authorities, and the aviation industry--most
importantly airlines and airports--to work together to ensure that
this opportunity for improvement is not lost.  The Gore Commission
recommended that the Secretary of Transportation report annually on
the status of the Commission's recommendations and that DOT's and
FAA's leaders be accountable for implementing them.  In order to
effectively implement the recommendations, FAA and other affected
parties should establish consistent goals and performance measures,
which can be used to report results to the Congress.  FAA also needs
to assess the effectiveness of initiatives that are being implemented
to ensure that they are achieving increased security.  For example,
the Congress directed that FAA purchase and deploy security equipment
for the nation's busiest airports and gain operational experience
with this equipment.  The performance of the equipment in the field
can provide FAA with information to guide future deployment decisions
and determine funding tradeoffs and priorities. 

Although the Gore Commission made a good start, it left a key
issue--the financing of additional security improvements--to be
resolved by the National Civil Aviation Review Commission, which is
expected to issue its report later this year.  To improve aviation
security, the Congress, the administration, and the aviation industry
need to agree on who will pay for the improvements.  I will discuss
FAA financing issues later in this testimony. 

Keys to successfully implementing both safety and security
recommendations are stable leadership at DOT and FAA and adequate
funding.  If the question of how to fund FAA is not resolved,
resources may not be available to implement improvements.  I will
return to the funding issue later in this testimony. 


--------------------
\1 See, for example, Aviation Safety:  New Airlines Illustrate
Long-Standing Problems in FAA's Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-97-2,
Oct.  17, 1996); Aviation Safety:  Data Problems Threaten FAA Strides
on Safety Analysis System (GAO/AIMD-95-27, Feb.  8.  1995); Aviation
Security:  Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan.  27, 1994); and
Aviation Security:  Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, Sept.  19, 1996). 


      HIGHWAY SAFETY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.2

A critical aspect of improving highway safety is the achievement of
strong, effective partnerships among federal, state, and local
governments.  State and local governments have the primary role in
highway safety.  The federal role is basically fulfilled through the
programs and initiatives of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
Through these agencies' efforts, the states identify their problems,
devise solutions, and seek federal technical assistance and funding. 

Over the past 30 years, highway safety has improved as a result of
federal, state, and local programs that have led to better designed
vehicles and highways, tougher penalties for drunk driving, and
greater use of seat belts and shoulder harnesses.  Nonetheless,
traffic accidents annually result in over 40,000 deaths and over $150
billion in costs to society.  Each year, about 20,000 of the people
who die in traffic accidents and another 600,000 who are injured are
not using seatbelts.  As we reported in January 1996, increasing the
use of safety belts is the most effective way to lower the nation's
death toll from highway accidents.\2 We suggested that the Congress
consider encouraging the states to enact primary enforcement laws
that allow police officers to stop and ticket a vehicle's occupants
solely for not using their safety belts.  We believe that such laws
should cover all the occupants of all the vehicles in which belts are
installed.  We also recommended that the Secretary of Transportation
provide special emphasis and targeted programs to increase the use of
safety belts by occupants of light trucks.  I understand, Mr. 
Chairman, that you and several members of the Committee recently
joined with the administration in urging governors and state
legislative leaders to enact primary enforcement laws.  This is an
important effort that can save thousands of lives each year. 

In addition, we believe that improvements in highway safety can best
be achieved by a national transportation safety strategy that
incorporates federal-state-local partnerships and is driven by
performance-based, results-oriented goals.  For example, we recently
issued a report on the inspection of Mexican commercial trucks
entering the United States.\3 We noted that from January through
December 1996, federal and state officials conducted more than 25,000
inspections of trucks from Mexico.  During that time, three of the
four border states substantially increased their capability to
inspect trucks at the major border locations.  As of January 1997,
approximately 100 state and federal inspectors were assigned to
border crossing locations, a significant increase over the previous
year.  However, as we also pointed out, despite this commitment of
resources, without specific results-oriented objectives, it is still
not possible to measure the increase in safety improvement, if any,
for Mexican commercial trucks entering the United States. 


--------------------
\2 Motor Vehicle Safety:  Comprehensive State Programs Offer Best
Opportunity for Increasing Use of Safety Belts (GAO/RCED-96-24, Jan. 
3, 1996). 

\3 Commercial Trucking:  Safety Concerns About Mexican Trucks Remain
Even as Inspection Activity Increases (GAO/RCED-97-68, Apr.  9,
1997). 


      MARINE SAFETY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.3

Over the years, we have noted numerous problems with the Coast
Guard's safety inspection programs.  For example, we found that
improvements were needed to (1) help detect unsafe tankers, (2)
improve the safety at waterfront facilities, (3) ensure that
intermodal containers carrying hazardous material are safe, and (4)
improve the safety of cruise ships.\4 We also identified problems
with the Coast Guard's efforts to reduce alcohol-related accidents in
the maritime industry.\5 We believe that one root cause of these
problems may be the frequent rotations of safety inspectors.  We have
reported that several organizations have concluded that lengthening
or eliminating military rotation for certain types of activities,
such as safety inspections, could help counter the undesirable
effects of frequent rotation on the continuity of operations and the
ability to build expertise and knowledge.\6 Another possible solution
that has been proposed by others is to convert such positions to
civilian positions, which could also result in building the expertise
and knowledge needed. 


--------------------
\4 Coast Guard:  Program to Inspect Intermodal Containers Carrying
Hazardous Materials Can Be Improved (GAO/RCED-94-139, Apr.  27,
1994); Coast Guard:  Additional Actions Needed to Improve Cruise Ship
Safety (GAO/RCED-93-103, Mar.  31, 1993); Coast Guard:  Inspection
Program Improvements Are Under Way to Help Detect Unsafe Tankers
(GAO/RCED-92-23, Oct.  8, 1991); and Coast Guard:  Oil Spills
Continue Despite Waterfront Facility Inspection Program
(GAO/RCED-91-161, June 17, 1991). 

\5 Coast Guard:  Magnitude of Alcohol Problems and Related Maritime
Accidents Unknown (GAO/RCED-90-150, May 24, 1990). 

\6 Coast Guard:  Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints
(GAO/RCED-97-110, May 14, 1997). 


   IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE
   MANAGEMENT OF AVIATION,
   HIGHWAY, AND TRANSIT PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Our work has shown that DOT can do more to improve its management of
aviation, highway, and transit programs to ensure that limited funds
are effectively and efficiently used and best practices applied. 
FAA's multibillion-dollar program to modernize the ATC system has
been plagued with cost overruns, schedule delays, and shortfalls in
performance.  In addition, major surface transportation projects,
each costing hundreds of millions to billions of dollars, are
continuing to incur cost increases, experience delays, and have
difficulties acquiring needed funding commitments. 


      AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
      MODERNIZATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

Since 1981, FAA has had under way a mission-critical capital
investment program to modernize its aging ATC system.  This effort,
which involves acquiring a vast network of radars and automated
data-processing, navigation, and communications equipment, is
expected to cost $34 billion through the year 2003.  Over the years,
ATC modernization projects have experienced substantial cost
overruns, lengthy delays, and significant performance shortfalls. 
Because of the size, complexity, cost, and problem-plagued past of
the ATC modernization, we designated it as a high-risk information
technology initiative in 1995 and again in 1997.\7

Over the years, we have found that the problems with the
modernization program have been caused largely by technical
difficulties and managerial weaknesses.  If FAA is to effectively
address these problems, it needs to follow management practices
observed by leading public and private organizations and embedded in
the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Government Performance and Results
Act, the Information Technology Management Reform Act (also called
the Clinger-Cohen Act), and the Chief Financial Officers Act.  These
acts emphasize (1) involving senior executives in decisions about
information management; (2) appointing qualified senior-level chief
information officers (CIO); (3) developing and implementing systems
architectures, or blueprints; (4) institutionalizing discipline in
such areas as investment management and system development and
acquisition; (5) maintaining integrated accounting and financial
management systems that permit the development and reporting of cost
information and the systematic measurement of performance; and (6)
using performance measures to assess technology's contributions in
achieving mission results. 

Using these acts to guide our work, we have pinpointed certain
solutions to FAA's long-standing problems with acquisitions.  For
example, we found that ATC systems have long proceeded without a
complete systems architecture to guide and constrain their
development and evolution, leading to unnecessarily higher spending
to buy, integrate, and maintain hardware and software.\8 We
recommended that FAA develop and enforce a complete systems
architecture and implement a management structure for doing so that
is similar to the CIO provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act. 

Furthermore, FAA's poor cost-estimating processes and cost-accounting
practices leave it at risk of making ill-informed investment
decisions on critical multimillion- or multibillion-dollar ATC
systems.\9 We recommended that FAA institutionalize defined processes
for estimating the costs of projects and develop and implement a
managerial cost-accounting capability. 

In addition, FAA's processes for acquiring software, the most costly
and complex component of ATC systems, are ad hoc, sometimes chaotic,
and not repeatable across projects.  As a result, FAA is at great
risk of not delivering promised software capabilities on time and
within budget.  Furthermore, FAA lacks an effective approach for
improving software acquisition processes.\10 We recommended that FAA
improve its software acquisition capabilities by institutionalizing
mature acquisition processes and reiterated our prior recommendation
that a CIO organizational structure be established for FAA. 

Finally, the lack of continuity in FAA's top management and the
agency's organizational culture have been underlying causes of the
agency's acquisition problems.\11

During the modernization program's first 10 years, FAA had seven
different Administrators and acting Administrators.  Furthermore,
between 1982 and 1993, the average tenure for the Administrator was
less than 2 years.  Although it is difficult to measure the effect of
the turnover, the instability has resulted in the agency's
bureaucracy focusing on short-term improvements, avoiding
accountability, and resisting fundamental changes.  Changes to the
organizational culture will address shortcomings in mission focus,
accountability, coordination, and adaptability.  We have recommended
that FAA develop a comprehensive strategy for cultural change that
includes specific responsibilities and performance measures for all
stakeholders throughout FAA and the incentives needed to promote the
desired behaviors.  Recent congressional action making the position
of the FAA Administrator a 5-year appointment should help overcome
the problem of instability in agency leadership. 


--------------------
\7 High-Risk Series:  An Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, Feb.  1995) and
High-Risk Series:  Information Management and Technology
(GAO/HR-97-9, Feb.  1997). 

\8 Air Traffic Control:  Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed
for FAA Systems Modernization (GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb.  3, 1997). 

\9 Air Traffic Control:  Improved Cost Information Needed to Make
Billion-Dollar Modernization Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20,
Jan.  22, 1997). 

\10 Air Traffic Control:  Immature Software Acquisition Processes
Increase FAA System Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar.  21,
1997). 

\11 Aviation Acquisition:  A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for
Cultural Change at FAA (GAO/RCED-96-159, Aug.  22, 1996). 


      HIGHWAY AND TRANSIT PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.2

Major highway and transit projects, each costing hundreds of millions
to billions of dollars, are continuing to incur cost increases,
experience delays, and have difficulties in acquiring needed funding
commitments.  We have found, particularly for large-dollar projects,
that costs have increased and financing has become more difficult at
the same time that federal, state, and local governments must deal
with the need for balanced budgets and many competing priorities.\12
Large-dollar projects can overwhelm other projects in a state if the
former require significantly more time and money than originally
estimated.  Given funding constraints and competing priorities, it is
critical that these projects are well managed and their costs are
contained, and that research is focused on ways to make our
transportation system more effective and efficient. 

Each year, the federal government distributes nearly $20 billion to
the states for the construction and repair of the nation's highways. 
Costs have grown on many large-dollar highway projects.\13 Cost
containment, however, is not an explicit statutory or regulatory goal
of FHWA's oversight of highway projects.  As such, FHWA has done
little to ensure that cost containment is an integral part of states'
project management.  We believe that FHWA can do more to address the
problem of cost growth by working with states to improve the cost
management of large-dollar highway construction projects. 
Initiatives that some states are undertaking and that others could
pursue more vigorously include improving the quality of initial cost
estimates, establishing cost performance goals and strategies, and
using external review boards to approve cost increases.  Although
FHWA disseminates information to state departments of transportation
on a wide variety of technical and research topics, we found that the
agency does not evaluate and disseminate information to all the
states on the best cost management practices.  We recommended that
FHWA do so.  If FHWA were more proactive in this regard, it could
provide states with strategies that could contain project costs and
promote more cost-effective project management. 

An underlying issue concerning cost containment is determining the
appropriate federal role in the federal-state partnership.  Over the
years, federal involvement in state highway projects that receive
federal aid has evolved from "full" project oversight--approving
design and construction specifications, periodically inspecting
construction sites, and formally accepting the final product for all
interstate construction projects--to requiring this level of detailed
oversight only on new construction or reconstruction projects on the
interstate highway system that are estimated to cost over $1 million. 
As the Congress and the administration work toward reauthorizing
federal-aid highway programs in 1997, they will ultimately decide on
the federal role in large-dollar highway projects.  Cost management
of these projects is just one part of the federal government's role. 
If appropriate, expanding that part could take the form of
encouraging the states to enhance their cost-management practices by
using some of the best practices some states already use.  From a
broader perspective, the Congress could consider strategies to make
the federal-aid highway program more performance-driven.  For
example, once an initial cost estimate is developed, establishing
cost-performance goals based on this estimate and a strategy to
accomplish them would make cost awareness and cost containment an
integral part of how states manage a project over time. 
Cost-performance goals and an appropriate strategy do not mean that
an initial cost estimate cannot be increased; however, any change and
reason for it should be agreed to.  Such an approach has the
potential to improve accountability for cost increases and create a
culture in which cost control is part of day-to-day activities. 

Funding shortfalls and the need for better financial planning affect
federally funded highway and transit projects.  For example, the Los
Angeles Red Line Project, a 23.4-mile heavy-rail subway system, is
facing cost increases as well as financing uncertainties associated
with funding shortfalls and the long-term financial capacity of the
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority, the project
manager.  To address such financial problems, the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) can do more to better ensure that large-dollar
transit projects have secured firm commitments for the funding needed
to finance them.  For example, we have testified that FTA needs to
utilize the results of its financial consultant's review of the
fiscal capacity of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit
Authority to finance the Los Angeles Red Line Transit Project, the
Alameda Corridor Project, and other surface transportation projects
to determine what funding shortfalls exist. 

Finally, improvements are needed in DOT's program to deploy the
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) to ensure its success.  The
ITS program has received about $1.2 billion since 1992.\14 This
amount represents about 35 percent of the $3.5 billion the federal
government provided for surface transportation research programs from
1992 to 1997.  The program has not been successful in achieving
widespread deployment of an integrated ITS for several reasons.  For
example, the program's national architecture and technical standards,
which define the elements for an integrated ITS, are prerequisites
for large-scale deployment.  However, the national architecture was
not completed until July 1996, and a 5-year effort to develop
standards is planned for completion in 2001.  Under the
reauthorization of surface transportation programs, DOT has proposed
a $600 million incentives program to facilitate the deployment of
integrated ITS systems.  However, DOT needs to address a number of
obstacles, such as limited technical expertise among state and local
officials, before it can aggressively pursue a large-scale deployment
program. 


--------------------
\12 The surface transportation projects we discuss in this testimony
all cost over $1 billion, but the definition of a large-dollar
project for an individual state or transit operator is relative to
that state's or operator's size and resources. 

\13 Transportation Infrastructure:  Managing the Costs of
Large-Dollar Highway Projects (GAO/RCED-97-47, Feb.  28, 1997). 

\14 The ITS program is intended to improve surface transportation's
efficiency and safety through enhanced computer and telecommunication
technologies.  An example of ITS technology is ramp meters to control
the flow of traffic entering expressways. 


   VIABLE LONG-TERM FINANCING
   SYSTEMS NEEDED FOR FAA AND
   AMTRAK
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Critical transportation financing issues face the Congress and the
administration:  meeting the long-term funding needs of FAA and
Amtrak.  Each area presents formidable challenges that will stretch
limited resources and will require long-term commitments to
successfully address. 


      FAA FINANCING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

FAA estimates that its needs will exceed projected funding levels by
about $13 billion over the next 5 years.  This shortfall is driven by
the safety and security improvements that FAA needs to undertake and
an effort to speed up the ATC modernization program.  Deciding how to
meet FAA's funding needs involves not only determining what FAA's
financial requirements are but choosing the best financing mechanism
to meet those needs.  Recognizing the seriousness of these issues,
the Congress directed that a number of studies be undertaken,
including (1) an independent assessment of FAA's financial needs and
costs, which was performed by Coopers & Lybrand, and (2) an
assessment by GAO of how ATC costs are allocated between FAA and the
Department of Defense (DOD).  The Congress also established the
National Civil Aviation Review Commission to, among other things,
consider these studies and recommend to the Secretary of
Transportation, by August 1997, how best to finance FAA.\15

FAA receives most of its funding from excise taxes, including a
10-percent tax on domestic airline tickets, but those taxes, which
were recently reinstated, lapse at the end of fiscal year 1997.  The
administration has proposed replacing the current system with user
fees, and the national commission will be examining this option among
others, including taxing indicators of system use such as departures
or fuel consumed. 

We believe that determining how best to finance FAA is a complex
problem that requires careful study and good cost data.  Our work has
shown that the agency does not have an adequate cost-accounting
system and, as a result, has limited capability to accumulate
accurate, reliable cost data.\16 FAA plans to implement a
cost-accounting system in October 1997.  Having a cost-accounting
system is important for budget control and performance measurement
and will become particularly important if FAA shifts to user-fee
financing.  FAA must be able to determine the costs of its services
and which users cause FAA to incur those costs.  In addition, FAA
needs to establish an equitable method for allocating common costs,
which account for about 55 percent of its costs.  In allocating
common costs, assumptions and judgments must be made, and the goals
of enhancing economic efficiency and maintaining equitable treatment
of multiple user groups should be considered.  Different user groups
are likely to have diverging opinions about what constitutes an
equitable cost allocation.\17

We have emphasized that the financing mechanism that is finally
selected should be relatively easy to administer and help ensure
that, in the long term, FAA has a secure funding source, the nation's
airports and airways are used as efficiently as possible, commercial
users of the system pay their fair share, and a strong, competitive
airline industry continues to exist.  Ultimately, the Congress will
decide how to achieve these and other goals. 


--------------------
\15 The Secretary of Transportation is required to consult with the
Secretary of the Treasury and report to the Congress by October 1997
on the Secretary's recommendations for funding FAA through 2002. 

\16 Air Traffic Control:  Improved Cost Information Needed to Make
Billion-Dollar Modernization Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20,
Jan.  22, 1997). 

\17 National Airspace System:  Issues in Allocating Costs for Air
Traffic Services to DOD and Other Users (GAO/RCED-97-106, Apr.  25,
1997). 


      AMTRAK FINANCING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.2

Since 1995, we have reported that Amtrak remains in a very precarious
financial position and continues to depend heavily on federal support
to meet its operating and capital needs.\18 Amtrak's passenger rail
service has never been profitable, and through fiscal year 1997, the
federal government has provided Amtrak with over $19 billion for
operating and capital expenses.  Amtrak projects that its fiscal year
1997 operating loss could be $783 million.  In response to its
deteriorating financial condition, in 1995 and 1996, Amtrak developed
strategic business plans designed to increase revenues and reduce the
growth in costs.  However, passenger revenues have generally declined
in recent years when adjusted for inflation, and at the end of fiscal
year 1996 the gap between operating deficits and federal operating
subsidies began to grow. 

Amtrak's goal is to eliminate the need for federal operating support
by 2002.  To achieve this goal, Amtrak is relying on significantly
increased federal capital assistance--about $750 million to $800
million per year--from a dedicated funding source.  However, the
President's fiscal year 1998 budget for Amtrak's capital subsidies is
over $300 million less than the amount envisioned in Amtrak's plans. 
In addition, we have raised concerns about whether Amtrak will
continue to find it difficult to make the route and service
adjustments necessary to reduce costs and to collectively bargain
cost-saving productivity improvements with its employees.  As a
result, Amtrak faces significant challenges to achieving operating
self-sufficiency.  In addition, Amtrak has substantial capital
investment needs to, among other things, bring its equipment and
infrastructure into a state of good repair and introduce high-speed
rail service between New York and Boston. 

Solutions to Amtrak's financial problems are not easy and will
require congressional attention.  Additional capital funding will be
needed to help Amtrak increase revenues by improving the quality of
its service and to facilitate revenue growth.  In fact, successful
implementation of Amtrak's entire strategic business plan will be
important.  We believe that Amtrak--as currently constituted and
funded--will continue to need federal operating and capital funds
well into the future.  If the Congress decides to reassess the scope
of Amtrak's mission, it could direct Amtrak or a temporary commission
to make recommendations and offer options that define and realign
Amtrak's basic route network so that efficient and quality service
could be provided within the funding available.  Earlier this year, a
blue-ribbon panel was formed by the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure to provide advice on how to best develop an
emergency plan to address the perilous financial condition of Amtrak
and intercity rail service.  The panel is expected to offer
recommendations about Amtrak's future no later than June 1997. 


--------------------
\18 Transportation Financing:  Challenges in Meeting Long-Term
Funding Needs for FAA, Amtrak, and the Nation's Highways
(GAO/T-RCED-97-151, May 7, 1997); Intercity Passenger Rail:  The
Financial Viability of Amtrak Continues to Be Threatened
(GAO/T-RCED-97-94, Mar.  13, 1997); Amtrak's Strategic Business Plan: 
Progress to Date (GAO/RCED-96-187, July 24, 1996); Northeast Rail
Corridor:  Information on Users, Funding Sources, and Expenditures
(GAO/RCED-96-144, June 27, 1996); Amtrak:  Early Progress Made in
Implementing Strategic and Business Plan, but Obstacles Remain
(GAO/T-RCED-95-227, June 16, 1995); and Intercity Passenger Rail: 
Financial and Operating Conditions Threaten Amtrak's Long-Term
Viability (GAO/RCED-95-71, Feb.  6, 1995). 


   AN APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL
   STRUCTURE AND ADEQUATE
   MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL
   INFORMATION ARE NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

Keys to successfully implementing many of the solutions we have
discussed are having (1) an appropriate organizational structure and
(2) adequate financial and other management information.  As we
previously discussed, other crucial elements that must be in place
include adequate funding, an organizational culture and stable
leadership that promotes the changes needed.  These are probably the
most difficult solutions to implement and will require dedicated
leadership in the Department and a strong partnership with the
Congress. 


      ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

DOT can do more to develop an appropriate organizational structure to
achieve the most cost-effective delivery of services and ensure the
proper use of federal funds.  We have reported that opportunities
exist to achieve these objectives by (1) examining the
appropriateness of reorganizing the surface transportation
administrations and their field office structure, (2) making changes
to FAA's management structure and organizational culture, and (3)
identifying additional opportunities to streamline the Coast Guard's
operations. 


         SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.1

DOT's current organizational structure for surface
transportation--separate agencies to manage the different
transportation modes--limits interaction and coordination among the
modal administrations.  Two years ago, DOT proposed reorganizing and
combining its five surface transportation operating
administrations--FHWA, FTA, NHTSA, the Federal Railroad
Administration, and parts of the Maritime Administration.  This
reorganization would have provided an opportunity for more
cost-effective delivery of services by consolidating administrative
and executive support functions and consolidating an extensive field
office structure.  DOT has since dropped plans for this overall
reorganization, and it is not currently examining options for
consolidating its field office structure for surface transportation. 

Changes to DOT's field structure need to be driven by the role field
offices will have in carrying out the Department's mission and the
skills that will be needed.  New technologies--such as ITS--and
transportation-related issues--such as energy conservation, land use
concerns, and statutory requirements for monitoring transportation's
impact on air quality--increasingly require staff who are skilled in
fields that are both highly technical and rapidly changing. 

Even if departmental reorganization does not occur, opportunities may
still exist to streamline the field structure through colocation. 
Colocation occurs when two or more offices share a common office
space, thereby potentially reaping the benefits of shared
administrative services, such as reception, printing, mailing, and
copying.  The existing field structure does not generally take
advantage of colocation.  For example, the Denver metropolitan area
has seven DOT field offices for surface transportation.  Some of
these offices are located in different buildings in downtown Denver,
while others are located outside Denver. 

DOT has established a Colocation Task Force to identify opportunities
for its modal agencies, including FAA and the Coast Guard, to
colocate field offices within metropolitan areas.  The task force
initially identified 160 field offices that could be colocated into
60 locations.  The results of its initial evaluation of these offices
are due this summer and will be reviewed by the Secretary's
Management Council.  In addition, we plan to examine the
organizational structure of DOT's field offices. 


         AVIATION
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.2

FAA can do more to develop an appropriate managerial structure and
organizational culture to achieve the most cost-effective delivery of
services.  This includes establishing a business-like approach for
developing and enforcing an ATC systems architecture and for
implementing and enforcing software acquisition improvements.  We
have recommended that FAA establish a chief information officers
management structure similar to the department-level chief
information officers prescribed in the Clinger-Cohen Act.  In
addition, as we mentioned earlier, FAA's organizational culture has
been an underlying cause of the agency's acquisition problems.  We
have recommended that FAA develop a comprehensive strategy for
cultural change.  Such cultural change is necessary before FAA can
successfully overcome more specific problems we have noted in its
major acquisitions programs. 

FAA also has opportunities to reduce costs by contracting out air
traffic control towers and consolidating facilities.  However, these
actions often result in considerable opposition by local communities
as well as FAA employees.  FAA is already contracting out level I
towers--which handle low-volume traffic--and the next logical step is
to examine the feasibility of contracting out higher-volume level II
towers. 


         COAST GUARD
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.3

Over the past several years, the Coast Guard has carried out an
ambitious streamlining program that is expected to result in an
estimated net savings of $77 million a year.  However, the Office of
Management and Budget's budget targets call for the Coast Guard to
find additional reductions of 4 times this amount by fiscal year
2002.  Coast Guard managers have acknowledged the enormity of this
task.  We have identified organizational issues facing the Coast
Guard during this period that include reconsidering several options
for streamlining--such as lengthening periods between military
assignment rotations to substantially reduce personnel transfer
costs--that were not implemented in earlier efforts.  Such changes
are controversial within the Coast Guard because they involve a
change in organizational culture.  Therefore, outside studies or
independent validation of the Coast Guard's studies may be needed. 
Examining other streamlining alternatives, such as changing the
services provided, may also be needed.  In addition, in 1994, we
validated the Coast Guard's process to determine which search and
rescue stations are no longer needed.  However, the Coast Guard has
not been able to close most of these stations because of
congressional objections.  A panel much like the Department of
Defense's Base Closure and Realignment Commission, established by the
Congress, may also be helpful to address the closing of Coast Guard
facilities.  We have recently issued a report requested by the
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that addresses the
challenges the Coast Guard faces in addressing budget constraints,
including some organizational issues.\19

Our latest report on the Coast Guard found that, even after it has
nearly completed its streamlining efforts, it still has about 40
percent of its staff working in support functions, headquarters, area
offices, or district offices.  The Clinger-Cohen Act calls for
agencies to develop measures of efficiency and to reengineer their
processes as ways of determining the proper mix of support and
on-line staff.  Until such actions are carried out and data become
available, the Congress and Coast Guard managers are at a
disadvantage in their efforts to assess the agency's operations and
to make data-based decisions for improving the cost efficiency of
those operations. 


--------------------
\19 Coast Guard:  Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints
(GAO/RCED-97-110, May 14, 1997). 


      INFORMATION RESOURCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

To monitor the performance of U.S.  transportation systems, determine
how best to allocate resources, and provide information for
congressional oversight, DOT needs timely, accurate, and complete
data.  Serious problems, however, exist with DOT's information
resources and database management.  These problems, which affect
financial and other program information, adversely affect the
Department's ability to identify, develop, and evaluate the
performance of the U.S.  transportation system, set priorities for
infrastructure investment needs, and evaluate the impacts of
transportation systems across modes.  These problems are exacerbated
by challenges facing the Department in addressing the "Year 2000"
computer problem.  Efforts by DOT to develop more results-oriented,
performance-based management information as required by the
Government Performance and Results Act should provide a good start to
improving data departmentwide.  However, to improve its oversight of
programs and risk management, DOT also needs to ensure that its data
are reliable. 


         FINANCIAL INFORMATION
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.2.1

An overriding concern is recurring problems that have been identified
in DOT's financial information and reporting.  DOT lacks the reliable
financial management information necessary to ensure that federal
funds are properly managed, performance is measured, and reliable
financial reports are prepared.  The lack of such information has
pervasive effects and limits the ability of program managers and
elected officials to make informed decisions.  For example, as
mentioned earlier, decisions about financing FAA depend in part on
understanding what it costs to provide services to various users. 
However, we recently reported that such basic information is not
available.\20

For fiscal year 1996, DOT prepared its first departmentwide financial
statement as required by the Chief Financial Officers Act.  DOT's
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) undertook an audit of the
departmentwide balance sheet but was unable to provide an opinion
about its reliability because of inadequate records and other
deficiencies.  The OIG was unable to validate the value of property,
equipment, operating materials, and supplies reported to be worth
$25.8 billion because of inadequacies in supporting documentation and
unreconciled discrepancies between summary accounts and their
supporting details.  For example, detailed records for certain FAA
property had an unreconciled difference of over $500 million with the
corresponding general ledger total. 

A strong internal control system is essential for providing DOT with
a framework for accomplishing management objectives and accurately
reporting financial information.  Effective internal controls serve
as checks and balances against undesired activities and reduce the
risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.  In evaluating DOT's internal
controls, the OIG identified 11 significant internal control
weaknesses and 13 additional conditions deemed important for
reporting.  Overall, the OIG made 72 recommendations to strengthen
internal controls and improve the accuracy of DOT's financial
reporting. 

DOT faces several important challenges to addressing its financial
management problems including (1) correcting the known weaknesses so
that it can produce reliable, auditable financial statements; (2)
fully implementing new federal accounting standards to meet federal
financial management goals; (3) implementing and maintaining
financial management systems that comply substantially with federal
requirements for financial management systems, applicable federal
accounting standards, and the U.S.  Government Standard General
Ledger at the transaction level; and (4) submitting fully audited
financial statements that cover all accounts and associated
activities. 

DOT has begun addressing some deficiencies.  For example, FAA hired a
contractor in 1996 to study its policies and procedures for
processing and recording equipment purchases.  The contractor made
over 100 recommendations, and FAA is developing a corrective action
plan to implement the recommendations.  In addition, FAA established
a Cost Accounting Systems Division in 1996.  A contractor has been
hired to help implement a cost-accounting system, which is scheduled
to be completed in October 1997. 


--------------------
\20 Air Traffic Control:  Improved Cost Information Needed to Make
Billion-Dollar Modernization Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20,
Jan.  22, 1997). 


         PROGRAM INFORMATION
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.2.2

We have also identified the need for better management data in many
of DOT's programs.  For example, for years we have reported on
shortcomings in FAA's aviation safety inspection program, including
the inadequacy of aviation safety databases.  In 1991, FAA began
developing the Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS), which draws
on information from a number of safety-related databases to better
establish priorities for FAA's inspections.  However, SPAS is not
expected to be fully operational until 1999.  Furthermore, some
databases that may provide source data for SPAS contain incomplete,
inconsistent, and inaccurate data.  FAA has recently developed and is
implementing a strategy to improve data quality to ensure that these
source databases provide reliable information.  The success of this
strategy is critical to SPAS' becoming an effective tool for
targeting resources to high-risk activities. 

In addition, we have frequently found that the Coast Guard has not
had an adequate base of information about its programs and
activities.  For example, in 1990, we reported that the federal
government had lost millions of dollars because the Coast Guard did
not calculate accurate spill costs from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
In 1991, we reported that the Coast Guard, while responsible for
responding to spills from pipelines, did not know the locations of
the pipelines.  To address these problems, we recommended that the
Coast Guard enhance its strategic planning process to improve its
information resources management.  The Coast Guard recognizes its
information problems and is in the process of implementing many new
information systems. 


         YEAR 2000 ISSUES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.2.3

DOT faces challenges in addressing data issues such as those we
mentioned and, at the same time, ensuring that it addresses the
upcoming "Year 2000" computer problem.  DOT's Year-2000 program is
probably the largest computer system conversion effort ever
undertaken by the Department and its modal administrations. 
First-class program management and the disciplined and coordinated
application of scarce resources are required to achieve the
departmentwide system conversion that must be completed by a fixed
date.  The massive year-2000 program is a management challenge. 

To help federal agencies achieve Year-2000 compliance, we developed a
guide that provides them with a framework and checklist of the
Year-2000 issue.\21 The guide is divided into five phases--awareness,
assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation--supported by
program and project management activities.  We have used the guide's
checklist to describe DOT's activities and progress in the first two
phases--awareness and assessment.  Although DOT considers the
awareness campaign about 90-percent complete, we believe that DOT has
not completed some of the key tasks in that phase.  For example, DOT
has not (1) performed a high-level analysis of the potential impact
of the Year-2000 problem on its core business areas, (2) developed or
documented a Year-2000 strategy, or (3) appointed an executive
management council to guide the Department's Year-2000 conversion
program. 

During the assessment phase, DOT must work with its administrations
to identify (1) systems that are mission-critical or support
important functions and must be converted or replaced by the deadline
and (2) systems that support marginal functions and may, therefore,
be converted or replaced later.  Although DOT has a partial inventory
of its systems, the information on its inventory may not be very
useful for establishing system conversion priorities.  For example,
FAA's Air Traffic Control Systems and Travel Voucher Tracking System
are both defined as mission-critical.  Moreover, the inventory does
not identify internal or external interfaces or show which systems
are to be renovated, replaced, or eliminated. 

We believe that as DOT deals with the Year-2000 issue, it is
essential that top-level management be fully aware of the problem and
its potential impact on DOT and those who use its services.  It is
the responsibility of the chief information officers to provide
leadership in defining and explaining the importance of achieving
Year-2000 compliance, selecting the overall approach for structuring
DOT's program, mobilizing needed resources, and assessing the
adequacy of the existing information resources management
infrastructure to adequately support year-2000 activities. 


--------------------
\21 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  An Assessment Guide, Exposure Draft
(GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, Feb.  1997). 


         GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
         AND RESULTS ACT
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.2.4

The Government Performance and Results Act is intended to address
basic management problems and deficiencies that have been typical
throughout the federal government.  If properly implemented, the act
could be a useful tool for solving many of the problems we have
identified at DOT.  The act requires agencies to clarify their
missions, set strategic goals, and measure performance toward those
goals with reliable, auditable information that the Congress can use
to hold them accountable for results rather than activities or
processes.  DOT could use this framework, for example, to reach
agreement on the goals and objectives of our aviation security
system, to develop performance goals and data for safety inspections,
or to clarify mission needs for its ATC modernization program. 

DOT, like other federal agencies, faces challenges in developing good
management, financial, and program information, which are key to
successfully implementing both the act and many of our
recommendations.  Without such information, accountability for
achieving results-oriented goals can never be ensured.  It is up to
the Congress and committees such as yours to make the act come alive
by working with agencies and holding them accountable for its
implementation. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

Many of the problems we have discussed are not new issues to either
the Department or the Congress.  Adequately addressing many of these
problems, however, will take concerted action by the Congress, senior
management at the Department, and program managers and staff.  The
Congress has a key role to play in helping set transportation
priorities and providing appropriate funding.  The Department can do
more to make clear its commitment to those priorities and the
organizational culture needed to implement them.  Program managers
and staff need to constantly strive to achieve the most
cost-effective delivery of services.  Congressional oversight, such
as that provided by this hearing, is also key. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.1

Mr.  Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement.  We would be
happy to respond to any question that you or other Members might
have. 


*** End of document. ***