Park Service: Agency Is Not Meeting Its Structural Fire Safety
Responsibilities (Testimony, 07/19/2000, GAO/T-RCED-00-253).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the National Park
Service's (NPS) structural fire safety efforts, focusing on: (1) whether
the parks were meeting their structural fire safety responsibilities;
(2) if the parks were not, meeting their responsibilities why not; and
(3) what efforts were underway to address any identified problems.

GAO noted that: (1) structural fire safety efforts in national parks are
not effective; (2) the structural fire activities at the six parks GAO
visited lacked many of the basic elements needed for an effective fire
safety effort; (3) these gaps included such fundamental things as
inadequate fire training for employees, inadequate or nonexistent fire
inspections, and--for many buildings--inadequate or nonexistent fire
detection or suppression systems; (4) these situations led to many fire
safety hazards; (5) GAO found fire extinguishers that had not been
checked for years, overnight accommodations that had not been inspected
by qualified fire safety people, cabins without smoke detectors, and
visitor centers that did not have fire-suppression systems; (6) even
when fire hazards are detected, they can go uncorrected for years; (7)
these deficiencies occur principally because local park managers are not
required to meet minimum structural fire safety standards and because
structural fire activities have been a low priority within the agency
for many years; (8) even though NPS issued policy to local park managers
about how to address structural fire safety, park managers are not
required to follow NPS' policy, nor are they required to meet a minimum
set of fire safety standards; (9) instead, individual park managers are
permitted to define the scope and emphasis given to the threat of
structural fire; (10) GAO's work shows that structural fire safety is
near the bottom of NPS' priority lists; (11) NPS has acknowledged
problems in implementing its structural fire safety program and has
begun a number of initiatives to address them; (12) these include: (a)
developing new agency policies for addressing structural fire safety
responsibilities; (b) placing specific minimum fire safety requirements
on park managers; and (c) developing a process for structural fire
inspections and performing assessments of structural fire risks at each
unit of the national park system; (13) however, these initiatives have
only recently begun; and (14) until these initiatives are completed, the
safety of park visitors, employees, buildings, and artifacts are being
jeopardized and are vulnerable to fire that could cause damage,
destruction, severe injury, and even loss of life.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-00-253
     TITLE:  Park Service: Agency Is Not Meeting Its Structural Fire
	     Safety Responsibilities
      DATE:  07/19/2000
   SUBJECT:  National parks
	     National historic sites
	     Performance measures
	     Safety standards
	     Noncompliance
	     Property damages
	     Federal property management
	     Building inspection
	     Internal controls
IDENTIFIER:  Yosemite National Park (CA)
	     Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Park (CA)
	     Ford's Theatre National Historic Site (DC)
	     Prince William Forest Park (VA)
	     Shenandoah National Park (VA)
	     Olympic National Park (WA)
	     Yellowstone National Park (WY)
	     NPS Structural Safety Program

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GAO/T-RCED-00-253

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Park Service's structural
fire safety efforts. Our comments today are based on our May 2000 report in
which we evaluated (1) whether the parks were meeting their structural fire
safety responsibilities; (2) if not, why not; and (3) what efforts were
underway to address any identified problems. Our report raised serious
concerns about the agency's commitment and priority to ensuring that the
risks of structural fires harming visitors, employees, resources, and other
assets were minimized.

In summary, we found:

Structural fire safety efforts in national parks are not effective. The
structural fire activities at the six parks we visited lacked many of the
basic elements needed for an effective fire safety effort. These gaps
included such fundamental things as inadequate fire training for employees,
inadequate or nonexistent fire inspections, and-for many
buildings-inadequate or nonexistent fire detection or suppression systems.
These situations led to many fire safety hazards. We found fire
extinguishers that had not been checked for years, overnight accommodations
that had not been inspected by qualified fire safety people, cabins without
smoke detectors, and visitor centers that did not have fire-suppression
systems. Furthermore, even when fire hazards are detected, they can go
uncorrected for years.

These deficiencies occur principally because local park managers are not
required to meet minimum structural fire safety standards and because
structural fire activities have been a low priority within the agency for
many years. Even though the Park Service issued policy to local park
managers about how to address structural fire safety, park managers are not
required to follow the agency policy, nor are they required to meet a
minimum set of fire safety standards. Instead, individual park managers are
permitted to define the scope and emphasis given to the threat of structural
fire. Our work shows that structural fire safety is near the bottom of the
parks' priority lists.

The Park Service has acknowledged problems in implementing its structural
fire safety program and has begun a number of initiatives to address them.
These include (1) developing new agency policies for addressing structural
fire safety responsibilities, (2) placing specific minimum fire safety
requirements on park managers, and (3) developing a process for structural
fire inspections and performing assessments of structural fire risks at each
unit of the national park system. However, these initiatives have only
recently begun. Until these initiatives are completed, the safety of park
visitors, employees, buildings, and artifacts are being jeopardized and are
vulnerable to fire that could cause damage, destruction, severe injury, and
even loss of life.

Background

Today, the Park Service is the nation's steward for over 30,000 structures,
many of them historic; many national icons, such as the Statute of Liberty;
and over 80 million artifacts. These structures include hotels; motels;
cabins; visitor centers; interpretative centers; and historical buildings,
such as Independence Hall and many former presidents' homes. In terms of
buildings alone, the Park Service is the federal government's third largest
landlord--behind only the Department of Defense and the U.S. Postal Service.

The Park Service is responsible for ensuring that the buildings and
artifacts entrusted to it are protected and that the people who visit or
work in them are safe from undue hazards or risks. However, one risk-the
threat of fire-has been a recurring issue. While much public and media
attention has historically focused on spectacular wildland fires, like those
that occurred in Yellowstone National Park in 1988, or around Los Alamos,
New Mexico, earlier this year, building or structural fires within parks
have not received much attention. Nonetheless, since 1990, more than 1,400
fires have occurred in national park buildings and other facilities. These
fires have killed five people, caused serious injury to many others, and
resulted in millions of dollars in property loss.

Key Elements Generally Missing From

Parks' Structural Fire Safety Activities

None of the six parks we visited had effectively addressed their structural
fire safety responsibilities. In fact, most of the basic components
necessary for addressing parks' structural fire risks were missing at each
park. These gaps have resulted in significant and, in some parks,
long-standing deficiencies that have seriously compromised fire safety.
Although we visited only a few parks, according to the Park Service's Deputy
Chief Ranger who is responsible for the agency's structural fire program,
similar problems with park structural fire programs would be found whether
we visited 6 or 60 parks.

According to structural fire safety experts from the National Fire
Protection Association, U.S. Fire Administration, and fire experts from six
other associations and government agencies we contacted, an effective
structural fire safety effort has three essential components: fire
prevention and protection, fire response, and funding. Both the fire
prevention and protection component and the fire response component have a
number of key elements associated with them. However, at each of the six
parks' that we visited most of the key elements were missing.

Fire prevention and protection

According to the structural fire experts we contacted, the key elements to
effective fire prevention and protection are (1) a fire plan for handling
fire risks and incidents, (2) fire inspections conducted by qualified staff,
and (3) an incident reporting system to analyze fire incidents and identify
corrective actions to the fire safety program. However, the parks that we
visited were lacking in most or all of these components.

None of the six parks that we sampled had adequate fire plans. At each park,
the plans were either out of date or not coordinated with nearby community
fire departments or had some combination of these problems. For example, the
fire plan at Shenandoah National Park was prepared in 1991 but has not been
updated since that time to reflect the addition of new buildings or other
changes in park operations. Updating the plan is particularly important at
this park because, according to park managers, the park has an inadequate
fire response capability and, therefore, must rely heavily on fire
departments from local jurisdictions outside the park to respond to fires.

Similarly, regarding inspections, none of the parks we visited had their
facilities regularly inspected for fire safety by qualified individuals.
Examples of structural fire inspection deficiencies that we identified
included the following:

   * At Yosemite National Park, until 1999, none of the park's structures
     had a formal structural fire safety inspection, including the 123-room
     Ahwahnee Hotel-a national historic landmark. In fiscal year 1999, the
     park hired, for the first time, a trained structural fire inspector to
     begin fire inspections for its 800 structures.
   * Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Park had not conducted any structural
     fire safety inspections, even though the park has about 250 buildings
     and other facilities, and has had 41 structural fires since 1988.
   * During a visit to Ford's Theatre in Washington, D.C., we noted that
     serious deficiencies concerning stairwell and stage doors had not been
     corrected even though they were first identified by a Park Service
     contractor in 1993. The contractor's report also raised concerns about
     the theater's sprinkler system and noted that, "If the sprinkler system
     fails or does not operate as designed, a fire in the stage area,
     particularly during a production, has the potential to kill several
     hundred people. . .. Fires in other theaters show that a severe fire
     can develop in a few minutes."

The remaining key element in fire prevention and protection is an incident
reporting system to analyze fire trends and causes in order that corrective
measures can be devised and initiated. Three of the six parks we visited did
not participate in an agencywide fire incident reporting system. Failure to
report this kind of information undermines the agency's ability to
understand the scope of fire problems and vulnerabilities throughout the
national park system as well as the agency's ability to set priorities for
its safety needs.

Fire response

According to the structural fire safety experts that we contacted, two key
elements are needed to effectively respond to fires, namely, (1) fire
detection and suppression systems and (2) fire brigades and/or agreements
with community fire departments. None of the parks in our sample had an
adequate fire response capability.

Suppression systems, such as sprinklers, should be a key component in any
structural fire safety effort, according to fire experts, and are especially
important to the Park Service because of the remoteness of many facilities
and the delayed fire response capabilities generally found in many parks. In
addition, where fire detection and/or suppression systems are installed in
buildings, experts agree that it is critical that these systems be
maintained and tested periodically to ensure they are working properly. Each
of the six parks we visited were either missing detection or suppression
systems in key facilities, such as visitor centers and overnight lodging
facilities, or were not being maintained and tested properly, if at all.

   * At Prince William Forest Park, smoke detectors were not installed in
     many cabins used as overnight accommodations by visiting guests.
     Frequently, these guests are youth organizations.

   * At Yosemite National Park, none of the sprinkler systems installed in
     park buildings have been tested since they were installed to make sure
     that they are operating properly. In addition, we found that park
     officials did not replace defective sprinklers involved in a
     well-publicized nationwide recall. A park manager told us that the park
     did not meet a 1999 deadline set by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
     Commission and the manufacturer to qualify for the reimbursement of
     labor costs associated with replacing, parkwide, about 1,000 recalled
     sprinkler heads. These sprinkler heads are used in fire suppression
     systems in residences where park employees live. The defective
     sprinkler heads, identical to those installed at Yosemite, failed to
     function in at least 20 fires. Nonetheless, the park has not replaced
     these sprinkler heads and is still relying on them as a key part of its
     fire safety effort.

To complement fire detection and suppression systems, adequate fire response
requires fire response crews that are properly trained and equipped. Within
the Park Service, adequate fire response is frequently accomplished by the
use of fire brigades. Fire brigades are similar to community fire
departments and include firefighters, fire equipment, and flame-retardant
clothing located in or near the park. The Park Service has come to rely on
the use of fire brigades in parks that are some distance from community fire
departments. In parks that are not remote, the park managers frequently have
agreements with nearby community or other fire districts for initial
response or additional backup for responding to fires. Each of the six parks
we visited either did not have a qualified or properly equipped fire brigade
or their response capability was not fully coordinated with local fire
departments. For example:

   * At Yosemite, in 1999, 42 of 45 of the firefighters stationed in
     Yosemite Valley-the central and busiest area of the park-had not taken
     the agency's annual 16 hours of required minimum training or had no
     record of any training.
   * Shenandoah National Park does not have qualified personnel to respond
     to structural fires. The park has a collateral-duty fire brigade that
     has not been trained to enter a burning structure and lacks the
     necessary equipment to respond to vehicle fires. The park's policy is
     to rely on local fire departments for entering burning structures.
     However, the departments' response times range from 10 to over 45
     minutes, in contrast to a much shorter response time-4 to 6
     minutes-that is generally needed to respond to burning buildings.
   * Olympic National Park has fire response agreements with only two of
     nine fire departments in the surrounding area. As a result, many areas
     of the park have no formal arrangements with local fire departments for
     a structural fire response.

Funding

Fire experts generally agree that sufficient, consistent funding is
necessary to support an effective structural fire safety effort. However,
there is no specific appropriation dedicated to structural fire activities
in the Park Service. Individual park managers are permitted to determine the
funding levels, if any, for structural fire activities. Park managers at the
six parks we visited acknowledged that structural fire safety activities
received insufficient funding.

Our findings on the gaps and problems in the parks' structural fire safety
efforts appear to be consistent with the Park Service's own analyses. A 1998
Park Service report stated, "sooner or later the NPS stands to be seriously
embarrassed (at a minimum) by the catastrophic loss, either of an
irreplaceable historic structure or collection, or of human life, from a
structural fire." In addition, in December 1997, the Director of the Park
Service expressed serious concerns when an internal agency report identified
about 1,900 fire safety deficiencies associated with the agency's museum
collections-such as the storing of flammable liquids and materials near
museum storage spaces. Yet, as of January 2000-over 2 years later-almost 75
percent of these deficiencies have not been corrected. According to the
director, "These deficiencies can be corrected at a modest cost. To do
otherwise would be negligence."

Key Reasons for the Agency's Ineffective Structural Fire Effort

The parks we visited lacked an effective structural fire safety effort
because the agency (1) has not fully specified the minimum structural fire
safety standards individual parks must meet and (2) has placed little
emphasis on structural fire safety. As a result, managers at these parks
gave this aspect of operations a low priority. This low priority is
inconsistent with Park Service assertions that health and safety issues are
a top agency priority.

Currently, the Park Service provides park managers with a generalized policy
on what their fire safety efforts should include. However, the policy does
not require parks to meet minimum fire safety standards. It places primary
responsibility for daily management and compliance for structural fire
safety with individual park managers. The extent to which such activities
are implemented at each park, however, depends on how individual park
managers define the scope, priority, and emphasis given to structural fire
safety efforts.

While the policy places primary responsibility on park managers to carry out
structural fire safety activities, little support or emphasis for the effort
appears to exist at the headquarters or regional levels. Furthermore, the
Park Service has no process for ensuring that plans for renovating existing
facilities or constructing new structures is routinely reviewed for fire
safety. The lack of agency attention to structural fire seems inconsistent
with the Department of the Interior's and the Park Service's statements that
addressing unmet health and safety concerns is a top priority. In April
1999, the Department of the Interior provided its component
agencies-including the Park Service-with guidance that identified health and
safety issues as a top funding priority. This guidance explicitly identifies
violations of national fire protection standards as requiring immediate
attention. Although the Park Service's fiscal year 2001 annual performance
plan stresses that employee and visitor health and safety are top agency
priorities, in the case of structural fire safety, the Park Service's
practices and activities have not been consistent with this policy.

Initiatives to Address Problems, but Practical Results

Depend on Effective Implementation

The Park Service is aware that there are major weaknesses in its structural
fire safety effort and has begun a number of initiatives to address them. It
is unclear, however, whether the Park Service will follow through on these
initiatives to ensure that an effective structural fire safety program is
developed and implemented.

Park Service officials are aware that structural fire safety is a low
priority at many parks, and the agency has begun a number of initiatives to
revitalize and improve its effort. In 1998, the agency appointed a
structural fire safety steering committee, which drafted a fire management
policy and mission statement. These documents defined the purpose, scope,
and general policy toward structural fire in the agency. Also in 1999, the
Park Service hired a new structural fire chief and directed the individual
to develop an agencywide structural fire safety program. This program is now
being developed. Once implemented, these initiatives are likely to increase
the level of structural fire prevention and response over that currently in
place. Over time, such initiatives would shift the agency's focus from one
that currently emphasizes fire response to one that emphasizes fire
prevention-an approach that, according to program administrators, is much
more cost-effective.

While the initiatives under way are certainly steps in the right direction,
their success depends on their being effectively implemented. However, it
appears that the planned levels of resources for these structural fire
safety initiatives will not be sufficient to get several key initiatives
completed, including one of the agency's most critical efforts-completing an
overall assessment of the structural fire risks facing facilities and
structures throughout the Park Service.

- - - - -

In closing, as a result of the findings in our report, we recommended that
the Park Service complete and implement the various structural fire safety
initiatives that have recently begun in the agency. This effort should
include, among other things, establishing minimum structural fire safety
requirements, developing and implementing a plan for correcting the fire
safety needs and deficiencies, and ensuring that new and rehabilitation
projects comply with generally accepted fire codes. In addition, to ensure
that local park managers elevate the priority given to addressing structural
fire safety needs and deficiencies, we also recommended that park managers
be held accountable for meeting the agency's health and safety
responsibilities by requiring them to develop and implement effective
structural fire safety programs.

In commenting on our May 2000 report, the Park Service agreed with our
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The agency also indicated that
is was continuing to work on its ongoing initiatives and considering plans
to implement our recommendations. Until the agency takes action in this
area, the problems that we identified will likely persist.

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer questions from you
or other Members of the Committee.

Contact and Acknowledgment

For further information on this testimony, please contact Barry T. Hill at
(202) 512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
include Cliff Fowler, Paul Staley, Frank Kovalak, Brian Estes, Lew Adams,
and Ned Woodward.

(141474)
  
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