Regulatory Reform: Procedural and Analytical Requirements in Federal
Rulemaking (Testimony, 06/08/2000, GAO/T-GGD/OGC-00-157).

This testimony discusses reviews GAO has undertaken of agency compliance
with procedural and analytical requirements in federal rulemaking. GAO's
evaluations paint a mixed picture. Although its findings may not be
representative of all rulemakings, in some cases, GAO found inadequate
data, methodologies, or assumptions. In other cases, GAO found
noncompliance with statutory requirements or executive orders. Some GAO
reviews have helped to ensure better adherence to regulatory
requirements. On the other hand, GAO's reviews sometimes did not
disclose a failure to comply with rulemaking requirements but provided
Congress with factual detail and a better understanding of the agencies'
procedures and decision making. Other reviews established that the
agencies were acting within allowable discretion to determine that some
requirements were inapplicable or that the requirements themselves were
narrowly tailored and had little effect on rulemaking. GAO also found
instances in which regulations considered burdensome by the regulated
community were required by the statute being implemented.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD/OGC-00-157
     TITLE:  Regulatory Reform: Procedural and Analytical Requirements
	     in Federal Rulemaking
      DATE:  06/08/2000
   SUBJECT:  Cost effectiveness analysis
	     Proposed legislation
	     Regulatory agencies
	     Agency proceedings
	     Reporting requirements
	     Federal regulations
	     Economic analysis

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T-GGD/OGC-00-157

United States General Accounting Office
GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and
Paperwork Reduction, Committee on Small Business
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m., EDT
on Thursday
June 8, 2000
GAO/T-GGD/OGC-00-157

REGULATORY REFORM
Procedural and Analytical Requirements in

Federal Rulemaking

Statement of Robert P. Murphy, General Counsel

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Statement
Regulatory Reform:  Procedural and Analytical
Requirements in Federal Rulemaking
Page 6                       GAO/T-GGD/OGC-00-157
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our
reviews of agency compliance with a number of
procedural and analytical requirements in federal
rulemaking.  The reviews were conducted in
response to congressional concerns that agencies
had not adequately considered the effects of their
actions on regulated entities or worked to
minimize any negative effects. The requirements
that we examined are contained in a number of
statutes and executive orders governing the
rulemaking process, including the Administrative
Procedures Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and Executive
Orders 12866 and 12612.

In brief, our congressionally requested
evaluations have produced a mixed result.  While
they may not have been representative of all
rulemakings, in some cases our work disclosed
inadequate data, methodologies, or assumptions,
and in other disclosed noncompliance with
statutory requirements or executive orders.  There
are examples in which our reviews have helped
ensure better adherence to applicable regulatory
requirements.  On the other hand, sometimes our
reviews did not disclose a failure to comply with
rulemaking requirements, but provided Congress
with factual detail and a better understanding of
the agencies' procedures and decision making.  In
others cases, our reviews established that the
agencies were acting within allowable discretion
to determine that certain requirements were
inapplicable, and in others, that the requirements
themselves were narrowly tailored and had little
effect on rulemaking.  We also found cases where
regulations that were considered burdensome by the
regulated community were required by the statute
being implemented.

Congressional Oversight Can Address Some
Regulatory Concerns
     Some of our work on regulatory issues has
clearly demonstrated the value of congressional
oversight of agency rulemaking.  Congressional
oversight can clarify issues left unclear in
agencies' public statements about their rules and,
on occasion, can directly result in changes to
agencies' rules.  The targets of that oversight
can vary substantially-from the particular (and
sometimes highly technical) elements of agencies'
economic analyses used to support the rules, to
the general public participation requirements in
the rulemaking process.

Reviews Indicate Some Agency Economic Analyses
Need Improvement
     A great deal of congressional attention and
concern has recently been focused on the economic
analyses that agencies prepare in support of their
regulatory actions.  Under Executive Order 12866,
issued by President Clinton in September 1993,
covered agencies are required to submit their
"significant" rules to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) before publishing them in the
Federal Register.  Agencies are also required to
prepare a detailed economic analysis for any
regulatory actions that are "economically
significant" (e.g., have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more).1  According to
the executive order, the analyses should include
an assessment of the costs and benefits
anticipated from the action as well as the costs
and benefits of "potentially effective and
reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned
regulation."  The order also states that, in
choosing among alternatives, an agency should
select those approaches that maximize net benefits
and "base its decisions on the best reasonably
obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and
other information concerning the need for, and
consequences of, the intended regulation."

     In January 1996, OMB issued "best practices"
guidance on preparing cost-benefit analyses under
the order.  The guidance gives agencies
substantial flexibility regarding how the analyses
should be prepared, but also indicates that the
analyses should contain certain basic elements and
should be "transparent"-disclosing how the study
was conducted, what assumptions were used, and the
implications of plausible alternative assumptions.

     At the request of Members of Congress, we
have examined agencies' economic analyses both in
our reviews of selected federal rules issued by
multiple agencies and in the context of particular
regulatory actions.  In one of our reviews, we
reported that some of the 20 economic analyses
from 5 agencies that we reviewed did not
incorporate all of the best practices set forth in
OMB's guidance.2  Five of the analyses did not
discuss alternatives to the proposed regulatory
action, and, in many cases, it was not clear why
the agencies used certain assumptions.  Also, five
of the analyses did not discuss uncertainty
associated with the agencies' estimates of
benefits and/or costs, and did not document the
agencies' reasons for not doing so.  We
recommended that OMB's best practices guidance be
amended to provide that economic analyses should
(1) address all of the best practices or state the
agency's reason for not doing so, (2) contain an
executive summary, and (3) undergo an appropriate
level of internal or external peer review by
independent experts.

Oversight of Analyses Can Result in Changes to
Rules
     In some cases, our congressionally-requested
reviews of agencies' regulatory analyses have
resulted in changes to the associated rules.  For
example, we reported last year on the scientific
basis for the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)
proposed rule on dietary supplements containing
ephedrine alkaloids and the agency's adherence to
statutory and executive order regulatory analysis
requirements.3  Although the number and type of
adverse event reports that FDA received warranted
the agency's consideration of steps to address
safety issues, we expressed concerns about the
strength of some of the information FDA used to
support two aspects of the proposed rule-the
dosing level and duration of use limits.  We
concluded that FDA generally complied with the
statutory and executive order requirements
applicable to the rulemaking, but the economic
analysis that accompanied the rule did not reflect
the full range of uncertainty associated with the
proposed rule.  The agency did not always disclose
why certain key assumptions were made or the
degree of uncertainty involved in those
assumptions.  It also did not disclose that
alternative assumptions would have had a dramatic
effect on the agency's estimate of the benefits of
the proposed actions.  We recommended that FDA
obtain additional information to support
conclusions regarding the specific elements in the
proposed rule before proceeding to final
rulemaking.  We also recommended that FDA improve
the transparency of its cost-benefit analysis in
its final rule.  In April 2000, FDA announced that
it was withdrawing certain portions of its
proposed rule "because of concerns regarding the
agency's basis for proposing a certain dietary
ingredient level and a duration of use limit for
these products."4

     In a review that we released earlier this
year, we reported on the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's (FEMA) plans to revise its
regulations pertaining to public assistance
insurance requirements.5  Although the rule was
economically significant, FEMA had not conducted
an analysis of the expected costs and benefits of
the draft regulation before submitting it to OMB
for its review, and had not prepared a
comprehensive analysis of other alternatives.  In
response to our preliminary discussions with FEMA
about these issues, FEMA entered into a contract
with a management consulting firm to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis and to examine and assess
alternative approaches.  FEMA also began
additional analysis of the impact of its draft
regulations on small entities in response to OMB's
concerns about FEMA's compliance with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act.  Finally, FEMA decided
to issue an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
before issuing the proposed rule.

     In some cases, we are asked to review and
comment on agencies' rulemaking approaches without
specific reference to Executive Order 12866.  For
example, in response to a requirement in the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, we issued a report in
February 1998 evaluating a Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) proposed rule describing
revisions to fee schedules used to pay physicians
in the Medicare program.6  We concluded that the
methodology that HCFA used to develop the fee
schedules was generally acceptable, but needed
some modifications. In June 1998, HCFA published
its revised proposal, and published its final rule
in November 1998.  Several Members of Congress
then asked us to monitor and report on HCFA's new
methodology.  In a report issued last year, we
concluded that the new methodology was an
acceptable approach, and that it responded to
several concerns we had with the agency's original
approach.7  Nevertheless, we said that certain
questions about the data and methodology needed to
be addressed before full implementation.  We
recommended that the Administrator of HCFA take
several actions to address our concerns.

Oversight of Analyses Can Clarify Agencies'
Actions, Answer Questions
     Some of our reviews of agencies' specific
regulatory analyses have clarified how the
associated rules were developed or answered other
questions posed by congressional requesters, but
did not conclude that the agencies actions were
deficient.  These kinds of information-gathering
efforts are often crucial to ensure that Congress
and the public understand how regulations are
developed, and the strength of the data,
methodology, and assumptions that underlie the
rules.  For example, in January 1998, we reported
on our review of the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) final rule that limited sulfur
dioxide emissions from the Navajo Generating
Station by approximately 90 percent.8
Specifically, we discussed the effect of changes
between the proposed and final rule on emissions
reductions and associated costs, how the agency
determined the expected level of visibility
improvements, and how the agency estimated the
monetary value of those improvements.

     In January 1999, we explained why there were
significant differences between EPA's and the
industry's cost estimates of EPA's proposed
pretreatment standards for industrial laundries.9
We also discussed how EPA estimated the benefits
of the proposed rule, uncertainties associated
with the accuracy of its estimates, and how EPA's
analysis supported the agency's belief that it had
chosen the least costly, most cost-effective, or
least burdensome regulatory alternative.

Agency Explanations for Use of the APA's "Good
Cause" Exception Were Sometimes Unclear
     The most long-standing and broadly applicable
federal rulemaking requirements are in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946.  Among
other things, the APA generally requires that
agencies publish a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) in the Federal Register.  After giving
"interested persons" an opportunity to comment on
the proposed rule, and after considering the
public comments, the agency may then publish the
final rule.  However, the APA says that the notice
and comment procedures generally do not apply when
an agency finds, for "good cause," that those
procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest." 10   When
agencies use the good cause exception, the act
requires that they explicitly say so and provide a
rationale for the exception's use when the rule is
published in the Federal Register.

In August 1998, we reported that about half of the
4,658 final regulatory actions published in the
Federal Register during 1997 were issued without
NPRMs.11 Although most of the final actions without
NPRMs appeared to involve administrative or
technical issues with limited applicability, some
were significant actions, and 11 were economically
significant.  Some of the explanations that the
agencies offered in the preambles to their rules
for using the good cause exception were not clear.
For example, in several cases, the preambles said
that an NPRM was  "impracticable" because of
statutory or other deadlines that had already
passed by the time the rules were issued.  In
other cases, the agencies asserted in the
preambles that notice and comment would delay
rules that were, in some general way, in the
"public interest."  For example, in one such case,
the agency said it was using the good cause
exception because the rule would "facilitate
tourist and business travel to and from Slovenia,"
and therefore delaying the rule to allow for
public comments "would be contrary to the public
interest."  In another case, the agency said that
soliciting public comments on the rule was
"contrary to the public interest" because the rule
authorized a "new and creative method of financing
the development of public housing."

     When agencies publish final rules without
NPRMs, the public's ability to participate in the
rulemaking process is limited.  Also, several of
the regulatory reform requirements that Congress
has enacted during the past 20 years use as their
trigger the publication of an NPRM.  Therefore, it
is important that agencies clearly explain why
notice and comment procedures are not followed.
We recommended in our report that OMB notify
executive departments and agencies that (1) their
explanations in the preambles to their rules
should clearly explain why notice and comment was
impracticable, unnecessary, or not in the public
interest, and (2) that OMB would, as part of its
review of significant final rules, focus on those
explanations.

Compliance With Congressional Review Act
Requirements Has Been Inconsistent
     We have also had an effect on agencies'
rulemaking actions as a result of our
responsibilities under the Congressional Review
Act (CRA).  For example, under the CRA, before a
final rule can become effective it must be filed
with the Congress and GAO.  However, in 1998, we
reported that several hundred final rules had been
published in the Federal Register but had not been
submitted to us.  We then worked with the agencies
and OMB to correct the situation, and now
virtually all of the rules that should have been
submitted are being filed.

     A related problem has been determining
whether certain documents constitute "rules" that
must be submitted in accordance with the CRA.  For
example, in one case, EPA claimed that its interim
guidance for investigating complaints under title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not a
"rule," and therefore did not have to be submitted
to the Congress and GAO before it could become
effective.  We concluded that the document was a
rule because it clearly affected the rights of
nonagency parties, and therefore had to be
submitted pursuant to the CRA's requirements.

     Another problem related to the CRA has been
the failure of some agencies to delay the
effective dates of their major rules for 60 days
as required by section 801(a)(3)(A) of the Act.
Agencies were not budgeting enough time into their
regulatory timetable to allow for the delay and
were misinterpreting the "good cause" exception to
the 60-day delay period found in section 808(2) of
the Act.  We again worked with the agencies and,
as a result, agencies have been much less likely
to erroneously avoid the required 60-day delay.

Some Rulemaking Requirements Are Unspecific or
Apply to Few Rules
In each of the examples that I have cited, we were
able to compare the agencies' rulemaking actions
to statutory or executive order requirements and
determine whether the agencies' actions satisfied
the requirements. However, some of the concerns
that have been expressed about agencies'
compliance with rulemaking requirements appear
traceable to the requirements themselves.  Some
are not specific, giving the agencies broad
discretion to determine whether the mandated
actions are applicable to their rules.  Other
requirements apply to few rules and/or require
little new analysis for the rules to which they
are applicable.

Regulatory Flexibility Requirements Need
Clarification
     The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980,
enacted in response to concerns about the effect
that federal regulations can have on small
entities, is an example of a broadly-based
rulemaking requirement. Under the RFA, an agency
must prepare an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis at the time proposed rules are issued
unless the head of the agency determines that the
proposed rule would not have a "significant
economic impact upon a substantial number of small
entities."  The act also requires agencies to
ensure that small entities have an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking process, and
requires the Chief Counsel of the Small Business
Administration's (SBA) Office of Advocacy to
monitor agencies' compliance with the Act.  The
RFA was amended in 1996 by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act to, among
other things, require that EPA and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
convene advocacy review panels before publishing
an initial regulatory flexibility analysis.

     We have reported on the implementation of the
RFA on several occasions in the past, and a
recurring theme in our reports is the varying
interpretation of the RFA's requirements by
federal agencies.  For example, in 1991, we
reported that each of the four federal agencies
that we reviewed had a different interpretation of
key RFA provisions.12  The report pointed out that
the RFA provided neither a mechanism to enforce
compliance with the act nor guidance on
implementing it. We recommended that Congress
consider amending the RFA to require that SBA
develop criteria for whether and how federal
agencies should conduct RFA analyses.

     In 1994 we examined the 12 SBA annual reports
on agencies' RFA compliance that had been issued
since 1980.13  The reports indicated that agencies'
compliance with the RFA varied widely from one
agency to another, and that some agencies'
compliance varied over time.  We noted that the
RFA does not expressly authorize SBA to interpret
key provisions of the statute, and does not
require SBA to develop criteria for agencies to
follow in reviewing their rules.  As a result,
different rulemaking agencies were interpreting
the statute differently.  We said that if Congress
wanted to strengthen the implementation of the RFA
it should consider amending the act to provide SBA
with clearer authority and responsibility to
interpret the RFA's provisions and require SBA to
develop criteria on whether and how agencies
should conduct RFA analyses.

     We essentially repeated this recommendation
in our 1998 report on the implementation of the
small business advocacy review panel requirements,
noting that Congress should provide SBA or another
entity with interpretive authority and
responsibility.14  We said that the lack of clarity
regarding whether EPA should have convened review
panels for its two proposed rules on ozone and
particulate matter was traceable to the lack of
agreed-upon government criteria for whether a rule
has a "significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities" under the
RFA.  Similarly, we concluded in our 1999 report
on the review requirements in section 610 of the
RFA that the agencies we reviewed differed in
their in their interpretation of those review
requirements.15  We said that if Congress was
concerned about these varying interpretations it
might wish to consider clarifying those
provisions.

Federalism Executive Order Had Little Effect on
Rulemaking
     Executive Order 12612 on "Federalism," issued
by President Reagan in 1987, also gave federal
agencies broad discretion to determine its
applicability.  The executive order required the
head of each federal agency to designate an
official to be responsible for determining which
proposed policies (including regulations) had
"sufficient federalism implications" to warrant
preparation of a federalism assessment.  If the
designated official determined that such an
assessment was required, it had to accompany any
proposed or final rule submitted to OMB for
review.

     We examined the preambles of more than 11,000
final rules that federal agencies issued between
April 1996 and December 1998 to determine how
often they mentioned the executive order and how
often the agencies indicated that they had
prepared a federalism assessment.16  Our work
indicated that Executive Order 12612 had
relatively little visible effect on federal
agencies' rulemaking actions during this time
frame.  The preambles to only 5 of the more than
11,000 rules indicated that the agencies had
conducted a federalism assessment.

     Most of these rules were technical or
administrative in nature, but 117 were
economically significant rules.  However, the
agencies prepared a federalism assessment for only
one of these economically significant rules.  The
lack of assessments for these rules is
particularly surprising given that the agencies
had previously indicated that 37 of the rules
would affect state and local governments, and said
that 21 of them would preempt state and local laws
in the event of a conflict.

     Federal agencies had broad discretion under
Executive Order 12612 to determine whether a
proposed policy has "sufficient" federalism
implications to warrant the preparation of a
federalism assessment.  Some agencies have clearly
used that discretion, to establish an extremely
high threshold.  For example, in order for an EPA
rule to require a federalism assessment, the
agency's guidance said that the rule must, among
other things, have an "institutional" effect on
the states (not just a financial effect), and
affect all or most of the states in a direct,
causal manner.  Under these standards, an EPA
regulation that has a substantial financial effect
on all states, but does not affect the
"institutional" role of the states, would not
require a federalism assessment.

     Executive Order 12612 was revoked by
President Clinton's Executive Order 13132 on
"Federalism," which was issued August 4, 1999, and
took effect on November 2, 1999.  Like the old
executive order, the new order provides agencies
with substantial flexibility to determine which of
their actions have "federalism implications" and,
therefore, when they should prepare a "federalism
summary impact statement."

UMRA Had Little Effect on Rulemaking
     The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) is
another example of a regulatory requirement that
has had little effect on agency rulemaking.  For
example, title II of UMRA generally requires
covered federal agencies to prepare written
statements containing specific information for any
rule for which a proposed rule was published that
includes a federal mandate that may result in the
expenditure of $100 million or more in any 1 year
by state, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or the private sector.  The statute
defined a "mandate" as not including conditions
imposed as part of a voluntary federal program or
as a condition of federal assistance.

     We examined the implementation of title II of
UMRA during its first 2 years and concluded that
it appeared to have only limited direct impact on
agencies' rulemaking actions.17  Most of the
economically significant rules promulgated during
that period were not subject to the act's
requirements for a variety of reasons (e.g., no
proposed rule, or the mandates were a condition of
federal assistance or part of a voluntary
program).  There were only two rules without an
UMRA written statement that we believed should
have had one (EPA's proposed national ambient air
quality standards for ozone and particulate
matter), but even in those rules we believed that
the agency had satisfied the substantive UMRA
written statement requirements.  Also, title II
contains exemptions that allowed agencies not to
take certain actions if they determined that they
were duplicative or not "reasonably feasible."
The title also required agencies to take certain
actions that they already were required to take or
had completed or that were already under way.

Agencies Sometimes Have Little Rulemaking
Discretion
     In some cases, concerns expressed by
regulated entities about burdensome regulations
are traceable to the statutes underlying the
regulations, rather than a failure of the agency
to comply with rulemaking requirements.  For
example, in November and December 1996, we
reported what officials from 15 private sector
companies said were the federal regulations that
were most problematic for their businesses.18  Our
reports also listed responses from the 19 federal
agencies that issued the regulations underlying
the 125 company concerns.  In about one-quarter of
the cases, the agencies indicated that the
companies' concerns were, at least in part,
attributable to statutory requirements underlying
their regulations.

     We analyzed the particular statutes in
question and, in a January 1999 report, concluded
that the statutes underlying about half of the
concerns gave the rulemaking agencies no
discretion in establishing the regulatory
requirements at issue; the statutes underlying
most of the other concerns gave the agencies only
some discretion. 19  In cases where the underlying
statute is the source of regulatory burden,
regulatory reform initiatives focused on the
agencies (e.g., cost-benefit analysis
requirements) are unlikely to have much direct
effect on the burden that those agencies impose.

Congress Needs Assistance to Perform Regulatory
Oversight
     In summary, Madam Chairwoman, oversight alone
of the regulatory process cannot, as we have
learned, change agency behavior where the
underlying statutes and executive orders do not
clearly compel desired policies, procedures, or
results.  On the other hand, the examples of
agency regulations that we have reviewed also
demonstrate that congressional oversight can be an
effective approach to ensure that agencies' rules
are carefully developed and permit participation
by the public in the rulemaking process.  The
examples also illustrate the difficulties involved
in that endeavor.  Agencies' rules are often
highly technical, and the data, methodologies,
scientific studies, and economic analyses that
agencies use to develop those rules are frequently
voluminous and extremely difficult to understand.
The subject matter involved in these rules ranges
from the health effects of environmental and
occupational contaminants to the rates at which
physicians are paid in the Medicare program.
Therefore, it is not surprising that there are
proposals to establish an independent source of
analysis to evaluate agencies' development of
significant regulations.

     Although Congress could, theoretically, ask
the agencies themselves to provide the information
they need for oversight, the agencies are hardly
an unbiased source of information about their own
rules.  Although OMB reviews every significant
rule covered by Executive Order 12866 and has a
wealth of expertise on rulemaking issues, its
primary mission is to support the policies and
goals of the President.  As we said last year in
our analysis of OMB's reports on the costs and
benefits of all federal rules, OMB cannot
realistically be expected to alter or dispute the
administration's own estimates of regulatory costs
and benefits in a report to Congress.20

     Therefore, if Congress wants an independent
assessment of regulatory costs and benefits, it
should consider assigning that responsibility to
an organization outside of the executive branch.
As the examples that I previously cited
illustrate, Congress has, on an occasional basis,
requested that we perform that function.
Legislation that was recently passed by the
Senate, and other proposals introduced by you,
Madam Chairwoman, and others in the House, would
regularize that analytic responsibility.  While we
stand ready to assist Congress in carrying out its
oversight responsibility, our ability to
successfully do so will depend on (1) the scope of
the analysis contemplated, (2) the number of
requests that we receive, (3) the time allotted to
perform the reviews, and (4) the resources that we
are given to accomplish the tasks involved.  These
subjects are not strictly the focus of this
hearing, but we would be happy to meet with
Members and staff of the Subcommittee to discuss
this possible legislation.

                                                -
-     -     -     -     -

     Madam Chairwoman, this completes my prepared
statement.  I would be pleased to answer any
questions.

_______________________________
1Similar economic analysis requirements had
previously been in place under Executive Order
12291, issued by President Reagan in 1981.
2Regulatory Reform:  Agencies Could Improve
Development, Documentation, and Clarity of
Regulatory Economic Analyses (GAO/RCED-98-142, May
26, 1998).
3Dietary Supplements:  Uncertainties in Analyses
Underlying FDA's Proposed Rule on Ephedrine
Alkaloids (GAO/HEHS/GGD-99-90, July 2, 1999).
4Federal Register, Vol. 65, No. 64 (Apr. 3, 2000),
p. 17474.
5Disaster Assistance:  Issues Related to the
Development of FEMA's Insurance Requirements
(GAO/GGD/OGC-00-62, Feb. 25, 2000).
6Medicare:  HCFA Can Improve Methods for Revising
Physician Practice Expense Payments (GAO/HEHS-98-
79, Feb. 27, 1998).
7Medicare Physician Payments:  Need to Refine
Practice Expense Values During Transition and Long
Term (GAO/HEHS-99-30, Feb. 24, 1999).
8Air Pollution:  Estimated Benefits and Costs of
the Navajo Generating Station's Emissions Limits
(GAO/RCED-98-28, Jan. 27, 1998).
9Water Pollution:  Proposed Pretreatment Standards
for Industrial Laundries (GAO/RCED-99-42R, Jan.
20, 1999).
10The APA also provides exceptions to the NPRM
requirement for certain categories of regulatory
action (e.g., rules dealing with military or
foreign affairs).  It also says the notice and
comment procedures do not apply to interpretive
rules; general statements of policy; or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice.
11Federal Rulemaking:  Agencies Often Published
Final Actions Without Proposed Rules (GAO/GGD-98-
126, Aug. 31, 1998).
12Regulatory Flexibility Act:  Inherent Weaknesses
May Limit Its Usefulness for Small Governments
(GAO/HRD-91-16, Jan. 11, 1991).
13Regulatory Flexibility Act:  Status of Agencies'
Compliance (GAO/GGD-94-105, Apr. 27, 1994).
14Regulatory Reform:  Implementation of the Small
Business Advocacy Review Panel Requirements
(GAO/GGD-98-36, Mar. 18, 1998).
15Regulatory Flexibility Act:  Agencies'
Interpretations of Review Requirements Vary
(GAO/GGD-99-55, Apr. 2, 1999).
16Federalism:  Previous Initiatives Have Had Little
Effect on Agency Rulemaking (GAO/T-GGD-99-31, June
30, 1999).
17Unfunded Mandates:  Reform Act Has Had Little
Effect on Agencies' Rulemaking Actions (GAO/GGD-98-
30, Feb. 4, 1998).
18Regulatory Burden:  Measurement Challenges and
Concerns Raised by Selected Companies (GAO/GGD-97-
2, Nov. 18, 1996); and Regulatory Burden (GAO/GGD-
97-26R, Dec. 11, 1996).
19Regulatory Burden:  Some Agencies' Claims
Regarding Lack of Rulemaking Discretion Have Merit
(GAO/GGD-99-20, Jan. 8, 1999).
20Regulatory Accounting:  Analysis of OMB's Reports
on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation
(GAO/GGD-99-59, Apr. 20, 1999).
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