Medical Records Privacy: Uses and Oversight of Patient Information in
Research (Testimony, 02/24/99, GAO/T-HEHS-99-70).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the the use of
medical records for research, focusing on: (1) to what extent medical
information used for research depends on personally identifiable
information; (2) research that is and is not subject to current federal
oversight requirements; and (3) how the institutional review board (IRB)
ensures the confidentiality of health information used in research.
GAO noted that: (1) the survey revealed that a considerable amount of
health research relies on personally identifiable information; (2) while
some of this research is subject to IRB review--either because it is
federally supported or regulated research or because the organization
voluntarily applies federal rules to all of its research--some of the
organizations conduct records-based research that is not reviewed by an
IRB; (3) the process of IRB review does not ensure the confidentiality
of medical information used in research--primarily because the
provisions of the Common Rule related to confidentiality are limited;
(4) according to recent studies, the IRB system on the whole is
strained; and (5) nevertheless, although external review of their
research is limited, most of the organizations in the study told GAO
that they have various security safeguards in place to limit internal
and external access to paper and electronic databases, and many say they
have taken measures to ensure the anonymity of research and survey
subjects.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-HEHS-99-70
TITLE: Medical Records Privacy: Uses and Oversight of Patient
Information in Research
DATE: 02/24/99
SUBJECT: Medical research
Medical information systems
Medical records
Health research programs
Internal controls
Right of privacy
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter **
** titles, headings, and bullets are preserved. Major **
** divisions and subdivisions of the text, such as Chapters, **
** Sections, and Appendixes, are identified by double and **
** single lines. The numbers on the right end of these lines **
** indicate the position of each of the subsections in the **
** document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the **
** page numbers of the printed product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO **
** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please **
** send an e-mail message to: **
** **
** **
** **
** with the message 'info' in the body. **
******************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, U.S.
Senate
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 9:30 a.m.
Wednesday, February 24, 1999
MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY - USES AND
OVERSIGHT OF PATIENT INFORMATION
IN RESEARCH
Statement of Bernice Steinhardt, Director
Health Services Quality and Public Health Issues
Health, Education, and Human Services Division
GAO/T-HEHS-99-70
GAO/HEHS-99-70T
(101804)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
FDA - Food and Drug Administration
HHS - Department of Health and Human Services
HIPAA - Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
IRB - institutional review board
MCO - managed care organization
OPRR - Office for Protection From Research Risks
PBM - pharmacy benefit management
MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY: USES AND
OVERSIGHT OF PATIENT INFORMATION
IN RESEARCH
============================================================ Chapter 0
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss our report on the privacy
of medical records used for health research, which was released
today.\1 As you know, the increased use of information technology in
the health care system and the number of parties with routine access
to personally identifiable medical data have raised concerns about
the potential misuse of these data and the adequacy of the current
system of protections. At the same time, the availability of these
data is important for research that can improve the understanding of
diseases and treatments across broad populations.
One of the principal mechanisms for overseeing research is the
institutional review board (IRB) system. Under the current Federal
Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects--which was adopted in
1991 and is known as the Common Rule--research conducted by academic
medical centers, pharmaceutical companies, and other organizations
that are supported or regulated by any of 17 federal agencies is
subject to review by local boards. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has regulations nearly identical for oversight of research
conducted for drug or medical device approvals. In general, IRBs are
meant to ensure that researchers minimize the risks to human research
subjects and obtain subjects' informed consent to participate. When
appropriate, IRBs are also supposed to consider whether the research
projects under their review will protect the privacy of subjects and
inform subjects of the extent to which their data will be kept
confidential.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of
1996 (P.L. 104-191) called for protections for the privacy of
medical information. Pursuant to HIPAA, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services recommended standards with respect to the privacy of
personally identifiable information in September 1997. If federal
legislation is not enacted by August 1999, the Secretary must
promulgate regulations setting privacy standards within 6 months. As
you know, a number of bills addressing privacy standards were
introduced in the 105th and 106th Congresses, although none has been
enacted. As the Congress continues to consider legislation, one
concern is to provide access to medical records for the purposes of
research while also offering privacy protections.
In light of these considerations, we examined issues related to the
use of medical records for research. In my remarks today, I will
describe to what extent medical information used for research depends
on personally identifiable information, research that is and is not
subject to current federal oversight requirements, and how IRBs
ensure the confidentiality of health information used in research. I
will also discuss the safeguards health care organizations have in
place to protect the confidentiality of health information used in
research. We relied extensively on information we collected from 7
IRBs and 12 organizations that conduct health research, including
managed care, pharmacy benefit management, pharmaceutical,
biotechnology, and health information organizations and integrated
health systems.
In summary, our survey revealed that a considerable amount of health
research relies on personally identifiable information. While some
of this research is subject to IRB review--either because it is
federally supported or regulated research or because the organization
voluntarily applies federal rules to all of its research--some of the
organizations conduct records-based research that is not reviewed by
an IRB. In any case, the process of IRB review does not ensure the
confidentiality of medical information used in research--primarily
because the provisions of the Common Rule related to confidentiality
are limited. Moreover, according to recent studies, the IRB system
on the whole is strained. Nevertheless, although external review of
their research is limited, most of the organizations in our study
told us that they have various security safeguards in place to limit
internal and external access to paper and electronic databases, and
many say they have taken measures to ensure the anonymity of research
and survey subjects.
--------------------
\1 Medical Records Privacy: Access Needed for Health Research, but
Oversight of Privacy Protections Is Limited (GAO/HEHS-99-55, Feb.
24, 1999).
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The growth of information technology and changes in the health care
delivery system have led to increased use of personal medical
information. Numerous organizations collect, store, transmit, and
use medical information on individuals, who may have little or no
knowledge of the organizations' accessing their personal health data.
Some of these databases are extensive, containing records on millions
of individuals. The availability of these large databases has made
many types of research possible but has increased the potential for
misuse of private medical information, raising concern over issues
related to privacy and confidentiality.\2
The federal system of protections was developed largely in response
to biomedical and behavioral research that caused harm to human
subjects. To protect the rights and welfare of human subjects in
research, the Common Rule requires organizations conducting federally
supported or regulated research to establish and operate IRBs, which
are, in turn, responsible for implementing federal requirements for
research conducted at or supported by their institutions. IRBs are
intended to provide basic protections for people enrolled in
federally supported or regulated research. Most of the estimated
3,000 to 5,000 IRBs in the United States are associated with a
hospital, university, or other research institution, but IRBs also
exist in managed care organizations (MCO), government agencies, and
as independent entities employed by the organizations conducting the
research. IRBs are made up of both scientists and nonscientists.
--------------------
\2 Privacy refers to the specific right of an individual to control
the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.
Confidentiality, a tool for protecting privacy, mandates specific
controls on personal data, limiting access and disclosure. The
privacy protections of the Common Rule apply to research on human
subjects when the researcher obtains information that is individually
identifiable. The Common Rule defines a human subject as a living
individual about whom a researcher obtains (1) data through
intervention or interaction with the individual or (2) identifiable
private information. Information is individually identifiable when
the identity of the subject is or may be readily ascertained by the
researcher or associated with the information.
HEALTH INFORMATION IS NEEDED
FOR A VARIETY OF RESEARCH
PURPOSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
The organizations that we contacted primarily conduct health research
to advance biomedical science, understand health care use, evaluate
and improve health care practices, and determine patterns of disease.
These organizations use health-related information on hundreds of
thousands, and in some cases millions, of individuals in conducting
their research. The MCOs and integrated health systems\3 in our
study use medical records data, which are generated in the course of
treating patients, to conduct epidemiological research and health
services research, such as outcomes and quality improvement
studies.\4 For example, one MCO, in conducting a quality improvement
study, determined from its claims database whether patients with
vascular disease were receiving appropriate medications and reported
the findings to patients' physicians to assist in the treatment of
their patients.
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that we contacted also
conduct health services and epidemiological research; but unlike MCOs
and integrated health systems, they rely on data from other
organizations for this type of research. One pharmaceutical
company's epidemiology department, for example, conducts large-scale
studies using data from MCOs and health information organizations to
monitor the effectiveness of drugs on certain populations.
For pharmacy benefit management (PBM) firms, which administer
prescription drug benefits for health insurance plans, a primary
source of data is prescription information derived from prescriptions
dispensed by mail or claims received from retail pharmacies. PBMs
design and evaluate programs that are intended to improve the quality
of care for patients who have specific diseases or risk factors while
controlling total health care costs. One PBM in our study, for
example, develops disease management programs; these programs depend
on the ability to identify individuals with conditions, such as
diabetes, that require more intensive treatment management.
The health information organizations that we contacted rely solely on
data from other organizations. Typically, they collect medical
claims data from their clients or obtain it from publicly available
sources, such as Medicare and Medicaid.\5 They may also acquire data
through employer contracts that stipulate that all the employers'
plans provide complete data to a health information organization.
Examples of research projects include studies of the effects of low
birth weight on costs of medical care and the effectiveness of
alternative drug therapies for schizophrenia.
Officials at the organizations we contacted believe that many of
these studies require personally identifiable information to ensure
study validity or to simply answer the study question. For
longitudinal studies, researchers may need to track patients' care
over time and link events that occur during the course of treatment
with their outcomes. Researchers may also need to link multiple
sources of information, such as electronic databases and patient
records, to compile sufficient data to answer the research question.
For example, officials at one health information organization stated
that without patient names or assigned patient codes, it would not
have been possible to complete a number of studies, such as the
effects of length-of-hospital stay on maternal and child health
following delivery and patient care costs of cancer clinical trials.
--------------------
\3 Integrated health systems are systems of care that can include
hospitals, academic medical centers, and primary care physicians and
specialists.
\4 Health services research examines the use, costs, quality,
accessibility, delivery, organization, financing, and outcomes of
health care services to increase the knowledge and understanding of
health services for individuals and populations. It includes
outcomes research on the benefits and harms of alternative strategies
for preventing, diagnosing, or treating illness.
\5 Clients of health information organizations may include health
care providers, health plans and plan administrators, employers, and
government health programs.
FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS DO NOT
APPLY TO ALL RESEARCH, BUT SOME
ORGANIZATIONS VOLUNTARILY APPLY
THOSE REQUIREMENTS TO ALL
STUDIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
Some of the research conducted by the organizations we contacted must
conform to the Common Rule or FDA regulations because it is either
supported or regulated by the federal government. Several MCOs
obtain grants from various federal agencies, including the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention; one health information
organization that we contacted conducts research for federal clients,
such as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. Some
organizations that conduct both federally supported or regulated
research and other types of privately funded research choose to apply
the requirements uniformly to all studies involving human subjects,
regardless of the source of funding.
However, some other organizations that carry out both publicly and
privately funded research apply the federal rules where required,
often relying on IRB review at collaborators' institutions, but do
not apply the rules to their privately funded research.
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, for example, rely on the
academic medical centers where they sponsor research to have in place
procedures for informed consent and IRB review,\6 but they do not
maintain their own IRBs.
Some organizations conduct certain activities that involve
identifiable medical information, but they do not define these
activities as research. For example, officials at several MCOs told
us that they did not define records-based quality improvement
activities as research, so these projects are not submitted for IRB
review. But there is disagreement as to how to classify quality
improvement reviews, and some organizations do submit these studies
for IRB review, where they define the studies as research.
Finally, at some organizations, none of the research is covered by
the Common Rule or FDA regulations and no research receives IRB
review. For example, one PBM in our study, which conducts research
for other companies--including developing disease management
programs--does not receive federal support and, thus, is not subject
to the Common Rule in any of its research. While it does not have an
IRB, this PBM uses external advisory boards to review its research
proposals. Another type of research that for some companies does not
fall under the Common Rule or FDA regulations is research that uses
disease or population-related registry data. Pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies maintain such registries to monitor how a
particular population responds to drugs and to better understand
certain diseases.
--------------------
\6 Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that conduct clinical
research in-house for FDA regulated products are required to have IRB
review and informed consent for that research.
IRB REVIEWS PROVIDE LIMITED
OVERSIGHT OF CONFIDENTIALITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
While many organizations have in place IRB review procedures, recent
studies that pointed to weaknesses in the IRB system, as well as the
provisions of the Common Rule itself, suggest that IRB reviews do not
ensure the confidentiality of medical information used in research.
While not focusing specifically on confidentiality, previous studies
by GAO and by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Office of Inspector General have found multiple factors that weaken
institutional and federal human subjects protection efforts.\7 In
1996, we found that IRBs faced a number of pressures that made
oversight of research difficult, including the heavy workloads of and
competing professional demands on members who are not paid for their
IRB services. Similarly, the Inspector General found IRBs unable to
cope with major changes in the research environment, concluding that
they review too many studies too quickly and with too little
expertise, and recommended a number of actions to improve the
flexibility, accountability, training, and resources of IRBs.
--------------------
\7 Scientific Research: Continued Vigilance Critical to Protecting
Human Subjects (GAO/HEHS-96-72, Mar. 8, 1996) and HHS Office of
Inspector General, "Institutional Review Boards: A Time for Reform,"
OEI-01-97-00193 (June 1998).
FEDERAL REGULATIONS CONTAIN
LIMITED PROVISIONS FOR
OVERSEEING CONFIDENTIALITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Under the Common Rule, IRBs are directed to approve research only
after they have determined that (1) there are provisions to protect
the privacy of subjects and maintain the confidentiality of data,
when appropriate, and (2) research subjects are adequately informed
of the extent to which their data will be kept confidential.
However, according to the Director of the Office for Protection From
Research Risks (OPRR),\8 confidentiality protection is not a major
thrust of the Common Rule and IRBs tend to give it less attention
than other research risks because they have the flexibility to decide
when it is appropriate to review confidentiality protection issues.
Consistent with federal regulations, the seven IRBs that we contacted
told us that they generally waive the informed consent requirements
in cases involving medical records-based research.\9 Researchers at
the organizations we visited contend that it is often difficult, if
not impossible, to obtain the permission of every subject whose
medical records are used. As an example, the director of research at
one integrated health system described a study that tracked about
30,000 patients over several years to determine hospitalization rates
for asthmatic patients treated with inhaled steroids.
The IRBs that we contacted told us that they routinely examine all
research plans using individually identifiable medical information to
determine whether the research is exempt from further review, can
receive an expedited review,\10 or requires a full review. Further,
in reviewing research using individually identifiable genetic data,
two of the IRBs had policies to consider additional confidentiality
provisions in approving such research.
--------------------
\8 OPRR is within the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and is the
oversight agency for HHS-supported research.
\9 A waiver or modification of informed consent may be permitted if
an IRB finds and documents that: the research involves no more than
minimal risk; the rights and welfare of subjects will not be
adversely affected; the research could not practicably be carried out
without the waiver or alteration of the consent requirement; and,
whenever appropriate, subjects will be provided with pertinent
information after participation. FDA regulations do not permit a
waiver of consent.
\10 An expedited review may be conducted by the chairperson or a
chair-appointed IRB member rather than the full board.
SOME BREACHES OF PRIVACY
HAVE BEEN REPORTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
The actual number of instances in which patient privacy is breached
is not fully known. While there are few documented cases of privacy
breaches, other reports provide evidence that such problems occur.
For example, in an NIH-sponsored study, IRB chairs reported that lack
of privacy and lack of confidentiality were among the most common
complaints made by research subjects.\11
Over the past 8 years, OPRR's compliance staff has investigated
several allegations involving human subjects protection violations
resulting from a breach of confidentiality. In the 10 cases provided
to us, complaints related both to research subject to IRB review and
to research outside federal protection.\12
In certain cases involving a breach in confidentiality, OPRR has
authority to restrict an institution's authority to conduct research
that involves human subjects or to require corrective action. For
example, in one investigation, a university inadvertently released
the names of participants who tested HIV positive to parties outside
the research project, including a local television station. In this
case, OPRR required the university to take corrective measures to
ensure appropriate confidentiality protections for human subjects.
In response, the university revised internal systems to prevent the
release of private information in the future.
However, in other cases, OPRR determined that it could not take
action because the research was not subject to the Common Rule and,
thus, it lacked jurisdiction. For example, in a case reported in the
media, OPRR staff learned of an experiment that plastic surgeons had
performed on 21 patients using two different facelift operations--one
on each half of the face--to see which came out better. OPRR staff
learned that the study was not approved by an IRB and that the
patients' consent forms did not explain the procedures and risks
associated with the experiment. In addition, the surgeons published
a journal article describing their research that included before and
after photographs of the patients. Because the research was
performed in physician practices and was not federally supported, it
fell outside the Common Rule and OPRR could take no action.
--------------------
\11 James Bell Associates, "Final Report: Evaluation of NIH
Implementation of Section 491 of the Public Health Service Act,
Mandating a Program of Protection for Research Subjects," prepared
for NIH's Office of Extramural Research (June 1998).
\12 Additional cases may have been reported to OPRR, but these were
examples the staff could readily identify that involved breaches of
confidentiality.
ORGANIZATIONS CONDUCTING
RESEARCH HAVE MEASURES TO
REDUCE ACCESS TO PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
Each organization that we contacted reported that it has taken one or
more steps to limit access to personally identifiable information in
their research. Many have limited the number of individuals who are
afforded access to personally identifiable information or limited the
span of time they are given access to the information, or both. Some
have used encrypted or encoded identifiers to enhance the protection
of research and survey subjects.\13 Most, but not all, of the
organizations have additional management practices to protect medical
information, including written policies governing confidentiality.
Some organizations have also instituted a number of technical
measures and physical safeguards to protect the confidentiality of
information.
Officials from two of the companies that we contacted told us that
they did not have written policies to share with us, and two other
companies were unable to provide us with such documentation, although
officials described several practices related to confidentiality.
The organizations that did provide us with documentation appear to
use similar management practices and technical measures to protect
health information used in their health research, whether they
generate patient records or receive them from other organizations.
To limit access, several organizations have created special subset
databases to enable them to limit researchers' access to information
that is relevant to their studies. In addition to limiting access to
certain individuals for specific purposes, some organizations have
encrypted or encoded patient information. Researchers at one
integrated health system, for example, work with information that has
been encoded by computer programmers on the research team--the only
individuals who have access to the fully identifiable data.
In conducting collaborative research, the organizations that we
contacted tend to use special data sets and contracting processes to
protect medical information. For example, one MCO, which conducts
over half of its research with government agencies and academic and
research institutions, transfers data in either encrypted or
anonymized form and provides detailed specifications in its contracts
that limit use of the data to the specific research project and
prohibit collaborators from re-identifying or transferring the data.
Generally, company policies define the circumstances under which
personally identifiable information may be disclosed and the
penalties for unauthorized release of confidential information. Most
company policies permit access only to the information that is needed
to perform one's job; 8 of the 12 organizations also require their
employees to sign agreements stating that they will maintain the
privacy of protected health information.
Each organization that we contacted said it uses disciplinary
sanctions to address employee violations of confidentiality or
failure to protect medical information from accidental or
unauthorized access, and an intentional breach of confidentiality
could result in employee termination--which may be immediate. But
they also pointed out that few employees have been terminated, and
when they have, the incidents were not related to the conduct of
research.
The organizations that we contacted said they use a number of
electronic measures to safeguard their electronic health data. Most
reported using individual user authentication or personal passwords
to ensure users access only the information that they need; some also
use computer systems that maintain an electronic record of each
employee who accesses medical data. These organizations may also use
other technical information system mechanisms, including firewalls,
to prevent external access to computer systems. In addition to
electronic security, officials at some of the organizations told us
they use various security measures to prevent unauthorized physical
access to medical records-based information, including computer
workstations and servers.
--------------------
\13 Data are considered "encoded" or "encrypted" when personal
identifiers and means of directly contacting an individual (for
example, name, address, and social security number) are replaced with
numeric or other coding. "Anonymized" data are those from which all
personal identifiers have been removed or information aggregated in a
manner so that individuals cannot be identified. Medical and health
data used by organizations when they conduct health research are
viewed as fully identifiable when a name, address, or another
identifier is associated with the data.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
Personally identifiable information is often an important component
of research using medical records, and the companies we met with
furnished many examples of useful research that could not have been
conducted without it. Because our study focused on only a limited
number of companies--in particular, those that were willing to share
information about corporate practices--it is difficult to judge the
extent to which their policies may be typical, nor do we know the
extent to which their policies are followed. Nevertheless, most of
the organizations we surveyed do have policies to limit and control
access to medical information that identifies individuals, and many
of them have adopted techniques, such as encryption and encoding, to
further safeguard individual privacy.
However, while reasonable safeguards may be in place in these
companies, external oversight of their research is limited. Not all
research is subject to outside review, and even in those cases where
IRBs are involved, they are not required to give substantial
attention to privacy protection. Further, in light of the problems
that IRBs have had in meeting current workloads--one of the key
findings of our earlier work as well as the work of HHS' Office of
Inspector General--it is not clear that the current IRB-based system
could accommodate more extensive review responsibilities. In
weighing the desirability of additional oversight of medical
records-based research, it will be important to take account of
existing constraints on the IRB system and the recommendations that
have already been made for changes to that system.
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6.1
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to
any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.
*** End of document. ***