Agriculture Trade Agreements: Selected Implementation Issues
(Statement/Record, 02/26/98, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-106).

GAO discussed the implementation of certain agricultural provisions of
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), focusing on: (1) the
impact of measures to protect human, animal or plant life or
health--referred to as sanitary and phytosantiary (SPS) measures; and
(2) state trading enterprises (STEs).

GAO noted that: (1) the Uruguay Round and NAFTA included significant
provisions to liberalize agricultural trade; (2) while forecasters have
estimated that increases in agricultural trade would account for a
sizeable portion of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA agreements' projected
benefits to the United States, challenges exist for ensuring their full
implementation; (3) the World Trade Organization's (WTO) agreement on
the application of sanitary and phytosanitiary measures, and chapter 7
of NAFTA, established guidelines regarding the appropriate use of SPS
measures in relation to trade; (4) although the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) has identified some foreign SPS measures as key
barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, GAO's recent report to Congress
found several weaknesses in the federal government's approach to
identifying and addressing such measures; (5) because of these
weaknesses, the federal government cannot be assured that it is
adequately monitoring other countries' compliance with the WTO or NAFTA
SPS provisions and effectively protecting the interests of U.S.
agricultural exporters; (6) USTR and the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) have primary responsibility for addressing agricultural trade
issues, and they receive technical support from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of State; (7) absent a coordinated approach for addressing
foreign SPS measures, the specific role of USDA regulatory and research
agencies in resolving SPS has not been clearly defined; (8) WTO and USTR
officials suggest that member countries appear to have focused on
implementing provisions of the SPS agreement that enable them to resolve
SPS disputes as they arise; (9) the agricultural and SPS agreements of
the Uruguay Round were intended to move member nations toward
establishing a market-oriented agricultural trading system by minimizing
government involvement in regulating agricultural markets; (10) as a
result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO officially defined STEs and
addressed procedural weaknesses of article XVII by improving the process
for obtaining and reviewing information; (11) in the absence of complete
and transparent information on the activities of STEs, member countries
are hindered in determining whether STEs operate in accordance with GATT
disciplines and whether they have a trade-distorting effect on the
global market; and (12) U.S. agriculture interests have expressed
concern regarding the potential of STEs to distort trade, and USDA
officials have said that a focused U.S. effort to address STEs is
vitally important.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-98-106
     TITLE:  Agriculture Trade Agreements: Selected Implementation Issues
      DATE:  02/26/98
   SUBJECT:  Foreign trade agreements
             Foreign trade policies
             International trade regulation
             International organizations
             Agricultural products
             Product safety
             International trade restriction
             Interagency relations
             Tariffs
IDENTIFIER:  NAFTA
             North American Free Trade Agreement
             Canada
             Mexico
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, House
of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
2:00 p.m., EST
Thursday,
February 12, 1998

AGRICULTURE TRADE AGREEMENTS -
SELECTED IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

Statement for the Record by JayEtta Z.  Hecker, Associate Director,
International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and
International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-106

GAO/NSIAD-98-106T

Agriculture Trade Agreements

(711324)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  EPA - Environment Protection Agency
  FDA - Food and Drug Administration
  GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
  NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement
  SPS - sanitary and phytosanitary
  STE - state trading enterprises
  USDA - U.S.  Department of Agriculture
  USTR - U.S.  Trade Representative
  WTO - World Trade Organization

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to have the opportunity to provide this statement for
the record for your hearing on February 12, 1998.  At your request,
we are providing some observations on the implementation of certain
agricultural provisions of the Uruguay Round and North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  These observations, based on our past and
ongoing work, focus on two areas that affect U.S.  agricultural
trade:  (1) the impact of measures to protect human, animal, or plant
life or health--referred to as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures--and (2) the impact of state trading enterprises (STE).\1
Our intention was to give Congress possible avenues of inquiry in its
oversight of agricultural trade issues. 


--------------------
\1 STEs are generally considered to be governmental or
nongovernmental enterprises that are authorized to engage in trade
and are owned, sanctioned, or otherwise supported by the government. 


   SUMMARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Both the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)\2 and NAFTA\3 included provisions for reducing agricultural
trade barriers.  If properly implemented, these provisions could help
liberalize global agricultural trade and provide substantial benefits
to the United States.  However, several challenges exist,
particularly in organizing an effective approach on the part of the
federal government to monitor and strengthen compliance with SPS
measures and to mitigate the effects of STEs on U.S.  agricultural
producers.  After providing some background information on the
agricultural market openings achieved by the Uruguay Round and NAFTA,
we will discuss our specific observations on SPS measures and the use
of STEs. 


--------------------
\2 A conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1986 launched the most
recent round of GATT negotiations--called the Uruguay Round.  The
Uruguay Round Agreement was concluded in 1993, went into force in
January 1995, and resulted in the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). 

\3 NAFTA negotiations were concluded in 1992 by Canada, Mexico, and
the United States.  The agreement became effective in January 1994,
creating the world's largest free trade area. 


   SIGNIFICANT AGRICULTURAL MARKET
   OPENINGS GENERALLY ACHIEVED IN
   BOTH URUGUAY ROUND AND NAFTA
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

The Uruguay Round and NAFTA included significant provisions to
liberalize agricultural trade.  Generally, these agreements comprised
commitments for reducing government support, improving market access,
and establishing for the first time rules on various aspects of
global agricultural trade.  As the largest exporter of agricultural
commodities in the world, the United States was expected to benefit
substantially from implementation of the reforms embodied in these
agreements. 


      URUGUAY ROUND
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

The Uruguay Round represented the first time that GATT member
countries established disciplines concerning international
agricultural trade.  The Uruguay Round agreements, including those on
agriculture and SPS, included several key measures to liberalize
agricultural trade.  First, generally over a 6-year period beginning
in 1995, member countries were required to make specific reductions
in three types of support to agricultural producers:  (1) import
restrictions, (2) export subsidies, and (3) internal support. 
Second, member countries concluded an Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures that established guidelines on
the use of import regulations to protect human, animal, and plant
life and health.  Third, countries established a Committee on
Agriculture that would oversee implementation of WTO member
countries' commitments to reduce agricultural support and provide a
forum for discussions on agricultural trade policies.  Fourth, the
Round provided a definition of STEs and implemented procedural
measures designed to improve compliance with GATT rules.  Finally,
member countries agreed to enter a second phase of negotiations to
further liberalize agricultural trade beginning in 1999. 


      NAFTA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.2

Under NAFTA, the three member countries--Canada, Mexico, and the
United States--agreed to eliminate all tariffs on agricultural trade. 
Some of these tariffs were to be eliminated immediately; others would
be phased out over a 5-, 10- or 15-year period.  NAFTA also required
the immediate elimination of all nontariff trade barriers, such as
import restrictions, generally through their conversion either to
tariff-rate quotas\4 or tariffs.  For example, Mexico's import
licensing requirements for bulk commodities, such as wheat, were
terminated under NAFTA.  In addition, the NAFTA charter's chapter on
agriculture included provisions on SPS.  NAFTA also established a
joint committee on agricultural trade and a committee on SPS
measures,\5 providing a channel for discussion of member countries'
ongoing concerns, in an effort to head off disputes. 


--------------------
\4 NAFTA tariff-rate quotas allow a certain quantity of product to
enter a country duty free, while anything over this amount will be
subject to an over-quota tariff. 

\5 The term "SPS measures" refers to various regulations governments
may adopt to protect human, animal, and plant life or health. 
Although SPS measures may result in trade restrictions, governments
generally agree that in certain cases they are necessary and
appropriate.  However, governments may disagree about the need for or
appropriateness of particular SPS measures. 


   CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING WTO
   AND NAFTA PROVISIONS ON SPS
   MEASURES AND STES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

While forecasters have estimated that increases in agricultural trade
would account for a sizable portion of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA
accords' projected benefits to the United States, challenges exist
for ensuring their full implementation.\6 In particular, our work on
foreign SPS measures and STEs illustrates the complexity of the
implementation challenges, particularly in organizing U.S. 
government efforts to assure effective enforcement and monitoring of
member nations' agricultural commitments under both agreements.  For
example, The U.S.  Trade Representative (USTR) has found that as
trade agreements begin to reduce tariffs on agricultural commodities,
the United States must guard against the increasing use of SPS
measures as the trade barrier of choice. 


--------------------
\6 In our 1994 review of the results of the Uruguay Round, we
identified several areas of the Agreement on Agriculture that would
require ongoing monitoring:  changes in other countries' policies,
changes in U.S.  policies, use of the Committee on Agriculture, and
preparation of a foundation for future agricultural negotiations.  At
the Singapore Ministerial meeting of the WTO in December 1996, U.S. 
officials expressed concern that not all countries were carrying out
their commitments to open their agricultural markets or were
implementing new, disguised, trade-distorting measures. 


      WTO AND NAFTA SPS PROVISIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, and chapter 7 of NAFTA, established guidelines regarding
the appropriate use of SPS measures in relation to trade.  While
these agreements are not identical, they are consistent in their
guiding principles and rules.  Both agreements recognize the right of
countries to maintain SPS measures but stipulate that such measures
(1) must not be applied arbitrarily or constitute a disguised
restriction on trade and (2) must be based on scientific principles
and an assessment of risk.  In addition, the WTO and NAFTA agreements
provided dispute settlement procedures to help resolve disagreements
between member countries on SPS measures, including consultations and
review by a dispute settlement panel. 

The WTO agreement also encourages progress toward achieving three
objectives:  (1) broad harmonization of SPS measures through greater
use of international standards (harmonization), (2) recognition among
members that their SPS measures may differ but still be considered
"equivalent" provided they achieve the same level of protection
(equivalency), and (3) adaptation of SPS measures to recognize pest-
and disease-free regions (regionalization).\7


Our work suggests open issues in the following areas: 

  -- the lack of coordination of U.S.  government efforts to address
     foreign SPS measures;

  -- the adequacy of the USDA's process for balancing its regulatory
     and trade facilitation roles and responsibilities; and

  -- the potential benefits from WTO member countries' progress
     toward achieving the longer-term objectives concerning
     harmonization, equivalency, and regionalization.


--------------------
\7 According to U.S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA) officials, SPS
measures typically do not recognize that imports from part of a
country may be safe even if imports from the entire country are not. 


         STRATEGY TO ADDRESS
         FOREIGN SPS MEASURES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:3.1.1

Although USTR has identified some foreign SPS measures as key
barriers to U.S agricultural exports, our recent report to Congress\8
found several weaknesses in the federal government's approach to
identifying and addressing such measures.  Because of these
weaknesses, the federal government cannot be assured that it is
adequately monitoring other countries' compliance with the WTO or
NAFTA SPS provisions and effectively protecting the interests of U.S. 
agricultural exporters. 

Specifically, we found that the federal structure for addressing SPS
measures is complex and involves multiple entities.  USTR and USDA
have primary responsibility for addressing agricultural trade issues,
and they receive technical support from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
the Department of State.  Our review demonstrated that the specific
roles and responsibilities of individual agencies within this complex
structure are unclear and that effective leadership of their efforts
has been lacking.  During our review, USTR and USDA implemented
certain mechanisms to improve their handling of SPS issues, but the
scope of these mechanisms did not encompass the overall federal
effort.  In addition, we found that the various agencies' efforts to
address foreign SPS measures have been poorly coordinated and they
have had difficulty determining priorities for federal efforts or
developing unified strategies to address individual measures. 
Finally, we found that goals and objectives to guide the federal
approach and measure its success had not been developed. 

We believe that a more organized, integrated, strategic federal
approach for addressing such measures would be beneficial. 
Therefore, we recommended that USTR, USDA, and the other concerned
agencies, such as FDA and EPA, work together to develop coordinated
goals, objectives, and performance measurements for federal efforts
to address foreign SPS measures. 

Outstanding questions derived from our work include the following: 

  -- What steps have USTR and USDA taken to address the weaknesses
     found by our study, such as the lack of a process to prioritize
     federal efforts to address foreign SPS measures? 

  -- How do USTR and USDA plan to improve coordination of their
     activities to address SPS measures? 

  -- How do USTR and USDA plan to work more closely with other
     relevant agencies, such as FDA and EPA, in determining which SPS
     measures to address and how to address them?  Specifically, at
     the executive branch level how does the administration intend to
     balance its trade facilitation and regulatory roles and
     responsibilities? 


--------------------
\8 See Agricultural Exports:  U.S.  Needs a More Integrated Approach
to Address Sanitary/Phytosanitary Issues (GAO/NSIAD-98-32, Dec.  11,
1997). 


         USDA AGENCIES' BALANCING
         OF REGULATORY AND TRADE
         FACILITATION ROLES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:3.1.2

Absent a coordinated approach for addressing foreign SPS measures,
the specific role of USDA regulatory and research agencies in
resolving SPS has not been clearly defined.  Some of these regulatory
agencies, such as the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and
the Food Safety Inspection Service, whose primary responsibilities
are to safeguard human, animal, and plant life or health, have
increasingly assumed a role in efforts to facilitate trade.  Several
trade authorities and industry officials have expressed frustration
that these regulatory agencies (1) seem to lack a sense of urgency
regarding trade matters and (2) are sometimes willing to engage in
technical discussions regarding foreign SPS measures for many months
and even years.  These groups expressed concerns that regulatory
authorities lack negotiating expertise, which sometimes undermined
efforts to obtain the most advantageous result for U.S.  industry
regarding foreign SPS measures.  U.S.  regulatory officials, in turn,
believe that at times trade authorities and industry groups fail to
appreciate that deliberate, and sometimes lengthy, technical and
scientific processes are necessary to adequately address foreign
regulators' concerns about the safety of U.S.  products. 

Government and industry officials have stated that regulatory and
research agencies' responsibilities for dealing with foreign SPS
measures have not been clearly defined.  The tension in balancing the
regulatory and trade facilitation activities of some USDA agencies
underlines the need to more clearly define their role in addressing
SPS measures. 

Questions resulting from our work include the following: 

  -- What steps has USDA taken to use its strategic planning process
     for integrating disparate agency efforts to address SPS
     measures? 

  -- What progress is USDA making in using the Working Group on
     Agricultural Trade Policy to strengthen USDA's SPS efforts?  Has
     this initiative, or any other, begun to deal with the tensions
     that have arisen over the dual roles of some USDA agencies as
     both regulatory and trade facilitation entities? 

  -- Has USDA provided guidance to regulatory agency officials to
     assist in promoting a more consistent effort to balance their
     competing goals and policies? 

  -- Is there outreach to agricultural producers to clarify the new
     roles that increased foreign trade has required these regulatory
     agencies to adopt? 


         POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF
         LONG-TERM SPS OBJECTIVES
         VERSUS IMMEDIATE
         RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
         OVER SPS MEASURES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:3.1.3

WTO and USTR officials suggest that member countries appear to have
focused on implementing provisions of the SPS agreement that enable
them to resolve SPS disputes as they arise, such as the requirement
that SPS measures be based on scientific evidence, but have paid less
attention to other key provisions.  Specifically, member countries
have been less concerned with provisions regarding harmonization,
equivalency, and regionalization of SPS measures.  The practices
these principles encourage are not currently widespread. 

Progress in implementing harmonization, equivalency, and
regionalization could be time consuming.  For example, the United
States and the European Union negotiated for 3 years before reaching
a partial agreement about the equivalence of their respective
inspection systems for animal products.  Nevertheless, these
provisions could help minimize trade disputes in the long run by
creating a more structured approach to SPS measures. 

Our work raises the following questions regarding the SPS agreement's
long-term objectives: 

  -- Is there a sufficient balance in efforts to implement the
     Uruguay Round SPS agreement so as to promote the goals of
     harmonization, equivalency, and regionalization as envisioned in
     the framework of the agreement? 

  -- What factors limit cooperation among WTO member countries in
     pursuit of these three long-term objectives? 

  -- How are USDA and USTR working to promote international
     harmonization of SPS measures based on U.S.  standards that
     would facilitate U.S.  industry access to foreign agricultural
     and agriculture-related markets? 


      WTO PROVISIONS ON STES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.2

The agricultural and SPS agreements of the Uruguay Round\9 were
intended to move member nations toward establishing a market-oriented
agricultural trading system by minimizing government involvement in
regulating agricultural markets.  Some member nations continue to use
STEs\10 to regulate imports and/or exports of selected products.  For
example, STEs have long been important players in the international
wheat and dairy trade. 

As a result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO officially defined STEs and
addressed procedural weaknesses of GATT's article XVII by improving
the process for obtaining and reviewing information.  In the past,
GATT required that STEs (1) act in a manner consistent with the
principles of nondiscriminatory treatment,\11 (2) make purchases
and/or sales in accordance with commercial considerations that allow
foreign enterprises an opportunity to compete, and (3) notify the WTO
secretariat about their STEs' activities (for example, WTO members
who have STEs are required to report information on their
operations).  Subsequently, the Uruguay Round established an STE
working party which is now incorporated into the WTO framework.  In
addition, STEs that engage in agricultural trade are also subject to
the provisions in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, that
define market access restrictions, export subsidies, and internal
support. 

Our work suggests open issues in two areas:  (1) a lack of
transparency in STE pricing practices and (2) the extent of U.S. 
efforts to address STEs. 


--------------------
\9 Although NAFTA contains provisions on STEs that are similar to
those in GATT, it does not include certain provisions such as the STE
reporting requirement. 

\10 Since GATT was first drafted in 1947, STEs have been recognized
as legitimate trading entities in world markets. 

\11 Under WTO, nondiscriminatory treatment generally encompasses
most- favored nation and national treatments.  (For further
information, see State Trading Enterprises:  Compliance With the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GAO/GGD-95-208, Aug.  30,
1995] p.  2, fn.  6.)


         LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN
         STE PRICING PRACTICES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:3.2.1

In the absence of complete and transparent information on the
activities of STEs, member countries are hindered in determining
whether STEs operate in accordance with GATT disciplines and whether
STEs have a trade-distorting effect on the global market.  In 1995,
we reported\12 that compliance with the Uruguay Round STE reporting
requirements or notifications had been poor.\13 Since then, STE
notifications to the WTO have improved, including reporting by
countries with major agricultural STEs.  However, because they are
not required to do so, none of the notifying STE countries have
reported transactional pricing practices--information that could
provide greater transparency about their operations. 

U.S.  agricultural producers continue to express concern over the
lack of transparency in STE pricing practices and their impact on
global free trade.  In 1996, we reported\14 that our effort to fully
evaluate the potential trade-distorting activities of STEs, including
pricing advantages, could not be conducted because of a lack of
transaction-level data.  Without this data and the more transparent
system it would create, the United States finds it difficult to
assess the trade-distorting effects of, and compliance with, WTO
rules governing reporting on STE operations. 

Our work on STEs raises the following questions with regard to the
lack of transparency: 

  -- What progress has the WTO working party on state trading
     enterprises made in studying STEs and improving the information
     available about their activities? 

  -- What steps, if any, can be taken within the WTO framework, or
     otherwise, to increase the pricing transparency of import- and
     export-oriented STEs?\15


--------------------
\12 See State Trading Enterprises:  Compliance with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

\13 While STEs encompass all types of trade, multilateral concerns
historically have focused almost exclusively on agricultural STEs. 

\14 See Canada, Australia, and New Zealand:  Potential Ability of
Agricultural State Trading Enterprises to Distort Trade
(GAO/NSIAD-96-94, June 24, 1996). 

\15 Export STEs include those STEs where the primary role of the
enterprise is to sell a particular commodity in a foreign market. 
Import STEs' primary role is to control and market foreign goods
coming into the host country. 


         U.S.  EFFORTS TO ADDRESS
         STES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:3.2.2

U.S.  agricultural interests have expressed concern regarding the
potential of STEs to distort trade, and USDA officials have said that
a focused U.S.  effort to address STEs is vitally important. 
Although, under the WTO, STEs are recognized as legitimate trading
entities subject to GATT rules, some U.S.  agricultural producers and
others are concerned that STEs, through their monopoly powers and
government support, may have the ability to manipulate worldwide
trade in their respective commodities.  For example, some trade
experts and some WTO member countries are concerned about STEs'
potential to distort trade due to their role as both market regulator
and market participant.  Further, the U.S.  agricultural sector
competes with several prominent export STEs in countries such as
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and import STEs in other countries
such as Japan. 

Questions from our work regarding the U.S.  effort to address STEs
include the following: 

  -- How are USTR and USDA monitoring STEs worldwide to ensure that
     member countries are meeting their WTO commitments? 

  -- Given the limited transparency resulting from STE notifications
     to the WTO, how can the United States be assured that STEs are
     not being operated in a way that circumvents other WTO
     agriculture commitments, such as the prohibition on export
     subsidies or import targets? 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.3

Mr.  Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
statement for the record.  Thank you for permitting me to provide you
with this information. 


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1

Agricultural Exports:  U.S.  Needs a More Integrated Approach to
Address Sanitary/Phytosanitary Issues (GAO/NSIAD-98-32, Dec.  11,
1997). 

Assistance Available to U.S.  Agricultural Producers Under U.S. 
Trade Law (GAO/NSIAD-98-49R, Oct.  20, 1997). 

North American Free Trade Agreement:  Impacts and Implementation
(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-256, Sept.  11, 1997). 

U.S.  Agricultural Exports:  Strong Growth Likely, but U.S.  Export
Assistance Programs' Contribution Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-97-260, Sept. 
30, 1997). 

World Trade Organization:  Observations on the Ministerial Meeting in
Singapore (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-92, Feb.  26, 1997). 

International Trade:  The World Trade Organization's Ministerial
Meeting in Singapore (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-243, Sept.  27, 1996). 

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand:  Potential Ability of
Agricultural State Trading Enterprises to Distort Trade
(GAO/NSIAD-96-94, June 24, 1996). 

International Trade:  Implementation Issues Concerning the World
Trade Organization (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-122, Mar.  13, 1996). 

State Trading Enterprises:  Compliance With the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GAO/GGD-95-208, Aug.  30, 1995). 

Correspondence Regarding State Trading Enterprises (GAO/OGC-95-24,
July 28, 1995). 

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:  Uruguay Round Final Act
Should Produce Overall U.S.  Economic Gains (GAO/GGD-94-83A&B, July
29, 1994). 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:  Agriculture Department's
Projected Benefits Are Subject to Some Uncertainty
(GAO/GGD/RCED-94-272, July 22, 1994). 

North American Free Trade Agreement:  Assessment of Major Issues
(GAO/GGD-93-137, Sept.  9, 1993) (two vols.). 

CFTA/NAFTA:  Agricultural Safeguards (GAO/GGD-93-14R, Mar.  18,
1993). 

International Trade:  Canada and Australia Rely Heavily on Wheat
Boards to Market Grains (GAO/NSIAD-92-129, June 10, 1992). 

*** End of document. ***