Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and
Schedule (Testimony, 03/11/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118).

Under its basic legislative responsibilities, GAO assessed the
Department of Defense's (DOD) chemical weapons and related materiel
disposal programs, focusing on: (1) the key factors affecting the costs
and schedules; (2) actions the Army has taken to improve the programs;
and (e) alternatives for improving the programs' effectiveness and
efficiency.

GAO noted that: (1) while there is general agreement about the need to
destroy the chemical stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed
due to the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and
localities about the destruction method that should be used; (2) as a
result, the costs and schedules for the disposal programs are uncertain;
(3) however, they will cost more than the estimated $23.4 billion above
current appropriations and take longer than currently planned; (4) the
key factors affecting the programs include the public concerns about the
safety of incineration, the environmental process, the legislative
requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies;
(5) the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program's cost and schedule are
largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities are
in agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining
stockpile sites; (6) based on program experience, reaching agreement has
consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated; (7) until DOD and
the affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method
for the remaining stockpile sites, the Army will not be able to predict
the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program's cost and schedule with any
degree of accuracy; (8) moreover, many of the problems experienced in
the stockpile program are also likely to affect the Army's ability to
implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program; (9) in addition,
more time is needed for the Army to prove that its proposed disposal
method for the nonstockpile program will be safe and effective and
accepted by the affected states and localities; (10) in December 1994,
DOD designated the Army's chemical demilitarization program, consisting
of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major
defense acquisition program; (11) the objectives of the designation were
to stabilize the disposal schedules, control costs, and provide more
discipline and higher levels of program oversight; (12) in addition,
Army officials have identified cost-reduction initiatives, which are in
various stages of assessment, that could reduce program costs by $673
million; (13) recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the
public concerns associated with each individual disposal location,
suggestions have been made by members of the Congress, DOD officials,
and others to change the programs' basic approach to destruction; and (*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-97-118
     TITLE:  Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting 
             Disposal Costs and Schedule
      DATE:  03/11/97
   SUBJECT:  Chemical warfare
             Army facilities
             Defense cost control
             Cost analysis
             Property disposal
             Emergency preparedness
             Environmental law
             Intergovernmental relations
             Munitions
             Safety standards
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
             Army Chemical Munitions Nonstockpile Disposal Program
             Army Alternative Disposal Technology Program
             Chemical Weapons Convention
             Army Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
             Army Enhanced Stockpile Surveillance Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Committee on
National Security, House of Representative

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m., EDT
Tuesday,
March 11, 1997

CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MATERIEL -
KEY FACTORS AFFECTING DISPOSAL
COSTS AND SCHEDULE

Statement of Henry L.  Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General,
National Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118

GAO/NSIAD-97-118T


(709248)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  CSEPP - Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project
  DOD - Department of Defense
  FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work concerning the
Department of Defense's (DOD) management of the programs for
destroying the U.S.  stockpile of chemical munitions and planning for
the disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel.  Since 1988,
the Congress has appropriated $4.2 billion for the disposal programs,
and DOD estimates that $23.4 billion more will be needed to complete
them.\1 The Army is working to complete the stockpile program by the
congressionally mandated date of December 31, 2004, and estimates
that the nonstockpile program will take nearly 40 years to complete. 
Appendix I provides appropriation and expenditure data for the
programs for fiscal years 1988 through 1997.  Appendix II provides
estimated funding data for the programs for fiscal years 1998 through
2005. 

Since 1990, we have issued a number of reports addressing
opportunities to improve various aspects of these disposal programs. 
In February 1997, we issued a report that discussed the key factors
affecting the costs and schedules for the chemical weapons and
related materiel disposal programs.\2 As requested, my statement
today provides an overview of our February report and includes a
discussion of the chemical stockpile and nonstockpile program,
actions the Army has taken to improve the programs, and alternatives
to the current approach. 


--------------------
\1 The programs' combined life-cycle cost estimate is $27.6 billion. 
This amount includes $12.4 billion for the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program and $15.2 billion for the Nonstockpile Chemical
Materiel Program. 

\2 Chemical Weapons and Materiel:  Key Factors Affecting Disposal
Costs and Schedule (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb.  10, 1997). 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

While there is general agreement about the need to destroy the
chemical stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to
the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities
about the destruction method that should be used.  As a result, the
costs and schedules for the disposal programs are uncertain. 
However, they will cost more than the estimated $23.4 billion above
current appropriations and take longer than currently planned.  The
key factors affecting the programs include the public concerns about
the safety of incineration, the environmental process, the
legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative
disposal technologies. 

The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program's cost and schedule are
largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities
are in agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining
stockpile sites.  Based on program experience, reaching agreement has
consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated.  For example,
the Army has consistently underestimated the time required to obtain
environmental permits for the disposal facilities.  Until DOD and the
affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method
for the remaining stockpile sites, the Army will not be able to
predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program's cost and schedule
with any degree of accuracy. 

Moreover, many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program
are also likely to affect the Army's ability to implement the
Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program.  For example, efforts to
dispose of nonstockpile materiel are likely to be driven by the need
to obtain state and local approvals for destruction methods.  In
addition, more time is needed for the Army to prove that its proposed
disposal method for the nonstockpile program will be safe and
effective and accepted by the affected states and localities. 

Notwithstanding these issues, DOD and the Army have taken actions in
response to congressional direction and our recommendations to
improve program management.  In December 1994, DOD designated the
Army's chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both
stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense
acquisition program.  The objectives of the designation were to
stabilize the disposal schedules, control costs, and provide more
discipline and higher levels of program oversight.  In addition, Army
officials have identified cost-reduction initiatives, which are in
various stages of assessment, that could reduce program costs by $673
million. 

Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public
concerns associated with each individual disposal location,
suggestions have been made by members of the Congress, DOD officials,
and others to change the programs' basic approach to destruction. 
However, the suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and
would require changes in existing legal requirements.  These
suggestions have included deferring plans for additional disposal
facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration
is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national site or
regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare
materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized
disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying laws and
regulations to standardize environmental requirements. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

In 1985, the Congress passed Public Law 99-145 directing the Army to
destroy the U.S.  stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions. 
The stockpile consists of rockets, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks,
and bulk containers, which contain nerve and mustard agents.  It is
stored at eight sites in the continental United States and on
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.  Appendix III identifies the
locations of the chemical stockpile storage sites.  To comply with
congressional direction, the Army established the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program and developed a plan to incinerate the agents and
munitions on site in specially designed facilities.  In 1988, the
Army established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Project (CSEPP) to help communities near the chemical stockpile
storage sites enhance existing emergency management and response
capabilities in the unlikely event of a chemical stockpile accident. 

Recognizing that the stockpile program did not include all chemical
warfare materiel requiring disposal, the Congress directed the Army
in 1992 to plan for the disposal of materiel not included in the
stockpile.  This materiel, some of which dates back to World War I,
consists of binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare
materiel, recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities,
and buried chemical warfare materiel.\3 Appendix IV identifies the
storage locations for the nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel.  In
1992, the Army established the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program
to dispose of the materiel. 

Appendix V provides a chronology of the Army's chemical disposal
programs. 


--------------------
\3 Binary weapons are formed from two nonlethal elements through a
chemical reaction after the munitions are fired or launched.  The
weapons were manufactured, stored, and transported with only one of
the chemical elements in the weapon.  The second element was to be
loaded into the weapon at the battlefield. 


      POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE
      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

In 1993, the United States signed the U.N.-sponsored Chemical Weapons
Convention.  In October 1996, the 65th nation ratified the convention
making the treaty effective on April 29, 1997.\4 If the U.S.  Senate
approves the convention, it could affect implementation of the
disposal programs.\5 Through ratification, the United States will
agree to dispose of its (1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile,
binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former
chemical weapon production facilities by April 29, 2007, and (2)
miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel by April 29, 2002.  If a
country is unable to maintain the convention's disposal schedule, the
convention's Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons may
grant a one-time extension of up to 5 years.  Under the terms of the
convention, chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt
from disposal as long as it remains buried.  Should the United States
choose to excavate the sites and remove the chemical materiel, the
provisions of the convention would apply.  The Senate has not
approved the convention, however, the United States is committed by
public law to destroying its chemical stockpile and related warfare
materiel. 


--------------------
\4 The convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation
ratified the treaty. 

\5 Under the U.S.  Constitution, treaties must be approved by a
two-thirds majority of the Senate. 


      OUR PRIOR REPORTS NOTED COST
      AND SCHEDULE ISSUES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.2

In prior reports, we expressed concern about the Army's lack of
progress and the rising cost of the disposal programs.  Appendix VI
provides a listing of our products related to these programs.  In
1991, we reported that continued problems in the program indicated
that increased costs and additional time to destroy the chemical
stockpile should be expected.  We recommended that the Army determine
whether faster and less costly technologies were available to destroy
the stockpile.\6 In a 1995 report on the nonstockpile program, we
concluded that the Army's plans for disposing of nonstockpile
chemical warfare materiel were not final and, as a result, its cost
estimate was likely to change.\7 In July 1995, we testified before
this subcommittee that the Army had experienced significant cost
growth and delays in executing its stockpile disposal program and
that further cost growth and schedule slippages could occur.\8 In
1996, we reported that efforts to enhance emergency preparedness is
Alabama had been hampered by management weaknesses in CSEPP.\9


--------------------
\6 Chemical Weapons:  Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule
Slippages Are Likely to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov.  20, 1991). 

\7 Chemical Weapons Disposal:  Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical
Warfare Materiel Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec.  20, 1994). 

\8 Chemical Weapons Disposal:  Issues Related to DOD's Management
(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995). 

\9 Chemical Weapons Stockpile:  Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is
Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996). 


   STOCKPILE PROGRAM'S COST AND
   SCHEDULE ARE UNCERTAIN BUT WILL
   EXCEED CURRENT ESTIMATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

The stockpile program will likely exceed its $12.4 billion estimate
and take longer than the legislative completion date of December
2004.\10 This is because reaching agreement on site-specific disposal
methods has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. 
Public concerns about the safety of incineration have (1) resulted in
additional environmental requirements, (2) slowed the permitting of
new incinerators, and (3) required the Army to research disposal
alternatives. 

Approximately $1 billion of the estimated $12.4 billion is associated
with CSEPP.  The cost estimate for CSEPP has increased because of
delays in the stockpile program and longstanding management
weaknesses.  These weaknesses have also slowed the program's progress
in enhancing emergency preparedness. 


--------------------
\10 Through fiscal year 1997, the Congress has appropriated $4
billion and the Army estimates that it will require $8.4 billion to
complete the program. 


      COST GROWTH AND SCHEDULE
      SLIPPAGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

Since 1985, the Army's cost estimate for the stockpile disposal
program has increased seven-fold, from an initial estimate of $1.7
billion to $12.4 billion, and the planned completion date has been
delayed from 1994 to 2004.  Although the Army is committed to
destroying the stockpile by the legislatively imposed deadline of
December 31, 2004, it is unlikely to meet that date.  Only two of the
nine planned disposal facilities are built and operating, 4 percent
of the stockpile has been destroyed, and environmental permitting
issues at the individual sites continue to delay construction of the
remaining facilities.  For example, since the Army developed the most
recent cost and schedule estimate in February 1996, the plant
construction schedule has slipped by 6 months at the Anniston Army
Depot, 9 months at the Pine Bluff Arsenal, 10 months at the Pueblo
Depot Activity, and 4 months at the Umatilla Depot Activity. 


      REACHING AGREEMENT ON
      ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES HAS
      BEEN A LENGTHY PROCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.2

Predicting the disposal schedule for the various sites is difficult. 
According to Army officials, this is partly due to the uncertainty of
the time required to satisfy changing environmental requirements. 
For example, although based on federal requirements, individual state
environmental requirements differ and are occasionally changed.  In
most cases, these changes have added unanticipated requirements,
resulting in the need for additional data collection, research, and
reporting by the Army. 

In addition, according to the Army, the original scope of the health
risk assessment to operate the disposal facilities was not completely
defined, the health assessment requirements have changed, and the
requirements currently vary from state to state.  According to DOD
officials, states have modified the requirements of their health risk
assessments well into the process, delaying the development of the
final assessment document. 

Based on program experience, the Army's 1996 schedule does not
provide sufficient time for the Army to complete the environmental
approval process.\11 As a result, program delays past the mandated
completion date of December 2004 are likely.  For example, the
schedule for the Anniston disposal facility includes a grace period
of a month for any slippage in the construction, systemization, or
operation to meet the legislative completion date of December 31,
2004.  Although the Army estimated that the permit would have been
issued by the end of September 1996, Alabama regulatory officials
expect the permit to be issued in June or July 1997--a slippage of
about 8 months in the schedule.  This slippage will cause disposal
operations at Anniston to extend to the middle of 2005. 


--------------------
\11 Department of Defense's Interim Status Assessment for the
Chemical Demilitarization Program, DOD (Apr.  15, 1996). 


      CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE
      TECHNOLOGIES HAS AFFECTED
      DISPOSAL COST AND SCHEDULE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.3

In the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed
the Army to report on potential technological alternatives to
incineration.  Consequently, in August 1994, the Army initiated a
program to investigate, develop, and support testing of alternative
disposal technologies for the two bulk-only stockpile sites--Aberdeen
Proving Ground and Newport Chemical Activity.  According to the
National Research Council, the Army has successfully involved the
state and the public in its alternative technology project for the
two bulk-only stockpile sites, demonstrating the importance of public
involvement to the progress of a program.\12 The development of
alternative disposal technologies for assembled chemical munitions
provides the Army the mechanism for encouraging public involvement
and establishing common objectives for the remaining disposal sites. 

In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed
DOD to assess alternative technologies for the disposal of assembled
chemical munitions.  The act also directed the Secretary of Defense
to report on the assessment by December 31, 1997.  Similarly, the
1997 DOD Appropriations Act provided $40 million to conduct a pilot
program to identify and demonstrate two or more alternatives to the
baseline incineration process for the disposal of assembled chemical
munitions.  The act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for
constructing disposal facilities at the Blue Grass Army Depot and
Pueblo Depot Activity, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on
the alternatives.  Although the prohibition applies only to Blue
Grass and Pueblo, public concerns about incineration may prompt state
regulators at other locations to delay their final decisions to
permit incinerators until the Secretary reports his findings. 


--------------------
\12 Public Involvement and the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program, National Research Council (Oct.  25, 1996). 


      MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES AND
      DISAGREEMENTS HAVE SLOWED
      THE PROGRESS OF CSEPP
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.4

The Army's and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) joint
management of CSEPP has not been effective in controlling the growth
in program costs and achieving timely results.  The Army's current
life-cycle cost estimate of $1.03 billion for the program has
increased by 800 percent over the initial estimate of $114 million in
1988.  The primary reasons for the cost increase are the 10-year
slippage in the completion of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
and financial management weaknesses.  Program management weaknesses
have also contributed to the increase and resulted in slow progress
in enhancing emergency preparedness in the 10 states and local
communities near the chemical stockpile storage sites.  Nine years
after CSEPP's inception, states and local communities still lack
critical items for responding to a chemical stockpile emergency,
including alert and notification systems, decontamination units, and
personal protection equipment. 

Although the Army has responded to this criticism and taken actions
in response to congressional direction to improve program management,
the completion of these actions has been delayed by disagreements
between Army and FEMA officials.  For example, the Army is still
working to respond to direction in the 1997 National Defense
Authorization Act to report on the implementation and success of
CSEPP Integrated Process Teams.\13 Because of this and other
differences regarding their roles and responsibilities, Army and FEMA
officials have not reached agreement on a long term management
structure for CSEPP. 


--------------------
\13 In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law
104-201), the Congress directed the Secretary of the Army to submit a
report within 120 days of the act's enactment that assessed the
implementation and success of the site-specific Integrated Process
Teams. 


   NONSTOCKPILE PROGRAM'S COST AND
   SCHEDULE ARE ALSO UNCERTAIN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

Through fiscal year 1997 the Congress has appropriated $221 million
for the nonstockpile program.  The Army estimates that it will
require an additional $15 billion and nearly 40 years to complete the
program.  However, given the factors driving the program, it is
uncertain how long the program will take or cost.  The program is
driven by the uncertainties surrounding buried chemical warfare
materiel and unproven disposal methods. 


      BURIED MATERIEL WILL DRIVE
      COST BUT LITTLE IS KNOWN
      ABOUT THEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

The Army estimates that it can dispose of binary weapons, recovered
chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous
chemical warfare materiel within the time frames established by the
Chemical Weapons Convention.  Under the terms of the convention,
chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal
as long as it remains buried.  Although the Army estimates that
buried chemical materiel accounts for $14.5 billion (95 percent) of
the nonstockpile program cost, the Army is still exploring potential
sites and has little and often imprecise information about the type
and amount of materiel buried.  Appendix VII identifies the potential
locations with buried chemical warfare materiel.  The Army estimated
that it will take until 2033 to identify, recover, and dispose of
buried nonstockpile materiel. 


   PROPOSED DISPOSAL SYSTEMS ARE
   NOT YET PROVEN EFFECTIVE AND
   ACCEPTABLE BY THE PUBLIC
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

Although Army officials are confident that the proposed disposal
systems will function as planned, the Army needs more time to prove
that the systems will safely and effectively destroy all nonstockpile
materiel and be accepted by the affected states and communities.  The
Army's disposal concept is based on developing mobile systems capable
of moving from one location to the next where the munitions are
remotely detoxified and the waste is transported to a commercial
hazardous waste facility.  Although the systems may operate in a
semi-fixed mode, they are scheduled to be available for mobile use at
recovered and burial sites after 1998. 


   ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES WILL ALSO
   AFFECT COST AND SCHEDULE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

Environmental issues similar to those experienced in the stockpile
program are also likely to affect the Army's ability to obtain the
environmental approvals and permits that virtually all nonstockpile
activities require.  Whether the systems are allowed to operate at a
particular location will depend on the state regulatory agency with
authority over the disposal operations.  In addition, public
acceptance or rejection of the mobile systems will affect their
transportation plans and disposal operations. 


   ACTIONS THE ARMY HAS TAKEN TO
   IMPROVE THE DISPOSAL PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7

DOD and the Army have taken a number of steps to respond to
congressional direction and independent reviews and improve their
management and oversight of the stockpile and nonstockpile programs. 
These steps have included efforts to improve coordination with the
public through an enhanced public outreach program, increase public
involvement in the alternative technology program for the two
bulk-only stockpile sites, and establish a joint CSEPP Army/FEMA team
to coordinate and implement emergency preparedness activities. 

In December 1994, DOD designated the Army's chemical demilitarization
program, consisting of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and
materiel, as a major defense acquisition program.  The objectives of
the designation were to stabilize the disposal schedules, control
costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of program
oversight.\14

In response to our recommendations and similar ones by the National
Research Council, the Army initiated the Enhanced Stockpile
Surveillance Program in 1995 to improve its monitoring and inspection
of chemical munitions.  On the basis of those activities, the Army
estimates that the stockpile will be reasonably stable through 2013. 

The Army's review of the stockpile disposal program has identified
several promising cost-reduction initiatives, but the Army cannot
implement some of the more significant initiatives without the
cooperation and approval of state regulatory agencies.  Army
officials estimated that the initial cost-reduction initiatives,
which are in various stages of assessment, could potentially reduce
program costs by $673 million.  The Army plans to identify additional
cost-reductions as the stockpile program progresses. 


--------------------
\14 The designation transferred management responsibility to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and
Acquisition) and required the program manager to develop a cost and
schedule baseline and prepare quarterly and annual reports on
variances from the baseline. 


   ALTERNATIVES TO THE ARMY'S
   BASIC APPROACH TO DESTRUCTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8

Recognizing the difficulty of resolving the public concerns
associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have
been made to change the programs' basic approach to destruction.  For
example, members of the Congress and officials from environmental
groups and affected states and counties have suggested deferring
plans for additional disposal facilities until an acceptable
alternative technology to incineration is developed.  Congressional
members have also suggested consolidating disposal operations at a
national or regional sites.  In addition, officials of various DOD
organizations have suggested destroying selected nonstockpile
chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities,
establishing a centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile
materiel, and modifying laws and regulations to standardize
environmental requirements. 


      DEFERRING INCINERATION UNTIL
      AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE IS
      DEVELOPED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8.1

Deferring disposal operations may eliminate much of the public
concern that has influenced the current approach to destroying the
chemical stockpile.  According to Army officials, alternative
technologies may not reduce costs or shorten disposal operations but
are likely to be acceptable to a larger segment of the public than
incineration.  Given the current status of alternative technologies,
the cost and schedule would remain uncertain and there would be a
corresponding increase in the risk of an accident from continued
storage of the munitions.  Although the Army has been researching
technological alternatives to incineration for chemical agents stored
in bulk containers, only recently have research and testing
demonstrated potentially effective alternatives.  Currently, there is
no proven alternative technology to incineration capable of safely
and effectively destroying assembled chemical munitions. 


      CONSOLIDATING DISPOSAL
      OPERATIONS AT A NATIONAL
      SITE OR REGIONAL SITES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8.2

Consolidating disposal operations could reduce construction and
procurement costs, but the required transportation of chemical
munitions could be an insurmountable barrier.  This option would
extend the disposal schedule and result in increased risk not only
from storage but also from handling and transportation.  Although
consolidating disposal operations could reduce estimated facility
construction and operation costs by as much as $2.6 billion, the
savings would be reduced by uncertain but potentially significant
transportation and emergency preparedness costs.  To help reduce
costs, the Army would have to consolidate three or more stockpile
sites, develop less expensive transportation containers, and control
emergency response costs.  In 1988, the Army and many in the Congress
rejected transporting the chemical stockpile weapons to a national
site or regional disposal sites because of the increased risk to the
public and the environment from moving the munitions.  DOD and Army
officials continue to be concerned about the safety of moving
chemical weapons and public opposition to transportation of the
munitions has grown since 1988. 


      DESTROYING SELECTED
      NONSTOCKPILE MATERIEL IN
      STOCKPILE FACILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8.3

Using the chemical stockpile facilities to destroy nonstockpile
chemical materiel has the potential for reducing costs.  Although
selected nonstockpile items could be destroyed in stockpile disposal
facilities, the 1986 DOD Authorization Act, and subsequent
legislation, specifies that the chemical stockpile disposal
facilities may not be used for any purpose other than the disposal of
stockpile weapons.  This legislative provision, in some cases,
necessitates that the Army implement separate disposal operations for
nonstockpile materiel along side of the stockpile facilities.  In its
1995 implementation plan, the Army suggested that the stockpile
disposal facilities could be used to process some nonstockpile
weapons, depending on the location, the type of chemical weapon or
materiel, and condition.\15


--------------------
\15 Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program Implementation Plan, U.S. 
Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (Aug.  1995). 


      DESTROYING NONSTOCKPILE
      MATERIEL IN A CENTRAL
      FACILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8.4

Another method for destroying nonstockpile chemical materiel could be
based on the use of a central disposal facility with equipment
designed specifically for destroying nonstockpile materiel.  Although
a national disposal facility could reduce program costs, the
legislative restrictions on the transportation of nonstockpile
chemical material and the prevalent public attitude that such a
disposal facility should not be located in their vicinity would be
significant obstacles that would have to be resolved. 


      MODIFYING LAWS AND
      REGULATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8.5

Modifying laws and regulations to standardize environmental
requirements could enhance both the stockpile and nonstockpile
programs' stability and control costs.  The current process of
individual states establishing their own environmental laws and
requirements and the prevalent public attitude that the Army's
disposal facilities should not be located in their vicinity have been
obstacles to the stockpile disposal program and are also likely to
affect the nonstockpile program.  For example, individual state
environmental requirements differ, such as the number of required
trail burns, and are occasionally changed.  As a result, there are no
standard environmental procedures and requirements for stockpile and
nonstockpile disposal sites.  According to the Army, establishing
standardized environmental requirements for all disposal sites would
enhance the programs' stability.  However, efforts to modify existing
laws and regulations to standardize the environmental requirements
for chemical weapons disposal would likely be resisted by the
affected states and localities and environmental organizations. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:9

In summary, implementation of the disposal programs has been slowed
due to the lack of consensus among DOD and the affected states and
localities over the process to dispose of chemical munitions and
materiel.  Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the
public concerns with the disposal of chemical munitions, suggestions
have been made by members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others
to change the Army's basic approach to destruction.  However, these
suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require
changes in legal requirements.  While our February report presented
these suggestions, we did not take a position on them or the Army's
current approach given the associated policy and legislative
implications.  Rather, our report presented the suggestions in
context of the trade-offs they present and noted that should the
Congress decide to consider modifications or alternatives to the
current approach, it may wish to consider the suggestions related to
the creation of alternative technologies, consolidation of stockpile
disposal operations, utilization of stockpile facilities for
nonstockpile items, centralization of nonstockpile destruction, and
standardization of environmental laws and requirements. 

In commenting on these suggestions, DOD said that it favored the
Congress considering the ones to establish a centralized disposal
facility for nonstockpile materiel and to modify laws and regulations
to standardize environmental requirements for chemical weapons
disposal.  DOD recommended against consideration of the options to
defer incineration plans, consolidate disposal operations, and to use
stockpile facilities for destroying nonstockpile items. 

In addition, we believe that high-level management attention is
needed to reach agreement on a long-term management structure for
CSEPP that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of Army and
FEMA personnel. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:9.1

This concludes my statement, Mr.  Chairman.  I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee
may have. 


APPROPRIATION, OBLIGATION, AND
DISBURSEMENT DATA FOR FISCAL YEARS
1988 THROUGH 1997
=========================================================== Appendix I

The following tables show appropriation, obligation, and disbursement
data for the disposal programs.  Funding data for the Chemical
Stockpile Disposal Program, Alternative Technology and Approaches
Project, and Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project are
shown in
tables I.1, I.2, and I.3, respectively.  Funding data for the
Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program are shown in table I.4. 



                               Table I.1
                
                  Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                            Appropriat  Obliga  Disbur
Fiscal year                                         ed     ted     sed
------------------------------------------  ----------  ------  ------
1988                                            $195.8  $194.3  $192.9
1989                                             168.0   165.5   165.4
1990                                             210.4   208.2   205.9
1991                                             255.0   252.3   251.5
1992                                             331.3   330.1   326.8
1993                                             419.1   417.9   316.0
1994                                             249.1   246.7   234.9
1995                                             486.5   472.2   279.2
1996                                             484.2   346.0   130.5
1997                                             534.7
======================================================================
Total                                         $3,334.1  $2,633  $2,103
                                                            .2      .1
----------------------------------------------------------------------


                               Table I.2
                
                 Alternative Technology and Approaches
                                Project

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                            Appropriat  Obliga  Disbur
Fiscal year                                         ed     ted     sed
------------------------------------------  ----------  ------  ------
1994                                             $22.4   $22.2   $10.2
1995                                               9.4     9.4     6.8
1996                                              22.2    19.6    12.2
1997                                              56.0
======================================================================
Total                                           $110.0   $51.2   $29.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------


                               Table I.3
                
                      Chemical Stockpile Emergency
                          Preparedness Project

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                            Appropriat  Obliga  Disbur
Fiscal year                                         ed     ted     sed
------------------------------------------  ----------  ------  ------
1988                                              $2.5    $2.5    $2.5
1989                                              11.3    11.3    11.1
1990                                              43.8    43.7    43.3
1991                                              37.7    37.6    37.5
1992                                              40.9    40.5    40.0
1993                                              88.2    87.5    62.1
1994                                              71.9    71.6    65.5
1995                                              56.5    56.4    27.6
1996                                              80.0    65.2    27.3
1997                                              82.4
======================================================================
Total                                           $515.2  $416.3  $316.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------


                               Table I.4
                
                 Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                            Appropriat  Obliga  Disbur
Fiscal year                                         ed     ted     sed
------------------------------------------  ----------  ------  ------
1992                                              $2.2    $2.2    $2.2
1993                                               6.3     6.3     6.0
1994                                              31.5    31.2    26.4
1995                                              26.0    25.8    18.5
1996                                              69.7    40.4    14.6
1997                                              85.3
======================================================================
Total                                           $221.0  $105.9   $67.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  The Army's Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization. 


ESTIMATED PROGRAM COST FOR FISCAL
YEARS 1998 THROUGH 2005
========================================================== Appendix II

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                  Alternative     Chemical  Nonstockpi
                        Chemical   Technology    Stockpile          le
                       Stockpile          and    Emergency    Chemical
                        Disposal   Approaches  Preparednes    Materiel
Fiscal year              Program      Project    s Project     Program
-------------------  -----------  -----------  -----------  ----------
1998                      $946.8        $16.0        $94.4       $71.7
1999                       960.9         30.5         66.6       174.1
2000                       842.2         19.0         74.0       112.2
2001                       700.2         15.0         71.3       154.4
2002                     1,644.8         88.3         69.5       166.5
2003                       866.2                      66.2       101.7
2004                       938.9                      60.8       101.8
2005                       235.8                                  55.2
======================================================================
Total\a                 $7,135.8       $168.8       $502.8      $937.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Then-year dollars. 

\a Totals do not add to the Army's estimated funding to complete the
programs because (1) the estimates were developed at different times
and based on different assumptions and (2) the table does not reflect
total costs for the nonstockpile program, which is estimated to
continue through 2033. 

Source:  DOD's Selected Acquisition Report (June 30, 1996). 


THE U.S.  STOCKPILE OF CHEMICAL
AGENTS AND MUNITIONS
========================================================= Appendix III



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Note:  As of December 15, 1995.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  DOD.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


STORAGE LOCATIONS OF NONSTOCKPILE
CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL
========================================================== Appendix IV



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Based on 1996 data
   provided by the Army's Project
   Manager for Nonstockpile
   Chemical Materiel.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


CHRONOLOGY OF THE U.S.  CHEMICAL
DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAM
=========================================================== Appendix V

Time frame          Activity
------------------  ------------------------------------------------------------
1917-1960s          Obsolete or unserviceable chemical warfare agents and
                    munitions were disposed of by open pit burning, land burial,
                    and ocean dumping.

1969                The National Academy of Sciences recommended that ocean
                    dumping be avoided and that public health and environmental
                    protection be emphasized. It suggested two alternatives to
                    ocean disposal: chemical neutralization of nerve agents and
                    incineration of mustard agents.

1970                The Armed Forces Authorization Act (P.L. 91-441) required a
                    Department of Health and Human Services review of any
                    disposal plans and detoxification of weapons prior to
                    disposal. It also limited the movement of chemical weapons.

1971                The Foreign Military Sales Act prohibited the transportation
                    of U.S. chemical weapons from Okinawa, Japan, to the
                    continental United States. The weapons were moved to
                    Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

1971-1973           The Army tested and developed an incineration process and
                    disposed of several thousand tons of mustard agent stored in
                    ton containers at Rocky Mountain Arsenal.

1973-1976           The Army disposed of nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by
                    chemical neutralization at Tooele Army Depot and Rocky
                    Mountain Arsenal. The process was problematic and not very
                    reproducible, making automation difficult.

1979                The Army opened the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System
                    at Tooele to test and evaluate disposal equipment and
                    processes for chemical agents and munitions on a pilot
                    scale.

1981                The Army decided to build the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent
                    Disposal System to dispose of its chemical M55 rocket
                    stockpile.

1981-1986           The Army used the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System
                    to test and evaluate incineration of chemical agents and
                    energetic materiel, and decontamination of metal parts and
                    ton containers.

1982                An Arthur D. Little Corporation study for the Army concluded
                    that using incineration, rather than neutralization, to
                    dispose of the stockpile would reduce costs.

1982                The Army declared its stockpile of M55 rockets obsolete.

1983                The Army expanded its chemical disposal program to include
                    the M55 rocket stockpile at Anniston Army Depot, Umatilla
                    Depot Activity, and Blue Grass Army Depot.

1984                The Army expanded its chemical disposal program to include
                    the M55 rocket stockpile at Pine Bluff Arsenal and Tooele
                    Army Depot.

1984                The National Research Council endorsed the Army's
                    disassembly and high-temperature incineration process for
                    disposing of chemical agents and munitions. It also
                    recommended that the Army continue to store most of the
                    chemical stockpile, dispose of the M55 rockets, and analyze
                    alternative methods for disposing of the remaining chemical
                    stockpile.

1985                The Army began construction of the Johnston Atoll Chemical
                    Agent Disposal System.

1985                The DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-
                    145) mandated the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of
                    lethal chemical agents and munitions. It also required that
                    the disposal facilities be cleaned, dismantled, and disposed
                    of according to applicable laws and regulations.

1986                The DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (P.L. 99-
                    500) prohibited shipments of chemical weapons, components,
                    or agents to the Blue Grass Depot Activity for any purpose.

1987                Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System operations were
                    suspended as a result of a low-level nerve agent release.

1988                The Army issued the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
                    Statement for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. The
                    Army selected on-site disposal of the chemical stockpile
                    because it posed fewer potential risks than transportation
                    and off-site disposal.

1988                The National Defense Act of Fiscal Year 1989 (P.L. 100-456)
                    required the Army to complete operational verification
                    testing at Johnston Atoll before beginning to systematize
                    similar disposal facilities in the continental United
                    States.

1989                The Army started construction of the chemical
                    demilitarization facility at Tooele Army Depot.

1990                The Army completed the successful retrograde of all chemical
                    munitions stored in Germany to storage facilities at
                    Johnston Atoll.

1990                The Army initiated disposal of M55 rockets at Johnston
                    Atoll.

1990                A very small amount of nerve agent leaked through the common
                    stack during maintenance activities at Johnston Atoll. The
                    agent release was below allowable stack concentration.

1990-1993           The Army completed four operational verification tests at
                    the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System. During
                    the test, the Army destroyed more than 40,000 munitions
                    containing nerve and mustard agents. In August 1993, the
                    Secretary of Defense certified to the Congress that the Army
                    has successfully completed the operational verification
                    tests at Johnston Atoll.

1991                The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
                    (P.L. 101-510) restricted the use of funds to transport
                    chemical weapons to Johnston Atoll except for U.S. munitions
                    discovered in the Pacific, prohibited the Army from studying
                    the movement of chemical munitions, and established the
                    emergency preparedness program.

1991                The Army moved 109 World War II mustard-filled projectiles
                    from the Solomon Islands to Johnston Atoll for storage and
                    disposal.

1991                The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992
                    and 1993 (P.L. 102-190) required the Secretary of Defense to
                    develop a chemical weapons stockpile safety contingency
                    plan.

1992                The U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency was
                    established to consolidate operational responsibility for
                    the destruction of chemical warfare capabilities into one
                    office.

1992                The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993
                    (P.L. 102-484) directed the Army to establish citizens'
                    commissions for states with storage sites, if the state's
                    governor requested one. It also required the Army to report
                    on (1) disposal alternatives to the baseline incineration
                    method and (2) plans for destroying U.S. nonstockpile
                    chemical weapons and materiel identified in the Chemical
                    Weapons Convention.

1993                The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System was shut
                    down during operation and verification tests when residue
                    explosive material generated during the processing of M60
                    105mm projectiles caught fire, causing damage to a conveyor
                    belt and other equipment in the explosive containment room.

1993                The Army completed construction and started systemization of
                    the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.

1993                The Army issued its report on the physical and chemical
                    integrity of the chemical stockpile to the Congress.

1993                A mustard leak from a ton container was discovered at Tooele
                    Army Depot.

1993                The Army issued an interim survey and analysis report on the
                    Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program to the Congress.

1994                Approximately 11.6 milligrams of nerve agent were released
                    into the atmosphere at the Johnston Atoll during a
                    maintenance activity on the liquid incinerator.

1994                The National Research Council issued its recommendations for
                    the disposal of chemical agents and munitions to the Army.

1994                The Army issued its alternative demilitarization technology
                    report to the Congress. The Army recommended the
                    continuation of the chemical demilitarization program
                    without deliberate delay and the implementation of a two-
                    technology research and development program.

1994                The Army issued it M55 rocket stability report to the
                    Congress. The report recommended that an enhanced stockpile
                    assessment program be initiated to better characterize the
                    state of the M55 rocket in the stockpile.

1994                The Army initiated the Alternative Technology Project to
                    develop an alternative disposal technology to the baseline
                    incineration process for the bulk-only stockpile locations
                    in Maryland and Indiana. This research and development
                    effort is conducted in conjunction with activities to
                    implement the baseline program.

1994                The U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency was
                    redesignated the U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization and
                    Remediation Activity after a merger with the U.S. Army
                    Chemical and Biological Defense Command. In addition, the
                    Army restructured and centralized its chemical stockpile
                    emergency preparedness program to streamline procedures,
                    enhance responsiveness of operations, and improve the
                    budgeting process.

1994                The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,
                    Development and Acquisition became the DOD Executive Agent
                    for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, replacing the
                    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations,
                    Logistics, and Environment. The Chemical Demilitarization
                    Program was designated a DOD Acquisition Category 1D
                    Program.

1995                The Army initiated the Enhanced Stockpile Surveillance
                    Program to investigate, develop, and support methods to
                    improve monitoring and inspection of chemical munitions.

1995                The U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation
                    Activity was renamed the Program Manager for Chemical
                    Demilitarization.

1995                The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System surpassed
                    the 1-million pounds target and completed the disposal of
                    all M55 rockets stored on Johnston Atoll. Disposal rates
                    exceeded established goals.

1995                A perimeter monitor located about 100 yards from the
                    demilitarization building at Johnston Atoll detected a trace
                    level of nerve agent. The source of the leak was identified
                    as a door gasket in the air filtration system. Temporary air
                    locks were erected and the gasket replaced. No one was
                    harmed from this event.

1995                The Army awarded the contract for small burial sites and
                    issued its implementation plan for the nonstockpile program.

1995                The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility completed
                    equipment systemization testing.

1995                The Army certified to the Congress that all Browder
                    Amendment requirements for the award of the Anniston
                    construction contract were met.

1996                The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
                    (P.L. 104-106) directed DOD to conduct an assessment of the
                    Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and options that could
                    be taken to reduce program costs.

1996                The Army completed disposal of all Air Force and Navy bombs
                    stored on Johnston Atoll ahead of schedule.

1996                The Army awarded the systems contract for the construction,
                    operation, and closure of the proposed Anniston Chemical
                    Agent Disposal Facility. Construction of the facility is
                    scheduled to begin after the state of Alabama issues the
                    environmental permits.

1996                The Army started disposal operations at the Tooele Chemical
                    Agent Disposal Facility. Shortly after the start, operations
                    were shut down for a week after a small amount of agent was
                    detected in a sealed vestibule attached to the air
                    filtration system. No agent was released to the environment
                    and no one was harmed.

1996                Several hair line cracks were discovered in the concrete
                    floor of the Tooele disposal facility's decontamination
                    area. The cracks caused a small amount of decontamination
                    solution to leak to a electrical room below. No agent was
                    detected and the cracks were sealed.

1996                The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201)
                    directed DOD to conduct an assessment of alternative
                    technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical
                    munitions. The act also directed the Secretary of Defense to
                    report on this assessment by December 31, 1997.

1996                The 1997 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) provided the
                    Army $40 million to conduct a pilot program to identify and
                    demonstrate two or more alternatives to the baseline
                    incineration process for the disposal of assembled chemical
                    munitions. The act also prohibited DOD from obligating any
                    funds for constructing disposal facilities at Blue Grass and
                    Pueblo until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the
                    alternatives.

1996                The Chemical Weapons Convention was ratified by the 65th
                    country needed to make the convention effective. As a
                    result, the convention will go into effect April 29, 1997.
                    Through ratification, the United States will agree to
                    dispose of its (1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile,
                    binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and
                    former chemical weapon production facilities by April 29,
                    2007, and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel by
                    April 29, 2002.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
========================================================== Appendix VI

Chemical Weapons and Materiel:  Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs
and Schedule (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb.  10, 1997). 

Chemical Weapons Stockpile:  Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is
Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996). 

Chemical Weapons Disposal:  Issues Related to DOD's Management
(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995). 

Chemical Weapons:  Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has
Financial Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-95-94, Mar.  15, 1995). 

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review (GAO/NSIAD-95-66R, Jan. 
12, 1995). 

Chemical Weapons:  Stability of the U.S.  Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67,
Dec.  22, 1994). 

Chemical Weapons Disposal:  Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare
Materiel Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec.  20, 1994). 

Chemical Weapons:  Issues Involving Destruction Technologies
(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-159, Apr.  26, 1994). 

Chemical Weapons Destruction:  Advantages and Disadvantages of
Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar.  18, 1994). 

Arms Control:  Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (GAO/NSIAD-94-136, Mar.  15, 1994). 

Chemical Weapon Stockpile:  Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has
Been Slow to Achieve Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb.  22, 1994). 

Chemical Weapons Storage:  Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to
Emergencies (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18, July 16, 1993). 

Chemical Weapons Destruction:  Issues Affecting Program Cost,
Schedule, and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan.  21, 1993). 
Chemical Weapons Destruction:  Issues Related to Environmental
Permitting and Testing Experience (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-43, June 16, 1992). 

Chemical Weapons Disposal (GAO/NSIAD-92-219R, May 14, 1992). 

Chemical Weapons:  Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule
Slippages Are Likely to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov.  20, 1991). 

Chemical Warfare:  DOD's Effort to Remove U.S.  Chemical Weapons From
Germany (GAO/NSIAD-91-105, Feb.  13, 1991). 


POTENTIAL LOCATIONS WITH BURIED
CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL
========================================================= Appendix VII



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Based on 1996 data
   provided by the Army's Project
   Manager for Nonstockpile
   Chemical Materiel.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


*** End of document. ***