Travel of Government Officials on Government Aircraft (Testimony,
12/29/95, GAO/T-NSIAD-96-85).

This testimony discusses two recent GAO reports (GAO/NSIAD-95-144, July
1995, and GAO/NSIAD-95-168BR, June 1995) on (1) the White House staff's
use of military helicopters and (2) government aircraft used to fly
senior-level military and civilian officials. This testimony highlights
the key findings from these reports and then discusses each finding in
detail.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-96-85
     TITLE:  Travel of Government Officials on Government Aircraft
      DATE:  12/29/95
   SUBJECT:  Military aircraft
             Helicopters
             Public officials
             Air transportation operations
             Military inventories
             Defense contingency planning
             Combat readiness
             Military personnel
             Inventory control systems
             Policy evaluation
IDENTIFIER:  Persian Gulf War
             Naval Flight Record Subsystem
             UH-1H Helicopter
             Pentagon
             HMX-1 Helicopter
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and
Technology, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
10:30 a.m., EDT
Friday,
December 29, 1995

- TRAVEL OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
ON GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT

Statement of Mark E.  Gebicke, Director,
Military Operations and Capabilities Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-96-85

GAO/NSIAD-96-85T


(703119)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV


============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our reports on (1) the White
House staff's use of military helicopters and (2) government aircraft
used to transport senior-level military and civilian officials.  I
will highlight the key findings from these reports and then discuss
each finding more specifically. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

In response to a congressional request, we reported in July that, as
previously disclosed by the White House, staff members had flown in
military helicopters 14 times during the first 16 months of the
current administration, without accompanying the President, Vice
President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, or Heads of
State.\1

In response to another congressional request, we reported in June on
government aircraft used to transport senior-level military and
civilian officials.\2 Department of Defense (DOD) policy states that
the military services' operational support airlift (OSA) inventory of
fixed-wing aircraft--which, among other things, are used to transport
senior- level military and civilian officials--should be based solely
on wartime requirements.  However, DOD had not provided central
guidance on how the services should count their OSA aircraft or
determine their wartime requirements, leaving each service to
independently establish its own requirements.  Our analysis showed
that the April 1995 OSA inventory of 520 fixed-wing aircraft was
about 10 times larger than the number of OSA aircraft used in theater
during the Persian Gulf War.  In addition, the Army and Air Force
helicopters located in the Washington, D.C., area were not justified
based on OSA wartime requirements and DOD senior travelers' most
frequent helicopter flight was to or from Andrews Air Force Base,
Maryland, located about 15 miles from the Pentagon.  In response to
recommendations made in our report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
completed a study which recommends a reduction in the number of OSA
aircraft to 391, and DOD strengthened the policy governing the use of
OSA aircraft, including helicopters, by senior-level travelers. 

Regarding civilian agency aircraft used to transport senior-level
officials, we reported that only 19 of 1,500 aircraft operated by the
various civilian agencies were used to routinely transport
senior-level officials. 


--------------------
\1 White House:  Staff Use of Helicopters (GAO/NSIAD-95-144, July 14,
1995). 

\2 Government Aircraft:  Observations on Travel by Senior Officials
(GAO/ NSIAD-95-168BR, June 5, 1995). 


   WHITE HOUSE STAFF'S USE OF
   HELICOPTERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

In 1994, six Members of Congress\3 expressed concern about a White
House official's use of a military helicopter to visit Camp David and
a golf course on May 24, 1994.  Accordingly, we were asked to
determine (1) the frequency of helicopter flights by White House
staff from January 21, 1993, to May 24, 1994, and (2) whether
applicable White House procedures were followed in requesting and
approving the May 24 trip to Camp David and the golf course. 

Since 1976, the Marine Corps HMX-1 Squadron in Quantico, Virginia,
has been responsible for providing helicopter support to the White
House.  The squadron is specifically tasked to fly the President,
Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, and visiting
Heads of State.  White House staff may be authorized to use HMX-1
helicopters when they are directly supporting the President, Vice
President, First Lady, and wife of the Vice President or conducting
immediate White House activities.  Manual records of flights taken
by, or in support of, the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife
of the Vice President, or Heads of State, are maintained at the
squadron's Quantico facilities. 


--------------------
\3 Representatives Bartlett, Gingrich, Clinger, Armey, Camp, and
now-retired Representative Michel. 


      STAFF USE OF HELICOPTERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

According to HMX-1 manual records, approximately 1,200 flights were
flown in support of the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife
of the Vice President, and Heads of State during the 16 months before
May 24, 1994.  These records indicated that, as previously disclosed
by the White House, staff members flew in military helicopters 14
times without the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the
Vice President, or Heads of State during this period.  We performed
several tests, which I will discuss, to verify the completeness and
accuracy of the HMX-1 manual records.  Our work did not identify any
additional White House staff flights. 

We reviewed approximately 1,200 manual records (HMX-1 after-action
reports) of flights by or in support of the President, Vice
President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, and Heads of
State.  The after-action report, which is filed by the pilot,
identifies the passengers, an itinerary, and the flight crew and is
retained by the HMX-1 White House Liaison Office in Quantico.  Among
the after-action reports we examined were the 14 flights previously
reported by the White House as the only flights taken by White House
staff when the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the
Vice President, or Heads of State were not on board.  According to
officials from the White House Military Office and the HMX-1 Squadron
and an associate counsel to the President, the after-action reports
we reviewed covered all White House-related flights between January
21, 1993, and May 24, 1994. 


         HOW WE DID OUR WORK
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:2.1.1

We performed four tests to independently verify the completeness and
accuracy of the manual records maintained by the HMX-1 Squadron.  As
our first test, we compared the President's itinerary, as reported in
the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, with HMX-1
after-action reports.  We then listed instances in which the
President had traveled, but no after- action reports existed.  A
White House official then provided us documents from the Presidential
Diarist and the Secret Service.  These documents verified that the
President had used other forms of transportation on the days in
question.  Next, we compared the records maintained at HMX-1 with the
flight records in the Navy's automated Naval Flight Record Subsystem. 
This database is part of a larger automated flight record system used
to track and manage all naval aircraft flights.  The database is
maintained by the Navy and the Marine Corps and contains flight
information provided by pilots after each flight.  The automated data
we obtained covered 6,120 flights of HMX-1 aircraft from January 21,
1993, to May 24, 1994.  We found the records maintained at HMX-1 to
be more complete than those maintained in the database. 

Third, during our review of the previously reported 14 White House
staff flights, we found that 10 had a squadron-specific mission
purpose code.  According to a Marine Corps official, pilots are to
assign this HMX-1 squadron-specific mission purpose code to all
flights for logistical support of an executive aircraft, as well as
any flight by White House staff that is not directly associated with
a flight taken by the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of
the Vice President, or Heads of State.  We searched the automated
database for all flights with this specific code and found 72 more
flights.  Of the 72 flights, 34 were included in the records we had
reviewed at HMX-1.  The remaining 38 flights had no after-action
reports.  Because it was unclear whether after-action reports should
have been completed for the 38 flights, we asked for clarification. 
We ultimately confirmed why the 38 flights had not been included in
the flight records we reviewed at the HMX-1 Squadron.  Some flights
with no after-action reports included flights to and from contractors
for maintenance, flights to test facilities, and support for
presidential travel. 

As one last check that the squadron had not inadvertently omitted a
flight from the after-action reports we had reviewed, we interviewed
52 pilots still assigned to the squadron who had flown a White House
mission during the 16- month period of our review.  In the presence
of officials from the White House and the HMX-1 Squadron, we asked
the pilots if they had ever flown a White House mission without
filing an after-action report.  All the pilots said that they always
filed after-action reports when they flew missions in support of the
White House. 


      APPROVAL PROCEDURES FOR THE
      MAY 24, 1994, TRIP
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.2

At the time of the May 24 trip to Camp David and a golf course, White
House policy required that White House Military Office officials
approve all HMX-1 helicopter travel by White House staff.  The former
Deputy Director of the White House Military Office stated that he had
approved the use of an HMX-1 helicopter for the May 24 trip. 
However, no written procedures detailed how such flights were
requested or approved.  White House Military Office officials told us
that the infrequency of helicopter use by the White House staff made
written policies and procedures unnecessary; each request had to be
considered on an individual basis.  The former Deputy Director also
told us that the request and approval for helicopter service for the
May 24 trip, like most requests for helicopter service, were made
orally. 

Shortly after the May 24 trip, the White House changed the approval
authority for staff's use of military aircraft.  According to a May
31, 1994, memorandum, the approval authority was elevated from the
level of the Deputy Director of the White House Military Office to
the White House Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff.  For
trips that involve the Chief of Staff, the approving authority is now
either the White House Counsel or the Deputy White House Counsel. 
Now let me turn to the issue of senior-level officials traveling on
government aircraft. 


   TRAVEL BY SENIOR OFFICIALS ON
   GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Approximately 500 fixed-wing airplanes and 100 helicopters are used
for DOD's OSA mission, which includes transporting senior-level
officials in support of command, installation, or management
functions.  The Secretary of Defense has designated some DOD
senior-level travelers as required use travelers (1) because of their
continuous requirement for secure communications, (2) for security,
or (3) for responsive transportation to satisfy exceptional
scheduling requirements.  However, the military department
secretaries may apply more stringent restrictions in determining
which four-star officers within their respective departments must use
these aircraft.  DOD policy excludes some aircraft, such as those
assigned to the Air Force 89th Military Airlift Wing, from the OSA
mission.  The 89th Wing provides worldwide airlift support for the
President, Vice President, and other high-level officials in the U.S. 
and foreign governments. 

The Office of Management and Budget has made the General Services
Administration (GSA) responsible for managing civilian agencies'
aircraft programs.  DOD, like the civilian agencies, is required to
report data to GSA semiannually on senior-level, civilian officials'
travel. 


      APRIL 1995 OSA INVENTORY IS
      10 TIMES GREATER THAN NUMBER
      OF OSA AIRCRAFT USED IN THE
      PERSIAN GULF WAR
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

DOD's policy states that the OSA inventory of fixed-wing aircraft
should be based solely on wartime requirements.  During our review,
however, we found that each service had established its own wartime
requirements based on differing definitions and methodologies.  As of
April 1995, the services reported 520 fixed-wing aircraft in DOD's
OSA inventory.  Our review showed that only 48 OSA aircraft were used
in theater during the Persian Gulf War, which is less than 10 percent
of the April 1995 OSA inventory. 

In 1994, the Air Force determined that its OSA inventory exceeded its
wartime requirements, whereas the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
determined that their OSA inventories were slightly less than wartime
requirements.  However, a February 1993 report on Roles, Missions,
and Functions issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the May 1995 report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the
Armed Forces indicated that the existing number of aircraft dedicated
to OSA missions had been and continued to be excessive. 

To correct this problem, we recommended in our June report that the
Secretary of Defense (1) provide uniform guidance to the services
concerning how to compute OSA wartime requirements, (2) develop the
appropriate mechanisms to ensure the availability of each service's
aircraft to help fulfill the OSA needs of the other services, and (3)
reassign or otherwise dispose of excess OSA aircraft.  Additionally,
in our September report on the 1996 DOD operation and maintenance
budget, we recommended that Congress direct the Air Force to reduce
its OSA inventory to its wartime requirements, which would save $18.1
million in operation and maintenance costs.\4

To address the recommendations in our June report, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff studied OSA wartime requirements across DOD, including how
the availability of each service's aircraft could help fill the needs
of the other services.  The resulting October 1995 report established
a joint requirement for 391 OSA aircraft and developed a common
methodology for determining OSA requirements.  The Chairman submitted
the report later in October to the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
requesting his approval for the OSA fleet to be sized at 391
aircraft, which would mean a reduction of over 100 aircraft.  The
disposition of excess OSA aircraft is currently under review. 
Further, DOD plans to update its policy on OSA to formalize the
definition, use, and management of OSA aircraft.  Plans are also
underway to assign to the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for
determining DOD's annual OSA requirements. 


--------------------
\4 1996 DOD Budget:  Potential Reductions to Operation and
Maintenance Program (GAO/NSIAD-95-200BR, Sept.  26, 1995). 


      A DOWNWARD TREND IN TRAVEL
      ON OSA FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.2

Adverse publicity and increased congressional concern about potential
abuses resulted in a number of statements during 1994 by the White
House and the Secretary of Defense emphasizing the need for senior
officials to carefully consider the use of commercial transportation
instead of government aircraft.  On May 9, 1995, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense issued a revised policy memorandum that eliminates an
entire category of "required mission use" for justifying individual
OSA flights and requires that many more OSA flights be justified
based on a cost comparison between DOD's OSA aircraft and commercial
carriers. 

Our review indicated that from March 1993 to February 1995, the
number of senior-level officials' OSA flights generally declined. 
During that period,\5 the number of senior officials' OSA flight
segments\6 per month ranged from a high of about 1,800 in March 1993
to a low of about 1,000.  We found that 16 of the 20 destinations
most frequently traveled to by senior-level DOD officials were also
served by commercial airlines with government contracts.  For
example, 1,619 flight segments from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland,
to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, could have been served by
government-contract airlines.  It should be recognized, however, that
some of the trips we identified were made by those senior-level
officials required to use government aircraft and that the contract
flights may not have provided the same scheduling flexibility made
possible by government-owned aircraft. 

On October 1, 1995, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a new
policy on travel that should help decrease the potential for abuse. 
The new policy (1) requires the services to use the smallest and most
cost-effective mission- capable aircraft available; (2) requires the
Secretary of Defense's or the military department secretary's
approval for use of military aircraft by required use officials for
permanent change-of-station moves;\7 (3) prohibits the scheduling of
training flights strictly to accommodate senior-level officials'
travel; (4) allows the military department secretaries to further
restrict the required use designation for four-star officers in their
respective departments; and (5) limits the use of helicopters for
senior-level officials' travel. 


--------------------
\5 Our review covered October 1992 through March 1995, but complete
records from all of the services were available for only January 1993
through February 1995. 

\6 Agencies record travel in individual flight segments rather than
in round trips. 

\7 All other travelers must obtain prior authorization for all
travel, including permanent change-of-station moves, from their
designated authorizing officials. 


      RESTRICTIONS ON SENIOR
      OFFICIALS' USE OF
      HELICOPTERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.3

Although senior-level officials' use of helicopters in the
Washington, D.C., area declined substantially between April 1994 and
March 1995, these officials continued to use helicopters to travel
between nearby locations.  For both the Air Force and the Army, the
most frequently traveled helicopter route was between Andrews Air
Force Base and the Pentagon, a distance of about 15 miles.  According
to an Army memorandum, flying time for an Army UH- 1H from Andrews
Air Force Base to the Pentagon is about 24 minutes--at a cost of
about $185.  The same flight in an Air Force UH-1N would cost
approximately $308.  However, actual cost to the government would be
higher because all trips are round trips.  In the case of the Army,
the cost to get a helicopter to the Pentagon or Andrews Air Force
Base must be included, which would increase the flight time to about
1 hour and the cost to about $460.  We estimate that the same trip
would cost about $9 by car and about $30 by taxi.  Thus, for general
comparison purposes, a trip between Andrews Air Force Base and the
Pentagon on either an Army or Air Force helicopter would cost over
$400 more than the same trip by car. 

In December 1994, the Secretary of the Army established a new policy
prohibiting Army officials' use of helicopter transportation between
the Pentagon and Andrews Air Force Base except in unusual
circumstances.  The memorandum stated that the existence of unusual
circumstances would be determined by the Secretary of the Army or the
Chief of Staff of the Army.  In our report, we recommended that the
Department of Defense adopt this policy. 

The October 1995 revisions to DOD's policy on the use of government
aircraft and air travel include a section on helicopter travel.  The
new policy states that "rotary wing aircraft may be used only when
cost [is] favorable as compared to ground transportation, or when the
use of ground transportation would have a significant adverse impact
on the ability of the senior official to effectively accomplish the
purpose of the travel." We believe that this change in policy should
result in fewer helicopter trips between the Pentagon and Andrews Air
Force Base, as well as other nearby destinations. 


      INVENTORY OF CIVILIAN AGENCY
      AIRCRAFT AND OPERATING COSTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.4

At the time of our June report, civilian agencies had over 1,500
aircraft that cost about $1 billion a year to operate.  The civilian
agency inventory includes many different types of aircraft, such as
helicopters, special- purpose aircraft for fire-fighting and
meteorological research, and specially configured aircraft for
research and development and program support.  However, only 19 are
routinely used for senior-level officials' travel.  These 19 aircraft
cost about $24 million a year to operate.  The operating costs
reflect aircraft that are owned, leased, lease/purchased, and loaned
between civilian agencies.  For most agencies, the operating costs
include those related to technical, mission-critical aircraft that
are not used for administrative purposes. 

We also reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and Coast Guard senior officials' use of aircraft and found that,
although the use of such aircraft was infrequent, when these aircraft
are used, many of the destinations were served by commercial airlines
with government contracts.  Inspector General reports indicate that
agencies were not adequately justifying the need for aircraft
acquisitions and that agencies' cost comparisons with commercial
service were not complete or accurate. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.5

Mr.  Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement.  I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
Subcommittee may have. 

*** End of document. ***