Federal Wildfire Activities: Issues Needing Future Attention (Testimony,
09/14/1999, GAO/T-RCED-99-282).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed various aspects of
the Forest Service's and the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM)
firefighting programs.
GAO noted that: (1) each year, wildfires on federal lands burn millions
of acres of forests, grasslands, and desert vegetation; (2) while
wildfires are being increasingly recognized as having ecological value
in some circumstances, they can adversely affect human lives and
property on state and private lands adjacent to federal lands; (3) in an
effort to reduce the adverse impacts of wildfires, the Forest Service
and BLM spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually preparing for,
controlling, and extinguishing wildfires on federal lands; (4) the
Forest Service's and BLM's firefighting workforce is shrinking, thus
leaving fewer firefighters to handle the workload; (5) some employees
are committed to performing their primary job responsibilities and no
longer choose to become qualified to fight wildfires and others cite
family commitments as a reason for not fighting fires; (6) also, many
firefighters nearing retirement age are no longer willing or able to
fight wildfires; (7) because fewer employees are qualified to fight
wildfires, fewer Forest Service and BLM firefighters will be available
to fill critical wildfire management positions in the future and
firefighter safety could be compromised; (8) the Forest Service and BLM
are implementing new radio technology; (9) however, the two agencies are
purchasing different radio systems that may not be able to communicate
with each other or with the systems used by other firefighting
organizations; (10) as a result, field officials are concerned that the
new systems may prevent them from communicating with federal, state, and
local firefighting organizations and could compromise firefighter
safety; (11) the Forest Service is using an outdated test to measure the
physical fitness of its firefighters; the test used by BLM is recognized
as more reliable; and (12) while the Forest Service plans to adopt BLM's
test, it has not decided when the test will be implemented.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-RCED-99-282
TITLE: Federal Wildfire Activities: Issues Needing Future
Attention
DATE: 09/14/1999
SUBJECT: Fire fighters
Interagency relations
Performance measures
Medical examinations
Emergency preparedness
Federal/state relations
Public lands
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Before the Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, Committee on
Resources, House of Representatives
For Release
on Delivery
2:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday
September 14, 1999
FEDERAL WILDFIRE ACTIVITIES -
ISSUES NEEDING FUTURE ATTENTION
Statement of Barry Hill, Associate Director,
Energy, Resources, and Science Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division
GAO/T-RCED-99-282
GAO/RCED-99-282T
(141376)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
BLM -
============================================================ Chapter 0
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Each year, wildfires on federal lands burn millions of acres of
forests, grasslands, and desert vegetation. While wildfires are
being increasingly recognized as having ecological value in some
circumstances, they can adversely affect human lives and property on
state and private lands adjacent to federal lands. In an effort to
reduce the adverse impacts of wildfires, the Forest Service and the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) spend hundreds of millions of dollars
annually preparing for, controlling, and extinguishing wildfires on
federal lands.
Today's testimony is based on our recent report for the Subcommittee
that described various aspects of the Forest Service's and BLM's
firefighting program.\1 That report addressed the process for
budgeting for wildfire preparedness, the role of the National
Interagency Fire Center, and the types of agreements that the
agencies have with state and local firefighting organizations. The
report also identified the following issues that could compromise the
success of future firefighting efforts unless these agencies take
steps to improve the management of their wildfire programs:
-- The Forest Service's and BLM's firefighting workforce is
shrinking, thus leaving fewer firefighters to handle the
workload. Some employees are committed to performing their
primary job responsibilities and no longer choose to become
qualified to fight wildfires and others cite family commitments
as a reason for not fighting fires. Also, many firefighters
nearing retirement age are no longer willing or able to fight
wildfires. Because fewer employees are qualified to fight
wildfires, fewer Forest Service and BLM firefighters will be
available to fill critical wildfire management positions in the
future and firefighter safety could be compromised.
-- The Forest Service and BLM are implementing new radio
technology. However, the two agencies are purchasing different
radio systems that may not be able to communicate with each
other or with the systems used by other firefighting
organizations. As a result, field officials are concerned that
the new systems may prevent them from communicating with
federal, state, and local firefighting organizations and could
compromise firefighter safety.
-- The Forest Service is using an outdated test to measure the
physical fitness of its firefighters; the test currently used by
BLM is recognized as more reliable. While the Forest Service
plans to adopt BLM's test, it has not decided when the test will
be implemented.
Madam Chairman, before we discuss the issues needing improvement, we
would like to briefly summarize the process used to plan, fund, and
coordinate federal wildfire preparedness efforts.
--------------------
\1 Federal Wildfire Activities: Current Strategy and Issues Needing
Attention (GAO/RCED-99-233, Aug. 13, 1999).
FEDERAL WILDFIRE PREPAREDNESS
EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
In fighting wildfires, the Forest Service and BLM employ permanent
firefighting staff. These staff, located on the national forests and
at BLM field offices include, among other things, fire planners,
dispatchers, and engine mechanics. The Forest Service and BLM also
use employees whose primary job is not firefighting, but are trained
to fight fires as a collateral duty, to fight wildfires. In addition
to these permanent employees, the agencies hire seasonal firefighting
staff (such as firefighting crews and smokejumpers) during fire
seasons.
In developing their wildfire preparedness budgets, the Forest Service
and BLM use the same computer model that determines, on the basis of
historical data such as fire activity, weather, and fire suppression
costs, the most efficient funding level for a firefighting
organization. Then, the national forests and BLM field offices
develop operational plans to show how they plan to allocate the
amounts determined to be needed by the budget planning process for
such firefighting resources as personnel, supplies, and equipment.
After the national forests and BLM field offices receive their annual
funding for wildfire preparedness, they revise their operational
plans for the year to reflect the funds actually received. With
these funds, the offices decide what firefighting resources will be
positioned before the start of the fire season and where these
resources will be located. According to agency officials, because
the level of funding received is less than the level of funds
determined to be needed by the computer modeling process, the
national forests and BLM field offices take measures to compensate
for the reduced funding.\2 For example, they have (1) removed fire
engines from service, (2) not fully staffed fire engines, (3) reduced
the time that fire engines were on-call from 7 to 5 days per week,
(4) not hired seasonal firefighters and/or hired seasonal
firefighters for less than the entire fire season, and (5) placed
employees on involuntary unpaid leave or temporarily transferred them
to other work locations.
The National Interagency Fire Center (Fire Center) in Boise, Idaho,
which is maintained and operated by the federal land management
agencies, is the nation's logistical support center for controlling
and extinguishing wildfires. As such, it coordinates the
mobilization of firefighting supplies, equipment, and personnel at
the federal, regional, and local levels.
Wildfires are attacked through three levels of management
responsibility--local, regional, and national. Generally, efforts to
control and extinguish a wildfire are handled initially by the local
agency responsible for protecting an area from fire, whether that
area is a national forest, a BLM field office, or a state land
management agency. Numerous federal, state, and local firefighting
resources, including engines, ground crews, and air tankers carrying
retardant, can be used to initially control and extinguish a
wildfire. Local agencies may also work together, sharing personnel
and equipment, to fight new fires as well as those that escape
initial suppression efforts. If a wildfire grows to the point where
local firefighting personnel and equipment are not sufficient to
suppress it--usually when 65 percent of all available firefighting
resources have been committed to other wildfires--the local agency
contacts its geographic area coordination center.
When this happens, the geographic area coordination center will
attempt to locate additional firefighters, equipment, and supplies
within the geographic area and dispatch the resources to the agency
that requested assistance. If the needed resources cannot be
located, the geographic area coordination center will order
additional resources through the National Interagency Coordination
Center, located at the Fire Center. The Coordination Center locates
the closest available firefighting resources--regardless of agency
affiliation or location--and dispatches them to the local agency
requesting the resources. In addition to dispatching firefighting
resources, the Coordination Center gathers and analyzes information
about specific wildfire incidents and the overall fire situation and
reports the information to all federal and state land management
agencies.
To provide mutual support in suppressing wildfires, the Forest
Service and BLM have entered into numerous agreements and other types
of cooperative efforts with other federal, state, and local
firefighting organizations. We found that each of the three
geographic regions we visited had different types of coordination
agreements. Our review of these different types of coordination
agreements and discussions with federal and state firefighting
officials, however, suggest that no one single type of coordination
agreement or coordination process is better than another. Forest
Service, BLM, and state officials told us that, except for an
occasional disagreement over the reimbursement of firefighting costs,
their coordination agreements and processes are working well and they
do not see a need for changes. The officials universally agreed that
it would be virtually impossible for them to manage their
firefighting programs without the coordination agreements.
--------------------
\2 For fiscal years 1996 through 1999, the agencies received about 85
percent of the funds they estimated they needed for wildfire
preparedness.
FIREFIGHTING WORKFORCE IS
SHRINKING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
We found that the Forest Service's and BLM's firefighting workforce
is shrinking. As a result, fewer qualified firefighters are
available to handle the wildfire workload, which could compromise
firefighter safety. According to Forest Service and BLM officials,
there are several reasons why some employees no longer become
qualified to fight fires as a collateral duty.
-- First, staff who do not fight fires as a primary duty--such as
resource specialists--are committed to carrying out their
primary job duties and do not want to spend time fighting fires.
Because of downsizing, the Forest Service and BLM do not have
staff available to temporarily fill positions when
fire-qualified employees are off fighting fires. Therefore, the
employees' normal workload will be waiting for them when they
return from fire duty.
-- Second, many families have dual careers, and the additional
income earned from fighting fires would not, in their view,
offset the inconvenience and expense involved in, for example,
rearranging their schedules and providing for additional child
care. In the current environment, many employees are unwilling
to abandon family commitments to fight wildfires.
-- Third, for many employees, the rate of overtime pay for fighting
wildfires is less than their regular base salary rate--thereby
negating any financial incentive to fight wildfires. The
disparity in wildfire overtime compensation--where a truck
driver may make more than a wildfire incident commander who is
responsible for managing all firefighting
activities--discourages some older, more experienced employees
from fighting wildfires.
-- Last, the aging workforce is shrinking the Forest Service's and
BLM's firefighting capabilities. Specifically, many older
employees who are qualified to fight wildfires are unwilling to
do so because it is more difficult for them to keep up with the
physical demands placed on firefighters and the satisfaction
gained from fighting wildfires no longer exists.
Forest Service and BLM officials are concerned about their shrinking
firefighting workforce because developing a cadre of qualified
wildfire management personnel takes many years. Coupled with the
competing demands and an aging workforce, fewer fire-qualified
employees will be available to fill critical wildfire management
positions. For example, the average age of BLM's wildfire incident
commanders exceeds 50 years of age--the age at which firefighters are
eligible to retire. It generally takes at least 17 years of training
and wildfire experience before a firefighter is qualified to function
as an incident commander.
In our August 1999 report, we recommended that the Chief of the
Forest Service and the Secretary of the Interior work together to
develop a combined strategy to rebuild their firefighting workforce.
Forest Service and BLM officials agreed that a combined strategy
should be developed to explore the various options available for
increasing the size of their firefighting workforce. The agencies
recently contracted with a consulting firm to study workforce issues
and the results are due on April 1, 2000.
LACK OF STANDARDIZED RADIOS IS
A SAFETY ISSUE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
By January 2005, all federal land management agencies are required by
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to
change their radio systems from wideband to narrowband.\3 The
Department of the Interior decided that its agencies, including BLM,
will purchase narrowband digital radios because they believe that the
radios have capabilities over and above those of narrowband analog
radios, such as the ability to receive and transmit data. The Forest
Service, however, decided that it will purchase narrowband analog
radios while it studies the merits of narrowband digital radios. The
Forest Service has done so because narrowband digital radios are
about twice as expensive as narrowband analog radios and narrowband
digital technology is still being developed.
Local officials from the national forests and BLM field offices that
we spoke with are concerned that changing from wideband to narrowband
radios could compromise firefighters' safety in two ways. First,
these officials believe that narrowband analog radios are not
completely compatible with narrowband digital radios. Consequently,
after the conversion, they believe that Forest Service and BLM
firefighters may find it difficult to communicate with each other.
Second, they believe that state and local firefighters may still be
using wideband radios and may not be able to convert their radio
systems to narrowband for several years because of the costs
involved. These officials believe that narrowband radios cannot
communicate with wideband radios; consequently, federal firefighters
may not be able to communicate with state and local firefighters
unless they use two independent radio systems.
Forest Service and BLM headquarters officials, however, believe that
narrowband analog and narrowband digital radios will be compatible
for two reasons. First, they said that by changing the frequency
setting on narrowband digital radios, narrowband analog radios will
be compatible. Second, they believe that a series of standards
supported by the telecommunications industry and federal agencies
will ensure that after the conversion to narrowband technology, all
federal, state, and local fire fighters will be able to communicate
with each other.
To resolve the radio compatibility issue, the Fire Center is testing
the compatibility of narrowband analog and narrowband digital radios
during the 1999 wildfire season. Additionally, Forest Service and
BLM headquarters officials said that they have begun discussing the
need for an agreement that will specify that both agencies purchase
only narrowband digital radios beginning in fiscal year 2003.
However, while such an agreement would solve the radio compatibility
issue between the Forest Service and BLM, the issue of whether
narrowband radios will be able to communicate with the wideband
radios used by the state and local firefighting agencies and
organizations will remain unresolved.
Given the uncertainties surrounding the conversion to narrowband
radio technology, we recommended, in our August 1999 report, that the
Chief of the Forest Service and the Secretary of the Interior (1)
develop and communicate to all firefighters a strategy for converting
to narrowband radio technology that ensures that radio communications
between all federal, state, and local firefighters will not be
affected by the conversion and (2) delay the purchase of narrowband
radio equipment until the equipment is fully developed and tested.
The Forest Service and BLM agreed with our recommendations.
--------------------
\3 Narrowband radio technology allows communications to take place in
half the channel space that is required for wideband technology. In
analog radios, voice signals are sent over the air in an unaltered
form while in digital radios, the voice is converted to a digital
format before being sent over the air.
AGENCIES USING DIFFERENT
PHYSICAL FITNESS TESTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
Fighting wildfires requires a high level of fitness so that
firefighters can safely perform physically demanding work in
difficult conditions. All firefighters must meet minimum physical
fitness standards for the types of firefighting duties to which they
are assigned. While the Forest Service and BLM follow the same
fitness standards, they use different tests for determining the
physical fitness of their firefighters.
BLM uses a work capacity test to qualify firefighters for three
levels of firefighting duty--arduous, moderate, and light. For
example, to qualify for the most difficult firefighting duty, each
firefighter must walk a 3-mile course in 45 minutes or less while
carrying a 45-pound pack. Before taking the work capacity test,
however, each BLM employee must complete a physical-screening
questionnaire designed to identify health risk factors such as age,
heart problems, and high blood pressure. On the basis of the results
of the screening process, at-risk employees are required to take a
physical examination, including an electrocardiogram, before taking
the work capacity test.
The Forest Service used the work capacity test, but not the screening
questionnaire, to measure a firefighter's physical fitness until
earlier this year, when an employee died while taking the test.
Since that time, the Forest Service has used the step test to
determine the physical fitness of its firefighters. After the
5-minute step test, a firefighter's pulse rate is taken, and it
should not exceed a specified rate based on the firefighter's age.
However, the step test is not as demanding or representative of the
physical fitness needed to fight fires as the work capacity test, and
the results of the step test can be affected by outside stimulants
such as caffeine and tobacco. Consequently, a Board of Review\4
evaluated the events surrounding the death of the employee and issued
its report to the Forest Service.
The work capacity test more typically simulates the actual physical
demands on firefighters because it requires them to walk specific
distances within specific times while carrying varying amounts of
weight to simulate carrying firefighting tools. To ensure that
firefighter safety is not compromised by inadequate physical fitness
tests, we recommended, in our August 1999 report, that the Chief of
the Forest Service issue policy direction as soon as possible on how
the work capacity test is to be administered--including the possible
use of BLM's physical screening process. The Forest Service agreed
that the work capacity test is the appropriate test to use to
determine the physical fitness of its firefighters and that the test,
along with an appropriate physical-screening process, is needed. The
Chief of the Forest Service approved the Board of Review's
recommendations on August 27, 1999 and the Forest Service is
currently working with the Department of Agriculture's Office of
General Counsel to develop a strategy to implement the Board's
recommendations.
--------------------
\4 The Board of Review is a panel of individuals convened by the
Chief, Forest Service to review and make recommendations with regard
to accident investigation and complaint reports prepared by the
Forest Service.
CONCLUSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
Optimizing the success of future firefighting efforts will be
difficult for the Forest Service and BLM unless they take steps to
rebuild their firefighting ranks; ensure the compatibility of
communications systems between federal, state, and local firefighting
organizations; and ensure the physical well-being of their
fire-qualified employees by using the best physical evaluation
methods possible. Our report made recommendations on each of the
three issues, and both the Forest Service and BLM concurred with the
recommendations. It is important that these agencies expeditiously
implement the proposed corrective actions.
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.1
Madam Chairman, this concludes our testimony, and we would be happy
to respond to any questions that you and the Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
CONTACT AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Barry
Hill at (202) 512-8021. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony included Linda Harmon, John Kalmar, and Robert Arthur.
*** End of document. ***