Drug Control: Observations on U.S. Interdiction in the Caribbean
(Testimony, 05/23/96, GAO/T-NSIAD-96-171).
GAO discussed U.S. interdiction efforts in the Caribbean, focusing on:
(1) the nature of drug trafficking activities in the Caribbean; (2)
impediments to an effective regional strategy; (3) U.S. capabilities to
interdict such activities; and (4) planning, coordination, and
implementation of U.S. interdiction efforts. GAO noted that: (1) drug
traffickers use advanced technologies to identify and monitor U.S.
counternarcotic operations; (2) a major part of the U.S. counternarcotic
strategy involves strengthening host nations' capabilities to support
U.S. counternarcotic efforts; (3) a number of host nations lack the
capability to conduct effective antidrug operations and combat
corruption; (4) funding for drug interdiction declined from $1 billion
in fiscal year (FY) 1992 to $569 million in FY 1995 and resulted in
fewer ship days, flight hours, and ground-based radars devoted to drug
interdiction; (5) the amount of cocaine seized declined by 47 percent
between FY 1992 and FY 1995; and (6) the executive branch has not
developed a regional plan to implement the U.S. antidrug strategy,
staffed interagency organizations with key roles in the interdiction
program, or resolved issues related to intelligence sharing.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-NSIAD-96-171
TITLE: Drug Control: Observations on U.S. Interdiction in the
Caribbean
DATE: 05/23/96
SUBJECT: Drug trafficking
Narcotics
Law enforcement
Budget cuts
Interagency relations
Foreign governments
International cooperation
Political corruption
Foreign policies
Federal aid to foreign countries
IDENTIFIER: Caribbean Basin Radar Network
Puerto Rico
Caribbean
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
GPS
Dept. of State International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report
National Drug Control Strategy
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs
and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at
11:00 a.m., EDT
Thursday
May 23, 1996
DRUG CONTROL - OBSERVATIONS ON
U.S. INTERDICTION IN THE
CARIBBEAN
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director,
International Relations and Trade Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division
GAO/T-NSIAD-96-171
GAO/NSIAD-96-171T
(711202)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
============================================================ Chapter 0
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our review of
U.S. interdiction efforts in the Caribbean. Our review focused on
(1) the nature of drug trafficking activities in the Caribbean
transit zone;\1 (2) host nation impediments to an effective regional
strategy; (3) the capabilities of U.S. agencies to interdict drug
trafficking activities; and (4) federal agency planning,
coordination, and implementation of U.S. interdiction efforts. We
recently issued a report to this subcommittee on our findings.\2 Our
report on U.S. drug control efforts in the other major transit zone
country, Mexico, should be available in the middle of June.
I would like to provide a short overview and then talk about each of
these issues in a little more detail.
--------------------
\1 The transit zone is the 2-million square mile area between the
U.S. and South American borders and covers the Caribbean Sea, the
Gulf of Mexico, Central America, Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific.
Our review concentrated on the Caribbean portion of the transit zone
to include the leeward islands, the windward islands, the Bahamas,
Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.
\2 Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline
(GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
With approximately 30 percent of the cocaine entering the United
States coming through the Caribbean transit zone, cocaine trafficking
is a major threat to the United States. During the past several
years, Caribbean traffickers have shifted their operations from
primarily air-related activities to maritime activities.
Furthermore, traffickers are using improved technologies, such as
global positioning systems, to counter efforts by U.S. agencies to
identify and monitor their activities.
In November 1993, the President issued a counternarcotics strategy
for cocaine in the Western Hemisphere. The strategy called for a
shift in emphasis from the transit zone to the source countries. A
major part of the U.S. strategy in the Caribbean is to strengthen
the host nations' capabilities to support U.S. international
counternarcotics objectives. The State Department has made some
progress in implementing the strategy through new agreements with
Caribbean countries and islands that promote increased air and
maritime cooperation. However, U.S. officials generally believe
that a number of host nations lack the capabilities needed to conduct
effective antidrug operations and are also inhibited by corruption.
Budget reductions for interdiction efforts in the entire transit zone
have reduced the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) and law
enforcement agencies to identify, track, and intercept drug
traffickers. Funding for drug interdiction declined from about $1
billion in fiscal year 1992 to $569 million in fiscal year 1995.
DOD's budget reductions resulted in fewer ship days, flight hours,
and ground-based radars devoted to drug interdiction. Although a
reduction in the interdiction effort was envisioned in the new
cocaine strategy, the strategy also anticipated source country
funding increases that never materialized. Cocaine seizures in the
transit zone declined from a peak of about 70,000 kilograms in 1992
to about 37,000 kilograms in 1995.
The executive branch had not (1) developed a regional action plan to
implement the cocaine strategy in the transit zone, (2) fully staffed
interagency organizations with key roles in the interdiction program,
or (3) fully resolved issues on intelligence sharing.
DRUG TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES ARE
CHANGING, AND INTERDICTION IS
BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Puerto Rico has become a major entry point for cocaine moving through
the Eastern Caribbean into the United States. U.S. drug officials
believe that after 1993 traffickers moved some of their activities
from the Bahamas to Puerto Rico because U.S. interdiction efforts in
the Bahamas had increased the risk to traffickers. U.S. law
enforcement officials have mixed opinions concerning whether drug
trafficking activities are increasing throughout other islands in the
Eastern Caribbean and into the southern United States. However,
several U.S. law enforcement officials stated that cocaine smuggling
activities are increasing in southern Florida.
DOD records showed that while the number of known drug trafficking
aircraft events\3 in the transit zone declined by 65 percent from 344
in 1992 to 125 in 1995, the number of known maritime events increased
by 40 percent from 174 in 1993 to 249 in 1995. (See attach. 1.)
Drug enforcement officials told us that drug traffickers are
increasingly relying on noncommercial and commercial maritime vessels
(such as go-fast boats, sailing and fishing vessels, and
containerized cargo ships) to transport drugs. According to U.S.
officials, the large number of noncommercial vessels traveling in the
transit zone makes it difficult to detect or intercept many drug
trafficking activities. In addition, interdiction efforts are
hampered by the increasing use of technology by drug traffickers to
avoid detection such as global positioning systems and cellular
equipment.
--------------------
\3 According to DOD, "known events" represent clear, firm information
about a drug shipment, confirmed delivery, aborted mission, or
apprehension.
HOST NATION IMPEDIMENTS HINDER
COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
According to the State Department and U.S. law enforcement
officials, most Caribbean host nations are cooperating in fighting
drug trafficking. However, most Caribbean nations lack resources and
law enforcement capabilities and have some corruption problems that
hamper their efforts to combat drug trafficking. The Department of
State's March 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
provides a detailed discussion on the Caribbean countries. The
report concluded that cooperation with U.S. authorities was
generally excellent in 1995. However, the report noted that the
governments of many Caribbean countries were unable to finance their
law enforcement operations at a level commensurate with the
trafficker threat.
U.S. officials stated that Caribbean nations will always have
limited capabilities because they have small populations and limited
funds available for counternarcotics. As a result, U.S. officials
are trying to improve interdiction capabilities by signing agreements
that allow U.S. personnel to conduct antidrug sea and air operations
within the territorial waters and airspace of these nations. U.S.
agencies are also providing limited supplies and training to the
police forces and the judicial institutions.
CAPABILITIES TO INTERDICT DRUG
TRAFFICKERS IN THE TRANSIT ZONE
HAVE BEEN REDUCED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
Since 1992, U.S. capabilities to interdict drug trafficking
activities in the transit zone have declined. From fiscal years 1992
to 1995, the budgets for most federal agencies in the transit zone
declined significantly. The amount of U.S. interdiction funding
devoted to the transit zone declined by about 43 percent, from $1
billion in fiscal year 1992 to $569 million in fiscal year 1995. In
November 1993, a presidential directive called for a gradual shift in
emphasis from the transit zone to the source countries. Various
agencies stressed that decisions to reduce the funding devoted to
drug interdiction were often beyond their control. For example, the
U.S. Coast Guard noted that, during the early 1990s, assets were
reallocated from counterdrug missions to respond to two mass exoduses
of emigrants from Haiti and Cuba.
Moreover, the anticipated shift to the source countries did not
materialize. Counternarcotics funding in the source countries
declined from fiscal year 1993 to lower levels in fiscal years 1994
and 1995. (See attach. II.)
Agency officials also reported reductions in operational
capabilities. Between December 1994 and November 1995, the DOD
deactivated three Bahamian Aerostat radars, two Caribbean Basin Radar
Network sites, two mobile tactical radars, and two remote
high-frequency Link 11 transmitter/receivers. DOD offset these lost
radars with two Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar systems which
provide a larger area of coverage than the radars they replaced.
However, the systems are less effective in detecting and monitoring
air events. In addition, reductions in the number of ship days
devoted to drug interdiction fell from about 4,400 in fiscal year
1993 to about 2,800 in fiscal year 1995. (See attach. III.) DOD
also reported reductions in use of AWACS aircraft.
COCAINE SEIZURES HAVE DECLINED
FROM 1991-92 LEVELS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
Cocaine seizures in the entire transit zone have declined from the
1991-92 levels. As shown in figure 1, the amount of cocaine seized
declined by about 47 percent, from about 70,000 kilograms to 37,000
kilograms between fiscal years 1992 and 1995.
Figure 1: Cocaine Seizures (
fiscal years 1991-95)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Air seizures accounted for the greatest amount of decline, from about
40,000 kilograms in fiscal year 1992 to only 14,500 kilograms in
fiscal year 1995. The decline in recorded seizures is likely due to
a combination of factors, including reduced capability of U.S.
agencies to detect air activities and a shift from air to maritime
trafficking, limited host nation law enforcement capabilities, and
cocaine traffickers' increased smuggling sophistication.
LACK OF REGIONAL PLAN HAMPERS
INTERDICTION EFFORT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
We found that the executive branch had not developed a plan to
implement the U.S. antidrug strategy in the Caribbean. DOD, the
State Department, and law enforcement agencies have various
agreements to implement the national drug strategy in the region.
However, counternarcotics officials expressed concern over the lack
of overall responsibility for implementing the current cocaine
strategy in the Caribbean. U.S. officials noted that neither the
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) nor
the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator had the authority to command the
use of any agency's operations resources.
Various U.S. officials noted that there is a need for leadership and
commitment by the ONDCP to ensure that agencies are carrying out
their missions to achieve U.S. counternarcotics objectives. We also
found that interagency staffing responses were inadequate, and that
intelligence sharing remains a contentious issue. For example, we
noted staffing shortfalls at both Joint Interagency Task Force-East,
located in Key West, Florida, and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.
In our report, we recommended that the Director of ONDCP develop a
regional action plan focused on the Caribbean part of the transit
zone to fully implement the U.S. policy for cocaine in the Western
Hemisphere. We stated that, at a minimum, the plan should determine
resources and staffing needed and delineate a comprehensive strategy
to improve host nation capabilities and commitment to
counternarcotics interdiction. ONDCP stated that the recommendation
was sound and was carefully examining our recommendation in preparing
the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy.
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6.1
This concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to
any questions.
AIR AND MARITIME DRUG TRAFFICKING
EVENTS AND RESULTS (1992-1995)
========================================================== Appendix II
Year Events Results Events Results
---------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
1992 344 66 \a \a
1993 217 71 174 122
1994 154 45 223 172
1995 125 26 249 135
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Maritime data for 1992 are not available.
Note: Traffickers' aborts were not counted in results.
Source: DOD.
COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING IN THE
TRANSIT ZONE (FISCAL YEARS
1991-1995)
========================================================== Appendix II
(Dollars in millions)
Agency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
------------------------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
DOD $407.1 $504.5 $426.0 $220.4 $214.7
Coast Guard 565.2 443.9 310.5 314.4 301.2
Customs \a \a 16.2 12.5 12.8
Dea 26.2 28.8 29.1 28.7 29.6
State 35.9 36.2 14.0 7.9 10.6
======================================================================
Total $1,034. $1,013. $795.8 $583.9 $568.9
4 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Customs data for 1991 and 1992 are unavailable.
Source: Indicated federal agencies.
COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING IN SOURCE
COUNTRIES (FISCAL YEARS 1991-1995)
(Dollars in millions)
Agency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
-------------------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
DOD $76.1 $120.7 $154.9 $144.5 $148.7
Customs \a \a 6.0 3.9 5.2
DEA 18.4 21.5 21.0 20.7 21.3
State 160.7 123.6 105.1 55.2 54.8
======================================================================
Total $255.2 $265.8 $287.0 $224.3 $230.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Customs data for 1991 and 1992 are not available.
Source: Indicated federal agencies.
LOST RADAR SURVEILLANCE
CAPABILITIES (1994-1995)
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed
edition.)
JIATF-East MARITIME ASSETS
(FISCAL YEARS 1991-95)
Ship type 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
------------------------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
Logistic 128 287 71 40 0
Cruiser 524 558 753 742 488
Destroyer 909 699 602 118 224
Frigate 1,874 2,008 1,441 785 727
Amphibious 51 87 188 9 0
Coast Guard 0 0 138 0 401
Other 750 533 1,255 974 1,005
======================================================================
Total 4,236 4,172 4,448 2,668 2,845
----------------------------------------------------------------------
*** End of document. ***