DOE Security: Information on Foreign Visitors to the Weapons Laboratories
(Stmnt. for the Rec., 09/26/96, GAO/T-RCED-96-260).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed unclassified visits
by foreign nationals to the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons
laboratories. GAO noted that: (1) the average annual number of foreign
visitors to these DOE laboratories has increased 55 percent since 1986;
(2) in 1996, the number of foreign visitors may increase to over 6,700;
(3) DOE designates some countries as sensitive due to national security,
terrorism, regional instability, or nuclear proliferation concerns; (4)
the average annual number of foreign visitors from sensitive countries
has increased 225 percent since 1993; (5) 93 percent of these visitors
came from China, India, Israel, Taiwan, and the states of the former
Soviet Union; (6) DOE has changed its visit approval and background
check requirements since 1988; (7) DOE has delegated the laboratories
authority to approve visits that do not involve high-level foreign
visitors, sensitive subjects, or secure areas; and (8) DOE only requires
background checks on visitors from sensitive countries who are on
assignment or involved in sensitive subjects or secure areas, but it has
permitted two laboratories to omit background checks for visitors on
assignment.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-96-260
     TITLE:  DOE Security: Information on Foreign Visitors to the 
             Weapons Laboratories
      DATE:  09/26/96
   SUBJECT:  Weapons research
             Laboratories
             Security clearances
             Nuclear weapons plant security
             Internal controls
             Foreign governments
IDENTIFIER:  China
             India
             Israel
             Taiwan
             Commonwealth of Independent States
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Committee on
National Security, House of Representatives

Statement submitted
on September 26, 1996

DOE SECURITY - INFORMATION ON
FOREIGN VISITORS TO THE WEAPONS
LABORATORIES

Statement for the Record by
Bernice Steinhardt, Associate Director,
Energy, Resources, and Science Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-96-260

GAO/RCED-96-260T


(302199)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOE -
  GAO -

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide this statement for the
record about unclassified visits by foreign nationals to the
Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons laboratories--the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and the Los
Alamos National Laboratory and the Sandia National Laboratories in
New Mexico.  As agreed with your staff, this statement responds to
the Committee's directive dated May 7, 1996,\1 and provides (1) a
comparison of the foreign visitors to DOE's weapons laboratories over
the last several years with the 1986-87 foreign visitor levels we
reported in 1988;\2 (2) the number of visitors to these laboratories
who were from countries DOE has designated as "sensitive" because of
national security, terrorism, regional instability, or nuclear
proliferation concerns; and (3) the major changes that have occurred
in the requirements for controlling visitors' access to the
laboratories over the last several years. 

In summary, the information we have obtained shows that the number of
foreign visitors to DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories is increasing. 
From January 1993 through June 1996, approximately 5,900 foreign
visits to the weapons laboratories occurred annually on average. 
This is a 55 percent increase over the 3,800 foreign visits on
average that occurred annually during 1986 and 1987.  This upward
trend is continuing; the average annual number of foreign visitors
has increased steadily over the last few years.  Moreover, the number
of visitors from sensitive countries has also increased, and at a
faster rate than the number from other countries.  The average annual
number of visitors from sensitive countries during 1993 through 1996
was 1,679, or more than 225 percent greater than the annual average
of 513 visitors from sensitive countries during 1986 and 1987. 
Finally, the requirements for allowing foreign visitors into the
laboratories have changed.  Among other things, headquarters has
delegated to DOE's laboratories greater authority to approve foreign
visitors to nonsensitive areas than was the case in 1988.  In
addition, requirements for background checks have changed.  In 1988,
all visitors from communist countries required background checks
regardless of the purpose of the visit.  Currently, at some
laboratories, background checks are only required for visitors from
sensitive countries--which include most of the countries designated
as communist in 1988--who will be visiting secure areas or discussing
sensitive subjects. 


--------------------
\1 The directive is contained in the House Committee on National
Security's report on H.R.  3230 (Report 104-563, May 7, 1996). 

\2 Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Major Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor
Controls at Weapons Laboratories (GAO-RCED-89-31, Oct.  11, 1988). 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories
conduct research and development for DOE's nuclear weapons program
and other classified activities related to defense and energy issues. 
These laboratories also conduct a wide range of unclassified
activities that do not have weapons applications, such as applied
environmental technologies, solar and geothermal energy,
transportation technologies, and nuclear safety.  Because of these
broad activities, a policy of more openness and international
cooperation, and/or the need for specialized expertise, DOE allows
substantial numbers of foreign visitors access to these
laboratories.\3 Access by foreign visitors to the laboratories can be
for either visits (up to 30 days) or assignments (over 30 days but
less than 2 years) to participate in workshops or hold technical
discussions, contribute to specific research projects, or work on
laboratory research and development activities.  In addition, some
foreign nationals are hired by the laboratories as employees; they
are also considered foreign visitors. 

In 1988, we issued a report that detailed a number of problems with
DOE's controls over foreign visitors to these facilities.  These
problems included inadequate prescreening of foreign visitors, poor
identification and review of visits that could involve potentially
sensitive subjects, and insufficient practices for approving,
monitoring, and reporting foreign visits.  In response, DOE revised
its control procedures to require that necessary background checks be
completed before access to the laboratories is granted and
established a DOE-wide foreign visitor reporting and tracking system
to better oversee this activity.  More recent events, including
dramatic changes in the nuclear arms race, the demand for technology
to solve massive environmental problems, and the international
competition facing U.  S.  industry, have caused many to reexamine
the roles of the laboratories.  As a result, the roles of the weapons
laboratories have been changing and becoming more diversified.  DOE
is studying the security implications of the changing role of the
laboratories and of foreign visitors to these laboratories. 


--------------------
\3 DOE defines a foreign visitor as any person who is not a U.S. 
citizen, including individuals who are permanent resident aliens. 


   NUMBER OF VISITORS TO THE
   WEAPONS LABORATORIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Substantial numbers of foreign visitors are allowed access to the
weapons laboratories each year, and the number of these visitors is
increasing.  On the basis of data contained in our 1988 report, DOE
averaged about 3,800 foreign visitors annually to the weapons
laboratories during 1986 and 1987.  Since 1993, the number of foreign
visitors to these laboratories has averaged almost 5,900 annually--an
increase of 55 percent.  Furthermore, the number of foreign visitors
is continuing to rise.  During 1993, over 5,000 foreign visitors
entered the weapons laboratories; in the following year, this number
increased to almost 6,000, and in 1995 the total number of foreign
visitors was over 6,200.  The number of foreign visitors during the
first half of 1996 totaled over 3,350.  If that rate is maintained,
the number of foreign visitors for 1996 will be over 6,700. 

Appendix I contains information on the number of visitors to the
laboratories.  Figure I.1 compares the average annual number of
foreign visitors to the laboratories during the periods 1986 through
1987 and 1993 through 1996.  Figure I.2 provides the number of
foreign visitors to each laboratory during 1993 through 1996. 


   NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM
   SENSITIVE COUNTRIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Certain countries have been designated by DOE as sensitive because of
concerns about national security, terrorism, regional instability, or
nuclear proliferation concerns.\4

The number of visitors to the weapons laboratories from these
sensitive countries is increasing at a faster rate than visitors from
nonsensitive countries.  During 1986 and 1987, an average of 513
foreign visitors from sensitive countries were allowed access to the
laboratories each year.  However, during the period from 1993 through
1996, that average rose to 1,679 visitors from sensitive countries
annually--an increase of over 225 percent.  Most of these foreign
visitors came from China, India, Israel, Taiwan, and the states of
the former Soviet Union.  Individuals from these countries account
for 5,476 (93 percent) of the 5,878 visitors from sensitive countries
to the weapons laboratories since 1993. 

Appendix II contains details on the visitors from sensitive countries
to the weapons laboratories.  Figure II.1 shows a comparison of the
average annual number of visitors from sensitive countries during the
periods 1986-87 and 1993-96.  Figure II.2 compares for the two
periods the average annual number of visits from the sensitive
countries that had the most visitors.  Table II.1 details the number
of visitors from each sensitive country during 1993-96. 


--------------------
\4 DOE previously designated countries of concern as either communist
or sensitive.  All countries of concern are now identified as
sensitive countries. 


   MAJOR CHANGES IN THE
   REQUIREMENTS FOR ALLOWING
   ACCESS TO LABORATORIES BY
   FOREIGN VISITORS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

DOE has always controlled foreign visitors' access to the weapons
laboratories.  These controls for unclassified foreign visits are set
forth currently in DOE Order 1240.2B.  That order, among other
things, describes the responsibilities of each organization involved
in foreign visits and details the process that must be used to allow
access by foreign visitors to the laboratories.  Two of the key
controls contained in the order are the (1) visit approval
requirements and (2) background checks of foreign visitors.  Both of
these controls have changed since our 1988 report. 

DOE has delegated to the laboratories a significant part of the
authority to approve foreign visitors to the laboratories. 
Previously, DOE reviewed and approved all visits to secure areas,
visits involving sensitive subjects, high-level foreign officials,
all visits involving foreign nationals from sensitive countries, and
all assignments regardless of country of origin.  DOE headquarters
offices previously held much of this approval authority.  Currently,
DOE headquarters approves visits involving visitors from sensitive
countries to secure areas and concurs with DOE field office decisions
on visits involving sensitive subjects and high-level foreign
officials.  All other approval authority has been fully delegated to
the DOE field offices.  This authority has been further delegated to
the laboratories.  Consequently, the laboratories now approve all
visits that do not involve high-level foreign visitors, sensitive
subjects, or secure areas.  At Los Alamos, for example, the
laboratory approved 94 percent of its foreign visitors in 1995. 
Appendix III provides a comparison of the past and current
authorization levels for approving foreign visitors. 

The requirements for background checks have also changed. 
Previously, DOE required background checks for visits (up to 30 days)
and assignments (more than 30 days) to secure areas by foreign
nationals from sensitive countries and all visitors from communist
countries.\5 DOE currently requires background checks for foreign
nationals from sensitive countries who are on assignments or on
visits involving secure areas or


sensitive subjects.  However, because of an exemption that DOE
granted to Los Alamos and Sandia, background checks at these
laboratories are required only for visits by foreign nationals that
involve access to secure areas or a sensitive subject.  At Livermore,
background checks on visitors from sensitive countries who are on
assignments are still required. 


--------------------
\5 At Livermore, background checks were required on all assignments
regardless of country of origin. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

This concludes our statement for the record. 


ALL FOREIGN COUNTRIES:  VISITS AND
ASSIGNMENTS TO DOE WEAPONS
LABORATORIES
=========================================================== Appendix I

   Figure I.1:  Average Annual
   Foreign Visits and Assignments
   to DOE Weapons Laboratories,
   Calendar Years 1986-87 and
   1993-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Sources:  Office of Personnel and Information Security, Los Alamos;
Foreign National Visits and Assignments Office, Livermore; Safeguards
and Security Special Projects Team, Sandia. 

   Figure I.2:  Foreign Visits and
   Assignments to DOE Weapons
   Laboratories, January 1993-June
   1996

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Projected totals for 1996 are based on 6-month actual totals
(Los Alamos--1,260; Livermore--1,350; Sandia--742). 

Sources:  Office of Personnel and Information Security, Los Alamos;
Foreign National Visits and Assignments Office, Livermore; Safeguards
and Security Special Projects Team, Sandia. 


SENSITIVE FOREIGN COUNTRIES: 
VISITS AND ASSIGNMENTS TO DOE
WEAPONS LABORATORIES
========================================================== Appendix II

   Figure II.1:  Sensitive Foreign
   Countries:  Average Annual
   Visits and Assignments to DOE
   Weapons Laboratories, Calendar
   Years 1986-87 and 1993-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Sources:  Office of Personnel and Information Security, Los Alamos;
Foreign National Visits and Assignments Office, Livermore; Safeguards
and Security Special Projects Team, Sandia; Office of International
Technology Cooperation, DOE headquarters. 

   Figure II.2:  Sensitive Foreign
   Countries with the Highest
   Average Annual Visits and
   Assignments to DOE Weapons
   Laboratories, Calendar Years
   1986-87 and 1993-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Sources:  Office of Personnel and Information Security, Los Alamos;
Foreign National Visits and Assignments Office, Livermore; Safeguards
and Security Special Projects Team, Sandia; Office of International
Technology Cooperation, DOE headquarters. 



                               Table II.1
                
                Visitors From Sensitive Countries to DOE
                 Weapons Laboratories, Jan. 1993--June
                                  1996

                                                       Jan.-
                                                        June
Sensitive country\a       1993    1994\b      1995      1996     Total
--------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------
Algeria                      5         7         5         3        20
Argentina                   20         6         -         -        26
Brazil                      21        18         -         -        39
Bulgaria                     4        10         -         -        14
Burma                        1         0         -         -         1
Cambodia                     1         0         -         -         1
Chile                        6         4         -         -        10
China                      235       525       442       232     1,434
Cuba                         0         1         3         0         4
El Salvador                  1         0         -         -         1
Ethiopia                     3         3         -         -         6
India                      126       245       256       168       795
Iran                        13        21        25        10        69
Iraq                         0         4         3         1         8
Israel                      69        88        73        51       281
Libya                        0         1         1         0         2
Pakistan                     3        11         7         3        24
Romania                      5         8         -         -        13
So. Africa                  10         7         -         -        17
So. Korea                   63        40         -         -       103
Fr.Soviet U.\c             760       705       797       486     2,748
Syria                        0         1         2         4         7
Taiwan                      47        64        73        34       218
Vietnam                      0         5         -         -         5
Yugoslavia                  26         6         -         -        32
======================================================================
Total                    1,419     1,780     1,687       992     5,878
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In addition, North Korea and Sudan are sensitive countries but did
not have visitors to the laboratories during 1993-96. 

\b As of July 28, 1994, the following countries were no longer
considered sensitive:  Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia,
Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Romania, South Africa, South Korea,
Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. 

\c The countries making up the former Soviet Union include Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan.  Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are nonsensitive
countries. 

Sources:  Office of Personnel and Information Security, Los Alamos;
Foreign National Visits and Assignments Office, Livermore; Safeguards
and Security Special Projects Team, Sandia; Office of International
Technology Cooperation, DOE headquarters. 


COMPARISON OF PAST AND CURRENT
AUTHORITY TO APPROVE FOREIGN
VISITORS
========================================================= Appendix III


                                         DOE             DOE field
Type of visit                            headquarters    office          LLNL  LANL  SNL
---------------------------------------  --------------  --------------  ----  ----  ----
1988 approval authority
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High-level foreign officials             X

Discussion of sensitive subjects         X

Visits/assignments to secure areas

From sensitive countries                 X

From nonsensitive countries                              X

Assignments to nonsecure areas

From communist countries\a               X

From other sensitive countries                           X

From nonsensitive countries                              X

Visits to nonsecure areas

From sensitive countries                                 X

From nonsensitive countries                                              X     X     X


1996 approval authority
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High-level foreign officials                             X\b

Discussion of sensitive subjects                         X\b

Visits/assignments to secure areas

From sensitive countries                 X

From nonsensitive countries                              X

Assignments to nonsecure areas

From sensitive countries                                                 X     X     X

From nonsensitive countries                                              X     X     X

Visits to nonsecure areas

From sensitive countries                                                 X     X     X

From nonsensitive countries                                              X     X     X
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a DOE's 1988 foreign visitor controls made a distinction between
communist and other sensitive countries.  DOE no longer makes such a
distinction. 

\b DOE headquarters must concur with DOE field office approval of
these visits. 


*** End of document. ***