Department of Energy: Need to Address Longstanding Management Weaknesses
(Testimony, 07/13/1999, GAO/T-RCED-99-255).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed proposals for
reorganizing the Department of Energy (DOE), focusing on: (1)
longstanding weaknesses in DOE's management that GAO has identified over
the past several years; (2) the effect that the proposals to deal with
national security weaknesses would have on addressing these weaknesses;
and (3) a framework for evaluating DOE's missions and possible
reorganization.

GAO noted that: (1) the security problems facing DOE underscore
longstanding weaknesses in the Department's management structure and
processes; (2) while the security lapses raise serious concerns, any
number of past DOE management problems could have easily triggered
today's debate; (3) for example, DOE's longstanding failures in managing
major environmental cleanup projects also illustrate the need to
fundamentally change how DOE operates; (4) at the core of DOE's
weaknesses is its inability to manage its disparate missions within a
highly complex organizational structure; (5) in particular, unclear
lines of authority throughout DOE have long resulted in weak oversight
of contracts and poor accountability for program management, leading GAO
to identify contracting as a high risk activity; (6) for decades, DOE
has failed to respond to reports by GAO, external experts, and its own
consultants that highlight these weaknesses; (7) additionally, DOE has
resisted independent regulatory oversight over nuclear and worker
safety, perpetuating a perception that it lacks accountability; (8) DOE
has also been reluctant to open up key laboratory contracts to new
bidders, reducing confidence that it has hired the most capable and
responsive contractor; (9) while the recent proposals for reorganizing
DOE's national security mission will clarify some lines of authority, a
more complete solution is needed; (10) the proposals assume that
existing missions are still valid in their present forms and that DOE is
still the best place to manage them; (11) along with many of the experts
GAO surveyed, GAO thinks a more fundamental rethinking of missions is in
order; (12) a framework exists for evaluating DOE's missions by asking
basic questions about both the validity of missions and their
organizational placement; and (13) indeed, now is an ideal time for
reconstructing DOE into a more manageable agency.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-99-255
     TITLE:  Department of Energy: Need to Address Longstanding
	     Management Weaknesses
      DATE:  07/13/1999
   SUBJECT:  Federal agency reorganization
	     Agency missions
	     Accountability
	     Research program management
	     Strategic planning
	     Public administration
	     Internal controls
	     Federal facilities
	     Atomic energy defense activities

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Cover
================================================================ COVER

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on
Science, and the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Committee on
Commerce, House of Representatives

For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m.  EDT
Tuesday
July 13, 1999

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - NEED TO
ADDRESS LONGSTANDING MANAGEMENT
WEAKNESSES

Statement of Victor S.  Rezendes, Director,
Energy, Resources, and Science Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-99-255

GAO/RCED-99-255T

(141362)

Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD -
  DOE -
  EPA -
  IDA -

============================================================ Chapter 0

Messrs.  Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: 

We are here today to testify on proposals for reorganizing the
Department of Energy (DOE).  As you know, there is renewed concern
about DOE's management of its missions after recent revelations that
foreign countries have obtained nuclear weapons designs and other
classified information.  Our testimony today discusses (1)
long-standing weaknesses in DOE's management that we have identified
over the past several years, (2) the effect that current proposals to
deal with national security weaknesses would have on addressing these
weaknesses, and (3) a framework for evaluating DOE's missions and
possible reorganization.  Our testimony is based on our management
reviews of DOE and our past and ongoing work on a wide variety of DOE
programs and activities.\1

In summary, the current security problems facing DOE underscore
long-standing weaknesses in the Department's management structure and
processes.  While the current security lapses raise serious concerns,
any number of past DOE management problems could have easily
triggered today's debate.  For example, DOE's long-standing failures
in managing major environmental cleanup projects also illustrate the
need to fundamentally change how DOE operates.  At the core of DOE's
weaknesses is its inability to manage its disparate missions within a
highly complex organizational structure.  In particular, unclear
lines of authority throughout DOE have long resulted in weak
oversight of contractors and poor accountability for program
management, leading us to identify contracting as a ï¿½high riskï¿½
activity.  For decades, DOE has failed to respond to reports by us,
external experts, and its own consultants that highlight these
weaknesses.  Additionally, DOE has resisted independent regulatory
oversight over nuclear and worker safety, perpetuating a perception
that it lacks accountability.  DOE has also been reluctant to open up
key laboratory contracts to new bidders, reducing confidence that it
has hired the most capable and responsive contractor. 

While the recent proposals for reorganizing DOE's national security
mission will clarify some lines of authority, a more complete
solution is needed.  Current proposals assume that existing missions
are still valid in their present forms and that DOE is still the best
place to manage them.  Along with many of the experts we surveyed, we
think a more fundamental rethinking of missions is in order.  A
framework exists for evaluating DOE's missions by asking basic
questions about both the validity of missions and their
organizational placement.  Indeed, now is an ideal time for
reconstructing DOE into a more manageable agency. 

--------------------
\1 A list of related products appears at the end of this statement. 

   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Created predominantly to deal with the energy crisis of the 1970s,
DOE's mission and budget priorities have changed dramatically over
time.  By the early 1980s, its nuclear weapons production had grown
substantially; and following revelations about environmental
mismanagement in the mid-to-late-1980s, DOE's cleanup budget began to
expand--and now overshadows other activities.  With the Cold War's
end, DOE found new or expanded missions in industrial competitiveness
and science.  Responding to changing missions and priorities with
organizational structures, processes, and practices that had been
established largely to build nuclear weapons has been a daunting task
for DOE.  For example, DOE's approach to contract management, first
created during the World War II Manhattan Project, allowed private
contractors to manage and operate billion-dollar facilities with
minimal direct federal oversight, yet reimbursed them for all their
costs regardless of their actual achievements.  After a number of
reports by us and other oversight groups, DOE is now attempting to
impose modern standards for accountability and performance. 

   DOE HAS LONG-STANDING
   MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

We recently testified that security problems at DOE's laboratories
reflect a lack of accountability.\2 The well-documented history of
security lapses in the nuclear weapons complex shows that DOE fails
to hold its contractors accountable for meeting essential
responsibilities.  Achieving accountability in DOE is made difficult
by its complex and ever-changing organizational structure.  Past
advisory groups and internal DOE studies have often reported on the
Department's dysfunctional structure, with unclear chains of command
among headquarters, field offices, and contractors.  For example: 

  -- The FBI, which examined DOE's counterintelligence activities in
     1997, noted a gap between authority and responsibility,
     particularly when national interests compete with the
     specialized interests of the academic or corporate managements
     that operate the laboratories.  The FBI found that the autonomy
     that DOE grants has made national guidance, oversight, and
     accountability of counterintelligence programs arduous and
     inefficient. 

  -- A 1997 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) cited
     serious flaws in DOE's organizational structure.  IDA noted
     long-standing concerns in DOE about how best to define the
     relationships between field offices and the headquarters program
     offices that sponsor work.  IDA concluded that "the overall
     picture that emerges is one of considerable confusion over
     vertical relationships and the roles of line and staff
     officials." As a consequence of DOE's complex structure, the
     Institute reported, unclear chains of command led to the weak
     integration of programs and functions across the Department and
     confusion over the difference between line and staff roles.\3

  -- A 1997 DOE internal report stated that "lack of clarity,
     inconsistency, and variability in the relationship between
     headquarters management and field organizations has been a
     longstanding criticism of DOE operations .  .  .  .  This is
     particularly true in situations when several headquarters
     programs fund activities at laboratories."\4

  -- DOE's Laboratory Operations Board also reported in 1997 that
     there were inefficiencies due to DOE's complicated management
     structure.  The Board recommended that DOE undertake a major
     effort to rationalize and simplify its headquarters and field
     management structure to clarify roles and responsibilities.\5

  -- As far back as 1982, an advisory group recognized the need for
     organizational change in DOE.  In its 1982 report, DOE's Energy
     Research Advisory Board noted the "layering and fractionation of
     managerial and research and development responsibilities in DOE
     on an excessive number of horizontal and vertical levels."\6

Our own work has shown that DOE's success with managing big projects
is not outstanding.  From 1980 through 1996, we found that DOE
conducted 80 projects that it designated as "major system
acquisitions"--its largest and most critical projects--ranging in
cost from $100 million to billions of dollars.\7 As of June 1996, 31
of the projects had been terminated before completion after total
expenditures of over $10 billion.  Only 15 of the projects were
completed, and most of them were finished behind schedule and with
cost overruns.  Furthermore, 3 of the 15 completed projects had yet
to be used for their intended purposes.  The remaining 34 projects
continue, many with substantial overruns and "schedule slippage." For
example, we found that DOE has spent a decade and almost one-half
billion dollars building the in-tank precipitation facility at its
Savannah River location.  While initially expected to cost $32
million and take 3 years, DOE now estimates it will take until 2007
to complete and cost $2-3 billion.  DOE estimates that that it may
cost up to $75 billion if the proposed alternative is not effective. 
The project was originally expected to cost $103 million and is still
not completed.\8 A National Research Council committee that examined
DOE's project management skills recently concluded, ï¿½The fundamental
deficiency is DOE's organization and culture.ï¿½\9

DOE's fundamental organizational problem is that laboratory
contractors and their field offices receive funding, program
direction and oversight from several different headquarters offices,
which sometimes have overlapping responsibilities.  Creating a
ï¿½cleanï¿½ line of accountability within DOE's complex structure has not
yet been achieved. 

The events in 1997 at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York
illustrate the consequences of organizational confusion and
accountability lapses.  The Secretary of Energy at that
time--Frederico Peï¿½a--fired the contractor operating the laboratory
when he learned that the contractor had breached the community's
trust by failing to ensure it could operate safely.  DOE's own
oversight report on Brookhaven concluded that the Department did not
have a clear chain of command over environment, safety, and health
matters and, as a result, laboratory performance suffered in the
absence of DOE accountability.  In another example, DOE gave the
University of California an ï¿½excellentï¿½ score for managing safeguards
and security at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for 1998, even
though the number of security breaches had risen dramatically. 
Another DOE evaluation, for 1998, criticized the University for its
handling of safeguards and security matters.  DOE's complex
organization stems from the multiple levels of reporting that exist
among contractors, field offices, and headquarters program offices. 
To improve accountability, DOE has tried several different reporting
schemes over the past several years.  For example, until recently
DOE's field units--operations offices--reported directly to a central
office, under a structure that had been in place for several years. 
Thus, while the Los Alamos National Laboratory is primarily funded by
Defense Programs, it reported to a field manager who, in turn,
reported to a central field management office that then reported to
an Under Secretary.  To correct this meandering line of authority,
operations offices now report directly to program offices.  But this
approach to reporting was tried under former Secretary Watkins and
was eventually abandoned when field and laboratory staff became
frustrated by having to report to both program and staff offices on
the same issues.  The former Secretary wanted more direct lines of
reporting to allow focused attention on environment, safety and
health matters. 

Furthermore, DOE's reluctance to allow external oversight for nuclear
safety and worker health and safety at its facilities perpetuates the
Department's chronic lack of accountability.  Virtually all other
federal agencies are externally regulated for nuclear and worker
safety.  Similarly, despite a 5-year-old competition policy, DOE has
never opened up for bidding its multi-billion dollar laboratory
contracts with the University of California.  As a result, DOE cannot
know whether other contractors could perform better at lower cost
than the University of California.  By contrast, DOE has competed
many other laboratory contracts. 

--------------------
\2 Department of Energy:  Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at
DOE Facilities (GAO/T-RCED-99-159, April 20, 1999). 

\3 The Organization and Management of the Nuclear Weapons Program,
Institute for Defense Analyses (March 1997). 

\4 DOE Action Plan for Improved Management of Brookhaven National
Laboratory, DOE (July 1997). 

\5 Department of Energy:  Uncertain Progress in Implementing National
Laboratory Reforms, (GAO/RCED-98-197, Sept.  10, 1998)

\6 The Department of Energy Multiprogram Laboratories:  A Report of
the Energy Research Advisory Board to the United States Department of
Energy (Sept.  1982). 

\7 Department of Energy:  Opportunity to Improve Management of Major
System Acquisitions, (GAO/RCED-97-17, Nov.  26 1996). 

\8 Nuclear Waste:  Process to Remove Radioactive Waste From Savannah
River Tanks Fails to Work (GAO/RCED-99-69, Apr.  30, 1999). 

\9 Improving Project Management In The Department of Energy, National
Research Council, 1999. 

   CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
   ARE INCOMPLETE AND WILL NOT
   ADDRESS DOE'S MAJOR PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

We believe that DOE's organizational weaknesses are a major reason
for the Department's failure to develop long-term solutions to its
recurring problems.  To solve the national security problems revealed
in recent allegations, several reorganization options have been
proposed.  One approach would create a separate agency within DOE, to
be managed by a new Under Secretary for National Security.  Another
would create a semiautonomous agency whose director would report
directly to the Secretary.  Another would transfer DOE's nuclear
weapons activities to the Department of Defense. 

While each of these proposals clarifies some lines of authority in
the national security area, they are a piecemeal approach to DOE's
structural problems and ignore the broader organizational issues. 
Historically, DOE has made piecemeal changes in response to
contemporary problems without undertaking a more fundamental
assessment of its missions.  For example, former Secretary Watkins
redirected lines of reporting to correct environment, safety, and
health deficiencies, and former Secretary O'Leary made changes to
reflect DOE's expanding role in science and technology
competitiveness issues.  None of these efforts had long-term success. 
Reorganization efforts that ignore the broader picture could create
new, unintended consequences. 

To gain insight into DOE's structural issues, experts we consulted in
a 1994 survey supported the view that, at a minimum, a serious
reevaluation of DOE's basic missions is needed.  We surveyed nearly
40 former DOE executives and experts on energy policy about how the
Department's missions relate to current and future national
priorities.  Our respondents included a former President, four former
Secretaries of Energy, former Deputy and Assistant Secretaries of
Energy, and individuals with distinguished involvement in issues of
national energy policy. 

Overwhelmingly, those respondents emphasized that DOE should focus on
its core missions.  Many believed that DOE must re-focus its
attention to such energy-related missions as energy policy, energy
information, and research and development on energy supply.  A
majority favored removing many of the remaining missions from DOE to
other agencies or entities.  For example, many respondents suggested
moving

  -- basic research to the National Science Foundation, the Commerce
     or Interior departments, other federal agencies, or a new
     public-private entity;

  -- some multiprogram national laboratories to other federal
     agencies (or sharing their missions with other agencies);

  -- the management and disposal of civilian nuclear waste to a new
     public-private organization, a new government agency, or the
     Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);

  -- nuclear weapons production and waste cleanup to the Department
     of Defense (DOD) or a new government agency and waste cleanup to
     the Environmental Protection Agency;

  -- environment, safety, and health activities to the Environmental
     Protection Agency or other federal entities;

  -- arms control and verification to DOD, the State Department, or a
     new government nuclear agency;

  -- activities furthering industrial competitiveness to the Commerce
     Department or a public-private organization; and

  -- science education to the National Science Foundation or another
     federal agency. 

DOE is taking some steps to improve its management of both national
security activities and its other missions.  For example, DOE
recently realigned several of its national security functions into
new offices to eliminate overlap and to sharpen focus.  To improve
its laboratory management, a Laboratory Operations Board was created
to provide policy direction on laboratory mission and management
issues.  DOE also identified four ï¿½business linesï¿½ for making
strategic decisions, developed ï¿½roadmapsï¿½ for managing its major
science and technology activities, and began a long-range program to
make its contracting practices more business-like and
results-oriented.  Although these changes are important, they all
assume that existing missions are still valid in their present forms
and that DOE is still the best place to manage them.  Along with many
of the experts we surveyed, we concluded that a more fundamental
rethinking of missions is in order. 

   A FRAMEWORK EXISTS FOR
   EVALUATING DOE'S MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

Two fundamental questions are a good starting point for developing a
framework to evaluate the future of DOE and its missions: 

  -- Which missions should be eliminated because they are no longer
     valid governmental functions? 

  -- For those missions that are governmental, what is the best
     organizational placement of the responsibilities? 

Once agreement is reached on the appropriate governmental missions, a
practical set of criteria could be used to evaluate the best
organizational structure for each mission.  These
criteria--originally used by an advisory panel for evaluating
alternative approaches to managing DOE's civilian nuclear waste
program\10 --allow for rating each alternative structure on the basis
of its ability to promote cost-effective practices, attract talented
technical specialists, be flexible in responding to changing
conditions, and be accountable to stakeholders.  Using these criteria
could help identify more effective ways to implement missions,
particularly those that could be privatized or reconfigured under
alternative governmental forms.  Appendix I summarizes these
criteria. 

Our work and others' has revealed the complex balancing of
considerations in reevaluating missions.  In general, deciding the
best place to manage a specific mission involves assessing the
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative institution for its
potential to achieve that mission, produce integrated policy
decisions, and improve efficiency.  Potential efficiency gains (or
losses) that might result from moving parts of DOE to other agencies
need to be balanced against the policy reasons that first led to
placing that mission in the Department. 

For example, transferring the nuclear weapons complex to DOD, as is
proposed by some, would require carefully considering many policy and
management issues.  Because of the declining strategic role of
nuclear weapons, some experts argue that DOD might be better able to
balance resource allocations among nuclear and other types of weapons
if the weapons complex were completely under its control.  Others
argue, however, that the need to maintain civilian control over
nuclear weapons outweighs any other advantages and that few gains in
efficiency would be achieved by employing DOD rather than DOE
supervisors.  Some experts we consulted advocated creating a new
federal agency for weapons production. 

Similarly, moving the responsibility for cleaning up DOE's defense
facilities to another agency or to a new institution, as proposed by
some, requires close scrutiny.  For example, a new agency
concentrating its focus on cleanup exclusively would not have to
allocate its resources among competing programs and could maximize
research and development investments by achieving economies of scale
in applying cleanup technology more broadly.  On the other hand,
separating cleanup responsibility from the agency that created the
waste may limit incentives to reduce waste and to promote other
environmentally sensitive approaches.  In addition, considerable
startup time and costs would accompany a new agency, at a time when
the Congress is interested in limiting the size of government and
controlling its costs. 

DOE's task force on the future of the national laboratories (the
Galvin Task Force) has suggested creating private or federal-private
corporations to manage most or all of the laboratories.\11 Under this
arrangement, nonprofit corporations would operate the laboratories
under the direction of a board of trustees that would channel funding
to various laboratories to meet the needs of both government and
nongovernment entities.  DOE would be a customer, rather than the
direct manager, of the labs.  The Galvin proposal raises important
issues for the Congress to consider, such as how to (1) monitor and
oversee the expenditure of public funds by privately managed and
operated entities; (2) continue the laboratories' significant
responsibilities for addressing environment, safety, and health
problems at their facilities, some of which are governed by legal
agreements between DOE, EPA, and the states; and (3) safeguard
federal access to facilities so that national priorities, including
national security missions, are met.  Other alternatives for managing
the national labs exist:  Each has advantages and disadvantages, and
each needs to be evaluated in light of the laboratories' capabilities
for designing nuclear weapons and pursuing other missions of national
and strategic importance.  Furthermore, the government may still need
facilities dedicated to national and defense missions, a possibility
that would heavily influence any future organizational decisions. 

Finally, another set of criteria, developed by the National Academy
of Public Administration in another context, could be useful for
determining whether DOE should remain a cabinet-level department.\12
These criteria, which are summarized in appendix II, pose such
questions as the following:  "Is there a sufficiently broad national
purpose for the Department?  Are cabinet-level planning, executive
attention, and strategic focus necessary to achieve the Department's
mission goals?  Is cabinet-level status needed to address significant
issues that otherwise would not be given proper attention?"

Although DOE has a strategic plan, it assumes the validity of the
existing missions and their placement in the Department.  But DOE
alone cannot make these determinations.  They require a cooperative
effort among all stakeholders, with the Congress and the
administration responsible for deciding which missions are needed and
how best to implement them.  The requirements of the Government
Performance and Results Act reinforce this concept by providing a
legislative vehicle for the Congress and agencies to use to improve
the way government works.  The act requires, among other things,
strategic plans based on consultation with the Congress and other
stakeholders.  These discussions are an important opportunity for the
Congress and the executive branch to jointly reassess and clarify the
agencies' missions and desired outcomes.\13

Our work has shown that to be effective, decisions about the
structure and functions of the federal government should be made in a
thorough manner, with careful attention to the effects of changes in
one agency on the workings of other agencies.\14 Specifically,
reorganization demands a coordinated approach, within and across
agency lines, supported by a solid consensus for change; it should
seek to achieve specific, identifiable goals; attention must be paid
to how the federal government exercises its role; and sustained
oversight by the Congress is needed to ensure effective
implementation. 

--------------------
\10 Managing Nuclear Waste--A Better Idea, Advisory Panel on
Alternative Means of Financing and Managing Radioactive Waste
Facilities (Dec.  1984). 

\11 The Secretary of Energy asked Robert Galvin, Chairman of Motorola
Corporation, to chair a task force to analyze the national
laboratories.  Its report was titled Alternative Futures for the
Department of Energy National Laboratories, Secretary of Energy
Advisory Board, Task Force on Alternative Futures for the Department
of Energy National Laboratories (Feb.  1995). 

\12 Evaluation of Proposals to Establish a Department of Veterans
Affairs (Mar.  1988). 

\13 Managing for Results:  Key Steps and Challenges in Implementing
GPRA in Science Agencies (GAO/T-GGD/RCED-96-214, July 10, 1996). 

\14 Government Reorganization:  Issues and Principles
(GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166, May 17, 1995). 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

Messrs.  Chairmen, this concludes our statement.  We would be happy
to respond to any questions you or Members of the Subcommittees may
have. 

   CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Victor
Rezendes at (202) 512-3841.  Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony included Gary R.  Boss, William Lanouette, and Melissa
Francis. 

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING DOE'S
MISSIONS
=========================================================== Appendix I

The following criteria, adapted from a former DOE advisory panel that
examined the Department's civilian nuclear waste program, offers a
useful framework for evaluating alternative ways to manage missions. 
These criteria were created to judge the potential value of several
different organizational arrangements that included an independent
federal commission, a mixed government-private corporation, and a
private corporation. 

Mission orientation and focus:  Will the institution be able to focus
on its mission(s) or will it be encumbered by other priorities? 
Which organizational structure will provide the greatest focus on its
mission(s)? 

Credibility:  Will the organizational structure be credible, thus
gaining public support for its action? 

Stability and continuity:  Will the institution be able to plan for
its own future without undue concern for its survival? 

Programmatic authority:  Will the institution be free to exercise
needed authority to accomplish its mission(s) without excessive
oversight and control from external sources? 

Accessibility:  Will stakeholders (both federal and state overseers
as well as the public) have easy access to senior management? 

Responsiveness:  Will the institution be structured to be responsive
to all its stakeholders? 

Internal flexibility:  Will the institution be able to change its
internal systems, organization, and style to adapt to changing
conditions? 

Political accountability:  How accountable will the institution be to
political sources, principally the Congress and the President? 

Immunity from political interference:  Will the institution be
sufficiently free from excessive and destructive political forces? 

Ability to stimulate cost-effectiveness:  How well will the
institution be able to encourage cost-effective solutions? 

Technical excellence:  Will the institution attract and retain highly
competent people with the requisite skills needed to accomplish its
mission? 

Ease of transition:  What will be the costs (both financial and
psychological) of changing to a different institution? 

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING
CABINET-LEVEL STATUS
========================================================== Appendix II

The following criteria were developed by the National Academy of
Public Administration as an aid to deciding whether a government
organization should be elevated to be a cabinet department.  However,
they raise issues that are relevant in judging cabinet-level status
in general. 

1.  Does the agency or set of programs serve a broad national goal or
purpose not exclusively identified with a single class, occupation,
discipline, region, or sector of society? 

2.  Are there significant issues in the subject area that (1) would
be better assessed or met by elevating the agency to a department,
and (2) are not now adequately recognized or addressed by the
existing organization, the President, or the Congress? 

3.  Is there evidence of impending changes in the type and number of
pressures on the institution that would be better addressed if it
were made a department?  Are such changes expected to continue into
the future? 

4.  Would a department increase the visibility of, and thereby
substantially strengthen the active political and public support for,
actions and programs to enhance the existing agency's goals? 

5.  Is there evidence that becoming a department would provide better
analysis, expression, and advocacy of the needs and programs that
constitute the agency's responsibilities? 

6.  Is there evidence that elevation to a cabinet department would
improve the accomplishment of the existing agency's goals? 

7.  Is a department required to better coordinate or consolidate
programs and functions that are now scattered throughout other
agencies in the executive branch of government? 

8.  Is there evidence that a department--with increased centralized
political authority--would result in a more effective balance within
the agency between integrated central strategic planning and resource
allocation and the direct participation in management decisions by
the line officers who are responsible for directing and managing the
agency's programs? 

9.  Is there evidence of significant structural, management, or
operational weaknesses in the existing organization that could be
better corrected by elevation to a department? 

10.  Is there evidence that there are external barriers and
impediments to timely decision-making and executive action that could
be detrimental to improving the efficiency of the existing agency's
programs?  Would elevation to a department remove or mitigate these
impediments? 

11.  Would elevation to a department help recruit and retain better
qualified leadership within the existing agency? 

12.  Would elevation to a department promote more uniform achievement
of broad, cross-cutting national policy goals? 

13.  Would elevation to a department strengthen the Cabinet and the
Executive Office of the President as policy and management aids for
the President? 

14.  Would elevation to a department have a beneficial or detrimental
effect upon the oversight and accountability of the agency to the
President and the Congress. 

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Department of Energy:  Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at
DOE Facilities (GAO/T-RCED-99-159, Apr.  20, 1999)

Department of Energy:  Uncertain Progress in Implementing National
Laboratory Reforms (GAO/RCED-98-197, Sept.  10, 1998). 

Department of Energy:  Contract Reform Is Progressing but Full
Implementation Will Take Years (GAO/RCED-97-18, Dec.  10, 1996). 

Department of Energy:  Opportunity to Improve Management of Major
System Acquisitions (GAO/RCED-97-17, Nov.  26, 1996). 

Department of Energy:  A Framework For Restructuring DOE and Its
Missions (GAO/RCED-95-197, Aug.  21, 1995). 

Department of Energy:  National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions
and Better Management (GAO/RCED-95-10, Jan.  27, 1995). 

Department of Energy:  Challenges to Implementing Contract Reform
(GAO/RCED-94-150, Mar.  24, 1994). 

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