Nuclear Safety: The Convention on Nuclear Safety (Testimony, 03/17/99,
GAO/T-RCED-99-127).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Convention on
Nuclear Safety, focusing on the: (1) Convention's scope and objectives;
(2) process for reviewing compliance with the Convention; (3)
dissemination of information related to the Convention's proceedings;
and (4) costs to implement the Convention.

GAO noted that: (1) the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which focuses on
civilian nuclear power reactors, is viewed by the United States as one
of the chief policy instruments to encourage countries with
Soviet-designed nuclear reactors to improve the safety of their
reactors; (2) the Convention seeks to achieve its safety objectives
through countries' adherence to general safety principles, such as
establishing an independent body to oversee safety, rather than binding
technical standards; (3) the Convention does not provide sanctions for
noncompliance nor require the closing of unsafe nuclear reactors; (4)
the Convention's peer review process is intended to establish a forum
where groups of countries will comment on reports that are
self-assessments of their nuclear programs and thereby encourage
countries to improve the safety of these programs; (5) however, the
Convention does not specify the form and content of the peer review
process nor the quality of countries' reports; therefore, it is unclear
how peer pressure will accomplish change or even whether sufficient
information will be contained in the reports; (6) although public
dissemination of information about the countries' progress in meeting
the terms of the Convention can play a role in influencing compliance,
it is uncertain how much information from the peer review meetings will
be available to the public; (7) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
officials told GAO that the Convention does not specifically provide for
the kind of openness that they would prefer, but they believe that over
time, more information will be made available to the public; (8) in
January 1997, GAO reported that the United States estimated that it
could spend up to $1.1 million through fiscal year 1999 to prepare for
and attend the first review meeting; and (9) however, according to an
NRC official, the actual costs for this time period will be
significantly less because U.S. officials have not participated in the
full range of meetings and activities to date related to the Convention.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-99-127
     TITLE:  Nuclear Safety: The Convention on Nuclear Safety
      DATE:  03/17/99
   SUBJECT:  International agreements
             International relations
             Nuclear powerplant safety
             Treaties
             Nuclear fuel plant safety
             Foreign governments
             Nuclear reactors
             Safety standards
             Cost analysis
             Government information dissemination

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.  Senate

For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
2 p.m.  EST
Wednesday
March 17, 1999

NUCLEAR SAFETY - THE CONVENTION ON
NUCLEAR SAFETY

Statement of Ms.  Gary L.  Jones, Associate Director,
Energy, Resources, and Science Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-99-127

GAO/RCED-99-127T


(141313)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  NRC -
  IAEA -

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Committee:  We are here today to
provide information on the Convention on Nuclear Safetyï¿½a
multilateral treaty to improve civil nuclear power safety.  Our
statement today summarizes (1) the Convention's scope and objectives,
(2) the process for reviewing compliance with the Convention, (3) the
dissemination of information related to the Convention's proceedings,
and (4) the costs to implement the Convention.  We have issued two
reports that track the Convention's development and implementation.\1

In summary, Mr.  Chairman: 

  -- The Convention on Nuclear Safety, which focuses on civilian
     nuclear power reactors, is viewed by the United States as one of
     the chief policy instruments to encourage countries with
     Soviet-designed nuclear reactors to improve the safety of their
     reactors.  The Convention seeks to achieve its safety objectives
     through countries' adherence to general safety principles, such
     as establishing an independent body to oversee safety, rather
     than binding technical standards.  The Convention does not
     provide sanctions for noncompliance nor require the closing of
     unsafe nuclear reactors. 

  -- The Convention's peer review process is intended to establish a
     forum where groups of countries will comment on reports that are
     self-assessments of their nuclear programs and thereby encourage
     countries to improve the safety of these programs.  However, the
     Convention does not specify the form and content of the peer
     review process nor the quality of countries' reports; therefore,
     it is unclear how peer pressure will accomplish change or even
     whether sufficient information will be contained in the reports. 

  -- Although public dissemination of information about the
     countries' progress in meeting the terms of the Convention can
     play a role in influencing compliance, it is uncertain how much
     information from the peer review meetings will be available to
     the public.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials told
     us that the Convention does not specifically provide for the
     kind of openness that they would prefer, but they believe that
     over time, more information will be made available to the
     public. 

  -- In January 1997, we reported that the United States estimated
     that it could spend up to $1.1 million through fiscal year 1999
     to prepare for and attend the first review meeting.  However,
     according to an NRC official, the actual costs for this time
     period will be significantly less because U.S.  officials have
     not participated in the full range of meetings and activities to
     date related to the Convention. 


--------------------
\1 Nuclear Safety:  Progress Toward International Agreement to
Improve Reactor Safety (GAO/RCED-93-153, May 14, 1993) and Nuclear
Safety:  Uncertainties About the Implementation and Costs of the
Nuclear Safety Convention (GAO/RCED-97-39, Jan.  2, 1997). 


   SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
   NUCLEAR SAFETY CONVENTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The development of the Nuclear Safety Convention is one of a number
of cooperative efforts being undertaken by the international
community to improve nuclear safety.  The impetus for these efforts
is based largely on the continuing concern about the safety of the
older Soviet-designed reactors.  Many of these reactors are operating
without basic safety features, such as protective structures to
contain radioactive releases and adequately trained personnel. 
Although the Convention is not viewed as a panacea or ï¿½quick fix,ï¿½ it
is believed to be a positive step toward improving worldwide nuclear
safety.  Importantly, though, the Convention does not require any
specific actions like closing unsafe nuclear reactors, and its focus
is limited to civilian nuclear power reactors.  The Convention seeks
to achieve its safety objectives through countries' adherence to
general safety principles rather than binding technical standards. 
These principles include (1) establishing and maintaining a
legislative framework and an independent regulatory body to govern
the safety of nuclear installations; (2) establishing procedures to
ensure that technical aspects of safety, such as the siting, design,
and construction of nuclear power reactors, are adequately
considered; and (3) ensuring that an acceptable level of safety is
maintained throughout the life of the installations by such things as
considering safety to be a priority and establishing a quality
assurance program. 

The majority of the country representatives that we met with during
the early drafting stages of the Convention supported these
principles.  A few country officials stated, however, that without
establishing procedures for addressing existing problem reactors,
including time frames for upgrading their safety, the Convention
would not improve nuclear safety.  Nevertheless, 65 countries have
signed the Convention, and 49 of the 65 have ratified it.  As you
know, the United States has signed but not ratified the Convention. 


   PEER REVIEW PROCESS IS CENTRAL
   TO THE CONVENTION'S SUCCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

As noted, the Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance. 
Rather, it seeks to encourage compliance through a peer review
process, which is considered central to the Convention's success. 
According to officials of the departments of State and Energy and
NRC, this process will enable countries' safety practices to be
brought before the ï¿½bar of world public opinion.ï¿½ The Convention does
not specify the form and content of the peer review process but calls
on the parties to (1) submit self-assessment reports of the measures
they have taken to implement the Convention and (2) hold meetings to
review these reports.  As you are aware, the first meeting of the
parties will take place next month at the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. 

Review groups composed of members from participating countries serve
as the foundation of the peer review mechanism.  Each group includes
members from several countries that have ratified the Convention.  As
the process is currently envisioned, the countries with the most
operating nuclear reactors will participate in separate groups along
with several other countries that have ratified the Convention. 
Within this group setting, all countries will critically examine and
review how each country is complying with the Convention.  Because
the United States has not yet ratified the Convention, it has not yet
been assigned to one of the country groups.  In our 1997 report, we
pointed out that NRC officials had expressed some concern about the
potential grouping of countries.  For example, the United States,
which has spent tens of millions of dollars to improve the safety of
Soviet-designed reactors, will not be in the same review group as
Russia, which operates many of these reactors. 

Although U.S.  representatives had misgivings about the country peer
review groups, the Convention states that each country shall have a
reasonable opportunity to discuss and seek clarification of the
reports of any other party at the review meeting.  As a result, NRC
officials believed that regardless of how the countries are
ultimately grouped, the United States would have ample opportunity to
review and comment on the self-assessment reports of all countries. 
According to NRC, the procedures on the peer review process have been
clarified since the issuance of our 1997 report.  The process will
begin with discussions by group members but will then allow countries
that are outside a particular group to obtain information of interest
to them.  Outside parties will be permitted to sit in on the full
discussion of any report about which they have submitted questions or
comments as observers.  NRC believes this process will enable the
United States' concerns about any country's report to be fully heard. 

We would like to point out that this process is still somewhat
theoretical and neither we nor anyone else can be fully certain that
it will work precisely as described.  Furthermore, it is unclear what
form peer pressure will take and how it will cause changes in a
country's nuclear power program.  As we noted in our May 1993 report,
overall responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the country
where a nuclear installation is located. 

Another issue that will affect the success of the peer review process
is the quality of the individual countries' self-assessment reports,
which are expected to describe how the parties are complying with the
Convention.  Because of differences in countries' nuclear safety
programs and available resources, NRC officials anticipate unevenness
in the quality and detail of the reports.  In their view, this
unevenness could affect the level of review and analysis.  Similarly,
an NRC official recently told us that there is no standard format for
the reports and that quality issues will remain problematic. 


   PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION
   RESULTING FROM THE CONVENTION'S
   MEETINGS CAN INFLUENCE
   COMPLIANCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

The public dissemination of information about the countries' progress
in meeting the terms of the Convention can play a key role in
influencing compliance, according to some experts familiar with
international agreements that rely primarily on peer review. 
Although U.S.  and IAEA officials believe the Convention will
encourage greater openness about many countries' safety records and
programs, it is uncertain how much information resulting from the
periodic meetings will be made available to the public.  According to
NRC officials, the countries can limit the distribution of their
reports.  While several countries have made the reports prepared for
the first review meeting available to the public and even accessible
on the Internet, an NRC official told us that one country, for
example, has not made its report public.  According to an NRC
official, the United States plans to make its report publicly
available. 

Our 1997 report pointed out some concerns about what type of public
record would result from the periodic meetings.  We noted that the
Convention provides for the public distribution of a report
summarizing the issues discussed and the decisions reached during a
meeting.  However, an NRC official recently told us that the report
will be generic in nature and unlikely to identify countries by name. 
Overall, NRC officials told us that the Convention does not
specifically provide for the kind of openness that they would prefer
but they believe that over time, more information will be made
available to the public.  Certainly, promoting greater openness about
countries' nuclear safety regimes will enhance the credibility of the
process. 


   COSTS TO IMPLEMENT THE
   CONVENTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

In January 1997, we reported that the United States estimated that it
could spend up to $1.1 million through fiscal year 1999 to prepare
for and attend the first review meeting.  However, according to an
NRC official, the actual costs for this time period will be
significantly less because U.S.  officials have not participated in
the full range of meetings and activities to date related to the
Convention. 

The Convention states that IAEA will bear the costs of administering
the meeting of the parties, which were expected to total about $1
million.  Our 1997 report noted that IAEA planned to support the
Convention through its operating budget, which the United States
supports through an annual 25-percent contribution.  NRC officials
had told us that they were concerned about IAEA's potential costs for
administering the Convention.  The factors affecting IAEA's costs
primarily involve the number of languages used to conduct the meeting
of the parties and the corresponding translation services.  Recently,
though, an NRC official told us that costs are being contained
because English will serve as the working language for the meeting of
the parties.  If more languages had been used, then the costs would
have been higher given the corresponding costs for translation.  As
noted in our 1997 report, IAEA's then Deputy Director General for
Nuclear Safety told us that the Convention might uncover additional
safety problems that require attention.  As a result, the countries
with the most acute safety problems may seek to use the Convention
process as leverage to obtain additional nuclear safety assistance. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

This concludes our statement.  We would be happy to respond to any
questions you or other Members of the Committee may have. 


*** End of document. ***