Reducing Wildfire Threats: Funds Should Be Targeted to the Highest Risk
Areas (Testimony, 09/13/2000, GAO/T-RCED-00-296).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the efforts to reduce
the future risk of catastrophic wildfires to human lives and property,
focusing on (1) why conditions on federal forests and rangelands have
reached the point that they pose a significant risk to nearby
communities and to the ecological sustainability of lands and natural
resources; (2) the history and status of efforts by the Forest Service
and the Department of the Interior to reduce the risk; and (3)
budget-related issues that should be addressed to better ensure that the
agencies spend effectively and account accurately for funds appropriated
to reduce hazardous fuels.

GAO noted that: (1) the media and others have attributed much of the
blame for this year's destructive wildfire season to the prolonged
drought that has gripped the interior West; (2) however, the Forest
Service has observed that, in hindsight,"uncontrollable wildfire should
be seen as a failure of land management and public policy, not as an
unpredictable act of nature"; (3) millions of acres of forests and
wildlands were cleared for agricultural crops and livestock pastures,
and grass cover and soil were lost as a result of intensive livestock
grazing; (4) during most of the 20th century, the federal government's
policy was to suppress all fires, and for 75 years, federal land
management agencies were highly effective in implementing this policy;
(5) the federal government's approach to reducing hazardous fuels has
evolved over time in response to new information and events; (6) from
the 1950s to the 1970s, land managers within Interior experimented with
allowing fires ignited both by lightning and by the managers themselves
to burn, under controlled conditions; (7) by 1972, both Interior and the
Forest Service had formally adopted the policy of using fire as a tool
to reduce the buildup of hazardous fuels; (8) until recently, both
agencies continued to emphasize prescribed fire as the tool of choice in
reducing the accumulation of hazardous fuels; (9) however, in the past
several years, land managers have increasingly recognized that in many
areas, the volume of accumulated fuels has increased to the point that
thinning and mechanical treatments must be used before fire can be
reintroduced into the ecosystems; (10) both Congress and the
administration are now prepared to fund an aggressive campaign to reduce
hazardous fuels; (11) it is imperative that the Forest Service and
Interior act quickly to develop a framework to spend effectively and to
account accurately for what they accomplish with the funds; and (12)
rather than allocating funds to the highest-risk areas, the Forest
Service allocates funds for hazardous fuels reduction on the basis of
the number of acres treated.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-00-296
     TITLE:  Reducing Wildfire Threats: Funds Should Be Targeted to the
	     Highest Risk Areas
      DATE:  09/13/2000
   SUBJECT:  Land management
	     Forest management
	     Environmental policies
	     National forests
	     Prioritizing

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GAO/T-RCED-00-296

REDUCING WILDFIRE THREATS

Funds Should Be Targeted to the Highest Risk Areas Statement of Barry T.
Hill, Associate Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues Resources,
Community, and Economic Development Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony Before the Task Force on Resources and the Environment,

Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2: 00 p. m., EDT Wednesday, September
13, 2000

GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 296

1 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

It is very sobering to be here today to discuss the status of efforts to
reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfires to communities and natural
resources in dry, lower- elevation regions of the interior western United
States. So far this year, such wildfires have burned over 6.5 million acres
of public and private land-- more than twice the 10- year national average
and more than in any other year in decades. Lives have been lost, over 1,000
homes have been destroyed, and the estimated damage to human property and
forest and rangeland ecosystems totals billions of dollars. The costs to the
U. S. Treasury to suppress these fires and to rehabilitate and restore
burned areas will exceed $1 billion in this fiscal year alone.

Reducing the future risk of catastrophic wildfires to human lives and
property as well as to forest and rangeland ecosystems will require
development and implementation of a comprehensive management strategy that
includes three components. Two are reactive- suppressing wildland fires
after they have become wildfires and rehabilitating and restoring forests
and rangelands after they have burned. The third component is proactive--
reducing the risk of future fires by removing accumulated hazardous fuels,
including small trees, underbrush, and dead vegetation. As requested, our
testimony today will focus on the proactive hazardous fuels reduction
component. Specifically, we will discuss (1) why conditions on federal
forests and rangelands have reached the point that they pose a significant
risk to nearby communities and to the ecological sustainability of lands and
natural resources, (2) the history and status of efforts by the Department
of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of the Interior to reduce
this risk, and (3) budget- related issues that should be addressed to better
ensure that the agencies spend effectively and account accurately for funds
appropriated to reduce hazardous fuels. Our comments are based primarily on
GAO products issued over the last decade. 1

In summary:

ï¿½ The media and others have attributed much of the blame for this year's
destructive wildfire season to the prolonged drought that has gripped the
interior West. However, the Forest Service has observed that, in hindsight,
“uncontrollable wildfire should be seen as a failure of land
management and public policy, not as an unpredictable act of nature.”
Past land management practices that contributed to current conditions
included harvesting timber by selectively removing the larger, more valuable
firetolerant trees or removing all of the trees from a site at one time
(clearcutting). In addition, millions of acres of forests and wildlands were
cleared for agricultural crops and livestock pastures, and grass cover and
soil were lost as a result of intensive livestock grazing. Moreover, during
most of the 20 th century, the federal government's policy was to suppress
all fires, and for 75 years, federal land management agencies were highly
effective in implementing this policy.

1 See app. I for relevant GAO products on hazardous fuels reduction.

2

ï¿½ The federal government's approach to reducing hazardous fuels has evolved
over time in response to new information and events. From the 1950s to the
1970s, land managers within Interior experimented with allowing fires
ignited both by lightning and by the managers themselves to burn, under
controlled conditions. By 1972, both Interior and the Forest Service had
formally adopted the policy of using fire as a tool to reduce the buildup of
hazardous fuels. Until recently, both agencies continued to emphasize
prescribed fire as the tool of choice in reducing the accumulation of
hazardous fuels. However, in the past several years, land managers have
increasingly recognized that in many areas, the volume of accumulated fuels
has increased to the point that thinning and mechanical treatments must be
used before fire can be reintroduced into the ecosystems.

ï¿½ Both the Congress and the administration are now prepared to fund an
aggressive campaign to reduce hazardous fuels. It is, therefore, imperative
that the Forest Service and Interior act quickly to develop a framework to
spend effectively and to account accurately for what they accomplish with
the funds. For example, according to the Forest Service, priority for
treatments to reduce hazardous fuels should be given to areas where the risk
of catastrophic wildfires is the greatest to communities, watersheds,
ecosystems, or species. However, currently neither the Forest Service nor
Interior knows how many communities, watersheds, ecosystems, and species are
at high risk of catastrophic wildfire, where they are located, or what it
will cost to lower this risk. Therefore, they cannot prioritize them for
treatment or inform the Congress about how many will remain at high risk
after the appropriated funds are expended. In addition, rather than
allocating funds to the highest- risk areas, the Forest Service allocates
funds for hazardous fuels reduction on the basis of the number of acres
treated. Similarly, both the Forest Service and Interior use the number of
acres treated to measure and report to the Congress their progress in
reducing the threat of catastrophic wildfires rather than using the number
of acres treated in the highest- priority areas or reductions in areas at
high risk of long- term damage from wildfire.

The Increasing Risk of Uncontrollable Wildfires Reflects an Unintended
Consequence of Past Land Management and Public Policy

The media and others have attributed much of the blame for this year's
destructive wildfire season to the prolonged drought that has gripped the
interior West. However, the Forest Service has observed that, in hindsight,
“uncontrollable wildfire should be seen as a failure of land
management and public policy, not as an unpredictable act of nature.”
2

More than a century ago, most forests in the interior West and their
associated species were fire- adapted and some- known as short- interval,
fire- adapted ecosystems- relied on frequent, low- intensity fires to cycle
nutrients, check the encroachment of competing vegetation, and maintain
healthy conditions. However, before the turn of the last

2 Course to the Future: Positioning Fire and Aviation Management, U. S.
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (May 1995).

3 century, these short- interval, fire- adapted ecosystems and species--
such as ponderosa

and other long- needle pines-- began to be replaced by fire- intolerant
ecosystems and species-- such as Douglas and other firs. These changes
resulted mostly from the nation's increased demand for fiber and food. As a
result, (1) the larger, more valuable firetolerant trees were removed by
selective timber harvesting or all of the trees from a site were removed at
one time (clearcutting); (2) millions of acres of forests and wildlands were
cleared for agricultural crops and livestock pastures; (3) grass cover and
soil were lost as a result of intensive livestock grazing; and (4) burning
by Native Americans was curtailed to accommodate other land uses. In
addition, during most of the 20 th century, the federal government's policy
was to suppress all fires, and for 75 years, federal land management
agencies were highly effective in implementing this policy.

As a result of these human activities, the composition and structure of the
forests changed from open, park- like stands of approximately 50 large,
older- aged, and wellspaced fire- tolerant trees per acre to dense
“dog- hair” thickets of more than 200 mostly small, fire-
intolerant trees per acre. Unnaturally dense forests cause individual trees
to compete for limited quantities of water, and during drought conditions,
weakened trees become susceptible to insect infestations and disease
outbreaks. Such trees die in unnaturally high numbers, adding to hazardous
fuel loads.

The composition of many rangelands has also changed. Native grass species,
including Idaho fescue and bluestem, have been replaced by invasive plant
species, such as cheat grass, that fuel and thrive on wildland fires. These
exotic species follow fire wherever it goes, are opportunistic, and
repopulate a burned landscape faster than native species. Cheat grass grows
earlier, quicker, and higher than native grasses and then dies, dries, and
becomes fuel for the next year's fires.

As the composition and structure of public forests and rangelands in the
interior West were changing, so too was their interface with human
structures and other property. Communities have developed alongside and in
these forests and rangelands, resulting in a patchwork of homes interspersed
among public lands. These areas are collectively referred to as the
“wildland- urban interface.”

The Federal Government's Approach to Reducing Hazardous Fuels Has Evolved
Over Time

The federal government's approach to reducing hazardous fuels has evolved
over time in response to new information and events. From the 1950s to the
1970s, land managers within the Department of the Interior experimented with
so- called “prescribed fire programs.” Under these programs,
fires ignited by lightning as well as by land managers themselves are
allowed to burn, under controlled conditions, so that the ecological
benefits of fire can be reintroduced into fire- adapted ecosystems.

By 1972, both Interior and the Forest Service had formally adopted the
policy of using fire as a tool to reduce the buildup of hazardous fuels.
From then until 1988, federal land managers allowed thousands of prescribed
fires to burn in wildlands. This changed in 1988, when a number of fires
started by lightning in and around Yellowstone National

4 Park burned out of control, resulting in a controversy over what the media
termed the

government's “let burn” policy. In 1989, an interagency review
team reaffirmed the benefits of fire and tasked federal land managers to (1)
re- evaluate the use of management- ignited fires and other methods for
reducing hazardous fuels and (2) develop fire management plans for each of
their land units before allowing a prescribed fire to burn. However, some
land managers continued to subscribe to the policy of suppressing all fires,
and some land units were slow to develop the required plans.

During the early 1990s, both the Forest Service and Interior emphasized
prescribed fire as the tool of choice in reducing the accumulation of
hazardous fuels. As recently as in its fiscal year 1997 budget
justification, Interior made no mention of other methods to reduce
accumulated hazardous fuels, such as thinning dense stands of trees and
mechanically removing underbrush. However, in the past several years, land
managers have increasingly recognized that in many areas, the volume of
accumulated fuels has increased to the point that thinning and mechanical
treatments must be used before fire can be reintroduced into the ecosystems.

The Forest Service and Interior Must Develop a Framework to Spend
Effectively and to Account Adequately for What They Accomplish With Funds
Appropriated to Reduce Hazardous Fuels

An aggressive campaign to reduce accumulated fuels will require money.
However, before this fire season, neither the administration nor the
Congress assigned a high funding priority to reducing the threat of
catastrophic wildfires. Both the Congress and the administration are now
prepared to fund an aggressive campaign to reduce hazardous fuels. It is,
therefore, imperative that the Forest Service and Interior act quickly to
develop a framework to spend effectively and to account accurately for what
they accomplish with the funds.

A Lack of Funds Has Been a Limiting Factor For a number of years, both the
Congress and the administration have been aware of the increasingly grave
risk of catastrophic wildfires as well as the need to aggressively reduce
hazardous fuels. However, until recently, neither had assigned a high
funding priority to reducing the threat.

In a 1994 report, the National Commission on Wildfire Disasters stated that:
“The vegetative conditions that have resulted from past management
policies have created a fire environment so disaster- prone in many areas
that it will periodically and tragically overwhelm our best efforts at fire
prevention and suppression. The resulting loss of life and property, damage
to natural resources, and enormous costs to the public treasury, are
preventable. If the warning in this report is not

5 heeded, and preventative actions are not aggressively pursued, the costs
will, in

our opinion, continue to escalate.” 3 The Commission observed that:
“The question is no longer if policy- makers will face disastrous
wildfires and their enormous costs, but when.” To mitigate this risk,
the Commission recommended, among other things, that federal land management
policies, programs, and budgets place a high priority on reducing hazardous
fuels in high- risk wildland ecosystems “for at least a decade or
more.”

Similarly, in 1995, the administration undertook a comprehensive interagency
review of wildland fire policy. On the basis of the review, which was
summarized in a 1995 statement, 4 the Departments of Agriculture and the
Interior predicted serious and potentially permanent environmental
destruction and loss of private and public resource values from large
wildfires.

In April 1999, we reported that 39 million acres on national forests in the
interior West are at high risk of catastrophic wildfire and that the cost to
the Forest Service to reduce fuels on these lands could be as much as $12
billion over the next 15 years, or an average of about $725 million
annually. We observed that this was more than 10 times the $65 million
appropriated for reducing fuels in fiscal year 1999, and that the agency,
contrary to its earlier plans, had requested the same amount for fiscal year
2000. We also observed that funding to address the increasingly grave risk
of catastrophic wildfires may be too little too late.

In December 1999, the Forest Service estimated that it would need up to $825
million a year and almost $12 billion over 15 years to reduce fuels on 40
million acres nationwide. 5 However, the agency's fiscal year 2001 budget
justification, submitted to the Congress 2 months later, requested $75
million.

Interior has not, to our knowledge, developed similar cost estimates.
However, the Department spent about $34 million in both fiscal years 1999
and 2000 to reduce hazardous fuels. It requested $52 million for these
activities in fiscal year 2001, even though, according to Interior, more
than half of the 95 million acres of federal wildlands identified as
requiring periodic burning or other fuel treatment are on lands managed by
the Department.

The Congress and the Administration Agree That Funds Should Be Increased To
Reduce Hazardous Fuels

The Congress and the administration now agree that money should be made
available to begin an aggressive campaign to reduce hazardous fuels. The
Congress is considering

3 Report of the National Commission on Wildfire Disasters( 1994). The
Commission was established on May 9, 1990, by the Wildfire Disaster Recovery
Act of 1989 (PL 101- 286). 4 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and
Program Review, Department of the Interior and Forest

Service, Department of Agriculture (Washington, D. C.: 1995). 5 Protecting
People and Sustaining Resources in Fire- Adapted Ecosystems: A Cohesive
Strategy( Draft),

Forest Service (Dec. 1999).

6 appropriating an additional $240 million- about $120 million to both the
Forest Service

and Interior-- in fiscal year 2001 to reduce hazardous fuels in high- risk
wildland- urban interfaces. Similarly, for fiscal year 2001, the
administration is now requesting an additional $115 million for the Forest
Service and an additional $142 million for Interior. 6 Thus, between $367
million and $395 million may be available in fiscal year 2001 to reduce
hazardous fuels. Moreover, the Forest Service estimates that up to an
additional $325 million a year could be made available from within its
existing budget to fund hazardous fuels reduction activities and research.

Accountability Must Now Become A Priority With the Congress and the
administration now prepared to double or triple the Forest Service's and
Interior's funding for reducing hazardous fuels and with up to five times
the current fiscal year's appropriation already available from within the
Forest Service's existing budget for these activities and related research,
we believe that the Forest Service and Interior must act quickly to develop
a framework to spend effectively and to account accurately for what they
accomplish with the funds.

For example, according to the Forest Service, priority for treatments to
reduce hazardous fuels should be given to areas where the risk of
catastrophic wildfires is the greatest to communities, watersheds,
ecosystems, or species. However, currently neither the Forest Service nor
Interior knows how many communities, watersheds, ecosystems, and species are
at high risk of catastrophic wildfire, where they are located, or what it
will cost to lower this risk. Therefore, they cannot prioritize them for
treatment or inform the Congress about how many will remain at high risk
after the appropriated funds are expended. According to the report on
managing the impact of wildfires released by the administration last Friday,
regional and local interagency teams will be assigned the responsibility for
identifying communities that are most at risk.

Moreover, rather than allocating funds to the highest- risk areas, the
Forest Service allocates funds for hazardous fuels reduction to its field
offices on the basis of the number of acres treated. Thus, the agency's
field offices have an incentive to focus on the easiest and least costly
areas, rather than on those that present the highest risks but are often
costlier to treat, including especially the wildland- urban interfaces.
Similarly, both the Forest Service and Interior use the number of acres
treated to measure and report to the Congress their progress in reducing the
threat of catastrophic wildfires. For instance, they report that they have
increased the number of acres treated to reduce hazardous fuels from fewer
than 500,000 acres in fiscal year 1994 to more than 2.4 million acres in
fiscal year 2000. However, they cannot identify how many of these acres are
within areas at high risk of long- term damage from wildfire.

The Forest Service and Interior note that reducing the threat to
communities, watersheds, ecosystems, and species can often take years and
that annual measures of progress must, therefore, focus on actions taken. We
agree, but believe that they must be

6 Managing the Impact of Wildfires on Communities and the Environment: A
Report to the President in Response to the Wildfires of 2000, U. S.
Departments of Agriculture and the Interior (Sept. 8, 2000).

7 able to show the Congress and the American public that these actions, such
as the

number of acres treated, occur within the highest- priority areas.
Furthermore, over time, they should be able to show reductions in areas at
high risk of long- term damage from wildfire.

Finally, although we have not examined this issue as thoroughly at Interior,
our work to date at the Forest Service has shown that, over time, the link
between how the Congress appropriates funds and how the agency spends them
has weakened as the Forest Service's field offices have been required to
address issues and problems- such as hazardous fuels reduction- that are not
aligned with its budget and organizational structures. Forest Service field
offices must now combine projects and activities from multiple programs and
funding from multiple sources to accomplish goals and objectives related to
reducing hazardous fuels. We have observed that the agency could better
ensure that the up to $325 million a year that may already be available from
within its existing budget to fund hazardous fuels reduction activities and
research will be used for these purposes by replacing its organizational and
budget structures with ones that are better linked to the way that work is
routinely accomplished on the national forests. We have also observed that
the Forest Service's research division and state and private programs should
be better linked to the national forests to more effectively address
hazardous fuels reduction as well as other stewardship issues that do not
recognize the forests' administrative boundaries. 7 However, according to
the Forest Service, it has no plan to replace its program structure with one
that is better linked to the way that work is routinely accomplished on the
national forests.

---- In closing, we are faced with a pay- me- now or pay- me- later
situation in which paying me now is likely the more cost- effective
alternative. However, restoring fire- adapted ecosystems and protecting the
communities that have developed alongside and in these ecosystems will
require that the resources for reducing the threat of catastrophic wildfires
be well spent. To do so will require that the Forest Service and Interior
clearly identify not only how they spend funds appropriated to reduce
hazardous fuels but also what they accomplish with these funds.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my formal statement. I will be pleased to
respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may
have.

Contact and Acknowledgment

For future contacts regarding this statement, please contact Barry Hill on
(202) 512- 8021. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony were
Charles S. Cotton and Chester M. Joy.

7 Forest Service: Actions Needed for the Agency to Become More Accountable
for Its Performance (GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 236, June 29, 2000).

8 Appendix I

Relevant GAO Reports and Testimonies on Reducing Hazardous Fuels on Federal
Lands

Federal Fire Management: Limited Progress in Restarting the Prescribed Fire
Program (GAO/ RCED- 91- 42, Dec. 5, 1990).

Western National Forests: Catastrophic Wildfires Threaten Resources and
Communities (GAO/ T- RCED- 98- 273, Sept. 28, 1998).

Western National Forests: Nearby Communities Are Increasingly Threatened by
Catastrophic Wildfires( GAO/ T- RCED- 99- 79, Feb. 9, 1999).

Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats( GAO/ RCED- 99- 65, Apr. 2, 1999).

Western National Forests: Status of Forest Service's Efforts to Reduce
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats( GAO/ T- RCED- 99- 241, June 29, 1999).

Fire Management: Lessons Learned From the Cerro Grande (Los Alamos) Fire(
GAO/ TRCED- 00- 257, July 27, 2000).

Fire Management: Lessons Learned From the Cerro Grande (Los Alamos) Fire and
Actions Needed to Reduce Fire Risks( GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 273, Aug. 14, 2000).
(141491)
*** End of document. ***