Managing for Results: Key Steps and Challenges in Implementing GPRA in
Science Agencies (Stmnt. for the Rec., 07/10/96, GAO/T-GGD/RCED-96-214).

GAO discussed the challenges in implementing the Government Performance
and Results Act (GPRA) in federal civilian science agencies, focusing on
ways to improve the management of federal civilian science agencies and
aid congressional decisionmaking. GAO noted that: (1) GPRA enables
Congress to make difficult funding, policy, and programming decisions
relative to science agencies' demands; (2) the science agencies are
required to set strategic and annual goals, measure performance rates,
and report their goals attainment; (3) GPRA has shifted the focus of
federal management and accountability from staffing and activity levels
to federal program outcomes; (4) GPRA is being phased in through 70
pilot projects, to provide agencies with guidance in meeting GPRA
requirements; (5) the successful implementation of this results-oriented
management approach depends on defining missions and desired outcomes,
measuring program performance, and using performance data to improve
program operations; (6) measuring program performance can be extremely
difficult because of the wide range of factors to consider in
determining a project's commercial viability; and (7) most agencies are
struggling to integrate GPRA goal-setting and performance measurement
requirements into their daily program operations.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD/RCED-96-214
     TITLE:  Managing for Results: Key Steps and Challenges in 
             Implementing GPRA in Science Agencies
      DATE:  07/10/96
   SUBJECT:  Agency missions
             Research program management
             Research and development
             Federal agency reorganization
             Research and development costs
             Strategic planning
             Scientific research
             Mission budgeting
             Interagency relations
IDENTIFIER:  High Performance Computing and Communications Program
             NIST Advanced Technology Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Committee on Science
House of Representatives

Not to Be Released
Before 12:00 noon EDT
Wednesday
July 10, 1996

MANAGING FOR RESULTS - KEY STEPS
AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING
GPRA IN SCIENCE AGENCIES

Statement for the Record by
L.  Nye Stevens, Director, Federal Management
and Workforce Issues, General Government Division; and
Victor S.  Rezendes, Director, Energy, Resources,
and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division

GAO/T-GGD/RCED-96-214

GAO/GGD/RCED-96-214T


(410059)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ATP - Advance Technology Program
  DOE - Department of Energy
  GPRA - Government Performance and Results Act
  HPCC - High Performance Computing and Communication
  NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
  NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
  NSF - National Science Foundation
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget
  R&D - research and development

MANAGING FOR RESULTS:  KEY STEPS
AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING
GPRA IN SCIENCE AGENCIES
====================================================== Chapter SUMMARY

The commitment to reduce the deficit is forcing Congress and the
executive branch to undertake a basic reexamination of the value of
programs across the federal government and is placing pressure as
never before on all federal agencies, including the civilian science
agencies, to clearly demonstrate that they are making effective use
of taxpayers' dollars. 

The landmark Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) provides a
legislative vehicle for Congress and agencies to use to improve
program effectiveness and make the difficult trade-offs that the
current budget environment demands.  GAO's recently released
Executive Guide:  Effectively Implementing the Government Performance
and Results Act discusses three key steps for federal agencies to
successfully implement GPRA.  These three steps are (1) define
mission and desired outcomes, (2) measure performance, and (3) use
performance information.  The experiences of civilian science
agencies suggest that each one of these steps offers important
opportunities for improving agency management and congressional
decisionmaking. 

GAO work has shown that the effectiveness of the Department of
Energy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and a host
of other agencies has been hampered by unfocused missions and unclear
goals.  GPRA is intended to provide this focus, in part by requiring
that agencies develop strategic plans based on consultation with
Congress and other stakeholders.  These consultations are an
important opportunity for Congress and the executive branch to
jointly reassess and clarify the agencies' missions and desired
outcomes. 

Measuring the performance of science-related projects can be
extremely difficult because a wide range of factors determine if and
how a particular research and development (R&D) project will result
in a commercial application or have other benefits.  It can also take
many years between when a research project is undertaken and when the
outcome occurs.  Due to the difficulties in measuring performance,
R&D agencies typically have chosen to measure a variety of proxies
for outcomes, such as the number of patents resulting from the
federally funded research and expert review and judgments of the
quality and importance of research findings. 

As to be expected during the initial efforts of such a challenging
management reform effort as GPRA, most agencies, including science
agencies, are still struggling to integrate the mission- based
goal-setting and performance measurement requirements of GPRA into
their daily program operations.  This integration is important
because GPRA performance information is to be used to guide an array
of congressional and executive branch decisions.  Consistent
congressional interest--in hearings such as today's, for example--on
the status of an agency's GPRA efforts, the performance measures it
is using, and how performance information is being used to make
decisions will send an unmistakable message to agencies that Congress
expects GPRA to be conscientiously implemented. 


MANAGING FOR RESULTS:  KEY STEPS
AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING
GPRA IN SCIENCE AGENCIES
==================================================== Chapter Statement

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We are pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the key steps and
challenges in using the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
to improve federal civilian science agencies' management and
congressional decisionmaking. 

Each year, American taxpayers invest about $70 billion of federal
funds in military and civilian research and development (R&D)
efforts.  Over the years, this investment has yielded substantial
benefits to the health, welfare, and security of the American people. 
Yet the powerful pressures to reduce the deficit are forcing Congress
and the executive branch to undertake a basic reexamination of the
value of programs across the federal government and to update the
nation's spending priorities.  The effort to reduce the deficit is
therefore placing pressure as never before on all federal agencies,
including the civilian science agencies, to clearly demonstrate that
they are making sound and effective use of taxpayers' dollars. 

Fortunately, the landmark GPRA provides a legislative vehicle for
agencies to use as they seek to demonstrate and improve their
effectiveness.  Equally important, if successfully implemented, GPRA
should help Congress make the difficult funding, policy, and program
decisions that the current budget environment demands.  Under GPRA,
agencies are to set strategic and annual goals, measure performance,
and report on the degree to which goals are met.  Congress intended
for GPRA to fundamentally shift the focus of federal management and
accountability from a preoccupation with staffing and activity levels
to a focus on "outcomes" of federal programs.  Outcomes are results
expressed in terms of the difference federal programs make in
people's lives. 

In crafting GPRA, Congress recognized that the types of management
changes that successful implementation will require will not come
quickly or easily for many agencies.  As a result, GPRA is being
phased in initially through almost 70 pilot projects during fiscal
years 1994 through 1996 to provide agencies with experience in
meeting its requirements before governmentwide implementation in the
fall of 1997.  Several agencies with a major civilian science focus,
such as the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environment Protection
Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the
National Science Foundation (NSF), have programs that are included in
the pilot phase of GPRA. 

Our recently released Executive Guide:  Effectively Implementing the
Government Performance and Results Act, which, at the request of the
Committee, we are providing for the record, is intended to help
federal managers implement GPRA and make the difficult transition to
a form of management and accountability that stresses outcomes.\1 In
the guide, we discuss three key steps for federal agencies to
successfully implement results-oriented management.  These three
steps are (1) define mission and desired outcomes, (2) measure
performance, and (3) use performance information.  The guide shows
the relationship of these steps to GPRA and highlights important
practices associated with each step.  The guide also discusses the
role of top leadership in implementing GPRA and the practices leaders
can follow to make GPRA a driving force in federal decisionmaking. 
Accompanying the discussion of each practice is a case illustration
describing a federal agency that has made progress incorporating the
practice into its operations.  The practices discussed in the guide
emerged from the experiences of leading public organizations here and
abroad and have been shown to be effective in the federal management
environment.  These practices provide a useful framework for agencies
working to implement GPRA and for assessing their progress. 

Our comments today use that framework to underscore the opportunities
and challenges to using GPRA as a vehicle that agencies and Congress
can employ as they seek to improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of civilian science programs.  Our comments are based on completed
and ongoing reviews of efforts to implement GPRA in pilot and
nonpilot agencies across the federal government and of the management
of civilian science agencies. 


--------------------
\1 Executive Guide:  Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996). 


   STEP 1:  DEFINE MISSION AND
   DESIRED OUTCOMES
-------------------------------------------------- Chapter Statement:1

Our work has shown that all too frequently individual agencies have
lacked clear missions and goals, and related agencies' efforts have
not been complementary.  Moreover, legislative mandates may be
unclear and Congress, the executive branch, and other stakeholders
may not agree on the goals an agency and its programs should be
trying to achieve, the strategies for achieving those goals, and the
ways to measure their success.  Thus, many agencies cannot
confidently answer the basic questions in defining a mission--what is
our purpose, whom do we serve, and how do we meet our mission?  GPRA
seeks to address these problems by requiring executive branch
agencies to develop strategic plans that are to define missions and
articulate strategic goals. 

Although statutory requirements are to be the starting point for
agency mission statements, agencies are to consult with Congress and
other stakeholders in defining their missions.  In the case of
Congress, this may entail identifying legislative changes that are
needed either to clarify Congress' intent and expectations or to
address differing conditions and citizens' needs that have arisen
since initial statutory requirements were established.  Congressional
consultation may also involve obtaining guidance on Congress'
priorities in those frequent cases where agencies have more than one
statutory mission. 


      CLARIFYING AGENCIES'
      MISSIONS
------------------------------------------------ Chapter Statement:1.1

These consultations are an important opportunity for Congress and the
executive branch to work together in reassessing and clarifying the
missions of federal agencies and the desired outcomes of agencies'
programs.  For example, our work has shown that DOE sorely needs a
reevaluation of its basic mission, including its significant science
responsibilities.\2 DOE's mission and priorities have changed
dramatically over time so that DOE is now very different from what it
was in 1977 when it was created in response to the nation's energy
crisis.  While energy research, conservation, and policymaking
dominated early DOE priorities, national defense and environmental
clean-up now overshadow those efforts.  Meanwhile, new mission areas
in science and industrial competitiveness, such as applied R&D
programs supporting technology to secure future energy supplies, have
emerged and are pressing for priority attention.\3 Each new phase in
DOE's evolution has been accompanied by new leadership with vastly
different agendas concerning DOE's basic mission and how it should be
managed. 

The DOE national laboratories, in which DOE estimates it has invested
over $100 billion in the last 2 decades, are a specific area where
our work and the work of others have shown a longstanding need for
clarified missions.\4 We have reported that DOE had not coordinated
the laboratories' efforts to solve national problems but had managed
each laboratory on a program-by-program basis.  The laboratories'
missions were set forth as broad goals and activity statements rather
than as a coordinated set of objectives with specific implementation
strategies for bringing together the collective strengths of the
laboratories to meet pressing national needs.  As a result, DOE was
unable to address issues that required cooperation and coordination
across its many mission areas.  For example, we reported that
although solutions to the proliferation of nuclear weapons require
expertise in identifying the effects of weapons, the research on
nonproliferation and effects of weapons was carried out in different
laboratories and was managed by different assistant secretaries. 
Overall, laboratory managers said that they feared that the lack of
proper departmental direction was compromising both their
effectiveness and their ability to respond to new national
priorities. 

Planning-related problems were not unique to DOE.  As another
example, our past work at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) showed the need for NASA to develop a strategic
plan that realistically matched its program plans to its likely
budgets.\5

NASA strategic planning efforts in the early 1990s were incomplete
and unrealistic because they did not indicate the relative priority
of NASA's key missions and large programs and provided no balance
between planning and budgeting.  For example, NASA's failure to
ground its goals in realistic budget expectations forced it to make
significant program adjustments to make up for the lower-than-planned
funding levels.  Over the past several years we have reported that
space shuttle operations, the space station, the Advanced X-Ray
Astrophysics Facility, the Earth Observing System, and other NASA
programs and projects had been or were being restructured primarily
because they were not deemed affordable. 

Both DOE and NASA are undertaking strategic planning efforts intended
in part to address these longstanding problems.  Sustained
congressional involvement in these efforts and similar planning
efforts undertaken by other agencies are vital to ensuring that
missions are focused, goals are clearly established, and strategies
and funding expectations are appropriate and reasonable.  The
experiences of leading organizations suggest that planning efforts
that have such characteristics can become driving forces in improving
the effectiveness and efficiency of program efforts.  The GPRA
strategic planning process thus provides Congress with a potentially
powerful vehicle for clarifying its expectations for agencies and the
program results expected from funding decisions. 


--------------------
\2 Department of Energy:  Need to Reevaluate Its Role and Missions
(GAO/T-RCED-95-85, Jan.  18, 1995). 

\3 For an assessment of DOE's efforts in this research area see DOE's
Success Stories Report (GAO/RCED-96-120R, Apr.  15, 1996), and Energy
R&D:  Observations on DOE's Success Stories Report
(GAO/T-RCED-96-133, Apr.  17, 1996). 

\4 See, for example, Department of Energy:  National Laboratories
Need Clearer Mission and Better Management (GAO/RCED-95-10, Jan.  27,
1995). 

\5 See, for example, NASA:  Major Challenges to Management,
(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-18, Oct.  6, 1993). 


      IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING
      CROSSCUTTING ISSUES
------------------------------------------------ Chapter Statement:1.2

Thus far our comments have been directed toward how congressional
involvement in agencies' strategic planning processes can improve
programs and aid congressional decisionmaking as it relates to the
individual agencies.  Equally important, we believe, is congressional
involvement in strategic planning for program efforts that cut across
several agencies.  This is particularly true for science programs
where, in many cases, the greatest return for the federal dollar can
come through the coordinated efforts of a number of agencies.  Not
surprisingly, given the planning problems that individual agencies
have confronted, program efforts that involve several agencies also
have suffered from a lack of focus and unclear goals. 

For example, we also have reported that the multiagency High
Performance Computing and Communication (HPCC) initiative could
benefit from a strengthened program direction.\6 Our work showed that
a more focused management approach and an identification of priority
areas were needed to help ensure that the program's goals were met. 
The HPCC program was originally established, by design, as a loosely
coordinated, scientifically oriented research effort rather than a
rigorously managed development program.  Once the administration
expanded the role of HPCC to support the national information
infrastructure, a more rigorous and coordinated management approach
was required that better targeted the specific technology areas that
most needed to be developed to support the information superhighway. 
The HPCC effort at NSF, an agency with a major role in the program,
is one of NSF's four GPRA pilot projects.  NSF is using GPRA as a
vehicle for clarifying the long-term goals for its HPCC program and
developing performance measures to gauge progress. 

As Congress works with agencies on the development of the agencies'
strategic plans, it can identify other instances of potential overlap
or uncoordinated programs by insisting that agencies show how their
programs are aligned with appropriate efforts from other agencies. 
One area where such an approach could prove helpful is in looking at
the federal government's vast array of R&D laboratories.  In response
to our survey, 17 federal departments and independent agencies
identified 515 federal R&D laboratories that spent a total of $26.6
billion in fiscal year 1995.\7 Federal agencies also supported,
primarily through contracts and grants, a wide range of R&D performed
by businesses, universities, and other organizations. 

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recognizes the key role
that the development of strategic plans under GPRA can have in
helping to ensure federal efforts across agencies are properly
coordinated.  OMB is now undertaking a "Summer Review" during which
it is examining the progress that agencies are making in meeting the
GPRA strategic planning requirements.  As part of that review, OMB is
seeking to identify any steps that should be taken on a multiagency
basis to coordinate and harmonize goals and objectives for
cross-agency programs and functions.  OMB's efforts under GPRA should
assist Congress as it looks for opportunities to streamline and
improve the effectiveness of the federal government. 


--------------------
\6 The HPCC program was first included in the President's budget in
fiscal year 1992 as a coordinated effort among nine federal agencies
to accelerate the availability and use of the next generation of high
performance computers and networks.  In 1993, the administration
expanded the scope of the HPCC program to include a broader range of
applications that would have a more direct, near-term impact on the
national information infrastructure, also known as the "information
superhighway." See High Performance Computing and Communications: 
New Program Direction Would Benefit From a More Focused Effort
(GAO/AIMD-95-6, Nov.  4, 1994). 

\7 Federal R&D Laboratories (GAO/RCED/NSIAD-96-78R, Feb.  29, 1996). 


   STEP 2:  MEASURE PERFORMANCE
-------------------------------------------------- Chapter Statement:2

GPRA requires executive agencies to develop annual plans with
suitable performance measures to reinforce the connection between the
long-term strategic goals outlined in their strategic plans and the
day-to-day activities of their managers and staff.  Measuring
performance allows an organization to track its progress toward its
goals and gives managers important information on which to base their
organizational and management decisions.  At a broader level,
measuring R&D agencies' performance helps Congress to know the
results of R&D investments and to effectively allocate budgets among
competing programs. 

Science agencies, like other agencies, must guard against the
understandable tendency to overly rely on goals and measures that are
easily quantifiable, such as numbers of research grants provided and
completed, at the expense of what is truly important but more
difficult to measure, such as the difference a research grant made. 
Organizations that measure and manage on the basis of easily
quantifiable goals rather than results run the risk of striving to
achieve goals that may be only marginally related to the reasons the
program was created.  For example, we recently reviewed the
short-term performance results and long-term evaluation strategy of
the Advanced Technology Program (ATP).\8 ATP is administered by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) within the
Department of Commerce and has had its funding grow from $68 million
in fiscal year 1993 to $431 million in fiscal year 1995, more than
doubling each year. 

NIST identified several evaluation measures that it expects will
indicate the long-term economic success of ATP projects.  One NIST
measure is "straightforward tracking of technical milestones."
However, we found that achieving technical milestones may not be a
valid indicator of the economic success of ATP projects because
achieving technical milestones does not always lead to economic
success.  For example, earlier versions of the ATP evaluation plan
pointed to one ATP project that was achieving all of its technical
milestones as evidence of the project's likely success in stimulating
economic growth.  However, the lead company involved in this joint
venture went bankrupt before the project was completed.  Although the
other company in the joint venture has stated its intention to
continue the joint venture commercialization plan, the lead company's
bankruptcy reduces the likelihood of future economic benefits being
realized from this ATP project. 


--------------------
\8 See Performance Measurement:  Efforts to Evaluate the Advanced
Technology Program (GAO/RCED-95-68, May 15, 1995). 


      THE CHALLENGE TO MEASURING
      SCIENCE PROGRAMS' OUTCOMES
------------------------------------------------ Chapter Statement:2.1

The tendency to focus on what is relatively easy to measure may be
particularly strong for science agencies because the selection and
use of performance measures have presented a longstanding challenge
for such agencies, especially for those that support fundamental
scientific research.\9 In particular, assessing the outcomes of
science-related projects can be extremely difficult because a wide
range of factors determine if and how a particular R&D project will
result in commercial or other benefits.  It can also take many years
between when a research project is undertaken and when the outcome
occurs.  For example, the National Institutes of Health and other
federal institutions support research at universities by investing in
(1) the development of principal investigators, who work at the
forefront of scientific and engineering research and (2) the training
of new PhDs and other professionals.  Hence, these people are
"products" of the research projects the agencies support.  However,
the outcomes--in terms of scientific contributions--produced by these
individuals as a result of the federal agencies' investments in their
development and training frequently extend well beyond a specific
federally funded research project and can be exceedingly difficult to
measure. 

Determining the specific outcomes resulting from federal R&D has been
a challenge that will not be easily resolved.  Due to the
difficulties in identifying outcomes, R&D agencies typically have
chosen to measure a variety of proxies for outcomes, such as the
number of patents resulting from the federally funded research,
expert review and judgments of the quality and importance of research
findings, the number of project-related publications or citations,
and contributions to expanding the number of research scientists. 

To help address the challenges of measuring the results of R&D
programs, the Research Roundtable, a consortium of federal agency
representatives, has been meeting periodically to share ideas and
approaches for implementing GPRA.  The Roundtable has been
considering the extent to which R&D agencies can and should adopt a
common approach to measuring performance.  It is still too early to
tell whether this group will define and recommend a common model to
meet the performance requirements under GPRA.  Nonetheless, the
Roundtable's efforts are promising in that they show that officials
in science agencies recognize the performance measurement challenges
they confront and are working collectively to address those
challenges.  Congress can support the Roundtable's efforts by working
with it to ensure that congressional data needs are met by any common
performance measurement model that the Roundtable may recommend. 

GPRA recognizes how difficult it is to state the goals and measure
the results of some programs.  While the law encourages the use of
objective measures of performance, it authorizes agencies--with the
approval of OMB--to use alternative, subjective measures of
performance.  Congress expects that one form of alternative
measurement will be to define the characteristics of a marginally
effective program and a fully successful program and to assess
progress against those definitions.  NSF is seeking OMB approval to
use an alternative format for articulating its performance goals
under GPRA.  This request, and any additional ones, to employ an
alternative form of measurement may become an important indicator of
the difficulty of fully achieving GPRA's design in science programs. 


--------------------
\9 Assessing the Output of Federal Commercially Directed R&D
(GAO/PAD-79-69 Aug.  27, 1979). 


   STEP 3:  USE PERFORMANCE
   INFORMATION
-------------------------------------------------- Chapter Statement:3

As to be expected during the initial efforts of such a challenging
management reform effort as GPRA, most agencies, including science
agencies, are still struggling to integrate the mission-based
goal-setting and performance measurement requirements of GPRA into
their daily program operations.  This integration is important
because GPRA performance information is to be used to guide an array
of congressional and executive branch decisions. 

Consistent congressional interest at authorization, appropriation,
budget, and oversight hearings on the status of an agency's GPRA
efforts; the performance measures it is using; and how performance
information is being used to make decisions will send an unmistakable
message to agencies that Congress expects GPRA to be implemented as
conscientiously as possible.  Congressional hearings, such as the one
the Committee is holding today, are one key to showing agencies that
Congress is looking to use GPRA performance goals and information to
help inform its decisions and that it expects agencies to do the
same.  Moreover, congressional engagement in the strategic planning
efforts now under way in executive agencies provides an excellent
opportunity to clarify agencies' missions and goals and ensure that
the resulting performance information will meet congressional and
other decisionmakers' needs. 


------------------------------------------------ Chapter Statement:3.1

In summary, if successfully implemented in the science agencies, GPRA
should help the Committee make the difficult science policy and
program decisions confronting the nation.  It also will help science
agencies manage their programs and provide Congress and the American
people with better assurance that tax dollars are being wisely spent. 
But the changes in management and accountability envisioned by
Congress in passing GPRA are not coming quickly or easily,
particularly in science agencies.  The continued support and interest
of this Committee may well determine the degree to which GPRA is
successfully implemented in those agencies. 





RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 0

Executive Guide:  Effectively Implementing the Government Performance
and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996). 

Managing for Results:  Achieving GPRA's Objectives Requires Strong
Congressional Role (GAO/T-GGD-96-79, Mar.  6, 1996). 

Federal R&D Laboratories (GAO/RCED/NSIAD-96-78R, Feb.  29, 1996). 

GPRA Performance Reports (GAO/GGD-96-66R, Feb.  14, 1996). 

Office of Management and Budget:  Changes Resulting From the OMB 2000
Reorganization (GAO/GGD/AIMD-96-50, Dec.  29, 1995). 

Department of Energy:  A Framework For Restructuring DOE and Its
Missions (GAO/RCED-95-197, Aug.  21, 1995). 

Managing for Results:  Status of the Government Performance and
Results Act (GAO/T-GGD-95-193, June 27, 1995). 

Department of Energy:  Framework Is Needed to Reevaluate Its Role and
Missions (GAO/T-RCED-95-232, June 21, 1995). 

Managing for Results:  Critical Actions for Measuring Performance
(GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-187, June 20, 1995). 

Government Reorganization:  Issues and Principles
(GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166, May 17, 1995). 

Performance Measurement:  Efforts to Evaluate the Advanced Technology
Program (GAO/RCED-95-68, May 5, 1996). 

Managing for Results:  Experiences Abroad Suggest Insights for
Federal Management Reforms (GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2, 1995). 

Department of Energy:  Alternatives for Clearer Missions and Better
Management at the National Laboratories (GAO/T-RCED-95-128, Mar.  9,
1995). 

Department of Energy:  Research and Agency Missions Need Reevaluation
(GAO/T-RCED-95-105, Feb.  13, 1995). 

Department of Energy:  National Laboratories Need Mission Focus and
More Effective Departmental Management (GAO/RCED-95-10, Jan.  27,
1995). 

Department of Energy:  Need to Reevaluate Its Role and Missions
(GAO/T-RCED-95-85, Jan.  18, 1995). 

DOE's National Laboratories:  Adopting New Missions and Managing
Effectively Pose Significant Challenges (GAO/T-RCED-94-113, Feb.  3,
1994). 


*** End of document. ***