DOE Cleanup: Status and Future Costs of Uranium Mill Tailings Program
(Testimony, 05/01/96, GAO/T-RCED-96-167).
GAO discussed the status and cost of the Department of Energy's (DOE)
uranium mill tailings cleanup program and the factors that could affect
future costs. GAO noted that: (1) surface contamination cleanup has been
completed at two-thirds of the identified sites and is underway at most
of the others; (2) if DOE completes its surface cleanup program in 1998,
it will have cost $2.3 billion, taken 8 years longer than expected, and
be $621 million over budget; (3) DOE cleanup costs increased because
there were more contaminated sites than originally anticipated, some
sites were more contaminated than others, and changes were needed to
respond to state and local concerns; (4) the future cost of the uranium
mill tailings cleanup will largely depend on the future DOE role in the
program, remediation methods used, and the willingness of states to
share final cleanup costs; and (5) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
needs to ensure that enough funds are collected from the responsible
parties to protect U.S. taxpayers from future cleanup costs.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-RCED-96-167
TITLE: DOE Cleanup: Status and Future Costs of Uranium Mill
Tailings Program
DATE: 05/01/96
SUBJECT: Uranium
Nuclear waste management
Radioactive waste disposal
Water pollution control
Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Environmental monitoring
Hazardous substances
Environmental policies
Cost sharing (finance)
Fines (penalties)
IDENTIFIER: Grand Junction (CO)
DOE Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Project
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on
Science, House of Representatives
For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m. EDT
Wednesday
May 1, 1996
DOE CLEANUP - STATUS AND FUTURE
COSTS OF URANIUM MILL TAILINGS
PROGRAM
Statement of Bernice Steinhardt,
Associate Director, Energy, Resources,
and Science Issues, Resources, Community,
and Economic Development Division
GAO/T-RCED-96-167
GAO/RCED-96-167T
(302195)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOE -
NRC -
GAO -
EPA -
============================================================ Chapter 0
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to participate in this hearing on the Department of
Energy's (DOE) fiscal year 1997 budget. Our testimony focuses on one
part of DOE's cleanup efforts: the cleanup of contamination that
resulted from decades of processing uranium ore as part of the
nation's nuclear weapons and energy program. Under the Uranium Mill
Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, DOE was required to clean up
inactive sites, while private owners/operators were required to clean
up those sites that were active at the time the law was passed.
Although the act directed that the cleanup of surface contamination
be completed by March 1990, the Congress subsequently extended the
deadline twice. DOE's authority now expires in September 1996, and
DOE is seeking to extend the deadline to 1998. In anticipation of
congressional deliberations on reauthorizing the program, we recently
examined (1) the status and cost of DOE's cleanup program and (2)
factors that could affect the federal government's costs in the
future.\1 We are pleased to report our findings to you today, but to
provide a context for our discussion, we would like first to present
an overview of the larger effort to clean up the weapons complex and
some recent observations about the cleanup program's costs.
The huge cost of cleaning up the weapons complex has been a matter of
growing concern. DOE is responsible for environmental restoration,
waste management, and facility transition and management at 15 major
contaminated facilities and more than 100 small facilities in 34
states and territories. These facilities encompass a wide range of
environmental problems, including more than 7,000 locations where
radioactive or hazardous materials were released into the
environment, as well as almost 200 tanks that contain high-level
radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production, some of which have
leaked or could explode. Over the last several years, the total
estimated cost of the DOE's cleanup has gone from roughly $100
billion in 1988 to a current figure ranging from $230 billion to a
high of $350 billion.\2
Mr. Chairman, over the past several years we have frequently
reported on many issues that have affected and will affect the cost
of the cleanup. One of these is the need for a national risk-based
strategy under which DOE and its regulators can negotiate realistic
agreements and milestones under increasingly restrictive budgets. We
have also highlighted the need for DOE to more effectively address
the complex technical problems it faces in cleaning up its most
vexing problems, such as the high-level tank wastes at Hanford, as
well as the need for more effective contractor management.\3
Cleaning up these sites is an enormous task that is likely to span
multiple generations. To date, only a small portion of DOE's
environmental restoration projects have been completely cleaned up.
By contrast, DOE's efforts to clean up at least surface contamination
under its uranium mill tailings program is near completion; 16 of the
24 sites have already been cleaned up and work is under way or
planned at the rest. While groundwater cleanup is still ahead, DOE
hopes to adopt a strategy that will minimize its costs. Let me
return to our findings on the uranium mill tailings program.
In summary, the cleanup of surface contamination has been completed
at two-thirds of the sites and is underway at most of those
remaining. However, since the surface cleanup began in 1979, it has
grown in both size and cost. If it is completed in 1998, as DOE
currently projects, it will have taken nearly 8 years longer than DOE
originally expected. It will also have cost $2.3 billion--$621
millon, or 37 percent, more than DOE anticipated. Moreover, total
future cleanup costs are still uncertain. DOE estimates that the
groundwater cleanup at contaminated properties, which is not subject
to the same deadline as the surface cleanup, will be completed in
2014 at a cost of at least $147 million, depending on which cleanup
strategies DOE ultimately selects and whether the states pay their
share of the costs. Other factors that could affect the federal
government's costs include (1) the extent and cost of DOE's role in
the future disposal of tailings in the Grand Junction, Colorado, area
and (2) whether the charges for the long-term surveillance and
maintenance of sites that are supposed to be assessed against
owners/operators are sufficient to ensure that the U.S. taxpayer
will not bear the burden of the long-term custody costs.
Before discussing these issues in detail, we would like to provide
some background information on the program.
--------------------
\1 Uranium Mill Tailings: Cleanup Continues, but Future Costs Are
Uncertain (GAO/RCED-96-37, Dec. 15, 1995).
\2 These amounts are in 1995 dollars, but have not been discounted.
All other amounts have been converted to discounted 1995 dollars.
\3 Nuclear Weapons Complex: Establishing a National Risk-Based
Strategy for Cleanup (GAO/T-RCED-95-120, Mar. 6, 1995), Nuclear
Waste: Hanford Tank Waste Program Needs Cost, Schedule, and
Management Changes (GAO/RCED-93-99, Mar. 8, 1993), and Department of
Energy: National Priorities Needed for Meeting Environmental
Agreements (GAO/RCED-95-1, Mar. 3, 1995).
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
During the three decades in which uranium was used in the
government's nuclear weapons and energy programs, for every ounce of
uranium that was extracted from ore, 99 ounces of waste were produced
in the form of mill tailings--a finely ground, sand-like material.
By the time the government's need for uranium peaked in the late
1960s, tons of mill tailings had been produced at the processing
sites. After fulfilling their government contracts, many companies
closed down their uranium mills and left large piles of tailings at
the mill sites. Because the tailings were not disposed of properly,
they were spread by wind, water, and human intervention, thus
contaminating properties beyond the mill sites. In some communities,
the tailings were used as building materials for homes, schools,
office buildings, and roads because at the time the health risks were
not commonly known. The tailings and waste liquids from processing
uranium ore also contaminated the groundwater.
Tailings from the ore processing resulted in radioactive
contamination at about 50 sites (located mostly in the southwestern
United States) and at 5,276 nearby properties. The most hazardous
constituent of uranium mill tailings is radium. Radium produces
radon, a radioactive gas whose decay products can cause lung cancer.
The amount of radon released from a pile of tailings remains constant
for about 80,000 years. Tailings also emit gamma radiation, which
can increase the incidence of cancer and genetic risks. Other
potentially hazardous substances in the tailings include arsenic,
molybdenum, and selenium.
DOE's cleanup authority was established by the Uranium Mill Tailings
Radiation Control Act of 1978. Title I of the act governs the
cleanup of uranium ore processing sites that were already inactive at
the time the legislation was passed. These 24 sites are referred to
as Title I sites. Under the act, DOE is to clean up the Title I
sites, as well as the nearby properties that were contaminated. In
doing so, DOE works closely with the affected states and Indian
tribes. DOE pays for most of this cleanup, but the affected states
contribute 10 percent of the costs for remedial actions.
Title II of the act covers the cleanup of sites that were still
active when the act was passed. These 26 sites are referred to as
Title II sites. Title II sites are cleaned up mostly at the expense
of the private companies that own and operate them. They are then
turned over to the federal government for long-term custody. Before
a Title II site is turned over to the government, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) works with the sites' owners/operators to
make sure that sufficient funds will be available to cover the costs
of long-term monitoring and maintenance.
The cleanup of surface contamination consists of four key steps: (1)
identifying the type and extent of the contamination; (2) obtaining a
disposal site; (3) developing an action plan, which describes the
cleanup method and specifies the design requirements; and (4)
carrying out the cleanup using the selected method. Generally, the
primary cleanup method consists of enclosing the tailings in a
disposal cell--a containment area that is covered with compacted clay
to prevent the release of radon and then topped with rocks or
vegetation.
Similarly, the cleanup of groundwater contamination consists of
identifying the type and extent of the contamination, developing an
action plan, and carrying out the cleanup using the selected method.
According to DOE, depending on the type and extent of the
contamination, and the possible health risks, the appropriate method
may be (1) leaving the groundwater as it is, (2) allowing it to
cleanse itself over time (called natural flushing), or (3) using an
active cleanup technique such as pumping the water out of the ground
and treating it.
Mr. Chairman, we now return to the topics discussed in our report:
the status and cost of DOE's surface and groundwater cleanup and the
factors that could affect the federal government's costs in the
future.
STATUS AND COST OF DOE'S
CLEANUP PROJECT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Since our report was issued on December 15, 1995, DOE has made
additional progress in cleaning up and licensing Title I sites. As
of April 1996, DOE's surface cleanup was complete at 16 of the 24
Title I sites, under way at 6 additional sites, and on hold at the
remaining 2 sites.\4 Of the 16 sites where DOE has completed the
cleanup, 4 have been licensed by NRC as meeting the standards of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). At 10 of the other 12 sites,
DOE is working on obtaining such a license, and the remaining 2 sites
do not require licensing because the tailings were relocated to other
sites. Additionally, DOE has completed the surface cleanup at about
97 percent of the 5,276 nearby properties that were also
contaminated. Although DOE expects to complete the surface cleanup
of the Title I sites by the beginning of 1997, it does not expect all
of NRC activities to be completed until the end of 1998. As for the
cleanup of groundwater at the Title I sites, DOE began this task in
1991 and currently expects to complete it in about 2014.
Since its inception in 1979, DOE's project for cleaning up the Title
I sites has grown in size and in cost. In 1982, DOE estimated that
the cleanups would be completed in 7 years and that only one pile of
tailings would need to be relocated. By 1992, however, the
Department was estimating that the surface cleanup would be completed
in 1998 and that 13 piles of tailings would need to be relocated.
The project's expansion was caused by several factors, including
-- the development of EPA's new groundwater protection standards;
-- the establishment or revision of other federal standards
addressing such things as the transport of the tailings and the
safety of workers; and
-- the unexpected discovery of additional tailings, both at the
processing sites and at newly identified, affected properties
nearby.
In addition, DOE made changes in its cleanup strategies to respond to
state and local concerns. For example, at the Grand Junction,
Colorado, site, the county's concern about safety led to the
construction of railroad transfer facilities and the use of both rail
cars and trucks to transport contaminated materials. The cheaper
method of simply trucking the materials would have routed extensive
truck traffic through heavily populated areas.
Along with the project's expansion came cost increases. In the early
1980s, DOE estimated that the total cleanup cost--for both the
surface and groundwater--would be about $1.7 billion. By November
1995, this estimate had grown to $2.4 billion. DOE spent $2 billion
on surface cleanup activities through fiscal year 1994 and expects to
spend about $300 million more through 1998.\5
As for groundwater, DOE has not started any cleanup. By June 1995,
the Department had spent about $16.7 million on site characterization
and various planning activities. To make the cleanup as
cost-effective as it can, DOE is proposing to leave the groundwater
as it is at 13 sites, allow the groundwater to cleanse itself over
time at another 9 sites, and use an active cleanup method at 2
locations, in Monument Valley and Tuba City, Arizona. The final
selection of cleanup strategies depends largely on DOE's reaching
agreement with the affected states and tribes. At this point,
however, DOE has yet to finalize agreements on any of the groundwater
cleanup strategies it is proposing. At the time we issued our
report, the cleanups were projected to cost at least another $130
million using the proposed strategies, and perhaps as much as another
$202 million. More recently, DOE has indicated that the Department
could reduce these costs by shifting some of the larger costs to
earlier years; reducing the amounts built into the strategies for
contingencies, and using newer, performance-based contracting
methods.
--------------------
\4 The state of North Dakota, in which these two sites are located,
has asked DOE to "delist" its sites, or drop them from the program,
claiming that the sites present minimal risk to the public and
environment and that the state legislature was not likely to
appropriate funds for the state's share of the cleanup cost.
According to DOE, if the state did not pay its 10-percent share, the
Department would not have authority to complete the cleanup.
Accordingly, DOE would notify the Congress that it could not complete
the planned remedial actions. As of April 1996, DOE had not made a
final decision on the North Dakota sites, but it did not include
funds for cleaning up these sites in its fiscal year 1997 budget
request.
\5 For the surface cleanup costs, fiscal year 1994 data were the most
recent available, at the time of our review.
UNCERTAIN FUTURE COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
Once all of the sites have been cleaned up, the federal government's
responsibilities, and the costs associated with them, will continue
far into the future. What these future costs will amount to is
currently unknown and will depend largely on how three issues are
resolved. First, because the effort to clean up the groundwater is
in its infancy, its final scope and cost will depend largely on the
remediation methods chosen and the financial participation of the
affected states. Since the time we issued our report, DOE has
reported some progress in developing its groundwater cleanup plans.
However, it is still too early to know whether the affected states or
tribes will ultimately persuade DOE to implement more costly remedies
than those the Department has proposed or whether any of the
technical assumptions underlying DOE's proposed strategies will prove
to be invalid. If either of these outcomes occurs, DOE may implement
more costly cleanup strategies, and thereby increase the final cost
of the groundwater cleanup. In its fiscal year 1997 congressional
budget request, DOE identified five sites where it believes it may
have to implement more expensive alternatives than the ones it
initially proposed.
In addition, the final cost of the groundwater cleanup depends on the
ability and willingness of the affected states to pay their share of
the cleanup costs. According to DOE, several states may not have
funding for the groundwater cleanup program. DOE believes that it is
prohibited from cleaning up the contamination if the states do not
pay their share. Accordingly, as we noted in our report, we believe
that the Congress may want to consider whether and under what
circumstances DOE can complete the cleanup of the sites if the states
do not provide financial support.
Second, DOE may incur further costs to dispose of uranium mill
tailings that are unearthed in the future in the Grand Junction,
Colorado, area. DOE has already cleaned up the Grand Junction
processing site and over 4,000 nearby properties, at a cost of about
$700 million. Nevertheless, in the past, about a million cubic yards
of tailings were used in burying utility lines and constructing roads
in the area and remain today under the utility corridors and road
surfaces. In future years, utility and road repairs will likely
unearth these tailings, resulting in a potential public health hazard
if the tailings are mishandled. In response to this problem, DOE has
worked with NRC and Colorado officials to develop a plan for
temporarily storing the tailings as they are unearthed and
periodically transporting them to a nearby disposal cell--referred to
as the Cheney cell, located near the city of Grand Junction--for
permanent disposal. Under this plan, the city or county would be
responsible for hauling the tailings to the disposal cell, and DOE
would be responsible for the cost of placing the tailings in the
cell. The plan envisions that a portion of the Cheney disposal cell
would remain open, at an annual cost of roughly $200,000. When the
cell is full, or after a period of 20 to 25 years, it would be
closed. However, DOE does not currently have the authority to
implement this plan because the law requires that all disposal cells
be closed upon the completion of the surface cleanup. Accordingly,
we suggested in our report that the Congress might want to consider
whether DOE should be authorized to keep a portion of the Cheney
disposal cell open to dispose of tailings that are unearthed in the
future in this area.
Finally, DOE's costs for long-term care are still somewhat uncertain.
DOE will ultimately be responsible for the long-term custody, that
is, the surveillance and maintenance, of both Title I and Title II
sites\6 , but the Department bears the financial responsibility for
these activities only at Title I sites. For Title II sites, the
owners/operators are responsible for funding the long-term
surveillance and maintenance. Although NRC's minimum one-time charge
to site owners/operators is supposed to be sufficient to cover the
cost of the long-term custody so that they, not the federal
government, bear these costs in full, at the time we issued our
December 1995 report, NRC had not reviewed its estimate of basic
surveillance costs since 1980, and DOE was estimating that basic
monitoring would cost about three times more than NRC had estimated.
Since then, NRC and DOE have worked together to determine what level
of basic monitoring should occur and how comprehensive the inspection
reports should be. However, DOE still maintains that ongoing routine
maintenance will be needed at all sites, while NRC's charge does not
provide any amount for ongoing maintenance. In light of the
consequent potential shortfall in maintenance funds, our report
recommended that NRC and DOE work together to update the charge for
basic surveillance and determine whether routine maintenance will be
required at each site. On the basis of our recommendations, NRC
officials agreed to reexamine the charge and determine the need for
routine maintenance at each site. They also said that they are
working with DOE to clarify the Department's role in determining the
funding requirements for long-term custody.
--------------------
\6 States have the option of assuming long-term custody of the
cleaned-up Title II sites, but DOE does not expect that any states
will choose to do so.
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We will be
pleased to answer any questions that you or Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
*** End of document. ***