Defense Acquisition Organizations: Linking Workforce Reductions with
Better Program Outcomes (Testimony, 04/08/1997, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-140).

By reducing infrastructure costs, the Defense Department hopes to
realize savings that can pay for forces modernization. As an element of
that infrastructure, the defense acquisition workforce is a logical
place to look for efficiencies and savings. This testimony focuses on
the three main reasons this will be a complex and challenging
undertaking. First, there is no agreed-upon definition of what
constitutes the acquisition workforce. This makes targeting changes and
measuring their progress very difficult. Second, the workforce cuts made
to date have not yielded expected savings and have kept the basic
organizational structure relatively intact. Third, decisions to
restructure or reduce the acquisition workforce should be linked to
getting better outcomes from the acquisition process. Cutting personnel
levels without changing how acquisition organizations generate weapon
system requirements and estimates will miss an opportunity to address
the deep-seated causes of acquisition problems.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-97-140
     TITLE:  Defense Acquisition Organizations: Linking Workforce
	     Reductions with Better Program Outcomes
      DATE:  04/08/1997
   SUBJECT:  Defense procurement
	     Base closures
	     Civilian employees
	     Federal downsizing
	     Personnel management
	     Reductions in force
	     Advanced weapons systems
	     Future budget projections
	     Defense cost control
	     Privatization
IDENTIFIER:  F/A-18C/D Aircraft
	     F/A-18E/F Aircraft
	     Hornet Aircraft

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T-NSIAD-97-140

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Military Procurement and

Military Readiness, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m., EDT Tuesday April 8, 1997

DEFENSE ACQUISITION ORGANIZATIONS

Linking Workforce Reductions With Better Program Outcomes

Statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140

Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: I am pleased to be here today
to discuss issues associated with the acquisition workforce and acquisition
process of the Department of Defense (DOD).

As you know, Mr. Chairmen, we have reported many times on cost growth and
other problems on individual weapon systems; systemic problems, such as the
mismatch between planned programs and available funding; and the underlying
reasons for these problems. I believe that in contemplating changes to the
acquisition workforce, there is an opportunity to improve the acquisition
process and the results it produces. It does not appear to us that DOD has
taken that opportunity. It is not an easy task but we believe that it is the
right approach.

Reducing infrastructure is one approach DOD is pursuing to increase funds
for modernization. As an element of that infrastructure, the defense
acquisition workforce is a logical place to look for efficiencies and
savings. This morning I will talk about the reasons why this will be a
complex and challenging undertaking. I see these reasons as threefold:

First, there is no agreed- upon definition of what constitutes the
acquisition workforce. This makes targeting changes and measuring their
progress very difficult. Second, the workforce cuts made to date have not
resulted in expected savings and have kept the basic organizational
structure relatively intact. Third, decisions to restructure or reduce the
acquisition workforce should be linked to getting better outcomes from the
acquisition process. Cutting personnel levels without changing how
acquisition organizations generate weapon system requirements and estimates
will miss an opportunity to address the deep- seated causes of acquisition
problems.

I will elaborate on these points in my statement today and will offer some
preliminary observations on DOD 's plan to reduce and restructure its
acquisition workforce submitted in January in response to legislation.
Before turning to these issues, I would like to provide a general
description of the current climate for change.

Background As you know, budgets available for defense modernization over the
last several years have been declining. In response, there has been a
significant

restructuring of the defense industry. Lockheed and Martin Marietta, the

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 1

Northrop and Grumman Corporations, Hughes Aircraft Company and General
Dynamics Corporation's Missile Operations, to name a few, have merged in the
face of reduced defense spending now and for the foreseeable future. Those
companies and others have determined that their health and profitability
required more efficient structures, less overhead, and fewer employees. So
too has DOD. Yet within DOD itself, which is operating in the same
environment of declining resources but without the same business
imperatives, no such restructuring of the acquisition community of this
magnitude has occurred.

The demand within DOD for available dollars is growing. DOD has said that
funds needed for weapons modernization will come, in part, from acquisition
reform initiatives and infrastructure reductions. However, the significant
level of savings has not yet materialized. It is clear there is a
significant mismatch between desired program funding and funds available
that should not be perpetuated.

What Is the Acquisition Workforce?

A sound, agreed- upon definition of what constitutes the workforce is
important for two reasons. It helps set the stage for identifying those
individuals and organizations involved in the acquisition process and it is
critical in establishing whether and to what extent DOD is making cuts. When
measuring cuts on a percentage basis, which DOD has been mandated to do, the
larger the baseline, the larger the cuts for any given percentage.

The smallest universe I am aware of that defines DOD's acquisition workforce
is the 46,500 people DOD includes in its estimate of personnel associated
with infrastructure. A second definition is those individuals covered by the
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990. The DAWIA
work force in fiscal year 1994 was about 114,000. About 98,000 of these were
civilians.

A third definition is based on the DOD instruction that defines an
acquisition organization as one whose mission includes planning, managing,
and/ or executing acquisition programs that are governed by the DOD 5000
series of regulations. In our November 1995 report, 1 we pointed out that
the workforce associated with those organizations in 1994 was about 464,000,
of which about 398,000 were civilians.

1 Defense Acquisition Organizations: Changes in Cost and Size of Civilian
Workforce (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 46, Nov. 13, 1995).

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 2

In its plan on workforce downsizing recently submitted in response to
section 906 of the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense Authorization Act, DOD used a
fourth definition. This definition includes acquisition organizations, minus
depot trade skill personnel.

DOD states that its workforce in the first quarter of fiscal year 1997 was
comprised of about 382,420 military and civilian personnel, using the same
definition we used in our 1995 report. DOD has stated its intention to
develop another definition of the acquisition workforce. If in doing so,
however, the baseline changes, it may be necessary to calculate future cuts
differently.

Finally, I should point out that these definitions may not include all of
the organizations within the services that establish requirements to start
new programs- groups with a significant impact on the acquisition process.
We do not know how many additional people this would entail.

Managing the Acquisition Workforce

In our November 1995 report on selected aspects of DOD's acquisition
workforce, we compared civilian acquisition workforce levels with
procurement budget funding. Figure 1 provides an update of that comparison.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 3

Figure 1: Comparison of Civilian Workforce in Acquisition Organizations to
Procurement Budget

80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 0 150

300 450

600 Fiscal year

Procurement (dollars in billions)

Civilian workforce (in thousands)

Sec. 906

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

As you can see, the number of individuals involved first increased and then
decreased during the period from 1980 to 1994, roughly tracking DOD's
budgets during that period. In 1994, a year that roughly matched DOD's
budget level in 1980, DOD's civilian acquisition workforce was 12 percent
smaller. Since 1994, DOD has continued to reduce its civilian workforce. At
the time of our 1995 review, DOD officials stated that it would be possible
to again see increases in the acquisition workforce with any increases in
the defense procurement budget.

In our 1995 report, we found that the personnel reductions did not result in
a commensurate decline in civilian payroll cost. The average annual payroll
costs for civilians in acquisition organizations was about $20 billion in
1980 and in 1994, measured in 1996 constant dollars. The higher per capita
costs were due to several factors. There was a significant decline in blue
collar workers and an increase in white collar employees.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 4

In addition, DOD officials stated that civilian payroll costs increased
because of the advent of locality pay and changes in grade structure.

We also looked more closely at two occupational categories in DOD's
acquisition workforce- engineers and computer specialists. These groups
increased from 1980 until 1990 and then decreased from 1990 until 1994.
During the period of decrease, we found that contracts for these services
were increasing. To the extent that DOD was contracting out for services its
own personnel formerly provided- in essence, outsourcing- savings from
reducing those positions would be offset. In general, our work on
outsourcing shows that there is reason for caution about whether the
magnitude of hoped for savings can be achieved.

Finally, despite the declines in both the defense procurement budgets and
the civilian workforce since 1990, the number of acquisition organizations
remains relatively constant. Each acquisition organization maintains similar
occupational fields in common areas such as personnel, budgeting, computing
specialists, and contracting. Many other duties performed in these
occupations are not unique to an acquisition organization's mission. As a
result, there may be significant opportunities to improve efficiencies in
these areas.

In one sense, the consistency in DOD's acquisition structure may reflect the
incentives underlying the process by which DOD acquires systems. Despite the
many reform initiatives adopted by DOD over the last several years, many of
which represent improvements, the basic incentives in weapons acquisition to
downplay risk and present optimistic assessments of cost, schedule, and
performance still exist. Putting in place incentives and performance indices
that drive DOD acquisitions to be more efficient and effective, in other
words, to change the culture, should go hand in hand with a more efficient
structure that can operate successfully with a reduced force and, perhaps,
result in better outcomes.

Let me turn now to those outcomes. The Need for Better Acquisition Outcomes

DOD's acquisition process has provided the United States with military
weapons that no other country is in a position to challenge. Yet, despite a
number of initiatives to improve the process, the acquisition of these
weapons has been and, in many cases continues to be, fraught with
significant problems. Weapon systems cost more and take longer to field than
expected, encounter performance problems, and are often difficult to

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 5

produce or support. Stretching out production of proven systems to fund new
starts or going into production with unproven systems are conscious
decisions that contribute to these problems. These outcomes put significant
pressure on the efficient use of resources. Thus, the goal of improving
acquisition outcomes is perhaps more important today than ever.
Understanding the factors that drive those outcomes is critical in working
toward this goal.

Acquisition Outcomes Are Accompanied by Persistent Problems

At the aggregate level, a systemic problem with weapon acquisitions has been
described as “too many programs chasing too few dollars”. We
first reported on this issue in 1984. At that time, our analysis showed that
from 1963 to 1983, the Congress provided an average of 32 percent more in
appropriations for weapons than projected in DOD plans, even though the
numbers of weapons DOD procured were less than anticipated. In the late
1980s, we estimated the mismatch between DOD's program estimates and
estimated appropriations to be $553 billion over a 5- year period. In 1995,
we estimated this mismatch could exceed $150 billion over a 5- year period.
It is still a problem today, as evidenced by repeated delays in DOD's
projected buildup of procurement funding, illustrated in figure 2.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 6

Figure 2: Planned DOD Procurement Programs Since 1995

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 35 40

45 50

55 60

65 70

Fiscal year Dollars in billions

1995 FYDP 1996 FYDP 1997 FYDP

Source: DOD Future Years Defense Program data.

To illustrate, assume that a weapon system was approved to begin low rate
production in fiscal year 1995 on the basis that the projected funding
increases would support full rate production in fiscal year 1998. As you can
see, as fiscal year 1998 approached, the projected funding increases did not
materialize. Consequently, the program started in fiscal year 1995 would
have to continue in low rate production, along with other programs, to fit
within available funding for fiscal year 1998.

Despite the chronic nature of this funding mismatch, DOD continues to (1)
generate and support acquisitions of new weapon systems that will not
satisfy the most critical requirements at minimal cost and (2) plan on the
availability of more procurement funds than can be reasonably expected to be
in future budgets. For example, we have reported that DOD is proceeding with
major investments to improve air power capabilities

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 7

without clear evidence that all of the programs are justified. 2 Some of
these programs will add only marginally to already formidable capabilities;
in some cases viable, less costly alternatives exist. As a case in point, we
have reported that the Navy's F/ A- 18E/ F program will result in an
aircraft whose operational capabilities will only be marginally improved
over that of the F/ A- 18C/ D model. 3 Yet, the C/ D model would cost almost
$17 billion less (in fiscal year 1996 dollars) in recurring flyaway costs
for the purchase of 660 aircraft. 4

DOD's force modernization plans are based on several assumptions that we
believe are unlikely to materialize fully. These assumptions include:

? Procurement funding levels will rise to $60.1 billion in fiscal year 2001-
over 40 percent higher than the fiscal year 1997 procurement budget. ?
Significant savings will result from base closures, other infrastructure

reductions, and outsourcing many support activities. ? Significant savings
will result from reforming the defense acquisition

system. On individual acquisition programs, familiar problems still add
billions of dollars to defense acquisition costs. Problems persist regarding
(1) questionable requirements and solutions that are not the most cost-
effective available; (2) unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance
estimates; (3) questionable program affordability; and (4) the use of high-
risk acquisition strategies. Over the years, we have observed that, while a
small number of systems reach the field as unqualified successes and a small
number are canceled, most weapons reach the field but cost more, take
longer, and are often harder to support than expected. Generally, they
represent a significant improvement over those weapons they replace, but it
is not uncommon for them to have performance shortfalls or to require
expensive, time- consuming modifications to achieve the required
performance. These outcomes are impervious to different reforms, contract
types, contractors, acquisition strategies, weapon types, critics, military
services, administrations, and Congresses. 5

2 Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program
and Budget Decisions (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 177, Sept. 20, 1996). 3 Navy Aviation:
F/ A- 18E/ F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost
(GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 98, June 18, 1996). 4 Recurring flyaway costs include costs
related to the production of the basic aircraft and do not include all
procurement costs. 5 Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting
Change (GAO/ NSIAD- 93- 15, Dec. 31, 1992).

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 8

To the extent these problems increase the costs of individual programs, they
exacerbate the aggregate funding mismatch that already exists. DOD usually
resolves these funding mismatches- whether stemming from across- the- board
cuts in defense spending, the unanticipated start of a new program, or cost
growth- by stretching and reshuffling programs to fit new funding levels.
For example, we have recently reported that DOD has inappropriately placed a
high priority on buying large numbers of untested weapons during low- rate
initial production to ensure commitment to new programs and thus has had to
cut by more than half its planned full- rate production for many weapons
that have already been tested. 6 The costs for 17 of 22 full- rate
production systems we reviewed increased by $10 billion beyond original
estimates due to stretching out the completion of the weapons' production.

Outcomes Are the Consequences of an Underlying Culture

While occurrences such as performance shortfalls, schedule delays, and cost
increases are frequently cited as the major problems in weapon acquisitions,
we believe that they are largely the consequences of a prevailing culture.
This culture can be defined as the collective behavior of the various
participants in the acquisition process and the forces that motivate their
behavior. In fact, the process may be more realistically portrayed as the
interaction of its participants than the methodological procedure depicted
on paper. This culture has evolved as the acquisition process has become a
vehicle for meeting the diverse needs of its participants.

While participants may see their individual needs as aligned with the
national interest, collectively, these needs create incentives for pushing
programs and encouraging undue optimism, parochialism, and other compromises
of good judgment. Under these circumstances, the inevitable performance
problems, cost growth, schedule slippage, and difficulties with field
support cannot be written off as mainly the result of errors or lack of
expertise. Rather, these problems have been the undesirable, but apparently
acceptable, consequences of the process. They persist not because they are
overlooked or underregulated, but because they enable more programs to
survive and thus more needs to be met. Over time, the threat and the ability
of weapon programs to help participants achieve their own goals have
institutionalized a culture that prefers continuing a program over
terminating it and hinders making difficult trade- offs to alleviate cost,
affordability, duplication, risk, and logistic supportability

6 Weapons Acquisition: Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition Funding Would
Reduce Costs (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 23, Feb. 13, 1997).

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 9

concerns. Collectively, these needs shape the cultural problem, for they
cannot be easily met without an ample supply of programs.

The traditional difficulty the acquisition process has had in dealing
squarely with affordability limitations is a case in point. In a collective
process that favors compromise, decisionmakers have preferred to find ways
to afford individual programs rather than making difficult decisions between
programs that would result in not starting or terminating some. The result
has been to sustain more programs at lower funding levels rather than to
fully fund fewer programs. Program sponsors are motivated to make optimistic
cost assumptions and to reduce quantities, program scope, or prolong the
schedule to avoid cancellation. Although these actions do not solve the
long- term affordability problem, they lessen the need for decision- makers
to make difficult choices among programs. Collectively, they provide
insights as to why the production rates of mature programs are lowered to
make room for new production of immature weapons.

The seeds of weapon system problems can often be traced to the very
beginning of the acquisition process. In addressing mission needs, service
organizations propose programs that perpetuate their existence and oversell
the programs to ensure their survival. Predictably, programs begin as
parochial solutions embodying highly optimistic estimates. If the proposing
organizations were to act more objectively, they could doom their own
programs and jeopardize their own existence. The decisions made in
justifying a program are crucial because they largely determine the eventual
performance, schedule, and cost of the weapon system. An approved
requirement embodies how a weapon is to perform its mission and often the
specific technical characteristics it is to possess, thereby setting the
tone for the remainder of the acquisition.

The parochialism endemic to the services' structures for developing weapon
system requirements tends to narrow consideration of alternatives. The
convergence of parochial preferences and the demand for high performance in
justifying weapons creates incentives for developing requirements that
embody a preferred solution against which alternatives can hardly compete.
The result is not necessarily that the best solution to a valid need is
selected, but that the preferred solution is successfully justified.

The organizations responsible for developing requirements for new weapons
generally represent individual communities, such as infantry,

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 10

within the services that analyze their own mission area deficiencies and
recommend solutions from within their communities. These organizations, over
time, have institutionalized an advocacy for the weapons under their purview
and help perpetuate the funneling of successor weapons into the acquisition
process. Under this system for developing requirements, programs are
justified on their unique characteristics under the protection of closely-
guarded missions, making it difficult to broadly assess which alternative
best serves the general defense. Narrow reviews of missions and
requirements, together with each service's reluctance to compromise in
design or performance goals for weapon systems, have contributed to the
services' large investment in service- unique weapons that perform similar
missions.

As a program proceeds through development, the disposition for sponsors to
present program information optimistically and to protect the program
against disruption intensifies. This behavior is necessary to overcome the
numerous challenges a program faces as it competes for more funds. At the
same time, program support grows because more acquisition participants have
become active sponsors and because the money spent has built a compelling
argument for continuing the program. Together, these factors complement the
initial efforts to push the program and begin to pull it through the
acquisition process. They enable the program to develop “a life of its
own” and to become its own objective. Thus, even when the very
underpinnings of a program are badly shaken, strong arguments are made by
participants at all levels to continue the program as planned. This is
particularly true for programs that have entered the engineering and
manufacturing development phase, by which time it is generally conceded that
they are committed to production. Ironically, if a weapon has serious
problems, they are most likely to surface during this phase- when the
program has become virtually unstoppable.

The foregoing does not stem from a pejorative view of individual
participants or organizations. Rather, they do what they believe is right
given the pressures they face. The difficulty lies in the fact that there is
no consensus on what is right. In the absence of such a consensus, the
acquisition process serves to satisfy the diverse needs of its participants
within the umbrella of providing U. S. forces with the best weaponry. In so
doing, the incentives of the process- both positive and negative- favor
maximizing programs. Parochialism, optimism, protectionism, and information
hoarding are pragmatic responses to these incentives, while cost growth,
schedule delays, duplication, and performance problems are the logical
consequences. These cultural issues are not unique to DOD's

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 11

weapons acquisitions; we have reported on a similar situation with respect
to major acquisitions undertaken by the Federal Aviation Administration. 7

A Joint Perspective Is Needed

Several attempts have been made to strengthen DOD's ability to set program
requirements and priorities from an aggregate perspective to curb the
dominance of the individual service perspective. These include (1) the
Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, (2) the
increased responsibilities given to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, and (3) the establishment of the joint warfighting capability
assessment process. Although these efforts have improved DOD's joint
orientation, the individual services continue to heavily influence defense
decisions, particularly those related to investments in weapons.

In its May 1995 report, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
Forces faulted the decision support processes that DOD used to develop
requirements and make resource allocation decisions. It cited a need for the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense staff to address DOD needs in the aggregate. The Commission found
that each service was fully engaged in trying to deliver to the commanders
in chief what it viewed as the best possible set of its specific
capabilities, without taking into account the similar capabilities provided
by the other services. We believe that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff must be the strong advocate for the joint perspective that the
Goldwater- Nichols legislation intended.

In our review of combat air power, we found that DOD had not sufficiently
assessed joint mission requirements and was not well positioned to determine
the need for and priority of its planned investments. Joint warfighting
capability assessment teams have thus far had little impact in identifying
unneeded overlaps and duplication in existing capabilities or in weighing
the relative merits of alternatives. Assessments that could threaten service
plans and budgets are frequently avoided, and the potential effects of
program reductions or cancellations on careers, jobs, and industrial base
inhibit serious consideration of alternatives.

We also found that not enough information is available above the service
levels to weigh individual investments against aggregate capabilities.
Consequently, there is little assurance that the decisions to buy or modify
air power systems are sound. Aggregate analysis has been limited by

7 Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for Cultural
Change at FAA (GAO/ RCED- 96- 159, Aug. 22, 1996).

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 12

(1) weak analytical tools and databases, (2) weaknesses in decision- making
support processes (such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
oversight being limited by information shortages and the limited ability of
joint warfighting concerns to influence the requirements for new weapons),
and (3) service resistance.

Conversely, much of the information for making decisions on major
acquisition programs is developed by the individual services and is limited
in scope. The services conduct considerable analyses to identify mission
needs and justify new weapons proposals. The needs are not based on
assessments of the aggregate capabilities of the services to perform
missions and DOD does not routinely review service modernization proposals
from such a perspective. Currently, reviews done by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council have not
provided adequate assurance that there is a valid mission need, that force
capabilities are properly sized, and that the most cost- effective
alternative has been identified.

DOD's Planned Restructuring

As you know, DOD was required to submit a plan to reduce and restructure its
acquisition workforce in response to Section 906 of the Fiscal Year 1996
Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, the plan was to (1) result in an
acquisition workforce that was 25 percent smaller by the end of fiscal year
2000 than it was in fiscal year 1996, (2) eliminate duplication of
functions, (3) maximize opportunities for consolidation among DOD's
acquisition organizations and (4) assess specific streamlining and
restructuring options. DOD submitted the plan in January of this year and at
the request of this Committee, we have just begun an evaluation of it. But
today, I can offer some preliminary observations.

It appears that the plan falls short of what is needed. DOD has presented
numbers in the plan that show a declining workforce. The definitional
differences I described earlier in my statement could make it difficult to
evaluate the extent of any quantitative changes in the workforce. These
declines, as we have previously shown, do not necessarily indicate
commensurate savings, do not preclude contracting out functions previously
performed by government employees, or ensure that organizations and
functions have been appropriately adjusted and not just “hollowed
out.”

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 13

In responding to the legislative requirement to eliminate duplication of
functions and maximize opportunities for consolidation among acquisition
organizations, the plan includes actions such as base closures and pending
plans that will not take effect until after the year 2000. The plan does not
assess specific streamlining and restructuring options but rather concludes
that DOD's current efforts are sufficient. It is unclear whether the plan is
maximizing opportunities to consolidate or will result in an acquisition
workforce and structure that will achieve better program outcomes.

Conclusions If better program outcomes are desired and persistent
acquisition problems are to be alleviated, then the motives and incentives
that drive

the participants and the process must be realigned to produce such outcomes.
Thus, decisions on how to reduce or restructure DOD's acquisition workforce
should, at the same time, alter the status quo and improve outcomes.

Whether DOD's acquisition workforce and organizations drive the outcomes of
the acquisition process or are a reflection of them, they are connected in a
way that should be considered in contemplating solutions.

Mr. Chairmen, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittees may have.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 14

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 15

Related GAO Reports Defense Restructuring Costs: Information Pertaining to
Five Business Combinations (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 97, Apr. 1, 1997).

Defense Outsourcing: Challenges Facing DOD As It Attempts to Save Billions
in Infrastructure Costs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 110, Mar. 12, 1997).

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Could Enhance Investment
Decisions (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 105, Mar. 5, 1997).

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on Optimistic
Budget Projections (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 103, Mar. 5, 1997).

Weapons Acquisition: Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition Funding Would
Reduce Costs (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 23, Feb. 13, 1997).

High- Risk Series: Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/ HR- 97- 6, Feb.
1997).

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and
Budget Decisions (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 177, Sept. 20, 1996).

Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for Cultural Change
at FAA (GAO/ RCED- 96- 159, Aug. 22, 1996).

Navy Aviation: F/ A- 18E/ F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at
High Cost (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 98, June 18, 1996).

Acquisition Management: Fiscal Year 1995 Waivers of Acquisition Workforce
Requirements (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 102, Apr. 15, 1996).

Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996- 2001 Offer Little Savings
for Modernization (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 131, Apr. 4, 1996).

Defense Acquisition Organizations: Changes in Cost and Size of Civilian
Workforce (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 46, Nov. 13, 1995).

DOD Infrastructure: DOD's Planned Finance and Accounting Structure Is Not
Well Justified (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 127, Sept. 1995).

Weapons Acquisition: Low- Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems
Prematurely (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 18, Nov. 21, 1994).

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 16

Related GAO Reports

Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change (GAO/ NSIAD- 93-
15, Dec. 31, 1992).

Underestimation of Funding Requirements in Five Year Procurement Plans (GAO/
NSIAD- 84- 88, Mar. 12, 1984).

(707257) GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 140 Page 17

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