International Monetary Fund: Lending Policies (Testimony, 06/22/99,
GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), focusing on the: (1) conditions the IMF negotiates
with its borrower countries; and (2) trade policies of borrower
countries.

GAO noted that: (1) the IMF has a process for establishing and
monitoring financial arrangements with member countries and it generally
followed the process for the six countries in GAO's study; (2) the
process encompasses data collection and analysis as well as judgment by
the IMF Executive Board and staff, and gives the IMF wide latitude in
assessing a country's initial request for assistance, negotiating terms
and conditions for that assistance, and determining the country's
continued access to IMF resources; (3) under its charter, the IMF limits
financial assistance to members with a balance-of-payments need; the IMF
has broadly interpreted this to encompass a wide range of financial
difficulties; (4) the IMF has continued to make disbursements to a
country that had not met all conditions when it decided that the country
was making satisfactory progress; this decision was based on the IMF's
analysis of data on the country's progress and the IMF's judgment; (5)
when the IMF determined that the country's progress in meeting key
conditions was insufficient, disbursements have been delayed, and have
not resumed unless or until satisfactory progress was achieved, in the
IMF's judgment; (6) IMF financial arrangements in four borrower
countries that are important trading partners of the United States focus
primarily on macroeconomic and structural reforms rather than trade
reform because restrictive trade policies were not major causes of the
countries' financial problems leading to the request for IMF assistance,
according to the Department of the Treasury and the IMF; (7)
nevertheless Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea have undertaken some trade
liberalization within the context of their most recent IMF arrangements;
(8) according to Treasury, Thailand's recent IMF financial arrangements
have had no trade liberalization commitments because trade policies were
not the root causes of its financial crisis, and also because Thailand's
trade system was more open than the other three countries' systems; (9)
the large macroeconomic changes in these four borrower countries caused
by their recent financial crises have probably been a more important
source of changes in their trade policies; (10) this greatly complicates
the task of measuring the impact of the trade policies on the United
States; and (11) the countries' trade policies can distort trade in
specific sectors, however, which could contribute to import surges.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194
     TITLE:  International Monetary Fund: Lending Policies
      DATE:  06/22/99
   SUBJECT:  International organizations
	     Foreign financial assistance
	     Foreign loans
	     Balance of payments
	     Eligibility determinations
	     International trade regulation
	     Foreign trade agreements
	     International economic relations
	     Foreign governments
IDENTIFIER:  Argentina
	     Brazil
	     Indonesia
	     Korea
	     Russia
	     Uganda
	     Thailand

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INTERNATIONALMONETARY FUND Lending Policies Statement of Susan S.
Westin, Associate DirectorFinancial Institutions and Markets
Issues General Government Division and Harold J. Johnson, Jr.,
Associate DirectorNational Security and International Affairs
Division

United States General Accounting OfficeGAO Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Domestic and InternationalMonetary Policy,
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of
Representatives

For Release on DeliveryExpected at 10:00 a.m. EDTon Tuesday June
22, 1999

GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194

Statement

Page 1 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here this morning to present
several key findings intwo reports that we are releasing today. We
prepared these reports to address the mandate in the Omnibus
Appropriations Act for 1999 that wereport on (1) the conditions
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiates with its borrower
countries1 and (2) the trade policies ofborrower countries. One
report

2 describes how the IMF establishes and

monitors financial arrangements with borrower countries and
assesseshow this process was used for six borrower countries--
Argentina, Brazil,

Indonesia, Korea, Russia, and Uganda. While we describe the
conditionsfor financial assistance to these countries, evaluating
whether these were the appropriate policies was beyond the scope
of our work. The secondreport

3 identifies the trade policies of four IMF borrowers--Brazil,

Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand--and the likely effects of their
policies oncertain U.S. industry sectors. We will be reporting
separately on the IMF's

financial condition this September. First, looking at how the IMF
establishes and monitors conditions, weconcluded that:

*  The IMF has a process for establishing and monitoring
financialarrangements with member countries and it generally
followed the process

for the six countries in our study. The process encompasses
datacollection and analysis as well as judgment by the IMF
Executive Board and staff, and gives the IMF wide latitude in
assessing a country's initialrequest for assistance, negotiating
terms and conditions for that assistance, and determining the
country's continued access to IMFresources. Under its charter, the
IMF limits financial assistance to

1 With the exception of some financing for low-income countries,
the IMF does not loan funds to a

country, per se. Rather, the country "purchases" the currency it
needs from the IMF with an equivalentamount of its own currency
and then later "repurchases" its own currency according to the
terms

applicable to the IMF financing policy. For the purposes of this
statement, we will use the terms"disbursement" and "loan" to refer
to "purchases," and "repayments" to refer to "repurchases." In
this statement, we use the term "arrangement" to describe the
broad concept of IMF's financial assistanceto countries and the
associated conditions that are intended to address the underlying
causes of the countries' need for assistance. We use the term
"program" to describe the conditions that are the policychanges
and reforms as outlined in the documents the countries prepare in
the context of their IMF financial assistance. 2 International
Monetary Fund: Approach Used to Establish and Monitor Conditions
for Financial Assistance (GAO/GGD/NSIAD-99-168, June 22, 1999).
3International Monetary Fund: Trade Polices of IMF Borrowers
(GAO/NSIAD/GGD-99-174, June 22, 1999).

Statement Page 2 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 members with a balance-of-
payments need; the IMF has broadlyinterpreted this to encompass a
wide range of financial difficulties.

*  The IMF has continued to make disbursements to a country that
had notmet all conditions when it decided that the country was
making

satisfactory progress; this decision was based on the IMF's
analysis of dataon the country's progress and the IMF's judgment.

*  When the IMF determined that the country's progress in meeting
keyconditions was insufficient, disbursements have been delayed,
and have

not resumed unless or until satisfactory progress was achieved, in
theIMF's judgment.

Second, our report on the trade policies of IMF borrowers
concluded that:

*  IMF financial arrangements in four borrower countries that are
importanttrading partners of the United States focus primarily on
macroeconomic

and structural reforms rather than trade reform because
restrictive tradepolicies were not major causes of the countries'
financial problems leading to the request for IMF assistance,
according to the U.S. TreasuryDepartment and the IMF. Nevertheless
Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea have undertaken some trade
liberalization within the context of their mostrecent IMF
arrangements. According to the Treasury Department, Thailand's
recent IMF financial arrangements have had no tradeliberalization
commitments because trade policies were not the root causes of its
financial crisis, and also because Thailand's trade system wasmore
open than the other three countries' systems.

*  The large macroeconomic changes in these four borrower
countriescaused by their recent financial crises have probably
been a more

important source of changes in their trade than trade policies.
This greatlycomplicates the task of measuring the impact of the
trade policies on the United States. The countries' trade policies
can distort trade in specificsectors, however, which could
contribute to import surges.

The IMF's first purpose is promoting international monetary
cooperation.Its Articles of Agreement, as amended, provide that it
may make its resources available to members experiencing balance-
of-paymentsproblems; this is to be done under "adequate
safeguards." The IMF's approach to alleviating a country's
balance-of-payments problems has twomain components--financing and
conditionality--that are intended to address both the immediate
crisis as well as the underlying factors thatcontributed to the
difficulties. Although financing is designed to help alleviate the
short-term balance-of-payments crisis by providing a countrywith
needed reserves, it may also support the longer term reform
efforts by providing needed funding.

Background

Statement

Page 3 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 The access to and disbursement of
IMF financial assistance areconditioned upon the adoption and
pursuit of economic and structural policy measures the IMF and
recipient countries negotiate. This IMF"conditionality" aims to
alleviate the underlying economic difficulty that led to the
country's balance-of-payments problem and ensure repayment tothe
IMF. As the reasons for and magnitude of countries' balance-
ofpayments problems have expanded (due, in part, to the
growingimportance of external financing and changes in the
international monetary system since the 1970s), conditionality has
also expanded.According to the IMF, conditionality has moved
beyond the traditional focus of reducing aggregate demand, which
was appropriate for relievingtemporary balance-of-payments
difficulties, typically in industrial economies. Structural
policies--such as reducing the role of governmentin the economy
and opening the economy to outside competition--that take longer
to implement and are aimed at increasing the capacity foreconomic
growth--became an important part of conditionality. More recently,
the financial crises in Mexico (1994-95) and in Asia and
Russia(1997-99) have resulted in an increased focus on
strengthening countries' financial sectors and the gradual opening
of their economies tointernational capital flows.

Over time, the IMF has developed a broad framework for
establishing andmonitoring financial assistance arrangements that
is applied on a case-bycase basis considering each country's
circumstances. This process, basedon the IMF's analysis of country
data and projections of future economic performance, gives the IMF
wide latitude in establishing an actual orpotential balance-of-
payments need, the amount and timing of resource disbursements,
and the conditions for disbursements; and in monitoringand, in
some cases, modifying the arrangements.

Under its Articles of Agreement, as amended, the IMF provides
financialassistance only to those countries with a balance-of-
payments need. Under these Articles, the IMF primarily considers
actual or potential difficultiesin either the country's balance of
payments or its reserve position to be a basis for providing
financial assistance. This framework has provided theIMF with wide
latitude to consider countries' individual circumstances and
changes in the international monetary system in its financial
assistancedecisions.

The specific conditions that the IMF and the country authorities
negotiateare intended to address the immediate and underlying
problems that contributed to the country's balance-of-payments
difficulty, while ensuringrepayment to the IMF. These conditions
are intended to be clear indicators

Approach Used ToEstablish And Monitor FinancialArrangements

Its Process for Establishingand Monitoring Programs Gives IMF
Latitude

Statement

Page 4 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 of a country's progress toward the
overall program goals, such asstrengthening the country's balance
of payments or reducing inflation. These conditions can include a
variety of changes in a country's fiscal,monetary, or structural
policies. Fiscal policy conditions may call for countries to
reduce budget deficits; Brazil's program, for instance, calledfor
limits on public sector debt. Monetary policy conditions seek to,
among other things, rebuild international reserves to promote
financial stability;Uganda's program set a minimum level for its
net international reserves. Changes in structural policies may
include revisions to financial marketregulation or tax policies;
Korea's program called for restructuring its financial supervisory
system. Political constraints and economicuncertainty can make
these negotiations sensitive and difficult. After a country
fulfills any early IMF requirements, known as "prior actions,"
andthe IMF Executive Board approves the financial arrangement, the
program is to take effect and the country is eligible to receive
its first disbursementof funds.

Korea and Argentina exemplify the differences that can exist
betweencountries' financial arrangements with the IMF. Korea's
program provided substantial funding at the earliest stage of the
program to counter anongoing balance-of-payments crisis in late
1997 resulting from substantial losses in Korea's foreign currency
reserves and the depreciation of thewon, Korea's currency. The
country faced balance-of-payments problems primarily due to
significant capital outflows. Korean banks had a largeamount of
short-term external debt that needed frequent refinancing. As
market confidence fell, the willingness of external creditors to
"roll over"or refinance these loans declined rapidly. The
government's attempt to support the exchange rate rapidly depleted
official reserves of foreigncurrencies. The main goals for the
program's monetary policy were to limit the depreciation of the
won and contain inflation. In contrast, Argentina's 1998 program
was designed as a precaution againsta potential balance-of-
payments problem that could result from external economic shocks.
Although Argentina enjoyed good access to capitalmarkets and had
employed a strategy to lengthen the maturity of its debt and
borrow when interest rates were low, it faced an uncertain future
dueto deteriorating conditions in the international financial
environment and the effect this likely would have on its future
access to capital markets.Argentina agreed to access IMF resources
only if external conditions made access necessary. The program was
principally concerned withmaintaining fiscal discipline and
enacting labor market and tax reforms that were intended to
maintain investor confidence and strengthen theeconomy's
competitiveness.

Statement Page 5 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 The process of monitoring
a country's progress toward overall programgoals and compliance
with program conditions involves both the borrower country and the
IMF. The approach is designed to incorporate data on acountry's
economic performance as well as the judgment of the IMF Executive
Board and staff. IMF staff reviews a member's economicperformance
and implementation of policy changes that were negotiated as
conditions of the financial assistance. The staff then reports to
theExecutive Board at regularly scheduled intervals for each
assistance program. In situations where conditions have not been
met, the staffformally or informally advises the Executive Board.
The staff may recommend that the Board grant a waiver for the
nonobservance of theunmet conditions. Typically waivers can be
recommended if the nonobservance is minor and program
implementation is otherwise "ontrack." If there is no waiver,
additional financial assistance is not to be made available to the
country and the program is effectively suspendeduntil there is an
agreement between the IMF and the country that is approved by the
IMF Executive Board. This agreement may mandatepolicy changes
before any further assistance is granted and change the conditions
for future assistance. In monitoring compliance, IMF missions to
each country documented acountry's progress in satisfying
conditions. In some cases, the IMF determined the countries had
made sufficient overall progress in meetingprogram conditions so
that additional funds could be made available, even when the
countries had not satisfied some key conditions. For example, in
response to the Argentine government's request, the IMFstaff
recommended, and the Executive Board approved, a waiver on the
basis of the IMF's judgment that there was sufficient overall
progress inimplementing the program and that the deviation from
meeting the required condition was minor. In March 1999, the IMF
Board approved awaiver when Argentina's fiscal deficit (1.1
percent of gross domestic product) slightly exceeded its target of
1 percent. Access to funding wasnot delayed.

Similarly, in April 1998, the IMF Board approved a waiver when
theUgandan government experienced a temporary shortfall in its
checking account balances, causing it to miss a required
condition. According to theIMF staff, this shortfall happened
because the government made payments sooner than expected. The
staff viewed this as a minor, technical issue andrecommended the
waiver.

The IMF Has DisbursedFunds on the Basis of Sufficient Overall
Progress

Statement

Page 6 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 The IMF and borrower countries may
also negotiate changes in conditionsto respond to unanticipated
developments. For example:

*  The IMF and Korea revised Korea's program several times during
its first 2months. The IMF acknowledged that the initial program
was "overly

optimistic" as economic conditions worsened; Korea continued to
haveaccess to financial assistance during these renegotiations.

*  Brazil's program was modified due to adverse events. The
maintenance ofthe exchange rate regime was an objective of
Brazil's IMF program. Brazil

turned to the IMF for assistance in September 1998, when its
currencycame under pressure as a result of the Russian crisis, and
it experienced a significant loss of reserves. This reserve loss
decelerated after thenegotiations began; but, according to
Brazilian officials, Brazil's currency came under additional
pressure after its IMF program had started. Thereasons for this
included the defeat in Brazil's congress of two tax measures
deemed crucial to the fiscal adjustment program and thereluctance
of a number of Brazilian state governors to fulfill their
financial obligations to the government. To try to stem the
additional loss ofreserves, the Brazilian government found it
necessary to devalue and then float the currency. The IMF program
was then revised to reflect the neweconomic situation and currency
regime.

In some cases, the IMF determined that the countries had not
madesufficient overall progress in meeting program conditions. In
these cases, no additional funds were made available until, in the
IMF's judgment,satisfactory progress had been achieved.

The IMF delayed disbursements to Indonesia at various points
during itscurrent program until the IMF determined that the
country had made sufficient overall progress in meeting the
program requirements. Forexample, the IMF delayed Indonesia's
disbursements from mid-March 1998 to early in May 1998 due to the
IMF staff's determination that Indonesiahad made insufficient
progress in carrying out its program. The first review was
completed in May 1998. Indonesia met none of the required
conditionsaddressing macroeconomic components of the program and
one of the key conditions for structural economic changes. IMF
staff recommended thatthe Board grant Indonesia's request for
waivers of these conditions on the basis of actions taken by the
government. (For example, the governmenthad established a new
comprehensive bank-restructuring program in January 1998 to be
implemented by a new agency, the Indonesian BankRestructuring
Agency.) Following the Board's approval, Indonesia received its
next disbursement. At this time, the IMF moved from quarterly to

Disbursements Have BeenDelayed Until Satisfactory Progress
Occurred

Statement

Page 7 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 monthly reviews of Indonesia's
program. Disbursements were also delayedin the process of
completing several subsequent reviews. The IMF faced continued
problems in Russia's implementation of its IMFprogram. Over time,
the IMF delayed disbursements and program approval, reduced the
amount of the disbursement, and ultimatelysuspended the program.
According to the IMF, it delayed disbursements because of Russia's
poor tax collections, reflecting a lack of governmentresolve to
collect taxes. However, throughout Russia's program the IMF staff
expressed the view that Russia's key senior authorities
werecommitted to the program and should be supported; therefore,
the IMF Board continued to approve disbursements. Events in 1998
particularlyillustrate this. The delayed approval of the 1998
program, due to cabinet changes and difficulty in meeting the
revenue package, meant that Russiareceived no funds between
January and June 1998. The program was finally approved in June
1998, on the basis of implementation of prioractions. In July
1998, the IMF approved additional funds to Russia but reduced the
amount of the disbursement from $5.6 billion to $4.8 billiondue to
delays in getting two measures passed in the Duma. The IMF was
scheduled to release the next disbursement in September 1998, but
Russiahad deviated so far from the program that the IMF made no
further disbursements. In March 1999, Russia requested that the
program beterminated. In April 1999, the IMF and Russia announced
they had reached agreement on a new arrangement. To date, the IMF
Board has notapproved the new arrangement.

Although all borrowers restrict trade to some extent, only a few
of the 98current IMF borrowers are traders large enough to affect
the U.S. economy. Trade policies were not the major focus of IMF
conditions forstructural reform in the four borrowers we studied
that are important U.S. trade partners. The IMF did seek to
promote trade liberalization in thesecountries, however, and
Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea undertook some actions to liberalize
their trade regimes. Also, although U.S. imports fromsome of these
countries have grown in some sectors, the effect of trade policy
changes on U.S. imports has probably been of lesser magnitude
thanthe effect of the substantial macroeconomic changes that these
countries experienced.

Trade Policies of IMFBorrowers

Statement

Page 8 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 In its programs with four important
U.S. trade partners, the IMF focusedprimarily on macroeconomic and
structural reforms other than trade reforms. As we noted earlier,
the IMF seeks to address the immediate andunderlying problems that
contributed to a country's balance-of-payments problem;
restrictive trade policies were not major factors contributing
tothe countries' needs for IMF assistance.

Nevertheless, the IMF sought to promote trade liberalization in
thecountries, as it deemed appropriate. Part of the IMF's mission,
as embodied in its Articles of Agreement, is to facilitate the
expansion andbalanced growth of world trade. As such, countries
that have borrowed from the IMF sometimes have liberalized their
trade systems within thecontext of their financial arrangements.
Borrowers have eliminated or reduced tariffs or nontariff barriers
to imports4 and have ended or alteredexport policies, such as
subsidies and export restrictions.

Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea have undertaken some trade
liberalizationwithin the context of their recent IMF financial
arrangements. Nevertheless, their overall conditionality has
focused primarily onmacroeconomic and structural reforms other
than trade reform because restrictive trade policies per se were
not major causes of their balance-of-payments difficulties,
according to the Treasury Department and the IMF. Reflecting this,
only one of the trade liberalization measures taken was arequired
condition--the requirement that Indonesia reduce export taxes on
logs and sawn timber. Further, although some of the import and
exportpolicies to be eliminated or modified under their IMF
arrangements have been of concern to the United States and other
countries, the statedpurpose of these measures is not to benefit
the three countries' trading partners. Rather, the purpose is to
help resolve the countries' balance-of-payments problems and
address the underlying causes of these problems by promoting
greater efficiency in their economic systems. Korea has eliminated
four export subsidies, reduced some import barriers,and made
improvements to the transparency of its subsidy programs.
Indonesia has made many changes to its trade policies in the
context of itsIMF financial arrangements, including reducing or
eliminating some import tariffs and export restrictions. Indonesia
has committed to phase out mostremaining nontariff import barriers
and export restrictions by the time its IMF program ends in the
year 2000. Brazil has committed to limit the scope
4 Nontariff import barriers include quantitative restrictions,
state trade monopolies, restrictive foreign

exchange practices that affect a country's trade system, and
quality controls and customs proceduresthat act as trade
restrictions.

IMF Conditions Did NotFocus on Trade Policies of Brazil,
Indonesia, Korea,And Thailand

Statement

Page 9 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 of its interest equalization export
subsidy program to capital goods and hassuspended for 1999 a tax
rebate given to exporters. Further, according to the IMF, Brazil
has kept its pledge not to impose any new trade restrictionsthat
hinder regional integration, are inconsistent with the World Trade
Organization, or that are for balance-of-payments purposes. The
large macroeconomic changes in these four countries caused by
theirrecent financial crises greatly complicate predicting and
measuring the trade policies' impact on the United States. Our
analysis of 1997-98 tradedata reveals that overall U.S. imports
from Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand rose moderately in
1998. However, there have been substantialincreases in U.S.
imports from these countries in certain sectors. For example,
imports of one category of flat-rolled steel from Korea rose by
36percent to $355.8 million, and paper and paperboard imports from
Indonesia were up by 284 percent to $40.8 million. Under U.S. law,
thereare procedures to investigate and remedy situations, such as
steel import surges, where U.S. industry believes rising imports
are attributable toforeign government policy and harm its economic
interests.

In some sectors, rising imports may be due to other factors
besidesgovernment policies. For example, market factors, such as
increasing U.S. coffee consumption and the need for more natural
rubber for the largertires being used in U.S. motor vehicles, may
be the reason for some of the import surges. Also, chemical
imports are causing price pressures on U.S.producers in the United
States, but the import increases are partly due to depressed
demand within Asia that has led to increased shipments to
theUnited States.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement this morning. My
colleaguesand I would be pleased to answer any questions you or
members of the subcommittee may have.

Some U.S. Imports Fromthe Four Countries Have Increased Markedly
in thePast Year, but Impact Is Difficult to Measure

Page 10 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 Page 11 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194 Page
12 GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-99-194

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