Foreign Assistance: Lack of Haitian Commitment Limited Success of U.S.
Aid to Justice System (Testimony, 09/19/2000, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the preliminary
results of its review of U.S. assistance provided to Haiti's justice
system, focusing on the: (1) results of the U.S. assistance provided to
the Haitian police and judicial sector and the major problems that
continue to affect these justice institutions; and (2) primary factors
that have affected the success of the assistance.

GAO noted that: (1) over the last 6 fiscal years, the United States
provided about $97 million in assistance to help Haiti establish its
first civilian-controlled police force and improve aspects of this
judicial sector, which includes various judicial institutions,
procedures, and legal codes; (2) about $70 million in U.S. assistance
helped Haiti recruit, train, organize, and equip a basic police force,
including specialized units, such as an antinarcotics unit, a special
investigative unit, and the Haitian Coast Guard; (3) during the same
period, the United States provided about $27 million in assistance that
led to improvements in training magistrates and prosecutors, management
practices of judicial institutions, and in the access of the Haitian
people to justice services; (4) however, despite these achievements, the
police force has not effectively carried out its basic law enforcement
responsibilities, and recent events suggest that politicization has
compromised the force, according to U.S. and other donor officials; (5)
the judicial sector also has serious weaknesses, according to U.S. and
other donor officials; (6) the sector has not undergone a major reform
and, as a result, lacks independence from the executive branch and has
outdated legal codes and cumbersome judicial proceedings; (7) the
judicial institutions have personnel shortages inadequate infrastructure
and equipment, and an ineffective internal oversight organization unable
to stem corruption; (8) overall, these institutions provides justice
services to only a small segment of the population, because the
institutions rely heavily in judicial proceedings on the use of French
rather than Creole--the language of the majority of the population; and
(9) the key factor affecting the lack of success of U.S. assistance has
been the Haitian government's lack of commitment to addressing the major
problems of its police and judicial institutions.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-00-257
     TITLE:  Foreign Assistance: Lack of Haitian Commitment Limited
	     Success of U.S. Aid to Justice System
      DATE:  09/19/2000
   SUBJECT:  Judicial reform
	     International relations
	     Federal aid to foreign countries
	     Law enforcement
	     Foreign aid programs
	     International cooperation
	     Political corruption
	     Foreign governments
	     Police training
IDENTIFIER:  Haiti

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GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257

[0x08 graphic]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of our
review of U.S. assistance provided to Haiti's justice system.

In September 1994, the United States and other countries intervened
militarily in Haiti to restore the democratically elected government that
had been overthrown by the Haitian military in September 1991. Before this
intervention, the Haitian military controlled the police and the judicial
sector. Military and political cronyism dominated these institutions, and
the military influenced the appointments of magistrates and the decisions
made by them. These justice institutions were widely regarded as ineffective
and corrupt.

After the intervention, the United States stepped in to provide assistance
to the Haitian justice system -- both the police and the judicial sector --
aimed at developing a professional civilian police force, enhancing the
effectiveness of existing judicial organizations, and improving the Haitian
people's access to justice. This assistance also aimed at supporting a
broader reform of the judicial sector that the Haitian government intended
to pursue over time. The objectives of this assistance program were
consistent with U.S. justice assistance objectives in other countries in
Latin America.

As you know, U.S. assistance to the judicial sector was suspended in July
2000, because the United States was not able to negotiate an agreement with
the Haitian government for continuing these assistance efforts. As of
September 2000, most of the U.S. assistance to the Haitian police has
stopped, due to congressional concerns related to events surrounding the May
2000 Haitian parliamentary and local elections. The U.S. Department of State
is currently reassessing several aspects of the U.S. relationship with
Haiti, based on concerns about how votes were counted in Haiti's May 2000
parliamentary and local elections.

My statement today is based on work we are currently concluding for your
committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. First, I will discuss
the results of the U.S. assistance provided to the Haitian police and
judicial sector and the major problems that continue to affect these justice
institutions. Second, I will discuss the primary factors that have affected
the success of the assistance.

Our work is based on meetings with officials of the U.S. Departments of
State and Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
the U.S. Coast Guard, and other U.S. agencies. To examine the results of
assistance provided, in June 2000, we went to Haiti, where we met with
officials of the Haitian government, other donor countries (Canada and
France), the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and U.S.
contractors. We also performed an extensive review of program documents. We
expect to issue our report in October 2000.

SUMMARY

Over the last 6 fiscal years, the United States provided about $97 million
in assistance to help Haiti establish its first civilian-controlled police
force and improve aspects of its judicial sector, which includes various
judicial institutions, procedures, and legal codes. About $70 million in
U.S. assistance helped Haiti recruit, train, organize, and equip a basic
police force, including specialized units, such as an antinarcotics unit, a
special investigative unit, and the Haitian Coast Guard. During the same
period, the United States provided about $27 million in assistance that led
to improvements in training magistrates and prosecutors, management
practices of judicial institutions, and in the access of the Haitian people
to justice services. However, despite these achievements, the police force
has not effectively carried out its basic law enforcement responsibilities,
and recent events suggest that politicization has compromised the force,
according to U.S. and other donor officials. The judicial sector also has
serious weaknesses, according to U.S. and other donor officials. The sector
has not undergone a major reform and, as a result, lacks independence from
the executive branch and has outdated legal codes and cumbersome judicial
proceedings. Further, the judicial institutions have personnel shortages;
inadequate infrastructure and equipment, such as shortages of vehicles and
legal texts; and an ineffective internal oversight organization unable to
stem corruption. Overall, these institutions provides justice services to
only a small segment of the population, because the institutions rely
heavily in judicial proceedings on the use of French rather than Creolethe
language of the majority of the population.

The key factor affecting the lack of success of U.S. assistance has been the
Haitian government's lack of commitment to addressing the major problems of
its police and judicial institutions. U.S. assistance to the police has been
impeded because the Haitian government has not acted, for example, to (1)
strengthen the police organization by filling currently vacant key
leadership positions, such as the Inspector General; (2) provide the human
and physical resources needed to develop an effective police force; (3)
support vigorously police investigations of serious crimes; and (4) keep the
police force out of politics. U.S. assistance to the judicial sector has
been largely undercut because the Haitian government has not, for instance,
(1) followed through on implementing the broad reforms needed to address its
major problems, (2) assumed responsibility for adopting many of the
improvements made possible by U.S. assistance, and (3) provided the physical
and human resources needed to operate effectively.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and two organizations
within the Department of Justice's Criminal Division--the International
Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program and the Office of
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training--implemented
the majority of assistance provided to the Haitian police and judicial
sector. The Department of State has overall responsibility for coordinating
this assistance. It also funds training programs implemented by U.S. law
enforcement agencies and, immediately after Haiti's return to democracy in
1994, carried out some training programs, mainly in support of the
Presidential Palace Guard, which protects the Haitian President.

Several other U.S. agencies have also been involved in supporting the
Haitian police. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of
Defense played key roles in helping to build the Haitian Coast Guarda main
component of the Haitian National Police. Also, the Drug Enforcement
Administration helped to support the police's antinarcotics unit. In
addition, the U.S. Customs Service helped to train Haitian customs and
police officers on countersmuggling techniques.

U.S. ASSISTANCE HELPED IMPROVE THE POLICE AND

JUDICIAL SECTOR, BUT MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS PERSIST

U.S. assistance to Haiti's justice sector totaled about $97 million since
fiscal year 1995, with about $70 million going to help build a
civilian-controlled police force and about $27 million going to improve
certain aspects of Haiti's judicial system, such as case registration and
tracking systems. Appendix I provides a breakdown of U.S. assistance to the
Haitian police and justice sectors.

U.S. Assistance Helped Build a New Haitian Police Force

U.S. assistance was intended to help Haiti create and strengthen a
civilian-controlled police force that would be professional and respect the
rights of the population. The assistance was used to recruit, train,
organize, and equip a new police force and was administered under the
Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and
Assistance Program.

The U.S. assistance helped Haiti

   * recruit an interim police force of about 4,000 police officers and U.N.
     police monitors to work with this force;
   * establish and equip a new civilian-controlled police organization and
     several specialized units, such as an investigative division and its
     antinarcotics and forensics units, the special investigative unit, the
     crowd control unit, the special weapons and tactics unit, and the
     Haitian Coast Guard;
   * create a police academy and recruit and train a new police force of
     about 6,500 police officers;
   * train police officers for the specialized units;
   * develop managerial and supervisory skills at all levels of the police
     force; and
   * establish an Inspector General's office for monitoring the police
     force.

Other U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Customs Service, provided some
assistance. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard provided over $4.6 million to
help organize, train, and equip the Haitian Coast Guard. This assistance
helped Haiti establish one Coast Guard base in Port-au-Prince, refurbish
three vessels, maintain equipment, and develop capabilities for dealing with
drug smuggling and illegal migration, for example.

Major Weaknesses Persist in the Police Force

Despite some initial achievements made possible by U.S. assistance, the
current Haitian police force has major deficiencies and is considered by
many U.S. and other donor officials as a largely ineffective law enforcement
body. According to these officials, the police force suffers from
organizational weaknesses, shortages of personnel and training, shortages of
vehicles and equipment, and limited investigative capabilities. Over the
past year, particularly, U.S. and other donor officials have expressed
concern over the Haitian police's crippled internal oversight organization,
continued corruption, and increased signs of politicization related to
recent Haitian elections.

Starting in late 1994, the United States helped Haiti organize its police
force so as to have the major components of a modern civilian police
organization. However, the current organization of the Haitian police is
weak, according to U.S. and other donor officials. For example, several key
police units are not fully operational, such as the Maritime, Air, Border,
Migration, and Forest Police Directorate. Also, a few individuals manage the
police organization in a highly centralized manner, delegating little
authority from headquarters to the field and within the police institutions
in the field. As a result, the police force in the field shows little
initiative, tending to be reactive rather than actively patrolling the
community. Furthermore, the police force has not yet developed a strong
esprit de corps and discipline. During our visits to several police units,
we saw that many lower ranking police officers did not show much respect for
high-ranking officers and were milling around police facilities, reading
newspapers, or watching soccer games on television.

Initially, the United States sought to help Haiti recruit and train police
officers, and by 1998 the police force had reached a peak of about 6,500
officers. However, shortages of personnel plague the current police force.
According to U.S. and other donor officials, the current police force is
estimated to range between 3,500 and 4,500 police officers. Compared with a
country like El Salvador, with 19,000 police officers serving about 6
million people, Haiti - with its approximately 8 million people - has a
relatively small police force. In addition, the Haitian police has a
shortage of qualified commanders and supervisors.

According to U.S. officials, there has been serious attrition in police
ranks, partly as a result of the police's failure to provide professional
opportunities, to implement a work schedule better than the current schedule
of 12 hours a day 6 days a week, and to provide work opportunities in
locations near the officers' families. U.S. officials noted that police
officers have also left the force to join the growing private security
industry, which offers fewer risks and better pay and working conditions.
Also, more than 1,100 police officers were dismissed from the force since
1995, as a result of the police Inspector General's investigations into
police misconduct. In addition, the police's failure to recruit new officers
regularly has exacerbated the attrition of the police force.

Initially, the United States placed great emphasis on training the new force
and setting up the police academy to continue such training. However, most
of the current police force has received only basic training. For instance,
police officers attend an initial 6-month training course at the academy,
but they receive very little or no follow-on training unless they are
assigned to a specialized unit. Although officers in the specialized units
receive more training, they still have limited technical capabilities to
prevent or investigate crimes. Most police officers do not get regular
qualification training in firearms use, and, as a result, many officers are
not qualified to use their weapons and cannot properly maintain their
firearms, according to U.S. officials.

U.S. assistance helped Haiti equip its police force by supplying police
vehicles, communications systems, and other equipment and supplies. However,
the Haitian police force still faces severe shortages of all these items.
For instance, during our visits to Saint-Marc and Jacmel, we noticed that
the police stations had few vehicles, communications equipment, and other
police equipment to service the large populations and territories under
their jurisdictions. Moreover, U.S. officials told us that the special
weapons and tactics unit could not train with its issued weapons because it
did not have enough ammunition. According to U.S. officials, the
effectiveness of Haitian Coast Guard is seriously constrained by its lack of
bases, personnel, and equipment, particularly in the southern part of the
country where the main cocaine trafficking routes are located. As a result,
this unit has a limited capability to stop vessels suspected of carrying
illegal cargo and emigrants.

The United States sought to help Haiti improve the investigative
capabilities of its police force by providing training, technical
assistance, and donations of equipment. However, the current force has made
little progress in improving its investigative capabilities. For instance,
U.S. officials indicated that the judicial police does not have enough
trained officers to investigate crimeits primary missionand the
antinarcotics unit is too small to carry out major drug investigations. The
antinarcotics unit also has limited investigative capabilities; it was until
recently without a leader for months; and it consists of only 28 officers.
According to an assistance agreement between the United States and Haiti,
this unit was to have had about 75 officers.

Recent Problems Raise Particular Concerns About the Haitian Police

Over the past year, several problems have arisen with the Haitian police
force that have raised particular concern for U.S. and other donor
officials. These concerns relate to (1) the weakened position of the police
Inspector General's unit, (2) the inability of the police to deal with the
growing drug-trafficking threat, and (3) the signs of politicization of the
police force during this past year's extended election period.

In 1995, the United States helped Haiti establish an oversight structure to
monitor the conduct of its police. However, over the past year the police
oversight structure has been crippled by the unexpected departures of the
Secretary of State for Public Security and the Inspector General of the
police, according to U.S., Haitian, and other donor officials. These two
positions are key to ensuring the internal accountability of the police
force. The U.S. Department of State noted that groups reportedly associated
with former President Aristide's political party mounted a public campaign
calling for the resignation of the Secretary of State for Public Security.
On October 7, 1999, the Secretary resigned from his position, which remains
vacant, and left the country. According to U.S. officials, the Inspector
General-who was conducting investigations into human rights violations,
narcotrafficking, corruption, and other offenses allegedly committed by
police officers--unexpectedly left the force in April 2000 and has not been
permanently replaced. According to U.S. and Haitian officials, the Inspector
General's investigations had led to the dismissal of over 1,100 police
officers for misconduct. As reported by the Department of State, at least 58
police officers were in prison as of September 1999 on a variety of charges.
The Department noted that the police more often simply discharged officers
caught committing flagrant abuses, rather than initiating legal proceedings
against them. Since the departure of the Inspector General, investigations
of police misconduct have dramatically decreased, opening the door to
increased corruption within the force, according to U.S. and Haitian
officials.

The United States also helped establish the antinarcotics unit and the
Haitian Coast Guard to address the growing drug trafficking problem. U.S.
estimates indicate that the percentage of cocaine coming into the United
States through Haiti increased from 10 to 14 percent from 1998 to 1999.
However, the Haitian police has been generally ineffective in countering the
growing drug threat, due to the limited capabilities and resources of its
antinarcotics unit and Coast Guard. As a result, the police has conducted
few major drug-related investigations successfully. Moreover, the Haitian
police does not have the resources to stop airdrops of cocaine loads to
waiting land vehicles or maritime vessels.

The United States sought to help Haiti establish a professional and
impartial police force. However, events over the past year have raised
serious concerns about the impartiality of the force. In addition to
concerns over the weakened role of the police oversight structure, as noted
earlier, U.S. and other donor officials have serious concerns over the
partisan role played by the police during the May 2000 parliamentary and
local elections. During the extended election period, for example, the
police on occasion failed to protect legal demonstrations by the opposition.
According to U.S. officials, the police also arrested some opposition
candidates after the elections and failed to successfully investigate major
killings, including political assassinations, committed before the
elections.

Assistance Helped Improve Certain Aspects of the Judicial Sector

From fiscal years 1993 through 2000, the United States provided about $27
million to support Haiti's judicial system. The aid was intended to help
Haiti improve the effectiveness of existing judicial organizations and
enhance the access of the population to justice. It also was intended to
help Haiti develop and implement a broad reform of the judicial sector that
would enhance its independence, modernize criminal codes, and restructure
judicial organizations and processes.

USAID, its contractors, and the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training provided most of this
assistance under the USAID Administration of Justice Program. The bulk of
the assistance, about $23 million, funded (1) administrative enhancements
for judicial institutions, such as case registration and tracking systems;
(2) judge and prosecutor training; and (3) the establishment and operation
of the magistrate school. The remaining assistance, $4 million, funded legal
assistance and education as a means of improving the access of the
population to justice.

Serious Problems Remain in the Judicial Sector

Despite U.S. assistance, the Haitian judicial sector continues to exhibit
major shortcomings. This sector has not undergone a major reform, and, as a
result, it has outdated legal codes and cumbersome judicial proceedings.
Also, it has inadequate infrastructure and shortages of personnel and
equipment, and limited investigative capabilities. Furthermore, it suffers
from corruption and a lack of effective internal oversight, and it serves
only a small portion of the population.

Despite the constitutional mandate for an independent judicial sector, the
executive branch, through the Ministry of Justice, continues to control the
judicial sector, including the judicial budget and judicial appointments,
training, evaluation, and removal. The lack of independence compromises the
impartiality of the judicial sector, according to U.S., Haitian, and other
donor officials. For instance, the Haitian government has not vigorously
supported investigations and prosecutions of major crimes, including drug
trafficking, major killings, and political violence. Investigations and
prosecutions have moved slowly and produced very limited results, according
to U.S. officials.

The judicial system is characterized by outdated legal codes and complex,
time-consuming procedures. In criminal cases, many people are put behind
bars in preventive detention. Some judicial institutions have large case
backlogs, and criminal courts hold few jury trials every year. During our
visits to judicial facilities in Port-au-Prince and Jacmel, judicial
officials emphasized the urgent need for developing and implementing a
comprehensive reform of the judicial sector to modernize legal codes and
streamline judicial proceedings.

The judicial sector receives only 11.5 percent of the Ministry of Justice
budget, and as a consequence, the sector has serious personnel shortages and
inadequate infrastructure. For example, during our visits to judicial
institutions in Port-au-Prince and Jacmel, Haitian officials emphasized that
their institutions did not have enough personnel to conduct business
adequately, given the size of the populations and territories they had to
serve. We also found that prosecutors' offices, justice of the peace courts,
and other courts had very basic infrastructure. One of the courts that we
visited had no doors, windows, bathrooms, running water, or electricity. The
courts also had serious supply shortages, including vehicles, legal texts,
telephones, and office supplies. Haitian officials noted that the dire
conditions of judicial facilities such as this one projected a bad image and
did not inspire respect for their institutions, seriously undermining the
people's confidence in the judicial sector.

The judicial sector also has limited capabilities to investigate and
prosecute cases. Judicial officials have received little professional
training; have minimum resources to conduct investigations, prosecutions,
and trials; have received limited support from specialized units, such as
the judicial police and forensics unit; and do not have many incentives to
solve major crimes. In addition, some judicial officials stated that,
because they have little personal protection, they fear for their personal
safety when dealing with high-profile cases, such as drug trafficking and
political assassinations.

In addition, the judicial sector suffers from corruption and lacks adequate
oversight to monitor the behavior of judicial officials. For instance, U.S.
officials noted that the cumbersome and lengthy judicial proceedings create
opportunities for corruption among judicial officials willing to accept
bribes in return for advancing cases in their offices. Also, according to
these officials, the Ministry of Justice has a judicial inspection unit that
has limited capabilities and has done little to address corruption and other
major problems of the judicial sector. Despite efforts to enhance this unit,
it remains largely ineffective, according to U.S. officials.

The judicial sector continues to provide only limited access to justice for
the majority of the Haitian population. For example, by not having a public
defender's office, by not systematically providing legal assistance to the
population, and by conducting most of its business through written
procedures in French, the judicial sector remains unavailable to the
majority of the population, which is poor and illiterate and speaks only
Creole.

KEY FACTOR AFFECTING SUCCESS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE IS THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT'S
LACK OF COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHENING JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS

The primary factor affecting the success of U.S. assistance has been the
Haitian government's lack of clear commitment to supporting the police and
judicial sector and dealing with the main problems affecting these
institutions.

The Haitian Government Lacks Strong

Commitment to Strengthening the Police Force

U.S. assistance to the police has been undermined because the Haitian
government--after showing a strong initial commitment to establishing a
civilian-controlled police force--failed to (1) strengthen the
organizational capabilities of the force, (2) support investigations of
police corruption and serious crimes, and (3) keep the police out of
politics, particularly during the past election year.

The Haitian government's failure to strengthen the organizational
capabilities of the police has hindered U.S. efforts to improve the
capabilities of the force, according to U.S. officials. Although the Haitian
government has allocated the bulk of the Ministry of Justice budget to the
police and prisons--about 83 percent of the 1996-97 budget--the government
has weakened the police by not filling key leadership positions, such as the
Inspector General and the head of the antinarcotics unit, and by not
strengthening key units. For instance, since the unexpected departure of the
Inspector General, his office has stopped vigorously investigating police
misbehavior, including corruption. Also, some key police units, such as the
antinarcotics unit, have limited capabilities because the government has not
provided needed resources and personnel. According to the Department of
State, the Haitian government failed to increase the size of the
antinarcotics unit, as had been agreed to by the U.S. and Haitian
governments.

U.S. assistance to improve the investigative capabilities of the police has
been constrained by the failure of the Haitian government to support
investigations of police corruption and serious crimes, including
drug-related crimes and political assassinations. In March 2000, the State
Department reported that the Haitian government had failed to investigate
drug-related corruption involving police officers. The State Department also
reported that little progress had been made in bringing to justice persons
responsible for major killings, such as political killings, in Haiti. U.S.
officials are concerned about the Haitian government's lack of support for
the police's special investigations unit, which is responsible for
investigating major killings. This unit's human resources have declined by
about 80 percent since 1997.

U.S. assistance to the Haitian police has also been undermined by the
Haitian government's failure to keep the police out of politics during this
past election year. The force's inaction during several violent campaign
incidents and its arrests of several political candidates seriously
compromised the perception of police impartiality.

Haitian Government Lacks Strong Commitment

to Improving the Judicial Sector

U.S. assistance to the judicial sector has been undercut because the Haitian
government, after initially supporting the assistance effort, failed to
follow through in implementing broad reform of the judicial sector, adopt
and institutionalize many of the improvements made possible by the
assistance, provide the resources needed to operate the sector adequately,
build an oversight capability to monitor the sector, and vigorously support
the prosecution of major crimes.

The Haitian government did not follow through in implementing a broad reform
of its legal codes and judicial organization and processes -- some of the
measures that donors consider key to addressing the main problems of the
judicial sector. The Haitian government has taken some steps since 1995 that
may eventually lead to the implementation of a broad reform of the judicial
sector. These steps include enacting judicial reform-related legislation in
1998, increasing judicial salaries, and pursuing further reform plans, such
as expanding the use of Creole in judicial proceedings. However, none of
these steps has moved significantly toward addressing the main shortcomings
of the judicial sector.

Many improvements to the judicial sector made possible by the U.S.
assistance have not been institutionalized because the Haitian government
did not adopt and fund them. Although the Haitian government assumed
responsibility for most of the funding for the magistrate school that was
created with U.S. and other donor support, the government did not assume
ownership of the improvements, such as case registration and tracking
systems, made possible by U.S. assistance in the justice of the peace courts
and prosecutors' offices. As a result, according to U.S. officials, after
USAID stopped its assistance to the justice of the peace courts, the
improvements made by this assistance disappeared.

The Haitian government has not provided the resources needed to operate
judicial institutions. During our visits to judicial institutions in
Port-au-Prince, Saint-Marc, and Jacmel, we saw that the judicial
institutions were overwhelmed by the lack of personnel and equipment and by
their poor physical conditions.

The improvements to the judicial sector made possible by U.S. assistance
have also been limited because the Haitian government has not put in place
an effective oversight capability to monitor the judicial sector. The
Ministry of Justice has a judicial inspection unit that has limited
capabilities and physical and human resources to deal with the problems of
the sector, such as judicial corruption.

The Haitian government's failure to vigorously support investigations and
prosecutions of serious crimes, such as drug-related crimes and political
assassinations, has hindered the improvements in the prosecutorial
capabilities of the judicial sector made possible by the U.S. assistance.
According to U.S., other donor, and Haitian officials, prosecutors and
investigating magistrates do not have an incentive to investigate and
prosecute major criminal cases and, if they do investigate, they do it with
the knowledge that they are risking their personal security.

- - - - -

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared
remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included Virginia Hughes, Juan Tapia-Videla, David Bernet, Lee Kaukas,
Richard Seldin, Steve Iannucci, Douglas Ferry, and Rona Mendelsohn.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE HAITIAN

POLICE AND JUSTICE SECTOR, FISCAL YEARS 1995-2000

Table 1 shows U.S. assistance to the Haitian police force.

Table 1: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
Assistance to the Haitian Police, Fiscal Years 1995-1999

 Activity             Amount
 Police training and
 donations of         $34,402,963
 equipment
 Construction of
 police academy       18,680,474
 Program headquarters
 expenses             6,357,274
 U.S. embassy support
 and program expenses 2,477,990
 Staff salaries and
 benefits             1,838,928
 Staff travel
 expenses             967,604
 Antinarcotics
 training             347,029
 Program audits       221,738
 Total                $65,294,000

Source: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.

Table 2 shows the overall assistance provided to Haiti's judicial system
under the USAID Administration of Justice Program.

Table 2: USAID Administration of Justice Program Assistance to Haitian
Judicial Sector, Fiscal Years 1993-2000

Dollars in millions

 Organization and activity                      Amount
 USAID                                          $5.4
 Direct aid to Ministry of Justice              2.4
 Other technical and equipment assistance       0.8
 USAID management                               2.0
 Audit of Checchi                               0.2
 RONCO Consulting Corporation
 Interim Administration of Justice Program      2.8
 Checchi & Company Consultants, Inc.            11.5
 Legal assistance and education                 4.0
 Case registration and court management         3.2
 Judicial mentoring                             1.8
 Other technical and equipment assistance       2.5
 Department of Justice's Office of Overseas
 Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and
 Training                                       7.0
 Magistrate school                              2.1
 Case tracking system                           0.5
 Model jurisdiction program and related         4.4
 assistance
 Total                                          $26.7

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.

USAID provided $2.4 million in direct aid and $0.8 million in technical and
equipment assistance to the Haitian Ministry of Justice in fiscal years
1993-2000 and incurred $2.2 million in management costs for its
Administration of Justice Program.

RONCO provided $2.8 million in aid from June 1995 to July 1996. This
contractor primarily focused on refurbishing, equipping, and providing
administrative and logistical support to the magistrate school established
in 1995.

Checchi provided $11.5 million in assistance August 1995 to August 1999.
Under its contract with USAID, Checchi focused its efforts on three
activities: legal assistance and education, case tracking and court
management, and judicial mentoring.

(711564)

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See Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years
1993-98 (GAO/NSIAD-99-158, June 30, 1999); Foreign Assistance: U.S. Rule of
Law Assistance to Five Latin American Countries (GAO/NSIAD-99-195, Aug. 4,
1999); and Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of Law Program Coordination
(GAO/NSIAD-00-8R, Oct. 13, 1999).

This unit has focused on investigating high profile crimes, including
extrajudicial killings. The U.S. assistance's long-term goal is to help
integrate this unit into the mainstream judicial police.

The special weapons and tactics unit responds to crises in the
Port-au-Prince area. This unit receives orders directly from the Director
General of the police.

Juries are convened only for serious criminal offenses, such as murders.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

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