Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later
Deploying Army Divisions (Testimony, 03/20/98, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126).

GAO discussed its preliminary findings from its ongoing evaluation of
personnel readiness in the Army's five later-deploying divisions,
focusing on the: (1) extent of personnel shortages in the divisions and
the extent to which these shortages are reflected in readiness reports;
(2) key factors contributing to personnel shortages and the impact such
shortages have on readiness; (3) Army's plans for correcting such
shortages should these divisions be called upon to deploy; and (4)
issues to be considered in dealing with personnel shortages.

GAO noted that: (1) in the aggregate, the Army's five later-deploying
divisions had an average of 93 percent of their personnel on board at
the time of GAO's visits; (2) however, aggregate data does not fully
reflect the extent of shortages of combat troops, technical specialists,
experienced officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCO) that exist in
those divisions; (3) the readiness reporting system that contains the
aggregate data on these divisions does not fully disclose the impact of
personnel shortages on the ability of the divisions' units to accomplish
critical wartime tasks; (4) as a result, there is a disconnect between
the reported readiness of these forces in formal readiness reports and
the actual readiness that GAO observed on its visits; (5) these
disconnects exist because the unit readiness reporting system does not
consider some information that has a significant impact on a unit's
readiness, such as operating tempo, personnel shortfalls in key
positions, and crew and squad staffing; (6) the Army's priority in
assigning personnel to these divisions, Army-wide shortages of
personnel, frequent deployments to peacekeeping missions, and the
assignment of soldiers to other tasks outside of their specialty are the
primary reasons for personnel shortfalls; (7) the impact of personnel
shortages on training and readiness is exacerbated by the extent to
which personnel are being used for work outside their specialties or
units; (8) according to commanders in all the divisions, the collective
impact of understaffing squads and crews, transferring to other jobs the
NCOs from their crews and squads they are responsible for training, and
assigning personnel to other units as fillers for exercises and
operations have degraded their capability and readiness; (9) if the Army
had to deploy these divisions for a high-intensity conflict, these
divisions would fill their units with Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers,
retired servicemembers, and newly recruited soldiers; (10) however, the
Army's plan for providing these personnel includes assumptions that have
not been validated, and there may not be enough trained personnel to
fully staff or fill later-deploying divisions within their scheduled
deployment times; and (11) solutions, if any, will depend upon how the
Army plans to use these divisions in the future.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-98-126
     TITLE:  Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in 
             Later Deploying Army Divisions
      DATE:  03/20/98
   SUBJECT:  Military forces
             Combat readiness
             Army personnel
             Management information systems
             Defense contingency planning
             Human resources utilization
             Training utilization
             Armed forces reserves
             Personnel evaluation systems
             Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Individual Ready Reserve Program
             Desert Storm
             Bosnia
             DOD Status of Resources and Training System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Military Personnel,
Committee on National Security, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
9:00 a.m.  CST
Friday,
March 20, 1998

MILITARY READINESS - OBSERVATIONS
ON PERSONNEL READINESS IN LATER
DEPLOYING ARMY DIVISIONS

Statement of Mark E.  Gebicke, Director, Military Operations and
Capabilities Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126

GAO/NSIAD-98-126T


(703211)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  NCO - noncommissioned officers
  SORTS - Status of Resources and Training System

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: 

We are pleased to be here to discuss our preliminary findings from
our ongoing evaluation of personnel readiness in the Army's five
later-deploying divisions.  These divisions constitute almost half of
the Army's active combat forces and, according to Army officials, are
critical to the success of specific war plans and the national
military strategy. 

This morning, I would first like to summarize our preliminary
observations regarding personnel readiness in the later-deploying
divisions.  Then, I would like to describe in more detail the (1)
extent of personnel shortages in the divisions and the extent to
which these shortages are reflected in readiness reports, (2) key
factors contributing to personnel shortages and the impact such
shortages have on readiness, (3) Army's plans for correcting such
shortages should these divisions be called upon to deploy, and (4)
issues to be considered in dealing with personnel shortages.  Unless
otherwise indicated, the information provided reflects what we found
at the time of our visits to the later-deploying divisions during the
period August 1997 through January 1998. 


   SUMMARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

In the aggregate, the Army's five later-deploying divisions had an
average of 93 percent of their personnel on board at the time of our
visits.  However, aggregate data does not fully reflect the extent of
shortages of combat troops, technical specialists, experienced
officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCO) that exist in those
divisions. 

The readiness reporting system that contains the aggregate data on
these divisions does not fully disclose the impact of personnel
shortages on the ability of the divisions' units to accomplish
critical wartime tasks.  As a result, there is a disconnect between
the reported readiness of these forces in formal readiness reports
and the actual readiness that we observed on our visits.  These
disconnects exist because the unit readiness reporting system does
not consider some information that has a significant impact on a
unit's readiness, such as operating tempo, personnel shortfalls in
key positions, and crew and squad staffing. 

The Army's priority in assigning personnel to these divisions,
Army-wide shortages of personnel, frequent deployments to
peacekeeping missions, and the assignment of soldiers to other tasks
outside of their specialty are the primary reasons for personnel
shortfalls. 

The impact of personnel shortages on training and readiness is
exacerbated by the extent to which personnel are being used for work
outside their specialties or units.  According to commanders in all
the divisions, the collective impact of understaffing squads and
crews, transferring to other jobs the NCOs from the crews and squads
they are responsible for training, and assigning personnel to other
units as fillers for exercises and operations have degraded their
capability and readiness. 

If the Army had to deploy these divisions for a high-intensity
conflict, these divisions would fill their units with Individual
Ready Reserve Soldiers,\1 retired servicemembers, and newly recruited
soldiers.  However, the Army's plan for providing these personnel
includes assumptions that have not been validated, and there may not
be enough trained personnel to fully staff or fill later-deploying
divisions within their scheduled deployment times. 

Solutions, if any, to these problems will depend upon how the Army
plans to use these divisions in the future. 

Before I continue, I want to provide you with some additional
background about the Army's divisions. 


--------------------
\1 The Individual Ready Reserve is comprised of officers and enlisted
soldiers with prior military service who are completing their 8-year
military service obligation or who are not assigned to units.  The
majority of these personnel have no annual training requirements. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Today's Army faces an enormous challenge to balance risks and
resources in order to meet its many missions.  Since 1990, active
Army ranks have been reduced from 770,000 to 495,000 personnel, a
reduction of about 36 percent.  Simultaneously, world events have
dictated that forces be trained and ready to respond to potential
high-intensity missions in areas such as Korea and the Persian Gulf
while conducting peace enhancement operations around the world. 

The Army currently has 10 active combat divisions compared to the 18
it had at the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.\2 Four of the
10 divisions are considered contingency divisions and would be the
first to deploy in the event of a major theater war.  These units are
the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, 3rd Infantry, and 1st Cavalry
divisions.  The 2nd Infantry Division, while not a contingency force
division, is already deployed in Korea. 

The remaining five divisions, which are the focus of my testimony,
are expected to deploy in the event of a second simultaneous or
nearly simultaneous major theater contingency or as reinforcements
for a larger-than-expected first contingency.  These units are the
1st Armored,
1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 10th Infantry, and 25th Infantry
divisions.  Also, these divisions have been assigned the bulk of the
recent peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Haiti, and the 4th
Infantry division over the last
2 years has been conducting the Army's advanced war-fighting
experiment. 

Appendix I provides a list of the Army's current active divisions and
the locations of each division's associated brigades. 


--------------------
\2 Three of the 18 divisions were composed of 2 active brigades and 1
reserve component brigade.  Today, the 10 divisions are composed of
all active duty units. 


   PERSONNEL SHORTAGES ARE
   SIGNIFICANT IN LATER-DEPLOYING
   DIVISIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

In the aggregate, the Army's later-deploying divisions were assigned
66,053, or 93 percent, of their 70,665 authorized personnel at the
beginning of fiscal year 1998.  However, aggregate numbers do not
adequately reflect the condition that exists within individual
battalions, companies, and platoons of these divisions.  This is
because excess personnel exist in some grades, ranks, and skills,
while shortages exist in others.  For example, while the 1st Armored
Division was staffed at 94 percent in the aggregate, its combat
support and service support specialties were filled at below 85
percent, and captains and majors were filled at 73 percent. 

In addition, a portion of each later-deploying division exists only
on paper because all authorized personnel have not been assigned. 
All these divisions contain some squads, crews, and platoons in which
no personnel or a minimum number of personnel are assigned. 
Assigning a minimum number of personnel to a crew means having fewer
personnel than needed to fully accomplish wartime missions; for
example, having five soldiers per infantry squad rather than nine,
tank crews with three soldiers instead of four, or artillery crews
with six soldiers rather than nine.  We found significant personnel
shortfalls in all the later-deploying divisions.  For example: 

  -- At the 10th Infantry Division, only 138 of 162 infantry squads
     were fully or minimally filled, and 36 of the filled squads were
     unqualified. 

  -- At the 2nd and 3rd brigades of the 25th Infantry Division, 52 of
     162 infantry squads were minimally filled or had no personnel
     assigned. 

  -- At the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, only 56 percent
     of the authorized infantry soldiers for its Bradley Fighting
     Vehicles were assigned, and in the 2nd Brigade, 21 of 48
     infantry squads had no personnel assigned. 

  -- At the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, only 16 of 116
     M1A1 tanks had full crews and were qualified, and in one of the
     Brigade's two armor battalions, 14 of 58 tanks had no
     crewmembers assigned because the personnel were deployed to
     Bosnia.  In addition, at the Division's engineer brigade in
     Germany, 11 of 24 bridge teams had no personnel assigned. 

  -- At the 4th Infantry Division, 13 of 54 squads in the engineer
     brigade had no personnel assigned or had fewer personnel
     assigned than required. 

The significance of personnel shortfalls in later-deploying divisions
cannot be adequately captured solely in terms of overall numbers. 
The rank, grade, and experience of the personnel assigned must also
be considered.  For example, captains and majors are in short supply
Army-wide due to drawdown initiatives undertaken in recent years. 
The five later-deploying divisions had only 91 percent and 78 percent
of the captains and majors authorized, respectively, but 138 percent
of the lieutenants authorized.  The result is that unit commanders
must fill leadership positions in many units with less experienced
officers than Army doctrine requires.  For example, in the 1st
Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, 65 percent of the key staff
positions designated to be filled by captains were actually filled by
lieutenants or captains that were not graduates of the Advanced
Course.  We found that three of the five battalion maintenance
officers, four of the six battalion supply officers, and three of the
four battalion signal officers were lieutenants rather than captains. 
While this situation represents an excellent opportunity for the
junior officers, it also represents a situation in which critical
support functions are being guided by officers without the required
training or experience. 

There is also a significant shortage of NCOs in the later-deploying
divisions.  Again, within the 1st Brigade, 226, or 17 percent of the
1,450, total NCO authorizations, were not filled at the time of our
visit.  As was the case in all the divisions, a significant shortage
was at the first-line supervisor, sergeant E-5 level.  At the
beginning of fiscal year 1998, the 5 later-deploying divisions were
short nearly 1,900 of the total 25,357 NCOs authorized, and as of
February 15, 1998, this shortage had grown to almost 2,200. 


   CURRENT READINESS REPORTS DO
   NOT FULLY DISCLOSE PERSONNEL
   SHORTFALLS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

In recent years, in reports and testimony before the Congress, we
discussed the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS),\3

which is used to measure readiness, and reported on the need for
improvements.  SORTS data for units in the later-deploying divisions
have often reflected a high readiness level for personnel because the
system uses aggregate statistics to assess personnel readiness.  For
example, a unit that is short 20 percent of all authorized personnel
in the aggregate could still report the ability to undertake most of
its wartime mission, even though up to 25 percent of the key leaders
and personnel with critical skills may not be assigned.  Using
aggregate data to reflect personnel readiness masks the underlying
personnel problems I have discussed today, such as shortages by skill
level, rank, or grade.  Compounding these problems are high levels of
personnel turnover, incomplete squads and crews, and frequent
deployments, none of which are part of the readiness calculation
criteria.  Yet, when considered collectively, these factors create
situations in which commanders may have difficulty developing unit
cohesion, accomplishing training objectives, and maintaining
readiness. 

Judging by our analysis of selected commanders' comments submitted
with their SORTS reports and other available data, the problems I
have just noted are real.  However, some commanders apparently do not
consider them serious enough to warrant a downgrade in the reported
readiness rating.  For example, at one engineer battalion, the
commander told us his unit had lost the ability to provide sustained
engineer support to the division.  His assessment appeared
reasonable, since company- and battalion-level training for the past
4 months had been canceled due to the deployment of battalion leaders
and personnel to operations in Bosnia.  As a result of this
deployment, elements of the battalion left behind had only 33 to 55
percent of its positions filled.  The commander of this battalion,
however, reported an overall readiness assessment of C-2, which was
based in part on a personnel level that was over 80 percent in the
aggregate.  The commander also reported that he would be able to
achieve a C-1 status in only 20 training days.  This does not seem
realistic, given the shortages we noted.  We found similar
disconnects between readiness conditions as reported in SORTS and
actual unit conditions at other armor, infantry, and support units. 


--------------------
\3 The system assigns each unit a readiness rating from C-1 to C-5. 
A C-1 unit can undertake the full wartime mission for which it is
organized and designed; a C-2 unit can undertake the bulk of its
wartime mission; a C-3 unit can undertake major portions of its
wartime mission; C-4 and C-5 units are at lower levels of readiness. 
Each commander reporting readiness may use his/her professional
judgment to either upgrade or downgrade the calculated overall
C-rating by one level but must provide a written justification in the
form of "commander's comments."


   MANY FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED
   TO PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS IN
   LATER DEPLOYING DIVISIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

Many factors have contributed to shortfalls of personnel in the
Army's later-deploying divisions, including (1) the Army's priority
for assigning personnel to units, commands, and agencies; (2)
Army-wide shortages of some types of personnel; (3) peacekeeping
operations; and (4) the assignment of soldiers to joint and other
Army command, recruiting, and base management functions. 


      LATER-DEPLOYING DIVISIONS
      RECEIVE LOW PRIORITY FOR
      STAFFING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.1

The Army uses a tiered system to allocate personnel and other
resources to its units.  The Army gives top priority to staffing DOD
agencies; major commands such as the Central Command, the European
Command, and the Pacific Command; the National Training Center; and
the Army Rangers and Special Forces Groups.  These entities receive
98 to 100 percent of the personnel authorized for each grade and each
military occupational specialty.  The 2nd Infantry Division, which is
deployed in Korea, and the four contingency divisions are second in
priority.  Although each receives 98 to 100 percent of its aggregate
authorized personnel, the total personnel assigned are not required
to be evenly distributed among grades or military specialties.  The
remaining five later-deploying divisions receive a proportionate
share of the remaining forces.  Unlike priority one and two forces,
the later-deploying units have no minimum personnel level. 


      ARMY-WIDE SHORTAGES OF
      PERSONNEL HAVE CONTRIBUTED
      TO SHORTFALLS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.2

Army-wide shortages of personnel add to the shortfalls of
later-deploying divisions.  For example, in fiscal year 1997, the
Army's enlistment goal for infantrymen was 16,142.  However, only
about 11,300 of those needed were enlisted, which increased the
existing shortage of infantry soldiers by an additional 4,800
soldiers.  As of February 15, 1998, Army-wide shortages existed for
28 Army specialties.  Many positions in squads and crews are left
unfilled or minimally filled because personnel are diverted to work
in key positions where they are needed more. 

Also, because of shortages of experienced and branch-qualified
officers, the Army has instituted an Officer Distribution Plan, which
distributes a "fair share" of officers by grade and specialty among
the combat divisions.  While this plan has helped spread the
shortages across all the divisions, we noted significant shortages of
officers in certain specialties at the later-deploying divisions. 


      PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAVE
      EXACERBATED SHORTFALLS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.3

Since 1995, when peacekeeping operations began in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
there has been a sustained increase in operations for three of the
later-deploying divisions:  the 1st Armored Division, the 1st
Infantry Division, and the 10th Infantry Division.  For example, in
fiscal year 1997,
the 1st Armored Division was directed 89 times to provide personnel
for operations other than war and contingency operations, training
exercises, and for other assignments from higher commands.  More than
3,200 personnel were deployed a total of nearly 195,000 days for the
assignments, 89 percent of which were for operations in Bosnia. 
Similarly, the average soldier in the 1st Infantry Division was
deployed 254 days in fiscal year 1997, primarily in support of
peacekeeping operations. 

Even though the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions have had 90
percent or more of their total authorized personnel assigned since
they began operations in Bosnia, many combat support and service
support specialties were substantially understrength, and only
three-fourths of field grade officers were in place.  As a result,
the divisions took personnel from nondeploying units to fill the
deploying units with the needed number and type of personnel.  As a
further result, the commanders of nondeploying units have squads and
crews with no, or a minimal number of, personnel. 


      OTHER ASSIGNMENTS OF
      SOLDIERS HAVE CREATED MORE
      SHORTFALLS OF PERSONNEL
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.4

Unit commanders have had to shuffle personnel among positions to
compensate for shortages.  For example, they

  -- assign soldiers that exist in the largest numbers--infantry,
     armor, and artillery--to work in maintenance, supply, and
     personnel administration due to personnel shortages in these
     technical specialties;

  -- assign soldiers to fill personnel shortages at a higher
     headquarters or to accomplish a mission for higher headquarters;
     and

  -- assign soldiers to temporary work such as driving buses, serving
     as lifeguards, and managing training ranges--vacancies, in some
     cases, which have resulted from civilian reductions on base. 

At the time of our visit, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry
Division had 372, or 87 percent, of its 428 authorized dismount
infantry.  However, 51 of these 372 soldiers were assigned to duties
outside their specialties to fill critical technical shortages,
command-directed positions, and administrative and base management
activities.  These reassignments lowered the actual number of
soldiers available for training to 75 percent daily. 

In Germany, at the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, 21 of
48 infantry squads had no personnel assigned due to shortages.  From
the remaining 27 squads that were minimally filled, the equivalent of
another 5 squads of the Brigade's soldiers were working in
maintenance, supply, and administrative specialties to compensate for
personnel shortages in those specialties.  The end result is that the
brigade only had 22 infantry squads with 7 soldiers each rather than
48 squads with 9 soldiers each. 


   ARMY OFFICIALS BELIEVE
   READINESS AND TRAINING HAVE
   BEEN DEGRADED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

According to Army officials, the reduction of essential training,
along with the cumulative impact of the shortages I just outlined,
has resulted in an erosion of readiness.  Readiness in the divisions
responsible for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia has been especially
affected because the challenges imposed by personnel shortages are
compounded by frequent deployments. 

Universally, division officials told us that the shortage of NCOs in
the later-deploying divisions is the biggest detriment to overall
readiness because crews, squads, and sections are led by lower-level
personnel rather than by trained and experienced sergeants.  Such a
situation impedes effective training because these replacement
personnel become responsible for training soldiers in critical skills
they themselves may not have been trained to accomplish.  At one
division, concern was expressed about the potential for a serious
training accident because tanks, artillery, and fighting vehicles
were being commanded by soldiers without the experience needed to
safely coordinate the weapon systems they command. 

According to Army officials, the rotation of units to Bosnia has also
degraded the training and readiness of the divisions providing the
personnel.  For example, to deploy an 800-soldier task force last
year, the Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team had to reassign 63
soldiers within the brigade to serve in infantry squads of the
deploying unit, strip nondeploying infantry and armor units of
maintenance personnel, and reassign NCOs and support personnel to the
task force from throughout the brigade.  These actions were
detrimental to the readiness of the nondeploying units.  For example,
gunnery exercises for two armor battalions had to be canceled and 43
of 116 tank crews became unqualified on the weapon system, the number
of combat systems out of commission increased, and contractors were
hired to perform maintenance. 

According to 1st Armored and 1st Infantry division officials, this
situation has reduced their divisions' readiness to the point of not
being prepared to execute wartime missions without extensive training
and additional personnel. 


   RETIREES, INDIVIDUAL READY
   RESERVISTS, AND NEW RECRUITS
   WOULD BE USED TO FILL
   SHORTFALLS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7

If the later-deploying divisions are required to deploy to a second
major theater contingency, the Army plans to fill personnel
shortfalls with retired servicemembers, members of the Individual
Ready Reserve, and newly trained recruits.  The number of personnel
to fill the later deploying divisions could be extensive, since (1)
personnel from later deploying divisions would be transferred to fill
any shortages in the contingency units that are first to deploy and
(2) these divisions are already short of required personnel. 

The Army's plan for providing personnel under a scenario involving
two major theater contingencies includes unvalidated assumptions. 
For example, the plan assumes that the Army's training base will be
able to quadruple its output on short notice and that all reserve
component units will deploy as scheduled.  Army officials told us
that based on past deployments, not all the assumptions in their
plans will be realized, and there may not be sufficient trained
personnel to fully man later-deploying divisions within their
scheduled deployment times.  Finally, if retired personnel or
Individual Ready Reserve members are assigned to a unit, training and
crew cohesion may not occur prior to deployment because Army
officials expect some units to receive personnel just before
deployment. 


   SOLUTIONS DEPEND ON
   EXPECTATIONS FOR
   LATER-DEPLOYING FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8

Finding solutions to the personnel problems I have discussed today
will not be easy, given the Army's many missions and reduced
personnel.  While I have described serious shortfalls of personnel in
each of later-deploying divisions, this condition is not necessarily
new.  What is new is the increased operating tempo, largely brought
about because of peacekeeping operations, which has exacerbated the
personnel shortfalls in these divisions.  However, before any
solutions can be discussed, the Army should determine whether it
wants to continue to accept the current condition of its active force
today, that is, five fully combat-ready divisions and five less than
fully combat-capable divisions. 

The Army has started a number of initiatives that ultimately may help
alleviate some of the personnel shortfalls I have described.  These
initiatives include targeted recruiting goals for infantry and
maintenance positions; the advanced war-fighting experiment, which
may reduce the number of personnel required for a division through
the use of technology; and better integration of active and reserve
forces.  Efforts to streamline institutional forces\4 may also yield
personnel that could be used to fill vacancies such as these noted in
my testimony. 

If such efforts do not yield sufficient personnel or solutions to
deal with the shortages we have noted in this testimony, we believe
it is important that the Army, at a minimum, review its current plans
for rectifying these shortfalls in the event of a second major
theater war.  In particular, if the Army expects to deploy fully
combat-capable divisions for such a war, it should review the
viability of alleviating shortfalls predominately with reservists
from the Individual Ready Reserve. 


--------------------
\4 The Army's institutional force provides generally nondeployable
support to the Army infrastructure, including training, doctrine
development, base operations, supply, and maintenance. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8.1

This concludes my testimony.  I will be happy to answer any questions
you may have at this time. 


ACTIVE ARMY DIVISIONS
=========================================================== Appendix I

1st Cavalry Division - headquarters and three brigades at Fort Hood,
Tex. 

3rd Infantry Division - headquarters and two brigades at Fort
Stewart, Ga., and one brigade at Fort Benning, Ga. 

82nd Airborne Division - headquarters and three brigades at Fort
Bragg, N.C. 

101st Airborne Division - headquarters and three brigades at Fort
Campbell, Ky. 

2nd Infantry Division - headquarters and two brigades in Korea, and
one brigade at Fort Lewis, Wash. 

1st Infantry Division - headquarters and two brigades in Germany, and
one brigade at Fort Riley, Kans. 

1st Armored Division - headquarters and two brigades in Germany, and
one brigade at Fort Riley, Kans. 

4th Infantry Division - headquarters and two brigades at Fort Hood,
Tex., and one brigade at Fort Carson, Colo. 

10th Mountain Division - headquarters and two brigades at Fort Drum,
N.Y. 

25th Infantry Division - headquarters and two brigades at Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii, and one brigade at Fort Lewis, Wash. 


*** End of document. ***