Nuclear Weapons: Status of DOE's Nuclear Stockpile Surveillance Program
(Testimony, 03/13/96, GAO/T-RCED-96-100).

GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons stockpile
surveillance program. GAO noted that: (1) during the last 4 years, DOE
has not conducted all of the tests necessary to ensure the stockpile's
reliability; (2) testing delays have resulted from equipment problems,
lack of space on missiles for testing, an incomplete safety study, and
physical relocation of testing activities; (3) for 3 of the 9 types of
weapons scheduled for flight testing, DOE had conducted more than 33
percent fewer tests than scheduled, which causes DOE to be concerned
about the accuracy of the weapons' reliability levels; (4) laboratory
tests of nonnuclear components are seriously behind schedule for one
weapon type; and (5) destructive laboratory testing of most nuclear
components is behind schedule, but DOE expects to be back on schedule by
the end of fiscal year 1997.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-96-100
     TITLE:  Nuclear Weapons: Status of DOE's Nuclear Stockpile 
             Surveillance Program
      DATE:  03/13/96
   SUBJECT:  Nuclear weapons testing
             Strategic forces
             Atomic energy defense activities
             Nuclear weapons plants
             Missile warheads
             Spare parts
             Safety standards
IDENTIFIER:  DOE Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Surveillance Program
             W62 Warhead
             W78 Warhead
             W88 Warhead
             DOE Nuclear Explosive Safety Study
             W87 Warhead
             Minuteman III Missile
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
9:30 a.m.  EST
Wednesday,
March 13, 1996

NUCLEAR WEAPONS - STATUS OF DOE'S
NUCLEAR
STOCKPILE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

Statement of Victor S.  Rezendes,
Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-96-100

GAO/RCED-96-100T


(302159)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  GAO -
  DOE -

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary findings
from our ongoing review of the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear
weapons stockpile surveillance program.\1 The program uses various
tests to identify problems in our nuclear weapons stockpile.  Over
the years of conducting these tests, DOE and its predecessor agencies
have found and corrected many defects and failures in nuclear weapons
systems and components.  Because our nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile is aging and new nuclear weapons are not replacing older
ones, this program has become increasingly important to ensuring the
reliability of the stockpile.\2

Our preliminary analysis of data indicates that DOE has not conducted
all the tests it believes are necessary to ensure the reliability of
the nuclear weapons in the stockpile.  For some types of weapons, the
tests are far behind schedule and DOE's confidence in the reliability
of those weapons is diminished.  DOE has not conducted the scheduled
tests for various reasons, including equipment problems, lack of
space on missiles for testing, the absence of a required safety
study, and delays in testing while testing operations were being
transferred to new locations.  Although DOE plans to get some tests
back on schedule within a few years, it appears that other tests will
not be back on schedule for the foreseeable future.  I would like to
stress at this point that the data is preliminary and we have not yet
fully analyzed the impact of this situation. 


--------------------
\1 This review is being conducted for the Senate Committee on Armed
Services in response to its February 1, 1996, request. 

\2 DOE's stockpile surveillance program also tries to identify safety
problems in nuclear weapons.  The primary focus of this testimony,
however, is DOE's ability to ensure the weapons' reliability. 


   DOE TESTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO
   ENSURE RELIABILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The purpose of DOE's surveillance program is to ensure, through
various tests, that the reliability of nuclear weapons is maintained. 
The testing program is designed to allow DOE to predict the
reliability of the entire stockpile by weapon type.  The program
consists primarily of three types of tests--nonnuclear flight tests,
nonnuclear systems laboratory tests, and laboratory tests of the
nuclear components.  Flight tests involve the actual dropping or
launching of a weapon from which the nuclear components have been
removed.  Nonnuclear systems laboratory tests involve testing the
nonnuclear systems in the weapon to detect defects due to aging,
manufacturing, or design.  Laboratory tests of the nuclear components
involve destructive analysis to detect defects or failures in the
nuclear portion of the weapon. 

Weapons for flight and nonnuclear systems laboratory tests are
randomly selected from the stockpile each year.  Laboratory tests of
the nuclear components are judgmentally selected from the weapons
that have been randomly selected for the other two tests.  For
testing purposes, DOE considers the active stockpile to consist of
nine weapon types. 

From 1958 to 1996, the surveillance program tested about 14,000
weapons, systems, and components with more than 2,400 findings
documented.  Over 50 percent of these findings were considered
"significant findings." A significant finding is the identification
of a defect or failure in a weapon system.  A defect is an observable
anomaly, while a failure is a flaw or malfunction in a weapon that
would prevent it from operating as intended.  About 1.3 percent of
the tests have identified failures. 

When a test results in a significant finding, DOE may perform
additional tests to confirm the finding, determine the cause of the
problem, assess its impact on the stockpile, and recommend a
corrective plan if retrofits or repairs are needed.  According to a
DOE official, when a significant number of tests are cancelled or
delayed, DOE lacks information on the reliability of the weapon.  The
lack of information could impact on DOE's confidence in the
reliability of the weapon. 


   FLIGHT AND LABORATORY TESTS
   HAVE FALLEN BEHIND SCHEDULE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

DOE and the national nuclear laboratories\3 have determined that they
generally need to test 44 weapons of each weapon type in the
stockpile over a 4-year period.\4 Over that 4-year timeframe, the 44
tests per type of weapon should consist of 8 to 12 flight tests (an
average of 2 or 3 tests per year) and 32 to 36 laboratory system
tests of nonnuclear systems (an average of 8 or 9 tests per year). 
Finally, from the weapons scheduled for testing each year, one weapon
of each type is designated for special laboratory tests of its
nuclear components. 


--------------------
\3 Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratories,
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. 

\4 The number of weapons needed to be tested can vary somewhat
according to the history of the weapon type and the number of weapons
of that type in the stockpile at that time. 


      FLIGHT TESTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

Flight tests involve the actual dropping or launching of a weapon
from which its nuclear components have been removed.  DOE uses
specially designed telemetry equipment to test the integration and
functioning of the weapon's electrical and mechanical subsystems.  As
of February 29, 1996, three of the nine types of weapons that were
scheduled to be tested were more than 33 percent below the number of
flight tests considered necessary to meet DOE's standard.  These
weapons are considered "red flagged." According to DOE officials,
when a weapon is red-flagged, it means that DOE is concerned with the
accuracy of the reliability level assigned to that weapon type and
that management should focus attention on the need for obtaining test
data.  The following table shows the red-flagged weapons, the
standard for testing, the red-flag threshold, and the number of tests
conducted. 



                                Table 1
                
                 Flight Testing of Three Weapon Types,
                     Fiscal Years 1992 Through 1995

                              Standard   Red-flag test
                                (tests           limit    Actual tests
Weapon type                 scheduled)       threshold       completed
----------------------  --------------  --------------  --------------
W62                                 12              <9               6
W78                                 12              <9               7
W88                                 12              <9               3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Sandia National Laboratories. 

The W62, a warhead used by the Air Force on the Minuteman III
missile, has been flight tested only six times over the past 4 years. 
The W78, also used on the Minuteman III missile, is also below the
red-flag limit.  Only seven W78s have been flight tested during the
past 4 years.  The third weapon below the red-flag limit is the W88. 
The W88 is a warhead used by the Navy on the Trident II missile. 
Only three W88 stockpile flight tests have been conducted over the
past 4 years.\5

According to officials at DOE and the testing laboratory (Sandia
National Laboratories) responsible for flight testing, several
reasons exist for the shortfall in flight testing.  Initially, DOE
had enough packages of telemetry equipment to test the W62 during its
projected lifespan.  Retirement of the W62 has been delayed, however,
and DOE is running out of telemetry packages and cannot procure
additional packages unless they are redesigned.  As a result, flight
testing of the W62 has been reduced.  In regard to the W78, DOE and
national laboratory officials told us that flight tests with
telemetry equipment were not conducted because available missile
launches were used for other tests of the W78.  Finally, flight
testing of W88s taken from the stockpile was halted for more than 1
year because an important safety study required for disassembly and
inspection of the W88 lacked approval.\6

Although it plans to redesign the telemetry equipment for the W62,
DOE estimates it will take at least 3 years to redesign and procure
the package.  Further, DOE and Sandia National Laboratories officials
told us that future flight testing of the W62, as well as the W78, is
uncertain because of possible restrictions on the number of missile
launches that are made available to DOE by the Air Force.  As a
result, these two weapons could stay below the red-flag limit.\7 The
safety study has been approved for W88s, and a DOE official told us
that flight tests for this weapon type should reach desired levels
sometime during fiscal year 1997.  DOE and national laboratory
officials are not concerned about the W88 because they have been able
to collect considerable test data during the past few years by
testing W88 systems that were never placed in the stockpile.  Because
the W88 is a relatively new weapon, DOE and national laboratory
officials believe that the information from these "new material"
tests provides good reliability data. 


--------------------
\5 The desired number of flight tests for three other weapon types
were not performed, but none of these had a shortfall that fell below
the red-flag limit. 

\6 The Nuclear Explosive Safety Study is required before DOE's Pantex
Plant can disassemble and inspect a weapon selected for testing. 

\7 DOE and national laboratory officials told us that the limitation
on available missiles for weapons testing could also affect the W87
in the near future. 


      SYSTEMS LABORATORY TESTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.2

Systems laboratory tests involve testing the nonnuclear systems in a
weapon to detect defects due to aging, manufacturing, or design. 
Only one of the nine weapon types is considered to be below the
red-flag limit for systems laboratory tests.  Three other weapon
types did not have all scheduled systems laboratory tests performed,
but were all above the red-flag limit. 

The W88 is the red-flagged weapon type.  It should have had about 28
laboratory tests conducted, but over the past 4 years, only 12
laboratory tests were performed.  According to DOE and national
laboratory officials, the tests were not conducted because of the
aforementioned absence of a safety study and because a centrifuge
used to simulate weapon motion was inoperative for about 1 year
because of a cracked weld.  Like the flight tests, DOE plans to be
back on schedule in fiscal year 1997. 


   NUCLEAR COMPONENT LABORATORY
   TESTS HAVE BEEN DELAYED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

From the weapons scheduled for testing each year, one weapon of each
type is selected to have its nuclear components package destructively
tested.  According to a DOE official, the five key components tested
are the pit, the secondary, the detonator assembly, the high
explosives, and the gas transfer system.\8

Generally, for each weapon type, one pit, one secondary, two to five
detonator assemblies, the high explosives from one or two weapons,
and one or two gas transfer systems are to be tested annually. 
Testing of four of these nuclear package components have been behind
schedule in recent years.  Only testing of high explosives has been
conducted on schedule. 

The pit is a part of the nuclear package that, until 1989, was
manufactured and tested at DOE's Rocky Flats facility in Colorado. 
In December 1989, the Rocky Flats facility ceased production
operations, and responsibility for pit testing was eventually
transferred to DOE's Los Alamos National Laboratory.  At first, it
was thought that Rocky Flats would reopen, and several years passed
until DOE decided to move pit tests to Los Alamos.  This lapse
created a backlog of pit tests.  Los Alamos has nearly caught up and
should be back on schedule by the end of this fiscal year. 

The secondary is tested at DOE's Y12 facility in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.  Few have been tested since September 1994 when Y12 was
placed in a "stand down" mode because of problems related to safety
procedures that had been noted by the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board.  According to DOE officials, most of these problems did
not involve unsafe conditions.  The problems were related to not
following approved procedures for activities being conducted.  DOE is
in the process of testing seven secondaries (from four different
weapon types) under special procedures but DOE officials could not
provide us with a date for resuming full testing. 

DOE's Mound facility in Ohio tested detonator assemblies until 1994. 
At that time, responsibility for testing detonator assemblies was
moved to DOE's Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore laboratories.  Both
laboratories are scheduled to begin testing detonator assemblies
later this year.  In the meantime, a 2-year backlog of detonator
assemblies exists.  DOE officials estimate that this backlog will be
eliminated by the end of fiscal year 1997. 

DOE's Mound facility in Ohio tested gas transfer systems until 1994. 
At that time, responsibility for testing gas transfer systems was
moved to DOE's Savannah River facility in South Carolina.  Savannah
River has begun testing some gas transfer systems, but a DOE official
estimates that the backlog will not be eliminated until the end of
fiscal year 1999. 

In summary, Mr.  Chairman, the preliminary results of our work
indicate that portions of all three major components of DOE's
stockpile surveillance program have been and are currently behind
schedule.  DOE is behind schedule for a variety of reasons and while
some tests will soon be back on schedule, others will not be for the
foreseeable future.  These programs will become more important as
weapons in the stockpile age beyond their originally planned
lifespan.  As we continue our work on this assignment, we will be
analyzing the overall impact of this situation and DOE's corrective
action plans. 


--------------------
\8 The pit is a metal casing that contains plutonium and other
material.  The pit is where the fission explosion originates.  A
nuclear weapon secondary is an assembly in a nuclear weapon where a
fusion explosion originates.  A gas transfer system includes a
tritium reservoir and associated hardware. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

Mr.  Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement.  We will be
glad to respond to any questions you or any member of the
Subcommittee may have. 


*** End of document. ***