Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of
Executive Branch Officials (Testimony, 07/27/2000, GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177).

From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, 42 executive branch positions at 31
executive branch agencies--including all 14 Cabinet secretaries, four
deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly
heads of agencies)--had security protection. Personnel from 27 different
agencies protected them: 36 officials by their own agencies or
departments and six from other agencies or departments, such as the
Secret Service and the Marshals Service. Protective personnel increased
73 percent from fiscal year 1997 through 1999. Funding rose from $19.1
million in 1997 to $28.5 million in 1999, largely due to increased
travel. Only the Secret Service and State Department have specific
statutory authority to protect executive branch officials. Agencies
reported that their officials received different levels and frequency of
protection and that protection was needed to respond to possible and
actual threats. Most agencies favored establishing a repository of
protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information
about their officials. Also, agencies reported that their protective
personnel received different amounts of protection training and from
different sources. Field staff received less training than did the
agencies' full-time personnel based in Washington. Most agencies favored
establishing a standardized protection training program. Most agencies
opposed centralizing security protection under one agency. No single
agency or official is responsible for handling issues relating to
routine protection of executive branch officials. This fragmentation has
serious implications because 14 of the protected officials are in the
line of presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat
assessments documenting the level of protection needed makes it
difficult to determine the basis for and reasonableness of protection
being given. This testimony summarizes the July 2000 report,
GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD/OSI-00-177
     TITLE:  Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding
	     Protection of Executive Branch Officials
      DATE:  07/27/2000
   SUBJECT:  Public officials
	     Law enforcement personnel
	     Interagency relations
	     Standards and standardization

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T-GGD/OSI-00-177

United States General Accounting Office
GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice
Oversight, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
2:00 p.m., EDT
on Thursday
July 27, 2000
GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

SECURITY PROTECTION
Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of

Executive Branch Officials

Statement of Bernard L. Ungar

Director, Government Business Operations Issues

General Government Division

and

Robert H. Hast

Acting Assistant Comptroller General

for Special Investigations

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Security Protection:  Standardization Issues
Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Page 2                       GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177
Security protection for executive branch officials
is currently being conducted in a decentralized
fashion. Most agencies protect their own
officials, although some officials are protected
by other agencies, such as the U.S. Secret Service
and the U.S. Marshals Service. From fiscal years
1997 through 1999, agencies reported that security
protection was being provided for 42 positions at
31 executive branch agencies. To protect these
officials, agencies reported spending $19.1
million in fiscal year 1997, $26.1 million in
fiscal year 1998, and $28.5 million in fiscal year
1999-a 49-percent increase in those 3 years. They
also reported that the number of full-time
personnel employed to protect these officials
increased by 73 percent during that 3-year period.

Our review indicated that some of the government's
highest ranking officials were being protected by
personnel who said they did not have sufficient
access to protective intelligence and training. We
found that three-fourths of the agencies did not
have detailed, written threat assessments
justifying their decisions to protect officials.
Without assessments that link the level of threat
to the size of the protective force, it would be
difficult to determine whether the level of
protection provided and the amount of money spent
on protection were appropriate. Further, some
agencies said they lacked the legal authority to
make arrests and conduct threat investigations to
protect their officials. Some security officials
also raised questions about potential conflicts of
interest that could result from using protective
personnel from agencies' offices of inspectors
general. Most agencies opposed centralizing
security protection services under one agency. We
believe that additional sharing of protective
intelligence, establishing a standardized
protection training program, and providing
agencies with specific statutory authority to
provide protection could help enhance security
protection for top federal officials.

We also found that no single agency or official
was responsible for handling issues relating to
the routine protection of executive branch
officials. This fragmentation of protective
responsibilities among multiple executive branch
agencies has national security implications
regarding the functioning of government in part
because 14 of the protected officials are in the
line of presidential succession. We are
recommending that the OMB Director, in
consultation with the President, designate an
appropriate official or group to assess security
protection issues for top-level federal officials
and report its recommendations to Congress for
action. Once the OMB Director has submitted his
recommendations to Congress, Congress should
consider enacting legislation that would give
whatever agency or agencies that provide
protection the resources and specific statutory
authority needed to effectively carry out these
responsibilities.

Statement
Security Protection:  Standardization Issues
Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Page 6                       GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our
report entitled Security Protection:
Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of
Executive Branch Officials (GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139,
July 11, 2000). As you requested, this report
updates our December 1994 report in which we
reviewed security protection for officials at 10
of the 14 cabinet-level departments.1 You asked
that we expand our 1994 report by addressing
standardization and centralization issues
regarding security protection. In addition, as
agreed with the Subcommittee, this report includes
data on the protection of all civilian executive
branch officials except the President, Vice
President, Central Intelligence Agency officials,
and U.S. ambassadors to foreign countries.

Our report contains information from agency
security officials and protected officials on the
following questions pertaining to fiscal years
1997 through 1999: (1) How many federal government
officials were protected, who protected them, and
how many security personnel protected them? (2)
How much did it cost to protect these officials?
(3) Under what legal authorities were agencies
providing security protection? (4) Under what
circumstances were officials protected? (5) How
were agencies preparing threat assessments, and
what are the implications of standardizing and
centralizing threat assessments? (6) What training
did protective personnel receive, and what are the
implications of standardizing and centralizing
security protection training? (7) What are the
implications of centralizing protection services
under one agency? and (8) What are the views of
the protected officials regarding the need for and
adequacy of their protection?

We collected this information by asking security
officials from the 27 agencies that provided the
protection to complete detailed questionnaires on
these issues, reviewing documents, and visiting
protection training facilities. We also sent
letters directly to officials who were protected
from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 requesting
their views on their protection and on security
standardization issues. Although we asked agencies
for the bases of their decisions to protect
officials, we did not independently assess whether
particular officials should be protected or
whether the level of protection being provided and
resources being expended were appropriate.

Due to the sensitive nature of this information,
we agreed to respond in two reports. The report we
are discussing today addresses all eight questions
by providing aggregate data. It does not provide
information by agency or identify specific
protected officials. A separate, classified report
addressed to you on May 31, 2000, provided
specific information on the security provided by
position held and agency.

Findings
From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, agency
security officials said that security protection
was provided to officials holding 42 positions at
31 executive branch agencies. These officials
included all 14 cabinet secretaries, 4 deputy or
under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking
officials (mainly heads of agencies). The 42
officials were protected by personnel from 27
different agencies. Thirty-six officials were
protected by personnel from their own agencies or
departments, and 6 officials were protected by
personnel from other agencies or departments, such
as the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Marshals
Service.

Agencies reported that the number of full-time
protective personnel increased by 73 percent in
fiscal years 1997 through 1999. The 27 agencies
also reported spending a total of at least $73.7
million to protect the officials holding the 42
positions during that 3-year period. The agencies
reported that they spent $19.1 million in fiscal
year 1997, $26.1 million in fiscal year 1998, and
$28.5 million in fiscal year 1999-a 49-percent
increase in 3 years. The agencies with the largest
increases in costs and full-time protective
personnel during those 3 years generally said that
these increases were the result of increased
travel by the protected officials and the
provision of enhanced security to respond to
potential terrorist threats.

We did not find that historically, top appointed
federal officials have been frequent victims of
harm. However, security officials stressed that
effective security protection serves as a
deterrent to harm. In addition, agencies reported
receiving 134 direct threats (threat of direct
physical harm, kidnapping, extortion, etc.)
against their officials in fiscal years 1997
through 1999. Moreover, research on threat
assessments suggests that top appointed federal
officials may be vulnerable to attack. According
to a 1998 study conducted by the Secret Service,
many attackers and would-be attackers considered
more than one target before attacking. This
finding has implications for high-ranking
government officials, who may become targets of
attack by potentially dangerous individuals who
shift their focus from one government official to
another.

Legal Authorities
Only two agencies-the Secret Service and the State
Department-had specific statutory authority to
protect executive branch officials. The other
agencies relied on a variety of other authorities
in providing protection to officials, such as
having their protective personnel deputized by the
U.S. Marshals Service to provide them with law
enforcement authority. When agencies provide
protection to their officials without specific
statutory authority to do so, potential problems
can arise, particularly with respect to whether
their protective personnel have the necessary law
enforcement authorities to make arrests, conduct
investigations, and use force. The military
agencies in our review, for example, indicated
that their protective personnel had the authority
to arrest military personnel, but not civilians,
and that they had only the authority to detain
civilians who constitute an immediate threat to
the safety of a protected official. Eight agencies
also said that they did not have the authority to
investigate threats made against their protected
officials and referred threats for investigation
to other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

The primary protective personnel employed at 11
agencies, including 2 offices of inspectors
general, were deputized as U.S. Marshals to
provide them with needed law enforcement
authorities. The Marshals Service indicated that
it may not renew these deputations after January
1, 2001, to highlight the need for Congress to
provide agencies' offices of inspectors general
with their own statutory authority to provide
protection. Further, the Marshals Service said
that if Congress does not provide statutory
authority to those agencies by January 2001, it
might be appropriate for the Marshals Service to
assume those agencies' protective responsibilities
at that time.

Protective personnel at three agencies were
employed by offices of inspectors general. Some
security officials expressed a concern that using
personnel from agencies' offices of inspectors
general could represent a potential conflict of
interest. They said that if offices of inspectors
general were investigating officials whom they
were also protecting, it could result in an
atmosphere of distrust between the protective
personnel and the officials. A March 2000
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
opinion raised similar concerns. However,
officials at the agencies that employed protective
personnel in offices of inspectors general
disagreed, saying that potential conflicts of
interest were avoided by separating the
investigative and protective responsibilities
within their offices.

Threat Assessments
Agencies reported that their officials received
different levels and frequencies of protection and
that protection was needed to respond to possible
and actual threats. According to agencies with
security protection as one of their primary
missions (the Secret Service, the Marshals
Service, and the State Department's Diplomatic
Security Service), threat assessments form the
basis for determining the need and scope of
protection. The agencies with security protection
as one of their primary missions, and most of the
Department of Defense agencies, had prepared
detailed, written threat assessments regarding
their protected officials. However, nearly three-
fourths of the agencies that provided protection
said they had not prepared detailed, written
threat analyses justifying their decisions to
apply certain levels of protection and expend
resources. In addition, the seven agencies that
had written threat assessments did not detail how
decisions were made regarding the size of the
protective force needed. Without assessments that
link the level of threat to the size of the
protective force, it would be difficult to
determine whether the level of protection provided
and the amount of money spent on protection were
appropriate.

Security personnel generally reported that their
ability to prepare threat assessments depended in
part on their access to information from other
agencies about potential and actual threats
against their officials. Such information is known
as protective intelligence.2 Three agencies cited
specific examples of instances when they had been
unable to obtain timely protective intelligence
from another agency about potential threats
against their officials.

With regard to standardizing threat assessments,
it is uncertain how agencies could obtain the
protective intelligence they need from
governmentwide sources in order to prepare the
assessments and who would prepare them. Most
agencies favored establishing a central repository
of protective intelligence to facilitate the
sharing of threat information about their
officials. Security officials said that
establishing a central repository of protective
intelligence to facilitate the sharing of such
information among agencies would involve
determining who should administer the repository,
how it would operate, whether specific statutory
authority would be needed, and the cost of
establishing and administering it. The agencies
that favored establishing a central repository of
protective intelligence said that it could provide
a formal mechanism for sharing threat data, which
could give agencies additional information about
threats against their officials and individuals in
their presence. Of the agencies that favored the
establishment of a central protective intelligence
repository, most favored having the Secret Service
administer it. Some security officials who opposed
the central repository feared that it could result
in the creation of a new bureaucracy and that
valuable information could be overlooked, and
questioned whether all agencies would share
protective intelligence, given certain legal
restrictions on the disclosure of information
regarding their clients.

Protection Training
The agencies in our review reported that their
protective personnel received different amounts of
protection training and from different sources.
Generally, protective personnel from the agencies
with security protection as one of their primary
missions reported having more training than those
employed by the other agencies. The agencies with
security protection as one of their primary
missions reported that their training consisted of
instruction in firearms; threat assessments;
emergency medical training; practical protection
exercises; security advance, motorcade, airport,
and foreign travel procedures; defensive driving
skills; defensive tactics; and legal authorities.
Further, several agencies reported that their
field staff who provided protection as part of
their collateral duties received less protection
training than the agencies' full-time protective
personnel based in Washington, D.C., or that their
field staff had received no protection training.
Six agencies said they had difficulty obtaining
protection training for their personnel because of
class availability, funding, or workload problems.

With regard to standardizing training for
protective personnel, what subjects the training
should include, what agency should provide the
training, and the cost would need to be
considered. Most agencies favored establishing a
standardized protection training program so that
different agencies' protective personnel would be
trained in the same procedures and would react in
a similar manner in case of an emergency. Further,
most of the agencies that favored a standardized
protection training program said that it should be
conducted by the Secret Service. The agencies that
did not favor standardized training said that
training was important, but that they preferred to
conduct their own training tailored to address
their own needs and unique environments.

Centralizing Security Protection Services
The issue of centralizing security protection
governmentwide has many implications, including
who would decide who is to be protected and the
level of protection to be provided; who would
provide the services; whether Congress would need
to grant statutory authorities; and whether
centralization would be a more cost-efficient and
effective way of providing these services than the
current decentralized approach. Security officials
at most of the agencies in our review said that
they opposed centralizing security protection
under one agency. They said it was more effective
to use protective personnel who were employed by
the officials' own agencies because such personnel
were more knowledgeable about the agencies'
culture and operations. Further, some agencies
said that they would lose a measure of control
over the protection of their officials if the
responsibility were transferred to a single
agency, and also questioned how resources would be
allocated for protecting officials.

The Marshals Service was the only agency that
favored centralizing security protection services.
The Marshals Service said that it was interested
in assuming responsibility for protecting agency
officials, provided that it received the needed
resources to accomplish this. In addition, the
Marshals Service said that it could use well-
trained personnel who would operate in a
consistent and coordinated fashion governmentwide
and could provide certain economies of scale in
terms of resources and equipment. We were unable
to determine how the costs of protection would be
affected if a single agency protected agency heads
because of the number of variables involved, such
as the threat levels against different protected
officials and the officials' preferences regarding
their protection.

The Secret Service said it was not currently
interested in assuming responsibility for
protecting all agency heads. An official in charge
of protection at the State Department said that
the State Department might be interested in
protecting cabinet secretaries if it received the
necessary resources, and that agencies might be
more comfortable with having the Diplomatic
Security Service protect their officials, compared
to a traditional law enforcement agency.

We contacted protected officials in our review to
ask them for their views about their protection
and about security protection standardization
issues. Those officials who responded to our
queries (or their immediate, nonsecurity staff)
generally said that they were satisfied with their
protection and would like to continue with the
current arrangements. Most of the protected
officials, or their top aides, said that the
individuals holding such positions automatically
should receive security protection because of
their visibility and the types of issues that they
handled.

Action Needed to Address Issues
The safety of the government's highest ranking
officials is important to maintain the orderly
functioning of government. Individuals serving in
the government's highest offices can be vulnerable
to threats from individuals who are opposed to
their agencies' policies and actions or are
emotionally unstable, and terrorists. At the same
time, protection for federal officials should be
based on thorough threat assessments using
protective intelligence from governmentwide
sources and documenting the need and plan for
protection. Threat assessments should also show
linkages between identified threats and the nature
and level of protection to be provided.

Our review indicated that some of the government's
highest officials were being protected by
personnel who said they did not have sufficient
access to protective intelligence and protection
training. Further, some agencies said they lacked
the legal authority to make arrests and conduct
threat investigations to protect their officials.
Additional sharing of protective intelligence,
establishing a standardized protection training
program, and providing agencies with specific
statutory authority to provide protection could
help enhance security protection for top federal
officials.

We also found that no single agency or official
was responsible for handling issues relating to
the routine protection of executive branch
officials. This fragmentation of protective
responsibilities among multiple executive branch
agencies has implications regarding the
functioning of government in part because 14 of
the protected officials are in the line of
presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of
thorough threat assessments documenting the level
of protection needed makes it difficult to
determine the basis for and reasonableness of the
protection being given, especially considering the
growth in the costs of protection in recent years.

Recommendations
We recommended in our recent report that the OMB
Director, in consultation with the President,
designate an appropriate official or group to
assess security protection issues for top-level
federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment
should include such issues as

ï¿½    how agencies can best obtain protective
intelligence from governmentwide sources needed to
prepare thorough threat assessments, including an
assessment of whether a central protective
intelligence repository should be established and,
if so, who should administer it;

ï¿½    how best to ensure that a clear linkage
exists between the documented threat assessments
and the need for and level of protection for the
routine protection of top executive branch
officials;
ï¿½    what training should be provided to federal
protective personnel, to what extent the training
should be standardized, and who should provide it;
ï¿½    whether security protection should be
centralized under one agency or, if not, whether
any changes in the way protection is currently
being provided should be made;
ï¿½    whether agencies and/or offices of inspectors
general should be provided with specific statutory
authority to provide protection, and whether the
Marshals Service should continue to renew its
deputation of agencies' protective personnel;
ï¿½    whether the administration should adopt a
policy regarding the routine protection of top
executive branch officials; and
ï¿½    whether an official or group should be
designated to oversee security protection issues
for top executive branch officials on an ongoing
basis.
To ensure that the benefits of this assessment are
realized, we further recommended that the
individual or group conducting the assessment
produce an action plan that identifies any issues
requiring congressional action. We also
recommended that this official or group report its
findings to the OMB Director and that the Director
report his recommendations on these subjects to
Congress.

Matters for Congressional Consideration
Once the OMB Director has submitted his
recommendations to Congress, we suggested that
Congress consider enacting legislation that would
give whatever agency or agencies that provide
protection specific statutory authority to
effectively carry out these responsibilities. In
addition, should it be determined that centralized
protection training, threat assessment, or
protection services are appropriate, we suggested
that Congress consider making the needed resources
available to the appropriate agency or agencies
that are designated to provide these services and
should make any needed legislative changes.

Agency Comments
Fifteen agencies, including OMB, provided comments
on a draft of our July 11 report. The agencies
generally agreed with our findings, conclusions,
and recommendations. In particular, OMB agreed to
conduct the assessment of security protection
issues we recommended, provided that it receive
sufficient resources and time to accomplish this.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared
statement. We would be pleased to answer any
questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.

Contacts And Acknowledgement
For further information regarding this testimony,
please contact Bernard L. Ungar, Director,
Government Business Operations Issues, on (202)
512-8387, or Robert H. Hast, Acting Assistant
Comptroller General for Special Investigations, on
(202) 512-7455. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony included Robert
Homan, Thomas Wiley, and Patrick Sullivan.

_______________________________
1 Security Protection: Costs of Services Provided
for Selected Cabinet Officials (GAO/GGD-95-50,
Dec. 30, 1994).
2 A Secret Service official defined protective
intelligence as the programs and efforts that seek
to identify, assess, and manage persons and/or
groups who make or pose threats to public
officials.
*** End of document ***