Export-Import: Reauthorization Issues (Testimony, 04/29/97,
GAO/T-NSIAD-97-147).

GAO discussed issues concerning the reauthorization of the U.S.
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), focusing on: (1) the rationale for and
against the Eximbank's programs; (2) the ways in which its assistance is
distributed; and (3) foreign competitors' export finance programs.

GAO noted that: (1) in reviewing the Eximbank's export finance programs,
the Congress needs to weigh the benefits to the U.S. economy of the
Eximbank's programs against their costs; (2) while there are numerous
arguments for and against government export financing programs, the most
compelling case for these programs appears to be in helping to "level
the international playing field" for U.S. exporters and providing
leverage in trade policy negotiations to induce foreign governments to
reduce and ultimately eliminate such subsidies; (3) during fiscal years
(FY) 1994 to 1996, the top 15 users (lead U.S. exporters or contractors)
of Eximbank financing accounted for about 38 percent of the value of
Eximbank's financing commitments; (4) during the same period, the
Eximbank also reported that 20 percent of its assistance went to support
small business; (5) the Eximbank believes that these small business
transactions would not otherwise have been financed by private lenders;
(6) in geographical terms, China, Indonesia, Mexico, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Brazil were Eximbank's top markets in FY 1996; (7) the six
major industrialized countries GAO reviewed all maintain various types
of export finance assistance programs; (8) although considerable
differences exist among these programs, they all help exporters in
competing for market share in developing markets by providing varying
types of financial assistance (loans, guarantees, and insurance); (9)
the Eximbank provides similar types of assistance and also administers a
tied aid capital projects fund (also known as the "war chest") as part
of its programs; (10) tied aid is concessionary (low interest rate)
financing that is linked to the procurement of goods and services from
the donor country: (11) the war chest is designed to counter other
countries' trade-distorting tied aid practices; (11) Eximbank's
assistance programs have cost the U.S. taxpayers about $4 billion over
the last 5 years; (12) the Eximbank's programs require substantial
levels of taxpayer support and the U.S. government's ultimate objectives
continue to be aimed at reducing and eliminating such export financing
subsidies and allowing exporters to compete on the basis of price,
quality, and service, not subsidized financing; (13) the U.S. government
needs to make renewed efforts to use international forums such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to reduce and eve*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-97-147
     TITLE:  Export-Import: Reauthorization Issues
      DATE:  04/29/97
   SUBJECT:  Exporting
             Subsidies
             International trade
             International economic relations
             International organizations
             Foreign governments
             Competition
             Business assistance
             Restrictive trade practices
             Foreign trade policies
IDENTIFIER:  China
             Indonesia
             Mexico
             Trinidad and Tobago
             Brazil
             Tied Aid Capital Projects Fund
             Canada
             France
             Germany
             Italy
             Japan
             United Kingdom
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary
Policy, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
1:00 p.m., EDT
Tuesday,
April 29, 1997

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK -
REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES

Statement of Benjamin F.  Nelson, Director, International Relations
and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-147

GAO/NSIAD-97-147T

Export-Import Bank

(711247)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ECA - export credit agencies
  EDC - Export Development Corporation
  OECD - Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
  OPIC - Overseas Private Investment Corporation
  SBA - Small Business AdministrationMr.  Chairman and Members of the
     Subcommittee: 

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues concerning the
reauthorization of the U.S.  Export-Import Bank (Eximbank).  My
statement today will focus on three key factors that the Congress
should weigh in the reauthorization debate: 

  -- the rationale for and against the Eximbank's programs,

  -- the ways in which its assistance is distributed, and

  -- foreign competitors' export finance programs. 

My comments are based on the results from our current and past
reviews of the Eximbank and governmentwide export promotion issues. 
(A listing of related GAO products is at the end of this statement.)


   SUMMARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

In reviewing the Eximbank's export finance programs, the Congress
needs to weigh the benefits to the U.S.  economy of the Eximbank's
programs against their costs.  While there are numerous arguments for
and against government export financing programs, the most compelling
case for these programs appears to be in helping to "level the
international playing field" for U.S.  exporters and providing
leverage in trade policy negotiations to induce foreign governments
to reduce and ultimately eliminate such subsidies. 

During fiscal years 1994 to 1996, the top 15 users (lead U.S. 
exporters or contractors) of Eximbank financing accounted for about
38 percent of the value of Eximbank's financing commitments.  During
the same period, the Eximbank also reported that 20 percent of its
assistance went to support small business.  The Eximbank believes
that these small business transactions would not otherwise have been
financed by private lenders.  In geographical terms, China,
Indonesia, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Brazil were Eximbank's
top markets in fiscal year 1996. 

The six major industrialized countries we reviewed all maintain
various types of export finance assistance programs.  Although
considerable differences exist among these programs, they all help
exporters in competing for market share in developing markets by
providing varying types of financial assistance (loans, guarantees,
and insurance).  The Eximbank provides similar types of assistance. 
The Eximbank also administers a tied aid capital projects fund (also
known as the "war chest") as part of its programs.  Tied aid is
concessionary (low interest rate) financing that is linked to the
procurement of goods and services from the donor country.  The war
chest is designed to counter other countries' trade-distorting tied
aid practices.  Eximbank's assistance programs have cost the U.S. 
taxpayers about $4 billion over the last
5 years. 

The Eximbank's programs require substantial levels of taxpayer
support and the U.S.  government's ultimate objectives continue to be
aimed at reducing and eliminating such export financing
subsidies--allowing exporters to compete on the basis of price,
quality, and service--not subsidized financing.  The U.S.  government
needs to make make renewed efforts to use international forums such
as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)\1
to reduce and eventually eliminate such subsidized export finance
programs.  However, given the growing importance of exports to
national economic performance, achieving the objective of eliminating
all financial subsidies may prove difficult. 


--------------------
\1 The OECD, created in 1960, is a forum for monitoring economic
trends and coordinating economic policy among 29 countries, including
the United States, and serves as the forum for negotiating
limitations on government export credit subsidies and developing
guidelines for export-financing assistance programs.  The OECD's
"Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits,"
which was established in 1978, establishes the terms and conditions
for official export credits.  Although OECD lacks authority to
enforce compliance with its agreements, member states generally take
upon themselves responsibility for monitoring compliance. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Created in 1934, the Eximbank is an independent U.S.  government
agency that operates under a renewable congressional charter that
expires on September 30, 1997.  In conducting its operations, the
Eximbank must comply with several statutory requirements.  The
Eximbank is required to

  -- supplement and encourage, but not compete, with private sources
     of capital;

  -- seek to reach international agreements to reduce
     government-subsidized export financing; and

  -- provide financing at rates and on terms that are "fully
     competitive" with those of other foreign government-supported
     export credit agencies (ECA) (12 U.S.C.  sec.  635
     (b)(1)(A)(B)). 

Eximbank financing programs include

  -- loans to foreign buyers of U.S.  exports,

  -- loan guarantees to commercial lenders,

  -- export credit insurance to U.S.  exporters and lenders, and

  -- working capital guarantees for pre-export production. 

Reflecting the growing move toward privatization in the developing
world, the Eximbank has recently expanded its activities to include
project finance.  Project finance involves financing where repayment
is provided through the project's anticipated future revenues rather
than through sovereign (government) or other forms of guarantee.  In
fiscal year 1997, the Eximbank estimates project-financing deals will
account for about 30 percent of its total financing commitments
(these deals accounted for about 14 percent of its assistance in
1996). 


   RATIONALES REGARDING EXIMBANK
   PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

I would first like to discuss the various rationales that have been
advanced for and against government involvement in export finance and
GAO's position on this matter.  The arguments for and against the
programs focus on three issues:  (1) trade policy leverage, (2)
industry effects, and (3) employment and trade effects.  Supporters
of the Eximbank export finance programs say that this assistance
provides leverage in trade policy negotiations, helps to "level the
international playing field" for U.S.  business, corrects "market
failures," and helps to increase exports and employment.\2 According
to Eximbank officials, the direct and indirect benefits include
follow-on sales and support contracts, high-paying jobs, and federal
tax revenues.  Opponents say that the Eximbank's programs result in
no net increase in national employment and output, misallocate
resources, and are a form of corporate welfare. 


--------------------
\2 In the last 15 years, some trade economists have argued that a
targeted industrial trade policy of promotion (or protection) could
increase national income.  The cases are quite specific, however, and
apply to industries with "external" economies that involve the
spillover of knowledge between firms or economies of scale.  These
rationales have been associated with infant industries in the
developing world and with high-tech industries such as aircraft and
semiconductors in the developed world.  While these interventions
have been recognized in principle, economists are generally cautious
about their policy usefulness and application. 


      TRADE POLICY LEVERAGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

Supporters believe that the Eximbank's programs (1) help assist U.S. 
companies to compete against foreign companies that receive similar
types of government support and (2) provide leverage in trade policy
negotiations.  Supporters hold that the Eximbank helps to neutralize
the foreign exporter's advantage in such situations by providing
similar financing for U.S.  exports.  However, critics have
questioned the usefulness of these programs in getting countries to
reduce subsidies.  As discussed below, the foreign competitor
countries we studied offer a variety of government-supported export
finance programs. 

As already noted, the Eximbank is required to seek international
agreements to reduce government-subsidized export financing.  OECD
nations, including the United States, have made progress since the
late 1970s in negotiating reductions in officially supported export
subsidies.  U.S.  Treasury officials who participate in these
negotiations told us that the Eximbank's programs have provided them
with leverage in negotiating subsidy reductions. 


      INDUSTRY EFFECTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.2

Another rationale that proponents make is that markets do not always
lead to an optimal allocation of resources and that so-called "market
failures" provide an additional justification for government export
finance programs. 

Eximbank claims that the following are examples of market failures: 

  -- Private financial institutions may be unwilling to support
     exports to emerging markets even when the risk is correctly
     priced. 

  -- Foreign buyers in certain markets may be unable to secure
     long-term financing for capital equipment. 

  -- Finally, and probably the most often-cited example is that small
     business exporters may have difficulty in obtaining export
     financing. 

Supporters of government export finance programs believe that
correcting such "market failures" can improve economic efficiencies
and overall economic well-being.  Opponents hold that there is no
credible evidence that private capital markets do not function
efficiently and that government intervention can potentially distort
markets. 


      EMPLOYMENT AND TRADE EFFECTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.3

According to the Eximbank, the exports it financed in fiscal year
1996 "supported or maintained" nearly 300,000 jobs.\3 We do not
dispute that some jobs are directly supported through the Eximbank's
programs.  However, economists and policy makers recognize that
employment levels are substantially influenced by macroeconomic
policies, including actions of the Federal Reserve.  At the national
level, under conditions of full employment, government export finance
assistance programs may largely shift production among sectors within
the economy rather than raise the overall level of employment in the
economy.  Hence, the jobs figure that the Eximbank reports may not
represent net job gains. 

Others have supported export promotion programs as a way to
substantially reduce the U.S.  trade deficit.  These programs,
however, cannot produce a substantial change in the overall U.S. 
trade balance.\4 The trade balance is largely determined by
macroeconomic conditions, such as savings and investment and the
government budget deficit.  According to the President's Council of
Economic Advisers, significantly reducing the trade deficit will
require macroeconomic policy measures, such as eliminating the
federal budget deficit. 


--------------------
\3 See Keeping America Competitive:  1996 Annual Report (Washington,
D.C.:  Eximbank), p.  5. 

\4 See Export Promotion:  Rationales for and Against Government
Programs and Expenditures (GAO/T-GGD-95-169, May 23, 1995). 


   DISTRIBUTION OF EXIMBANK
   FINANCING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

During fiscal years 1994 to 1996, the Eximbank provided an annual
average of $12.8 billion in export financing commitments (loans,
guarantees, and insurance) at an annual average program cost of $877
million.  The Eximbank projects that it will provide about $16.5
billion of export finance support in fiscal year 1997, an all-time
high.  Program costs are projected to fall from $934 million in
fiscal year 1996 to $773 million in fiscal year 1997 and to $681
million in fiscal year 1998 because of a projected increase in
lower-risk financing (such as project finance and aircraft
transactions, which consume relatively lower amounts of its program
budget).  (See table I.1.) Another reason for the decrease is that no
additional money for tied aid was included in the Eximbank's fiscal
year 1998 budget request. 

In fiscal year 1996, China was the Eximbank's top export market
($1.2 billion), followed by Indonesia ($825 million), Mexico ($753
million), Trinidad and Tobago ($632 million), and Brazil ($488
million).  (See fig.  I.1 for a list of the Eximbank's top 10 markets
and their associated program costs for fiscal year 1996.) Relative to
total U.S.  goods\5

exported to these markets, the Eximbank supported about 11 percent of
U.S.  exports to China, about 22 percent of U.S.  exports to
Indonesia, about 1 percent of U.S.  exports to Mexico, about 93
percent of U.S.  exports to Trinidad and Tobago, and about 4 percent
of U.S.  exports to Brazil. 

During fiscal years 1994 through 1996, the 15 largest users (lead
U.S.  exporters or contractors) of Eximbank financing accounted for
about $14.4 billion, or about 38 percent, of the Eximbank's total
export-financing commitments made during that period.  (see fig. 
I.2).  The export finance transactions involving these companies
absorbed about 27 percent of the Eximbank's total program budget, or
about $682 million over the same period.  However, these data do not
capture the full range of U.S.  companies associated with
Eximbank-financed deals such as subcontractors and other suppliers. 

About 20 percent ($7.5 billion) of the Eximbank's financing
commitments--about 79 percent of its total transactions--went to
small business, primarily through its insurance programs.\6 (See
table I.2.) The Eximbank also supports the export of several dual-use
(military and civilian) items.  (See app.  V). 

The Eximbank has participated in international (OECD) negotiations to
limit the use of tied aid and has used its tied aid capital projects
fund to counter foreign countries' use of tied aid.  The OECD efforts
have resulted in a decrease in reported international levels of tied
aid--the annual average level of tied aid decreased from about $10
billion in 1992 to approximately $4 billion in 1995.\7 During
1994-96, the Eximbank board of directors approved the use of war
chest funds in 40 instances.  (See app.  II for a list of firms and
countries that actually received war chest assistance in 1994-96.)
The balance in the tied aid war chest was $337.7 million as of
September 30, 1996. 

Since fiscal year 1993, the Eximbank has issued guarantees related to
23 project finance deals totaling $5.6 billion (the estimated value
of these projects was $21.5 billion).  (See table III.1.) Because
these projects tend to be large, the Eximbank often shares project
risk with other export credit agencies, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), or with multilateral institutions such
as the International Finance Corporation.  With regard to project
finance, the Eximbank's activity in this rapidly expanding area has
increased from one deal in fiscal year 1993 to seven in fiscal year
1996.  According to the Eximbank, this growth is a reflection of the
rising demand for capital projects in emerging market economies. 


--------------------
\5 Department of Commerce data on service exports to these markets
were unavailable. 

\6 Since 1986, the Eximbank has been legislatively required to allot
at least 10 percent of its financing authorizations to small business
concerns as defined by the Small Business Administration (SBA)
regulations. 

\7 Tied aid notifications occur through the OECD's reporting
mechanism. 


   FOREIGN COMPETITORS' EXPORT
   FINANCE PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

The six G-7 countries we studied--Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, and the United Kingdom (U.K.)--all have ECAs, each with
different roles and structures.  (According to Euromoney, a total of
73 ECAs now exist worldwide).  The support the G-7 ECAs provide for
their exporters can be measured in various ways.  In terms of the
percentage of national exports these ECAs have financed, the Eximbank
is tied for last.  In 1995, the Eximbank supported 2 percent of total
U.S.  exports (the latest year for which comparative data are
available).  This figure is at the bottom of the range of support
provided by the other G-7 nations.  In contrast, Japan's ECAs
supported 32 percent of its country's exports in that year.  France
was second, with 18 percent.  The support provided by Canada,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy ranged from 7 to 2 percent. 

In terms of the share of financing commitments extended by ECAs in
1995, the Eximbank ranks fourth:  Japan, France, and Germany
accounted for the largest shares.  Japan extended over half (56
percent), followed by France (20 percent), and Germany (9 percent). 
The United States and Canada extended smaller shares--5 percent
each--followed by the United Kingdom (3 percent) and Italy (2
percent).\8

Comparing ECA programs is difficult for a number of reasons: 

  -- Each nation has structured its export financing differently --
     there is no single export finance model.  ECAs in the six
     nations we studied function as independent government agencies,
     sections of ministries, or private institutions operating under
     an agreement with the government.  Most of the countries we
     studied offered overseas investment insurance through their ECA. 
     However, in the United States, overseas investment insurance is
     offered through a separate agency, OPIC.  (Table IV.1 provides a
     summary of the principal differences between the Eximbank and
     the six ECAs we studied.)

  -- Unlike the Eximbank, other ECAs appear to compete to varying
     degrees with private sources of export financing.  They do not
     aim to function exclusively as "lenders of last resort," as the
     Eximbank strives to do.  For example, the Japanese government's
     export insurance provider is Japan's only export insurer and
     reported that it insured about 28 percent ($124 billion) of all
     Japanese trade transactions in 1995--the highest level of trade
     and investment insurance underwriting in the world (private or
     public).  Similarly, Canada's Export Development Corporation
     (EDC) does not function as a lender of last resort.  The
     Eximbank aims to complement and not compete with private sources
     of capital. 

  -- ECAs also have different fee structures.  As stated earlier, the
     Eximbank must set fees that are "fully competitive" with the
     pricing and coverage offered by other major ECAs.\9 The Eximbank
     has interpreted "fully competitive" by setting its fees at
     levels below most of the foreign competition (as low or lower
     than about 75 percent of those offered by other major export
     credit agencies).  U.K.'s ECA aims to set fees at levels high
     enough to cover operating costs. 

  -- Other ECAs we studied over different amounts of political and
     commercial risks.  Currently, the Eximbank provides 100-percent,
     unconditional political and commercial risk protection on most
     of the medium- and long-term coverage (coverage over 5 years) it
     issues.  Other ECAs generally require exporters and banks to
     assume a portion of the risks (usually 5 to 10 percent)
     associated with such support.  This concept of risk-sharing is a
     fundamental difference between the Eximbank and these ECAs. 

  -- Finally, ECAs use different budgetary and reporting standards
     thus making it difficult to directly compare the Eximbank's
     program costs.  The 1990 Federal Credit Reform Act (P.L. 
     101-508, Nov.  5, 1990) requires the Eximbank to estimate and
     budget annually for the total long-term costs of its credit
     programs on a net present value basis.  Other nations operate on
     a cash basis\10 and are not subject to similar budget
     constraints.  Under this approach, a government reimburses an
     ECA for total cash losses sustained on its operations during the
     year.  Moreover, costs reported may not always represent total
     expenses to the government.  For example, Canada's EDC uses a
     separate national interest account ("Canada Account") to support
     some export finance activity.  The costs of this support are
     accounted for separately in its year-end reports.  (Table IV.2
     provides information on the costs of the G-7 nations'
     export-financing programs.)


--------------------
\8 The United States and the six major industrialized countries we
studied provided $258 billion of the total $553 billion in total
export financing. 

\9 See Export-Import Bank:  Options for Achieving Possible Budget
Reductions (GAO/NSIAD-97-7, Dec.  20, 1996).  This report discusses
how the Eximbank sets its fees in relationship to other ECAs. 

\10 Under cash-based budgeting, receipts are recorded when received
and expenditures are recorded when paid regardless of the accounting
period in which the receipts are earned or the costs incurred. 


      ECAS COSTS ARE DIFFICULT TO
      COMPARE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.1

Although direct cost comparisons between Eximbank and other national
programs are difficult to make, the available cost data we reviewed
suggests that several ECAs in the six countries we studied have
reported improved financial results.  France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom all reported positive financial results for their ECAs in
1995, the most recent year for which complete information was
available.  The Berne Union reported that among its member countries
there was an aggregate loss of $501 million in 1995 compared with
$6.5 billion in 1994.\11 According to the Berne Union, this change
was attributed to an improved global debt scenario and tighter ECA
underwriting standards. 

In sum, the Congress may wish to assess Eximbank's reauthorization
within the context of the international competition.  While these
ECAs operate under different mandates and are subject to different
budgeting and reporting standards than the Eximbank, they all help
their exporters compete for contracts in the world market.  The costs
of these programs need to be weighed against their benefits to
exporters and the leverage they provide in international negotiations
to reduce government support for these types of programs. 


--------------------
\11 The Berne Union is an association of 43 export credit insurance
agencies that includes the G-7 nations' ECAs. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5.2

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee that concludes my
prepared statement.  I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have. 


DISTRIBUTION OF EXIMBANK FINANCING
=========================================================== Appendix I



                                    Table I.1
                     
                     The U.S. Export-Import Bank's Financing
                      Commitments and Program Costs, 1994-98

                              (Dollars in millions)

                                               Fiscal year
                          ------------------------------------------------------
                               1994       1995       1996       1997      1998\a
------------------------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ----------
Value of export           $14,886.4  $11,864.9  $11,516.9  $16,521.7         N/A
 financing commitments
Administrative costs           42.6       41.4       40.8       46.6        48.6
Estimated program costs       936.7     $674.8      893.6      726.0       632.0
================================================================================
Total costs\b                $979.3     $716.2     $934.4     $772.6      $680.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend

N/A = Not available. 

Note:  The cost figures for 1994-96 are based on amounts obligated,
while the 1997 figures represent the amount appropriated.  Under the
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (P.L.  101-508, Nov.  5, 1990), the
Eximbank is required to estimate and budget for the total long-term
costs of their credit programs on a net present value basis.  Present
value analysis calculates the value today of a future stream of
income or expenses.  Congress funds the Eximbank's estimated credit
subsidy costs through the annual appropriations process.  Subsidy
costs arise when the estimated program disbursements by the
government exceed the estimated payments to the government on a net
present value basis.  Administrative expenses receive a separate
appropriation and are reported separately in the budget. 

\a President's fiscal year 1998 budget request. 

\b Total costs are defined as the Eximbank's program costs and
administrative costs. 

Source:  Eximbank. 

   Figure I.1:  Top 10 Country
   Recipients of Eximbank
   Financing Authorizations and
   associated estimated program
   costs, Fiscal Year 1996

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Eximbank. 

   Figure I.2:  Top 15 Recipients
   of Eximbank Financing, Fiscal
   Years 1994-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Eximbank. 



                                     Table I.2
                      
                         Eximbank Small Business Financing
                         Commitments, Fiscal Years 1994-96

                               (Dollars in millions)

                     Number of
Fi                   financing                         Value of      Percentage of
sc                 commitments                        financing           Eximbank
al         Total    supporting      Percentage of       made to          financing
ye      Eximbank         small              total         small     commitments to
ar  transactions    business\a       transactions      business    small business\
--  ------------  ------------  -----------------  ------------  -----------------
19         1,984         1,576                 79         2,690                 18
 94
19         2,415         1,910                 79         2,461                 21
 95
19         2,422         1,934                 80         2,405                 21
 96
==================================================================================
To         6,821         5,420        Average for      $7,556 A         verage for
 t                                    Period: 79%                      period: 20%
 a
 l
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Eximbank. 

\a See table I.1 for Eximbank budget figures for fiscal years
1994-96. 


U.S.  FIRMS THAT RECEIVED TIED AID
WAR CHEST ASSISTANCE, 1994-96
========================================================== Appendix II

                                 Total
                              Eximbank  Contributing country/
Firm                         financing  recipient country           Sector
--------------------------  ----------  --------------------------  ------------
Ellicott Machine Corp.,     $21,994,29  Norway/Indonesia            Transport
International                        5

U.S. China Industrial        2,921,520  Austria/China               Medical
Exchange

U.S. China Industrial        2,921,520  Austria/China               Medical
Exchange

U.S. China Industrial        2,921,520  Austria/China               Medical
Exchange

Motorola, Inc.              43,870,988  U.K. and European           Telecommunic
                                        Community/Indonesia         ation

Cubic Automatic Revenue     35,948,268  Germany/China               Transport
Collection Group

Zond Systems, Inc.           3,700,073  Denmark/China               Power

Zond Systems, Inc.           3,675,075  Denmark/China               Power

Zond Systems, Inc.           3,695,400  Denmark/China               Power

Interdigital                35,928,415  France and Australia/       Telecommunic
Communications                          Indonesia                   ation
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Eximbank. 


PROJECT FINANCE
========================================================= Appendix III



                                   Table III.1
                     
                      Eximbank Project Finance Transactions,
                               Fiscal Years 1993-97

                              (Dollars in millions)

                                                                           Total
                                                            Eximbank     project
Fiscal year   Project       Country       Sector             support        size
------------  ------------  ------------  --------------  ----------  ----------
1993          Pagbilao      Philippines   Power                 $185        $933

1994          Upper Mahiao  Philippines   Power                  166         229

              Mahanagdong   Philippines   Power                  200         320

1995          Paiton        Indonesia     Power                  540       2,600

              Samalayuca    Mexico        Power                  477         644

              Cilicap       Indonesia     Petrochemical          296         633

              Sual          Philippines   Power                  164       1,200

              El Abra       Chile         Mining                 151       1,400

              Termobarranq  Colombia      Power                  161         756
              uilla

              Marmara       Turkey        Power                  228         544

              Comsigua      Venezuela     Manufacturing           67         270

1996          Jawa          Indonesia     Power                  390       1,600

              Saba          Pakistan      Power                   84         141

              Leyte         Philippines   Power                   50          69

              Uch           Pakistan      Power                  255         612

              Farmland      Trinidad      Petrochemical          235         335

              Alumbrera\a   Argentina     Mining                 228       1,000

              Atlantic      Trinidad      Petrochemical          391     1,100\b
              LNG\a

1997          Avantel       Mexico        Telecom.               306     1,100\b

              Halliburton   Angola        Petrochemical           82       200\b

              Qatargas      Qatar         Petrochemical           45        1000

              Quezon        Philippines   Power                  456         800

              Ras Laffan    Qatar         Petrochemical          465       4,000

================================================================================
Grand Total                                                   $5,622     $21,486
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Eximbank. 

\a Political risk coverage only. 

\b Project has been authorized, but deal has not closed. 



                                   Table III.2
                     
                       Infrastructure Projects in Emerging
                         Markets Utilizing ECA Financing

                                         Emerging market
                  --------------------------------------------------------------
Export credit     Turke  Thaila         Indonesi         Argenti
agency            y      nd      China  a         India  na       Brazil  Mexico
----------------  -----  ------  -----  --------  -----  -------  ------  ------
Japan                                                                N/A

United States           N/A                                   

Germany                                                      N/A     N/A

United Kingdom          N/A                            N/A              N/A

France                                N/A              N/A      N/A     N/A

Austria                        N/A    N/A       N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A

Italy                            N/A              N/A             N/A     N/A

Belgium                         N/A    N/A       N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A

Spain             N/A                  N/A       N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A

Netherlands              N/A     N/A    N/A       N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A

Switzerland       N/A    N/A     N/A              N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A

Sweden            N/A            N/A    N/A       N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A

Norway            N/A            N/A    N/A       N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A

Canada                   N/A     N/A    N/A       N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A

Brazil            N/A    N/A     N/A    N/A       N/A                     N/A

Korea             N/A    N/A            N/A       N/A    N/A      N/A     N/A
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend

N/A = Not applicable because no projects reported. 

 At least one completed project with ECA financing. 

Proposed project(s) with ECA financing. 

Source:  Compiled from U.S.  government information and foreign data. 


COMPARISON OF G-7 NATIONS' EXPORT
CREDIT AGENCY STRUCTURES AND ROLES
========================================================== Appendix IV



                                    Table IV.1
                     
                        G-7 Nations' Export Credit Agency
                              Organization and Roles

                    Export credit
Country             agency              Public or private   Role
------------------  ------------------  ------------------  --------------------
United States       Eximbank            Public,             --Statutory mandate
                                        independent         to supplement and
                                        government agency.  encourage, but not
                                                            compete with,
                                                            private sources of
                                                            capital.
                                                            --Receives a credit
                                                            subsidy
                                                            appropriation each
                                                            year from the U.S.
                                                            Congress.

Canada              Export Development  Public,             --Some competition
                    Corporation (EDC)   independent         with private
                                        government agency.  sector.
                                                            --Aims to be
                                                            financially self-
                                                            sustaining.

France              COFACE provides     Private. Both       --COFACE exercises a
                    export finance      COFACE and BFCE     dual role by
                    insurance and       have recently been  administering
                    guarantees          privatized.         export-financing
                    BFCE provides       Government covers   support on behalf of
                    interest-rate       deficits incurred   the French
                    support on          on state account    government and
                    commercial bank     activities.         offering export
                    loans                                   finance assistance
                                                            through its own
                                                            programs.

Germany             Hermes, C&L         Private             --Hermes and C&L
                    Deutsche Revision,  consortium. Hermes  exercise a dual role
                    and KfW             and C&L Deutsche    by operating the
                                        Revision jointly    government's export
                                        administer German   finance programs and
                                        export finance      offering export
                                        program on behalf   finance assistance
                                        of the state. KfW   privately.
                                        offers export
                                        loans to German
                                        exporters.
                                        Government covers
                                        deficits on state
                                        account
                                        activities.

Italy               Special Section     Public agencies.    --Some competition
                    for Export Credit                       with private sector
                    Insurance (SACE)                        as Mediocredito
                    and Central                             Centrale also
                    Institute for                           functions as
                    Medium Term                             commercial bank.
                    Credits
                    (Mediocredito
                    Centrale)

Japan               Export-Import Bank  Public. JEXIM is a  --JEXIM aims to
                    of Japan (JEXIM)    independent         supplement and
                    provides            government agency.  encourage commercial
                    financing. Export   EID-MITI is housed  bank financing but
                    Insurance           in Japan's          not compete with
                    Division-Ministry   Ministry of         it.
                    of International    International       --EID-MITI competes
                    Trade and Industry  Trade and           with private sector
                    (EID-MITI)          Industry.           providers.
                    provides insurance

U.K.                Export Credits      Public,             --Short-term
                    Guarantee           independent         business was
                    Department (ECGD)   government          privatized.
                                        department.         --Has a specific
                                                            mandate to break
                                                            even financially.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend

COFACE = Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur. 

BFCE = Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur. 



                                    Table IV.2
                     
                          Reported Financial Results of
                      Government-supported Export-financing
                      Programs in the United States and Six
                          Competitor Countries, 1994-96

                            (U.S. dollars in millions)

Country                      Export credit agency           1994    1995    1996
---------------------------  ---------------------------  ------  ------  ------
United States\a              Eximbank                     ($979)  ($716)  ($934)
Canada\b                     EDC                             N/A     N/A     N/A
France                       COFACE and BFCE              ($503)      $7  $1,151
Germany\c                    Hermes/C&L and Deutsche      ($1,98     $38    $605
                              Revision                        5)
Italy                        SACE and Mediocredito        ($1,50  ($1,82  ($822)
                              Centrale                        1)      1)
Japan\d                      JEXIM and EID-MITI            ($80)  ($113)     N/A
United Kingdom\e             ECGD                            $29    $362     N/A
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A = Not available. 

Note 1:  There are several caveats with regard to how the numbers in
this table should be interpreted.  The type and nature of each
nation's export credit agency (ECA) business varies in ways that
ultimately influence its costs.  In the case of Japan's Export-Import
Bank, 44 percent of its fiscal year 1995 commitments were for loans
not "tied" to Japanese exports, 37 percent were for overseas
investment loans, and 8 percent for import loans.  Only 11 percent of
JEXIM's total financing in that year was reported to have been used
for export loans.  Where there are two ECAs, we have combined
financial results. 

Note 2:  Negative amounts indicate a deficit.  Positive amounts
indicate a surplus. 

\a The figures for the Eximbank represent the credit subsidy
obligation and administrative costs obligated for the fiscal year. 

\b Canada's EDC reported net income of $171 million, $44 million, and
$112 million in 1994, 1995, and 1996, respectively.  However, these
amounts do not include the support separately provided through the
Canadian national interest account ($200 million in 1996 but not
available for 1994 and 1995).  EDC conducts a significant (42
percent) level of business with Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) nations, which influences its profitability. 

\c The totals for Germany include interest revenues from debt
reschedulings. 

\d The Japanese fiscal year ends March 31.  The figures for Japan's
EID-MITI include direct transfers from the Ministry of Finance for
Paris Club debt writeoff of $272 million in fiscal
year 1994 and $233 million in 1995. 

\e The United Kingdom's fiscal year ends March 31.  ECGD figures
include amounts spent on foreign exchange insurance and interest rate
subsidies. 


EXIMBANK'S FINANCING OF DUAL-USE
EXPORTS
=========================================================== Appendix V

For the last 3 fiscal years, the Eximbank has had the authority to
finance exports of nonlethal defense items whose primary end use is
for civilian purposes.  The Eximbank is authorized to use up to 10
percent of its annual commitments to finance the exports of these
dual-use (military and civilian) items.  As depicted in tables VI.1
and VI.2 the Bank has financed several items but well below the
10-percent annual cap.  The Eximbank's authority to finance these
items expires on September 30, 1997.  We are required to report to
the Congress no later than September 1, 1997, on the end use of these
items.  We plan to issue a report to the Congress on this matter by
late July 1997. 



                               Table V.1
                
                 Summary of Eximbank's Cap on Dual-Use
                     Financing Commitments, 1995-97

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                                    Cap on
                                                  dual-use
                                                commitment
                                                    s (10%
                                      Value of    limit of
                                        export       total      Actual
                                     financing   projected    dual-use
                                    commitment  commitment  commitment
Fiscal year                                  s          s)           s
----------------------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------
1995                                 $11,864.9      $1,186       $15.5
1996                                  11,516.9       1,151       102.5
1997\a                                16,521.7       1,652       108.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Projected commitment. 

Source:  Eximbank. 



                               Table V.2
                
                     Summary of Eximbank's Dual-Use
                          Commitments, 1995-97

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                               Dual-Use Commitments
                                             -------------------------
                                             Type/
               Country        End user       description        Amount
Fiscal year    -------------  -------------  --------------  ---------
1995           Indonesia      Indonesian     Loan/aircraft     $15.428
                              Air Force      parts

1996           Romania        Romantsa       Guarantee/air      79.549
                              (Romanian Air  traffic
                              Traffic        control system
                              Administratio
                              n Services)

               Indonesia      Indonesian     Loan/              22.907
                              Army           helicopters

1997           Venezuela      Venezuelan     Guarantee/          8.841
                              Army           radio systems

               Venezuela      Venezuelan     Guarantee/          3.400
                              Air Force      radio systems

               Brazil         Brazilian Air  Loan/aircraft      34.000
                              Force          components


               Venezuela      Venezuelan     Guarantee/         25.500
                              Army           trucks

               Venezuela      Venezuelan     Guarantee/         14.057
                              Army           trucks

               Venezuela      Venezuelan     Guarantee/         10.085
                              Army           aircraft parts

               Venezuela      Venezuelan     Guarantee/         12.421
                              Army           motor vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Eximbank. 


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
=========================================================== Appendix 1

Ex-Im Bank's Retention Allowance Program (GAO/GGD-97-37R, Feb.  19,
1997). 

Export Finance:  Federal Efforts to Support Working Capital Needs of
Small Business (GAO/NSIAD-97-20, Feb.  13, 1997). 

Export-Import Bank:  Options for Achieving Possible Budget Reductions
(GAO/NSIAD-97-7, Dec.  20, 1996). 

Retention Allowances:  Usage and Compliance Vary Among Federal
Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-32, Dec.  11, 1995). 

Export Finance:  Comparative Analysis of U.S.  and European Union
Export Credit Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-1, Oct.  24, 1995). 

Export Promotion:  Rationales for and Against Government Programs and
Expenditures (GAO/T-GGD-95-169, May 23, 1995). 

International Trade:  U.S.  Efforts to Counter Competitors' Tied Aid
Practices (GAO/T-GGD-95-128, Mar.  28, 1995). 

International Trade:  Combating U.S.  Competitors' Tied Aid Practices
(GAO/T-GGD-94-156, May 25, 1994). 

Export Finance:  Challenges Facing the U.S.  Export-Import Bank
(GAO/T-GGD-94-46, Nov.  3, 1993). 

Export Finance:  The Role of the U.S.  Export-Import Bank
(GAO/GGD-93-39, Dec.  23, 1992). 


*** End of document. ***