Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Narcotics Detection
Technologies (Testimony, 06/25/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-192).

GAO discussed federal agencies' efforts to develop technologies for
detecting narcotics, focusing on: (1) responsibilities of those agencies
primarily involved in developing narcotics detection technologies; (2)
differences in views between the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) and the U.S. Customs Service in developing and deploying these
technologies; and (3) opportunities to strengthen federal detection
technology development efforts.

GAO noted that: (1) ONDCP, Customs, the Department of Defense (DOD), and
the Office of Management Budget (OMB) are primarily responsible for
coordinating or developing narcotics detection technologies; (2)
however, ONDCP and Customs have differing views on the need for various
detection technologies; (3) for example, ONDCP and Customs have
differing views regarding the types of technologies needed along the
southwest border; (4) these differing views should be resolved as they
work with other agencies in preparing a long-term technology development
plan; and (5) at a minimum, the technology plan should address: (a) a
methodology for transitioning technologies from development to
deployment; (b) the status of the automated targeting system's
development as the first line of defense against drug trafficking; (c)
the best technologies for detecting drugs in empty trucks; (d) the
capabilities of the high-energy X-ray system for its ability to detect
narcotics concealed in fully loaded cargo containers; and (e) the
possible use of explosive detection technologies for detecting drugs in
a seaport environment.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-97-192
     TITLE:  Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Narcotics 
             Detection Technologies
      DATE:  06/25/97
   SUBJECT:  Narcotics
             Drug trafficking
             Interagency relations
             Research and development
             Inspection
             Law enforcement
             Search and seizure
             Customs administration
             Electronic equipment
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis Project
             
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO report.  Delineations within the text indicating chapter **
** titles, headings, and bullets are preserved.  Major          **
** divisions and subdivisions of the text, such as Chapters,    **
** Sections, and Appendixes, are identified by double and       **
** single lines.  The numbers on the right end of these lines   **
** indicate the position of each of the subsections in the      **
** document outline.  These numbers do NOT correspond with the  **
** page numbers of the printed product.                         **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO   **
** Document Distribution Center.  For further details, please   **
** send an e-mail message to:                                   **
**                                                              **
**                                            **
**                                                              **
** with the message 'info' in the body.                         **
******************************************************************


Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs,
and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
2:00 p.m., EDT
Wednesday,
June 25, 1997

DRUG TRAFFICKING -
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING
NARCOTICS DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES

Statement of David E.  Cooper, Associate Director, Defense
Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-192

GAO/NSIAD-97-192T

Drug Trafficking

(707279)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  CTAC - Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center
  DOD - Department of Defense
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget
  ONDCP - Office of National Drug Control Policy

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee

It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss federal agencies'
efforts to develop technologies for detecting narcotics.\1 My
testimony focuses on the (1) responsibilities of those agencies
primarily involved in developing narcotics detection technologies,
(2) differences in views between the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) and the U.S.  Customs Service in developing and
deploying these technologies, and (3) opportunities to strengthen
federal detection technology development efforts. 


--------------------
\1 For a listing of our reports on narcotics detection technologies,
see our list of Related GAO Products at the end of this testimony. 


   SUMMARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Four agencies--ONDCP, Customs, Department of Defense (DOD), and
Office of Management Budget (OMB)--are primarily responsible for
coordinating or developing narcotics detection technologies. 
However, ONDCP and Customs have differing views on the need for
various detection technologies.  For example, ONDCP and Customs have
differing views regarding the types of technologies needed along the
southwest border.  These differing views should be resolved as they
work with other agencies in preparing a long-term technology
development plan.  At the close of our testimony, we would like to
suggest areas that should be addressed by the plan.  With this
overview, let me go back and provide more details in each of those
areas. 


   AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING
   NARCOTICS DETECTION
   TECHNOLOGIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Numerous federal agencies are involved in developing technologies for
detecting narcotics.  However, four agencies--ONDCP, Customs, DOD,
and OMB--are primarily responsible for coordinating or developing
narcotics detection technologies.  The congressionally established
Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) within ONDCP is
responsible, among other things, for coordinating federal counterdrug
technology efforts and assessing and recommending narcotics detection
technologies.  Customs, because of its mission to interdict drugs at
U.S.  ports of entry, is ultimately responsible for deciding on the
types of technologies to be developed and used.  As congressionally
directed, DOD has been primarily responsible for funding and
developing most of the innovative narcotics detection technologies
for Customs.  OMB is also involved in overseeing Customs' plans for
developing and deploying narcotics detection technologies. 


      CTAC COORDINATES DEVELOPMENT
      OF NARCOTICS DETECTION
      TECHNOLOGIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

Our work shows that federal agencies have spent about $100 million
since 1990 to develop technology for detecting narcotics.  In
coordinating the counterdrug research and development program, CTAC
attempts to prevent duplication of effort and to ensure that,
whenever possible, those efforts provide capabilities that transcend
the needs of any single agency.  CTAC relies on its interagency
Science and Technology Committee to help prioritize projects
supported with CTAC funds.  The projects are generally managed by a
member agency.  In addition, a Contraband Detection Working Group was
established under this committee to provide an interagency forum to
focus other agencies' research activities on technology areas that
support the contraband detection requirements of law enforcement
agencies. 

In August 1996, the Director, ONDCP, committed himself to
revitalizing the Science and Technology Committee and its working
groups.  Among other things, the Director proposed that the committee
act as a steering body, with membership at a level senior enough to
make commitments to research and development policy decisions.  An
ONDCP official informed us that by December 1997, the Committee
expects to complete preparation of a 10-year technology development
plan with a 5-year budget request. 


      CUSTOMS RELIES ON DOD TO
      DEVELOP MOST NARCOTICS
      DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.2

While Customs has the operational need for detection technologies,
Congress tasked DOD to develop most of these technologies because DOD
was already developing technologies that could be adapted for
narcotics detection.  During fiscal years 1992-96, DOD provided a
total of $73 million for the development of detection technologies,
or an average of about $14.6 million per year.  Over the same period,
Customs provided $3.1 million for the detection technologies, or an
average of about $620,000 per year. 

In 1990, the House Appropriations Committee tasked DOD, in
coordination with Customs, to develop a comprehensive plan for
developing drug detection technology for use in inspecting cargo
containers.  The Committee cited cargo containers as a major threat
for the import of illegal drugs into the United States and identified
specific technologies that should be pursued. 

In April 1994, DOD began testing a high-energy X-ray system\2 capable
of penetrating fully loaded containers, at a specially constructed
port in Tacoma, Washington.  DOD and CTAC viewed the system as a key
step toward the development of effective, nonintrusive cargo
inspection technologies.\3 The tests showed that high-energy X- ray
technology could be an effective tool in detecting drugs in a broad
range of vehicles and in containers carrying varying types of cargo. 
DOD expended about $15 million for facility construction and system
testing.  However, ONDCP, Customs, and DOD agreed in December 1994 to
dismantle the site because Customs did not believe that the system
was affordable, safe, or operationally suitable for its needs. 

Based on experiences with the Tacoma high-energy system, Customs and
DOD entered into an agreement to ensure that DOD would develop only
those technologies that Customs would transition into an operational
environment.  Based on this understanding, DOD also discontinued work
on a Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis project\4 after spending about $15
million because Customs was likewise concerned about its
affordability, safety, and operational suitability.  According to DOD
and Customs officials, future efforts in container inspection will
include developing less expensive X-ray systems with a lower energy
level, mobile X-ray systems, and more capable hand-held trace
detection systems. 


--------------------
\2 The system scans a target with X-ray at an energy level of 8
million electron volts, or about 50 to 70 times the energy of a
typical airport passenger X-ray. 

\3 Nonintrusive inspection technology refers to a variety of advanced
systems that will permit Customs officials to inspect cargo and
conveyances for the presence of narcotics without physically opening
or entering the shipment. 

\4 The Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis probes targets, using neutrons,
for the presence of explosives or narcotics.  It uses high-energy
neutrons, allowing reliable detection of carbon and oxygen found in
narcotics as well as nitrogen found in explosives. 


      OMB OVERSEES NARCOTICS
      DETECTION TECHNOLOGY FUNDING
      REQUESTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.3

OMB has traditionally reviewed agencies' budgets to ensure they meet
presidential priorities and are adequately justified.  For fiscal
years 1996 and 1997, OMB questioned Customs' funding requests for
truck X-ray systems to be placed at U.S.  ports of entry along the
southwest border.  These systems use a low-energy X-ray source\5

capable of penetrating empty trucks and other conveyances.  OMB
limited Customs' use of the funds until certain conditions were met,
citing its concern that a low-energy system had limited capabilities
for inspecting fully loaded containers.  OMB requested a
comprehensive border technology plan that would focus effective
inspection technologies in the areas of greatest need. 

In response, Customs prepared a plan favoring the use of fixed-site
truck X-ray systems as well as mobile or relocatable systems. 
Customs stated that the large number of empty trucks crossing the
southwest border presents a very high threat because they sometimes
carry drugs.  As a result, Customs wanted a system to inspect for
drugs concealed within the structure of the truck.  According to
Customs officials, the low-energy X-ray system has been effective in
detecting drugs concealed in these empty trucks, is safe, and fits
into available space.  In addition, acquisition costs are estimated
at $3 million, operating expenses are low, and training requirements
are minimal compared to the high-energy X-ray system built at Tacoma
and the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis system. 

OMB continues to believe that Customs needs a range of technologies
for the southwest border.  Thus, OMB plans to stay informed on issues
dealing with the development of those technologies and has started
attending ONDCP meetings on developing narcotics detection
technologies so that it can become aware of emerging issues. 


--------------------
\5 Rated at 450 thousand electron volts, about three or four times
the energy of a typical passenger X-ray system at an airport. 


   DIFFERENCES IN VIEWS BETWEEN
   ONDCP AND CUSTOMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Federal agencies have not always agreed on the most appropriate
technologies to detect narcotics at U.S.  ports of entry.  As noted
earlier, two technologies funded at about $30 million have been
developed but not deployed.  More recently, differing views between
ONDCP and Customs regarding the type of systems needed along the
southwest border led to varying directions from congressional
committees. 


      EFFECT OF DIFFERENCES
      BETWEEN ONDCP AND CUSTOMS ON
      CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

Congressional committees have provided differing direction regarding
the development and acquisition of narcotics detection technologies. 
One committee, supporting Customs needs, recommended funding for a
certain technology, while another committee, responding to ONDCP
concerns, directed a moratorium on the purchase of such technology. 
The differences stem, in part, from recommendations presented in a
congressionally mandated study on costs and benefits of specific
technologies. 

In September 1994, Congress mandated a study on the cost and benefit
tradeoffs in different nonintrusive inspection systems.  The study,
conducted by ONDCP, was released in September 1996.  It concluded
that Customs should accelerate the development of an automated system
for screening documents to target cargo for further inspection to be
deployed at land ports. 

The National Defense Appropriations Act for 1997 provided $6 million
for DOD's purchase of low-energy truck X-ray systems to be used by
Customs.  However, the conference report relating to the 1997
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Appropriations Act directed a
moratorium on the purchase of the low-energy systems until Customs
reevaluated its plans regarding the acquisition of an automated
targeting system, low-energy, and high-energy X-ray systems.  The
conference report further directed that Customs present Congress with
an integrated plan responding to the recommendations in ONDCP's
September 1996 study. 

Customs' February 6, 1997, response stated that empty trucks crossing
the southwest border are a very high threat.  As a result, Customs
wanted a system to examine trucks returning empty to the United
States.  Customs also stated that it would work with DOD and ONDCP to
identify and evaluate new inspection technologies that would
complement the capabilities of the low-energy system.  According to
ONDCP, a promising technology currently under development may be as
effective.  This system, which will be mobile, is expected to cost
about $600,000 compared to the estimated $3 million cost of the low-
energy system.  Customs and DOD are to evaluate this new technology
to inspect empty trucks. 


   OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN
   DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
   DEVELOPMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

ONDCP, in coordination with other federal agencies, is preparing a
10-year plan for developing detection technologies.  Customs is among
the agencies working on this plan and intends to develop a deployment
methodology acceptable to ONDCP.  In addition, Customs has indicated
that it now intends to participate in the interagency development of
a relocatable explosives detection system that may have counterdrug
application. 


      CUSTOMS SUPPORTS A
      METHODOLOGY FOR DEPLOYMENT
      AND A PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

Development of the current generation of narcotics detection
technologies is nearing completion, but Customs does not have a
detailed methodology for selecting the technologies to be acquired. 
Nonetheless, Custom's future development efforts are expected to be
integrated in ONDCP's 10-year technology development plan. 

ONDCP's September 1996 study recommended that Customs adopt a
methodology similar to the one ONDCP used for assessing procurement
options.  The study also pointed out that the variation among the
ports require a port-by-port analysis to assess the specific
technology needs at each port.  Customs has acknowledged that a
methodology was needed but noted that the methodology presented in
the study was only one of several possible approaches and did not
realistically consider personnel and funding constraints. 

The 10-year technology development plan is expected to provide a road
map for developing nonintrusive inspection technologies and upgrading
existing systems.  For example, Customs and DOD are expected to set
out their plans for developing mobile or relocatable high-energy
systems\6 for drug interdiction.  Both Customs and DOD plan to
evaluate the capabilities of the high-energy X-ray system for its
ability to detect narcotics concealed in cargo containers.  ONDCP
plans to review the results of this evaluation. 


--------------------
\6 High energy systems are defined as having an energy level of at
least 2 million electron volts, about 13 to 18 times the energy of a
typical X-ray system found at an airport. 


      EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEM
      THAT MAY HAVE A COUNTERDRUG
      APPLICATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

Customs advised an interagency working group on counterterrorism that
it would participate in the development of a explosives detection
system that may have counterdrug application.  In addition, a Customs
official is monitoring the system's development.  However, as now
being developed, the explosives detection system will not include
requirements unique to a narcotics detection application.  ONDCP
believes that Customs' involvement with the system will be a
worthwhile effort. 


   CONCLUSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

We endorse the concept of preparing a long-term technology plan for
developing and deploying narcotics detection technologies.  This
effort is consistent with ONDCP's broader efforts to develop a long
range plan for achieving the administration's 10-year National Drug
Control Strategy with 5-year budget projections.  To be effective,
ONDCP's technology plan should address the differing views between
ONDCP and Customs on needed technologies. 

At a minimum, the technology plan should address

  -- a methodology for transitioning technologies from development to
     deployment,

  -- the status of the automated targeting system's development as
     the first line of defense against drug trafficking,

  -- the best technologies for detecting drugs in empty trucks,

  -- the capabilities of the high-energy X-ray system for its ability
     to detect narcotics concealed in fully loaded cargo containers,
     and

  -- the possible use of explosive detection technologies for
     detecting drugs in a seaport environment. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.1

Mr.  Chairman, that concludes my statement.  I will be glad to answer
any questions you or other members of the subcommittee might have. 

Related GAO Products

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Responsibilities for Developing
Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies
(GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr.  15, 1997). 

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Technologies for Detecting
Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept.  4, 1996). 

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Threats and Roles of Explosives and
Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar.  27,
1996). 


*** End of document. ***