Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
(Testimony, 06/23/99, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the use of National
Guard Response Teams in combating terrorism, focusing on: (1) the role
of the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID)
teams in response plans as understood by local, state, and federal
officials; (2) other response assets that can perform similar functions
to the RAID teams; and (3) the RAID teams' responsibilities and how they
plan to meet these responsibilities.

GAO noted that: (1) GAO found that there are differing views among
federal and state officials on the role and use of RAID teams and how
they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) incidents; (2) among the principal federal agencies
involved, Army officials believe the teams can be valuable assets to
federal authorities, if needed, as part of the federal response plan;
(3) they also believe that the teams will be a critical and integral
part of the state and local response to such weapons; (4) officials with
the two agencies responsible for managing the federal response to
terrorist incidents--the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency--do not see a role for the RAID teams in the
federal response; (5) instead, they see the National Guard responding
with personnel and equipment as it does for natural disasters and other
emergencies; (6) differing views also exist at the state level; (7)
officials in some states without a RAID team question the teams' utility
primarily because of their response time; however, officials from a
state with a RAID team are very enthusiastic about the concept and are
making plans to use their team; (8) there are numerous local, state, and
federal organizations that can perform similar functions to the RAID
teams; (9) there are over 600 local and state hazardous materials teams
in the U.S. that assess and take appropriate actions in incidents almost
daily involving highly toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous
materials; (10) there are numerous military and federal civilian
organizations that can help local incident commanders deal with WMD
incidents by providing advice, technical experts, and equipment; (11)
local, state, and federal officials expressed a number of concerns about
the teams' abilities to meet their mission and responsibilities; (12)
the most significant and frequently mentioned is the time it would take
the RAID teams to respond to calls for assistance; (13) other concerns
centered on recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues;
(14) the Department of Defense believes that no "show-stopping" training
or operational issues have been identified to date; and (15) because of
the significant number of exercises conducted by federal, state, and
local authorities, they believe there will be ample opportunities for
the teams to exercise their skills.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-99-184
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams
	     Is Unclear
      DATE:  06/23/99
   SUBJECT:  Emergency preparedness
	     Civil defense
	     Defense contingency planning
	     Interagency relations
	     National Guard
	     Federal/state relations
	     Terrorism
	     National defense operations
	     Redundancy
IDENTIFIER:  National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
	     DOD Domestic Preparedness Program
	     FEMA Federal Response Plan

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NS99184t GAO United States General Accounting Office

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans'
Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m., EDT, Wednesday,
June 23, 1999 COMBATING TERRORISM

Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, National Security
Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

  GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be
here to discuss our report, 1 which this Subcommittee is releasing
today, on the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial
Detection (RAID) teams. The Department of Defense (DOD) is
creating the teams to assist local and state authorities in
assessing situations surrounding weapons of mass destruction
emergencies (WMD), 2 advise these authorities regarding
appropriate actions, and facilitate requests for assistance to
expedite the arrival of additional state and federal military

assets. As you know, over the past 3 years we have studied and
reported on a number of issues concerning federal agencies'
programs and activities to combat terrorism for this Subcommittee
and Representative Ike Skelton. For example, we reported in
September 1997 that many federal agencies had duplicative or
overlapping capabilities and missions in combating acts of
terrorism, 3 including incidents involving WMD. We have also
reported that the many and increasing number of participants and
programs in the evolving counter- terrorism area across the
federal government pose a

difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program
duplication, fragmentation, and gaps.

After a brief summary, my testimony will address three issues in
more detail. First, I will describe the role of the RAID teams in
response plans as understood by local, state, and federal
officials. Second, I will discuss other response assets that can
perform similar functions to the RAID

teams. Finally, I will discuss the RAID teams' responsibilities
and how they plan to meet these responsibilities. Summary While
DOD has defined the specific mission for the RAID teams, the plans

for these relatively new teams and their implementation continue
to evolve. We found that there are differing views among federal
and state officials on the role and use of the RAID teams and how
they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to WMD
incidents. Among the principal federal

1 Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is
Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). 2 For purposes of this
testimony, weapons of mass destruction are defined as biological,
chemical, or radiological weapons.

3 Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

agencies involved, Army officials believe the teams can be
valuable assets to federal authorities, if needed, as part of the
federal response plan. They also believe that the teams will be a
critical and integral part of the state and local response to such
weapons. In contrast, officials with the two agencies responsible
for managing the federal response to terrorist incidents-- the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-- do not see a role for the
RAID teams in the federal response. They question the need for the
RAID teams because of the federal structure already available to
respond to WMD incidents. Instead, they see the National Guard,
whether in state or federal status, responding with personnel and
equipment as it does for natural disasters and other emergencies.
Differing views also exist at the state level. Officials in some
states without a RAID team question the teams' utility primarily
because of their response time; however, officials from a

state with a RAID team are very enthusiastic about the concept and
are making plans to use their team. There are numerous local,
state, and federal organizations that can perform similar
functions to the RAID teams. For example, there are over 600 local
and state hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams in the United States
that assess and take appropriate actions in incidents almost daily
involving highly toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous
materials. As we discussed in our November 1998 report to this
Subcommittee, 4 the Domestic Preparedness Program is providing
teams from the largest 120

cities in the United States with the opportunity to expand their
capabilities to counter WMD incidents. In addition, there are
numerous military and federal civilian organizations that can help
local incident commanders deal with WMD incidents by providing
advice, technical experts, and equipment.

Local, state, and federal officials expressed a number of concerns
about the teams' abilities to meet their mission and
responsibilities. The most significant and frequently mentioned is
the time it would take the RAID teams to respond to calls for
assistance. Other concerns centered on

recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues. For
example, some officials believe that it will be difficult to fill
vacancies in the highly specialized positions on the RAID teams
and that the members of the teams will not get the type and level
of training needed to maintain proficiency in the technical skills
and team skills. DOD believes that no show- stopping 4 See our
report Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998) for a discussion of this program.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

training or operational issues have been identified to date. For
example, because of the significant number of exercises conducted
by federal, state, and local authorities, they believe there will
be ample opportunities for the teams to exercise their skills.

These issues further point to the need for a more focused and
coordinated approach to the U. S. response to attacks involving
WMD-- an approach that capitalizes on existing capabilities,
minimizes unnecessary duplication of activities and programs, and
focuses funding on the highest priority

requirements. Because of the differing views on the role and use
of the RAID teams, the numerous organizations that can perform
similar functions, and the potential operational issues that could
impact the teams,

our report recommends that the appropriate federal agencies
determine the need for the teams before proceeding to expand the
program in more states.

Background Operationally, federal efforts to combat terrorism are
organized along a lead agency concept. The Department of Justice,
through the FBI, is responsible for crisis management of domestic
terrorist incidents and for pursuing, arresting, and prosecuting
the terrorists. State governments have primary responsibility for
managing the consequences of domestic

disasters, including major terrorist incidents; however, the
federal government can support state and local authorities if they
lack the capabilities to respond adequately. FEMA manages this
federal support through a generic disaster contingency plan known
as the Federal Response Plan, which outlines the roles,
responsibilities, and emergency support functions of various
federal agencies, including DOD, for consequence management. The
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Counter- Terrorism, created in May 1998 by Presidential Decision
Directive 62, is responsible for coordinating the broad variety of
relevant policies and programs, including such areas as

counter- terrorism, preparedness, and consequence management for
WMD. According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives
and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists.
Many familiar with industrial chemicals, such as officials from
the FBI, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Coast
Guard, and local HAZMAT teams, believe that industrial chemicals
may also be a weapon of choice in

terrorist attacks because they can be easily obtained and
dispersed. They believe that terrorists are less likely to use
chemical and biological weapons than conventional explosives, at
least partly because these

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

materials are more difficult to weaponize and the results are
unpredictable. Agency officials have noted that terrorists' use of
nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario, although the
consequences could be disastrous. According to the FBI, the threat
from chemical and biological weapons is low, but some groups and
individuals of concern are beginning to show

interest in such weapons. This fiscal year, DOD started fielding
10 RAID teams. According to Army officials, the Secretary of
Defense plans that the RAID teams will be dedicated forces for
domestic incidents. The initial 10 teams are located in
Washington, California, Colorado, Texas, Illinois, Missouri,
Georgia, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. Each of these
states is within a defined FEMA region and was selected based on
state demographics,

proximity to Air National Guard units that could provide airlift,
presence of other federal/ military assets, transportation
networks, and other criteria. Consideration was also given to the
level of congressional interest in the

teams' locations. Currently, the team is an asset of the state in
which it is located, but can be deployed as a regional asset to
other states. The DOD plan that created the teams suggested that
there eventually should be a RAID team in each state, territory,
and the District of Columbia, for a total of 54 teams. Until this
occurs, the Army Guard is establishing RAID (Light) teams in the
other 44 locations to provide limited chemical/ biological
response capabilities.

The Army Guard is responsible for implementing the concept and has
developed the plans for organizing, staffing, training, and
equipping the teams for their mission. State National Guard
organizations receiving the teams are hiring and training
personnel in their individual skills. The

10 RAID teams are scheduled to be operational in January 2000.
Funding for the teams will be through the Army Guard and includes
personnel costs for the full- time positions, as well as training,
equipment, and maintenance costs. DOD allocated about $52 million
for the RAID program in fiscal year 1999 and has requested about
$37 million for fiscal year 2000. Specifically,

DOD allocated about $19. 9 million from the fiscal year 1999
Defense Appropriations Act for the first year of the program,
which covered the startup costs for the first 10 teams. An omnibus
supplemental appropriation followed, from which DOD allocated an
additional $19.2 million for RAID team equipment and $13 million
to establish the RAID (Light) teams. The DOD budget request for
fiscal year 2000 includes about $37.2 million to support the 10
existing RAID teams and create

5 more. It also includes about $0. 5 million to support the RAID
(Light) teams.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Each RAID team is to be staffed with 22 full- time National Guard
members organized into 6 functions: command, operations,
administration and logistics, communication, medical, and survey.
Members are to be on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. All but
the survey function have a primary

mission of RAID team support. For example, the medical unit
primarily provides medical support to RAID personnel, but can
provide guidance to the incident commander on the medical
implications of a WMD event and coordinate with health care
facilities for follow- on support requirements. Each function will
have personnel trained to perform their particular mission. There
will be two survey units that have the mission of conducting
search, survey, surveillance, and sampling of a WMD incident site
and advising the incident commander of appropriate response
protocols. Members are to be cross- trained so that a full unit
can be fielded

at any one time. Differing Views on the Role and Use of National
Guard RAID Teams in Response Plans

In designing the RAID teams, Army officials stated they tried to
create a capability that would detect and identify WMD, which is
critical to any effective response effort, and according to these
officials, was missing from most local and state response units.
According to these officials, having the RAID team in the National
Guard gives the state governor an asset that can be rapidly
deployed to provide this initial WMD detection and

identification support, as well as technical advice on handling
WMD incidents, to the local incident commander. Also, according to
these officials, it is less expensive to have one state asset
trained and equipped to deploy with this capability than to train
and equip every HAZMAT team in the state. Other advantages cited
include using the teams to identify and test new concepts and
equipment in WMD detection and identification and filling a very
important force protection role for other National Guard units
deployed to assist in a WMD emergency.

Officials from the FBI and FEMA are concerned about the RAID team
concept and how the teams would fit into any federal WMD response.
They question the need for the RAID teams because of the federal
structure already available to respond to WMD incidents. The FBI
officials are concerned about a conflict between the RAID teams
and their own Hazardous Materials Response Unit or other federal
assets, if all arrive with the same capabilities and try to give
advice to the incident commander. FEMA officials are also
concerned about the duplication of capabilities between the RAID
teams and the local and state HAZMAT teams, as well as

other federal responders involved in the Federal Response Plan.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Because the RAID teams are just getting established, there is not
much information about the teams at the state and local levels.
Therefore, we contacted only a few states, including Pennsylvania,
which has a RAID team, and major metropolitan areas to obtain
their opinion on the RAID

team concept. Officials from larger local jurisdictions usually
have very robust HAZMAT capabilities. Many of the officials we
spoke with stated that they see no use for the RAID teams because
their own experienced HAZMAT technicians can not only perform
sufficient detection and identification of WMD chemical agents to
begin to handle the situation, but also work in the stressful,
dangerous environment. They also did not see the RAID team
providing advice on situation assessment and management, which is
another of the RAID team missions. These officials consider
themselves very experienced in managing emergencies that involve
hazardous chemicals and did not believe the RAID team could
suggest

anything they did not already practice every day. However, some of
the officials did state that perhaps the RAID teams could be a
useful asset for those locations with little or no HAZMAT
capability. One state official

stated that the RAID team could bring certain capabilities to a
WMD event, such as expertise on military agents. Officials from
Pennsylvania are not only integrating the RAID team into the
state's WMD response plan, but also plan to use it to respond to
more common HAZMAT emergencies. According to DOD, other states
have submitted requests for or expressed an interest in fielding
their own RAID team.

The state and federal officials stated that the National Guard in
its traditional role of assisting with personnel and equipment in
natural disasters and other emergencies would be necessary and
invaluable in a WMD emergency. They, as well as officials from the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, agreed that the
detection and identification capabilities in the RAID teams would
be better placed in the local responder community, since the local
responders will be on the scene first and need information quicker
than the RAID team, or any federal assets,

could get there to provide. According to some officials, an
investment in more sophisticated detection and identification
equipment and advanced training for HAZMAT teams would benefit the
teams' response to all HAZMAT emergencies, not just WMD incidents.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Similar Capabilities Exist at Local, State, and Federal Levels

According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs, there
are over 600 local and state HAZMAT teams that will be the first
to respond to an event involving hazardous materials, whether it
is a WMD agent, industrial

chemical, or other material. Although these teams vary in
capability, ranging from basic to robust, they all have the basic
capability to detect and identify industrial chemicals and
mitigate the effects of a chemical emergency, either on their own
or with help from nearby jurisdictions, private contractors, or
federal organizations. Among the federal organizations that can
help are EPA, Coast Guard, FBI, and DOD response teams.

Federal, state, and local officials generally agree that a WMD
incident involving chemical agents would look like a major HAZMAT
emergency. In such scenarios, the local HAZMAT team would be the
first to respond and the local fire chief would usually be the
incident commander. HAZMAT technicians are trained to detect the
presence of highly toxic industrial chemicals and can use basic
identification techniques and equipment to give them sufficient
information to begin to assess and respond to the situation. For
example, the chemical agent sarin is from the same organophosphate
compound family of chemicals as pesticides. HAZMAT technicians can
identify this chemical family using readily available kits. The
technicians are trained and experienced in the protocols used to
handle this chemical family and can begin to mitigate the chemical
immediately. The identification of biological agents requires a
complex

process performed in a lab and cannot, as yet, be done on scene by
any unit, including the RAID teams. However, it is likely that
detecting and identifying an actual biological agent will involve
the medical community over a period of days rather than the HAZMAT
community or the RAID teams over a matter of hours.

If the local responders are unable to manage the situation or are
overwhelmed, the protocol is for the incident commander to contact
nearby communities and the state emergency management office for
assistance. The RAID team could be requested at that point.
However, the local commander also can access the National Response
System hotline, which is well publicized and known within the
first responder community

for reporting hazardous material accidents and obtaining advice
and/ or assistance from federal agencies like the FBI, the EPA,
and Coast Guard. Although the system is primarily to report
emergencies involving chemical or oil spills, it could also alert
federal authorities to what could turn out to be a WMD event. If
the incident commander suspects that the event is a

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

WMD incident, they can also call the Chemical and Biological
hotline to get information or federal assistance. This hotline
links the caller to both the Army's Soldier and Biological
Chemical Command for advice and the FBI to begin the federal
response. The incident commander can also call the local office of
the FBI, which would trigger the federal response.

EPA is responsible for preparing for and responding to emergencies
involving oil and hazardous substances, including radiological
substances, for all natural and manmade incidents, including those
caused by terrorism. The U. S. Coast Guard is responsible for the
same kinds of incidents as they impact the U. S. coastal waters.
When a local or state responder calls via the National Response
System for EPA or Coast Guard assistance, the call is immediately
relayed to either agency's on- scene coordinator. The EPA has
about 270 on- scene coordinators across the United States and the
Coast Guard has 44 Marine Safety Officers, who are coordinators.
Most coordinators try to deploy within a half- hour of notice. The
coordinators have HAZMAT training, can assist with situational
assessment, and are the

point of contact for the coordination of federal HAZMAT efforts
with the local and state responders. If the state asks for
assistance, the coordinator can bring both contractor and federal
assets to the scene. Both EPA and the Coast Guard have other
assets that respond to HAZMAT emergencies with capabilities
similar to the RAID teams. The EPA has two Environmental Response
Teams, stationed in New Jersey and Ohio, and 10 Superfund
Technical Assessment and Response Teams that have similar HAZMAT
capabilities and access to contractor support. EPA's National
Enforcement Investigations Center is the technical support center
for EPA

enforcement and compliance assurance programs, providing
environmental forensic evidence collection, sampling, and analysis
and can also assist the FBI with these activities. EPA has 12 labs
that provide analytical support, field monitoring, and other
environmental program support. Five of these labs have deployable
mobile units that can provide

chemical and biological analysis. Finally, the EPA has
radiological response capabilities to handle some aspects of
nuclear/ radiological incidents.

The Coast Guard's National Strike Force has three teams, located
in New Jersey, Alabama, and California. These teams each have 36
members trained to the HAZMAT technician level, as well as trained
members in the Coast Guard Reserve, and are equipped to handle
major oil and chemical

spills in coastal waters, but can also respond to other
environmental HAZMAT emergencies.

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

As discussed previously, the FBI has the responsibility for crisis
management in a WMD event. Its Hazardous Materials Response Unit
is responsible for providing laboratory, scientific, and technical
assistance to FBI investigations involving hazardous materials,
including WMD, and environmental crimes. In support of both the
FBI and the local incident

commander, the unit can also sample, package, and transport
hazardous material to labs for further analysis, provide
decontamination capability and situational assessment, and assist
with technical scientific support and advice. The unit can
mobilize within 4 hours and has access to FBI aircraft if the
emergency is too far to drive to.

The FBI has a new initiative to put operational HAZMAT teams in 15
of its 56 field offices by June 1999. Each team will have 10
special agents trained at the HAZMAT technician level. Although
these agents will not function as full- time HAZMAT technicians,
they will be available as a quick response asset for gathering
evidence in environmental crimes and WMD events. The team will be
equipped to perform detection, monitoring, sampling, and

decontamination. By the end of 1999, the FBI plans to have 4-
person teams in the remainder of the field offices, trained to the
HAZMAT technician level, but with very little equipment. Eight of
the larger FBI teams will be in states that also have the National
Guard RAID teams.

There are also highly specialized military assets to deal with the
full range of WMD. These include the Army's Technical Escort Unit,
with three detachments stationed across the United States; the U.
S. Marine Corps' Chemical/ Biological Incident Response Force
stationed at Camp Lejune, North Carolina; the Army's 52 nd
Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, stationed across the United
States; military laboratories, such as the U. S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; and other assets, such
as the Mobile Analytical Response System from the Edgewood
Research, Development and Engineering Center. These units have
been positioned at large events such as the Atlanta Summer Olympic
Games, economic summits, and presidential inaugurations in case of
a terrorist attack.

There are 89 Air National Guard civil engineering units spread
throughout the 50 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia that the state governors or federal officials can access
to help in a WMD event. These civil engineering units-- Prime Base
Engineering Emergency Forces, known as Prime BEEF units-- have the
wartime mission of supporting sustained air operations during a
WMD attack and mitigating the consequences of an attack. The Air
Guard also has 78 Prime BEEF fire

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

fighting units that are trained in handling hazardous materials
and 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal units that are capable of
handling WMD devices. There are plans to increase the number of
Disposal units to 44 in the next 5 years. According to Air Guard
officials, these skilled units could be of great use to local
incident commanders in a WMD attack on civilian targets, if their
equipment and training were upgraded. This would allow these units
to be available to the states, not only in a WMD event, but also

in a major HAZMAT emergency. The military services, both active
and reserve, have units that could be used in a WMD emergency. For
example, the U. S. Army Reserve has 63 percent of the chemical
units in the U. S. Army, including 100 chemical reconnaissance/
decontamination elements stationed across the United

States that can perform basic detection and identification of
chemical agents as well as decontamination operations. The U. S.
Army Reserve also has two chemical companies that are specifically
designed for nuclear, chemical, and biological reconnaissance and
contains the only biological detection company in the Army today
that is ready to deploy. Under the

authority of Army Regulation 500- 60, a Reserve commander can
respond to an emergency in the local area when there is imminent
danger of loss of life or critical infrastructure. Accordingly,
the local authorities could request assistance from the local
Reserve commander in a WMD emergency without an official
deployment of the military. Concerns About RAID Teams' Ability to
Fully Meet Their Responsibilities

Our discussions with local, state, and federal officials and our
analysis of the information regarding the RAID teams surfaced a
number of concerns that the teams may not be able to meet their
mission and responsibilities. The most significant and frequently
mentioned is the time it would take the RAID team to respond to an
incident. Other concerns centered on recruiting and retention,
training, and operational issues. The goal for the RAID team,
either in part or as a whole, is to be able to deploy to a WMD
incident within 4 hours of notice. All local, state, and federal
officials we met with expressed concern that this time frame would
get the team there too late to be useful. They stated that, for
the incident commander to benefit from the information they could
produce, the RAID

team would be needed at the scene within the first 1 to 2 hours.
After that time, the local/ state HAZMAT teams could have the
basic detection and identification information that would allow
them to begin to handle the situation. Then, the incident
commander would either be in control of the situation and not need
additional assessment input from the RAID team or

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

so completely overwhelmed by the enormity of the situation that
the FBI and FEMA already would have been notified, and in
coordination with the state, federal assets already would be on
their way to the scene. The RAID teams will have dedicated
vehicles to transport them and their equipment to the incident.
The teams will also have access to Army National Guard helicopters
and small, fixed- wing aircraft that could carry

some team members with hand- held equipment. The remainder of the
team and equipment would then follow in the vehicles. To transport
the entire team to a distant location within the state or region,
with all its equipment and vehicles, would require military
airlift, like C- 130 aircraft.

However, there are no plans to dedicate ground crews, flight
crews, or aircraft for on- call, immediate response to a RAID team
deployment. If Air National Guard or Air Force aircraft were
required to transport the RAID teams, authorization would have to
be obtained from the U. S. Transportation Command.

The lack of dedicated airlift for the RAID teams adds to the
concern about the delayed arrival. Some federal assets, including
the FBI's Hazardous Materials Response Unit, have immediate access
to aircraft and flight crews. The EPA and Coast Guard On- Scene
Coordinators have the ability

to contract for civilian aircraft to get their assets, as well as
contractor assets, to a scene quickly. As a result of a 1993
restructuring, combat support and combat service support functions
were concentrated in the Army Reserve and combat functions in the
Army National Guard. Therefore, except for the RAID teams, there
are few promotion opportunities for chemical and medical
specialists in the rest of the Army Guard. Some officials
expressed concern

that the Guard would not be able to maintain a pipeline of highly
trained individuals to fill vacancies on the RAID teams, making it
necessary for the teams to operate at less than full capability
when vacancies occur. For example, it may be difficult to find the
highly trained personnel with the necessary education and skills
required to operate the sophisticated equipment planned for the
RAID teams, such as the mass spectrometer. According to DOD, there
are ample units in the Guard and Reserve from which to draw
qualified candidates for the RAID teams and that can

provide opportunities for team members who want to leave for
promotions.

According to local and federal HAZMAT team leaders, it may be
difficult for the RAID team members to maintain their proficiency
after they receive

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

their training. For example, the teams will have a mobile lab with
very sophisticated, technical identification equipment. Many local
HAZMAT team leaders stated that they would not have some of this
equipment in their inventory, particularly the mass spectrometer,
because it requires highly trained personnel to use and maintain
it effectively. The federal HAZMAT team leaders stated that, while
some of them have a mass

spectrometer, it takes almost daily use to maintain competency and
accuracy, which the RAID team may not get. All of the HAZMAT team
leaders expressed concern that the RAID team members would lose
their HAZMAT expertise if they did not have opportunities to
continually practice their skills in more than just a simulated
environment. All of the leaders stated that this on the job
training is also critical to effective team operation. The
stressful situation of an actual HAZMAT emergency cannot be
replicated in a classroom or exercise and team members need to
know that everyone on the team can operate in that environment.
The Pennsylvania Guard officer responsible for developing that
state's RAID team stated that the Guard was concerned about this
and realized the need to create these on- the- job opportunities,
not only to maintain proficiency but to keep the team members from
leaving to work on local HAZMAT teams. He added that the Guard was
working with local HAZMAT teams so that the RAID team could
participate in local training exercises and, at some later point,
perhaps respond with the local teams on actual HAZMAT emergencies.
According to DOD, there are a significant number of exercises
conducted by federal, state, and local authorities that provide
ample opportunities for the RAID teams to exercise their skills.

All of the HAZMAT team leaders discussed the need to have
sufficient team members cross trained in each position to be able
to field a complete team when an emergency arises. This process
also alleviates the concern of having the entire team on call 24
hours a day, 365 days a year, which could

cause significant hardships for the RAID team members as they try
to maintain normal lives. The RAID team survey function is the
only part of the team that has multiple individuals performing the
same job. All other members of the RAID team who could not respond
to a deployment call

would create a loss of capability for the team. Also, the RAID
team will have only one set of equipment for both training and
deployment, which could make it difficult to both train on the
equipment and be operationally ready to deploy.

Conclusions In conclusion, I would like to summarize our three
major findings and reiterate the recommendation in our report.
First, the fact that local, state,

Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

and federal officials responsible for implementing emergency
response plans have differing views regarding the role for the
RAID teams suggests that further clarification of their expected
role and use is needed. Second,

the fact that the RAID teams have capabilities similar to other
local, state, and federal emergency response teams suggests that
these teams might unnecessarily duplicate existing capabilities.
Finally, concerns about whether they could arrive on the scene in
a timely manner as well as other concerns related to recruiting,
retention, and training raise questions about whether they could,
in fact, effectively execute their responsibilities and

missions. In view of these questions, we believe that a pause is
warranted to more fully evaluate the need for these teams and more
fully explore how they would fit into the total WMD response
framework. Accordingly, we are recommending that the National
Coordinator for Security,

Infrastructure Protection, and Counter- Terrorism in conjunction
with the FBI, FEMA, and DOD determine whether the teams are, in
fact, needed before proceeding to expand the program in more
states.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We would be
happy to answer any questions at this time.

Contact and Acknowledgment

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Mr. Mark
Gebicke at (202) 512- 5140. Individuals making key contributions
to this testimony include Robert Pelletier and Ann Borseth.

(702011) Lett er

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