Department of Energy: Problems in the Management and Use of
Supercomputers (Statement/Record, 07/14/1999, GAO/T-RCED-99-257).

The Department of Energy (DOE) spent about $826 million between 1994 and
1997 acquiring and operating supercomputers. The computers support
various uses, and DOE's largest supercomputer effort -- the Accelerated
Strategic Computing Initiative -- is a critical part of the agency's
attempt to build the capability for "virtual testing" as a replacement
for the actual testing of nuclear weapons. This testimony covers how
effectively DOE has managed the use and acquisition of its
supercomputers and the management of its strategic computing initiative.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-99-257
     TITLE:  Department of Energy: Problems in the Management and Use
	     of Supercomputers
      DATE:  07/14/1999
   SUBJECT:  Supercomputers
	     Federal procurement
	     Information resources management
	     Strategic information systems planning
	     Laboratories
	     Internal controls
	     ADP procurement
	     Future budget projections
IDENTIFIER:  DOE Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO
    Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Basic Research, Committee on
    Science, House of Representatives To Be Released on Delivery
    DEPARTMENT OF Expected at 2 p.m. EDT           ENERGY Wednesday
    July 14, 1999 Problems in the Management and Use of Supercomputers
    Statement For the Record by Susan D. Kladiva, Associate Director,
    Energy, Resources, and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and
    Economic Development Division GAO/T-RCED-99-257 Mr. Chairman and
    Members of the Subcommittee: We appreciate the opportunity to
    provide a statement for the record on the Department of Energy's
    (DOE) use, acquisition, and management of its supercomputing
    resources. The Department spent about $826 million between 1994
    and 1997 acquiring and operating supercomputers. These computers
    support a variety of uses, and DOE's largest supercomputer effort-
    the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative-is a critical part
    of DOE's attempt to build the capability for "virtual testing" as
    a replacement for the actual testing of nuclear weapons. DOE
    estimates that it will spend about $5.2 billion on the strategic
    computing initiative between fiscal years 1996 and 2004. Our
    testimony covers how effectively DOE has managed the use and
    acquisition of its supercomputers, and DOE's management of its
    strategic computing initiative. Our testimony is based on two
    reports we issued in 1998 and 1999.1 In summary, we found that DOE
    had not effectively overseen the use and acquisition of
    supercomputers and that oversight of the $5.2 billion strategic
    computing initiative is hampered by weaknesses in management and
    information processes. In July 1998, we reported that DOE's
    national laboratories used only about 59 percent of their
    available supercomputing capacity and were missing opportunities
    to share these resources. At that time, DOE had about 17 percent
    of the world's supercomputing capacity and was planning to almost
    triple its capacity over the next 3 years. In terms of managing
    acquisitions of supercomputers, we concluded that DOE has not
    effectively overseen the process. Furthermore, the strategic
    computing initiative's strategic plan is out of date, annual plans
    have been prepared only sporadically, and milestones are not well
    defined. Currently, little information exists to track the
    program's progress or to compare the program's accomplishments
    with its milestones. Consequently, it is difficult to determine
    which of the hundreds of milestones have been met, which are
    behind schedule, or even which are still relevant, given changes
    in the program. Background    In July 1998, we reported that nine
    DOE laboratories have supercomputers. DOE's program offices fund
    supercomputer purchases (or leases), and the laboratories'
    management and operating contractors acquire and operate the
    systems. According to DOE, it acquires new supercomputers
    relatively frequently because of rapidly changing technology.
    Since 1993, when 1Information Technology: Department of Energy
    Does Not Effectively Manage Its Supercomputers (GAO/RCED-98-208,
    July 17, 1998) and Nuclear Weapons: DOE Needs to Improve Oversight
    of the $5 Billion Strategic Computing Initiative (GAO/RCED-99-195,
    June 28, 1999). Page 1
    GAO/T-RCED-99-257 statistics were first collected, DOE has
    consistently had several supercomputers that have ranked among the
    world's most powerful as measured by a list of the top 500
    supercomputers in the world. DOE uses supercomputers to support
    two major research missions. First, DOE uses them in the strategic
    computing initiative to ensure the safety and reliability of
    nuclear weapons. The initiative is part of DOE's Office of Defense
    Programs' nuclear stockpile stewardship program. DOE created the
    initiative as a substitute for the physical testing of nuclear
    weapons. The initiative is intended to provide the unprecedented
    simulation capabilities needed to help verify the safety and
    reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. The
    estimated cost of the initiative is about $5.2 billion for fiscal
    years 1996 through 2004. Second, DOE's Office of Science funds
    non-defense computational research projects, including specific
    science and engineering problems that require large-scale
    supercomputing capability. In 1996, the Congress passed the
    Clinger-Cohen Act, which requires federal agencies to adopt a
    comprehensive approach to acquiring and managing information
    technology (including supercomputers), and charged the Office of
    Management and Budget with oversight responsibility. DOE Does Not
    We found that DOE had not effectively overseen the use and
    acquisition of Effectively Manage Its supercomputers. During 1997,
    DOE's national laboratories used only about 59 percent of their
    available supercomputing capacity and were missing Supercomputers
    opportunities to share these resources. Utilization rates varied
    among the laboratories from about 31 percent to about 75 percent.
    At that time, DOE had about 17 percent of the world's
    supercomputing capacity and was planning to almost triple its
    capacity during fiscal years 1998 through 2000. Sharing of
    supercomputers among DOE laboratories and with DOE-funded off-site
    users was not generally considered by the Department as a way to
    better use existing resources and/or to forgo the need to acquire
    more supercomputers. In addition, the largest supercomputers were
    not being used to run the very large-scale programs that were used
    to justify their acquisition. In 1997, for example, less than 5
    percent of the jobs run on the largest supercomputers used more
    than one-half of the machines' capabilities. Because DOE does not
    manage supercomputers centrally, no single person or office within
    the Department knows at a given time how many Page 2
    GAO/T-RCED-99-257 supercomputers the Department has agency-wide,
    what they cost, or how they are being utilized. The Department
    lacks an investment strategy and a defined process to ensure that
    supercomputer acquisitions are fully justified and represent the
    best use of funds among competing priorities. Instead, individual
    program offices (e.g., Office of Defense Programs, Office of
    Science) independently procure and operate supercomputers and the
    Department's chief information officer does not oversee the
    acquisition of these supercomputers. As a result, new
    supercomputers are planned and acquired with little departmental
    oversight, while underutilized capacity already exists within the
    Department. We also reported that DOE's proposed implementation of
    the Clinger-Cohen Act would not improve departmental oversight. In
    April 1998, the Department outlined its plan to implement a new
    investment planning and oversight process for information
    technology in response to the Clinger-Cohen Act. DOE's process
    separately manages administrative and scientific computers,
    leaving the responsibility for scientific computers-including
    supercomputers-to individual program offices. This proposed
    approach reflects the view of the Department's program offices
    that supercomputers are research "tools" rather than information
    technology investments. This approach may also allow DOE's program
    offices to continue acquiring supercomputers outside the
    Department's normal process for complying with the Clinger-Cohen
    Act. Contrary to what is envisioned in the Clinger-Cohen Act, this
    approach effectively places the vast majority of DOE's information
    technology resources outside the purview of the chief information
    officer. DOE Needs to            In June 1999, we reported that
    significant weaknesses in DOE's Improve Oversight of    management
    and information processes hamper the oversight of the strategic
    computing initiative. Although program managers report that the
    Strategic           many milestones have been met, the lack of a
    comprehensive planning and Computing Initiative    progress
    tracking system makes assessment of the program's progress
    difficult and subjective. Currently, the program's strategic plan
    is out of date, annual plans have been prepared only sporadically,
    and milestones are not well defined. Furthermore, little
    information exists to track the program's progress or to compare
    the program's accomplishments with its milestones. Consequently,
    it is difficult to determine which of the hundreds of milestones
    have been met, which are behind schedule, or even which are still
    relevant, given changes in the program. Page 3
    GAO/T-RCED-99-257 Program cost estimates have also increased
    substantially. In 1995, DOE estimated that costs for the first 5
    years of the program (fiscal years 1996 through 2001) would be
    $1.7 billion. By 1999, estimated costs for that same 5-year period
    increased to $2.9 billion. DOE currently estimates that the
    program will cost about $5.2 billion for fiscal years 1996 through
    2004. Some of the cost increases result from the shift to
    computer-based simulations, while some reflect weaknesses in DOE's
    cost estimation. Contact and       For future contacts regarding
    this testimony, please contact Susan D. Acknowledgment    Kladiva
    at (202) 512-3841. Individuals making contributions to this
    testimony included Linda Chu, Daniel Feehan, Anne McCaffrey, and
    Edward Zadjura. (141364)          Page 4
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