Nuclear Waste: Observations on DOE's Privatization Initiative for Complex
Cleanup Projects (Testimony, 06/22/2000, GAO/T-RCED-00-215).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of
Energy's (DOE) privatization initiative as it has been applied to DOE's
nuclear waste cleanup program, focusing on: (1) what DOE has
accomplished by privatizing such projects; and (2) the lessons that can
be learned from these efforts.

GAO noted that: (1) for the complex cleanup projects GAO reviewed, DOE's
privatization initiative has had little success in achieving cost
savings, keeping the projects moving forward on schedule, or getting
improvements in contractors' performance; (2) for example, on the
Hanford tank waste project, DOE estimated savings of from $2.1 billion
to $3.5 billion by using the privatization approach; (3) however, after
dramatic growth in the project's estimated cost and concerns about the
contractor's performance, DOE decided to terminate the contract; (4)
similar problems on the Pit 9 project in Idaho led DOE to terminate that
contract without achieving expected cost savings; (5) although DOE
adopted privatization as a solution to its past contracting
difficulties, recurring cost, schedule, and performance problems
demonstrate that privatization has not been a successful alternative for
complex cleanup projects; (6) several lessons can be learned from DOE's
privatization efforts; (7) DOE cannot rely on privatization alone to fix
its past contracting problems--instead, it must carefully evaluate
privatization as just one of the many contracting and financing
strategies that it can use to get the most out of federal cleanup
dollars; (8) DOE's experience indicates that the two strategies that
underpin the privatization initiative--fixed-price contracting and full
private financing--will not work effectively for all cleanup projects;
(9) rather, a complex matrix of decision factors must be analyzed before
deciding how to contract for and finance a cleanup; (10) these factors
include how much is known about the characteristics of the waste, the
number of contractors willing to compete, the financing options, and the
risks posed by the project and the entity that is best prepared to
assume them; (11) GAO's review of the Hanford project indicates that
future analyses of financing options need to: (a) use more realistic
assumptions about cost growth for various types of contracts; and (b)
better reflect the actual risks assumed by the government; and (12)
because effective DOE management and oversight are critical to selecting
the appropriate type of contract and financing mechanism, as well as to
implementing the contract successfully, DOE needs to continue improving
its technical, financial, and managerial oversight capabilities.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-00-215
     TITLE:  Nuclear Waste: Observations on DOE's Privatization
	     Initiative for Complex Cleanup Projects
      DATE:  06/22/2000
   SUBJECT:  Privatization
	     Nuclear waste management
	     Radioactive waste disposal
	     Hazardous substances
	     Cost control
	     Fixed price contracts
	     Contract performance
	     Schedule slippages
	     Contract oversight
IDENTIFIER:  DOE Nuclear Waste Cleanup Program
	     DOE Idaho Pit 9 Remediation Demonstration Project
	     DOE Hanford Tank Waste Remediation Project

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GAO/T-RCED-00-215

NUCLEAR WASTE Observations on DOE's Privatization Initiative for Complex
Cleanup Projects Statement of Ms. Gary L. Jones, Associate Director, Energy,
Resources, and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,

Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 am EDT Thursday June 22, 2000

GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 215

1

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are here today to discuss
the Department of Energy's (DOE) privatization initiative as it has been
applied to DOE's nuclear waste cleanup program. DOE oversees some of the
most highly radioactive and polluted sites in the United States, primarily
the consequence of over 50 years of producing nuclear materials for weapons.
Cleaning up radioactively contaminated buildings, soil, and groundwater
within the weapons complex and safely storing wastes is a major mission for
DOE. The Department estimates that for the years 2000 through 2070, it will
cost between about $150 billion and $195 billion (1999 dollars) to complete
this mission and provide long- term monitoring of the remaining sites. DOE
primarily contracts with private companies to accomplish the cleanup. In the
past, this effort was generally performed under costreimbursement contracts
by contractors that managed and operated many of DOE's facilities. DOE
financed the operations, owned the facilities, and paid the contractors
regardless of what was accomplished.

DOE started its privatization initiative in 1995 as a way to reduce the cost
and speed the cleanup of its contaminated sites and to improve contractors'
performance. The initiative was primarily an alternative contracting and
financing strategy to foster open competition for fixed- price contracts;
require the contractors to design, finance, build, own, and operate the
facilities necessary to meet treatment requirements; and pay the contractors
only for products or services delivered in accordance with the contracts.
Since the initiative began, DOE has managed several of its complex and
expensive cleanup activities as privatization projects.

Concerns have surfaced about whether DOE's privatization initiative has
yielded significant results when applied to the Department's more complex
cleanup projects. Our testimony discusses (1) what DOE has accomplished by
privatizing such projects and (2) our observations on the lessons that can
be learned from these efforts. It is based on our past reviews of DOE's
privatization initiative, including reviews of three

2

complex cleanup projects requested by this Committee- two at DOE's Idaho
Falls Site and one at the Hanford Site in Washington State. Collectively,
the estimated contract prices for these three projects were about $8
billion. We have included a list of products at the end of this statement
that we have issued on various aspects of DOE's privatization initiative.

In summary:

ï¿½ For the complex cleanup projects we reviewed, DOE's privatization
initiative has had little success in achieving cost savings, keeping the
projects moving forward on schedule, or getting improvements in contractors'
performance. For example, on the Hanford tank waste project, DOE estimated
savings of from $2.1 billion to $3.5 billion by using the privatization
approach. However, after dramatic growth in the project's estimated cost and
concerns about the contractor's performance, DOE decided to terminate the
contract. Similar problems on the Pit 9 project in Idaho led DOE to
terminate that contract without achieving expected cost savings. Although
DOE adopted privatization as a solution to its past contracting
difficulties, recurring cost, schedule, and performance problems demonstrate
that privatization has not been a successful alternative for complex cleanup
projects.

ï¿½ Several lessons can be learned from DOE's privatization efforts. DOE
cannot rely on privatization alone to fix its past contracting problems;
instead, it must carefully evaluate privatization as just one of the many
contracting and financing strategies that it can use to get the most out of
federal cleanup dollars. DOE's experience indicates that the two strategies
that underpin the privatization initiative- fixed- price contracting and
full private financing- will not work effectively for all cleanup projects.
Rather, a complex matrix of decision factors must be analyzed before
deciding how to contract for and finance a cleanup. These factors include
how much is known about the characteristics of the waste, the number of
contractors willing to compete, the financing options, and the risks posed
by the project and the entity that is best prepared to assume them. Our
review of the Hanford project indicates that

3

future analyses of financing options need to (1) use more realistic
assumptions about cost growth for various types of contracts and (2) better
reflect the actual risks assumed by the government. Because effective DOE
management and oversight are critical to selecting the appropriate type of
contract and financing mechanism, as well as to implementing the contract
successfully, DOE needs to continue improving its technical, financial, and
managerial oversight capabilities.

Background

DOE spends nearly $6 billion each year to clean up the weapons complex and
provide long- term monitoring of the remaining sites. In the past, DOE
primarily approached this mission by signing cost- reimbursement contracts,
telling contractors how to perform waste cleanup activities, and paying them
for the amount of effort that was expended, regardless of what was
accomplished. Under this arrangement, DOE financed the contractors'
activities and owned the facilities. As part of a broader contract reform
effort, and in an attempt to reduce costs and speed the progress of cleanup,
DOE developed its privatization initiative.

DOE's privatization initiative is primarily an alternative contracting and
financing strategy. For cleanup projects, privatization means using
competitively awarded, fixedprice contracts to purchase cleanup services.
The contractor agrees to design, finance, build, own, and operate treatment
facilities. DOE specifies the required end products or services- for
example, treating waste to meet disposal requirements- and generally leaves
the methods and technologies used to achieve those requirements to the
discretion of the contractor. The contractor is expected to finance the
project with private money instead of using federal appropriations. This
means that the contractor must either use its own funds (equity) or borrow
money (debt) in order to proceed with design, construction, and related
activities until the project is operational and the contractor begins
receiving payments from DOE for successfully treating units of waste.

DOE expected that the competitive award process, the use of fixed- price
contracts, and the requirement for private financing would bring contractors
of a “best in class” caliber

4

to its projects. With the contractors' own equity and/ or debt funding the
projects, DOE also expected that the contractors would have significant
incentives to complete the projects on schedule and within budget. Finally,
DOE expected that privatization would allow cleanup to move forward while
deferring the government's own budget outlays for several years until the
contractors constructed facilities and prepared them for operations.

The three cleanup projects we reviewed involved constructing and operating
treatment facilities. 1 (See table 1). The largest, a project at Hanford
with an estimated contract price of $6.9 billion, involves treating highly
radioactive liquid wastes. The two contracts at Idaho Falls, totaling about
$1 billion, involve treating less radioactive solid wastes, some of which
are mixed with sludges and other hazardous materials, that are buried in the
ground or stored in drums or boxes. DOE has approved a total of eight
privatization projects involving the construction and operation of
facilities to treat wastes, although none have been approved since 1998. The
eight projects are listed in appendix I.

1 In its January 1997 report on privatization ( Harnessing the Market: The
Opportunities & Challenges of Privatization), DOE identified three different
types of privatization initiatives that the Department would implement-
eliminating functions, transferring assets, and contracting out. Eliminating
functions involves eliminating from the Department those activities for
which a federal role is no longer required- such as the transfer of the Elk
Hills Petroleum Reserve to the private sector. Transferring assets involves
the sale or transfer of real property or personal property, including
disposing of surplus assets such as precious metals in DOE's inventory.
Contracting out involves either the Department's directly contracting for
services previously provided by federal employees or site operating
contractors, or site operating contractors' subcontracting specific tasks to
other companies instead of performing the tasks themselves. The majority of
DOE's privatization efforts have involved contracting out. These projects
take three main forms- treating wastes at contractor- owned and -operated
facilities, removing existing contaminated facilities and structures, and
providing services using existing DOE facilities.

5

Table I: DOE Privatization Cleanup Projects Reviewed by GAO Idaho Pit 9

Idaho advanced mixed waste Hanford tank waste

Date of contract award Oct. 1994 Dec. 1996 Aug. 1998 c Contractor Lockheed
Martin

Advanced Environmental Systems

BNFL Inc. BNFL Inc. Wastes to be treated 250,000 cubic feet of

buried transuranic a and hazardous wastes and contaminated soil

65,000 cubic meters of mixed waste b stored above ground in drums and boxes

About 5 million gallons of highly radioactive wastes stored in underground
tanks

Contract price $200 million $876 million $6.9 billion (est.) a Transuranic
waste contains man- made radioactive elements with atomic numbers higher
than uranium, such as plutonium. b Mixed waste is a combination of
radiological contaminants, such as plutonium, and hazardous but
nonradiological contaminants, such as degreasing agents or acids. C The
original contract was awarded in September 1996. The contract was modified
in August 1998 to reflect DOE's revised approach to the project.

Source: GAO's presentation of data from DOE.

DOE's Objectives in Privatizing Complex Cleanup Projects Have Not Been Met

DOE has not achieved the cost savings or the schedule and performance
improvements that it expected privatization would provide. Specifically, DOE
estimated significant cost savings for each of the three projects. To date,
however, none of these projects have achieved savings. (See table 2.)
Instead, DOE terminated the contract on the Pit 9 project, and intends to
terminate the contract on the Hanford tank waste project, after the
contractors estimated significant cost increases and experienced management
problems. Savings on the advanced mixed waste project are too early to
determine, since construction has not yet started. However, delays in
starting construction are likely to increase the estimated contract price.

6

Table 2: DOE's Estimated and Actual Savings to Date on Three Complex
Privatization Cleanup Projects Idaho Pit 9

Idaho advanced mixed waste Hanford tank waste

DOE savings estimate $134 million (1996 dollars)

$670 million (1996 dollars)

$2.1 billion -$ 3.5 billion (1997 dollars)

Actual savings achieved None- project terminated None to date- construction
has not started; construction delays will likely affect costs and potential
savings

None- contract is being terminated and recompeted after significant growth
in cost estimate

Source: GAO's presentation of data from DOE.

Contrary to DOE's expectations that privatization projects would stay on
schedule, all three of the projects we reviewed experienced delays in
meeting schedule milestones. In addition, a key feature of DOE's
privatization initiative was that contractors would receive payments only
for successfully treating waste. For two of the projects, DOE was
dissatisfied with the contractors' performance, but it is unclear if DOE's
dissatisfaction will prevent the contractors from being paid.

ï¿½ The Idaho Pit 9 project was to start waste treatment operations in August
1996 and complete treating the waste by February 1999. However, the contract
was terminated in June 1998 because of problems with the contractor's
performance. Treatment of the waste is now being considered as part of a
future project at the site. Although Lockheed Martin Advanced Environmental
Systems (Lockheed Martin) provided a corporate guarantee of performance
under the contract, the case is now in litigation. DOE is trying to recover
the $54 million already paid to Lockheed Martin, and Lockheed Martin is
seeking additional payments of $271 million for its work on the failed
project. DOE project officials said that it is unclear how the issues will
be resolved or how responsibility for the costs incurred on the project will
be assigned to the parties involved.

7

ï¿½ The Hanford tank waste project was initially to start waste treatment
operations in December 2002 and complete processing about 6 percent of the
waste by 2007. In 1998, DOE changed its approach to the project and revised
the schedule to start waste treatment operations in February 2007 and
complete processing about 10 percent of the waste by 2018. In May 2000, DOE
directed BNFL 2 to stop work, and it is now in the process of terminating
the contract because of dramatically escalating costs and concerns about
BNFL's performance. DOE expects to pay BNFL for the allowable costs it
incurred on the project as well as negotiated termination costs. DOE has
abandoned privatization for this project and plans to recompete a contract
for the design/ construction phase and compete a separate contract for the
operations phase. DOE hopes to keep the project moving forward in accordance
with the revised schedule, but DOE officials expect some delays to occur as
these changes are implemented.

ï¿½ The Idaho advanced mixed waste project was to start waste treatment
operations in March 2003 and complete waste treatment by December 2018.
BNFL's February 2000 estimate shows that waste treatment operations will
begin in November 2003 and are to be completed as scheduled in December
2018. However, several uncertainties may affect the achievement of these
milestones. First, the start of construction has been delayed because BNFL
has not obtained the construction permits from the state and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Second, to resolve a lawsuit, DOE has
agreed to pursue technical or regulatory alternatives to incineration for up
to 22 percent of the waste to be treated. It is unclear how long the search
for alternatives will take or whether it will be successful. Finally, it is
unclear if the flexibility built into the operational phase of the project
will be sufficient to absorb these potential delays and allow the project to
be completed on time. However, at this early stage of the project, there are
no signs that DOE is dissatisfied with BNFL's performance.

2 BNFL Inc. is the U. S. subsidiary of British Nuclear Fuels plc, a public
limited company in the United Kingdom. The British government is the sole
stockholder of British Nuclear Fuels plc.

8

The cost, schedule, and performance problems we found on privatization
projects are similar to problems found on other DOE cleanup projects that
involved more traditional contracting and financing approaches. For example,
our 1996 report on DOE's major system acquisition projects (generally
projects costing $100 million or more), none of which were privatization
projects, disclosed that at least half of the ongoing projects and most of
the completed ones had cost overruns and/ or schedule delays. 3 Reasons for
these problems included inadequate project oversight and insufficient
attention to technical, institutional, and management issues. Although
privatization was an attempt to address these types of problems, it has not
yielded the desired results.

Observations on DOE's Privatization of Complex Cleanup Projects

We have the following observations based on our past and current reviews of
DOE's privatization projects:

ï¿½ Fixed- price contracts may not work effectively in all situations. DOE has
had a strong preference for using fixed- price contracts as a key component
of its privatization program. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
guidelines note that the conditions most conducive to fixed- price
contracting include a clearly defined scope of work, a low probability of
major changes to the work scope, the existence of proven technologies,
sufficient price information to determine a fair price, and an appropriate
allocation and sharing of risks. In contrast, the three projects we reviewed
had changes in scope, uncertainties about waste constituents and technical
approaches, unrealistic project schedules, or unresolved regulatory issues
that ended up affecting schedules or costs after the contracts were awarded.
For example, on the Pit 9 project, the contractor changed the design of the
chemical treatment system, a major component of the project, after
construction of the building had started. Eventually, the chemical treatment
system was modified so much that it no longer fit in the building as
constructed. These inconsistencies with the FAR guidelines make

3 See Department of Energy: Opportunity to Improve Management of Major
System Acquisitions (GAO/ RCED- 97- 17, Nov. 26, 1996).

9

it more likely that significant changes will occur during the life of the
contracts. Therefore, these projects may not have been good candidates for
fixed- price contracts.

DOE's guidance on privatization encourages the use of fixed- price contracts
for cleanup projects. In contrast, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers has
guidance that appears to be more consistent with the FAR guidelines for
using fixed- price contracts. The Corps' general contracting guidance for
hazardous, toxic, and radioactive cleanup projects states that fixed- price
contracts are not the best contracting vehicle for complex radioactive waste
cleanup projects. The guidance further states that the Corps increasingly
relies on cost- reimbursement contracts for the design and operations phases
of such projects. The primary reason the Corps has taken this position is
that projects to clean up radioactive wastes can have significant
uncertainties, including undefined amounts and concentrations of
contaminants, which can affect costs and schedules. These conditions are
similar to the uncertainties DOE has faced on its complex nuclear waste
cleanup projects.

DOE has been more successful using fixed- price contracts for projects whose
conditions have more closely matched those specified in the FAR guidelines.
Generally, those projects were not complex cleanup projects that involved
constructing and operating treatment facilities. For example, DOE has used
fixedprice contracts at Idaho Falls and Hanford to purchase laundry services
for such items as contaminated workers' uniforms. DOE's operating experience
under these contracts has confirmed savings of several million dollars each
year.

ï¿½ Full private financing for complex cleanup projects may not be a viable
approach. It is not clear whether full private financing for complex
projects is achievable or whether it will provide needed assurance that
contractors will perform effectively. According to DOE officials, including
the Director of the Office of Contract Reform and Privatization, none of
these privatized cleanup projects have secured commercial financing to date,
although a few have been financed internally by the contractors.

10

For example, on the Pit 9 project, Lockheed Martin financed project design
and construction activities from its own equity funds and government
progress payments. On the Hanford project, BNFL planned to use both equity
and debt financing. However, in order to make commercial financing viable,
DOE agreed to pay BNFL's commercial debt in the event of contract
termination. DOE decided it would terminate the contract before BNFL
obtained commercial financing. On the advanced mixed waste project, BNFL is
currently funding activities using its equity. However, in the unlikely
event that BNFL's financing is not sufficient for the entire project, DOE
may need to consider other options, such as making progress payments or
changing the contract to make financing the project more attractive to
lenders. These potential changes would also affect the allocation of risk
between the two parties.

Full private financing also has not ensured that contractors perform
satisfactorily. For example, the Pit 9 contract was terminated and the
Hanford contract is being terminated because of concerns about the
contractors' abilities to successfully complete the projects. On the
advanced mixed waste project, it is too early to tell if BNFL can perform
successfully.

Overall, full private financing of cleanup projects is only one of several
ways that DOE can encourage its contractors to perform. In addition to using
different mixes of public and private financing, DOE could use an incentive
fee structure in its contracts to tie a contractor's performance more
closely to its potential profits.

ï¿½ A thorough analysis of financial alternatives and risks is an important
part of structuring a successful cleanup project. When DOE initiated each of
the three projects we reviewed, it limited its analysis of contracting and
financing alternatives primarily to a comparison between a privatized
approach and a cost- reimbursement contract without performance incentives.
In our previous work on privatization, we have criticized such a narrow
approach to making important contracting decisions.

11

On the Hanford project, after this Committee raised questions about the
contract, DOE agreed to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of its
financial alternatives. We are encouraged that DOE is considering a broader
range of alternatives, but we have some concerns about DOE's analysis,
particularly its assumptions about cost growth and its analysis of financial
risks. These assumptions led DOE to conclude that privatization would be the
least- cost alternative for the project.

In its March 2000 draft report, Hanford Tank Waste Treatment Alternatives,
DOE concluded that cost growth on federally financed projects would more
than offset the higher costs associated with private financing. We have
several concerns about this conclusion. For example, DOE assumed that with
the privatization approach, there would be no cost growth once the project
started because the contractor would have incentives to control its costs.
In contrast, DOE assumed that with other options, cost growth would more
than offset the higher cost of private financing. However, DOE had no
convincing evidence to support the assumption that the privatization
approach would have no cost growth. In fact, its experiences contradict this
assumption. We also are concerned about DOE's use of point estimates of cost
growth rates. Since estimates of cost growth under the various options
considered are not precise, using one cost growth rate can lead to a
misleading conclusion about the most cost- effective approach. To clearly
show the uncertainty associated with the cost growth estimated for various
contracting and financing options, we believe it would be more appropriate
to represent the cost growth as a range of values instead of a single point
estimate.

DOE did not fully analyze or disclose the financial risks it incurred when
it assumed responsibility, in the event of the Hanford contract's
termination, for a large portion of BNFL's debt on the project. With this
action, which DOE took so that BNFL could obtain private financing,
significant performance risk shifted from BNFL to DOE. By contrast, under a
more typical privatization project, the performance risk remains
predominately with the contractor. Had the Hanford contract continued, it is
not

12

clear that DOE would have reflected this shifting of the risk in its cost
analysis of financial alternatives, as we suggested in our October 1998
report on this project. 4 A more complete evaluation of the actual risks
assumed by the government on this project could have shown that a
significant portion of the potential cost of the project shifted to the
government, since the government's liability for BNFL's debt has a cost
associated with it. Such an evaluation might have found a different
financing alternative more cost- effective for the government.

ï¿½ Regardless of the contracting and financing mechanisms used, effective
oversight is essential to a project's success. In our past work, we have
raised concerns about the adequacy of DOE's technical, financial, and
managerial oversight capabilities, since DOE's oversight has not been
sufficient to prevent schedule slippages or cost increases. For example, on
the Pit 9 project, DOE was unable to ensure that Lockheed Martin was
addressing significant design, safety, and performance problems, and the
contract was finally terminated. On the Hanford project, we reported in 1998
that effective oversight by DOE, especially in the areas of project
administration, technical issues, and support activities, would be critical
to the project's success. DOE has invested considerable effort in
establishing oversight mechanisms for technical, health and safety, risk
management, and business and financial aspects of the project. Even so, DOE
officials said in April 2000 that they were not aware of the extent of the
cost increases that BNFL was estimating for the project until shortly before
BNFL submitted its proposal on April 24, 2000. This lack of awareness raises
questions about the adequacy of DOE's expertise to oversee this aspect of
the project. As DOE continues to explore ways to improve the performance of
its cleanup program, it will be especially important to ensure the
effectiveness of its technical, financial, and managerial oversight
capabilities, both in structuring contracts and in overseeing them. DOE has
an initiative under way to strengthen its capabilities in this area. This
initiative involves improved coordination and

4 See Nuclear Waste: Department of Energy's Hanford Tank Waste Project-
Schedule, Cost, and Management Issues( GAO/ RCED- 99- 13, Oct. 8, 1998).

13

accountability for project management teams and increased oversight of
critical projects by senior DOE management.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, privatization has not been a successful approach
for the complex cleanup projects we reviewed. In our view, DOE has not given
sufficient attention to a number of factors when deciding how to contract
for and finance such projects. These include (1) the type of waste and how
well its constituents are understood, (2) the degree of competition
available among private companies with the necessary cleanup expertise, (3)
the financing options available, (4) the risks involved in the project and
the entity that is best prepared to assume them, and (5) the capabilities of
DOE's project oversight staff. In the future, DOE needs to more carefully
evaluate these factors when making decisions about some of its most
challenging cleanup responsibilities.

---- Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. That concludes
our testimony. We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may
have.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For further information on this testimony, please contact Ms. Gary L. Jones
at (202) 512- 3841. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included Carole Blackwell, Dwayne Curry, Doreen Feldman, Nancy Kintner-
Meyer, Mehrzad Nadji, Tom Perry, and Bill Swick.

14

Appendix I Approved DOE Privatization Cleanup Projects That

Involved Constructing and Operating Facilities

Project Location Status as of June 2000

Tank waste remediation system Hanford Contract terminated during design;
project to be recompeted

Pit 9 Idaho Falls Contract terminated; parties in litigation

Advanced mixed waste treatment Idaho Falls Ongoing- preconstruction Low
activity waste treatment Idaho Falls Project cancelled Spent nuclear fuel
dry storage Idaho Falls Ongoing- preconstruction Transuranic waste treatment
Oak Ridge Ongoing- preconstruction Environmental management waste management
facility

Oak Ridge Ongoing- preconstruction Spent nuclear fuel transfer and storage

Savannah River No longer a privatization project- converted from private to
federal financing

15

Related GAO Products

Nuclear Waste: DOE's Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project- Uncertainties
May Affect Performance, Schedule, and Price( GAO/ RCED- 00- 106, Apr. 28,
2000).

Nuclear Waste: Department of Energy's Hanford Tank Waste Project- Schedule,
Cost, and Management Issues( GAO/ RCED- 99- 13, Oct. 8, 1998).

Department of Energy: Alternative Financing and Contracting Strategies for
Cleanup Projects( GAO/ RCED- 98- 169, May 29, 1998).

Nuclear Waste: Department of Energy's Project to Clean Up Pit 9 at Idaho
Falls Is Experiencing Problems( GAO/ RCED- 97- 180, July 28, 1997).

Nuclear Waste: DOE's Estimates of Potential Savings From Privatizing Cleanup
Projects (GAO/ RCED- 97- 49R, Jan. 31, 1997).

Hanford Waste Privatization( GAO/ RCED- 96- 213R, Aug. 2, 1996). (141444)

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