Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the
Middle East (Testimony, 10/28/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44).

In preparing a July 1997 report on Defense Department (DOD) efforts to
protect U.S. forces overseas from terrorist attacks (GAO/NSIAD-97-207),
GAO visited overseas locations where U.S. forces are considered to be at
high risk of attack, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
This testimony is based on the results of those visits and related work
with the U.S. military. GAO provides a brief overview and discusses in
greater detail the following three issues: (1) the environment that U.S.
forces abroad are facing, including the terrorist threat and the
relationship with the host nation governments; (2) the measures DOD has
taken to improve security for personnel stationed in the countries GAO
visited; and (3) DOD's initiatives to strengthen its overall force
protection program.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-98-44
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in 
             Turkey and the Middle East
      DATE:  10/28/97
   SUBJECT:  Terrorism
             Military bases
             Military personnel
             Armed forces abroad
             Facility security
             Bombs
             Military facilities
             International cooperation
             International relations
IDENTIFIER:  Turkey
             Khobar Towers (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia)
             Saudi Arabia
             Kuwait
             Bahrain
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs
and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10 a.m.  EST
Tuesday,
October 28, 1997

COMBATING TERRORISM - EFFORTS TO
PROTECT U.S.  FORCES IN TURKEY AND
THE MIDDLE EAST

Statement of Mark E.  Gebicke, Director, Military Operations and
Capabilities Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44

GAO/NSIAD-98-44T

Combating Terrorism

(703224)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - x
  NATO - x

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to protect overseas forces from
terrorist attacks.  As the Subcommittee requested, we will focus our
discussion on Turkey and the Middle East.  In July we issued a
report\1 on DOD's antiterrorism\2 efforts based, in large part, on
our visits to the five geographic combatant commands and to selected
overseas sites where U.S.  forces are stationed.  Most of the sites
we visited were in countries that DOD considered high threat.  Among
the countries we visited during March and April 1997 were Bahrain,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.  My testimony today is based on the
results of those visits and related work we conducted at the Joint
Staff, the military services, and other DOD components during the
course of our review.  We have also provided the Subcommittee with a
classified statement that expands upon the information in this
statement. 

We would like to provide a brief overview and then go back and
provide more information about the following three issues:  (1) the
environment U.S.  forces overseas are facing, including the terrorist
threat and the relationship with the host nation governments; (2) the
measures DOD has taken to enhance the security of personnel in the
countries we visited; and (3) DOD initiatives to improve its overall
force protection program. 


--------------------
\1 Combating Terrorism:  Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207,
July 21, 1997).  In addition, we issued a separate report entitled,
Combating Terrorism:  Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National
Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept.  26, 1997), on national
counterterrorism policy and strategy; the roles, responsibilities,
programs, and activities of federal agencies under this policy; and
the mechanisms for coordinating interagency efforts. 

\2 For the purposes of this testimony, we use DOD's term
"antiterrorism" to refer to defensive measures used to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. 
Counterterrorism, in contrast, refers to offensive measures taken to
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.  Antiterrorism and
counterterrorism are elements of a broader concept known as combating
terrorism.  In turn, combating terrorism is part of a much broader
concept known as force protection.  Other elements of force
protection are physical security, operations security, protective
services, and law enforcement operations. 


   OVERVIEW
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Senior military commanders and defense officials we met with
emphasized that they can reduce, but not eliminate, vulnerabilities
and that further terrorist attacks against U.S.  forces should be
expected.  They observed that efforts to defend against the terrorist
threat are complicated by a number of factors, including the ability
of terrorists to decide where and when to attack and to choose from a
wide selection of targets.  Moreover, DOD relies heavily on the host
nations for many of its security needs.  Because of this reliance,
efforts to reduce vulnerabilities often require extensive host nation
support.  In addition, many DOD personnel overseas may not be
protected adequately because it is unclear who is responsible for
their security. 

During our March and April visits, we found that deployed U.S. 
forces were better protected from terrorist attacks like the one that
occurred last year at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia than they were
prior to that terrorist incident.  Security improvements were most
evident where the risk of terrorism was greatest, such as in the
Middle East and Turkey.  DOD placed less emphasis on addressing
vulnerabilities in countries considered a lower terrorist threat. 
However, DOD officials said that even in high-threat countries
vulnerabilities exist and that new vulnerabilities could emerge as
terrorist tactics respond to the measures DOD has taken. 

In addition to the improvements made at individual sites, DOD
initiated a number of changes aimed at enhancing its overall
antiterrorism program.  However, we found these initiatives did not
represent a comprehensive and consistent DOD approach to
antiterrorism.  We made a number of recommendations for improving the
situation.  DOD concurred with all of our recommendations except for
the one calling for prescriptive DOD-wide physical security
standards.  DOD believes that commanders, who are responsible for
force protection, need flexibility and should not be told how to
provide physical security for their personnel.  However, the
commanders we spoke with believe that such standards would help them
carry out this responsibility as well as provide an objective basis
for determining whether antiterrorism measures are sufficient. 

With this overview, let me talk about the security environment for
U.S.  forces overseas. 


   SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FACING
   U.S.  FORCES OVERSEAS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

DOD faces a number of obstacles in defending against future terrorist
attacks.  First, DOD has a large presence in many countries around
the world, offering a plethora of potential targets.  Second,
predictive intelligence on terrorist attacks is difficult to obtain. 
Commanders, therefore, may not be in a position to prevent an attack
from occurring; they can only prepare to minimize the consequences
from an attack.  Third, DOD installations are often located on host
nation installations and as a result there are limitations on the
security measures DOD can undertake.  Political and cultural
considerations outside the control of local commanders also influence
decisions that affect security.  During our visits, military
officials told us that the question is not whether additional
terrorist attacks will occur, but when, where, and how.  They
emphasized that vulnerabilities to attacks can be reduced, but a zero
defects approach to fighting terrorism is not possible. 

According to DOD officials, terrorism is a pervasive phenomenon,
whose specific threats are difficult to predict.  It is worldwide in
scope, with some terrorist organizations state supported and some
only loosely affiliated, in support of multiple causes.  It is a
transnational phenomenon, acting across geographic and political
boundaries.  Areas considered safe and benign one day, such as Saudi
Arabia prior to the bombings, can quickly become high threat the
next.  Terrorists' tactics have not been to challenge U.S.  military
power directly, but to weaken U.S.  resolve through isolated attacks
with high publicity value. 

DOD designates the terrorist threat level faced by personnel in each
country.  A five-step scale is used to describe the severity of
threat.  These steps, from highest to lowest, are critical, high,
medium, low, and negligible.  Threat levels may be raised or lowered
on the basis of new information or analysis.  As of October 1, 1997,
DOD had designated
14 countries as having a high threat level.  The list included Egypt,
Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Greece, and Turkey.\3 No
countries were assessed as having a critical terrorist threat. 

According to a report issued by the Secretary of Defense following
the Khobar Towers bombing, U.S.  forces are constantly exposed to the
terrorist threat because executing the national security strategy
requires their physical presence in many nations.  U.S.  commanders
in the past have agreed to operate out of facilities and locations
that now present serious security challenges in today's terrorist
environment.  The Khobar Towers complex, for example, was paid for by
the Saudis and convenient to U.S.  military work areas but was
difficult to defend.  In most of the countries we visited, we found
that many U.S.  forces were located in urban areas, closely
surrounded by easily accessible buildings or roads. 

Terrorists can alter their mode of attack.  For instance, some
commanders in the Middle East are concerned that terrorists will
switch to weapons that can be fired over perimeter defenses from
hidden locations.  One U.S.  commander was concerned that terrorists
could fire weapons from different sectors of the surrounding city. 
Such attacks are difficult to defend against because these weapons
can be set up, fired, and moved in a very short period of time. 

In many cases, overseas U.S.  forces work at facilities that are
owned by the host nation, and the host nation is responsible for
their security.  As a result, DOD relies on the host nation for
important security functions, such as controlling entry onto bases. 
U.S.  commanders in some cases are prevented from taking actions that
would make their forces more secure.  U.S.  forces in the countries
we visited are usually prevented from patrolling outside the fencing
of their own perimeter.  At one location we visited, entry to the
base is controlled by host nation security forces with no U.S. 
military role.  The U.S.  military does not have its own perimeter
within this base and may not approach the base perimeter without
escort from host nation personnel.  U.S.  security officials at this
base said because the base perimeter is easily penetrated, they
believe themselves to be more vulnerable to small suitcase sized
bombs than to truck bombs.  Although the responsibility for ensuring
force protection for most DOD personnel has been assigned to the
geographic combatant commanders, a large group of DOD personnel
deployed abroad do not fall under the authority of these commanders. 
Some of these personnel, such as those assigned to the Defense
Attache Office and Marine embassy guards, fall under the authority of
a chief of mission,\4 who is responsible for their security.  Others,
however, while legally the responsibility of a chief of mission, fall
into a gray area between the force protection responsibility of the
chief of mission and the geographic combatant commander.  Many of
these personnel were receiving little or no security support from the
embassy.  Such support can include security guards, physical security
assessments of housing and work places, and threat information. 

In Turkey, for example, the U.S.  embassy and local U.S.  military
representatives identified about 1,500 people whose security falls
into this gray area.  These include several hundred assigned to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as others assigned
to the Office of Defense Cooperation, the Army's Training and
Doctrine Command, the Army Corps of Engineers, and Military Traffic
Management Command.  Embassy officials in Turkey said that
antiterrorism responsibility for these people must be clarified. 
Either DOD must take responsibility for these people, they said, or
the embassy must have explicit authority over them to enforce the
State Department's security regulations.  The officials added that
State will need a concomitant increase in resources to carry out any
added responsibilities. 

Following the bombing in Saudi Arabia, DOD and State signed a
memorandum of understanding clarifying security responsibilities for
all DOD personnel in the region.  In our July report, we recommended
that the Secretary of Defense take the necessary steps to expedite
approval of a similar memorandum of understanding with the Secretary
of State that would clarify the antiterrorism responsibilities for
all DOD personnel stationed overseas who do not fall under the
command of a geographic combatant commander.  DOD concurred with this
recommendation. 


--------------------
\3 The others were Algeria, Bosnia, Colombia, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Peru, and Rwanda. 

\4 The chief of mission, with the title of Ambassador, Minister, or
Charge D'Affaires, is the head of each U.S.  diplomatic mission. 
These officers are responsible for all components of the mission
within a country, including consular posts. 


   PROTECTION OF MANY U.S.  FORCES
   HAS IMPROVED, BUT
   VULNERABILITIES REMAIN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

During our review, we found the U.S.  Central Command and its service
component commands had taken a number of steps to improve the
protection of U.S.  forces from terrorist attacks.  The U.S.  Central
Command's area of responsibility includes the Middle East, the region
with the most high-threat countries.  The special emphasis at U.S. 
Central Command was not unexpected given that its forces were the
most recent targets of terrorist attacks.  Among the actions taken,
the command had

  -- determined the range of specific terrorist threats it needed to
     counteract in its area of responsibility, including a
     20,000-pound truck bomb--the estimated approximate size of the
     bomb that struck Khobar Towers;

  -- devised threat-based standards, such as stand-off,\5 to guide
     the design and construction of new facilities and modifications
     to existing structures;

  -- established an office that coordinates antiterrorist activities
     in the region and reports directly to the Deputy Commander in
     Chief, U.S.  Central Command; and

  -- identified a need for and filled hundreds of additional security
     positions. 

During our visits to overseas bases, we found that significant
efforts had been taken in Turkey and the Middle East to increase the
protection of U.S.  forces from vehicle bombs.  In these countries,
sites had been fortified in various ways for protection against a
possible terrorist attack, particularly against a truck bomb like the
one that struck Khobar Towers.  Commanders were attempting to extend
the stand-off distance around their facilities.  Where sufficient
stand-off was not available, they were using other measures, such as
concrete barriers, to mitigate against the impact of a truck bomb. 

Saudi Arabia had seen the most profound changes, as thousands of DOD
personnel were moved to remote facilities in the desert and
restricted from leaving base throughout their entire tour.  Most
military dependents were returned to the United States to reduce
exposure to the terrorist threat.  Many dependents also were being
withdrawn from Kuwait and Bahrain.  In Turkey, an off-base apartment
building dedicated solely to U.S.  military personnel was closed
because it was considered too vulnerable to a truck bomb attack.  The
personnel living in this building were relocated to on-base housing
or dispersed to other off-base housing facilities.  The base also had
installed concrete barriers to make on-base residential areas and
headquarters buildings less vulnerable and had begun to repair holes
in the perimeter fence. 

Despite these improvements, commanders and security officials
acknowledged that vulnerabilities remained.  We discuss these
vulnerabilities in our classified statement. 

Some U.S.  officials expressed concern that efforts to isolate and
fortify DOD facilities could have the effect of making other targets
more vulnerable.  For instance, terrorists could decide to target
small military offices or vehicles outside the main installations. 
Moreover, they could target housing areas because in Turkey and some
Middle East countries, many U.S.  military personnel were living in
off-base housing complexes or in individual quarters dispersed among
the civilian population. 


--------------------
\5 According to DOD officials, "stand-off" is the distance between
the base facilities and uncontrolled public and private land. 


   DOD HAS TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE
   THE ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

At the time of our review, DOD had initiated a number of changes in
its overall antiterrorism program in response to the Khobar Towers
bombing.  Some of the major initiatives were as follows: 

  -- The Secretary of Defense assigned the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
     Staff, to be his principal advisor on antiterrorism.  To support
     this added responsibility, the Chairman created a new office in
     the Joint Staff--the Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism. 

  -- The Secretary of Defense directed that the five geographic
     combatant commanders take on increased antiterrorism
     responsibilities.  Prior to this, the combatant commanders did
     not have explicit responsibility for ensuring the force
     protection of all DOD activities in their area of
     responsibility. 

  -- Under the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
     Defense Special Weapons Agency began to conduct vulnerability
     assessments at installations.  The assessments, which supplement
     those done by other DOD components, are intended to help
     commanders understand their vulnerabilities to terrorist attack
     and to give them options for enhancing security and mitigating
     weapon effects. 

  -- DOD mandated more robust antiterrorism training for personnel
     deploying to medium- and high-threat countries.  The training is
     intended to increase awareness of the threat and provide
     information on individual protective measures.  Additional
     training is to be provided to (1) personnel designated as unit
     antiterrorism instructors and advisors, (2) officers attending
     pre-command courses, and (3) executive-level officials with
     antiterrorism responsibilities. 

  -- The Secretary of Defense established a centrally controlled fund
     to support emergency high-priority antiterrorism requirements
     not funded by the services.  The fund is managed by the Joint
     Staff.  In fiscal year 1998, DOD requested $15 million for this
     fund. 

  -- The services also had planned or instituted changes in their
     approach to antiterrorism.  Most notably, the Air Force created
     a Force Protection Group that would be among the first to deploy
     in a contingency and would be responsible for establishing the
     security infrastructure at the deployment site. 

Nevertheless, Mr.  Chairman, our work raised concerns that DOD's
initiatives were falling short of establishing a comprehensive and
consistent approach to antiterrorism.  This was the vision set forth
by the Downing Assessment Task Force, appointed by the former
Secretary of Defense to investigate the Khobar Towers bombing and
make recommendations on how to prevent or minimize the damage of
future attacks.  The Secretary on the whole concurred with the task
force's report.  The report identified key principles for managing
and improving the antiterrorism program, and we used these principles
as the primary criteria for our review. 

The Downing task force found, and our review confirmed, that
commanders at all levels lacked definitive guidance on implementing
an antiterrorism program.  Such guidance--in the form of
prescriptive, measurable standards--is one of the tools commanders
need to fulfill their responsibilities for protecting the force.  In
the absence of definitive guidance, commanders lack an objective
basis for determining whether their antiterrorism measures are
sufficient.  They must rely instead on their own knowledge and
experience and that of their staff.  I should note here that U.S. 
Central Command was much further along than the other combatant
commands or DOD as a whole in providing definitive guidance to
commanders in its area of responsibility. 

In our July report, we made a number of recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense.  Specifically, we recommended that the
Secretary direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop the
following common standards and procedures: 

  -- standardized vulnerability assessments to ensure a consistent
     level of quality and to provide a capability to compare the
     results from different sites,

  -- DOD-wide physical security standards that are measurable yet
     provide a means for deviations when required by local
     circumstances, and

  -- procedures to maintain greater consistency among commands in
     their implementation of threat condition security measures. 

DOD concurred with two of our recommendations but did not agree on
the need for DOD-wide physical security standards

Mr.  Chairman, it is important to note that in its investigation of
the Khobar Towers bombing, the Downing task force found that DOD had
not established physical security standards, including standards
governing the design and construction of new buildings or the
modifications of existing structures against the terrorist threat. 
The Downing task force recommended that DOD adopt prescriptive
physical security standards.  We found that DOD had not implemented
this recommendation and had no plans to do so. 

The Downing task force held up the State Department's physical
security standards as an example for DOD to follow in developing its
own standards.  The task force characterized State's standards as
detailed and descriptive.  Most importantly, the task force said that
State had adopted the standards as requirements, not as guidance. 
State's standards, developed in coordination with the Overseas
Security Policy Board, apply to all U.S.  missions abroad under the
authority of a chief of mission.  The standards were created
primarily for U.S.  diplomatic offices and residential facilities. 
They are based on the assessed threat level in the country, with the
result that facilities in higher threat countries must meet more
stringent requirements.  For high-threat areas, the standards address
such physical security concerns as the height of perimeter walls,
entry control, stand-off distance, and the location of parking areas. 

Currently, DOD requires its components to deploy a physical security
system to protect defense resources.  But, unlike State's
regulations, DOD's regulations do not establish physical security
standards that define what is acceptable or unacceptable.  After the
Khobar Towers bombing, DOD developed combating terrorism program
standards,\6 but these do not provide detailed and descriptive
requirements.  The new DOD standards, rather, are intended as a
baseline for developing specific standards.  For instance, one
program standard states,

     "Commanders at all levels shall develop and implement a physical
     security plan, as part of the [antiterrorism/force protection]
     program, that incorporates facilities, equipment, trained
     personnel, and procedures into a comprehensive effort designed
     to provide maximum antiterrorism protection to personnel and
     assets."

More specific guidance to implement these performance standards is
provided in a DOD handbook, but the handbook guidance is advisory
only.\7

DOD officials told us they had no plans to issue DOD-wide physical
security standards.  They believe that the variability in threat and
vulnerabilities among geographic areas and individual sites precludes
such standards.  However, we noted that diplomatic missions also face
different threats and vulnerabilities yet are required to meet
State's physical security standards.  The DOD officials also said
commanders responsible for antiterrorism may establish specific
standards if they choose.  Of the five geographic combatant commands,
only U.S.  Central Command had developed prescriptive design
standards.  Central Command officials said that since DOD declined to
issue standards for protecting facilities against a bomb blast, they
developed their own.  Officials at the other geographic combatant
commands had various opinions regarding the need for DOD-wide
physical security standards.  For instance, U.S.  European Command
officials stated that DOD should establish minimum physical security
standards for each threat level and then require the services to
publish more specific guidance.  Such an approach would allow for
differences among the services.  U.S.  Pacific Command officials
believe that measurable DOD-wide physical security standards are a
good idea if they provide flexibility to allow for variability in the
threat and local circumstances.  U.S.  Navy Europe stated that there
is a need for a DOD-wide standard that is tough enough to force all
activities to a minimum level of compliance but flexible enough to
allow an activity to adjust for impediments that might prevent them
from complying with the requirements.  In its official comments on
our report, DOD stated that commanders should not be told how to
accomplish the task of providing physical security for their
personnel.  DOD believes that its new program standards, supplemented
by existing physical security guidance, will be sufficient to assist
commanders.  DOD also stated that it would be a mistake to have a
central office in Washington, D.C., issue standards because such an
office could not react quickly enough to changes in terrorists
tactics.  Furthermore, DOD stated that establishing standards would
require a bureaucratic waiver process for facilities that do not meet
the standards. 

We continue to believe that common DOD standards would aid commanders
by providing them with a more objective basis for determining whether
their forces are adequately protected from terrorist threats.  Many
of the commanders and antiterrorism officials we spoke with
specifically noted the need for, and the importance of, DOD-wide
standards. 

We agree with DOD that any physical security standards must be
flexible to accommodate unique security situations and recognized
this need for flexibility in our recommendation.  The common DOD
standards could be supplemented as warranted by the geographic
combatant commands and their service component commands.  Similarly,
if a waiver process is required, it could be implemented by these
commands rather than by a central office in Washington, D.C. 
Moreover, in our view and in the view of several commanders we spoke
with, a waiver process is likely to add a measure of accountability
to the program and assures that senior-level officials are aware of
potential problems. 


--------------------
\6 The standards were issued in July 1997. 

\7 DOD 0-2000.12H, "Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities
Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence" (Feb.  1993). 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

Mr.  Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement.  We would be
pleased to answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee
may have. 


*** End of document. ***