World Trade Organization: Seattle Ministerial: Outcomes and Lessons
Learned (Testimony, 02/10/2000, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-86).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the World Trade
Organization's (WTO) 1999 ministerial conference, focusing on the: (1)
outcome of the ministerial conference; (2) factors contributing to the
outcome; and (3) the lessons learned from the meeting.

GAO noted that: (1) the WTO member countries failed to meet their goal
of launching a new round of multilateral trade negotiations at their
biennial ministerial conference last December in Seattle, Washington;
(2) the conference was suspended without initiating a new round or
issuing a ministerial declaration; (3) no one factor, but a combination
of circumstances, led to the impasse; (4) however, two themes emerged;
(5) there was a lack of agreement on many issues both among major
trading partners and between developed and many developing countries on
the eve of the ministerial conference; (6) disagreement centered on the
scope of the round and stemmed from the sensitivity and complexity of
the issues being addressed; (7) the Seattle negotiation process had
inherent difficulties; (8) the document used as the basis for
negotiations was a poor starting point for reaching consensus; (9) it
was a lengthy amalgamation of countries' divergent positions rather than
a text reflecting members' common objectives; (10) in addition, the
negotiating process was hampered by the newness of the WTO leadership
team; (11) the process was made difficult by the challenge of
accommodating the needs and interests of a large and increasingly
diverse WTO membership; and (12) several lessons can be learned: (a)
efforts to launch a new round may have been premature; (b) ministerial
conferences are more likely to succeed if they address only a handful of
politically difficult decisions, having reached consensus on most issues
in advance; (c) the WTO needs to find ways to address the institutional
challenges posed by increases in the number and diversity of its
members; and (d) holding high profile WTO meetings in countries that are
major trading partners, such as the United States and the European
Union, may present difficulties.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-00-86
     TITLE:  World Trade Organization: Seattle Ministerial: Outcomes
	     and Lessons Learned
      DATE:  02/10/2000
   SUBJECT:  Foreign trade agreements
	     International trade regulation
	     International economic relations
	     Foreign trade policies
	     Globalization
	     International organizations
IDENTIFIER:  European Union
	     Seattle (WA)
	     Geneva (Switzerland)

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Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery, Expected at 10 a.m., EST Thursday, February 10,
2000

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Seattle Ministerial: Outcomes and Lessons Learned

Statement of Susan S. Westin, Associate Director, International Relations
and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-86

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to provide some observations about the World
Trade Organization's ministerial conference in Seattle that took place in
December 1999. Specifically, my testimony will address (1) the outcome of
the ministerial conference, (2) the factors contributing to the outcome, and
(3) the lessons learned from the meeting.

My observations are based on our past and ongoing work; our review of World
Trade Organization and executive branch documents; related literature;
discussions with experts on the World Trade Organization and international
trade; and U.S. government, World Trade Organization, and foreign government
officials from 14 countries. In addition, I along with members of my staff
attended the Seattle ministerial conference.

The ministerial conference, composed of the trade ministers of all the WTO
member countries, is the highest decision making body in the WTO and is
required to meet at least every 2 years. Ministerial conferences are
intended to evaluate current trade agreements and set the agenda for future
work with a ministerial declaration that identifies issues for negotiation
and specifies how negotiations should proceed.

The Seattle ministerial conference was to be particularly significant
because it was expected to launch a major new round of negotiations and it
was hosted and chaired by the United States for the first time. The core of
the new round was to be negotiations on agriculture and services (such as
telecommunications); these negotiations, referred to as the "built-in
agenda," were already mandated to begin on January 1, 2000. Ministers
intended to decide on what other trade issues, if any, to include in the
agenda for a new round. They also expected to review the implementation of
past agreements and to address calls from nongovernmental organizations and
some WTO members to improve the WTO's openness. In addition, they were to
develop a plan to assist least developed countries in several ways, such as
providing technical assistance to help them meet their trade obligations.

SUMMARY

WTO member countries failed to meet their goal of launching a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations at their biennial ministerial conference
last December in Seattle. The conference was suspended without initiating a
new round or issuing a ministerial declaration. No one factor, but a
combination of circumstances, led to the impasse. However, two themes
emerged. First, there was lack of agreement on many issues both among major
trading partners and between developed and many developing countries on the
eve of the ministerial conference. Disagreement centered on the scope of the
round and stemmed from the sensitivity and complexity of the issues being
addressed. Second, the Seattle negotiation process had inherent
difficulties. For example, the document used as the basis for negotiations
was a poor starting point for reaching consensus. It was a lengthy
amalgamation of countries' divergent positions rather than a text reflecting
members' common objectives. In addition, the negotiating process was
hampered by the newness of the WTO leadership team. Further, the process was
made difficult by the challenge of accommodating the needs and interests of
a large and increasingly diverse WTO membership.

Several lessons can be learned:

   * Efforts to a launch a new round may have been premature.

   * Ministerial conferences are more likely to succeed if they address only
     a handful of politically difficult decisions, having reached consensus
     on most issues in advance.

   * The WTO needs to find ways to address the institutional challenges
     posed by increases in the number and diversity of its members.

   * Holding high profile WTO meetings in countries that are major trading
     partners, such as the United States and the EU, may present
     difficulties.

BACKGROUND

The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on January 1, 1995, as a
result of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations. The WTO
provides the institutional framework for the multilateral trading system. It
administers rules for international trade, provides a mechanism for settling
disputes, and provides a forum for conducting trade negotiations. The WTO
succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had
provided the institutional framework for world commerce since 1948. The 1994
Uruguay Round agreements brought agriculture, services, intellectual
property rights, trade-related investment measures, and textiles and apparel
under the discipline of multilateral trade rules for the first time and
established a stronger dispute settlement process. Two of these agreements
also mandated a "built-in agenda" for further negotiations on agriculture
and services to commence January 1, 2000.

Membership in the WTO has grown to 135 members, up from about 90 GATT
members in September 1986, at the start of the Uruguay Round. Not only has
there been an increase in membership, but also increased diversity in WTO
members. Roughly 80 percent of the current members are developing countries,
although some are at more advanced stages of development than others and
thus they do not all have the same needs. According to WTO, virtually all of
the 30 countries currently applying for membership are also developing
nations or economies in transition. Unlike many other international
organizations where decisions are based on a majority of member votes,
decision-making in the WTO is largely based on consensus among member
governments.

There have been three ministerial conferences since the creation of the WTO:
one in Singapore in December 1996, one in Geneva in May 1998, and the third
in Seattle in December 1999. The WTO General Council makes major decisions
in the periods between ministerial conferences. The Director General, chosen
by members, heads the WTO Secretariat that supports the membership and the
institution.

The 1996 Singapore ministerial conference reviewed the implementation of the
Uruguay Round agreements and considered proposals for trade issues to be
addressed in the future. The ministers in Singapore reaffirmed their
commitment to complete the built-in agenda and also addressed several trade
issues that were previously outside the scope of detailed trade
negotiations. Among other things, they authorized the creation of working
groups to study transparency in government procurement, investment and
competition, and agreed to continue ongoing analysis of trade and
environment issues. The ministers in Singapore rejected attempts led by the
United States to establish a working group on trade and labor, stating that
this issue was best handled by the International Labor Organization.

The Geneva ministerial conference coincided with the 50th anniversary of the
GATT. Ministers agreed to begin preparing an agenda for further trade
liberalization. Ministers also accepted President Clinton's offer that the
United States host the next ministerial conference. Seattle was selected as
the host city in January 1999.

SEATTLE MINISTERIAL DID NOT ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES

The ministerial conference failed to achieve its goal of initiating a new
round of multilateral trade negotiations with a ministerial declaration.
After 4 days of intensive talks, the conference was suspended on December 3
without agreeing on a round, or issuing a ministerial declaration or any
other formal documentation of its deliberations. As a result of the
inconclusive nature of the meeting, the status of the ministerial conference
remains unclear. For example, members have not decided if and when the
conference might reconvene. Even without a new round, negotiations to
further liberalize trade in agriculture and services are scheduled to begin
in the year 2000 under the Uruguay Round agreements' built-in agenda.
Progress on these negotiations, however, may be slow, partly because the
agenda lacks a deadline for completion. The negotiating impasse also left
several issues unresolved, such as addressing some developing countries'
concerns about expiration of certain Uruguay Round agreement deadlines.

In a brief statement at the end of the meeting, the Conference Chair, U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) Charlene Barshefsky, noted that the issues
before WTO ministers were complex, and divergences too wide to be bridged
rapidly. Ambassador Barshefsky stated that it was the collective judgement
of those present that it would be best to, "take a time out, consult with
one another, and find creative means to finish the job." She then announced
that the ministers had agreed to suspend the work of the ministerial
conference. In the interim, the Chair asked WTO Director General Mike Moore
to consult with delegations in an effort to bridge differences, develop an
improved decision-making process, and prepare for a successful conclusion of
the ministerial conference.

The Chair and other delegations emphasized that the progress that was made
at Seattle would not be lost. But those assurances were quickly dismissed by
other participants, who refused to "freeze" their positions and said that
any draft texts of a declaration on the table at Seattle were no longer
valid. Even if members were to agree in principle to restart negotiations
from where ministers left off at Seattle, no text reflects the state of
countries' positions at the end of the day.

One outstanding issue due to the suspension of the Seattle meeting concerns
developing countries' efforts to delay their end-of-1999 deadlines for
conforming to certain provisions in a number of Uruguay Round agreements,
such as those on intellectual property rights and investment measures. The
WTO General Council met on December 17 but could not agree on whether to
grant extensions for all developing countries, or to consider them on a
member-by-member basis. The General Council postponed until early 2000 a
decision on how to proceed. In the meantime, WTO members were asked by the
General Council Chairman to exercise restraint and understanding in dealing
with these deadlines. USTR officials told us that the United States retains
the right to bring cases based on the deadlines, which have since passed.

NO ONE FACTOR CONTRIBUTED TO MINISTERIAL OUTCOME

No one factor, but a combination of circumstances, led to the WTO's
inability to launch a new round. Nonetheless, seemingly unbridgeable gaps on
major issues both among the major trading partners and between developed and
many developing countries were at the root of the outcome of the ministerial
conference. First, disagreements centered on the scope and direction of a
new round. They also stemmed from the increased sensitivity and complexity
of the issues on the table. Further, Seattle negotiators faced inherent
difficulties in their negotiation process both in Seattle and Geneva. These
included the challenge of accommodating the needs and interests of a large
and increasingly diverse WTO membership. In addition, negotiators were
working from an unwieldy draft text symptomatic of the lack of agreement
among countries in Geneva on the eve of the ministerial meeting. Further,
U.S. and foreign officials noted that WTO members' selection of a new
Director General earlier in the year had been lengthy and divisive. This
experience left members without leadership during a good part of their
preparations for Seattle and lingering hard feelings. Adding tension to a
difficult situation, protesters marching against the WTO in Seattle during
the week disrupted the proceedings.

No Agreement on the Scope of Negotiations

U.S. and foreign officials with whom we met said that fundamental
differences between the major trading countries contributed greatly to the
ministerial conference's ultimate lack of consensus. The United States
wanted to pursue a narrow agenda in the new round, while the European Union
(EU) and Japan promoted a broad framework for negotiations to bring many new
areas under international disciplines. Officials we interviewed generally
felt that without agreement among these major players in international
trade, it would be impossible to build consensus among the rest of the
members.

The United States favored limiting negotiations primarily to address market
access concerns and to focus on the areas of agriculture and services as
called for under the Uruguay Round agreements. With the backing of the other
major agricultural exporting countries, known as the "Cairns Group," the
United States insisted that negotiations on agriculture address a number of
tough issues, including the elimination of export subsidies and substantial
reduction of trade-distorting farm supports. Such far-reaching goals in
agriculture were difficult for the EU to accept. According to European
officials, they simply could not support language calling for the
elimination of agricultural export subsidies as the starting point of
negotiations. Instead, the EU viewed the new round as an opportunity to
establish international rules in other areas of the global trading system.
In addition to agriculture and services, the EU proposed including
investment, competition policy, government procurement, and other issues in
a broad framework for negotiations. Japan largely supported the EU's
position on these issues. Although U.S. negotiators indicated support for
continued study of investment and competition policy by WTO working groups,
the United States and many other WTO members were unwilling to include these
issues in the negotiating agenda.

In addition to differences among the major trading countries, there was also
a serious gap between developed and many developing countries on the scope
of a new round. Like the United States, developing countries generally
backed a narrower scope for negotiations. Although developing countries'
positions differed on some issues, many of them called for a reassessment of
the commitments of the Uruguay Round agreements. The United States did not
want to reopen existing agreements to new negotiations. Some developing
countries felt they had received few benefits from the Uruguay Round and had
found it difficult to meet their obligations under its agreements. For
example, certain developing countries insisted they lacked the financial and
technical resources to implement the complex requirements called for under
the intellectual property agreement. Developing countries also wanted to
re-negotiate areas of the Uruguay Round, such as the agreement on textiles
that they argued had not given them the benefits they had anticipated. U.S.
negotiators indicated they would consider ways of helping developing
countries meet their Uruguay Round commitments on a case-by-case basis, but
they rejected any attempt to reopen negotiations on the hard-fought
agreements.

Finally, officials from some developing countries we interviewed noted that
5 years did not provide enough time for them to cope with the changes
mandated under the Uruguay Round. Given the difficulties they were having in
implementing the Uruguay Round agreements, many of these countries expressed
reservations about undertaking further trade liberalization. One developing
country official remarked that in comparison with the situation in 1994 when
the Uruguay Round was concluded, starting a new round at this time would be
considerably more difficult. In 1994, the ideas of market reforms and trade
liberalization were still fresh and held tremendous promise. It was also a
time of economic growth in many of the developing countries engaged in the
negotiations. The current situation is very different. Much of the
developing world is going through a difficult time economically, even though
many countries have already undertaken far-reaching market reforms and trade
liberalization.

Sensitivity and Complexity of Issues Impeded Progress

The most sensitive and complex area of negotiations between the EU on the
one hand and major agricultural exporters including the United States on the
other was on agriculture. Although the EU has been reducing subsidies to
agriculture since the Uruguay Round, it remains by far the world's largest
user of agricultural export subsidies. In the WTO, the United States and
other major agricultural exporting nations, such as Australia, Brazil, and
Canada, have put increased pressure on the EU to abandon its reliance on
export subsidies. Export subsidies, however, are a key mechanism in the EU's
Common Agricultural Policy. The Common Agricultural Policy is intended to
preserve farm incomes and rural economies by supporting high domestic prices
for a wide variety of agricultural commodities and products. EU member
states have taken a very strong position on maintaining the Common
Agricultural Policy, which is a central element in the EU's institutional
system and is regarded as essential to its cohesiveness.

Like the EU and its position on agricultural export subsidies, the United
States was virtually isolated on the issue of antidumping regulations in the
negotiations. Major trading partners like Japan and Korea, as well as some
developing countries, called for reconsideration of the agreement on
anti-dumping reached under the Uruguay Round. These countries felt that the
current antidumping rules allow countries to use trade remedies to unfairly
protect certain sectors. The United States argued that re-opening the
complex agreement was premature and risked weakening the strength of the
existing U.S. anti-dumping regime. U.S. negotiators said they would consider
holding discussions on how WTO members were implementing the agreement's
procedural requirements, but this U.S. offer attracted limited support.

Developing countries were very concerned about U.S. and EU initiatives to
bring labor into the WTO. They feared that addressing labor standards under
the WTO was simply a veiled form of protectionism aimed at undermining one
of the few competitive advantages they enjoy as lower-wage producers. At the
Singapore ministerial conference, it had been agreed that labor standards
were best addressed in the International Labor Organization rather than in
the WTO, and many developing countries felt the issue had been put to rest.
According to some officials from developing countries, the U.S. insistence
on resurfacing the issue of labor in Seattle and the President's remarks
potentially linking labor standards to trade sanctions were
counterproductive.

Seattle Negotiation Process had Inherent Difficulties

The difficult task of accommodating the needs and interests of a large and
increasingly diverse WTO membership hampered progress in Seattle. Efforts to
balance efficiency with allowing the maximum participation of all WTO
members in negotiations presented a challenge to reaching consensus.

In an effort to give all WTO members the opportunity to take part in the
negotiations, Chairperson Barshefsky and Director General Moore set up five
large working groups on the major issues including agriculture, market
access, implementation, Singapore issues (such as investment), and systemic
issues (such as the structure of the WTO). The working groups were open to
all WTO member delegations and convened on the second day of the conference.
Working group chairs--trade ministers selected in Seattle--were to
facilitate consensus and refine the Geneva draft text into a consensus
document. Next, working group consensus texts were to be brought together
later in the week to produce a complete ministerial declaration to be issued
at the end of the conference.

Ultimately however, the working groups were not able to achieve the
necessary consensus to avoid the more traditional less inclusive "green
room" process. Chairperson Barshefsky had told ministers at a meeting on
Wednesday that she intended to proceed with the large working groups, but if
they were unsuccessful she would initiate a green room to facilitate
consensus. After 2 days of large working group meetings, the green room
process began Friday morning, the last day of the conference.

One difficulty in achieving consensus may have been that the chairpersons of
the working group meetings were not in place until Tuesday during the
ministerial conference. This may have prevented parts of the leadership team
from effectively preparing for their roles-such as developing compromise
texts and meeting with key delegations before Seattle-as some have claimed.
Officials said that it had been difficult to find chairpersons because trade
ministers had to volunteer their time to lead the sessions as opposed to
their own country delegations.

The green room had only 1 day to work out compromises across the range of
unresolved issues and then gather the support of the rest of the delegation.
Furthermore, the green room worked sequentially-issue by issue. Negotiators
began in the morning with agriculture and spent until mid-afternoon on this
issue. Although many officials said that the green room did make progress in
agriculture, others argued that too much time was spent on this issue to the
exclusion of others. However, officials expressed mixed views about whether
additional time would have resulted in consensus on a round. Some said an
additional day would have sufficed with the progress made in agriculture,
while others were more pessimistic or said outright that no agreement could
have been reached.

Despite efforts to the contrary, some countries still expressed frustration
about being left out when the negotiations shifted to the green room. In
fact, a group of Latin American and Caribbean countries and a group of
African countries stated publicly in Seattle that they would reject the
outcome of these smaller sessions. However, some officials noted that a
green room process involving a smaller number of countries is necessary to
efficiently handle the negotiations. Some said the particular problem with
the green room process in Seattle was that countries were selected to
participate in an ad hoc, informal manner. They recommended a more
formalized or transparent process of determining the members invited to
participate in the green room.

A number of officials with whom we spoke said that hosting the Seattle WTO
ministerial meeting posed both substantive and procedural challenges for the
United States, given its large stake in the world trading system. First,
perceptions about the U.S. role as chair may have affected the negotiating
dynamic. For example, it may have raised questions about U.S. neutrality in
brokering compromise, or raised WTO members' expectations about U.S.
willingness to make concessions to ensure the ministerial conference's
success. Second, the United States was wearing two hats, that of host and
key participant, a difficult job that was made harder by the newness of the
WTO team and the number of issues to be resolved at Seattle. Overall,
several U.S. and foreign officials said that a major trading nation hosting
such meetings inevitably poses problems.

Another major factor affecting the outcome of the Seattle negotiations was
the inherent weakness of the draft text used as the basis for negotiations.
When WTO ministers arrived in Seattle in late November, the draft
declaration officially on the table was some 32 pages long and contained
nearly 400 bracketed items indicating disagreement among members. The draft
was, in fact, an amalgamation of all the proposals, or position papers,
members had submitted to the WTO General Council during their 15-month,
pre-Seattle preparatory process. The problems with the draft conveyed the
wide differences over substance and philosophical approach that remained at
the conclusion of those preparations. Also, one WTO official noted that
because the text included many strongly held competing proposals,
negotiators had to "build down," or remove text, to reach a consensus
document. In his view, this is more difficult to do than "building up," or
negotiating to add desired language. Thus, he believed, in Seattle,
countries automatically perceived agreeing to remove text as a loss.

Contributing to members' inability to reach consensus before Seattle were
the difficulties they had experienced in selecting a new Director General.
In Geneva in early 1999, WTO members had had great difficulty reaching
consensus on a new Director General, whose 4-year term had expired. There
were two final candidates, Mike Moore from New Zealand and Supachai
Panitchpakdi from Thailand, from a developed and developing country,
respectively. Ultimately, members selected both candidates to serve a split
term, with Mike Moore serving first. Many U.S. and foreign officials said
that the divisiveness of that experience had dampened the mood for
compromise in Seattle.

In addition, the lengthy and contentious selection process left WTO members
without leadership for 5 of the 11 months they had available to prepare for
Seattle. Mike Moore did not take the helm at the WTO until September, when
drafting of a declaration started in earnest. His principal deputies were
named less than a month before the WTO ministerial conference. While the WTO
is largely a member-driven organization, the WTO Director-General and his
deputies can play an important role in facilitating consensus and organizing
work so as to ensure maximum progress. The diversity of member interests and
lack of institutional leadership meant that fewer informal,
consensus-building meetings took place both in Geneva and Seattle.

During the ministerial conference, nongovernmental organizations
representing labor, the environment, and other interests demonstrated and
marched against the WTO in the vicinity of the Seattle convention center.
The protests interfered with the convention by causing delays and dampening
the general mood among the delegates but were not a major cause for their
ultimate inability to launch a new trade round. The most frequent comment we
heard from foreign government officials was that the protests cost them 1 to
2 days of work. Some foreign officials attending the ministerial conference
said that limitations on moving safely about the city interfered with
delegates' normal ability to resolve differences through informal social
contacts. Another foreign embassy official said that, while not a deciding
factor, the protests raised questions about the U.S. ability to conduct
trade negotiations without being unduly influenced by domestic politics.
Overall, however, delegates did not believe that the protesters changed the
outcome of the conference.

Lessons Learned

Several lessons can be learned from the experience in Seattle:

   * Efforts to launch a new round may have been premature. Countries, for
     various reasons, may not have been ready to launch a new round. Due to
     current strong domestic concerns, the EU and United States each found
     it politically difficult to make concessions and exert leadership. Many
     developing countries were resistant to calls for the WTO to address new
     issues such as labor and skeptical about the benefits of the last
     round.

   * Ministerial conferences are more likely to succeed if they address only
     a handful of politically difficult decisions, having reached consensus
     on most issues in advance. WTO members had not reached agreement on
     most issues on the eve of the conference. As a result, ministers in
     Seattle faced a long list of unresolved items. This left ministers with
     an overwhelming task to be accomplished within a short time frame.
     Efforts to sort through and agree upon a manageable number of issues
     should be made before a ministerial conference takes place.

   * The WTO needs to find ways to address the institutional challenges
     posed by increases in the number and diversity of its members. The
     Seattle negotiations demonstrated the importance of taking into account
     the different views of the WTO's large and diverse membership on issues
     such as the scope and nature of any further trade liberalization. Since
     the ministerial conference, the WTO Director General has been
     consulting with WTO member governments on ways to help developing
     countries engage in world trade and has been examining how the WTO can
     better gauge and act on its varied members' interests.

   * Holding high profile WTO meetings in countries that are major trading
     partners, such as the United States and the EU, may present
     difficulties. It is not easy for major trading countries to host
     ministerial conferences, given their significant interests in
     international trade and possible concerns about their influence on the
     negotiating agenda.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared
remarks. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgement

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Susan Westin or
Beth Sirois at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony included Nina Pfeiffer, Howard Cott, Kim Frankena, Juan Gobel,
Richard Seldin, and Tim Wedding.

(711493)

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