Intercity Passenger Rail: Decisions on the Future of Amtrak and Intercity
Passenger Rail Are Approaching (Testimony, 09/26/2000,
GAO/T-RCED-00-277).

From fiscal years 2000 through 2002, Amtrak needs to save an additional
$287 million to reach operational self-sufficiency. Amtrak's costs are
expected to increase, and Amtrak has a mixed record in controlling cost
growth. Furthermore, Amtrak's ability to realize substantial revenue
increases and productivity improvements is uncertain. Amtrak has
substantial short- and long-term capital investment needs that will be
difficult to meet. Amtrak has new equipment needs for which it currently
has no estimates. Between 2000 and 2004, the identified capital
investment needs will exceed expected federal capital funds by nearly $2
billion. If Amtrak does not reach operational self-sufficiency with the
next two years, federal law requires that the Amtrak Reform Council
submit a plan to Congress for a restructured intercity passenger rail
system and that Amtrak prepare a plan for its own liquidation. If Amtrak
attains operational self-sufficiency, it could require a substantially
higher level of financial support than it now receives to meet its
capital needs and other railroad retirement expenses.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-00-277
     TITLE:  Intercity Passenger Rail: Decisions on the Future of
	     Amtrak and Intercity Passenger Rail Are Approaching
      DATE:  09/26/2000
   SUBJECT:  Railroad transportation operations
	     Railroad industry
	     Federal aid to railroads
	     Financial analysis
	     Cost control
	     Financial management
	     Program graduation
	     Internal controls
	     Strategic planning

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Testimony.                                               **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO/T-RCED-00-277

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation's (Amtrak) progress toward achieving operating
self-sufficiency; its capital investment needs and how these capital needs
compare with expected federal funding; and the future of Amtrak and
intercity passenger rail. The Congress has directed Amtrak to be free of
federal operating subsidies by the end of fiscal year 2002. This deadline
presents serious implications for the future of Amtrak and intercity
passenger rail service in this country. This statement is based on our
recent reports on Amtrak financial issues.

In summary:

   * Amtrak continues to struggle financially and must overcome substantial
     hurdles to reach operational self-sufficiency. Amtrak has made limited
     progress in reducing its budget gapthe gap that Amtrak needs to close
     to reach operational self-sufficiency. From fiscal years 1995 through
     1999, Amtrak was able to reduce its budget gap by only $78 millionfrom
     about $554 million to $476 million. From fiscal years 2000 through
     2002, Amtrak will need to achieve about $287 million in additional
     savings to reach operational self-sufficiency. Yet Amtrak has made
     limited progress toward this goal in the first 9 months of this fiscal
     year. Furthermore, Amtrak's costs are expected to increase, and Amtrak
     has a mixed record in controlling cost growth. In addition, Amtrak's
     ability to realize substantial revenue increases and productivity
     improvements is uncertain. Nearly three-quarters of the $1.9 billion in
     net financial benefits that Amtrak expects to achieve between now and
     2004 have either not been identified or are based on initiatives that
     have yet to be fully implemented.

   * Amtrak has substantial short- and long-term capital investment needs
     that will be difficult to meet. From discussions with Amtrak managers
     and a review of published reports, we estimate Amtrak's identified
     capital needs to be at least $9 billion through 2015 (in 1999 dollars).
     In addition, Amtrak will have other capital needs, such as acquiring
     new equipment, for which the company has not yet developed cost
     estimates. Amtrak will find it difficult to pay for these needs. Over
     the 2001 through 2004 period, the identified capital investment needs
     will exceed expected federal capital funds by nearly $2 billion.
     Although some of this amount may be paid by other railroads that use
     Amtrak facilities, the federal government could be called upon to cover
     any funding shortfall, with capital financial support requested
     substantially higher than current levels.

   * Key decisions will soon have to be made regarding the future of Amtrak,
     the nation's intercity passenger rail operator. If Amtrak does not
     reach operational self-sufficiency within the next 2 years, federal law
     requires that the Amtrak Reform Council submit a plan to the Congress
     for a restructured intercity passenger rail system and that Amtrak
     prepare a plan for its own liquidation. On the other hand, if Amtrak
     does attain operational self-sufficiency, it could require a
     substantially higher level of financial support than it receives now to
     meet its capital needs and for certain railroad retirement expenses. In
     either case, the future of Amtrak will need to be decided. If that
     future does not include Amtrak, basic decisions must be made about an
     intercity passenger rail system. The decisions include the scope of a
     national intercity passenger rail network, if any; how it would be
     operated; and the level of federal funding that would be provided to
     support this network.

Background

The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created Amtrak to provide intercity
passenger rail service. Like other major national intercity passenger rail
systems in the world, Amtrak has received substantial government supportover
$23 billion through fiscal year 2000. However, the Amtrak Reform and
Accountability Act of 1997 (Amtrak Reform Act) prohibited Amtrak from using
federal funds for operating expenses, except for an amount equal to excess
Railroad Retirement Tax Act payments, after 2002. To help accomplish this
goal, the Amtrak Reform Act provided Amtrak with flexibility to address
certain costs. The act eliminated a statutory ban on contracting out work
that would result in employee layoffs and abolished statutorily required
labor protection arrangements that provided up to 6 years of compensation
for employees who lost their job because of the discontinuance of intercity
passenger rail service on a route or certain other actions. The Amtrak
Reform Act required negotiations with the unions over new protection
arrangements. To help achieve its financial goals, Amtrak has developed a
series of strategic business plans.

Amtrak, like other railroads, is a very capital-intensive business. Since
its creation, Amtrak has spent about $10.2 billion in federal support for
capital improvements and equipment overhauls. This amount includes about
$1.8 billion of the $2.2 billion that Amtrak received through the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997. These funds could be used for broadly defined expenses,
including (1) acquiring equipment, rolling stock (such as passenger cars and
locomotives), and other capital improvements; (2) upgrading maintenance
facilities; (3) maintaining existing equipment in intercity passenger rail
service; and (4) paying of interest and principal on obligations incurred
for these purposes. Amtrak has also obtained capital funding from state and
local governments, generally for specific capital investments, and from the
commercial debt markets. These funds support Amtrak's 22,000-route-mile
passenger rail system, including 650 miles of track owned by Amtrak. Amtrak
maintains an active fleet of 2,600 cars and locomotives.

Amtrak Will Have to Overcome Major Hurdles

to Become Operationally Self-Sufficient

Amtrak continues to struggle in its quest to become operationally
self-sufficient by the end of 2002. Amtrak has made relatively little
progress over the past 5 years, and the results for the first 9 months of
the current fiscal year in reducing its budget are not encouraging. This
means that substantial additional progress will be required over the next 2
years to attain operational self-sufficiency. One of Amtrak's difficulties
in reaching operational self-sufficiency is controlling its costs,
particularly labor costs. Finally, Amtrak has yet to fully implement the
various revenue enhancing and productivity improvement initiatives that it
considers important to operational self-sufficiency, including its Acela
Express service.

Most Financial Results Needed to Reach Operational Self-Sufficiency Are in
the Future

Amtrak has made limited progress in moving toward operational
self-sufficiency in the last 5 years. According to Amtrak, its budget gap
fell by $78 million during fiscal year 1995 and through 1999from about $554
million in fiscal year 1995 to $476 million in fiscal year 1999.

Through the first 9 months of the current fiscal year (October-June),
Amtrak's revenue increased by 11 percent over the same period in 1999. But,
expenses increased by 7 percent. Since Amtrak has about $3 in expenses for
every $2 in revenue, the increase in expenses for the most part negated
revenue gains. As a result, the budget gap was only about $33 million lower
than it was for the same period in 1999. Amtrak officials agreed that
additional actions are needed during the final 3 months of this year to
achieve the planned budget gap reduction of $114 million and that achieving
its goal will be difficult. Amtrak attributes the problems to the delayed
rollout of the Acela Express service and a slower-than-expected increase in
its mail and express business.

The limited progress that Amtrak has achieved in reducing its budget gap
makes it essential that Amtrak make substantial strides over the next 2
years to achieve operational self-sufficiency. To become operationally
self-sufficient by 2002that is, to reduce its budget gap to no more than the
amount of excess Railroad Retirement Tax Act paymentsAmtrak will have to
reduce its budget gap by an additional $287 million over what it was in
fiscal year 1999. This is nearly four times the reduction that Amtrak made
in the last 5 years. It is therefore critical that Amtrak take those actions
necessary to control cost growth and achieve the revenue projections
contained in its latest business plan.

Amtrak Will Continue to Have Difficulty Controlling Its Costs

Amtrak has had and will continue to have difficulty controlling cost growth.
Amtrak met its expense targets in 1998 and 1999 but missed them from 1995 to
1997 and, overall, its expenses have been about $150 million more than
planned over this period. Amtrak's strategic business plans have generally
tried to hold cost increases to no more than the rate of inflation. But, as
we recently reported, Amtrak's operating costs increased by about 12 percent
over the rate of inflation from 1995 through 1999. Amtrak's
inflation-adjusted costs (1999 dollars) were about $2.4 billion in 1995 and
about $2.7 billion in 1999. Amtrak has attributed increased costs to, among
other things, the results of labor negotiations, expanded service levels,
increased depreciation, and the implementation of its progressive overhaul
program. While Amtrak has spent money to make money, it has realized little
benefit from the expenditures it has made. For example, in 1995, for every
operating dollar that Amtrak spent, it earned $0.65 in total revenue. In
comparison, Amtrak earned $0.67 in total revenue for every dollar spent in
1999. Through the first 9 months of this fiscal year, Amtrak has earned
about $0.64 in total revenue for every dollar expended.

Labor costs represent Amtrak's single largest operating costabout 52 percent
of total operating costs in 1999. Amtrak's labor costs have increased since
1995about 10 percent above the rate of inflation (from about $1.3 billion to
about $1.4 billion). This is a net increase, that is, net of the savings
achieved through such actions as negotiated productivity improvements. In
part, this increase reflects the fact that the size of Amtrak's workforce
has not changed materially in recent years. In 1999, Amtrak employed about
22,500 agreement (union represented) employees and about 2,700 management
employeesabout the same total as in 1994 when Amtrak started to reduce its
workforce. Amtrak officials attributed employment increases to such things
as service expansion and capital investments. In part, increases in labor
costs may also reflect that Amtrak has no standard measures of labor
productivity for its different lines of business (e.g., intercity passenger
rail service and commuter service). Such measures would allow Amtrak to
determine its efficiency and better manage cost growth.

Amtrak's cost growth can be expected to continue. Amtrak's operating plan
for 2000 shows that overall operating costs will increase by a net $60
million over the next 5 years. This is a net increase because it includes
growth in such costs as labor and interest expenses as well as savings from
such things as productivity improvements. Regarding labor costs, Amtrak has
entered into a new round of collective bargaining with its union-represented
employees. If the new round of bargaining follows the pattern of past
negotiations, substantial cost increases can be expected. As a result of
collective bargaining for 1998 to 1994, Amtrak estimated that wages
increased between $120 million and $140 million. As a result of the most
recently completed round of bargaining (1995 to early 2000), Amtrak
estimated that wage payments increased by $144 million through 1999.

Important Business Plan Initiatives to Increase Revenues and

Improve Productivity Have Yet to Be Fully Implemented

Amtrak's plans to reach operational self-sufficiency emphasize business
growth, particularly increasing revenues and improving productivity. Over
the next several years, Amtrak expects substantial increases in revenue from
such initiatives as implementing its Network Growth Strategy (a strategy to
increase passenger and mail and express business) and new service standards
designed to ensure a consistent, high-quality product. Amtrak's most recent
business plan update estimates that initiatives such as these will result in
net financial improvements of about $1.9 billion through 2004.

Nearly three-quarters ($1.4 billion) of the net financial benefits that
Amtrak expects to achieve from 2000 through 2004 have either not been
identified or are based on initiatives that Amtrak has not yet fully
implemented. (See table 1.) These include such initiatives as expanding the
mail and express program, developing actions to improve productivity,
implementing the market-based route network, and implementing service
standards. Amtrak officials told us they are in the process of defining the
specific actions associated with these initiatives but agreed they had not
yet been fully defined. That Amtrak has not fully implemented its most
important business plan initiatives increases the uncertainty about whether
it can meet its financial goals over the next 2 years.

 Table 1:
 Estimated
 Financial Impacts
 of Amtrak's
 Business Plan
 Initiatives,
 Fiscal Years 2000
 Through 2004
 Dollars in
 millions

 Initiative        Change in   Change in    Net impact
                   revenues    expenses
 Productivity
 actions to be     $70.3       -$803.6      $874.0
 determined
 Aligning route
 structure to      30.0        -205.0       235.0
 customer demand
 Increasing ticket
 revenue           175.2       5.9          169.2
 Mail and express
 expansion         274.3       181.4        92.9
 Productivity
 actions to offset 0           -54.2        54.2
 inflationa
 Subtotal          $549.8      -$875.5      $1,425.3
 Implement other
 initiatives       429.5       -80.7        510.2
 Total             $979.2      -$956.2      $1,935.5

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. Amtrak's business plan does not
contain a separate initiative for its Acela Express service. Rather, Acela
Express is integrated into the plan as a whole.

aAmtrak officials told us that this initiative is a combination of actions
designed to achieve cost savings to offset potential cost increases due to
inflation. These activities include wage and work rule changes, revenue
enhancements, and improved food and beverage management.

Source: GAO's analysis of Amtrak's data.

In addition, Amtrak has encountered difficulties in implementing high-speed
rail service on the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak's Acela program is one of the
cornerstones of Amtrak's plans to eliminate the need for federal operating
subsidies. In January 2000, Amtrak began Acela Regional service on a limited
basis between Washington, D.C., and Boston. However, the introduction of
Acela Express has been delayed by mechanical problems since September 1999,
and Amtrak has yet to announce a start date for this service. Amtrak
expected the Acela Express to generate about $180 million in net revenues by
2003. Amtrak officials agreed that revenues have been lost because of Acela
Express delays and are still quantifying these losses as the delay
continues. According to Amtrak, the company is currently identifying actions
that might be needed to offset lost Acela Express revenues and reduce
Amtrak's budget gap as a whole. The loss of Acela Express revenue increases
the pressure on Amtrak to make even more progress in other areas over the
next 2 years to reach operational self-sufficiency.

Amtrak's Capital Needs Could Require an Increase in Federal Support

Amtrak has substantial capital investment needs that could result in
requests for increases in federal capital support. As we recently reported,
these needs total over $9 billion through 2015. These needs include making
safety improvements on the Northeast Corridor, bringing the Northeast
Corridor up to a condition where only routine maintenance is required
(called state of good repair), and overhauling equipment. However, Amtrak
will have difficulty funding these investments. We estimate that Amtrak's
capital investment needs will exceed expected federal funding by nearly $2
billion from 2001 through 2004. The shortfall will likely be higher since it
does not include capital investment needs for which Amtrak has not developed
cost estimates.

Amtrak Has Significant Short- and Long-Term Capital Investment Needs

Amtrak has significant capital needs, both in the short-term (2001 through
2004) and in the long-term (2005 through 2015). Our discussions with Amtrak
officials and review of reports show Amtrak's capital investment
requirements over the next 4 years (through 2004) to total at least $4
billion. Infrastructure investment needs account for over $2.5 billion of
the total and are targeted toward addressing deferred maintenance and
improving the quality of service on the Northeast Corridor. Included in
these investment needs is about $316 million to continue safety investments
at various locations on the Corridor. According to an Amtrak analysis, these
investments are primarily concentrated on the tunnels leading into and out
of New York City's Pennsylvania Stationa station that serves over 300,000
intercity and commuter rail passengers daily. In addition, about $1.2
billion will be needed to eliminate deferred maintenance and restore the
Corridor's infrastructure to a condition where only routine maintenance is
required. Other short-term capital investment needs include reducing
equipment maintenance backlogs in the progressive overhaul program (at an
estimated cost of over $1 billion), repaying debt principal for the
acquisition of cars and locomotives ($346 million), and upgrading
maintenance facilities ($42 million).

Amtrak's long-term capital investment needs also focus heavily on the
Northeast Corridor. We estimate that at least $5.1 billion in investments
may be needed from 2005 to 2015. These capital investment requirements
include making further safety improvements to tunnels, including those
leading into and out of Pennsylvania Station, continuing to restore the
Corridor to a state of good repair, and completing the high-speed rail
program. Most of the long-term capital investments we identified (about $4.5
billion) are concentrated on continuing the restoration of the Northeast
Corridor's infrastructure to a state of good repair. Other long-term capital
investment needs include replacing bridges and tunnels on the Northeast
Corridor and replacing and rehabilitating the Corridor's electric power
system (a system that supplies power to Amtrak's trains and dates from the
1920s to the 1940s). These investments would replace aging systems that are
prone to mechanical failures and allow for growth.

In addition to the identified short- and long-term capital needs, Amtrak
will have other capital investment needs for which it has not developed cost
estimates. These include equipment maintenance needs and new capital
investment needs, such as station renovations and acquiring new equipment.
Although Amtrak acquired a large number of passenger cars and locomotives
during the 1990s, some components of Amtrak's fleet are past their useful
lives and will need to be replaced. Finally, Amtrak will have capital
investment needs related to implementing its Network Growth Strategy,
expanding its express program, and developing new high-speed rail corridors
across the country.

Potential Funding Shortfalls May Require Additional Federal Support

Amtrak's identified capital investments will exceed expected levels of
federal capital funds by nearly $2 billion over the 2001 through 2004
period. Since Amtrak has never covered the cost of its operations, it has
relied solely on external funds for capital investments. This has included
the federal government, state and local governments, and the commercial debt
market.

Amtrak should be able to meet its planned investment requirements through
2000 from Taxpayer Relief Act funds and the fiscal year 2000 federal capital
grant. However, beginning in 2001, Amtrak's capital investment requirements
will exceed expected available federal funding. The shortfall assumes that
Amtrak will receive federal capital grants of $521 million annually through
2004. In reality, Amtrak's funding shortfall will be more than $2 billion
because our analysis does not include investment requirements for which
Amtrak has not yet developed cost estimates. The potential shortfall in
federal capital funds will require Amtrak to rely heavily on sources other
than federal capital grants to meet some its needs. However, the federal
government may well be called upon to fund these shortfalls in amounts
substantially higher than current funding levels.

Analyzing Amtrak's capital needs and expected funding to meet these needs is
made more difficult because Amtrak has not prepared a multiyear capital plan
since 1997. Instead, it has developed a series of capital plans that cover
only a limited horizonnot more than 1 year at a time. These plans do not
fully describe Amtrak's current and future capital investment requirements
and how they will be funded, or indicate their relative priority. Amtrak has
stated that it expects to issue a multiyear capital plan later this year.

Time Nears for Decisions on the Future

of Amtrak and Intercity Passenger Rail

Amtrak is under extreme pressure to reach operational self-sufficiency by
the end of 2002. In our opinion, no matter whether Amtrak succeeds or fails
in this endeavor, important decisions will need to be made about the scope
of intercity passenger rail service and the level of federal support, if
any.

If Amtrak attains operational self-sufficiency, it will likely need
substantially more funds than it currently receives. As discussed earlier,
we estimate that Amtrak will need at least $9 billion to meet its identified
capital needs through 2015. This amount does not include needs for which
cost estimates have not been made. In addition, Amtrak will require
substantial funds annually to cover excess Railroad Retirement Tax Act
payments, an operating expense for which it may receive federal funds under
the Amtrak Reform Act (e.g., according to Amtrak, $190 million in 2003 and
$200 million in 2004). The federal government could be called upon to
provide support for both Amtrak's capital needs and excess Railroad
Retirement Tax Act payments, which could total more than the $521 million
that Amtrak currently receives in federal support.

On the other hand, if Amtrak fails to reach operational self-sufficiency,
the Amtrak Reform Act requires that the railroad submit to the Congress a
liquidation plan, and the Amtrak Reform Council submit a plan to the
Congress for a restructured national intercity passenger rail system. As a
result of any congressional action on these plans, the nation's intercity
passenger rail service could have a considerably different look.

In either situation, the future of Amtrak, and, by extension, the future of
intercity passenger rail in the United States need to be decided. Given that
2002 is just 2 years away, it is not too early to begin considering a
long-term vision for Amtrak and intercity passenger rail and how this vision
should be structured. If that future does not include Amtrak, basic
decisions about an intercity passenger rail system need to be made. This
would include determining the scope of an intercity passenger rail network,
if any; how it would be operated; and what level of funding would be
provided to support this network.

- - - - -

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We would be pleased to answer
any questions you or Members of the Committee may have.

Contact and Acknowledgements

For information regarding this testimony, please contact Phyllis F.
Scheinberg at (202) 512-3650. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony were Helen Desaulniers, Richard Jorgenson, and James Ratzenberger.

(348252)

Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak Will Continue to Have Difficulty
Controlling Its Costs and Meeting Capital Needs (GAO/RCED-00-138, May 31,
2000), Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak Needs to Improve Its Accountability
for Taxpayer Relief Act Funds (GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-78, Feb. 29, 2000), and
Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak Faces Challenges in Improving Its Financial
Condition (GAO/T-RCED-00-30, Oct. 28, 1999).

The Amtrak Reform Council is an independent oversight body created by the
Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997.

Amtrak participates in the railroad retirement system, under which each
participating railroad pays a portion of the total retirement and benefit
costs for employees of the industry.

Acela Express is part of Amtrak's high-speed rail program on the Northeast
Corridor. Acela Express trains are expected to reach speeds of up to 150
miles per hour and have trip times of about 3 hours between New York City
and Boston and about 2-1/2 hours between New York City and Washington, D.C.

Amtrak defines budget gap as the corporation's net loss (total revenues less
total expenses) less capital-related expenses, including the depreciation of
its physical plant, other noncash expenses, and expenses from its program to
progressively overhaul railcars (i.e., to conduct limited overhauls of cars
each year rather than comprehensive overhauls every several years).

The 1998 budget gap excludes $36 million in retroactive payments under
recently negotiated labor agreements.

Express is the transportation of higher value, time-sensitive goods, such as
produce.

This amount represents the $476 million budget gap in 1999 less expected
excess Railroad Retirement Tax Act payments in 2002 of $189 million.

In addition, Amtrak's overall financial condition has also not improved.
Through the first 9 months of this year, Amtrak's net loss was about $711
millionabout $6 million higher than it was for the same period in fiscal
year 1999 ($705 million). Amtrak's lower-than-expected performance appears
to be related to higher expenses rather than lower revenue.

See GAO/RCED-00-138.

This includes the costs of progressive overhauls. Amtrak funds progressive
overhauls through its capital program. However, under generally accepted
accounting principles, the cost of such overhauls are considered an
operating expense.

Total negotiated wage payments (including general wage increases, signing
bonuses, and retroactive payments) were $260 million. Amtrak expects to pay
the balance of this amount ($116 million) in 2000.

Acela Regional is designed to replace Amtrak's current NortheastDirect,
Empire, and Keystone service and will offer improved equipment, trip times,
and schedules.

See GAO/RCED-00-138. All amounts in this section are in constant 1999
dollars. Amtrak has not comprehensively identified its short- and long-term
capital investment needs. Therefore, to identify these needs, we asked
Amtrak managers to identify capital investments they believed are needed to
maintain current service levels and improve Amtrak's service and reviewed
Amtrak and other reports addressing capital investment needs. As a result,
the needs we identified may not be the same as those that might have been
identified by Amtrak, had it comprehensively identified its capital needs.

Amtrak expects to share some portion of this cost with other users of the
Northeast Corridor.

Our analysis is based on Amtrak receiving $521 million in capital grants
beginning in 2001. Amtrak's most recent business plan update also assumes
that Amtrak will receive this level of capital funding through 2003. No
estimate was available for 2004. Recently introduced bills, if enacted,
could provide capital funds for Amtrak. S.1900 and H.R. 3700 allow Amtrak to
issue $10 billion in bonds over 10 years for capital improvements to
Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and other high-speed rail corridors.
*** End of document ***