Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism
(Testimony, 03/11/99, GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its work and
observations on federal spending to combat terrorism, focusing on: (1)
the foreign-origin and domestic terrorism threat; (2) program growth and
other issues raised throughout its work on combating terrorism; and (3)
steps the executive branch has taken toward improving crosscutting
management and coordination and provide some preliminary observations on
the 1998 and 1999 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports to
Congress on governmentwide spending and budgeting to combat terrorism.
GAO noted that: (1) the U.S. intelligence community continuously
assesses both the foreign-origin and the domestic terrorist threat to
the United States and notes that conventional explosives and firearms
continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists; (2) terrorists are
less likely to use chemical and biological weapons than conventional
explosives, although the possibility that they may use chemical and
biological materials may increase over the next decade, according to
intelligence agencies; (3) since GAO's work began in 1996, the number
and cost of various programs and initiatives to combat terrorism have
grown significantly; (4) key agencies involved in activities to combat
terrorism reported to GAO that they spent $5.7 billion in fiscal year
(FY) 1996; (5) the President's FY 2000 budget requests $10 billion, a $3
billion increase over the $6.7 billion originally requested for FY 1999;
(6) this rapid program growth has occurred in the absence of: (a) a
governmentwide strategy that includes defined end-state; (b) soundly
established, defined, and prioritized program requirements; and (c)
crosscutting analyses of individual agencies' budget proposals to ensure
that unnecessary duplication and waste are avoided and existing federal,
state, and local capabilities are fully leveraged; (7) the executive
branch has taken some important steps and made progress towards
improving the way it manages and coordinates the growing, complex array
of agencies, offices, programs, activities, and capabilities; (8) in
addition, in December 1998, the Attorney General issued a classified
5-year interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crime that
includes goals, objectives, and performance indicators and
recommendations to resolve interagency problems and issues it
identified; (9) the Attorney General is also establishing a National
Domestic Preparedness Office at the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
reduce state and local confusion over the many federal training and
equipment programs to prepare for terrorist incidents involving weapons
of mass destruction; (10) also, in May 1998, Presidential Decision
Directive 62 further articulated U.S. policy and established a National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and
Counter-Terrorism within the National Security Council; and (11) OMB's
1998 and 1999 reports provide unprecedented and helpful insight into
enacted funding and budget requests that are for the most part not
readily identifiable in the federal budget and appropriations acts.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to
Combat Terrorism
DATE: 03/11/99
SUBJECT: Emergency preparedness
Terrorism
Crime prevention
Budget administration
Domestic intelligence
Interagency relations
Strategic planning
Budget outlays
IDENTIFIER: Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program
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ns99107t GAO
United States General Accounting Office
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives
For Release Expected at 1:00 p.m., EST Thursday, March 11, 1999
COMBATING TERRORISM Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism
Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General,
National Security and International Affairs Division
GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be
here to discuss our past and ongoing work and observations on
federal funding of efforts to combat terrorism. As you know, over
the past 3 years we have studied and reported on a number of
issues concerning federal agencies' programs and activities to
combat terrorism for this Subcommittee and Representative Ike
Skelton. (See app. I for a list of related GAO products.) In
December 1997, we reported that key federal agencies with
responsibilities to combat terrorism spent about $6.7 billion in
fiscal year 1997 for unclassified activities and programs to
combat terrorism and noted that precise funding information was
unavailable for various reasons. 1 That report led to legislation
requiring the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a
system for collecting and reporting information on executive
agencies' spending and budgets for combating terrorism. The
legislation also required the President to annually report this
information to the Congress. 2
OMB's most recent report identified $10 billion for programs to
combat terrorism in the fiscal year 2000 budget. 3
My testimony will address three issues. First, I will briefly
describe the foreign-origin and domestic terrorism threat as we
understand it from intelligence analyses. Second, I will provide
some of our overall observations on program growth and other
issues raised throughout our work on combating terrorism. Finally,
I will discuss some steps the executive branch has taken toward
improving crosscutting management and coordination and provide
some preliminary observations on the 1998 and 1999 OMB reports to
Congress on governmentwide spending and budgeting to combat
terrorism.
Summary The U.S. intelligence community continuously assesses both
the foreign-origin and the domestic terrorist threat to the United
States and
notes that conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the
weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to
use chemical
1 Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs
Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec.
1, 1997).
2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L.
105-85, Nov. 18, 1997).
3 Of the $10 billion, $8.6 billion is for combating terrorism,
including weapons of mass destruction, and $1.4 billion is for
critical infrastructure protection.
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
and biological weapons than conventional explosives, although the
possibility that they may use chemical and biological materials
may increase over the next decade, according to intelligence
agencies.
Since our work began in 1996, the number and cost of the various
programs and initiatives to combat terrorism have grown
significantly. Key agencies involved in activities to combat
terrorism reported to us that they spent $5.7 billion in fiscal
year 1996. The President's fiscal year 2000 budget requests $10
billion, a $3-billion increase over the $6.7 billion originally
requested for fiscal year 1999. This rapid program growth has
occurred in the absence of (1) a governmentwide strategy that
includes a defined end-state; (2) soundly established, defined,
and prioritized program requirements; and (3) crosscutting
analyses of individual agencies' budget proposals to ensure that
unnecessary duplication and waste are avoided and existing
federal, state, and local capabilities are fully leveraged.
The executive branch has taken some important steps and made
progress toward improving the way it manages and coordinates the
growing, complex array of agencies, offices, programs, activities,
and capabilities. For example, in responding to the legislative
requirement, OMB has performed two governmentwide reviewsone in
1998 and one in 1999of funding levels and programs to combat
terrorism. In addition, in December 1998, the Attorney General
issued a classified 5-year interagency plan on counterterrorism
and technology crime that includes goals, objectives, and
performance indicators and recommendations to resolve interagency
problems and issues it identified. The plan, however, does not
link its recommended actions and priorities to budget resources.
The Attorney General is also establishing a National Domestic
Preparedness Office at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 4
to reduce state and local confusion over the many federal training
and equipment programs to prepare for terrorist incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction. Also, in May 1998,
Presidential Decision Directive 62 further articulated U.S. policy
and established a National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism within the
National Security Council.
Notwithstanding these positive steps, we continue to see
opportunities to better focus and target the nation's investments
in combating terrorism and
4 Under Presidential Decision Directive 39, the FBI is the lead
federal agency for crisis response in the event of a terrorist
incident in the United States. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency for consequence
management.
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
better assure that the United States is prioritizing its funding
of the right programs in the right amounts. OMB's 1998 and 1999
reports provide unprecedented and helpful insight into enacted
funding and budget requests that are for the most part not readily
identifiable in the federal budget and appropriations acts. The
reports, however, do not clearly or explicitly describe any
established priorities or duplication of efforts as called for in
the legislation. We have not fully evaluated the executive branch
agencies' processes or methodologies associated with the OMB
reports and cannot comment on whether they fully and accurately
capture the costs associated with programs and activities to
combat terrorism.
The Foreign and Domestic Terrorism Threat in the United States
The bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the federal
building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in 1995, along with the use
of a nerve agent in the Tokyo subway in 1995, have elevated
concerns about terrorism in the United Statesparticularly
terrorists' use of chemical and biological weapons. The U.S.
intelligence community, which includes the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the FBI and others, has
continuously assessed the foreign-origin and domestic terrorist
threats to the United States. According to intelligence agencies,
conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of
choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical
and biological weapons at least partly because they are more
difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable. However,
some groups and individuals of concern are showing interest in
chemical and biological weapons. Chemical and biological agents
are still less likely to be used than conventional explosives.
Figure 1 shows the number of terrorist incidents in the United
States during 1992-97, according to the FBI.
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Figure 1: Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1992- 97
Source: FBI.
Initiatives and Funding to Combat Terrorism Are Increasing Rapidly
Annual and supplemental agency appropriations have continued to
fund a growing number of programs, initiatives, and activities to
combat terrorism. For example, for fiscal year 1999, the Congress
authorized $9.7 billion for combating terrorism, including $2.1
billion in an emergency supplemental following the bombings of two
U.S. embassies. Included in the emergency supplemental was $1.4
billion for the State Department to reconstruct its embassies and
upgrade embassy security. The President's fiscal year 2000 budget
proposes $10 billion for counterterrorism programs, domestic
preparedness, and critical infrastructure protectiona $3 billion
increase over the requested funding of $6.7 billion for fiscal
year 1999. Table 1 shows the President's fiscal year 2000 budget
proposal of $8.6 billion for programs to combat terrorism,
excluding critical infrastructure programs, by major agency.
0 2
4 6
8 10
12 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number of Incidents
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Table 1: Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Request for Combating Terrorism
Note: Totals may not add due to OMB rounding. Source: OMB.
Certain individual agencies have experienced rapid increases in
recent years in funding for programs and activities to combat
terrorism. For example, the Department of Health and Human
Services has increased its spending from $7 million in fiscal year
1996 to about $160 million budgeted for fiscal year 1999 and has
requested $230 million for fiscal year 2000 for its bioterrorism
initiative. The initiative is intended to improve disease
surveillance and communications systems, establish regional
laboratories, continue to establish a national pharmaceutical
stockpile, conduct research into new vaccines and drugs, and
expand the number of local emergency medical teams. Figure 2 shows
the increases in Health and Human Services' funding for efforts to
combat terrorism.
Dollars in millions
Department/ agency Fiscal year 2000 request
National Security Community $5, 052 Department of Justice 838
Department of Treasury 838 Department of Energy 648 Department of
State 524 Others 712
Total $8, 613
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Figure 2: Health and Human Services Funding to Combat Terrorism,
Fiscal Years 1996- 2000
Source: OMB annual reports and GAO report.
The Office of Justice Programs in the Department of Justice has
also experienced rapid growth in funds budgeted for its state and
local domestic preparedness programs. As shown in figure 3, funds
have increased from zero allocated in fiscal year 1997, to $21
million in fiscal year 1998, to $120 million in fiscal year 1999,
to a fiscal year 2000 budget request of $162 million to provide
training and equipment to local first responders and to fund
national training centers.
0 50
100 150
200 250
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Fi sca l Ye a r Dollars in Millions
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Figure 3: Office of Justice Programs Funding for Domestic
Preparedness, Fiscal Years 1997- 2000
Source: Department of Justice.
As discussed in our November 1998 report, 5 and as shown in figure
4, the FBI more than doubled its allocation of resources for
combating terrorism, from about $256 million in fiscal year 1995
to about $581 million in fiscal year 1998. As of July 1998, the
FBI planned to allocate about $609 million for its
counterterrorism mission in fiscal year 1999 (including about $70
million in no-year funds carried forward from prior fiscal years).
The estimated fiscal year 2000 FBI allocation for combating
terrorism totals $498 million.
5 Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for
Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7,
Nov. 20, 1998).
0 20
40 60
80 100
120 140
160 180
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
F isca l Ye a r Dollars in Millions
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Figure 4: FBI Funding Allocations for Counterterrorism Mission,
Fiscal Years 1995- 99
Source: GAO.
Roughly half of the FBI's funding to combat terrorism was for
related law enforcement and investigative activities, while the
other half involved activities such as preparing for or responding
to terrorist acts and protecting the national infrastructure. Our
work also showed that about 25 percent of the funds FBI allocated
to counterterrorism was based on statutory direction or
congressional guidance.
Program Growth Areas Should Be Based on Sound Requirements
I would like to highlight the rapid growth in two program areas
that is taking place in the absence of sound threat and risk
assessment to establish program requirements and prioritize and
focus the nation's investments: domestic preparedness programs for
responding to terrorist attacks and public health initiatives. We
have previously reported on the benefits of threat and risk
assessments, both in the context of domestic preparedness
0 100
200 300
400 500
600 700
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Fi sca l Ye a r Dollars in Millions
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
programs and generally. 6 Threat and risk assessments are widely
recognized as sound decision support tools to help define and
prioritize requirements and properly focus programs and
investments in combating terrorism. Soundly established
requirements could help ensure that the specific programs,
initiatives, and activitiesand related expenditures are justified
and targeted, given the threat and risk of validated terrorist
attack scenarios as assessed by a multidisciplinary team of
experts.
Domestic Preparedness In the absence of sound, well-defined
requirements, domestic preparedness funding increased from $42.6
million, 7 provided mainly to the Department
of Defense under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation 8 in fiscal
year 1997, to about $1.3 billion requested for a number of
agencies' preparedness activities in fiscal year 2000. For
example, the fiscal year 2000 budget proposes an additional $611
million for training, equipping, and exercising cities' first
responders in preparation for a potential terrorist attack and for
strengthening public health infrastructure. There are many similar
programs and initiatives across several agencies to train and
equip local emergency response personnel, such as those in fire,
police, and emergency medical services, to deal with the
consequences of a terrorist attack. We previously recommended that
threat and risk assessments be performed to establish training and
equipment requirements for the Domestic Preparedness Program. 9
As I mentioned earlier, the Department of Justice has sponsored
training programs and implemented an equipment grant program for
state and local responders. It also is establishing a Center for
Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan, Alabama. Other Justice-
funded centers and training venues related to combating terrorism
are at universities, such as Texas A&M and Louisiana State
University, and the Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site. FEMA
and its National Fire Academy have long-standing resident and
nonresident training programs in emergency management and
6 Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr.
9, 1998).
7 While other agencies' domestic preparedness programs may have
also received funding in fiscal year 1997, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program was most visible at the time.
8 Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (P.L.
104-201).
9 See Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr.
9, 1998).
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
hazardous materials. FEMA has requested about $31 million for
fiscal year 2000a $13-million increase over fiscal year 1999
funding. Twenty-nine million of the $31 million is to train and
equip state and local responders. The Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has been establishing Metropolitan Medical
Response Systems with trained and equipped local emergency teams
in 27 cities that also participate in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
domestic preparedness training and equipment program. HHS has
requested fiscal year 2000 funding to include 25 more cities in
its program.
In addition, HHS is contracting with the Department of Veteran's
Affairs (VA) to train non-federal National Disaster Medical System
hospital staffs to deal with weapons of mass destruction
situations. VA urged that decontamination and personal protection
equipment be provided to the hospitals. VA pointed out that VA
hospitals are not receiving training that is similar to the HHS-
offered training and are not budgeted for chemical-biological
equipment either, even though VA medical centers could have a role
in responding to a terrorist incident.
We also noted growth and potential overlap in federal agencies'
response capabilities to support state or local incident
commanders. National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
(RAID) teams 10 are being created despite numerous local, state,
and federal organizations that can perform similar functions. For
example, there are over 600 existing local and state hazardous
materials response teams that can respond to terrorist events,
including those involving highly toxic industrial chemicals. There
are also the Army's Technical Escort Units, the Marine Corps'
Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force, 11 military reserve
components' chemical and medical capabilities, Environmental
Protection Agency and Coast Guard response teams, and other
federal response assets organized under the Federal Response Plan.
Included in the fiscal year 1999 appropriations is $52 million to
establish, train, and equip the first 10 of potentially 54 RAID
teams and to establish RAID (Light) teams in states that do not
yet have a full RAID team. A RAID (Light) comprises four regular,
drilling Army
10 The RAID teams' mission is to provide assistance to local
incident commanders in the event of an incident involving
chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons. They are
to (1) assess the situation, (2) advise civilian responders as to
appropriate actions, and (3) facilitate the identification and
movement of federal military assets to the incident scene.
11 These are highly trained and equipped specialized military
units that can provide a wide range of support to handle,
transport, identify, and provide technical and medical advice and
assistance on chemical and biological weapons and agents.
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
National Guard members with a training and awareness mission and
limited response capabilities. The Defense Department's fiscal
year 2000 budget requests about $38 million to support the
existing teams and to create five new RAID teams. We are reviewing
the roles and missions of the RAID teams for this Subcommittee and
other requesters and expect to report on those in late May of this
year.
In addition to the 27 locally based medical response teams (with
more to be established), HHS has established four specialized
National Medical Response Teams, three of which are deployable in
the event of a terrorist attack involving a chemical or biological
weapon. These four special teams are in addition to 24 deployable
Disaster Medical Assistance Teams that are to provide medical
support for any type of disaster, including terrorism.
Another federal response element that appears to be growing is
federal laboratories with capability to analyze chemical and
biological agents. The Army, the Navy, and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention have laboratory capabilities. In addition,
HHS plans to establish regional laboratories, and the FBI is
establishing a mobile laboratory capability. Both the FBI and the
Environmental Protection Agency have forensic laboratories,
although there are some differences in capabilities, and the FBI
is looking into using existing facilities rather than creating a
specialized laboratory for weapons of mass destruction cases.
Public Health Initiatives HHS has received about $160 million in
fiscal year 1999 appropriations and requested $230 million in
fiscal year 2000 for a number of initiatives related
to the possibility of a terrorist event using biological or
chemical agents. HHS expects that creating a national stockpile of
millions of doses of vaccines for smallpox and anthrax, antidotes
for chemical agents, antibiotics for other diseases, and
respirators will cost $51 million in fiscal year 1999 and $52
million in fiscal year 2000. Preliminary observations from our
ongoing work are that HHS did not perform a formal and complete
threat and risk assessment to derive, prioritize, or rankin
accordance with the most likely threats the nation will facethe
specific items it plans to have researched, developed, produced,
and stockpiled. In fact, several of the items HHS plans to procure
do not match intelligence agencies' judgments on the more likely
chemical and biological agents a terrorist group or individual
might use. For example, smallpox, plague, and tularemia (a
bacteria) are not among the intelligence agencies' lists of agents
that are most likely to be used by terrorists. But HHS's stockpile
initiative and plans are geared in part toward these biological
threats. In
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
addition, it is unclear from HHS' fiscal year 1999 operating plan
whether the Department has fully considered the long-term costs,
benefits, and return on investment of (1) creating and sustaining
the production and inventory infrastructure for such a stockpile,
(2) inventory maintenance, and (3) shelf-life issues. HHS
estimates that research and expedited regulatory review of
improved drugs and vaccines, enhancing disease surveillance and
communications systems, and establishing regional laboratories to
identify and diagnose biological and chemical agents will cost
$139.7 million in fiscal year 2000.
We are currently reviewing the scientific and practical
feasibility of the terrorist chemical-biological threat for this
Subcommittee, Senator Specter, Senator Rockefeller, and
Representative Skelton. We are examining the ease or difficulty of
obtaining chemical and biological agents and making mass-casualty
chemical and biological weapons outside a state actor's laboratory
infrastructure and program. Such information would be among the
inputs to a sound threat and risk assessment by a
multidisciplinary team of experts.
Progress Toward Improving Management and Coordination of
Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism
We believe that the OMB reports on governmentwide spending and
budgeting to combat terrorism are a significant step toward
improved management and coordination of the complex and rapidly
growing programs and activities. We recognize the challenges and
difficulties of discerning much of the budgeting and spending for
combating terrorism, which is often imbedded in larger accounts.
12 For the first time, the executive branch and Congress have
strategic insight into the magnitude and direction of federal
funding for this priority national security and law enforcement
concern. The 1999 report provided additional analysis and more
detailed information than the 1998 report on budgeting for
programs to deal with weapons of mass destruction. For example,
the 1999 OMB report identified total funding (budget authority)
for combating weapons of mass destruction to be about $1.23
billion in fiscal year 1999 and $1.39 billion in the fiscal year
2000 budget request.
Nevertheless, OMB officials told us, as we noted in our December
1997 report, that a critical piece of the budget and spending
picture is missing
12 See Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs
Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec.
1, 1997) and Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for
Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO-GGD-99-7,
Nov. 20, 1998).
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
threat and risk assessments that would suggest priorities and
appropriate countermeasures. These officials notedand we agreethat
risk assessment is key to (1) knowing whether enough or too much
is being spent, (2) judging whether the right programs are being
funded, and (3) determining whether apparent duplication is good
or bad. We have not fully evaluated the processes or methodologies
the executive branch agencies used to derive the information in
the 1998 and 1999 OMB reports. As a result, we cannot comment on
whether or to what extent the reports reflect the best possible
estimate of costs associated with programs and activities to
combat terrorism. However, absent from the report was any
discussion about established priorities or efforts to reduce or
eliminate duplicative programs or activities across the
government.
Another important step toward improved interagency management and
coordination was the Attorney General's December 1998, classified
5-year interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crime.
The Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1998
Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies required the Attorney
General to develop the plan in coordination with several agencies.
The plan includes goals, objectives, and performance indicators
and recommends that specific actions be taken to resolve
interagency problems and issues it identified and assigns relative
priorities to the actions. The classified plan represents a
substantial interagency effort and was developed and coordinated
with 15 federal agencies with counterterrorism roles. The plan
generally does not link its recommended actions and priorities to
budget resources, although the document states that the agencies
hope to improve the link between the plan and resources in
subsequent updates.
Additionally, the executive branch has taken steps to reduce state
and local officials' confusion over so many federal agencies'
programs and capabilities intended to train, equip, and help them.
The Department of Justice is establishing within the FBI a
National Domestic Preparedness Office to coordinate the programs
and other federal support for state and local governments. The
office is intended to reduce state and local confusion over the
multitude of federal training and equipment programs and response
capabilities by providing one stop shopping for state and local
agencies. Also, the office has commissioned a local, state, and
federal interagency board to establish, maintain, and update a
standardized equipment list for use by the interagency community
in preparing state and local jurisdictions to respond to a
terrorist incident involving a weapon of mass destruction.
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
In Presidential Decision Directive 62, issued in May 1998, the
President designated a National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism who is not to
direct agencies' activities but is to integrate the government's
policies and programs on unconventional threats to the homeland
and Americans abroad, including terrorism. The National
Coordinator is also to provide advice in the context of the annual
budget process regarding the budgets for counterterrorism. We
understand he has established a number of working groups but have
been unable to obtain any further information.
Conclusions In the absence of well-defined requirements, we are
seeing a sudden increase in federal funding, programs, and
capabilities. Specifically, we
observed a rapid increase in recent years in the number of federal
programs and initiatives designed to provide training and
equipment to local emergency responders and to add to federal
capabilities to respond to a chemical or biological terrorist
event. Although the executive branch has taken some steps to
better manage efforts to combat terrorism, we believe that more
needs to be done. We have recommended that the National Security
Council, in consultation with the Director, OMB, and the other
executive branch agencies, take steps to ensure that
governmentwide priorities to combat terrorism are established,
agencies' programs and requirements are analyzed in relation to
the priorities, and resources are allocated based on the
priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist
attack. We also recommended that OMB use data on funds budgeted
and spent by executive departments and agencies to, among other
things, ensure that programs are based on analytically sound
threat and risk assessments and avoid unnecessary duplication. The
National Security Council and OMB have not fully embraced or
implemented our recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We would be
happy to answer any questions at this time.
Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Related GAO Products Appendix I
Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for
Counterterrorism- Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7,
Nov. 20, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr.
9, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1,
1997).
Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and
the Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).
Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management
Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June
11, 1997).
State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-
167, May 20, 1997).
Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection
Devices (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).
Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives
Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).
Page 19 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing
Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95,
Apr. 15, 1997).
Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at
13 Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).
Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-
RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting
Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).
Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).
Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud (GAO/NSIAD-
96-99, May 9, 1996).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives
and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar.
27, 1996).
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve
Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States
(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89, Mar. 8, 1996).
Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).
Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at
DOE's Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992).
Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's
Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992).
Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).
Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy
(GAO/NSIAD-92-106, Feb. 19, 1992).
Page 20 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
State Department: Management Weaknesses in the Security
Construction Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov. 29, 1991).
Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical
Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-91-200, May 15, 1991).
State Department: Status of the Diplomatic Security Construction
Program (GAO/NSIAD-91-143BR, Feb. 20, 1991).
(701166) Lett er
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