Railroad Safety: DOT Faces Challenges in Improving Grade Crossing Safety,
Track Inspection Standards, and Passenger Car Safety (Testimony,
04/01/96, GAO/T-RCED-96-115).

GAO provided information on the safety of highway railroad crossings,
commuter passenger rails and adequacy of track safety inspections. GAO
found that: (1) the leading cause of death associated with the railroad
industry involved railroad crossing accidents; (2) about half of
rail-related deaths occur because of collisions between trains and
vehicles at public railroad crossings; (3) in 1994, 501 people were
killed and 1,764 injured in railroad crossing accidents; (4) to improve
the safety of railroad crossings, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
must better target funds to high-risk areas, close more railroad
crossings, install new technologies, and develop educational programs to
increase the public's awareness of railroad crossings; (5) DOT plans are
costly and will require congressional approval; (6) the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) is unable to adequately inspect and enforce truck
safety standards or direct transportation officials to the routes with
the highest accident potential because its database contains inaccurate
information; and (7) Congress has directed FRA to establish sufficient
passenger car safety standards by 1999.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-96-115
     TITLE:  Railroad Safety: DOT Faces Challenges in Improving Grade 
             Crossing Safety, Track Inspection Standards, and
             Passenger Car Safety
      DATE:  04/01/96
   SUBJECT:  Railroad safety
             Railroad accidents
             Railroad regulation
             Safety standards
             Accident prevention
             Data collection operations
             Inspection
             Motor vehicles
             Management information systems
             Federal/state relations
IDENTIFIER:  DOT Surface Transportation Program
             DOT Rail-Highway Crossing Program
             Fox River Grove (IL)
             Cajon Pass (CA)
             Silver Spring (MD)
             Weyauwega (WI)
             National Highway System
             Ohio
             DOT Grade Crossing Action Plan
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate

Hearing held on
February 27, 1996
Statement Submitted on
April 1, 1996

RAILROAD SAFETY - DOT FACES
CHALLENGES IN IMPROVING GRADE
CROSSING SAFETY, TRACK INSPECTION
STANDARDS, AND PASSENGER CAR
SAFETY

Statement for the Record by
Phyllis F.  Scheinberg, Associate Director,
Transportation and Telecommunications Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-96-115

GAO/RCED-96-115t


(343879)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV


============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide this statement for the
record on several issues affecting safety on the nation's rail lines. 
Recent rail accidents at Cajon Pass, California; Silver Spring,
Maryland; and Weyauwega, Wisconsin, have heightened concern about the
safety of passenger and freight lines in the United States.  Since
1987, GAO has issued many reports describing safety problems on the
nation's rail lines.  This statement is based on recent GAO reviews
of safety at highway railroad crossings, the adequacy of track safety
inspections and enforcement, and the safety of passenger cars
operated by commuter railroads and Amtrak.  In summary, we found the
following: 

  -- Accidents at railroad crossings are the leading cause of deaths
     associated with the railroad industry; almost half of all
     rail-related deaths in the United States are caused by
     collisions of trains and vehicles at public railroad crossings. 
     In 1994, these collisions killed 501 people and injured 1,764
     others.  Strategies to improve safety at railroad crossings
     include targeting funds to high-risk areas through revisions in
     the Department of Transportation's (DOT) formula for
     distributing railroad improvement funds to the states; closing
     more railroad crossings; installing new technologies, such as
     four-quadrant gates, at the most dangerous crossings; and
     developing education and enforcement programs that increase the
     public's awareness of the dangers of railroad crossings. 
     Although DOT has an action plan incorporating these strategies,
     the plan will be costly to implement and will require DOT to
     seek congressional approval to implement key proposals. 

  -- The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has developed an
     overall strategy for inspecting and enforcing track safety
     standards.  As we recommended in our 1994 report,\1 to further
     strengthen the rail safety program, FRA needs to include
     site-specific data on volumes of passenger and hazardous
     materials traffic in its inspection plan and improve the
     reliability of its accident and injury data.  Information on the
     numbers of passengers and amounts of hazardous materials
     transported is important, since train routes carrying these
     types of traffic must be adequately maintained to prevent
     accidents that will injure passengers or expose populated areas
     to chemical risks.  Accurate and complete information on the
     numbers of accidents and injuries is equally important in
     identifying high-risk routes.  However, FRA's database, derived
     from the industry's reports to FRA, is inaccurate and
     incomplete.  Without reliable information on passenger and
     hazardous materials traffic, accidents, and injuries, FRA and
     its inspectors do not have the means to direct inspectors to the
     routes that have the highest potential for accidents. 

  -- Although Amtrak and commuter railroads transport over 20 and 330
     million passengers, respectively, each year, FRA has established
     few regulations concerning passenger car safety.  FRA does not
     have minimum safety standards for mechanical components on
     passenger cars, as it does for freight cars and locomotives.  In
     1984, FRA informed the Congress that it planned to study the
     need for standards governing the condition of safety-critical
     passenger car components.  The Congress subsequently directed
     FRA, in the Swift Rail Development Act of 1994, to complete
     rulemaking governing passenger car safety by 1999. 


--------------------
\1 Railroad Safety:  Continued Emphasis Needed for an Effective Track
Safety Inspection Program, (GAO/RCED-94-56, Apr.  22, 1994). 


   IMPROVING RAILROAD CROSSING
   SAFETY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

On October 25, 1995, Americans were reminded of the dangers that
drivers/passengers often face when they travel over railroad
crossings in the United States.  On that day, in Fox River Grove,
Illinois, seven high school students were killed when a commuter
train hit a school bus. 

The potential for tragedies like the one at Fox River Grove is
significant--the United States has over 168,000 public
highway-railroad intersections.  The types of warning for motorists
at these crossings range from no visible devices to active devices,
such as lights and gates.  About 60 percent of all public crossings
in the United States have only passive warning devices--typically,
highway signs known as crossbucks.  In 1994, this exposure resulted
in motor vehicle accidents at crossings that killed 501 people and
injured 1,764 others.  Many of these deaths should have been avoided,
since nearly one-half occurred at crossings where flashing lights and
descended gates had warned motorists of the approaching danger. 

In August 1995, we issued a comprehensive report on safety at
railroad crossings.\2 We reported that the federal investment in
improving railroad crossing safety had noticeably reduced the number
of deaths and injuries.  Since the Rail-Highway Crossing
Program--also known as the section 130 program--was established in
1974, the federal government has distributed about $5.5 billion (in
1996 constant dollars) to the states for railroad crossing
improvements.  This two-decade investment, combined with a reduction
in the total number of crossings since 1974, has significantly
lowered the accident and fatality rates--by 61 percent and 34
percent, respectively.  However, most of this progress occurred
during the first decade, and since 1985, the number of deaths has
fluctuated between 466 and 682 each year (see app.  1).  Since 1977,
the federal funding for railroad crossing improvements has also
declined in real terms.  Consequently, the question for future
railroad crossing safety initiatives will be how best to target
available resources to the most cost-effective approaches. 

Our report discussed several strategies for targeting limited
resources to address railroad crossing safety problems.  The first
strategy is to review DOT's current method of apportioning section
130 funds to the states.  Our analysis of the 1995 section 130
apportionments found anomalies among the states in terms of how much
funding they received in proportion to three key risk factors: 
accidents, fatalities, and total crossings.  For example, California
received 6.9 percent of the section 130 funds in 1995, but it had
only 4.8 percent of the nation's railroad crossings, 5.3 percent of
the fatalities, and 3.9 percent of the accidents.  Senators Lugar and
Coats have proposed legislation to change the formula for allocating
section 130 funds by linking the amounts of funding directly to the
numbers of railroad crossings, fatalities, and accidents.  Currently,
section 130 funds are apportioned to each state as a 10-percent
set-aside of its Surface Transportation Program funds. 

The second means of targeting railroad crossing safety resources is
to focus the available dollars on the strategies that have proved
most effective in preventing accidents.  These strategies include
closing more crossings, using innovative technologies at dangerous
crossings, and emphasizing education and enforcement.  Clearly, the
most effective way to improve railroad crossing safety is to close
more crossings.  The Secretary of Transportation has restated FRA's
goal of closing 25 percent of the nation's railroad crossings, since
many are unnecessary or redundant.  For example, in 1994, the
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
found that the nation had two railroad crossings for every mile of
track and that in heavily congested areas, the average approached 10
crossings for every mile.  However, local opposition and localities'
unwillingness to provide a required 10-percent match in funds have
made it difficult for the states to close as many crossings as they
would like.  When closing is not possible, the next alternative is to
install traditional lights and gates.  However, lights and gates
provide only a warning, not positive protection at a crossing. 
Hence, new technologies such as four-quadrant gates with vehicle
detectors, although costing about $1 million per crossing, may be
justified when accidents persist at signalled crossings.  The
Congress has funded research to develop innovative technologies for
improving railroad crossing safety. 

Although installing lights and gates can help to prevent accidents
and fatalities, it will not preclude motorists from disregarding
warning signals and driving around descended gates.  Many states,
particularly those with many railroad crossings, face a dilemma. 
While 35 percent of the railroad crossings in the United States have
active warning devices, 50 percent of all crossing fatalities
occurred at these locations.  To modify drivers' behavior, DOT and
the states are developing education and enforcement strategies.  For
example, Ohio--a state with an active education and enforcement
program--cut the number of accidents at crossings with active warning
devices from 377 in 1978 to 93 in 1993--a 75-percent reduction.  Ohio
has used mock train crashes as educational tools and has aggressively
issued tickets to motorists going around descended crossing gates. 
In addition, DOT has inaugurated a safety campaign entitled "Always
Expect a Train," while Operation Lifesaver, Inc., provides support
and referral services for state safety programs.\3

DOT's educational initiatives are part of a larger plan to improve
railroad crossing safety.  In June 1994, DOT issued a Grade Crossing
Action Plan, and in October 1995, it established a Grade Crossing
Safety Task Force.  The action plan set a national goal of reducing
the number of accidents and fatalities by 50 percent from 1994 to
2004.  As we noted in our report, whether DOT attains the plan's goal
will depend, in large part, on how well it coordinates the efforts of
the states and railroads, whose contributions to implementing many of
the proposals are critical.  DOT does not have the authority to
direct the states to implement many of the plan's proposals,
regardless of how important they are to achieving DOT's goal. 
Therefore, DOT must rely on either persuading the states that
implementation is in their best interests or providing them with
incentives for implementation.  In addition, the success of five of
the plan's proposals depends on whether DOT can obtain the required
congressional approval to use existing funds in ways that are not
allowable under current law.  The five proposals would (1) change the
method used to apportion section 130 funds to the states, (2) use
Surface Transportation Program funds to pay local governments a bonus
to close crossings, (3) eliminate the requirement for localities to
match a portion of the costs associated with closing crossings, (4)
establish a $15 million program to encourage the states to improve
rail corridors, and (5) use Surface Transportation Program funds to
increase federal funding for Operation Lifesaver. 

Finally, the action plan's proposals will cost more money.  Secretary
Pena has announced a long-term goal of eliminating 2,250 crossings
where the National Highway System intersects Principal Rail Lines. 
Both systems are vital to the nation's interstate commerce, and
closing these crossings is generally not feasible.  The alternative
is to construct a grade separation--an overpass or underpass.  This
initiative alone could cost between $4.5 billion and $11.3 billion--a
major infrastructure investment. 

DOT established the Grade Crossing Safety Task Force in the aftermath
of the Fox River Grove accident, intending to conduct a comprehensive
national review of highway-railroad crossing design and construction
measures.  On March 1, 1996, the task force reported to the Secretary
that "improved highway-rail grade crossing safety depends upon better
cooperation, communication, and education among responsible parties
if accidents and fatalities are to be reduced significantly." The
report provided 24 proposals for five problem areas it reviewed:  (1)
highway traffic signals that are supposed to be triggered by oncoming
trains; (2) roadways where insufficient space is allotted for
vehicles to stop between a road intersection and nearby railroad
tracks; (3) junctions where railroad tracks are elevated above the
surface of the roadway, exposing vehicles to the risk of getting hung
on the tracks; (4) light rail transit crossings without standards for
their design, warning devices, or traffic control measures; and (5)
intersections where slowly moving vehicles, such as farm equipment,
frequently cross the tracks. 


--------------------
\2 Railroad Safety:  Status of Efforts to Improve Railroad Crossing
Safety, (GAO/RCED-95-191, Aug.  3, 1995). 

\3 Operation Lifesaver is a private, not-for-profit organization
supported by federal and railroad funds and dedicated to improving
safety through education and improved law enforcement.  Operation
Lifesaver programs are currently operated in 49 states. 


   IMPROVING TRACK SAFETY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, as amended, FRA is
responsible for regulating all aspects of railroad safety.  FRA's
safety mission includes 1) establishing federal rail safety rules and
standards; 2) inspecting railroads' track, signals, equipment, and
operating practices; and 3) enforcing federal safety rules and
standards.  The railroads are primarily responsible for inspecting
their own equipment and facilities to ensure compliance with federal
safety regulations, while FRA monitors the railroads' actions. 

We have issued many reports identifying weaknesses in FRA's railroad
safety inspection and enforcement programs.  For example, in July
1990, we reported on FRA's progress in meeting the requirements, set
forth in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1980, that
FRA submit to the Congress a system safety plan to carry out railroad
safety laws.\4 The act directed FRA to (1) develop an inspection
methodology that considered carriers' safety records, the location of
population centers, and the volume and type of traffic using the
track and (2) give priority to inspections of track and equipment
used to transport passengers and hazardous materials.  The House
report accompanying the 1980 act stated that FRA should target safety
inspections to high-risk track--track with a high incidence of
accidents and injuries, located in populous urban areas, carrying
passengers, or transporting hazardous materials.  In our 1990 report,
we found that the inspection plan that FRA had developed did not
include data on passenger and hazardous materials routes--two
important risk factors.  In an earlier report, issued in April 1989,
we noted problems with another risk factor--accidents and injuries.\5
We found that the railroads had substantially underreported and
inaccurately reported the number of accidents and injuries and their
associated costs.  As a result, FRA could not integrate inspection,
accident, and injury data in its inspection plan to target high-risk
locations. 

In our 1994 report on FRA's track safety inspection program, we found
that FRA had improved its track inspection program and that its
strategy for correcting the weaknesses we had previously identified
was sound.  However, we pointed out that FRA still faced challenges
stemming from these weaknesses.  First, it had not obtained and
incorporated into its inspection plan site-specific data on two
critical risk factors--the volume of passenger and hazardous
materials traffic.  Second, it had not improved the reliability of
another critical risk factor--the rail carriers' reporting of
accidents and injuries nationwide.  FRA published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in August 1994 on methods to improve rail
carriers' reporting.  In February 1996, FRA reported that it intended
to issue a final rule in June 1996. 

To overcome these problems, we recommended that FRA focus on
improving and gathering reliable data to establish rail safety goals. 
We specifically recommended that FRA establish a pilot program in one
FRA region to gather data on the volume of passenger and hazardous
materials traffic and correct the deficiencies in its accident/injury
database.  We recommended a pilot program in one FRA region, rather
than a nationwide program, because FRA had expressed concern that a
nationwide program would be too expensive.  The House and Senate
Appropriations Conference Committee echoed our concerns in its fiscal
year 1995 report and directed the agency to report to the Committees
by March 1995 on how it intended to implement our recommendations. 
In its August 1995 response to the Committees, FRA indicated that the
pilot program was not necessary, but it was taking actions to correct
the deficiencies in the railroad accident/injury database.  For
example, FRA had allowed the railroads to update the database using
magnetic media and audited the reporting procedures of all the large
railroads. 

We also identified in our 1994 report an emerging traffic safety
problem--the industry's excessive labeling of track as exempt from
federal safety standards.  Since 1982, federal track safety standards
have not applied to about 12,000 miles of track designated by the
industry as "excepted;" travel on such track is limited to 10 miles
per hour, no passenger service is allowed, and no train may carry
more than five cars containing hazardous materials.  We found in our
1994 report that the number of accidents on excepted track had
increased from 22 in 1988 to 65 in 1992--a 195-percent increase. 
Similarly, the number of track defects cited in FRA inspections
increased from 3,229 in 1988 to 6,057 in 1992.  However, with few
exceptions, FRA cannot compel railroads to correct these defects. 
According to FRA, the railroads have applied the excepted track
provision far more extensively than envisioned.  For example,
railroads have transported hazardous materials through residential
areas on excepted track or intentionally designated track as excepted
to avoid having to comply with minimum safety regulations.  In
November 1992, FRA announced a review of the excepted track provision
with the intent of making changes.  FRA viewed the regulations as
inadequate because its inspectors could not write violations for
excepted track and railroads were not required to correct defects on
excepted track. 

FRA stated that changes to the excepted track provision would occur
as part of its rulemaking revising all track safety standards.  In
February 1996, FRA reported that the task of revising track safety
regulations would be taken up by FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee.  FRA noted that this committee would begin its work in
April 1996 but did not specify a date for completing the final
rulemaking.  The Congress had originally directed FRA to complete its
rulemaking revising track safety standards by September 1994. 


--------------------
\4 Railroad Safety:  New Approach Needed for Effective FRA Safety
Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-90-194, July 31, 1990). 

\5 Railroad Safety:  FRA Needs to Correct Deficiencies in Reporting
Injuries and Accidents (GAO/RCED-89-109, Apr.  5, 1989). 


   IMPROVING PASSENGER CAR SAFETY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

In September 1993, we issued a report examining whether Amtrak had
effective procedures for inspecting, repairing, and maintaining its
passenger cars to ensure their safe operation and whether FRA had
provided adequate oversight to ensure the safety of passenger cars.\6
We found that Amtrak had not consistently implemented its inspection
and preventive maintenance programs and did not have clear criteria
for determining when a passenger car should be removed from service
for safety reasons.  In addition, we found that Amtrak had
disregarded some standards when parts were not available or there was
insufficient time for repairs.  For example, we observed that cars
were routinely released for service without emergency equipment, such
as fire extinguishers.  As we recommended, Amtrak established a
safety standard that identified a minimum threshold below which a
passenger car may not be operated, and it implemented procedures to
ensure that a car will not be operated unless it meets this safety
standard. 

In reviewing FRA's oversight of passenger car safety (for both Amtrak
and commuter rail), we found that FRA had established few applicable
regulations.  As a result, its inspectors provided little oversight
in this important safety area.  For more than 20 years, the National
Transportation Safety Board has recommended on numerous occasions
that FRA expand its regulations for passenger cars, but FRA has not
done so.  As far back as 1984, FRA told the Congress that it planned
to study the need for standards governing the condition of
safety-critical passenger car components. 

Between 1990 and 1994, train accidents on passenger rail lines ranged
between 127 and 179 accidents each year (see app.  2).  In our 1993
report, we maintained that FRA's approach to overseeing passenger car
safety was not adequate to ensure the safety of the over 330 million
passengers who ride commuter railroads annually.  We recommended that
the Secretary of Transportation direct the FRA Administrator to study
the need for establishing minimum criteria for the condition of
safety-critical components on passenger cars.  We noted that the
Secretary should direct the FRA Administrator to establish any
regulations for passenger car components that the study shows to be
advisable, taking into account any internal safety standards
developed by Amtrak or others that pertain to passenger car
components.  However, FRA officials told us at the time that the
agency could not initiate the study because of limited resources. 

Subsequently, the Swift Rail Development Act of 1994 required FRA to
issue initial passenger safety standards within 3 years of the act's
enactment and complete standards within 5 years.  In 1995, FRA
referred the issue to its Passenger Equipment Safety Working Group
consisting of representatives from passenger railroads, operating
employee organizations, mechanical employee organizations, and rail
passengers.  The working group held its first meeting in June 1995. 
An advance notice of proposed rulemaking is expected in early 1996,
and final regulations are to be issued in November 1999.  Given the
recent rail accidents, FRA could consider developing standards for
such safety-critical components as emergency windows and doors and
safety belts as well as the overall crashworthiness of passenger
cars. 


--------------------
\6 Amtrak Safety:  Amtrak Should Implement Minimum Safety Standards
for Passenger Cars (GAO/RCED-93-196, Sept.  22, 1993). 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

In conclusion, safety at highway-railroad crossings, the adequacy of
track safety inspections and enforcement, and the safety of passenger
cars operated by commuter railroads and Amtrak will remain important
issues for Congress, FRA, the states, and the industry to address as
the nation continues its efforts to prevent rail-related accidents
and fatalities. 


ACCIDENTS AND FATALITIES AT PUBLIC
RAILROAD CROSSINGS 1975-94
=========================================================== Appendix I



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from FRA. 


PASSENGER RAIL ACCIDENTS 1990-94
========================================================== Appendix II



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note 1:  Analysis includes data from Amtrak, Long Island Rail Road,
Metra (Chicago), Metro-North (New York), Metrolink (Los Angeles), New
Jersey Transit, Northern Indiana, Port Authority Trans-Hudson (New
York), Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority and
Tri-Rail (Florida). 

Note 2:  Data for Amtrak include statistics from several commuter
railroads, including Caltrain (California), Conn DOT, Maryland Area
Rail Commuter (excluding those operated by CSX), Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, and Virginia Railway Express. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from FRA. 


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1

Railroad Safety:  FRA Needs to Correct Deficiencies in Reporting
Injuries and Accidents (GAO/RCED-89-109, Apr.5,1989). 

Railroad Safety:  DOT Should Better Manage Its Hazardous Materials
Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-90-43, Nov.17, 1989). 

Railroad Safety:  More FRA Oversight Needed to Ensure Rail Safety in
Region 2 (GAO/RCED-90-140, Apr.  27, 1990). 

Railroad Safety:  New Approach Needed for Effective FRA Safety
Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-90-194, July 31, 1990). 

Financial Management:  Internal Control Weaknesses in FRA's Civil
Penalty Program (GAO/RCED-91-47, Dec.26, 1990). 

Railroad Safety:  Weaknesses Exist in FRA's Enforcement Program
(GAO/RCED-91-72, Mar.22, 1991). 

Railroad Safety:  Weaknesses in FRA's Safety Program
(GAO/T-RCED-91-32, Apr.  11, 1991). 

Hazardous Materials:  Chemical Spill in the Sacramento River
(GAO/T-RCED-91-87, July 31, 1991). 

Railroad Competitiveness:  Federal Laws and Policies Affect Railroad
Competitiveness (GAO/RCED-92-16, Nov.  5, 1991)

Railroad Safety:  Accident Trends and FRA Safety Programs
(GAO/T-RCED-92-23, Jan.13, 1992). 

Railroad Safety:  Engineer Work Shift Length and Schedule Variability
(GAO/RCED-92-133, Apr.  20, 1992). 

Amtrak Training:  Improvements Needed for Employees Who Inspect and
Maintain Rail Equipment (GAO/RCED-93-68, Dec.8, 1992). 

Amtrak Safety:  Amtrak Should Implement Minimum Safety Standards for
Passenger Cars (GAO/RCED-93-196, Sep.22, 1993). 

Railroad Safety:  Continued Emphasis Needed for an Effective Track
Safety Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-94-56, Apr.22, 1994). 

Amtrak's Northeast Corridor:  Information on the Status and Cost of
Needed Improvements (GAO/RCED-95-151BR, Apr.  13, 1995). 

Railroad Safety:  Status of Efforts to Improve Railroad Crossing
Safety (GAO/RCED-95-191, Aug.  3, 1995). 

*** End of document. ***