Food Safety: U.S. Needs a Single Agency to Administer a Unified,
Risk-Based Inspection System (Testimony, 08/04/1999, GAO/T-RCED-99-256).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the need to revamp
the federal food safety system, focusing on: (1) an overview of GAO's
work on the problems resulting from the fragmented food safety system;
and (2) where in the federal government food safety inspection
responsibilities should reside.
GAO noted that: (1) the structure of the food safety system--which costs
the federal treasury more than $1 billion annually--hampers efforts to
address public health concerns associated with existing and newly
identified food safety risks; (2) the fragmented system was not
developed under any rational plan but was patched together over many
years to address specific health threats from particular food products;
(3) efforts to address food safety concerns--particularly changing
health risks--are hampered by inconsistent and inflexible oversight and
enforcement authorities, inefficient resource use, and ineffective
coordination; (4) a single food safety inspection agency responsible for
administering a uniform set of laws is the most effective way for the
federal government to resolve these long-standing problems, deal with
emerging food safety issues, and better ensure a safe food supply; (5)
while GAO believes that this would be the most effective approach, GAO
recognizes that there are short-term costs and other considerations
associated with setting up a new government agency; (6) a second option,
though less desirable, would be to consolidate food safety activities in
an existing department; (7) in such an event, consolidating these
activities--either in the Department of Agriculture or the Food and Drug
Administration--presents benefits and drawbacks; and (8) regardless, it
is unlikely that fundamental, long-lasting improvements in food safety
will occur until food safety activities are consolidated under a single
agency and the patchwork of food safety legislation is altered to make
it uniform and risk-based.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-RCED-99-256
TITLE: Food Safety: U.S. Needs a Single Agency to Administer a
Unified, Risk-Based Inspection System
DATE: 08/04/1999
SUBJECT: Food industry
Safety regulation
Redundancy
Health hazards
Federal agency reorganization
Interagency relations
Consumer protection
Food inspection
IDENTIFIER: Salmonella Enteritidis Bacteria
Ireland
Great Britain
Denmark
Canada
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Committee on Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate
For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
10:30 a.m. EDT
Wednesday
August 4, 1999
FOOD SAFETY - U.S. NEEDS A SINGLE
AGENCY TO ADMINISTER A UNIFIED,
RISK-BASED INSPECTION SYSTEM
Statement of Lawrence J. Dyckman,
Director, Food and Agriculture Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division
GAO/T-RCED-99-256
GAO/RCED-99-256T
(150152)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
USDA -
HHS -
FSIS -
EPA -
FDA -
CDC -
ARS -
AMS -
NMFS -
FTC -
============================================================ Chapter 0
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the need to revamp the
federal food safety system. Each year, millions of people become ill
and thousands die from eating unsafe foods. As we have stated in
previous reports and testimonies, fundamental changes to the food
safety system are needed, including moving to a uniform, risk-based
inspection system, administered by a single agency. (See Related GAO
Products.). My testimony today provides an overview of our work on
the problems resulting from the current fragmented food safety system
and discusses our views on where in the federal government food
safety inspection responsibilities should reside.
In summary, the structure of the current food safety system�which
costs the federal treasury more than $1 billion annually�hampers
efforts to address public health concerns associated with existing
and newly identified food safety risks. The fragmented system was
not developed under any rational plan but was patched together over
many years to address specific health threats from particular food
products. Efforts to address food safety concerns�particularly
changing health risks�are hampered by inconsistent and inflexible
oversight and enforcement authorities, inefficient resource use, and
ineffective coordination.
A single food safety inspection agency responsible for administering
a uniform set of laws is the most effective way for the federal
government to resolve these long-standing problems, deal with
emerging food safety issues, and better ensure a safe food supply.
While we believe that this would be the most effective approach, we
recognize that there are short term costs and other considerations
associated with setting up a new government agency. A second option,
though less desirable, would be to consolidate food safety activities
in an existing department. In such an event, consolidating these
activities--either in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) or
the Department of Health and Human Service's (HHS) Food and Drug
Administration�presents benefits and drawbacks. Regardless, it is
unlikely that fundamental, long-lasting improvements in food safety
will occur until food safety activities are consolidated under a
single agency and the current patchwork of food safety legislation is
altered to make it uniform and risk-based.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Twelve different agencies administer as many as 35 laws that make up
the federal food safety system. Two agencies account for most
federal spending on, and regulatory responsibilities for, food
safety: The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), under USDA,
is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and some eggs and
some egg products, while FDA is responsible for the safety of most
other foods. Other agencies with food safety responsibilities and/or
programs include HHS' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, Agricultural Research Service, and Grain
Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration; the Department of
Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service; the Department of the
Treasury's U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the Federal
Trade Commission. Appendix I describes the food safety roles and
responsibilities of these 12 agencies and shows each agency's food
safety funding and staffing level for fiscal year 1998.
Despite the more than $1 billion spent annually on the current food
safety system, food safety remains a concern. For example, in late
1998, 101 people became ill from eating hot dogs contaminated with
listeria�a pathogenic bacterium. Of those who became ill, 15 died
and 6 suffered a miscarriage or stillbirth. In May and June of this
year, about 120 people became ill in the Richmond, Virginia, area
because they ate at a local restaurant where some of the food
contained eggs contaminated with the pathogenic bacterium Salmonella
Enteritidis. Because many cases of foodborne illness go undiagnosed,
estimates of the actual number of incidents that occur nationally
each year cover a wide range--from a low of 6 million cases to a high
of 33 million cases, leading to about 9,000 deaths annually,
according to CDC. In medical costs and productivity losses,
foodborne illness costs the nation between $7 billion and $37 billion
per year, according to USDA estimates.
CURRENT FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY
SYSTEM NEEDS OVERHAUL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
During the past 25 years, we and other organizations, such as the
National Academy of Sciences, have issued reports detailing problems
with the federal food safety system and made numerous recommendations
for change. While many of these recommendations have been acted
upon, improvement efforts have fallen short, largely because the
separate agencies continue to operate under the different regulatory
approaches implicit in their basic authorities. Consequently, it is
unlikely that fundamental, lasting improvements in food safety will
occur until systematic legislative and structural changes are made to
the entire food safety system.
The federal regulatory system for food safety evolved haphazardly.
As the understanding of foodborne hazards grew, food safety concerns
changed. Addressing one new worry after another, legislators amended
old laws and enacted new ones. Programs emerged piecemeal, typically
in response to particular health threats or economic crises. The
laws not only assigned specific food commodities to particular
agencies but also provided the agencies with different authorities
and responsibilities, reflecting significantly different regulatory
approaches. The resulting inflexible and inconsistent oversight and
enforcement authorities, inefficient resource use, and ineffective
coordination efforts have hampered and continue to impede efforts to
address the public health concerns associated with existing and newly
identified food safety risks. The following examples represent some
of the problems we have found in reviewing the nation's food safety
system:
-- Federal agencies are not using their inspection resources
efficiently. Because the frequency of inspection is based on
the agencies' regulatory approach, some foods and establishments
may be receiving too much attention while others may not be
receiving enough. Firms that process food products posing
similar health risks to the public are inspected at widely
different frequencies, depending on which agency�and thus which
regulatory approach�governs them. Although the level of health
risk is similar for all animal products, meat and poultry plants
regulated by FSIS are inspected at least daily, while firms that
are under FDA's jurisdiction such as, processors of rabbit,
venison, and quail, are generally inspected, on average once
every ten years. Furthermore, food establishments are sometimes
inspected by more than one federal agency because they
participate in programs or process foods that are under the
jurisdiction of different agencies.
-- Responsibilities for the oversight of chemical residues in foods
are fragmented among FDA, USDA, and EPA. As a result, chemicals
posing similar risks may be treated differently by the agencies
because they operate under different laws and regulations.
Furthermore, the states use different methodologies for
determining the amount of fish that can be safely consumed. For
example, under the Clean Water Act, EPA is required only to
consider risks to human health and aquatic life when conducting
water quality assessments. However, under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA is allowed to consider both health
risks and benefits in establishing tolerances for chemical
contaminants in food. Therefore, as we reported in 1994,\1 FDA
standards for some chemicals are often less stringent than those
developed by EPA. This inconsistency is often reflected in the
methodology the states use to determine the levels of fish
consumption considered safe. According to EPA officials as of
1998, about 30 states use a methodology similar to EPA's and
about 20 states use a different methodology such as one similar
to FDA's.\2 Thus a fish considered unsafe to eat in one state
may become safe to eat if it swims to another state.
-- Enforcement authorities granted to the agencies also differ.
USDA agencies have the authority to (1) require food processors
to register so that they can be inspected, (2) presume that food
firms are involved in interstate commerce and are thus subject
to regulation, (3) prohibit the use of processing equipment that
may potentially contaminate food products, and (4) temporarily
detain any suspect foods. Conversely, FDA, without such
authority, is often hindered in overseeing food processors.
-- Oversight of imported food is inconsistent and unreliable.\3 To
ensure the safety of meat and poultry imports, FSIS has a
statutory mandate to require that each of the countries
exporting meat and poultry to the United States demonstrate that
it has a food safety system that is equivalent to the United
States' system. Under the equivalency requirement, FSIS has
shifted most of the responsibility for ensuring product safety
to the exporting country. The exporting country performs the
primary inspection, allowing FSIS to leverage its resources by
focusing its reviews on verifying the efficacy of the exporting
countries' systems. In contrast, FDA lacks the legal authority
to require that countries exporting foods to the United States
have food safety systems equivalent to ours. Without such
authority FDA must rely primarily on its port-of-entry
inspections, which covered less than 2 percent of shipments in
1997, to detect and bar unsafe foods. Such an approach has been
widely discredited as resource-intensive and ineffective.
-- Fragmented federal responsibilities also cause problems for the
food industry because communication about health risks
associated with contaminated food products is impaired. As we
reported in April 1998,\4 nearly every day during May, June, and
early July 1997, officials from FDA, FSIS, and the Environmental
Protection Agency participated in conference calls to discuss
the latest developments in the investigation of animal feeds
contaminated with dioxin (a suspected carcinogen) to determine
what actions, if any, the agencies needed to take to protect
consumers. While FDA and FSIS worked together to make decisions
on the preferred course of action, each agency was responsible
for communicating its decisions to the producers or processors
under its jurisdiction. However, complete information was not
communicated to all affected parties. For example, when
officials from FDA, the agency responsible for regulating animal
feed, met with meat and poultry producers, their primary concern
was with the contaminated feed, not with the animals that had
consumed it. Thus, they did not necessarily tell these
producers of the actions they should take for their affected
animals. FSIS, the agency responsible for regulating meat and
poultry processors, sent word of the testing requirements to
meat and poultry processors and to trade associations, but it
did not notify meat and poultry producers. FSIS has
jurisdiction over processing plants, but not producers.
-- The agencies have made attempts to coordinate their activities
to overcome the fragmentation and avoid duplication or gaps in
coverage, but history has shown that as time passes, such
efforts frequently prove to be ineffective. We have reported in
the past that unsafe conditions in food processing plants have
gone unaddressed because the notifications required by
coordination agreements do not always take place or the problems
referred to the responsible agency are not promptly
investigated.\5 As we testified before this Subcommittee last
month, egg safety remains questionable, despite FSIS' and FDA's
efforts to coordinate their activities on egg and egg product
safety�a shared responsibility between the two agencies.\6 In
1991, an amendment to the Egg Products Inspection Act mandated
that federal regulations be issued requiring the refrigeration
of shell eggs. Eight years later, FSIS regulations, effective
August 27, 1999, set refrigeration requirements for eggs from
the packing plant through transportation to the retail level.
However, FDA, which has responsibility for egg safety at the
retail level has not enacted similar regulations; therefore,
refrigerating eggs at the retail level is not yet required.\7
These problems, which apply to many food products, are clearly
illustrated in the regulation of pizza. Figure 1 shows the federal
responsibilities for ensuring the safety of a frozen meat pizza and a
frozen cheese pizza.
Figure 1: Federal Agencies
Responsible for Ensuring Safe
Pizza
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\1 Food Safety: Changes Needed to Minimize Unsafe Chemicals in Food
(GAO/RCED-94-192, Sept. 26, 1994).
\2 EPA officials stated that further review of the 20 states using a
methodology different than EPA's may reveal that some of them are
actually using a methodology similar to EPA's.
\3 Food Safety: Federal Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Imported
Foods Are Inconsistent and Unreliable (GAO/RCED-98-103, Apr. 30,
1998).
\4 Food Safety: Agencies' Handling of a Dioxin Incident Caused
Hardships for Some Producers and Processors (GAO/RCED-98-104, Apr.
10, 1998).
\5 Food Safety and Quality: Uniform, Risk-Based Inspection System
Needed to Ensure Safe Food Supply (GAO/RCED-92-152, June 26, 1992).
\6 Food Safety: U.S. Lacks a Consistent Farm-to-Table Approach to
Egg Safety (GAO/RCED-99-184, July 1, 1999).
\7 On July 1, 1999, FDA announced proposed regulations for ensuring
the safety of eggs that contained, among other things, refrigeration
requirements for eggs at the retail level.
A SINGLE AGENCY WOULD ENHANCE
FOOD SAFETY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The most effective solution to the current fragmentation of the
federal food safety system is consolidating food safety programs
under a single agency with uniform authority. Consolidating food
safety activities is hardly a new concept. Such a concept was
debated in 1972 in connection with a proposed bill to transfer FDA's
responsibilities, including its food safety activities, to a new
independent agency, called the Consumer Safety Agency. This new
agency was to be responsible for, among other things, ensuring the
safety of the nation's food supply, although meat and poultry
inspection was to remain in USDA.
Whether an independent single agency is preferable to a component of
an existing department, as we testified in 1972,\8 is a matter of
judgment upon which opinions differ. However, we continue to
believe, as we testified in 1994,\9 that a single independent food
safety agency administering a unified, risk-based food safety system
is the preferred approach, although we recognize the difficulties in
establishing a new government agency. Regardless of where a single
agency is housed, what is most important are certain principles,
including a clear commitment by the federal government to consumer
protection, a system that is founded on uniform laws that are
risk-based, adequate resources devoted to that purpose, and competent
and aggressive administration of the laws by the responsible agency.
Although these principles can be influenced by organizational
placement, commitment to them probably depends more on public and
political concern for the importance of the mission.
In this regard, we recently reported on the experiences of four
countries that have consolidated or are in the process of
consolidating their food safety responsibilities.\10 Two of the
four�Great Britain and Ireland�were responding to heightened public
concerns about the safety of their food supplies and chose to
consolidate responsibilities in the agencies that report to their
ministers of health. For example, the British plan to consolidate
food safety activities into a single agency was largely a result of
the government's perceived mishandling of an outbreak of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (commonly referred to as �mad cow�
disease). Public opinion viewed the agriculture ministry, which had
dual responsibilities to promote agriculture and the food industry
and to regulate food safety, as slow to react because it was too
concerned about protecting the cattle industry.
The other two countries�Canada and Denmark�were more concerned about
program effectiveness and cost saving and accordingly consolidated
activities in agencies that report to their ministers of agriculture,
who already control most of the food safety resources. For example,
Canada did not face a loss of public confidence, as did Great Britain
and Ireland, but instead faced a budgetary crisis; it therefore
sought ways to reduce federal expenditures. By combining the various
elements of its food inspection services, Canada expected to save
about 13 percent of its food inspection budget, or $44 million
Canadian ($29 million U.S.) per year.
We are not alone in calling for fundamental changes to the federal
food safety system. In an August 1998 report, the National Academy
of Sciences concluded that the current fragmented federal food safety
structure is not well equipped to meet emerging challenges.\11 As
such, the Academy report recommended that the Congress establish, by
statute, a unified and central framework for managing federal food
safety programs, one that is headed by a single official and has the
responsibility for, and control of, resources for all federal food
safety activities, including outbreak management, standard-setting,
inspection, monitoring, surveillance, risk assessment, enforcement,
research, and education.
According to the Academy report, many members of the committee
believed that the most viable means of achieving food safety goals
would be to create a single, unified agency headed by a single
administrator�an agency that would incorporate the several relevant
functions now dispersed, and in many instances separately organized,
among three departments and a department-level agency. However,
designing the structure and assessing the associated costs involved
were not possible in the timeframe given the committee, nor were
these tasks included in the committee's charge. As such, the
committee did not recommend a specific organizational structure but
instead provided several possible configurations for illustrative
purposes. These were
-- forming a Food Safety Council of representatives from the
agencies, with a central chair appointed by the President,
reporting to the Congress and having control of resources;
-- designating one current agency as the lead agency and making the
head of that agency the responsible individual;
-- establishing a single agency reporting to one current
cabinet-level secretary; and
-- establishing an independent single agency at the cabinet level.
In response to the National Academy's report, the President
established a Council on Food Safety and directed it to provide him
with an assessment of the Academy report within 180 days.\12 The
council was also charged with developing a comprehensive strategic
plan for federal food safety activities and making recommendations to
the President on how to implement the plan.
In its March 1999 report to the President,\13 the Council agreed with
the goal of the Academy's recommendation that there should be a fully
integrated food safety system and undertook to assess structural
models and other mechanisms that could strengthen the federal food
safety system through better coordination, planning, and resource
allocation. In its analysis, the council said it plans to determine
whether certain models of reorganization would have advantages for
coordination and allocation of resources while also considering how
each agency's responsibilities that are not driven by food safety
might affect food safety responsibilities.
--------------------
\8 Hearings on the Consumer Safety Act of 1972 before the
Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization and Government Research,
Senate Committee on Government Operations (1972).
\9 Food Safety: A Unified, Risk-Based Food Safety System Needed
(GAO/T-RCED-94-223, May 25, 1994).
\10 Food Safety: Experiences of Four Countries in Consolidating
Their Food Safety Systems (GAO/RCED-99-80, Apr. 20, 1999).
\11 Ensuring Safe Food From Production to Consumption (Institute of
Medicine, National Research Council, National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 1998).
\12 The President's Council on Food Safety comprises, among others,
the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and
Commerce, and the Administrator of EPA.
\13 President's Council on Food Safety Assessment of the NAS Report:
Ensuring Safe Food from Production to Consumption, (President's
Council on Food Safety, Mar. 1999).
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, as the United States prepares to enter a
new millenium, we believe the Congress has an opportunity to
transform our present food safety system into one that better
protects consumers' health. Creating a single agency to administer
food safety activities that are uniform and risk-based is the most
effective way for the federal government to resolve long-standing
problems, deal with emerging food safety issues, and better ensure
the safety of our country's food supply. This completes our prepared
statement. We would be happy to respond to any questions.
CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Lawrence
J. Dyckman at (202) 512-5138. Individuals making key contributions
to this testimony were Keith Oleson and John Nicholson.
FOOD SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES AND
FISCAL YEAR 1998 FUNDING AND
STAFFING LEVELS AT 12 FEDERAL
AGENCIES
=========================================================== Appendix I
(Dollars in millions)
Fiscal
year Fiscal
1998 year
funding\ 1998
Agency a staffing
--------------------------------------------------------------------- -------- --------
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the Department of Health $254\b 2,796\b
and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for ensuring that domestic
and imported food products (except meat, poultry, and processed egg
products) are safe, wholesome, and properly labeled. The Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended, is the major law governing
FDA's activities to ensure food safety and quality. The act also
authorizes FDA to maintain a surveillance of all animal drugs,
feeds, and veterinary devices to ensure that drugs and feeds used in
animals are safe and properly labeled, and produce no human health
hazards when used in food-producing animals.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), within HHS, is 15 50
charged with protecting the nation's public health by providing
leadership and direction in preventing and controlling diseases and
responding to public health emergencies. CDC conducts surveillance
for foodborne diseases; develops new epidemiological and laboratory
tools to enhance the surveillance and detection of outbreaks; and
performs other activities to strengthen local, state, and national
capacity to identify, characterize, and control foodborne hazards.
CDC engages in public health activities related to food safety under
the general authority of the Public Health Service Act, as amended.
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), within the U.S. Department 676 9,702
of Agriculture (USDA), is responsible for ensuring that meat,
poultry, and some eggs and egg products moving in interstate and
foreign commerce are safe, wholesome, and correctly marked, labeled,
and packaged. FSIS carries out its inspection responsibilities under
the Federal Meat Inspection Act, as amended, the Poultry Products
Inspection Act, as amended, and the Egg Products Inspection Act, as
amended.
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), within USDA, is \c \c
responsible for ensuring the health and care of animals and plants.
APHIS has no statutory authority for public health issues unless the
concern to public health is also a concern to the health of animals
or plants. APHIS identifies research and data needs and coordinates
research programs designed to protect the animal industry against
pathogens or diseases that are a risk to humans to improve food
safety.
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), \c \c
within USDA, is responsible for establishing quality standards and
providing for a national inspection system to facilitate the
marketing of grain and other related products. Certain inspection
services, such as testing corn for the presence of aflatoxin, enable
the market to assess the value of a product on the basis of its
compliance with contractual specifications and FDA requirements.
GIPSA has no regulatory responsibility regarding food safety. Under
a memorandum of understanding with FDA, GIPSA reports to FDA certain
lots of grain, rice, pulses, or food products (which were officially
inspected as part of GIPSA's service functions) that are considered
objectionable under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as
amended, the U.S. Grain Standards Act, as amended, and the
Agriculture Marketing Act of 1946, as amended.
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), within USDA, is primarily 10\d 42\d
responsible for establishing the standards of quality and condition
and for grading the quality of dairy, egg, fruit, meat, poultry,
seafood, and vegetable products. As part of this grading process,
AMS considers safety factors, such as the cleanliness of the
product. AMS carries out its wide array of programs to facilitate
marketing under more than 30 statutes�for example, the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended; the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1946, as amended; the Egg Products Inspection Act,
as amended; the Export Apple and Pear Act, as amended; and the
Export Grape and Plum Act, as amended. AMS is largely funded with
user fees.
Agricultural Research Service (ARS), within USDA, is responsible for 55 167
conducting a wide range of research relating to the Department's
mission, including food safety research. ARS carries out its
programs under the Department of Agriculture Organic Act of 1862;
the Research and Marketing Act of 1946, as amended; and the National
Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977,
as amended.
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), within the Department of 13\d 174\d
Commerce, conducts its voluntary seafood safety and quality
inspection programs under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as
amended, and the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, as amended. In
addition to the inspection and certification services provided for
fishery products for human consumption, NMFS provides inspection and
certification services for animal feeds and pet foods containing a
fish base.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for regulating 127 970
all pesticide products sold or distributed in the United States and
setting maximum allowed residue levels�tolerances�for pesticides on
food commodities and animal feed. EPA's activities are conducted
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, as
amended, and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces the Federal Trade Commission \e \e
Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices. FTC's
food safety objective is to prevent consumer deception through the
misrepresentations of food.
U.S. Customs Service, within the Department of the Treasury, is \e \e
responsible for collecting revenues and enforcing various customs
and related laws. Customs assists FDA and FSIS in carrying out their
regulatory roles in food safety.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, within the Department of \e \e
the Treasury, is responsible for administering and enforcing laws
covering the production (including safety), use, and distribution of
alcoholic beverages under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act and
the Internal Revenue Code.
=========================================================================================
Total $1,150 13,901
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Fiscal year 1998 appropriated funds.
\b FDA's data includes funding and staffing for various programs
across FDA that are involved with food safety activities, including
the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, the Center for
Veterinary Medicine, the field components for these centers, as well
as overall agency-wide support.
\c The agency did not specify its food safety resources.
\d Agencies' funding and staffing levels are for both safety and
quality inspection activities.
\e We did not obtain these agencies' food safety budgets due to the
small amount of funds for these activities in previous years.
Source: GAO's analysis of federal agencies' data.
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1
Food Safety: U.S. Lacks a Consistent Farm-to-Table Approach to Egg
Safety (GAO/RCED-99-184, July 1, 1999).
Food Safety: Experiences of Four Countries in Consolidating Their
Food Safety Systems (GAO/RCED-99-80, Apr. 20, 1999).
Food Safety: Opportunities to Redirect Federal Resources and Funds
Can Enhance Effectiveness (GAO/RCED-98-224, Aug. 6, 1998).
Food Safety: Federal Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Imported Foods
Are Inconsistent and Unreliable (GAO/RCED-98-103, Apr. 30, 1998).
Food Safety: Agencies' Handling of a Dioxin Incident Caused
Hardships for Some Producers and Processors (GAO/RCED-98-104, Apr.
10, 1998).
Food Safety: Information on Foodborne Illnesses (GAO/RCED-96-96, May
8, 1996).
Food Safety: Changes Needed to Minimize Unsafe Chemicals in Food
(GAO/RCED-94-192, Sept. 26, 1994).
Food Safety: A Unified, Risk-Based Food Safety System Needed
(GAO/T-RCED-94-223, May 25, 1994).
Food Safety: Risk-Based Inspections and Microbial Monitoring Needed
for Meat and Poultry (GAO/RCED-94-110, May 19, 1994).
Food Safety and Quality: Uniform, Risk-Based Inspection System
Needed to Ensure Safe Food Supply (GAO/RCED-92-152, June 26, 1992).
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