Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak's Financial Viability Continues to Be
Threatened (Testimony, 03/12/97, GAO/T-RCED-97-80).
GAO discussed preliminary information from its ongoing work looking at
Amtrak's progress in achieving operating self sufficiency, focusing on:
(1) Amtrak's financial condition and progress toward self-sufficiency;
(2) Amtrak's need for, and use of, capital funds; and (3) some of the
factors that will play a role in Amtrak's future viability.
GAO noted that: (1) Amtrak's financial condition is still very
precarious and heavily dependent on federal operating and capital funds;
(2) in response to its deteriorating financial condition, in 1995 and
1996 Amtrak developed strategic business plans designed to increase
revenues and reduce cost growth; (3) however, GAO has found that, in the
past 2 years, passenger revenues, adjusted for inflation, have generally
declined, and in fiscal year (FY) 1996, the gap between operating
deficits and federal operating subsidies began to grow again to levels
exceeding that of FY 1994, when the continuation of Amtrak's nationwide
passenger rail service was severely threatened; (4) at the end of FY
1996, the gap between the operating deficit and federal operating
subsidies was $82 million; (5) capital investment continues to play a
critical role in supporting Amtrak's business plans and ultimately in
maintaining Amtrak's viability; (6) such investment will not only help
Amtrak retain revenues by improving the quality of its service but will
be important in facilitating the revenue growth predicted in the
business plans; (7) in 1995 and 1996, GAO reported that Amtrak faced
significant capital investment needs to, among other things, bring its
equipment and facilities systemwide and its tracks in the Northeast
Corridor into a state of good repair and to introduce high-speed rail
service between Washington and Boston; (8) Amtrak will need billions of
dollars in capital investment for these and other projects; (9) it will
be difficult for Amtrak to achieve operating self-sufficiency by 2002
given the environment within which it operates; (10) Amtrak is relying
heavily on capital investment to support its business plans, which
envision a significant increase in capital funding support--possibly
from a dedicated funding source, such as the Highway Trust Fund; (11)
while such a source may offer the potential for steady, reliable
funding, the current budget environment may limit the amount of funds
actually made available to Amtrak; (12) Amtrak is also relying greatly
on revenue growth and cost containment to achieve its goal of
eliminating federal operating support; and (13) the economic and
competitive environment within which Amtrak operates may limit revenue
growth, and Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those
actions necessary, such as route and service adjustments, to reduce cos*
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-RCED-97-80
TITLE: Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak's Financial Viability
Continues to Be Threatened
DATE: 03/12/97
SUBJECT: Federal aid to railroads
Railroad industry
Railroad transportation operations
Financial management
Strategic planning
Future budget projections
Subsidies
IDENTIFIER: Amtrak Northeast Corridor
Amtrak Northeast Corridor Improvement Project
Amtrak Strategic and Business Plan
Highway Trust Fund
Amtrak Strategic Capital Plan
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Before the Subcommittee on Railroads,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
House of Representatives
For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
2 p.m., EST
Wednesday
March 12, 1997
INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL -
AMTRAK'S FINANCIAL VIABILITY
CONTINUES TO BE THREATENED
Statement of Phyllis F. Scheinberg,
Associate Director, Transportation Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division
GAO/T-RCED-97-80
GAO/RCED-97-80T
(343884)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
FRA -
GAO -
============================================================ Chapter 0
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on Amtrak and the
future of intercity passenger rail in the United States. As you
know, over the last several years, we have issued a number of reports
on Amtrak's financial condition, its Strategic Business Plan, and the
status of the Northeast Corridor.\1 We are continuing to monitor
Amtrak's progress as it attempts to address its financial problems
and free itself from federal operating subsidies by 2002.
Our statement today presents preliminary information from our ongoing
work looking at Amtrak's progress in achieving this operating
self-sufficiency. In particular, we are updating information from
our July 1996 and February 1995 reports on Amtrak's financial
condition and progress toward self-sufficiency; commenting on
Amtrak's need for, and use of, capital funds; and discussing some of
the factors that will play a role in Amtrak's future viability. In
summary, our ongoing work shows the following:
-- Amtrak's financial condition is still very precarious and
heavily dependent on federal operating and capital funds. We
previously reported that Amtrak's financial condition had
deteriorated steadily since 1990 and that Amtrak was unlikely to
overcome its financial problems without significant increases in
passenger revenues and/or subsidies from federal, state, and
local governments. In response to its deteriorating financial
condition, in 1995 and 1996 Amtrak developed strategic business
plans designed to increase revenues and reduce cost growth.
However, we have found that in the past 2 years, passenger
revenues, adjusted for inflation, have generally declined, and
in fiscal year 1996, the gap between operating deficits and
federal operating subsidies began to grow again to levels
exceeding that of fiscal year 1994, when the continuation of
Amtrak's nationwide passenger rail service was severely
threatened. At the end of fiscal year 1996, the gap between the
operating deficit and federal operating subsidies was $82
million.
-- Capital investment continues to play a critical role in
supporting Amtrak's business plans and ultimately in maintaining
Amtrak's viability. Such investment will not only help Amtrak
retain revenues by improving the quality of its service but will
be important in facilitating the revenue growth predicted in the
business plans. In both 1995 and 1996, we reported that Amtrak
faced significant capital investment needs to, among other
things, bring its equipment and facilities systemwide and its
tracks in the Northeast Corridor into a state of good repair and
to introduce high-speed rail service (at speeds of up to 150
miles per hour) between Washington and Boston. Amtrak will need
billions of dollars in capital investment for these and other
projects.
-- It will be difficult for Amtrak to achieve operating
self-sufficiency by 2002 given the environment within which it
operates. First, Amtrak is relying heavily on capital
investment to support its business plans, which envision a
significant increase in capital funding support--possibly from a
dedicated funding source, such as the Highway Trust Fund. While
such a source may offer the potential for steady, reliable
funding, the current budget environment may limit the amount of
funds actually made available to Amtrak. Second, Amtrak is also
relying greatly on revenue growth and cost containment to
achieve its goal of eliminating federal operating support. The
economic and competitive environment within which Amtrak
operates may limit revenue growth, and Amtrak will continue to
find it difficult to take those actions necessary (such as route
and service adjustments) to reduce costs.
--------------------
\1 Amtrak's Strategic Business Plan: Progress to Date
(GAO/RCED-96-187, July 24, 1996); Northeast Rail Corridor:
Information on Users, Funding Sources, and Expenditures
(GAO/RCED-96-144, June 27, 1996); Amtrak: Early Progress Made in
Implementing Strategic and Business Plan, but Obstacles Remain
(GAO/T-RCED-95-227, June 16, 1995); Intercity Passenger Rail:
Financial and Operating Conditions Threaten Amtrak's Long-Term
Viability (GAO/RCED-95-71, Feb. 6, 1995). The Northeast Corridor is
the area between Washington, D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Amtrak was created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 to
operate and revitalize intercity passenger rail service. Prior to
its creation, intercity passenger rail service was provided by
private railroads, which had continually lost money, especially after
World War II. The Congress gave Amtrak specific goals, including
providing modern, efficient intercity passenger service; helping to
alleviate the overcrowding of airports, airways, and highways; and
giving Americans an alternative to automobiles and airplanes to meet
their transportation needs. Through fiscal year 1997, the federal
government has invested over $19 billion in Amtrak. (Appendix I
shows federal appropriations for Amtrak since fiscal year 1988.)
In response to continually growing losses and a widening gap between
operating deficits and federal operating subsidies, Amtrak developed
its Strategic Business Plan. This plan (which has been revised
several times) was designed to increase revenues and control cost
growth and, at the same time, eliminate Amtrak's need for federal
operating subsidies by 2002. Amtrak also restructured its
organization into strategic business units: the Northeast Corridor
Unit, which is responsible for operations on the East Coast between
Virginia and Vermont; Amtrak West, for operations on the West Coast;
and the Intercity Unit, for all other service, including most
long-distance, cross-country trains.
AMTRAK IS STILL IN FINANCIAL
CRISIS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Amtrak is still in a financial crisis despite the fact that its
financial performance (as measured by net losses)\2 has improved over
the last 2 years. At the end of fiscal year 1994, Amtrak's net loss
was about $1.1 billion (in 1996 dollars). This loss was $873 million
if the one-time charge of $255 million, taken in fiscal year 1994 for
accounting changes, restructuring costs, and other items, is
excluded.\3 By the end of fiscal year 1996, this loss had declined to
about $764 million. However, the relative gap between total revenues
and expenses has not significantly closed, and passenger revenues
(adjusted for inflation)--which Amtrak has been relying on to help
close the gap--have generally declined over the past several years
(see apps. II and III).
More importantly, the gap between operating deficits\4 and federal
operating subsidies has again begun to grow. Amtrak continues to be
heavily dependent on federal operating subsidies to make ends meet.
Although operating deficits have declined, they have not gone down at
the same rate as federal operating subsidies (see app. IV). At the
end of fiscal year 1994, the gap between Amtrak's operating deficit
and federal operating subsidies was $75 million. At the end of
fiscal year 1996, the gap had increased to $82 million. Over this
same time, federal operating subsidies went from $502.2 million to
$405 million.\5
Amtrak's continuing financial crisis can be seen in other measures as
well. In February 1995, we reported that Amtrak's working
capital--the difference between current assets and current
liabilities--declined between fiscal years 1987 and 1994. Although
Amtrak's working capital position improved in fiscal year 1995, it
declined again in fiscal year 1996 to a $195 million deficit (see
app. V). This reflects an increase in accounts payable and
short-term debt and capital lease obligations, among other items. As
we noted in our 1995 report, a continued decline in working capital
jeopardizes Amtrak's ability to pay immediate expenses. Amtrak's
debt levels have also increased significantly (see app. VI).
Between fiscal years 1993 and 1996, Amtrak's debt and capital lease
obligations increased about $460 million--from about $527 million to
about $987 million (in 1996 dollars). According to Amtrak, this
increase was to finance the delivery of new locomotives and
Superliner and Viewliner cars--a total of 28 locomotives and 245 cars
delivered between fiscal years 1994 and 1996. These debt levels do
not include an additional $1 billion expected to be incurred to
finance 18 high-speed trainsets due to begin arriving in fiscal year
1999 and related maintenance facilities for the Northeast Corridor
(at about $800 million) and the acquisition of 98 new locomotives (at
about $250 million).
It is important to note that Amtrak's increased debt levels could
limit the use of federal operating support to cover future operating
deficits. As Amtrak's debt levels have increased, there has also
been a significant increase in the interest expenses that Amtrak has
incurred on this debt (see app. VII). In fact, over the last 4
years, interest expenses have about tripled--from about $20.6 million
in fiscal year 1993 to about $60.2 million in fiscal year 1996. This
increase has absorbed more of the federal operating subsidies each
year because Amtrak pays interest from federal operating assistance
and principal from federal capital grants. Between fiscal years 1993
and 1996, the percentage of federal operating subsidies accounted for
by interest expense has increased from about 6 to about 21 percent.
As Amtrak assumes more debt to acquire equipment, the interest
payments are likely to continue to consume an increasing portion of
federal operating subsidies.
--------------------
\2 As used here, net loss is calculated as total revenues minus total
expenses. Unless otherwise noted, information on financial
performance and condition was provided by Amtrak and was not
independently verified.
\3 Amounts stated in 1996 dollars.
\4 As used here, operating deficit is the same as net loss, except
noncash items (such as depreciation) and the one-time charge taken in
fiscal year 1994 are excluded from total expenses.
\5 Amounts include excess railroad retirement payments. Amtrak is
required to participate in the railroad retirement and unemployment
systems. Each participating railroad pays a portion of the costs for
all retirement and unemployment benefits in the industry. Amtrak's
payments exceed its specific retirement and unemployment costs.
IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC
BUSINESS PLANS HAS IMPROVED
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, BUT NET
LOSS TARGETS HAVE BEEN MISSED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The implementation of the strategic business plans appears to have
helped Amtrak's financial performance--as evidenced by the reduction
in net losses between fiscal years 1994 and 1996 (from about $873
million to about $764 million).\6 As we reported in July 1996, about
$170 million in cost reductions came in fiscal year 1995 by reducing
some routes and services, cutting management positions, and raising
fares. Amtrak projected that these actions would reduce future net
losses by about $315 million annually once they were in place. The
net loss was reduced in fiscal year 1996 as total revenues increased
more than total expenses did. In contrast, Amtrak estimates that its
net loss in fiscal year 1996 would have been about $1.1 billion if no
actions had been taken to address its financial crisis in 1994.
Although the strategic business plans have helped reduce the net
losses, targets for these losses have often been missed. To
illustrate, Amtrak's plans for fiscal years 1995 and 1996 included
actions to reduce the net losses by $195 million--from about $834
million in 1994 (in current year dollars) to $639 million in fiscal
year 1996. This reduction was to be accomplished, in part, by
increasing revenues $191 million while holding expenses at about the
1994 level. However, actual net losses for this period totaled about
$1.572 billion, or about $127 million more than the $1.445 billion
Amtrak had planned. This difference was primarily due to the severe
winter weather in fiscal year 1996--a contingency that Amtrak had not
planned for and one that added about $29 million to expenses--and the
unsuccessful implementation of various elements of the fiscal year
1996 business plan. For example, many of the productivity
improvements (such as reducing the size of train crews) that Amtrak
had planned in fiscal year 1996 were not achieved. As a result, cost
savings fell short of Amtrak's $108 million target by about $60
million. As we reported in July 1996, Amtrak has made little
progress in negotiating new productivity improvements with its labor
unions.
For fiscal year 1997, as a result of higher than anticipated losses
and an expected accounting adjustment, Amtrak planned for a net loss
of $726 million. However, after the first quarter of operations,
revenues were below target, and although expenses were lower than
expected, the operating deficit was almost $4 million more than
planned for that quarter. Furthermore, fiscal year 1997 financial
results will be affected by the postponement of route and service
adjustments planned for November 1996. Amtrak estimates that
postponing these adjustments will bring a net revenue reduction of
$6.9 million and a net cost increase of $29.2 million. Part of this
increased cost will be offset by an additional federal operating
grant of $22.5 million made to keep these routes operating. In part,
as a result of these increased costs, Amtrak revised its planned
fiscal year 1997 net loss upward to $762 million from the originally
projected $726 million. Even that might not be achieved. As a
result of additional unanticipated expenses and revenue shortfalls,
Amtrak projects its actual fiscal year 1997 year-end net loss could
be about $786 million.
Amtrak's projected fiscal year 1997 financial results may also affect
its cash flow and the need to borrow money to make ends meet. For
example, in January 1997, Amtrak projected a cash flow deficit of
about $96 million at the end of fiscal year 1997--about $30 million
more than planned. This deficit may require Amtrak to begin
borrowing as early as March 1997 to pay their bills. Moreover, the
cash flow deficit may be even larger than projected if Amtrak does
not receive anticipated revenues from the sale of property ($16
million) and cost savings from lower electric power prices in the
Northeast Corridor ($20.5 million). Amtrak's fiscal year 1998
projected year-end cash balance is also bleak. On the basis of
current projections, Amtrak estimates that it may have to borrow up
to $148 million next year. Amtrak currently has short-term lines of
credit of $150 million.
--------------------
\6 As mentioned, the net loss for fiscal year 1994 excludes the
one-time charge of $255 million (in 1996 dollars). Amounts stated in
1996 dollars.
AMTRAK CONTINUES TO HAVE
SIGNIFICANT CAPITAL INVESTMENT
NEEDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
Amtrak's need for capital funds remains high. We reported in June
1996 that Amtrak will need billions of dollars to address its capital
needs, such as bringing the Northeast Corridor up to a state of good
repair.\7 This situation largely continues today. In May 1996, the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Amtrak estimated that about
$2 billion would be needed over the next 3 to 5 years to recapitalize
the south end of the corridor and preserve its ability to operate in
the near term at existing service levels. This renovation would
include making improvements in the North and East river tunnels
serving New York City and restoring the system that provides electric
power to the corridor. This system, with equipment designed to last
40 to 50 years, is now between 60 and 80 years old, and, according to
FRA and Amtrak, has gotten to the point at which it no longer allows
Amtrak and others to provide reliable high-speed and commuter
service. FRA and Amtrak believe that this capital investment of
about $2 billion would help reverse the trend of adding time to
published schedules because of poor on-time performance. Over the
next 20 years, FRA and Amtrak estimate, up to $6.7 billion may be
needed to recapitalize the corridor and make improvements targeted to
respond to high-priority growth opportunities.
A significant capital investment will also be required for other
projects as well. For example, additional capital assistance will be
required to introduce high-speed rail service between New York and
Boston. In 1992, the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act
directed that a plan be developed for regularly scheduled passenger
rail service between New York and Boston in 3 hours or less.
Currently, such trips take, on average, about 4-1/2 hours.
Significant rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure as well as
electrification of the line north of New Haven, Connecticut, will be
required to accomplish this goal. According to Amtrak, since fiscal
year 1991 the federal government has invested about $900 million in
the high-speed rail program, and an additional $1.4 billion will be
required to complete the project. A significant capital investment
will also be required to acquire new equipment and overhaul existing
equipment. Amtrak plans to spend about $1.7 billion over the next 6
years for these purposes.
--------------------
\7 See Northeast Rail Corridor: Information on Users, Funding
Sources, and Expenditures, previously cited.
PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW IN
ADDRESSING PREVIOUSLY REPORTED
CAPITAL NEEDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
We reported in July 1996 and February 1995 on Amtrak's need for
capital investments and some of the problems being experienced as a
result. We noted the additional costs of maintaining an aging fleet,
the backlogs and funding shortages that were plaguing Amtrak's
equipment overhaul program, and the need for substantial capital
improvements and modernization at maintenance and overhaul
facilities. We also commented on the shrinking availability of
federal funds to meet new capital investment needs. Our ongoing
work, the results of which we expect to report later this year, is
looking at these issues.
The preliminary results of our work indicate that Amtrak has made
some progress in addressing capital needs, but the going has been
slow, and in some cases Amtrak may be facing significant future
costs. For example, we reported in February 1995 that about 31
percent of Amtrak's passenger car fleet was beyond its useful
life--estimated at between 25 and 30 years--and that 23 percent of
the fleet was made up of Heritage cars (cars that Amtrak obtained in
1971 from other railroads) that averaged over 40 years old. Since
our report, the average age of the passenger car fleet has declined
from 22.4 years old (in fiscal year 1994) to 20.7 years old (at the
end of fiscal year 1996), and the number of Heritage cars has
declined from 437 to 246. This drop is significant because Heritage
cars, as a result of their age, were subject to frequent failures,
and their downtime for repair was about 3 times longer than for other
types of cars. However, these trends may be masking substantial
future costs to maintain the fleet. In October 1996, about 53
percent of the cars in Amtrak's active fleet of 1,600 passenger cars
averaged 20 years old or more and were at or approaching the end of
their useful life (see app. VIII). It is safe to assume that as
this equipment continues to age, it will be subject to more frequent
failures and require more expensive repairs.
Our ongoing work also shows that the portion of Amtrak's federal
capital grant available to replace assets has continued to shrink.\8
In February 1995, we reported that an increasing portion of the
capital grant was being devoted to debt service, overhauls of
existing equipment, and legally mandated uses, such as equipment
modifications and environmental cleanup. In fiscal year 1994, only
about $54 million of Amtrak's federal capital grant of $195 million
was available to purchase new equipment and meet other capital
investment needs. Since our report, although the portion of the
capital grant available to meet general capital investment needs
increased in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, it shrunk in fiscal year
1997 (see app. IX). In fiscal year 1997, only $12 million of the
capital grant of $223 million is expected to be available for general
capital needs. The rest will be devoted to debt service ($75
million), overhauls of existing equipment ($110 million), or legally
mandated work ($26 million). It is likely that as Amtrak assumes
increased debt (including capital lease obligations) to acquire
equipment and as the number of cars in Amtrak's fleet that exceed
their useful life increases, even less of Amtrak's future capital
grants will be available to meet capital investment needs.
--------------------
\8 The federal capital grants referred to in this discussion exclude
ones for the Northeast Corridor Improvement Program (NECIP) and the
high-speed rail program. In fiscal years 1994 and 1997, Amtrak
received $225 million and $255 million, respectively, for these
programs.
ACHIEVING OPERATING
SELF-SUFFICIENCY BY 2002 WILL
BE DIFFICULT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
Amtrak's ability to reach operating self-sufficiency by 2002 will be
difficult given the environment within which it operates. Amtrak is
relying heavily on capital investment to support its goal of
eliminating federal operating subsidies. For example, Amtrak's draft
fiscal year 1997-2002 Strategic Capital Plan indicates that about 830
million dollars' worth of actions needed to close gaps in the
operating budget through 2002 is directly linked to capital
investments. To support these actions, Amtrak anticipates
significantly increased federal capital assistance--about $750
million to $800 million per year. In comparison, in fiscal year
1997, Amtrak received federal capital funding of $478 million.\9
Amtrak would like this increased assistance to be provided from a
dedicated funding source. Given today's budget environment, it may
be difficult to obtain this degree of increased federal funding. In
addition, providing funds from a dedicated source--such as the
federal Highway Trust Fund--may not give Amtrak as much money as it
expects. Historically, spending for programs financed by this Trust
Fund, such as the federal-aid highway program, has generally been
constrained by limiting the total amount of funds that can be
obligated in a given year.
Amtrak is also subject to the competitive and economic environment
within which it operates. We reported in February 1995 that
competitive pressures had limited Amtrak's ability to increase
revenues by raising fares. Fares were constrained, in part, by lower
fares on airlines and intercity buses. From fiscal year 1994 to
fiscal year 1996, Amtrak's yield (revenue per passenger mile)
increased about 24 percent, from 15.4 cents per passenger mile to
about 19.1 cents. In comparison, between 1994 and 1995, airline
yields declined slightly, intercity bus yields increased 18 percent,
and the real price of unleaded regular gasoline increased a little
less than 1 percent.\10 However, it appears that Amtrak's ability to
increase revenues through fare increases has come at the expense of
ridership, the number of passenger miles, and the passenger miles per
seat-mile (load factor). Between fiscal years 1994 and 1996, all
three declined.\11 Such trade-offs in the future could limit further
increases in Amtrak's yield and ultimately revenue growth.
Finally, Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those
actions necessary to further reduce costs. These include making the
route and service adjustments necessary to save money and to
collectively bargain cost-saving productivity improvements with its
employees. During fiscal year 1995, Amtrak was successful in
reducing and eliminating some routes and services. For example, on
seven routes Amtrak reduced the frequency of service from daily to 3
or 4 times per week, and on nine other routes various segments were
eliminated. Amtrak estimates that such actions saved about $54
million. Amtrak was less successful in making route and service
adjustments planned for fiscal year 1997 and estimates that its
failure to take these actions will increase its projected fiscal year
1997 loss by $13.5 million. Amtrak has also been unsuccessful in
negotiating productivity improvements with labor unions. Such
improvements were expected to save about $26 million in fiscal year
1995 and $19.0 million in fiscal year 1996. According to an Amtrak
official, over the last 2 years Amtrak has not pursued negotiations
for productivity improvements.
--------------------
\9 This amount includes the $255 million for NECIP and the high-speed
rail program.
\10 Data for 1996 were not available for this analysis.
\11 Between fiscal years 1994 and 1996, Amtrak's annual ridership
declined from 21.2 million to 19.7 million passengers, passenger
miles declined from 5.9 billion to 5.1 billion, and the load factor
declined from 49 to 46 percent. Ridership excludes commuter
passengers.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7
Amtrak's financial future has been staked on the ability to eliminate
federal operating support by 2002 by increasing revenues, controlling
costs, and providing customers with high-quality service. Although
the business plans have helped reduce net losses, Amtrak continues to
face significant challenges in accomplishing this goal, and it is
likely Amtrak will continue to require federal financial
support--both operating and capital--well into the future.
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7.1
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR AMTRAK,
FISCAL YEARS 1988-97
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Notes: Mandatory payments to the Railroad Retirement Fund for fiscal
years 1988 through 1990 are estimated.
The appropriations for fiscal year 1993 include $20 million in
supplemental operating funds and $25 million for capital
requirements. The appropriations for fiscal year 1997 include $22.5
million in supplemental operating funds and $60 million for the
Northeast Corridor Improvement Program.
For fiscal year 1997, an additional $80 million was appropriated to
Amtrak for high-speed rail.
Source: Amtrak.
REVENUES AND EXPENSES, FISCAL
YEARS 1988-96
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Source: Amtrak.
AMTRAK'S PASSENGER REVENUES,
FISCAL YEARS 1989-96
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Source: GAO's analysis of Amtrak's data.
AMTRAK'S FEDERAL OPERATING SUBSIDY
AND MANDATORY PAYMENT COMPARED TO
THE OPERATING DEFICIT, FISCAL
YEARS 1988-96
========================================================== Appendix IV
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Notes: Amtrak's operating deficit was calculated as total revenues
minus total expenses, excluding noncash expenses such as
depreciation.
Amounts are in current year dollars.
Source: GAO's analysis of Amtrak's data.
AMTRAK'S WORKING CAPITAL
SURPLUS/DEFICIT, FISCAL YEARS
1987-96
=========================================================== Appendix V
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Notes: Working capital is the difference between current assets and
current liabilities.
Amounts are in current year dollars. In 1996 dollars, working
capital declined from $149 million in fiscal year 1987 to a deficit
of $195 million in fiscal year 1996.
Source: GAO's analysis of Amtrak's data.
AMTRAK'S OUTSTANDING DEBT/CAPITAL
LEASE OBLIGATIONS, FISCAL YEARS
1987-96
========================================================== Appendix VI
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Amounts are in current year dollars.
Source: Amtrak.
AMTRAK'S INTEREST EXPENSE, FISCAL
YEARS 1987-96
========================================================= Appendix VII
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Amounts are in current year dollars.
Source: Amtrak.
AVERAGE AGE OF AMTRAK'S CAR FLEET,
OCTOBER 1996
======================================================== Appendix VIII
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Notes: The data exclude mail-handling cars and road railers.
The age of the baggage and autocarrier cars is a weighted average.
Source: GAO's analysis of Amtrak's data.
COMMITMENTS OF AMTRAK'S FEDERAL
CAPITAL FUNDS, FISCAL YEARS
1989-97
========================================================== Appendix IX
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Notes: The amount "available for other uses" is that portion of the
capital grant not already committed for specific requirements at the
beginning of the fiscal year. This figure does not include capital
grants for the Northeast Corridor Improvement Program.
Amounts for fiscal year 1997 are estimated.
Source: GAO's analysis of Amtrak's data.
*** End of document. ***