Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs
(Testimony, 06/09/99, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its prior work and
observations on federal efforts to combat terrorism, focusing on: (1)
the foreign- and domestic-origin terrorism threats, as GAO understands
them from intelligence analyses; (2) the growth in federal programs to
provide training and equipment to local first responders--police, fire,
and emergency medical services--and the expansion of the federal
response elements and teams to deal with a possible chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack; and (3)
steps the executive branch has taken to better manage federal efforts to
combat terrorism and some opportunities GAO sees for additional focus
and direction.

GAO noted that: (1) U.S. intelligence agencies continuously assess both
the foreign and domestic terrorist threat to the United States and note
that conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of
choice for terrorists; (2) terrorists are less likely to use chemical
and biological weapons than conventional explosives, although the
possibility that they may use chemical and biological materials may
increase over the next decade, according to intelligence agencies; (3)
agency officials have noted that terrorist use of nuclear weapons is the
least likely scenario, although the consequences could be disastrous;
(4) although the intelligence agencies agree on these matters, GAO has
observed many conflicting statements and views in public documents and
testimony about the CBRN terrorism threat; (5) there is an apparent
disconnect between the intelligence agencies' judgments and the focus of
certain programs; (6) the number of federal programs and initiatives to
combat terrorism have grown significantly; (7) according to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), funding has also increased about $6.5
billion in fiscal year (FY) 1998 to about $10 billion requested for FY
2000; (8) at the same time that the federal government has created
several potentially overlapping programs to train and equip local first
responders to prepare for possible CBRN terrorist attacks, federal
agencies have also expanded the number of federal response teams,
capabilities, and assets; (9) the executive branch has taken some
important steps toward improving the way it manages and coordinates the
growing, complex array of agencies, offices, programs, activities, and
capabilities; (10) OMB has issued two governmentwide reports--one in
1998 and one in 1999--on funding levels and programs to combat
terrorism; (11) in December 1998, the Attorney General issued a
classified 5-year interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology;
(12) the Attorney General is also establishing a National Domestic
Preparedness Office at the Federal Bureau of Investigation to try to
reduce state and local confusion over the many federal training and
equipment programs to help them prepare for terrorist incidents
involving CBRN weapons; (13) GAO sees opportunities to improve the focus
and direction of federal programs and activities to combat terrorism;
and (14) a governmentwide strategy that includes a defined end-state and
priorities is needed, along with soundly established program
requirements based on assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist
attack.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-99-181
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal
             Programs
      DATE:  06/09/99
   SUBJECT:  Federal/state relations
             Terrorism
             Emergency preparedness
             Domestic intelligence
             Biological warfare
             Chemical warfare
             Strategic planning
             Redundancy
             Firearms
             Explosives
IDENTIFIER:  FEMA Federal Response Plan
             Oklahoma City (OK)
             World Trade Center (NY)
             Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program
             HHS Metropolitan Medical Response System
             DOD Domestic Preparedness Program

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1-LG-BW logo.eps GAO United States General Accounting Office

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,
and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2: 00 p. m., EDT Wednesday,
June 9, 1999

COMBATING TERRORISM Observations on Growth in Federal Programs

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, National Security
Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 Madam Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here to discuss our prior work
and observations on

federal efforts to combat terrorism, especially those to prepare
for and respond to terrorist attacks involving chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons or devices. 1
As you know, the President's fiscal year 2000 budget requested
about $10 billion to combat terrorism. According to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), about $1. 4 billion of that amount
was for dealing with weapons of mass

destruction. Over the past 3 years we have evaluated and reported
on a number of issues concerning federal programs and activities
to combat terrorism. A list of related GAO reports and testimonies
is attached to this statement. My testimony will focus on three
issues. First, I will briefly describe the

foreign- and domestic- origin terrorism threats, as we understand
them from intelligence analyses, and discuss some issues
surrounding the emerging threat of CBRN terrorism. Second, I will
provide our observations on the growth in federal programs to
provide training and equipment to local first responders police,
fire, and emergency medical services and the expansion of federal
response elements and teams to deal with a possible CBRN terrorist
attack. Finally, I will discuss some steps the executive branch
has taken to better manage federal efforts to combat terrorism and
some opportunities we see for additional focus and direction.

Summary U. S. intelligence agencies continuously assess both the
foreign and domestic terrorist threat to the United States and
note that conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the
weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to
use chemical and biological weapons than conventional explosives,
although the possibility that they may use chemical and biological
materials may increase over the next decade, according to
intelligence agencies. Agency officials have noted that terrorist
use of nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario, although the

consequences could be disastrous. Although the intelligence
agencies 1 For purposes of this testimony, I will use the term
CBRN instead of the more common but less precise term weapons of
mass destruction. While some agencies define weapons of mass
destruction as chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological
weapons, others define it to include large conventional
explosives.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 agree on these matters, we have observed
many conflicting statements and views in public documents and
testimony about the CBRN terrorism threat. In addition, there is
an apparent disconnect between the intelligence agencies'
judgments and the focus of certain programs. Since 1996, the
number of federal programs and initiatives to combat terrorism
have grown significantly. According to OMB, funding has also
increased from about $6.5 billion in fiscal year 1998 to about $10
billion requested for fiscal year 2000. At the same time that the
federal

government has created several potentially overlapping programs to
train and equip local first responders to prepare for possible
CBRN terrorist attacks, federal agencies have also expanded the
number of federal response teams, capabilities, and assets. The
executive branch has taken some important steps toward improving
the way it manages and coordinates the growing, complex array of
agencies, offices, programs, activities, and capabilities. For
example, OMB has issued two governmentwide reports one in 1998 and
one in 1999 on funding levels and programs to combat terrorism. In
addition, in December 1998, the Attorney General issued a
classified 5- year interagency plan on counterterrorism and
technology. The Attorney General is also establishing a National
Domestic Preparedness Office at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to try to reduce state and local confusion
over the many federal training and equipment programs to help them
prepare for terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons. While
these are important positive steps, we see opportunities to
improve the focus and direction of federal programs and activities
to combat terrorism. For example, a governmentwide strategy that
includes a defined end state and priorities is needed, along with
soundly established program requirements based on assessments of
the threat and risk of terrorist attack. In addition, a
comprehensive inventory of existing federal, state, and local
capabilities that could be leveraged or built upon is warranted
before adding or expanding federal response assets. Without these
fundamental program elements, there can be little or no assurance
that the nation is focusing its investments in the right programs
and in the right amounts and that programs are efficiently and
effectively designed and implemented. Background Under
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (June 1995) federal efforts to
combat terrorism are organized along a lead agency concept. The
Department of Justice, through the FBI, is the lead federal agency
for crisis management of domestic terrorist incidents and for
pursuing, arresting,

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 and prosecuting the terrorists. For
managing the consequences of domestic terrorist incidents, state
and local authorities are primarily responsible. If federal
assistance is requested, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) is the lead federal agency for consequence

management. FEMA coordinates this federal support through the
Federal Response Plan, which outlines the roles, responsibilities,
and emergency support functions of various federal agencies for
consequence management. The National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism at the National
Security Council is

charged with coordinating the broad variety of relevant policies
and programs, including such areas as counterterrorism,
preparedness, and consequence management for CBRN terrorist
incidents. The Foreign- and Domestic- Origin Terrorism Threat in
the United States

Terrorist bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City in
1993 and the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 have
elevated concerns about terrorism in the United States.
Previously, the focus of U. S. policy and legislation had been on
international terrorism abroad and airline hijacking. Intelligence
agencies continuously assess the foreign and domestic terrorist
threats to the United States. The U. S. foreign intelligence
community, which includes the Central Intelligence Agency and
others, monitors the foreign- origin terrorist threat to the
United States. 2 In addition, the FBI gathers intelligence and
assesses the threat posed by domestic sources of terrorism.

What is important about these assessments is the very critical
distinction between what is conceivable or possible and what is
likely in terms of the threat of terrorist attack. While concerns
about terrorist use of CBRN weapons were heightened by an
apocalyptic sect's use of a nerve agent in the Tokyo subway in
1995, terrorists are still reportedly more likely to use
conventional weapons. According to the U. S. intelligence
community, conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the
weapons of choice for terrorists, at least partly because chemical
and biological agents are

more difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable. 2
The intelligence community includes the Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency,
the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and other offices within the Department of Defense and the
military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and such
other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by
the President or jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence
and the head of the department or agency concerned.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 On average, from 1992 through 1998,
there were fewer than four terrorist incidents in the United
States each year, according to FBI statistics. Figure 1 provides
FBI data on the number of terrorist incidents in the United States
during the 1992- 98 period, none of which were CBRN attacks. 3

Figure 1: Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1992- 98

Source: FBI.

The intelligence community reports that some foreign- origin
groups and individuals of concern are showing an increasing
interest in using chemical and biological materials. The FBI also
reports an increasing number of domestic cases involving U. S.
persons attempting or threatening to use such materials. Agency
officials have noted that, although the

3 FBI defines a terrorist incident as a violent act or an act
dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States, or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof.

0 2

4 6

8 10

12 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 consequences could be disastrous, the
terrorist use of nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario.
Issues Surrounding the

Emerging CBRN Terrorism Threat Statements made in testimony before
the Congress and in the press by various officials on the issue of
making and delivering a terrorist chemical or biological weapon
sometimes contrast sharply. On the one hand, some statements
suggest that developing a chemical or biological weapon can be
relatively easy. For example, in 1996, the Central Intelligence
Agency

Director testified that chemical and biological weapons can be
produced with relative ease in simple laboratories, and in 1997,
the Central Intelligence Agency Director said that delivery and
dispersal techniques also are effective and relatively easy to
develop. Similarly, an article by

former senior intelligence and defense officials noted that
chemical and biological agents can be produced by graduate
students or laboratory technicians and that general recipes are
readily available on the internet. On the other hand, some
statements suggest that there are considerable difficulties
associated with successfully developing and delivering a chemical
or biological weapon. For example, the former Deputy Commander of
the Army's Medical Research and Materiel Command testified in 1998
that an effective, mass- casualty producing attack on our citizens
would require either a fairly large, very technically competent,
well- funded terrorist program or state sponsorship. More
recently, in March 1999, the Special Assistant to the Director of
Central Intelligence for

Nonproliferation testified that the preparation and effective use
of biological weapons by both potentially hostile states and by
non- state actors, including terrorists, is harder than some
popular literature seems to suggest. We are reviewing the
scientific and practical feasibility of the terrorist chemical and
biological threat for the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs;
the Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee; and the
House Government Reform Committee's Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations.
Specifically, we are examining the ease or difficulty for a non-
state actor to successfully obtain chemical and biological agents,
process the materials, and make and

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 deliver chemical and biological weapons
that can cause mass casualties. 4 We plan to issue our report
later this summer. We have also observed a disconnect between
intelligence agencies' judgments about the more likely terrorist
threats particularly the

chemical and biological terrorist threat and certain domestic
preparedness program initiatives. For example, the Department of
Health and Human Services' (HHS) fiscal year 1999 budget amendment
proposal for its bioterrorism initiative included building for the
first time a civilian stockpile of antidotes and vaccines to
respond to a large- scale biological or chemical attack and
expanding the National Institutes of Health's research into
related vaccines and therapies. Specifically, the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P. L.
105- 277) included $51 million for the Centers of Disease Control
and Prevention to begin developing a pharmaceutical and vaccine
stockpile for

civilian populations. HHS' legislatively required operating plan
discusses several chemical and biological agents selected for its
stockpiling initiatives. These agents were selected because of
their ability to affect large numbers of people (create mass
casualties) and tax the medical system. We observed that several
of the items in HHS' plan did not match individual intelligence
agencies' judgments, as explained to us, on the more likely
chemical or biological agents a terrorist group or individual
might use. 5 HHS had not documented its decision making process
for selecting the specific vaccines, antidotes, and other
medicines cited in its plan. Thus, it was unclear to us whether
and to what extent intelligence agencies' official, written threat
analyses were used in the process to develop the list of chemical
and biological

terrorist threat agents against which the nation should stockpile.
Further, we have not seen any evidence that HHS' process
incorporated the many disciplines of knowledge and expertise or
divergent thinking that is warranted to establish sound
requirements to prepare for such a threat and focus on appropriate
medical preparedness countermeasures.

4 We recognize that some biological agents are communicable and
would not necessarily need to be weaponized to cause mass
casualties. 5 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological
Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar.
16, 1999).

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 Growth in Federal Funding, Programs, and
Initiatives Federal funding of efforts to combat terrorism has
increased rapidly. According to OMB, funding to combat terrorism
has increased from about $6.5 billion in fiscal year 1998 to about
$10 billion requested for fiscal year 2000. Overall, the number of
agencies, offices, and initiatives to combat terrorism has also
grown substantially. 6 Specifically, since 1996, we have

observed growth in federal funding and programs to provide
training and equipment to local first responders and,
concurrently, growth and potential overlap in federal response
elements and teams to deal with a possible CBRN terrorist attack.
The federal response elements and assets have been established to
support state or local incident commanders to manage the
consequences of a possible CBRN terrorist attack. Proliferation of
Federal Programs to Train and

Equip First Responders We have observed a proliferation of
programs and initiatives across several

agencies to provide training and/ or equipment to local first
responders for dealing with the consequences of a CBRN terrorist
attack. On the surface, it appears to us that there is potential
for duplication and overlap among these programs. The fiscal year
2000 budget request proposed $611 million for training, equipping,
and exercising cities' first responders in preparation for a
potential terrorist attack and for strengthening public health
infrastructure. 7 Table 1 summarizes some aspects of selected
federal training and/ or equipment programs available to state and
local agencies to build or enhance their CBRN response
capabilities.

6 See Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). 7 HHS requested $230 million
for fiscal year 2000 for its bioterrorism initiative, which
included strengthening the public health infrastructure.

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 Table 1: Selected Federal CBRN
Consequence Management Training and/ or Equipment Programs

Source: GAO.

Further information on these federal programs and activities is in
appendix I. Some local officials we spoke with during our
examination of DOD's Domestic Preparedness Program viewed the
growing number of CBRN consequence management training programs as
an indication of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal
approach toward combating terrorism. Similarly, multiple equipment
programs were causing frustration and confusion at the local level
and were resulting in further complaints that the federal
government is unfocused and has no coordinated plan or defined
end- state for domestic preparedness. For example, in the Domestic
Preparedness Program, the separation of the DOD and HHS equipment
packages required local officials to deal with two federal
agencies' differing requirements and procedures. Since the HHS
equipment program is offered through a contract with unmatched
federal funds, the cities had to meet certain requirements,
including developing a concept of operations plan for Metropolitan
Medical Agency What program provides Target audience

Department of Defense (DOD) Training: CBRN response with focus on
chemical, biological, and nuclear. Equipment: Provides each city
up to $300,000 in equipment on 5- year loan. Police, fire,
hazardous materials technicians, and medical and emergency
management

responders in the 120 most populous cities. Department of Justice
Training: Explosives, incendiary, chemical, and biological (not
radiological or nuclear)

response. Equipment: Provides equipment grants. Police, fire,
hazardous materials, and

medical and emergency management responders in the 120 largest
urban jurisdictions.

FEMA Training: Emergency management and hazardous materials
response, including those related to terrorist incidents.

Fire, medical, hazardous materials technicians, and other
emergency responders. Department of Energy Training: Nuclear and
radiological response

in emergencies. Responders in communities close to nuclear
facilities. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Training:
Chemical, biological, and

radiological hazardous materials response, with new focus on
terrorist weapons of mass destruction incidents. Federal, state,
and local hazardous

materials technicians. HHS Equipment: Contract grants include
funds

for equipment and items for medical response to CBRN incident.
Emergency medical responders in 27 cities

that also participate in DOD's Domestic Preparedness Program.

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Training: CBRN incident, with
focus on medical response. Training to be provided under contract
with HHS.

1,100 nonfederal National Disaster Medical System hospital staffs.

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 Response Systems that fits into a local
area's overall medical response system. The DOD equipment loan
program required a different process. Other equipment initiatives,
such as the Department of Justice equipment grant program, could
add to the local government officials' perception of an unfocused
federal strategy. 8 Growth in Federal CBRN

Response Elements At the same time federal training and equipment
programs for first

responders has grown, the number of federal response elements that
can deal with various aspects of managing the consequences of a
CBRN terrorist attack has also expanded and increased. Individual
agencies' initiatives include adding teams or capabilities that
can identify and analyze

various chemical and biological materials or agents; contain or
handle the weapon, device, or area of an incident; and provide
medical support or response for dealing with potential casualties
of an incident. We have pointed out that the growth in these
capabilities and assets has not been based on soundly established
requirements or a comprehensive inventory of existing federal,
state, and local assets that could be leveraged. State and local
officials have raised concerns about the increasing number of
federal response elements being formed. In our view, the emergence
of more federal response elements and capabilities will increase
the challenge for the federal government to provide a well-
coordinated response in support of a state or local incident
commander. 9 DOD has established several new response elements in
addition to those that have been or would have been called upon in
the past to respond to potentially dangerous chemical or
biological threats or incidents. Among the pre- existing response
assets are the Army's Technical Escort Unit, which has four teams
in two U. S. locations and the Army's 52 nd Explosives Ordnance
Disposal Group, which includes many units located throughout

the country and has personnel specially trained to respond to CBRN
incidents. In 1996, the Marine Corps created the Chemical
Biological Incident Response Force located at Camp LeJeune, N. C.,
to provide a medical and decontamination response to CBRN
incidents. In addition, the 8 We have work underway for
congressional requesters to examine various issues associated with
the

multiple federal programs and facilities to train and equip first
responders to manage the consequences of a CBRN terrorist attack.
9 We have completed a governmentwide review of the preparedness of
the many federal response assets to work together and with state
and local officials, and our report will be available before the
end of this month.

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Act required DOD
to establish a Chemical- Biological Rapid Response Team for
domestic incidents. More recently, DOD has created National Guard
Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams in 10 states
to respond to CBRN incidents. Potentially, up to 54 RAID teams are
planned. The RAID teams' mission is to provide assistance to local
and state authorities in the event of an incident involving
chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons. They are
to (1) help assess the situation, (2) advise civilian responders
as to appropriate actions, and (3) facilitate the identification
and movement of federal military assets to the incident scene. We
reviewed the roles and missions of the RAID teams and expect to
release a report this month. As mentioned earlier, HHS has
established Metropolitan Medical Response Systems with trained and
equipped local emergency teams in 27 cities that also participate
in the DOD- led Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic

Preparedness Program. HHS requested fiscal year 2000 funding to
include 25 more cities in its program. In addition to the 27
locally- based medical response teams (with more to be
established), HHS has established four specialized National
Medical Response Teams, three of which are deployable in the event
of a terrorist attack involving a chemical or biological weapon.
These 27 Metropolitan Medical Response Systems and

4 National Medical Response Teams are in addition to HHS' 24
Disaster Medical Assistance Teams that deploy to provide medical
support for any type of disaster, including terrorism. HHS is
further expanding its response capabilities by creating a national
stockpile of millions of doses of

vaccines, antidotes for chemical agents, antibiotics for other
diseases, and respirators. Another federal response element that
appears to be growing is federal laboratories with capability to
analyze chemical and biological agents. The Army, the Navy, and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have had laboratory
capabilities to analyze chemical and biological agents. In
addition, HHS has plans to establish regional laboratories, and
the FBI is establishing a mobile laboratory capability. Both the
FBI and EPA have forensic laboratories, although there are some
differences in capabilities, and the FBI is looking into using
existing facilities rather than creating a

specialized laboratory for CBRN cases.

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 Some Steps Taken, but Opportunities
Remain to Improve Management of Crosscutting Programs The
executive branch has taken a number of important steps to improve

management and coordination of programs to combat terrorism.
Nevertheless, we have pointed out several areas in which
fundamental program elements are missing while program growth
continues.

Steps Taken Toward Improved Management and Coordination I will
highlight four executive branch efforts that represent important
steps toward improved management and coordination of the growing
programs and activities to combat terrorism. First, OMB has
started to track spending by federal agencies to combat terrorism.
In December 1997, we reported that key federal agencies with
responsibilities to combat terrorism spent about $6. 7 billion in
fiscal year 1997 for unclassified terrorism- related activities
and programs and noted that precise funding information was
unavailable for various reasons. 10 That report led to

legislation (National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
1998) requiring OMB to establish a system for collecting and
reporting information on executive agencies' spending and budgets
for combating terrorism. We believe that the OMB reports on
governmentwide spending and budgeting to combat terrorism are a
significant step toward improved

management and coordination of the complex and rapidly growing
programs and activities. For the first time, the executive branch
and the Congress have strategic oversight of the magnitude and
direction of federal funding for this priority national security
and law enforcement concern. The 1999 report provided additional
analysis and more detailed information than the 1998 report on
budgeting for programs to deal with CBRN weapons. For example, the
1999 OMB report identified the funding (budget authority) for the
CBRN portion of combating terrorism to be about $1.23 billion in
fiscal year 1999 and $1.39 billion in the fiscal year 2000

budget request. Nevertheless, OMB officials told us, as we noted
in our December 1997 report, that a critical piece of the budget
and spending picture is missing threat and risk assessments that
would suggest priorities and appropriate countermeasures. These
officials noted and we agree that risk 10 Combating Terrorism:
Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and

Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 assessment is key to (1) knowing
whether enough or too much is being spent, (2) judging whether the
right programs are being funded, and (3) determining whether
apparent duplication is good or bad. We have not fully evaluated
the processes or methodologies the executive branch agencies used
to derive the information in the 1998 and 1999 OMB reports. As a
result, we cannot comment on whether or to what extent the reports
reflect the best possible estimate of costs associated with
programs and activities to combat terrorism. The reports, however,
do not clearly or explicitly describe any established priorities
or duplication of efforts as called for in the legislation.

A second step toward improved interagency management and
coordination was the Attorney General's December 1998, classified
5- year interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crime.
The Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1998
Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies required the Attorney
General to develop the plan in coordination with several agencies.
The plan includes goals, objectives, and performance indicators
and recommends that specific actions be taken to resolve
interagency problems and issues it identified and assigns relative
priorities to the actions. The classified plan represents a
substantial interagency effort and was developed and coordinated
with 15 federal

agencies with counterterrorism roles. The plan, however, generally
does not link its recommended actions and priorities to budget
resources, although it states that the agencies hope to improve
the link between the plan and resources in subsequent updates. The
plan also does not have a clearly defined end state that would be
useful to establish requirements and priorities. A third step was
the Attorney General's proposed establishment of a National
Domestic Preparedness Office to coordinate the programs and other
federal support for state and local governments. The purpose of
the office is to coordinate Justice programs with those of other
federal agencies to enable state and local first responders to
establish and maintain a crisis and consequence management
infrastructure capable of responding to a conventional and
unconventional terrorist attack. The office, under the leadership
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would address planning,
training, equipment, exercises, research and development,
intelligence and information sharing, and health and medical
service needs at the federal, state, and local levels. The office
has commissioned a local, state, and federal interagency board to
establish, maintain, and update a standardized equipment list for
use by the interagency community in

Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 preparing state and local jurisdictions
to respond to a terrorist incident involving a weapon of mass
destruction. The office is intended to reduce state and local
confusion over the multitude of federal training and equipment
programs and response capabilities by providing one stop

shopping for state and local agencies. We understand that this
office has not been formally approved. Finally, in Presidential
Decision Directive 62, issued in May 1998, the President
designated a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counterterrorism. While this coordinator is not to
direct agencies' activities, he is responsible for integrating the
government's policies and programs on unconventional threats to
the homeland and Americans abroad, including terrorism. He is also
to provide advice in the

context of the annual process regarding the budgets for
counterterrorism. We understand he has established a number of
interagency working groups, but we have been unable to obtain any
further information on these groups' responsibilities and
accomplishments. Opportunities to Enhance

Program Focus and Direction Notwithstanding these important steps
taken by the executive branch, we continue to see opportunities to
better focus the nation's investments and

efforts to combat terrorism. In November1998, we concluded that
the many federal CBRN consequence management training, equipment,
and response initiatives could benefit from a coordinated,
integrated approach with a defined end- state. 11 We also
recommended that the National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism actively review
and guide the growing number of consequence management training
and equipment programs and response elements to ensure that
individual agencies' efforts (1) leverage existing state and local
emergency management systems and (2) are coordinated,
unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end
state. More recently, we have noted that rapid program growth,
particularly in domestic

preparedness programs and public health initiatives, has occurred
in the absence of soundly established requirements based on
assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack involving
CBRN. A critical piece of the equation in decisions about
establishing and expanding programs to combat terrorism is an
analytically sound threat and risk assessment using valid inputs
from the intelligence community and other disciplines. Threat

11 Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998).

Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 and risk assessments could help the
government make decisions about how to target investments in
combating terrorism and set priorities on the basis of risk;
identify unnecessary program duplication, overlap, and gaps; and
correctly size individual agencies' levels of effort. Without
adequate assessment based on sound input, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to have confidence that the government has
properly shaped programs and

focused resources to combat and prepare for this complex, emerging
threat.

Conclusions The executive branch has taken a number of steps
toward improving the overall management and coordination of the
complex, growing array of agencies' and offices' efforts to combat
terrorism. Nevertheless, we see

opportunities to improve the overall focus of the nation's efforts
to combat and prepare for terrorist incidents. There is a need to
reconcile conflicting statements about the CBRN terrorism threat
and the lack of connectivity between intelligence judgments and
program initiatives. There is also a

need for a governmentwide strategy with a defined end state and
priorities, soundly defined requirements based on valid
assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack, and a
comprehensive inventory of existing capabilities and assets. In
the absence of these fundamental program elements, there has been
significant growth in federally funded consequence management
training and equipment programs for first responders and in
federal teams, assets, and capabilities to deal with possible CBRN
terrorist incidents. Without these program elements, there is
little assurance that the nation is investing in the right
programs and in the right amounts.

Major contributors to this testimony are Stephen L. Caldwell, Davi
M. D'Agostino, and Robert L. Pelletier. Madam Chairman, that
concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions at this time.

Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 Appendix I Information on Selected
Federal Training and Equipment Programs for First Responders
Appendi x I

The following summarizes some aspects of selected federal
consequence management training and equipment programs designed
for state and local first responders to deal with chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist incidents.

 Department of Defense (DOD): In the Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act, (Title XIV, P. L. 104- 201, Sept. 23, 1996)
commonly known as the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Act the Congress
authorized DOD to develop and conduct first responder training
focusing on terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons. In
designing the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program,
DOD

targeted the 120 most populated U. S. cities to receive this
training. Courses are to be delivered to experienced city trainers
so they can train rank- and- file first responders. The 5- year
loan agreement governing the provision of CBRN items and equipment
associated with the program requires the cities to repair,
maintain, and replace the equipment. DOD plans to transfer
responsibility for its domestic preparedness training and
equipment program to the Department of Justice by the end of
fiscal

year 2000.  Department of Justice: Through the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Congress authorized a
second terrorism- related consequence management training program
for firefighters and

emergency medical personnel. This program, developed in
conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
is administered by the Office of Justice Programs. The target
audience for this program overlaps with but is not identical to
the target audience for DOD's Domestic Preparedness Program. In
fiscal years 1998 and 1999, the Congress appropriated $103.5
million to make chemical/ biological equipment permanently
available to first responders through the Office

of Justice Programs. The Department of Justice also is
establishing a Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan,
Alabama. Other Justice- funded centers and training venues related
to combating terrorism are at universities, such as Texas A& M and
Louisiana State University, and at Department of Energy's (DOE)
Nevada Test Site. FEMA: Through its National Fire Academy and
Emergency Management Institute, FEMA offers training and issues
basic course materials.

FEMA and its National Fire Academy have long- standing resident
and nonresident training programs in emergency management and
hazardous materials. FEMA requested about $31 million for fiscal
year 2000 a $13- million increase over fiscal year 1999 funding.
Of the $31 million, $29 million is to provide grants and
assistance related to training, planning, and exercises for state
and local responders.

Appendix I Information on Selected Federal Training and Equipment
Programs for First Responders

Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):
EPA's Environmental Response Team provides training to federal,
state, and local hazardous materials technicians that addresses
radiological, biological, and chemical hazards. EPA is adding
training to its course that deals with CBRN weapons.

 DOE: DOE sponsors training in how to respond to incidents
involving the release of nuclear or radiological substances. The
training is made available primarily to communities in which
nuclear facilities are located.  Health and Human Services (HHS)
and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA): The Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act authorized funds for DOD to assist
the Secretary of HHS in establishing Metropolitan Medical Response
Systems to help improve local jurisdictions' medical response
capabilities for a CBRN incident. HHS' Office of Emergency
Preparedness has been establishing Systems with trained and
equipped local emergency teams in 27cities that also participate
in the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici domestic preparedness training and
equipment program. VA is involved in training through a contract

from HHS. Specifically, HHS is contracting with VA to train 1,100
nonfederal National Disaster Medical System hospital staffs to
deal with CBRN situations, according to VA officials.

Page 21 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181

Related GAO Products Appendi x II

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is
Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). Combating Terrorism:
Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations
(GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Efforts to Reduce Russian
Arsenals May Cost More and Accomplish Less Than Expected
(GAO/NSIAD-99-76, Apr. 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and
Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for
CounterterrorismRelated Activities (Fiscal Years 1995- 98)
(GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk
Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments
(GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1,
1997).

Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U. S. Forces in Turkey and
the Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

(702012) Letter

Page 22 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181

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