Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener
Performance Problems (Testimony, 03/16/2000, GAO/T-RCED-00-125).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed airport screeners'
role in enforcing aviation security, focusing on: (1) the causes of
screener performance problems in detecting threat objects; (2) the
status of efforts being made by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to address these causes; and (3) the screening practices in five
other countries as compared with the United States.

GAO noted that: (1) two important causes for the screeners' performance
problems are the rapid turnover among screeners and human factors issues
involved in their work; (2) turnover exceeds 100 percent a year at most
large airports and at one airport has topped 400 percent, leaving few
screeners with much experience at the checkpoints; (3) the main reason
for this turnover is the low wages and few benefits screeners receive;
(4) the human factors issues have not been addressed sufficiently; (5)
FAA has several interrelated initiatives underway to address the causes
of the screeners' performance problems, including establishing a
screening company certification program and a system for the automated
monitoring of screeners' performance, and has established goals for
improving performance; (6) however, these initiatives have not been
fully implemented and are behind schedule; (7) other countries GAO
visited conduct their checkpoint screening differently; (8) these
operations include: (a) conducting routine pat-downs of some passengers;
(b) requiring screeners to have more extensive qualifications and to
meet higher standards; and (c) paying screeners more and providing
benefits; and (d) placing the responsibility for screening with airports
or the government instead of with air carriers; (9) the five countries
GAO visited had significantly lower screener turnover and may have
better screener performance--one country's screeners detected over twice
as many objects in a joint screener testing program it conducted with
the FAA; (10) it must be recognized that the screeners' performance
problems do not fall solely on FAA's shoulders; (11) the responsibility
for certain conditions more appropriately rests with the air carriers
and screening companies; (12) nevertheless, FAA does have leadership
responsibility for aviation security, and it will be up to the agency to
provide the guidance and motivation for improving the performance of
screeners; (13) the actions FAA has underway are strong steps in the
right direction and, when fully implemented, may provide the needed
improvement; (14) it is critical that Congress maintain vigilant
oversight of FAA's efforts to ensure that it implements these actions in
a timely manner and achieves its performance improvement goals; and (15)
if performance improvements are not achieved, FAA and Congress may need
to consider other alternatives--such as some of the practices being used
by other countries--to improve the screeners' performance.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-RCED-00-125
     TITLE:  Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing
	     Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems
      DATE:  03/16/2000
   SUBJECT:  Commercial aviation
	     Facility security
	     Airline industry
	     Comparative analysis
	     Accident prevention
	     Terrorism
	     Safety standards
	     Transportation safety
	     Airports
	     Federal employees
IDENTIFIER:  FAA Threat Image Projection System
	     Belgium
	     Canada
	     France
	     United Kingdom
	     Netherlands

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Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m. EST

Thursday,

March 16, 2000

AVIATION SECURITY

Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham,

Associate Director, Transportation Issues,

Resources, Community, and Economic

Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-00-125

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss aviation security,
in particular airport screeners. Securing an air transportation system the
size of this nation's-with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and
tens of thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and
pieces of baggage-is a difficult task. Events over the past decade have
shown that the threat of terrorism against the United States is an
ever-present danger. Aviation is an attractive target for terrorists, and
because the air transportation system is critical to the nation's
well-being, protecting it is an important national issue. A single lapse in
aviation security can result in hundreds of deaths, destruction of equipment
worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and have immeasurable negative
impacts on the economy and the public's confidence in air travel.

A number of measures have been put in place by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the aviation industry to provide the security
needed for the aviation system; among the most important ones are the
passenger screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them. Concerns
have been raised for many years by GAO and others about the effectiveness of
screeners and the need to improve their performance. Two Presidential
commissions-established after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and
the then-unexplained crash of TWA Flight 800 in 1996-as well as numerous GAO
and Department of Transportation Inspector General reports have highlighted
problems with screening and the need for improvements. This situation still
exists, Mr. Chairman, and as I will discuss, there are long-standing
problems that affect screener performance.

We have been conducting a review that examines airport screeners'
performance at the request of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and its Subcommittee on Aviation, which agreed to our
appearance before this Subcommittee today. Our testimony discusses the
causes of screener performance problems in detecting threat objects, the
status of efforts being made by FAA to address these causes, and the
screening practices in five other countries as compared with the United
States. In summary:

   * Two important causes for the screeners' performance problems are the
     rapid turnover among screeners and human factors issues involved in
     their work. Turnover exceeds 100 percent a year at most large airports
     and at one airport has topped 400 percent, leaving few screeners with
     much experience at the checkpoints. The main reason for this turnover
     is the low wages and few benefits screeners receive. The human factors
     issues-tied to the repetitive, monotonous, yet stressful tasks that
     require constant vigilance-have not been addressed sufficiently. These
     are both long-standing causes of performance problems that have been
     noted by FAA for over 20 years.

   * FAA has several interrelated initiatives underway to address the causes
     of the screeners' performance problems, including establishing a
     screening company certification program and a system for the automated
     monitoring of screeners' performance, and has established goals for
     improving performance. However, these initiatives have not been fully
     implemented and are behind schedule. For example, the screening company
     certification program is 2 years behind schedule and the first
     certifications are not expected until 2002. Partially as a result of
     these delays, FAA has fallen short in meeting its screener improvement
     goals.

   * Other countries we visited-Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands,
     and the United Kingdom-conduct their checkpoint screening differently.
     Their checkpoint operations include routine "pat-downs" of some
     passengers; they require screeners to have more extensive
     qualifications and to meet higher training standards; they pay
     screeners more and provide benefits; and they place the responsibility
     for screening with airports or the government instead of with air
     carriers. The five countries we visited had significantly lower
     screener turnover and may have better screener performance-one
     country's screeners detected over twice as many test objects in a joint
     screener testing program it conducted with the FAA.

It must be recognized that the screeners' performance problems do not fall
solely on FAA's shoulders. The responsibility for certain conditions, such
as rapid screener turnover, more appropriately rests with the air carriers
and screening companies. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, FAA does have
leadership responsibility for aviation security, and it will be up to the
agency to provide the guidance and motivation for improving the performance
of screeners. In our view, the actions FAA currently has underway are strong
steps in the right direction and, when fully implemented, may provide the
needed improvement. However, it is critical that the Congress maintain
vigilant oversight of FAA's efforts to ensure that it implements these
actions in a timely manner and achieves its performance improvement goals.
If performance improvements are not achieved, FAA and the Congress may need
to consider other alternatives-such as some of the practices being used by
other countries-to improve the screeners' performance.

Before I discuss these issues in greater detail, I will briefly provide some
background on screening checkpoints and the long-standing concerns about the
screeners' performance.

Background

Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them are a key line of
defense against the introduction of a dangerous object into the aviation
system. Over 2 million passengers and their baggage must be checked each day
for weapons, explosives, or other dangerous articles that could pose a
threat to the safety of an aircraft and those aboard it. The FAA and air
carriers share this responsibility. FAA prescribes screening regulations and
establishes basic standards for screeners, equipment, and procedures to be
used. It monitors the performance of the screeners by periodically testing
their ability to detect potentially dangerous objects carried by FAA special
agents posing as passengers. The air carriers are responsible for screening
passengers and their baggage before they are permitted into the secure areas
of an airport or onto an aircraft. Air carriers can use their own employees
to conduct screening activities, but for the most part air carriers hire
security companies to do the screening.

Screeners use metal detectors, X-ray machines, and physical bag searches to
identify dangerous objects. However, because equipment at checkpoints does
not automatically detect threats, the effectiveness of the screening depends
heavily on the performance of the screeners themselves. It can be a
difficult, stressful, yet monotonous job, requiring sustained attention to
the task of identifying faint indications of infrequently appearing targets.
The screeners detect thousands of dangerous objects each year. Over the last
5 years, screeners detected nearly 10,000 firearms being carried through
checkpoints. Nevertheless, screeners do not identify all threats-instances
occur each year in which weapons were discovered to have passed through a
checkpoint.

Screener Performance Problems Are Attributed to Rapid Turnover and
Inattention to Human Factors

There is no single reason why screeners fail to identify dangerous objects.
Two conditions-rapid screener turnover and inadequate attention to human
factors-are believed to be important causes. The rapid turnover among
screeners has been a long-standing problem, having been singled out as a
concern in FAA and GAO reports dating back to at least 1979. We reported in
1987 that turnover among screeners was about 100 percent a year at some
airports, and today, the turnover is considerably higher. From May 1998
through April 1999, screener turnover averaged 126 percent at the nation's
19

largest airports, with five airports reporting turnover of 200 percent or
more and one reporting turnover of 416 percent. At one airport we visited,
of the 993 screeners trained at that airport over about a 1-year period,
only 142, or 14 percent, were still employed at the end of that year. Such
rapid turnover can seriously affect the level of experience among screeners
operating a checkpoint.

Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the rapid turnover to the low
wages screeners receive, the minimal benefits, and the daily stress of the
job. Generally, screeners get paid at or near the minimum wage. We found
that some of the screening companies at 14 of the nation's 19 largest
airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6.00 an hour or less and, at 5
of these airports, the starting salary was the minimum wage-$5.15 an hour.
It is common for the starting wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be
higher than the wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport we
visited, screeners wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the
starting wage at one of the airport's fast-food restaurants was $7 an hour.

Human factors associated with screening-those work-related issues that are
influenced by human capabilities and constraints-have also been noted by FAA
as problems affecting performance for over 20 years. Screening duties
require repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very rare
event when a dangerous object might be observed. Too little attention has
been given to factors such as (1) individuals' aptitudes for effectively
performing screener duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to
the screeners and how well they comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the
job and the distractions that reduce the screeners' vigilance. As a result,
screeners are being placed on the job who do not have the necessary
abilities, do not have adequate knowledge to effectively perform the work,
and who then find the duties tedious and unstimulating.

FAA is Making Efforts to Address Causes of Screeners' Performance Problems,
but Progress Has Been Slow

FAA has demonstrated that it is aware of the need to improve the screeners'
performance by conducting efforts intended to address the turnover and human
factors problems and establishing goals with which to measure the agency's
success in improving screener performance. The efforts to address turnover
and human factors include establishing a threat image projection system to
keep screeners alert and to monitor their performance; a screening company
certification program; and screener selection tests, computer-based
training, and readiness tests. Table 1 summarizes FAA initiatives and the
areas needing improvement they address.

Table 1: FAA's Initiatives to Improve Screeners' Performance

 FAA initiative   Expected improvement

 Select           Ensure        Ensure
 candidates with  screener is   screener is   Increase pay,
 screener         trained and   alert and     and reduce
 potential        ready to      monitored     turnover
                  perform
 Threat image
 projection                     X             X
 system
 Certification of
 screening                      X             X              X
 companies
 Screener
 selection tests  X                                          X
 Computer-based
 training                       X
 Readiness test                 X

FAA's implementation of these efforts has encountered substantial delays and
is behind schedule. I would like to focus on two key efforts, the threat
image projection system and the screening company certification program, and
then discuss FAA progress in achieving its screener performance improvement
goals.

The Threat Image Projection System

FAA is deploying an enhancement to the X-ray machines used at the
checkpoints called the threat image projection (TIP) system. As screeners
routinely scan passengers' carry-on bags, TIP occasionally projects images
of threat objects like guns and explosives on the X-ray machines' screens.
Screeners are expected to spot the threat objects and signal for the bags to
be manually searched. Once prompted, TIP indicates whether an image is of an
actual object in a bag or was generated by the system and also records the
screeners' responses, providing a measure of their performance while keeping
them more alert. By frequently exposing screeners to what a variety of
threat images look like on screen, TIP will also provide continuous
on-the-job training.

FAA is behind schedule in deploying this system. It had planned to begin
deploying 284 units to 19 large airports in April 1998. But as a result of
hardware and software problems, FAA dropped its plans to install the units
on existing X-ray machines nationwide. Instead, beginning in mid-2000, it
will begin purchasing and deploying 1,380 new X-ray machines already
equipped with the TIP system. FAA expects to have the system in place at the
largest airports by the end of fiscal year 2001 and at all airports by the
end of fiscal 2003.

Unfortunately, the delays in the TIP system's deployment have impeded
another key initiative to improve the screeners' performance: the
certification of screening companies.

The Certification of Screening Companies

In response to a mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996
and a recommendation from the 1997 White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security, FAA is creating a program to certify the security companies
that staff the screening checkpoints. The agency plans to establish
performance standards -an action we recommended in 1987 -that the screening
companies will have to meet in order to earn and retain certification. It
will also require that all screeners pass automated readiness tests after
training and that all air carriers have TIP units on the X-ray machines at
their checkpoints so that screeners' performance can be measured to ensure
FAA's standards are met. FAA believes that the need to meet certification
standards will give the security companies a greater incentive to retain
their best screeners longer and so will indirectly reduce turnover by
raising the screeners' wages and improving training. Most of the air
carrier, screening company, and airport representatives we contacted said
they believe certification has the potential to improve screeners'
performance.

The agency plans to use data from the TIP system to guide it in setting its
performance standards, but because the system will not be at all airports
before the end of fiscal year 2003, the agency is having to explore
additional ways to set standards. FAA plans to issue the regulation
establishing the certification program by May 2001, over 2 years later than
its original deadline. According to FAA, it has needed more time to develop
performance standards and to develop and process a very complex regulation.
The first certification of screening companies is expected to take place in
2002.

FAA's Screener Improvement Goals

As required by the Government Performance and Results Act, FAA established
goals in 1998 for improving screeners' detection of test objects carried
through metal detectors and concealed in carry-on baggage. FAA views
specific data relating to these goals, as well as other information relating
to screener detection rates, to be too sensitive to release publicly.
However, it can be said that, in part because of the delays in implementing
its screener improvement initiatives, the agency did not meet its first year
goals for improving screener performance. FAA acknowledged that it did not
meet its improvement goal for detecting threats carried through metal
detectors, but it believed that it had nearly met its goal for improving
detection of threats in carry-on baggage. However, we found flaws in FAA's
methodology for computing detection rates and that, in fact, the goal was
not met. We have discussed our findings with FAA and, as result of this and
the delays in its initiatives, the agency is revising its goals.

We are encouraged that FAA is currently developing an integrated checkpoint
screening management plan to better focus its screener initiatives and goals
for improving screeners' performance. According to FAA officials, the plan,
which is still in draft form, will (1) incorporate FAA's goals for improving
screener performance and detail how its initiatives relate to the
achievement of the goals; (2) identify and prioritize checkpoint and human
factors problems that need to be resolved; and (3) provide measures for
addressing the performance problems, including related milestone and budget
information. Moreover, the draft plan will consolidate the responsibility
for

screening checkpoint improvements under a single program manager, who will
oversee and coordinate efforts at FAA headquarters, field locations, and the
agency's Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. FAA expects that the
plan will be completed in April 2000 and that it will be continuously
updated based on progress.

Screening Practices in Five Other Countries Differ from U.S. Practices

We visited five countries-Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom-viewed by FAA and industry as having effective screening
operations to identify screening practices that differ from those in the
United States. These countries also have significantly lower screener
turnover than in the United States-the countries' screener turnover rates
were about 50 percent or lower. We found that some significant differences
exist in four areas; screening operations, screener qualifications, screener
pay and benefits, and institutional responsibility for screening.

First, screening operations in some countries are more stringent. For
example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom routinely touch or
"pat down" passengers in response to metal detector alarms. Additionally,
all five countries allowed only ticketed passengers through the screening
checkpoints, thereby allowing the screeners to more thoroughly check fewer
people. Some countries also had a greater police or military presence near
checkpoints. In the United Kingdom, for example, security forces-often armed
with automatic weapons-patrol at or near checkpoints. At Belgium's main
airport a constant police presence is maintained at one of two
glass-enclosed rooms directly behind the checkpoints.

Second, the screeners' qualifications are usually more extensive. In
contrast to the United States, Belgium requires screeners to be citizens;
France requires screeners to be citizens of a European Union country. The
Netherlands, screeners do not have to be citizens, but they must have been
residents of the country for 5 years. Four of the countries we visited had
greater training requirements for screeners. While FAA requires that
screeners in this country have 12 hours of classroom training, Belgium,
Canada, France, and the Netherlands require more. For example, France
requires 60 hours of training and Belgium requires at least 40 hours of
training with an additional 16 to 24 hours for each activity, such as x-ray
machine operations, the screener will conduct.

Third, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most of these
countries. While in the United States screeners receive wages that are at or
slightly above minimum wage, screeners in some countries receive wages that
are viewed as being at the "middle income" level by screeners. In the
Netherlands, for example, screeners receive at least the equivalent of about
$7.50 per hour. This wage is about 30 percent higher than wages at fast-food
restaurants. In Belgium, screeners receive about $14 per hour. Not only is
pay higher, but the screeners in some countries receive some benefits, such
as health care or vacations-in large part because it is required under the
laws of these countries.

Finally, the responsibility for screening in most of these countries is
placed with the airport or with the government, not with the air carriers as
it is in the United States. In Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, the
responsibility for screening has been placed with the airports, which either
hire screening companies to conduct the screening operations or, as at some
airports in the United Kingdom, hire screeners and manage the checkpoints
themselves. In the Netherlands, the government is responsible for passenger
screening and hires a screening company to conduct checkpoint operations,
which are overseen by a Dutch police force.

Because each county follows its own unique set of screening practices, and
because data on screener performance in each country were not available to
us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different practices,
either individually or jointly, on improving screener performance.
Nevertheless, there are indications that in at least one country, its
practices may help to increase the screeners' performance. This country
conducted a screener testing program jointly with FAA that showed that the
other country's screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did
the screeners in the United States.

Summary

The message I bring here today is not new. The performance problems
affecting airport screeners are longstanding. Yet, as we enter the new
millenium, not only do the same problems continue to exist but in the case
of turnover among the screeners, it is even getting worse. And, Mr.
Chairman, it must be recognized that the causes of and solutions to these
problems do not fall solely on FAA's shoulders. Certain conditions, such as
the screener wages and benefits, are not under FAA's control but rather are
under the control of the air carriers and the screening companies.

Nevertheless, FAA does have leadership responsibility for aviation security,
and it is taking steps to address the broad problems limiting the quality of
airport passenger screening. These steps, which address an array of
concerns-the hiring of quality personnel, providing sufficient training,
monitoring on-the-job performance, and, albeit indirectly, increasing the
screeners' compensation and retention-are efforts in the right direction and
may provide the improvements to the screeners' performance that are needed
in the aviation system. However, FAA's ability to undertake and implement
these efforts in a timely fashion remains a concern. We note that in 1987,
we recommended to FAA that it establish performance standards that must be
met for the detection of FAA test objects. However, only now is FAA
proposing to develop standards as part of its screening company
certification program. Moreover, the key efforts it is undertaking-the
threat image projection system and the screening company certification
program-are both currently behind schedule. We remain concerned about the
timely implementation of these efforts.

It will be critical that the Congress maintain vigilant oversight of FAA's
progress in implementing its screening improvement efforts and that it
monitor FAA's progress in achieving its performance improvement goals for
the screeners. These goals provide a road map for assessing the agency's
initiatives to improve the screeners' performance. Should FAA not be
successful in achieving its goals through its current efforts, the FAA and
the Congress may need to consider requiring other steps, such as some of
those practiced in other countries, to obtain the needed improvements at the
checkpoints.

- - - - -

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to
answer any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgements

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony included Leslie D. Albin, J. Michael Bollinger, Barry R. Kime,
John R. Schulze, and Daniel J. Semick.

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