Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges in Modernizing the Agency
(Statement/Record, 02/03/2000, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-87).
U.S. airspace carries by far the largest volume of air traffic in the
world--a volume that is expected to rise significantly within the
decade. If not managed effectively, this projected growth could affect
safety and cause aviation gridlock. The limited window of opportunity to
address this situation has prompted the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to undertake efforts to improve its performance and Congress to
provide the agency with greater flexibility in procurement and personnel
matters. Continuing dissatisfaction with FAA's efforts, however, has led
to proposals to overhaul the agency's organizational structure. This
testimony (1) highlights the key areas that have hampered FAA's ability
to achieve desired outcomes, (2) discusses various proposals for
restructuring the agency, and (3) describes the steps that FAA and
Congress can take to help the agency address its challenges more
effectively and efficiently.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-RCED/AIMD-00-87
TITLE: Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges in Modernizing
the Agency
DATE: 02/03/2000
SUBJECT: Transportation safety
Air transportation operations
Federal procurement
Air traffic control systems
Strategic planning
Internal controls
Information resources management
Financial management
Federal agency reorganization
IDENTIFIER: FAA Advanced Automation System
FAA Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
FAA Wide Area Augmentation System
FAA Air Transportation Oversight System
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GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-87
Testimony
Before the Committee on the Budget and the Subcommittee on Transportation,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate
To Be Released on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST
Thursday
February 3, 2000
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Challenges in Modernizing the Agency
Statement for the Record by
Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director,
Transportation Issues, Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division FILLIN \o \* MERGEFORMAT
GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-87
Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Committee and Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to provide our perspective on the challenges
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) faces in continuing to provide for
the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic in U.S. airspace. The
nation's airspace carries by far the largest volume of air traffic in the
world, a volume that is projected to increase significantly within the
decade. If not managed effectively, this projected growth could affect
safety and cause aviation gridlock. This situation creates a limited window
of opportunity, which is prompting FAA to undertake numerous initiatives to
improve performance and the Congress to provide FAA with greater flexibility
in procurement and personnel matters. However, continuing dissatisfaction
with FAA's efforts has given rise to proposals on alternative organizational
structures for the entire agency or for its air traffic service function.
Our testimony today highlights some key areas we and others have identified
that have hampered FAA's ability to achieve desired outcomes. We will also
discuss various proposals for restructuring FAA and talk about next steps
for FAA and the Congress to take to ensure that the agency can address its
challenges effectively and efficiently.
In summary:
* FAA's efforts to implement initiatives in five key areas-air traffic
control modernization, procurement and personnel reform, aviation
safety, aviation and computer security, and financial management-have
met with limited success. For example, FAA has established an
acquisition management system to reduce the time and cost of fielding
new products and services. However, in many of the five areas, FAA has
frequently not developed comprehensive plans, thus underestimating the
complexity involved in developing new systems, and has often not
adequately overseen the development and implementation of these
systems. As a result, although progress has been made in each of these
areas, cost overruns, delays, and/or performance shortfalls have
occurred.
* The proposals to restructure FAA, although significantly different from
one another, have a common objective-the more efficient and effective
modernization of the air traffic control system. These proposals
include creating a government-owned or private corporation or
emphasizing performance for air traffic control through a new
performance-based structure within FAA. In addition, one proposal would
establish FAA as an independent agency to better achieve its mission,
including its efforts to modernize the air traffic control system.
However, to be effective, restructuring will need to address the
fundamental problems affecting the modernization of the air traffic
control system, such as the lack of a complete systems architecture, a
sophisticated process for acquiring software acquisitions, sound
financial management practices, and an effective organizational
culture.
* As we have indicated, while FAA's initiatives have met with some
success, our work shows that many of these initiatives have been
undertaken without paying enough attention to factors critical to
achieving the desired results-establishing baseline data, priorities, a
game plan for addressing root causes, and an evaluation plan to measure
progress. These deficiencies need to be addressed promptly because,
with the projected growth in air travel, FAA has a limited window of
opportunity for making the changes we and others have recommended.
* With this pressing need for improved FAA performance, overseeing FAA's
implementation of its initiatives and critical management reforms is of
paramount importance. For this reason, we believe continuing
congressional oversight is critical to ensure that FAA successfully
meets the challenges of maintaining safety and improving efficiencies
in light of the expected growth in air travel.
Progress and Problems With Implementing Efforts in Key Areas
Over the years, reviews by us and others have identified problems in five
key areas: (1) modernizing the air traffic control system, (2) implementing
procurement and personnel reform, (3) ensuring the safe operation of
aircraft, (4) improving the security of both aviation and critical computer
systems, and (5) implementing the financial systems and controls needed to
effectively manage the agency. Overall, FAA has agreed with the problems
identified and has undertaken initiatives to mitigate these problems, as we
and others have recommended. However, these initiatives have often fallen
short because FAA establishes overly ambitious implementation schedules,
proceeds without adequate plans, and does not adequately oversee their
implementation. I would like to highlight some of the progress and problems
we have identified with FAA's implementation of efforts in these five key
areas.
Modernizing the Air Traffic Control System
Faced with rapidly growing volumes of air traffic and aging equipment to
control this traffic, FAA initiated an ambitious 10-year, $12 billion
program in 1981 to modernize its air traffic control system. This
effort-which involves acquiring a vast network of radar and automated
data-processing, navigation, communications equipment, and air traffic
control facilities-has been expanded and is now expected to cost $40 billion
through fiscal year 2004.
Despite this investment, the air traffic control modernization program has
not measured up to expectations. It has experienced cost overruns, delays,
and performance shortfalls of large proportions. For example, in 1994, FAA
restructured its Advanced Automation System, which was intended to be the
centerpiece of the air traffic control modernization program, after the
estimated cost to deploy the system had tripled, capabilities were shown to
be significantly less than promised, and delays were expected to run nearly
a decade.
We found that FAA's problems with the Advanced Automation System and other
modernization projects were caused primarily by design and implementation
factors, such as underestimating the complexity of developing systems and
inadequate management oversight. Because of the program's size, complexity,
cost, and problem-plagued past, we designated it as a high-risk information
technology initiative in 1995.
In addition, we identified four specific implementation issues-root
causes-of the modernization program's problems. These include the lack of
* a complete systems architecture, or overall blueprint, to guide the
program, which has resulted in unnecessarily higher spending to buy,
integrate, and maintain hardware and software;
* reliable cost-estimating processes and cost-accounting practices, which
puts the agency at risk of making ill-informed decisions on procuring
air traffic control systems;
* an effective approach for acquiring software, which places the agency
at greater risk of not delivering promised software capabilities on
time and within budget; and
* an effective organizational culture to assist the acquisition process
by encouraging staff to work cooperatively within the agency and with
the aviation community.
FAA has taken a number of steps to address these root causes. For example,
it has initiated activities to develop a complete air traffic control
systems architecture, cost-estimating processes and cost-accounting systems,
and to improve software acquisition capabilities and organizational culture.
However, it will take several years for these efforts to reach fruition.
Additionally, in January 1999, FAA appointed a Chief Information Officer,
who reports directly to the FAA Administrator. This action is consistent
with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which requires each executive agency to
have a chief information officer in order to establish an effective
structure for managing information technology investments. Furthermore, FAA
has moved away from its prior practice of taking on large, complex projects
all at once and is now acquiring new systems by using a more incremental
approach. Finally, the agency is no longer making unilateral decisions about
air traffic control modernization. Instead, it has been working actively
with the aviation community-airlines, unions, and equipment manufacturers-to
make decisions more collaboratively.
Nevertheless, problems remain. For example, we recommended that FAA disclose
the inherent uncertainty in projects' cost estimates in order to increase
the estimates' decision-making value and credibility. We recommended that in
providing cost estimates to the Congress, FAA not provide simply a single
cost estimate for a project but instead estimate a cost range and indicate
the level of confidence it had in that range. Although FAA agreed with this
recommendation, it does not always report estimates in this way;
consequently, congressional decisionmakers cannot be confident in the
estimates FAA provides. Furthermore, FAA often begins acquisition projects
without establishing baseline data and an evaluation plan to measure
progress.
Reforming Procurement and Personnel Practices
As problems with the air traffic control modernization program mounted in
the early 1990s, FAA attributed the delays with implementing air traffic
control projects, at least in part, to burdensome federal acquisition
regulations and governmentwide personnel rules that impeded its ability to
acquire equipment and systems and to hire, train, and deploy the personnel
involved in the modernization effort. In response to these claims, the
Congress exempted FAA from many federal acquisitions and personnel-related
regulations, and the agency began implementing procurement and personnel
reforms in 1996. Nevertheless, external reviews have found problems with
FAA's implementation of both the procurement and personnel reforms.
Procurement Reform
FAA introduced an acquisition management system to reduce the time and cost
to field new products and services. The agency established three broad
objectives for the system: (1) the development of a new procurement system
that provides flexibility in selecting and managing contractors, (2) the
development of a new investment management system that spans the entire life
cycle of an acquisition, and (3) organizational and cultural reform that
supports the new investment and procurement systems. FAA has had the most
success with the first objective. Booz-Allen & Hamilton found that FAA has
reduced by 50 percent the time it needs to award contracts, awarded a
greater percentage of contracts competitively, and awarded more contracts on
the basis of best value rather than on the basis of the lowest bid. It
appears the new policy on contracting has been successful because FAA's
offices and regions across the country have adapted it to their specific
missions.
Achievement of the acquisition management system's second objective-the life
cycle investment management system-includes acquiring, deploying,
maintaining, and replacing equipment in the air traffic control
modernization program. This process is to result in more timely and
cost-effective acquisitions. FAA has made some progress on this objective.
For example, for its investment management system, FAA has developed a set
of policies, procedures, and reporting requirements to analyze mission
needs; assess the affordability of proposed projects; and establish cost,
schedule, and performance parameters to control projects. Furthermore, an
FAA senior management investment review group-the Joint Resources
Council-makes key decisions about which investments best meet the agency's
needs and are to be funded.
However, implementation of this objective has fallen short. FAA has not
fully achieved its objective of managing its modernization projects as a
totally integrated program-that is, as a complete investment
portfolio-because it is not consistently applying acquisition management
policies and procedures to all of its modernization projects. Instead, it
limits its oversight of projects mainly to those that are under development
or being implemented, excluding those that are operational. As a result, FAA
is not examining the costs of maintaining existing systems versus investing
in new ones; comparatively ranking projects according to the expected costs,
benefits, and risks; and reaching decisions based on a project's overall
contribution to the most pressing organizational needs. Furthermore, in July
1999, Booz-Allen & Hamilton reported that FAA had made little progress
toward achieving the acquisition management system's stated goal of
executing more timely and cost-effective programs. For example, programs
such as the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System and Wide Area
Augmentation System are still experiencing delays and cost overruns.
Finally, FAA continues to experience problems in implementing its third
objective-organizational and culture reform. As part of its effort to reform
its culture, FAA is using a team approach to acquiring acquisitions. Members
of a team include all stakeholders who are involved in the acquisition,
maintenance, and eventual disposal of a product/system. However, team
members have reported that they do not feel empowered to make binding,
team-based decisions that would be supported by the different organizations
within FAA. As a result, they have had to consult with their respective
organizations on all issues, which extended the time it took to make
decisions, and might have prolonged the acquisition process.
Personnel Reform
Following congressional approval, FAA established a new personnel system to
meet its unique needs. According to the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA), this system provides some flexibility in hiring,
training, compensating, and deploying personnel. For example, FAA has
reduced the time taken to fill vacancies from months to weeks. Moreover,
over the last 3 years, more than 70 executive-level positions have been
filled as a result of tools provided by the new personnel system, such as
on-the-spot hiring authority, temporary promotions to executive positions,
and recruitment and retention bonuses. However, NAPA concluded that these
efforts have not made FAA more effective in carrying out its mission.
NAPA identified issues that have made FAA's implementation of personnel
reforms less than fully successful:
* FAA lacks baseline data and specific performance measures, which
hampers its efforts to assess the effectiveness of personnel reform and
establish a basis for continuous improvement.
* The decentralized personnel structure that resulted from FAA's reform
has caused (1) morale problems, (2) communication gaps and
inconsistencies in technical advice and leadership within FAA
organizations, and (3) insufficient understanding throughout the
workforce about the intent of reforms. As a result of these problems,
FAA lacks a broad base of support and accountability for reform
initiatives among employees below the highest management levels.
Ensuring Aviation Safety
Ensuring that all components of the air transportation system-including the
airports, aircraft, and key personnel such as pilots-operate in a manner
that maximizes aviation safety is a fundamental responsibility for FAA.
FAA's aviation safety programs provide for the initial certification,
periodic surveillance, and inspection of airlines, airports, repair
stations, other aviation entities, pilots, and mechanics. These inspections
are intended not only to detect actual violations but also to serve as part
of an early warning system for identifying potential systemwide weaknesses.
In October 1997, we reported that work performed by aviation repair
stations-the 2,800 facilities that repair and maintain nearly half of all
U.S. passenger and cargo aircraft-was cited by the National Transportation
Safety Board as a factor in several accidents. FAA had systems in place to
monitor the performance of repair stations, but its implementation of these
systems has inhibited the agency's effectiveness. We found that FAA
inspections of these stations relied primarily on reviews by individual
inspectors, even though inspection teams provide more effective reviews
because they uncover more systemic and long-standing problems. We also found
that when deficiencies were discovered, sufficient documentation did not
exist to determine how well FAA followed up to ensure that the deficiencies
were corrected.
These problems are compounded by FAA's lack of complete information on
compliance in the aviation industry and by the information's limited use in
providing early warning of potential risks and in targeting inspection
resources to the greatest risks. We reported in 1998 that some inspectors
reported less than half of the problems or violations they observed, and
many inspections were not thorough or structured enough to detect many
violations. We also noted that the impact of FAA's enforcement actions on
compliance was difficult to assess because the agency had not followed up on
the aviation industry's implementation of corrective action.
We recommended actions to FAA to improve its oversight of repair stations
and to improve the usefulness of its inspection and enforcement efforts. FAA
agreed with our recommendations and has developed and begun to implement a
fundamentally reengineered system-the Air Transportation Oversight System-to
oversee airline safety. While this system is definitely a positive action by
FAA to address prior problems, it is not fulfilling its potential because of
implementation problems. In June 1999, we reported that FAA's ability to
conduct effective inspections remains limited largely because of an overly
ambitious implementation schedule that compressed complex, critical steps
into a very short time frame.
Improving Aviation and Computer Security
Aviation and computer security are of paramount concern. U.S. aircraft are
widely believed to be a target of terrorist actions, which has heightened
the need to improve domestic aviation security. FAA is implementing
recommendations made in 1997 by the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security (the Gore Commission) and mandates contained in the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 to improve security at
airports.
FAA has made some progress in five critical areas-passenger profiling,
explosives detection technologies, passenger-bag matching, vulnerability
assessments, and the certification of screening companies-as recommended by
the Gore Commission and mandated by the Congress. However, given the current
implementation schedule, it will take years for FAA and the aviation
industry to fully implement all the initiatives. We reported in April 1998
that FAA had encountered delays of up to 12 months in implementing these
initiatives, in part, because they are more complex than FAA originally
envisioned and involve new and relatively untested technologies. These
delays are still occurring. In January of this year, FAA issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking requiring the certification of screening companies, but
the issuance of the final rule may not occur for another 12 months, nearly 2
years later than the planned issuance date.
Security is a concern not only for preventing and deterring terrorist and
criminal acts against aircraft but also for protecting critical information
and computer systems that are relied on by pilots, air traffic controllers,
and others. A failure to adequately protect these systems, as well as the
facilities that house them, could cause a nationwide disruption of air
traffic or even the loss of life in collisions. Consequently, FAA's policy
requires that air traffic control systems and facilities be certified as
having appropriately implemented security safeguards. However, in May 1998,
we reported that FAA was ineffective in all critical areas we analyzed. For
example, FAA had not assessed the physical security controls at 187
facilities since 1993 and therefore did not know how vulnerable they were.
Additionally, FAA had not performed the analysis necessary to determine
system threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguards for 87 of 90 operational air
traffic control computer systems nor had it consistently included
well-formulated security requirements in the specifications for new air
traffic control modernization systems. Further, we noted that FAA's security
structure was ineffective-responsibilities were distributed among three
organizations, all of which were remiss in their security duties.
We made a number of recommendations to FAA that address these computer
security concerns, and FAA has initiated efforts in response to these
recommendations. For example, FAA reported that it completed inspections of
the 187 facilities that it had not assessed since 1993 and that it
established a Chief Information Officer position in February 1999 with
responsibility for developing, implementing, and enforcing the agency's
information security policy. However, in December 1999, we reported that
computer security problems continued to exist. In its efforts to address
Year 2000 computer problems-which were largely successful-FAA used
contractor employees to perform repairs to mission-critical systems.
However, the agency did not follow its own policy requiring background
checks on all of these contractor employees, and in some instances no
background checks were conducted. As a result, the air traffic control
system may be more susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks.
Applying Sound Financial Management
As with any organization, sound financial management is critical to the
effective and efficient operation of FAA. Weak financial management renders
FAA vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse; undermines its ability to manage
its operations; and limits the reliability of the financial information it
provides to the Congress. Beginning with fiscal year 1994, the Department of
Transportation's Office of the Inspector General has audited FAA's financial
statements and has consistently been unable to determine whether the
financial information is reliable. This pattern has continued with the
Inspector General's most recent report-a disclaimer of opinion-on FAA's
fiscal year 1998 financial statements.
Related to the financial problems identified by the Inspector General, we
reported in February 1998 that many problems in the property and equipment
accounts affect FAA's ability to efficiently and effectively manage programs
that use these assets. For example, the lack of adequate physical controls
over equipment could result in the costly, unnecessary acquisition of
additional assets or the misuse of assets. We reported that until FAA
implements effective policies and procedures to provide accountability over
property and equipment, it remains vulnerable to significant mismanagement
of appropriated funds.
FAA also has problems in its cost accounting system. Federal financial
accounting standards require federal agencies to maintain a cost accounting
capability. The Congress has specifically required that FAA develop a cost
accounting system. However, the agency has not achieved this mandate. We
reported in February 1998 that many of the problems in the property and
equipment accounts result from the lack of a reliable system for
accumulating cost accounting information on individual projects. As a
consequence of weak cost accounting practices, the agency did not have
reliable and timely information about the full cost of program activities.
Furthermore, the lack of cost accounting information limits FAA's ability to
(1) make effective decisions about resource needs and adequately control
major projects, such as the multibillion-dollar air traffic control
modernization program; (2) estimate future costs in order to prepare and
review budgets; (3) control and reduce costs in order to increase efficiency
and avoid waste; (4) develop a system of user fees based on the cost of
services provided; and (5) meaningfully evaluate performance measures in
terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
In January 1999, we designated FAA's financial management as a high-risk
area because of serious and long-standing accounting and financial reporting
weaknesses. In March 1999, we testified that FAA senior management
recognized the urgency of correcting their financial management deficiencies
and had taken steps to address them, including efforts to continue to
develop a cost accounting system, which FAA expects will be fully
operational in 2001. However, much still remains to be done. Until full
accountability is achieved, FAA will continue to be exposed to waste, fraud,
abuse, and mismanagement. In addition, the Congress will have no assurance
of receiving accurate financial management information to help make informed
decisions about future funding and oversight of FAA activities.
Proposals to Resolve Modernization Problems Through Restructuring
Over the years, a number of fundamentally different proposals have been
offered for restructuring FAA. The impetus behind most reform proposals lies
in congressional frustration with the slow pace of modernization and
concerns about the potential for aviation gridlock. Two types of proposals
have been designed principally to improve FAA's air traffic control
modernization efforts: (1) establishing a public or private air traffic
control corporation or (2) making performance-based changes within FAA. In
addition, another type of proposal would make FAA, in its entirety, an
independent government agency to improve overall mission effectiveness,
including air traffic control modernization.
The common theme in the restructuring proposals is the need to make FAA more
effective, accountable, and results-oriented. Proponents of these proposals
contend that restructuring FAA, in whole or in part, will provide the agency
with flexibility in managing its budget, implementing regulations, and
making policy decisions. They also contend that such restructuring will
enable additional resources to be tapped, such as user fees. However, any
restructuring will need to address the fundamental problems affecting the
implementation of air traffic control modernization, such as the lack of a
complete systems architecture, a sophisticated process for acquiring
software, sound financial management practices, and an effective
organizational culture. While each of these proposals offers potential
advantages, each also raises a number of issues:
* Create a separate federal or private air traffic control corporation
while leaving safety oversight with the federal government. This
proposal has raised a number of safety and oversight issues. For
example, an air traffic control corporation would be responsible for
operating the air traffic control system and making long-term decisions
that affect safety and efficiency. At the same time, however, the FAA
Administrator would presumably have ultimate authority on all safety
matters. It is unclear how these two separate organizations would share
responsibilities and preserve the margin of safety. Additionally, if
this independent entity were a private organization, it is unclear how
the Congress would oversee this independent organization's activities.
* Make performance-based changes within FAA. If a performance-based
organization or a Chief Operating Officer position with set performance
expectations were established within FAA for air traffic control
modernization, congressional oversight would be preserved because the
organization would remain under the Department's jurisdiction. However,
like the proposed air traffic control corporation, the margin of safety
could suffer if there were ambiguity and lengthy conflict between the
FAA Administrator and the Chief Operating Officer. Also, while the
congressionally established National Civil Aviation Review Commission
advocated a performance-based organization for the air traffic control
system, the Commission noted that FAA initiatives to quantify and
measure the agency's performance are in their infancy and need to be
expanded.
* Make FAA an independent government entity. Opponents of this proposal
have noted that the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 gave
FAA final authority to issue certain types of regulations and make
other decisions, thus alleviating the need to separate FAA from the
Department of Transportation. They also note that removing FAA from the
Department would hamper efforts to develop and implement an integrated
national transportation system.
FAA Is at a Critical Crossroads for Resolving Outstanding Problems
With the projected growth in air travel, FAA has a limited window of
opportunity for correcting the critical deficiencies we and others have
identified. While FAA has agreed with recommendations made by us and others,
its implementation has often gone awry or proceeded too slowly. This raises
a larger question: What should FAA do differently to ensure that it
implements its initiatives successfully and on time?
We believe that FAA should develop a systematic approach to completing its
initiatives. The framework for such an approach has been laid out in recent
governmentwide management reforms, such as the Government Performance and
Results Act. As these acts make clear, such a framework should include the
establishment of baseline data, clear priorities, time-sensitive strategies
that respond to recommendations for addressing root causes of existing
problems, and an evaluation plan to measure progress. While FAA has made a
concerted effort to resolve outstanding problems, it has not done so in the
context of such a framework. Without this framework, FAA will not realize
its potential for accomplishing its mission, whatever its structure.
Furthermore, the Congress' ability to monitor FAA's progress will be
impaired.
The Congress Needs to Continue Its Oversight of FAA
The Congress has put into place mechanisms to better ensure efficient and
effective government operations-the Government Performance and Results Act,
the Chief Financial Officers Act, and the Clinger-Cohen Act. Taken together,
these laws provide a framework for developing and fully integrating
information about (1) FAA's mission and strategic priorities, (2) the
results-oriented performance goals that flow from those priorities, (3) the
extent to which goals are being achieved, (4) the relationship of technology
and other investments to the achievement of goals, and (5) the reliability
of financial information on the costs of achieving mission results.
FAA, like other federal agencies, is responding to these directives.
However, FAA's ability to successfully implement these directives is impeded
by the problems we have identified in modernization, procurement and
personnel, safety, aviation and computer security, and financial management.
Given the extent of these problems, we believe that continuing congressional
oversight is of paramount importance to ensure that FAA meets the challenges
presented by the exponential growth in air traffic projected for this
decade.
Contacts and Acknowledgments
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony included John C. Fretwell, Belva M. Martin, Colleen M. Phillips,
Yvonne C. Pufahl, John R. Schulze, and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman.
Related GAO Products
Air Traffic Control Modernization
Air Traffic Control: FAA's Modernization Investment Management Approach
Could Be Strengthened (GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-88, Apr. 30, 1999).
Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program (GAO/RCED-99-25,
Dec. 3, 1998).
National Airspace System: FAA Has Implemented Some Free Flight Initiatives,
but Challenges Remain (GAO/RCED-98-246, Sept. 28, 1998).
Air Traffic Control: Immature Software Acquisition Processes Increase FAA
System Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar. 21, 1997).
Air Traffic Control: Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed for FAA
Systems Modernization (GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb. 3, 1997).
Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for Cultural Change
at FAA (GAO/RCED-96-159, Aug. 22, 1996).
Aviation Safety
Aviation Safety: FAA's New Inspection System Offers Promise, but Problems
Need to Be Addressed (GAO/RCED-99-183, June 28, 1999).
Aviation Safety: FAA Has Not Fully Implemented Weather-Related
Recommendations (GAO/RCED-98-130, June 2, 1998).
Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in
Identifying and Responding to Risks (GAO/RCED-98-6, Feb. 27, 1998).
Aviation Safety: FAA Oversight of Repair Stations Needs Improvement
(GAO/RCED-98-21, Oct. 24, 1997).
Aviation Security
Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign
Nationals to Remediate and Review Software (GAO/AIMD-00-55, Dec. 23, 1999).
Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
Safety (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998).
Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but
Completion Will Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).
Financial Management
Federal Aviation Administration: Financial Management Issues
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-122, Mar. 18, 1999).
High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999).
Financial Management: Federal Aviation Administration Lacked Accountability
for Major Assets (GAO/AIMD-98-62, Feb. 18, 1998).
Air Traffic Control: Improved Cost Information Needed to Make Billion-Dollar
Modernization Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20, Jan. 22, 1997).
Other Related Products
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Transportation
(GAO/OGC-99-13, Jan. 1999).
Airport Development Needs: Estimating Future Costs (GAO/RCED-97-99, Apr. 7,
1997).
Airport Privatization: Issues Related to the Sale or Lease of U.S.
Commercial Airports (GAO/RCED-97-3, Nov. 7, 1996).
(348214)
*** End of document. ***