2000 Census: Status of Key Operations (Testimony, 02/15/2000,
GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-00-91).

In a little more than six weeks--on Census Day (April 1, 2000)--the
decade-long process of researching, planning, testing, and evaluating
procedures for conducting the nation's largest peace-time mobilization
will come to a close. At this critical juncture, it is important to
examine the state of the census, the progress made to ensure a complete
and accurate enumeration, and the level of risk that remains. Two recent
GAO reports discussed operational uncertainties that threaten a
successful population count. (See GAO/GGD-00-6, Dec. 1999, and
GAO/AIMD-00-61, Feb. 2000.) This testimony elaborates on the following
three operational uncertainties highlighted in these reports: (1)
achieving the Census Bureau's mail response rate objective, (2)
collecting accurate and timely data from nonrespondents, and (3)
conducting data capture options.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD/AIMD-00-91
     TITLE:  2000 Census: Status of Key Operations
      DATE:  02/15/2000
   SUBJECT:  Census
	     Population statistics
	     Surveys
	     Statistical data
	     Government information dissemination
	     Communication
	     Federal/state relations
	     Information resources management
	     Statistical methods
IDENTIFIER:  Census Bureau Data Capture System 2000
	     2000 Decennial Census

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GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-00-91

United States General Accounting Office
GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on the Census
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
2:00 p.m. EST
Tuesday
February 15, 2000
GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-00-91

2000 CENSUS
Status of Key Operations

Statement of
J. Christopher Mihm
Associate Director, Federal Management
    and Workforce Issues
General Government Division

 (410539)

Statement
2000 Census:  Status of Key Operations
Page 11
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
status of the 2000 Census. With just over 6 weeks
remaining until Census Day, April 1, 2000, the
decade-long process of researching, planning,
testing, and evaluating procedures for the
nation's largest peace-time mobilization has come
to a close, and the complex and costly data
collection and tabulation phase is now under way.
At this critical juncture, it is important to
examine the state of the census, taking measure of
the progress that has been made toward ensuring a
complete and accurate enumeration, and the level
of risk that remains.

As you are aware, in two recent reports we
discussed specific operational uncertainties that
pose a threat to a successful population count. In
our December 1999 report, we concluded that the
2000 Census may be less accurate than the 1990
Census, in part because motivating public
participation in the census will be a formidable
task and field follow-up efforts with
nonrespondents will be costly and may produce
unreliable data.1 To address these uncertainties,
we recommended that the Director, Bureau of the
Census, develop a contingency plan to mitigate the
impact of a lower-than-expected mail response
rate. Moreover, in early-February, we reported on
the challenges facing the Bureau's data capture
system.2 My statement today elaborates on the
operational uncertainties addressed in these
reports: (1) achieving the Bureau's mail response
rate objective, (2) collecting accurate and timely
data from nonrespondents, and (3) conducting data
capture operations. Where appropriate, I've
included information on developments that have
occurred since these reports were issued that
might affect the conduct of the census.

In discussing these uncertainties, three themes
will be highlighted. First, while the census is a
national undertaking, it is locally implemented.
This is important to keep in mind because
successes or problems in one area do not
necessarily affect other areas. For example, a
higher-than-expected mail response rate or a very
successful staff recruitment effort in one city or
neighborhood does not compensate for problems in
other cities or neighborhoods. Thus, while
national data on the status of census operations
are important for providing an overall
perspective, these data can mask shortcomings at
the local level that can affect the success of the
census. Indeed, experience from the 1990 Census,
as well as from the Bureau's preparations for
2000-including the 1998 dress rehearsal
census3-suggest that public and institutional
cooperation will be inconsistent, and that pockets
of problems are likely to occur that may not be
captured by examining the census from a national
perspective.

Second, many of the risks to a complete and
accurate census the Bureau faces are interrelated.
Mail response rates determine follow-up workload.
Follow-up workload drives staffing needs, which in
turn can affect the Bureau's operational schedule
and the quality of data. The cumulative and
interrelated effect of these challenges is the
fundamental risk facing the Bureau.

Third, the census is a shared national
undertaking. The Bureau of the Census, other
federal agencies, state and local governments, a
vast network of public and private organizations,
and ultimately the American public, all play vital
roles in making the census a success.

Background
We have been tracking the Bureau's progress in
designing and implementing the 2000 Census
throughout this past decade. A consistent theme of
our work has been that despite the Bureau's
unprecedented efforts to achieve maximum accuracy
in the most cost-effective way possible,
formidable challenges surround such key census-
taking operations as building a complete and
accurate address list, securing an acceptable
level of public participation, hiring a sufficient
number of temporary workers, and gathering
accurate and complete data. These challenges have
raised concerns that the 2000 Census may be less
accurate than the 1990 Census.

The cost of the 2000 Census has already far
surpassed that of the 1990 Census in real terms.
The Bureau estimates that the 2000 Census will
cost at least $6.8 billion, which is more than
double the $3.2 billion cost of the 1990 Census in
1999 dollars. To be sure, the nation's
population-and thus the Bureau's workload-has also
increased over the past 10 years, but even when
measured on a per housing unit basis, the price
tag for enumerating each household has risen
dramatically. It will cost an estimated $57 to
enumerate each housing unit in 2000 compared to
about $31 in 1990, an increase of 84 percent in
1999 dollars.

The scale and complexity of the Bureau's task is
enormous. For the 2000 Census, the Bureau will
need to properly locate and collect information
from about 274 million people residing in over 119
million housing units. To do this, the Bureau
opened 520 local census offices, and has plans to
fill about 1.35 million temporary positions and
process about 1.5 billion pages of data.

The Census Faces Significant Risks
For the 2000 Census, the Bureau will be challenged
to boost the declining level of public
participation in the census and collect timely and
accurate data from initial nonrespondents. A high
mail response rate is key to a successful census
because it helps the Bureau obtain more accurate
data and reduce what has been an error-prone and
costly nonresponse follow-up workload.

Achieving the Bureau's Mail Response Rate
Objective Will Be Difficult
The Bureau is anticipating a mail response rate of
61 percent; however, achieving this level of
public participation will be a formidable task.
The mail response rate has declined with each
decennial census since the Bureau first initiated
a national mailout/mailback approach in 1970. In
1970, the Bureau achieved a 78-percent response
rate. The response rate declined to 70 percent in
1980, and 65 percent in 1990. This declining trend
is due, in part, to various demographic,
attitudinal, and other factors, such as concerns
over privacy, mistrust of government, more complex
living arrangements, and a proliferation of
unsolicited mail and surveys.

To help boost public participation in the census,
the Bureau has instituted an outreach and
promotion campaign that is as ambitious as it is
diverse. At the national level, the Bureau hired a
consortium of private-sector advertising agencies,
led by Young & Rubicam, to develop an extensive
paid advertising program for the 2000 Census. To
date, television advertisements stressing the
theme that participating in the census benefits
one's community have been aired during daytime
soap operas and game shows, as well as during the
Super Bowl and a number of programs targeted to
specific racial and ethnic groups. As for print
media, advertisements have appeared in such
diverse publications as TV Guide, Ebony, Korea
Times, and India Today. The Bureau estimates it
will spend about $167 million on the paid
advertising campaign in fiscal years 1998 through
2000, of which $102.8 million was allocated for
media buys in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.

At the local level, the Bureau has secured
partnerships with local governments, community
groups, businesses, and nongovernmental
organizations to promote the census at the
grassroots level. The Bureau reports that it has
secured around 55,000 such agreements to date.

The Bureau's aggressive outreach and promotion
initiatives face several hurdles. First, rather
than simply raising the public's awareness of the
census, the Bureau must actually motivate people
to complete a census questionnaire and return it
on time. This gap between awareness of the census,
on the one hand, and actually responding, on the
other, was evident during the 1990 Census when the
public's high level of awareness was not matched
by a similarly high mail response rate. In fact,
the Bureau found that although 93 percent of the
population reported being aware of the census, the
mail response rate was just 65 percent.

Unfortunately, data from the 1998 dress rehearsal
suggest that the Bureau's promotional efforts did
not bridge this motivational gap. Although a
Bureau evaluation found that about 90 percent of
the residents in the South Carolina and Sacramento
dress rehearsal sites were aware of the census,
the mail response rate at both sites was around 55
percent.

Second, the Bureau expanded and enhanced the paid
advertising campaign following the dress rehearsal
(the most intensive phase of the campaign began
earlier this month). However, the impact that this
additional advertising might have on people's
willingness to respond to the census is difficult
to predict. According to the Bureau, there did not
appear to be a direct relationship between
exposure to advertising during the dress rehearsal
and the likelihood of returning a census form.4
However, the Bureau suspects that the campaign had
an "indirect effect" on public response to the
census in that the campaign may have made people
expect the census form in the mail, which in turn
increased the likelihood that they would return
it.

With respect to local outreach and promotion, we
are concerned that the Bureau may have overly
optimistic expectations concerning the resources
and capabilities available at the local level to
promote the census. For example, a key element of
the Bureau's local partnership effort is the
Complete Count Committee program. The committees,
which are to consist of local government,
religious, media, education, and other community
leaders, are to promote the census by sponsoring
events, placing articles in local newspapers, and
holding press conferences that convey the
importance of the census. The Bureau hopes that
local people who are trusted by members of the
community can more effectively market the census
to those who are difficult to convince through
traditional advertising media. Thus, while the
Bureau has formed partnerships with a number of
religious, service, community, and other
organizations, the Bureau believes that Complete
Count Committees are key to persuading everyone to
respond.

To date, based on our recent interviews with
officials from several regional census offices, a
number of communities appear to be aggressively
supporting the census. For example, some health
clinics in rural Kentucky are showing census
videos in waiting rooms, and some state and local
governments have allocated money for partnerships
and advertising in local media, while others have
set up web sites containing information on the
census and census employment opportunities.
However, the level of activity and support for the
census is likely to vary across the country, in
part because of a lack of resources. We found that
during the dress rehearsal the committees often
lacked the money, people, and/or expertise to
launch an adequate marketing effort. With respect
to money, officials representing 9 of the 14 local
governments participating in the dress rehearsal
told us that they were unable or unwilling to fund
promotional activities. Some local governments
also had difficulty getting staff to volunteer to
help plan and organize promotional activities,
while others lacked the experience and knowledge
to market the census.

The Bureau has also hired 613 partnership
specialists to help local groups initiate and
sustain grassroots marketing activities, such as
the Complete Count Committees. However, based on
the dress rehearsal experience, these partnership
specialists may be spread too thin to offer
meaningful support. According to the Bureau, there
are now about 12,000 Complete Count Committees.
Thus, on average, each partnership specialist is
responsible for assisting approximately 20
committees. By comparison, during the South
Carolina dress rehearsal, some committees never
formed, while others became inactive, partly
because the Bureau's two partnership specialists
were responsible for assisting an average of six
local governments. Initiating and maintaining the
efforts of the Bureau's thousands of additional
local partners will stretch the partnership
specialists' workload still further. Consequently,
it is likely that the results of the Bureau's
local outreach and promotion efforts will be
inconsistent.

Field Follow-up Efforts Will Be Costly and May
Produce Unreliable Data
To count those individuals who do not mail back
their census questionnaires, the Bureau conducts a
nationwide field follow-up operation in which
temporary employees called enumerators visit and
collect census information from each nonresponding
housing unit. However, past experience has shown
that following up with nonrespondents is one of
the most error-prone and costly of all census
operations. The Bureau will be challenged to
complete nonresponse follow-up on schedule without
compromising data quality, and to adequately staff
nonresponse follow-up operations.

Workload and Schedule
With regard to completing nonresponse follow-up on
schedule, if the Bureau achieves its anticipated
61-percent mail response rate, enumerators will
need to follow up on about 46 million of the more
than 119 million housing units estimated to be in
the nation. However, completing this workload in
the 10-week time frame the Bureau has allotted for
nonresponse follow-up could prove extremely
difficult since the Bureau will need to complete
an average of more than 657,000 cases each day for
the entire 10-week period. In addition, the
Bureau's quality assurance procedures, which call
for enumerators to revisit certain households to
identify and correct enumeration errors, will add
more than 17,000 cases to the Bureau's average
daily workload. Sustaining this pace could prove
challenging for a variety of reasons, ranging from
nonrespondents' unwillingness to open their doors
to enumerators to adverse local weather
conditions. By comparison, during the 1990 Census,
it took the Bureau 14 weeks to follow up with 34
million households using essentially the same
approach to nonresponse follow-up.

Moreover, if the response rate proves to be less
than 61 percent, past experience has shown that a
lower-than-expected mail response rate can trigger
a chain of events that can have significant
implications for the accuracy and cost of the
census. This was demonstrated during the 1990
Census. The Bureau had budgeted for a nonresponse
follow-up workload of about 31 million cases, but
because of an unexpectedly sharp decline in the
mail response rate, the Bureau had to follow up on
an additional 3 million cases. The higher than
expected workloads aggravated an already difficult
staffing situation in which some census offices
had difficulty filling all positions and
enumerator productivity was lower than
anticipated. As a result, 14 weeks were required
to complete the nonresponse follow-up operation,
which was 8 weeks longer than the Bureau's initial
estimate.

Proxy Data

As the data collection period dragged on, the
accuracy of the information collected declined as
some people moved and others had difficulty
remembering who was residing in their households
on April 1. To complete nonresponse follow-up,
enumerators collected data from secondhand
sources, such as neighbors and mail carriers.
However, such "proxy" data are not as reliable as
data obtained directly from household residents.
According to Bureau officials, a mail response
rate as little as 2 or 3 percentage points less
than the Bureau's 61-percent goal could cause
serious problems.

During the dress rehearsal, although nonresponse
follow-up operations were completed on schedule in
both Menominee County and Sacramento, and 6 days
early in South Carolina, the Bureau found that
securing interviews with household members proved
to be more difficult than it had anticipated. The
Bureau hoped to limit the portion of the
nonresponse follow-up universe workload that was
proxy data to less than 6 percent; however, the
Bureau did not achieve this objective at any of
the three dress rehearsal sites. In Sacramento,
20.1 percent of the occupied nonresponse follow-up
universe was proxy data; in South Carolina, the
proportion was 16.4 percent; and in Menominee
County, it was 11.5 percent.

Census Costs
Nonresponse follow-up is also expensive. Each
percentage point drop in the mail response rate in
this census would increase the nonresponse follow-
up workload by about 1.2 million households. In
1995, the Bureau estimated that a 1-percentage
point increase in workload could add approximately
$25 million to the cost of the census. On the
basis of our current analysis of fiscal year 2000
budget estimates, we project that a 1-percentage
point increase in workload could add at least $34
million in direct salary, benefits, and travel
costs to the $1.5 billion budgeted for nonresponse
follow-up.5 The extent to which the Bureau would
be able to absorb these additional costs will be a
function of the actual outcome of other
assumptions, such as enumerator productivity.

Staffing
In addition to the challenge of completing
nonresponse follow-up on schedule with minimal use
of proxy data, uncertainties exist concerning the
Bureau's ability to staff nonresponse follow-up.
The Bureau plans to fill about 860,000 positions
for peak field operations, including 539,000
positions for nonresponse follow-up. Because the
Bureau anticipates that a number of applicants
will not qualify for census employment, and to
cover for the possibility of high turnover rates,
the Bureau estimates it will need to recruit over
3 million people to apply for census employment.
The Bureau wants to have a pool of 2.4 million
qualified applicants by April 19, 2000. To quality
for census employment, candidates have to meet the
Bureau's employment requirements, which include
passing a basic skills test and a personal
background check.

Nationally, the Bureau's goal was to recruit 45
percent of the 2.4 million qualified
applicants-about 1.1 million people-by February 1,
2000. Bureau data as of February 9, 2000, showed
that the Bureau had recruited 1.3 million
qualified applicants, or just over half of its 2.4
million target. However, these national data mask
the fact that the Bureau's progress in recruiting
qualified candidates is lagging in a number of
locations. As of February 9, 2000, 3 of the
Bureau's 12 regions6 and 178 (35 percent) of 511
local census offices7 were below the Bureau's 45-
percent benchmark. Although some local census
offices were just a few percentage points below
the Bureau's 45-percent goal, 25 fell short by 20
percentage points or more. Of the 333 local census
offices that were ahead of the Bureau's February
1st milestone, 163 exceeded it by at least 20
percentage points.

The Bureau is aggressively recruiting candidates,
and thus applicant levels will change on a daily
basis. Recruitment needs vary by local census
office, depending on their specific operational
requirements, and the Bureau seeks to hire local
people who are familiar with their communities and
committed to a successful count in their own
neighborhoods. Thus, as a number of local census
offices appear to be falling short of the Bureau's
interim milestones, it is important for the Bureau
to closely monitor progress at the local levels.

To help ensure it meets its recruitment goals, the
Bureau has a number of initiatives in place. Key
among these are (1) the hiring of a private firm
to develop a recruitment advertising campaign; (2)
a geographic pay scale with wages set at 65 to 75
percent of local prevailing wages (from about
$8.25 to $18.50 per hour for enumerators); and (3)
partnerships with government agencies, community
groups, and other organizations. However, as the
Bureau fully appreciates, it is recruiting workers
in an unusually tight labor market, and census
jobs may not be as attractive as other employment
opportunities because they do not offer benefits,
such as health or life insurance, sick or annual
leave, retirement plans, and childcare.

Thus, as we stated in our December 1999 report, to
help expand the census applicant pool still
further, Congress may wish to consider legislative
actions to modify legal provisions that could
prohibit or financially discourage specific groups
of people from seeking census employment. For
example, Congress may want to consider allowing
active duty military personnel to hold temporary
census employment. (Currently, such individuals
are generally prohibited from holding outside
federal employment.) These proposals were included
as part of H.R. 3581, introduced by Representative
Maloney on February 7, 2000.

The Bureau Faces Formidable Challenges in
Conducting Data Capture Operations
In addition to the uncertainties and risks
surrounding the outreach and promotion program and
nonresponse follow-up operation, the Bureau also
faces formidable challenges in performing critical
data capture operations. These challenges fall
into two basic categories: (1) ensuring the
operational readiness of the Data Capture System
(DCS) 2000-which is the system that each data
capture center (DCC)8 will use to check-in
questionnaires and determine which households have
responded, scan the questionnaires to produce an
electronic image, optically read handwritten marks
and writings from the imaged questionnaires, and
convert the data into files that will be
transmitted to Bureau headquarters for tabulation
and analysis-and (2) ensuring the readiness of DCC
operations, including the movement and processing
of paper questionnaires.

DCS 2000 Progress and Risks
The Bureau has made considerable progress in
acquiring and deploying DCS 2000. However, we
reported earlier this month that its prospects for
delivering full system capability on time were
still mixed.9 As of January 7, 2000, when we
concluded our review of the DCS 2000 system,
hardware had been installed at all four data
capture centers; 21 of the system's 23 planned
application software releases had been completed;
and 6 of 10 major test events had been performed.
Additionally, results from system-level tests
performed thus far showed that key DCS 2000
performance targets were being met, and the Bureau
was reporting that remaining DCS 2000 tasks were
on schedule.

Despite this progress, the Bureau was still facing
a huge challenge in delivering promised DCS 2000
capabilities on time, primarily because much
remained to be done within the very short time
remaining before data capture operations were to
begin. In particular, the Bureau had extended the
system's schedule by 4 months due largely to
requirements changes-from October 15, 1999, to
February 25, 2000-leaving just 9 days between the
conclusion of the last test event and the date
that DCS 2000 must be operational. Moreover, at
the time of our review, the Bureau still needed to
complete many important system development and
testing activities, including the completion of
the final two software releases as well as system
acceptance, site acceptance, and operational
tests. Furthermore, the numbers of yet-to-be
resolved defects in DCS 2000 were not yet showing
the clear and sustained downward trend that is
expected as a system begins to mature, and the yet-
to-be completed development and testing activities
may surface more problems.

     The Bureau and its DCS 2000 development
contractor shared our concerns about the delivery
of promised DCS 2000 capabilities on time, and in
response, they were employing measures to minimize
risks and to expedite the completion of DCS 2000.
For example, they implemented a formal risk
management program to address risks proactively,
and they defined and were following processes to
ensure that only those changes that were justified
on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks were
approved and made. Also, they added a test event
scheduled for February 22-25, just prior to the
system's operational date, to evaluate, among
other things, the system's capabilities in a true
operational setting. Another factor strongly in
the Bureau's favor is that its development
contractor has been independently assessed as
having highly effective software development
capabilities in such important areas as software
project planning, tracking and oversight,
configuration management, software quality
management, and defect resolution. Lastly, partly
in response to our review, the Bureau and its
development contractor initiated proactive and
appropriate risk management steps, such as
strengthening oversight of the resolution of
system defects and requirements changes. While
these steps do not guarantee success, they should
help mitigate risk and its potential impact on the
program.

Data Capture Center Operations
     As previously mentioned, the Bureau is to
conduct a final operational test involving all
four DCCs during the period February 22-25, 2000.
This final operational test is to include
assessments of the centers' ability to process a
workload equivalent to that expected during actual
data capture operations, including operational
testing of the final DCS 2000 software release.
As part of this test, the Bureau will asses its
ability to achieve desired production rates for
checking-in and scanning questionnaires, among
others. During an operational test at the Pomona,
CA, DCC  in October and November 1999, the
Bureau's production goals were not met in these
and other critical areas.  More recently, however,
an operational test was completed in early
February at the Phoenix DCC.  According to Bureau
officials, preliminary results show that the
Phoenix DCC exceeded its productivity goals for
checking-in and scanning forms.  Bureau officials
attribute the improvements in part to better crew
training and increased practice time, two issues
identified during the Pomona operational test. We
will review the results of the forthcoming test
and continue to monitor the Bureau's progress in
getting its data capture processes fully
operational.

Contingency Plans Could Help Mitigate the Risks
That Pose a Threat to a Successful Census
     To help ensure an accurate and cost-effective
census, we recommended in our December 1999 report10
that the Director, Bureau of the Census, develop a
contingency plan of actions the Bureau could take
to address the operational challenges that would
result from a questionnaire mail response rate
that was lower than anticipated. We noted that the
Bureau's plan should address, at a minimum, the
budgetary, scheduling, staffing, and other
logistical implications of collecting data from a
larger number of nonresponding households.

     For example, the contingency plan could
include options and procedures to balance the
pressure to meet census schedules against the need
to limit the use of proxy data, and should be
shared with Congress. The uncertainties facing the
Bureau's data capture system make the need for a
contingency plan even more compelling.

In response to our recommendation, the Bureau has
noted that the only serious contingency plan would
be to request a supplemental appropriation from
Congress. However, we continue to believe that a
more fully developed and publicly disclosed plan
would be helpful.

Moreover, as previously noted, a margin of just
2-3 percentage points separates a response rate
that is consistent with the Bureau's goal, from
one that could trigger a host of operational
problems. Thus, by focusing on the critical
challenges and trade-offs that the Bureau will
face if it falls short of its response rate goals,
events that helped compromise the success of the
1990 Census could be addressed more effectively
and possibly avoided.

     In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Bureau has put
forth a tremendous effort to help ensure as
complete and accurate a count of the population as
possible, testing and retesting its design, and
making significant modifications when necessary.
Nevertheless, substantial challenges to a
successful census remain, and as we have done
throughout the decade, we look forward to keeping
the Subcommittee informed of the Bureau's progress
and the results of the census.

     Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared
statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.

     Contact and Acknowledgements

     For further information regarding this
testimony, please contact J. Christopher Mihm at
(202) 512-8676. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony included Robert
Goldenkoff, Mark Bird, Christina Chaplain, Richard
Hung, Ty Mitchell, and Lynn Wasielewski.

_______________________________
1 2000 Census: Contingency Planning Needed to
Address Risks That Pose a Threat to a Successful
Census (GAO/GGD-00-6, Dec. 14, 1999).
2 2000 Census: New Data Capture System Progress
and Risks (GAO/AIMD-00-61, Feb. 4, 2000).
3 The dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census was held
at three sites: Sacramento, CA; 11 counties in the
Columbia, SC, area; and Menominee County in
Wisconsin, including the Menominee American Indian
Reservation. The dress rehearsal tested the
Bureau's operations and procedures planned for the
2000 Census, and was conducted in April 1998.
4 See Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal Evaluation
Results Memorandum E1b, Effectiveness of the Paid
Advertising Campaign: Reported Exposure to
Advertising and Likelihood of Returning a Census
Form, U.S. Census Bureau, April 1999.
5 2000 Census: Analysis of Fiscal Year 2000
Amended Budget Request (GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-291, Sept.
22, 1999).
6 The Atlanta, Chicago, and Philadelphia census
regions fell short of the Bureau's interim
milestones.
7 Our analysis did not include nine local census
offices in Puerto Rico.
8 The data capture centers are located in
Baltimore, MD; Jeffersonville, IN; Pomona, CA; and
Phoenix, AZ.
9 GAO/AIMD-00-61.
10 GAO/GGD-00-6.

*** End of document ***