Western National Forests: Catastrophic Wildfires Threaten Resources and
Communities (Testimony, 09/28/98, GAO/T-RCED-98-273).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the: (1) extent and
seriousness of forest health-related problems on national forests in the
interior West; (2) status of the Forest Service's efforts to address the
most serious of these problems; and (3) barriers to successfully
implementing the agency's efforts.

GAO noted that: (1) it appears that the number of uncontrollable and
catastrophically destructive wildfires is the most extensive and serious
national forest health-related problem in the interior West; (2) past
management practices, especially the Forest Service's decades-old policy
of suppressing fire in the national forests, disrupted the historical
occurrence of frequent low-intensity fires; (3) as a result, vegetation
accumulated, creating high levels of fuels for catastrophic wildfires
and transforming much of the region into a tinderbox; (4) the number of
large wildfires, and of acres burned by them, has increased over the
last decade, as has the costs of attempting to suppress them; (5) these
fires not only compromise the forests' ability to provide timber,
outdoor recreation, clean water, and other resources but they also pose
increasingly grave risks to human safety and property; (6) recently, the
Forest Service announced its goal to improve the health of the forests
by adequately resolving the problems of uncontrollable, catastrophic
wildfires in national forests by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2015; (7)
to accomplish this goal, it has, among other things: (a) initiated a
program to monitor the forests' health; (b) refocused its wildland fire
management program to increase the number of acres on which it reduces
accumulated vegetation that forms excessive fuels; and (c) restructured
its budget to better ensure that funds are available for reducing these
fuels; (8) Congress has supported the agency's efforts by increasing the
funds for fuels reduction and authorizing a multiyear program to better
assess problems and solutions; (9) because it lacks adequate data, the
Forest Service has not yet been able to develop a cohesive strategy for
addressing several factors that may present significant barriers to
improving the health of the national forests by reducing fuels; (10) as
a result, many acres of national forests in the interior West may remain
at high risk of uncontrollable wildfire at the end of FY 2015; (11)
controlled fires can be used to reduce fuels, but: (a) such fires might
get out of control; and (b) there is concern about the effects of their
smoke on air quality; (12) as a result, mechanical methods will often be
necessary to remove accumulated fuels; and (13) removing accumulated
fuels may cost the Forest Service hundreds of millions of dollars
annually.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-98-273
     TITLE:  Western National Forests: Catastrophic Wildfires Threaten 
             Resources and Communities
      DATE:  09/28/98
   SUBJECT:  Forest conservation
             Forest management
             National forests
             Budget outlays
             Emergency preparedness
IDENTIFIER:  Joint Fire Science Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Forests and
Forest Health, Committee on Resources,
House of Representatives

For release on Delivery
Expected at
2:00 p.m., EDT
Monday,
September 28, 1998

WESTERN NATIONAL FORESTS -
CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRES THREATEN
RESOURCES AND COMMUNITIES

Statement of Barry T.  Hill,
Associate Director,
Energy, Resources, and Science Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-98-273

GAO/RCED-98-000T


(141070)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  GAO -
  RCED -

============================================================ Chapter 0

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our work to
date for you on the health of the national forests located in the
dry, inland portion of the western United States (hereafter referred
to as the "interior West").  About 60 percent of the 155 national
forests and about 70 percent of the 192 million acres of land managed
by the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service are located in this
region of the country, which generally extends north and south from
the Canadian to the Mexican borders and east and west from the Black
Hills in South Dakota to the Cascade mountain range in Washington and
Oregon and to the southwestern deserts and Coastal range in
California.  (See app.  I.)

Distinct ecological processes shaped the forests in the interior West
producing tree stands that differed in composition and structure from
those in other regions of the country.  Historically, frequent
low-intensity wildfires played a major role in determining the
dispersion and succession of tree stands in the interior West.  Lack
of rainfall also slows the decomposition of dead and downed trees and
woody material.  As early as the mid-nineteenth century, human
activities began to affect the region's ecology, introducing changes
that gradually weakened the health of today's national forests in the
interior West. 

My testimony today presents our preliminary observations on (1) the
extent and seriousness of forest health-related problems on national
forests in the interior West, (2) the status of the Forest Service's
efforts to address the most serious of these problems, and (3) the
barriers to successfully implementing the agency's efforts.  Our
observations draw on visits over the last year to six regional
offices and nine national forests, as well as interviews with and
reviews of data from Forest Service headquarters officials and
outside experts.  We will complete our work and issue a report to you
in the spring of 1999. 

In summary, Madam Chairman, the information that we have gathered to
date suggests the following: 

  -- It appears that the increasing number of large, intense,
     uncontrollable, and catastrophically destructive wildfires is
     the most extensive and serious national forest health-related
     problem in the interior West.  Past management practices,
     especially the Forest Service's decades-old policy of
     suppressing fire in the national forests, disrupted the
     historical occurrence of frequent low-intensity fires.  As a
     result, vegetation accumulated, creating high levels of fuels
     for catastrophic wildfires and transforming much of the region
     into a tinderbox.  The number of large wildfires, and of acres
     burned by them, has increased over the last decade, as have the
     costs of attempting to suppress them.  These fires not only
     compromise the forests' ability to provide timber, outdoor
     recreation, clean water, and other resources but they also pose
     increasingly grave risks to human health, safety, and property,
     especially along the boundaries of forests where population has
     grown rapidly in recent years. 

  -- During the 1990s, the Forest Service began to address the
     unintended consequences of its wildfire suppression policy. 
     Recently, it announced its goal to improve the health of the
     forests by adequately resolving the problems of uncontrollable,
     catastrophic wildfires in national forests by the end of fiscal
     year 2015.  To accomplish this goal, it has, among other things,
     (1) initiated a program to monitor the forests' health, (2)
     refocused its wildland fire management program to increase the
     number of acres on which it reduces accumulated vegetation that
     forms excessive fuels; and (3) restructured its budget to better
     ensure that funds are available for reducing these fuels.  The
     Congress has supported the agency's efforts by increasing the
     funds for fuels reduction and authorizing a multiyear program to
     better assess problems and solutions. 

  -- However, because it lacks adequate data, the Forest Service has
     not yet been able to develop a cohesive strategy for addressing
     several factors that may present significant barriers to
     improving the health of the national forests by reducing fuels. 
     As a result, many acres of national forests in the interior West
     may remain at high risk of uncontrollable wildfire at the end of
     fiscal year 2015.  Moreover, efforts to reduce accumulated fuels
     can adversely affect the Forest Service's achievement of other
     stewardship objectives.  For example, controlled fires can be
     used to reduce fuels, but (1) such fires might get out of
     control and (2) there is concern about the effects of their
     smoke on air quality.  As a result, mechanical methods,
     including commercial timber harvesting, will often be necessary
     to remove accumulated fuels.  But mechanical removals are
     problematic because the Forest Service's (1) incentives tend to
     focus efforts on areas that may not present the highest fire
     hazards and (2) timber sale and other contracting procedures are
     not designed for removing vast amounts of materials with little
     or no commercial value.  As a result, removing accumulated fuels
     may cost the Forest Service hundreds of millions of dollars
     annually. 


   THE NUMBER AND COSTS OF
   UNCONTROLLABLE, VERY
   DESTRUCTIVE WILDFIRES ARE
   INCREASING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

According to the Forest Service, large areas of national forests in
the interior West are not healthy.  Symptoms include tree stands that
are denser, with more small trees, undergrowth, and accumulated dead
materials on the ground than in the past.  Additionally, the
proportion of trees of less fire-tolerant species has increased, as
has the incidence of some disease and insect infestations.  These
conditions have developed in response to several factors that have
generally prevented fire from playing its historical role of limiting
the forests' density and clearing undergrowth and downed material. 
These factors include (1) extensive livestock grazing and
settlement-related changes in land use since the late 1800s, which
eliminated much of the grasses that historically carried fire through
the forests' undergrowth; (2) past timber harvesting methods that
selectively removed the larger, more valuable, and more accessible
trees or removed all of the trees from a timber-harvesting site at
one time (clear-cutting), allowing other species to increase; and (3)
invasions by nonnative plants, insects, and diseases.  However,
according to several studies, the primary factor contributing to
unhealthy forests in the region has been a decades-old policy of
suppressing fire in the national forests, particularly in those which
depend on frequent fires. 

The most common type of forested lands in the national forests of the
interior West are at warm, dry, lower elevations and are generally
dominated by ponderosa pine.  These are known as "frequent fire
interval" forests because, before pioneers settled in these areas,
fire historically occurred in them about every 5 to 30 years.  (See
app.  II.) Because frequent fires kept these forests clear of
undergrowth, fuels seldom accumulated and the fires were generally of
low intensity, largely consuming grasses and undergrowth and not
igniting the highly combustible crowns, or tops, of large trees.  In
contrast, fire historically occurred only about every 40 to 200 years
in the cooler, moister, forests at higher elevations, such as those
around Yellowstone National Park, which are generally dominated by
lodgepole pine.  These forests historically developed more dense
stands, and fires there generally killed nearly all of the trees. 

Fire suppression was first practiced to reduce the risk of
uncontrollable wildfires to protect early settlements.  Later it was
used as an agricultural production technique to increase the number
of trees available for timber harvesting.  But without frequent
fires, vegetation has accumulated so that many stands have become
more dense and less fire tolerant tree species have become more
prevalent.  (See apps.  III and IV.) As the forests' density and
composition have changed, stands have become more susceptible to
insects and disease.  In some cases, invasions by nonnative plants
and diseases have exacerbated these conditions.  In these denser
stands, where many smaller dead and dying trees now often form fuel
"ladders" to the crowns of larger trees, wildfires have increasingly
become large, intense, and catastrophic.  Such fires burn many more
acres, destroy much more timber and wildlife habitat, and subject
exposed soils to substantial erosion during subsequent rains,
damaging water quality. 

Our analysis of the Forest Service's data shows that the agency was
highly effective in suppressing fires in the national forests for
about 75 years after 1910, reducing substantially the number of
national forest acres burned annually, over 90 percent of which have
been in the interior West.  However, more recently, the agency has
been less effective because excessive accumulated fuels have made
fires larger and more intense.  (See app.  V.) For example, since
1984, the average number of fires annually on national forests that
burn 1,000 acres or more has increased from 25 to 80, and the number
of total acres burned (including on nearby lands) as a result of
these fires has more than quadrupled, from 164,000 to 765,000.  (See
app.  VI.) Since 1990, 91 percent of these large fires and 96 percent
of the acres they have burned were in the interior West. 

In 1995, the agency estimated that 39 million acres, or about one
third of all lands it manages in the interior West--more than ever
known before and more than in all other regions of the country
combined--are now at high risk of large, uncontrollable, catastrophic
wildfires.  According to Forest Service officials, virtually all of
these lands are located in the lower-elevation, frequent-fire forests
of the interior West that are generally dominated by ponderosa pine. 
This is because, as stated in a 1995 internal report,\1 far more
cycles of fire (up to ten) were suppressed in these forests than in
the higher-elevation, lodgepole-pine-dominated forests--where
generally only one or no fire cycle was suppressed.  (See app VII.)

Catastrophic wildfires not only compromise the forests' ability to
sustain timber, outdoor recreation, clean water, and other uses but
also pose hazards to human health, safety, and property.  For
example, 14 firefighters lost their lives in the 1994 South Canyon
Fire in Colorado, which--because of its size and intensity--was able
to rapidly surround them.  The hazard to human health, life, and
property is especially acute along the national forests' boundaries,
where population has grown rapidly in recent years--an area termed
the "wildland/urban interface." Because smoke from such fires
contains substantial amounts of fine particulate matter and other
hazardous pollutants, the fires can pose substantial health risks to
people living in this interface.  (See app.  VIII.)

The growing number of large wildfires and acres burned--coupled with
the increasing complexity of suppression in the wildland/urban
interface--has greatly increased the costs of suppressing fires. 
From fiscal year 1986 through fiscal year 1994, the 10-year rolling
average of annual costs for fighting fires grew from $134 million to
$335 million, or by 150 percent, in constant 1994 dollars.  (See app. 
IX.) Since 1990, 95 percent of these costs were incurred in the
interior West.  Moreover, the costs associated with preparedness,
including the costs of keeping equipment and personnel ready to fight
fires, are also increasing.  For the 6 fiscal years from 1992 through
1997, these costs increased from $189 million to $326 million, or by
72 percent.\2 (See app.  X.)

Furthermore, these fires impose additional costs on other parties,
both for fighting fires that cross national forest boundaries and for
repairing the damage they do.  For example, the 1996 Buffalo Creek
fire, a fire that burned several thousand acres and threatened
private property in the wildland/urban interface southwest of Denver,
left forest soils subject to extreme erosion.  Subsequent repeated
rainstorms have washed what ordinarily would have been several years
worth of sediment into a reservoir that supplies Denver with water. 
As a result, the Denver Water Board has estimated it will incur
several million dollars of ongoing expenses for dredging the
reservoir and treating water--an amount that is several times the
cost of fighting the fire. 


--------------------
\1 Fire Economics Assessment Report, U.S.  Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service (Washington, D.C., 1995). 

\2 Federal Lands:  Information About Land Management Agencies'
Wildfire Preparedness Activities (GAO/RCED-98-48R, Dec.  18, 1997)
and Federal Lands:  Wildfire Preparedness and Suppression
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1997 (GAO/T-RCED-98-247,
Aug.  4, 1998). 


   THE FOREST SERVICE IS TAKING
   STEPS TO ADDRESS THE INCREASING
   NUMBER OF CATASTROPHIC
   WILDFIRES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

In recent years, the Forest Service has taken steps to address the
increasing threat of catastrophic wildfires on national forests.  For
instance, in 1990, the agency, along with other federal and state
agencies, initiated a forest health monitoring program to better
identify tree stand conditions, including outbreaks of insects and
diseases and dead trees.  Also, in 1995, it announced its intention
to refocus its fire management program on reducing accumulated fuels. 
Specifically, a 1995 internal agency report recommended increasing
the number of acres on which accumulated fuels are reduced annually
from about 570,000 to about 3 million by fiscal year 2005.\3

In 1997, the Chief of the Forest Service said it was the agency's
intention to implement this recommendation and the agency plans to
continue reducing fuels on 3 million-acres per year through fiscal
year 2015.  By that time, the agency believes that it will have
adequately resolved the problem of national forest lands being at
high risk of uncontrollable, highly destructive wildfires. 

To implement its increased emphasis on reducing accumulated fuels,
the Forest Service restructured and redefined its fiscal year 1998
budget for wildland fire management to better ensure that funds are
available for these activities.\4 In fiscal year 1998, it announced
that the funds appropriated for reducing fuels would be allocated to
(1) protect high-risk wildland/urban interfaces, with special
emphasis on areas subject to frequent fires; (2) reduce accumulated
fuels within and adjacent to wilderness areas; and (3) lower the
expected long-term costs of suppressing wildfires by restoring and
maintaining fire-adapted ecosystems.\5 In addition, the Forest
Service has identified reducing accumulated fuels in the national
forests as a key measure of its performance in accomplishing its
high-priority, long-term strategic goal of restoring and protecting
forested ecosystems.\6

In the past 5 years, the Forest Service--either alone or with the
Department of the Interior and other federal agencies--has issued
several reports (1) addressing the health of forests in the interior
West as well as in other regions of the country, including the health
effects of fire suppression and (2) proposing management approaches
to more efficiently and effectively reduce accumulated fuels.\7 The
agency has also (1) revised its wildland fire management policy to
more clearly spell out its responsibilities and reimbursable costs so
that nonfederal parties can understand the consequences of not
working with the agency to reduce the risk of wildfire on their
adjacent lands and (2) proposed a number of pilot projects in
collaboration with willing nonfederal partners to demonstrate the
role of mechanical methods (including timber harvesting) of removing
materials to reduce accumulated fuels. 

The Congress has supported the Forest Service's efforts to reduce
accumulated fuels by, among other things, increasing the funding for
these activities.  In addition, in acting on the agency's fiscal year
1998 budget, the House and Senate appropriations committees approved
the Forest Service's budget restructuring to better ensure that funds
are available for reducing accumulated fuels.  The committees also
earmarked $8 million in fiscal year 1998 for the agency and Interior
to begin a multiyear program, called the Joint Fire Science Program,
to gather consistent information on accumulated fuels and ways to
reduce them.  In January 1998, the agencies issued a plan for
conducting this program.\8 An agency official involved in the plan's
implementation said they will need 10 years to complete this plan
and, as it is completed, national forests will use its findings to
amend or revise individual forest plans. 

Many experts believe that these agency and congressional efforts are
in a race against time.  A 1993 assessment of forest health in the
interior West concluded that only a "brief window of opportunity" of
perhaps 15 to 30 years exists for management intervention before
damage from uncontrollable wildfires becomes widespread, setting the
stage for a repeat of the current problems far into the 21st
century.\9 Five of those years have already passed. 


--------------------
\3 Course to the Future:  Positioning Fire and Aviation Management,
U.S.  Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Washington, D.C.,
1995). 

\4 FY 1998 Budget Explanatory Notes for the Committee on
Appropriations, U.S.  Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Feb. 
1997). 

\5 FY 1999 Budget Explanatory Notes for the Committee on
Appropriations, U.S.  Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Feb. 
1998). 

\6 USDA Strategic Plan 1997-2002:  A Healthy and Productive Nation in
Harmony With the Land, Forest Service Strategic Plan, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary (Sept.  30, 1997)
and FY 1999 USDA Forest Service Annual GPRA Performance Plan, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Feb.  4, 1998). 

\7 Healthy Forests For America's Future:  A Strategic Plan, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Washington, D.C., 1993);
Fire Related Considerations and Strategies in Support of Ecosystem
Management, U.S.  Department of Agriculture, Forest Service
(Washington, D.C., 1993); Western Forest Health Initiative, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Washington, D.C., 1994);
Fire Economics Assessment Report, U.S.  Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service (Washington, D.C., 1995); and Federal Wildland Fire
Management Policy and Program Review, Department of the Interior and
U.S.  Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Washington, D.C.,
1995 and 1996). 

\8 Joint Fire Science Plan, Department of the Interior and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Washington, D.C., 1998). 

\9 Assessing Forest Ecosystem Health in the Inland West, Forest
Policy Center (Washington D.C., 1994). 


   A COHESIVE STRATEGY APPEARS TO
   BE NEEDED FOR ADDRESSING
   BARRIERS TO REDUCING
   ACCUMULATED FUELS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Although the Forest Service is taking steps to address the increasing
number of catastrophic wildfires in the national forests, it may not
be able to adequately resolve the problem of the high risk of
catastrophic wildfires on national forest lands by the end of fiscal
year 2015.  In particular, because of a lack of adequate data, the
agency has not yet been able to develop a cohesive strategy for
addressing numerous factors that may present significant barriers to
the accomplishment of its goal. 

The Forest Service's current plans may significantly underestimate
the number of acres on which fuels must be reduced annually to
adequately reduce fire hazards.  Our preliminary analysis of the
agency's initial plans and data indicates that as many as about 10
million acres in the interior West may still have excessive fuel
levels and still be at high risk of uncontrollable, catastrophic
wildfire at the end of fiscal year 2015.  This is largely because the
Forest Service's criteria for allocating the funds appropriated to
reduce accumulated fuels have apparently not been linked to the
agency's actual allocation of these funds.  The agency's criteria
emphasize restoring the high-risk interface areas within the frequent
fire forest ecosystems.  However, these interface areas within the
interior West have not yet been defined.  Moreover, the current and
planned allocations largely emphasize maintaining satisfactory
conditions on lands outside these frequent fire forests that
currently have low levels of accumulated fuels so that conditions on
them do not also become hazardous.  Because maintaining these
conditions will require continued fuels reduction on about 1 million
acres per year, the agency's plans to reduce fuels on 3 million acres
per year appear to fall short of the levels needed to meet the
agency's goals for both these lands and the interior West's frequent
fire forests. 

The Forest Service may be able to substantially reduce fire hazards
without reducing fuels on all 39 million acres currently at high risk
of catastrophic fire.  For example, it might construct
fuelbreaks--i.e., areas where excessive fuels have been removed--in
strategic locations to isolate areas with excessive fuels and thus
limit the spread of large fires.  However, the Forest Service has not
yet developed a strategy for doing so or for any alternative
strategic approach.  Until it does, it has no basis for eliminating
any current high-risk areas from its fuels reduction efforts. 

Methods for reducing accumulated fuels can sometimes be difficult to
reconcile with other legislatively mandated stewardship objectives,
including meeting clean water quality standards and protecting
threatened and endangered species.  According to an agency official,
in the past, the Forest Service sometimes used chemicals (herbicides)
to kill undergrowth, which could then be burned.  Combining these two
methods was often less costly than mechanically removing the
undergrowth.  The agency has, however, largely stopped using
herbicides because of concerns about their adverse effects on water
quality and human health.  Additionally, as a result of selective
harvesting of large ponderosa pine trees and fire suppression in the
Deschutes National Forest in Oregon, ponderosa stands have been
largely replaced by abnormally dense stands of Douglas fir.  The
Douglas fir stands cannot be removed, however, because they now
provide habitat for the threatened northern spotted owl, whose
naturally occurring habitat on the western side of the Cascade
mountain range has been significantly reduced by timber harvesting. 

Many agency and outside experts believe that, ultimately, avoiding
catastrophic wildfires and restoring forest health in the interior
West will require reintroducing fire through burning under controlled
conditions to reduce fuels.  However, the use of controlled fire in
the interior West has two limitations.  First, winter snows limit the
time available for burning, and dry summer weather creates a high
risk that, given massive levels of accumulated fuels, controlled
fires will escape and become uncontrollable, catastrophic wildfires. 
Second, several officials and experts we spoke with believe that
emissions from controlled fires on the scale needed would violate
federal air quality standards under the Clean Air Act and that the
act would thus not permit the desired level of burning either
immediately or possibly even in the long term.  The Forest Service
and the Environmental Protection Agency, which administers the Clean
Air Act, are currently conducting a 3-year experiment to better
determine the impact of emissions from controlled fires. 

For these reasons, many experts agree that fuels must be reduced in
most areas of the interior West, at least initially, by mechanical
means, including commercial timber harvesting, in conjunction with
controlled burning.  The Forest Service currently uses its timber
sales management program to reduce accumulated fuels.\10

However, the use of timber harvesting to reduce fuels has been
limited by concerns about its adverse effects on other stewardship
objectives.  Specifically, in fiscal year 1997, timber harvesting was
used to reduce fuels on only about 95,000 acres, or less than 5
percent of the acres that are projected to need fuels reduction
annually to achieve the agency's long-term goal.  Forest Service
officials told us that it was not likely that commercial timber
harvesting could be increased enough to adequately reduce fuels on
the vast amount of acreage needing such reductions. 

Moreover, mechanical removals under both the timber sales management
program and the fuels reduction program funded by appropriations
currently involve incentives that tend to focus efforts on areas that
may not present the greatest fire hazards.  For example, under its
fuels reduction program, the Forest Service's lone performance
indicator measures the number of acres treated.  Agency field staff
told us that forests' funding often depends on their ability to
contribute to agency acreage targets.  As a result, they often focus
on areas where the costs of reducing fuels are low so that they can
accomplish more acres, rather than on areas with the highest fire
hazards, including especially the wildland/urban interfaces.  These
high-hazard areas often have significantly higher per-acre costs
because of limitations on the use of less expensive controlled fires
as a tool to reduce the accumulated fuels. 

Timber harvesting may make useful contributions to reducing
accumulated fuels in many circumstances.  However, reducing fuels
with the funds allocated for timber sales management may also provide
an incentive for forests to focus on less critical areas.  The Forest
Service stresses that its timber sales management program is
increasingly being used for efforts to improve forest health,
including efforts to prevent catastrophic fires.\11 The agency relies
on timber production to fund many of its programs and activities, and
all three of its budget allocation criteria for timber activities
relate solely to the volume of timber produced or offered.  As a
result, as forest officials told us, they tend to (1) focus on areas
with high-value commercial timber rather than on areas with high fire
hazards or (2) include more large, commercially valuable trees in a
timber sale than are necessary to reduce the accumulated fuels. 
Similarly, an interagency team that reviewed the implementation of
the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program observed that some Forest
Service personnel focused on achieving additional volumes of timber
rather than on protecting forested ecosystems.\12

Finally, most of the trees that need to be removed to reduce
accumulated fuels are small in diameter and have little or no
commercial value.  For example, to return experimental forest plots
near Flagstaff, Arizona to historical conditions, 37 tons per acre of
nonmarketable materials had to be disposed of by placing them in a
pit and burning them.  However, the agency's largely statutorily
defined contracting procedures for commercial timber sales--as well
as for service contracts that do not involve selling timber but are
let simply for the service of removing excess fuels--were not
designed to (1) facilitate the systematic removal of large volumes of
low-value material over a number of years, (2) readily combine funds
for conducting timber sales with funds for reducing accumulated
fuels, or (3) allow contractors to retain this low-value material to
partially offset the costs of its removal.  In 1998, for instance,
Agriculture's Office of General Counsel determined that only 6 of 23
pilot projects proposed by the Forest Service to demonstrate, among
other things, the role of timber harvesting in reducing accumulated
fuels, could proceed under the agency's existing statutory authority. 
This was because, among other things, the remaining projects would
have involved removing more material of minor commercial value than
is allowed under service contracts or letting contractors keep some
material in exchange for removing it.  During the fiscal year 1999
appropriation process, the agency asked for, but has not received,
one-time waivers to these statutory limitations so that it can
conduct the pilot projects.  Also, authority temporarily granted to
the agency in the early 1990s to enter into "land stewardship
contracts"--under which contractors were allowed to retain material
they removed in exchange for achieving desired conditions in the
national forests--has not been renewed.\13

Additionally, because the materials to be removed often have low or
no value, the revenue they generate will not cover the costs of their
removal.  Agency officials and outside analysts agree that reducing
accumulated fuels in the interior West may thus likely require
hundreds of millions of dollars a year in appropriated funds.  Our
preliminary analysis of the Forest Service's fuels reduction
costs--which according to agency data average about $320 per acre for
the combination of burning and mechanical removal that is necessary
in the interior West--indicates that as much as $12 billion, or about
$725 million a year, may be needed to treat the 39 million acres at
high risk of uncontrollable wildfire by the end of fiscal year 2015. 
These costs might be less if the agency reduced current hazards on
the 39 million acres selectively, in accordance with a strategy or
set of priorities.  Currently, however, the agency has requested $65
million for fiscal year 1999 to reduce accumulated fuels--or less
than a tenth the annual level that may be needed to accomplish its
goal--but has not developed an identifiable strategy or priorities
for applying these funds, nor even identified interface areas that
are at high risk. 

Moreover, our preliminary analysis examined only the "first-time"
costs of reducing fuels in these forests.  Fuels will have to be
reduced periodically in order to maintain the forests' health.  For
example, in 1998, the Wenatchee National Forest in Washington stated
that it would have to begin reducing fuels in areas treated only 10
to 15 years ago because undergrowth has accumulated in the interim,
posing new fire hazards.  Forest Service officials we spoke with
agreed with a 1997 observation by the Secretary of the Interior that
substantial efforts to reduce fuels will have to be repeated three to
five times or more on these lands over many decades, although the
later repetitions of this controlled burning and mechanical removal
may be less costly. 


--------------------
\10 FY 1999 Budget Explanatory Notes for the Committee on
Appropriations, U.S.  Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Feb. 
1998). 

\11 National Summary:  Forest Management Program Report for Fiscal
Year 1997, U.S.  Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, FS-627
(July 1998). 

\12 Interagency Salvage Program Review, U.S.  Department of Commerce,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine
Fisheries Service (Silver Spring, Maryland, Oct.  8, 1996). 

\13 See Forest Service Timber Sale Practices and Procedures: 
Analysis of Alternative Systems, Congressional Research Service
(95-1077 ENR, Washington, D.C., 1995) and M.  Mitsos, Improving
Administrative Flexibility and Efficiency in the National Forest
Timber Sale Program:  Scoping Session Summary, Pinchot Institute
(Washington, D.C., 1996). 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, the increasing number of
uncontrollable and often catastrophic wildfires in the interior West,
as well as the significant costs to resolve the problem of increasing
hazards both to human health, safety, and property and to natural
resources in national forests, present difficult policy decisions for
the Forest Service and the Congress:  Does the agency request, and
does the Congress appropriate, the hundreds of millions of dollars a
year that may be required to fund an aggressive fuels reduction
program?  If enough is not appropriated, what priorities should be
established?  How can the need for reintroducing fire into frequent
fire forests and mechanical removals best be reconciled with air
quality standards and other stewardship objectives?  What incentives
and changes in statutorily defined procedures are needed to
facilitate the mechanical removal of low-value materials?  Such
decisions should be based on a sound strategy that, in turn, depends
in large part on data being gathered under the Forest Service and
Interior's Joint Fire Science Program.  However, a Forest Service
official involved with implementing the program told us that the
agency may need a decade to complete many of the research projects
under the program.  It may also take another decade or longer to
revise or amend forest plans to incorporate the program's findings
and begin implementing individual fuels reduction activities.  Many
experts argue that the tinderbox that is now the interior West cannot
wait that long.  They also believe that inaction--or simply allowing
nature to take its inevitable course--will cost more not only for
fire suppression but also in damage to natural resources, human
health, and property, than would undertaking strategic actions now. 

Madam Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement.  We will be
pleased to respond to any questions that you or Members of the
Subcommittee may have. 


THE INTERIOR WEST
=========================================================== Appendix I



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Forest Service. 


LOCATION OF FREQUENT FIRE FORESTS
IN THE INTERIOR WEST
========================================================== Appendix II



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Forest Service. 


1909 PHOTOGRAPH OF TYPICAL OPEN
PONDEROSA PINE STAND IN THE
BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST IN
IDAHO
========================================================= Appendix III



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Forest Service.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


1989 PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN FROM THE
SAME SPOT IN THE BITTERROOT
NATIONAL FOREST IN THE SAME
DIRECTION
========================================================== Appendix IV



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Forest Service.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


NUMBER OF NATIONAL FOREST ACRES
BURNED BY FIRE, 1910-97
=========================================================== Appendix V



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  1.  The number of acres represents the 10-year rolling
average at each point. 

2.  Since 1990, 90 percent of national forest acres burned by fire
were in the interior West. 

Source:  GAO's presentation of data from the Forest Service. 


NUMBER OF AND TOTAL ACRES BURNED
BY LARGE WILDFIRES ON ALL NATIONAL
FORESTS, 1984-95
========================================================== Appendix VI



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Since 1990, 91 percent of large fires ( >1000 acres) and 96
percent of the acres burned were in the interior West. 

Source:  GAO's presentation of data from the Forest Service. 


NATIONAL FOREST LANDS AT MEDIUM
AND HIGH RISK OF CATASTROPHIC FIRE
========================================================= Appendix VII



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  American Forests. 


POPULATION GROWTH IN RELATION TO
NATIONAL FORESTS
======================================================== Appendix VIII



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's presentation of data from the Forest Service and the
Bureau of the Census. 


FOREST SERVICE'S EXPENDITURES FOR
FIRE FIGHTING, FISCAL YEARS
1986-94
========================================================== Appendix IX



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  1.  The expenditures for each year represent the 10-year
rolling average expressed in 1994 dollars. 

2.  Since 1990, 95 percent of these expenditures have been in the
interior West. 

Source:  GAO's presentation of data from the Forest Service. 


FOREST SERVICE'S EXPENDITURES FOR
WILDFIRE PREPAREDNESS, FISCAL
YEARS 1992-97
=========================================================== Appendix X



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  For 1994, the last year figures by region were available, over
90 percent of these expenditures were in the interior West. 

Source:  GAO. 


*** End of document. ***