U.S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues (Testimony, 05/18/99,
GAO/T-GGD-99-99).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed efforts by the
Customs Service to interdict drugs, allocate inspectional personnel, and
develop performance measures, including information on Customs' action
plan for resolving management problems.

GAO noted that: (1) Customs initiated and encouraged its ports to use
several programs to identify and separate low-risk shipments from those
with apparently higher smuggling risk; (2) GAO identified internal
control weaknesses in one or more of the processes used to screen Line
Release program applicants for entry into the program; (3) the Three
Tier Targeting program was used at the Southwest border ports where
officials say they lost confidence in the program's ability to
distinguish high- from low-risk shipments; (4) Customs is evaluating the
Automated Targeting System for expansion to other land-border cargo
ports; (5) Customs has been using traditional law enforcement measures
to evaluate the Aviation program; (6) these measures, however, are used
to track activity, not measure results or effectiveness; (7) Customs has
discontinued the use of the threat index as an indicator of its
effectiveness in detecting illegal air traffic, as well as some other
performance measures, because Customs determined that they were not good
measures of results and effectiveness; (8) Customs, Department of
Defense (DOD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Ancore
Corporation recently began planning to field test the pulsed fast
neutron analysis (PFNA) inspection system; (9) while Customs, DOD, and
FAA officials acknowledge that laboratory testing has proven the
technical feasibility of PFNA, they told GAO that the Ancore inspection
system would not meet their operational requirements; (10) agency
officials said that a PFNA system not only is too expensive, but also is
too large for operational use in most ports of entry or other sites;
(11) Customs officials were not aware of any formal agencywide efforts
prior to 1995 to determine the need for additional cargo or passenger
inspectional personnel for its 301 ports; (12) in preparation for its
fiscal year 1997 budget request, Customs conducted a formal needs
assessment; (13) GAO concluded that the assessments had limitations that
could prevent Customs from accurately estimating the need for
inspectional personnel and then allocating them to ports; (14) GAO found
that Customs' strategic plan contained weaknesses that could affect the
reliability of Customs' performance data; (15) Customs' first action
plan was issued in February 1999 and has since been updated three times;
(16) it is Customs' intention to implement all action items included in
the plan by 2000; and (17) use of this kind of management tool can be
very helpful in communicating problems and proposed solutions to
executives, managers, and the Customs Service workforce.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD-99-99
     TITLE:  U.S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues
      DATE:  05/18/99
   SUBJECT:  Customs administration
	     Law enforcement
	     Performance measures
	     Narcotics
	     Smuggling
	     Drug trafficking
	     Internal controls
	     Human resources utilization
	     Program evaluation
	     Strategic planning
IDENTIFIER:  Customs Service Three Tier Targeting Program
	     Customs Service Aviation Program
	     Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis Inspection System
	     Customs Service Line Release Program
	     Customs Service Land Border Carrier Initiative Program
	     Customs Service Automated Targeting System
	     Customs Service Operation Hard Line

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U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: Enforcement Oversight Issues (GAO/T-GGD-99-
99) U. S. CUSTOMS SERVICE Enforcement Oversight Issues

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin Director, Administration of Justice
Issues General Government Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony Before the Committee on Finance

U. S. Senate

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. EDT on Tuesday
May 18, 1999

GAO/T-GGD-99-99

  GAO/T-GGD-99-99

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 1

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to be here
today to discuss work we have done addressing efforts by the U. S.
Customs Service to interdict drugs, allocate inspectional
personnel, and develop performance measures. For the most part,
our testimony is based on products we have issued on each of these
subjects since 1997. You also asked us to discuss Customs' action
plan for resolving management problems. Our discussion of the
action plan is based on (1) interviews with Customs officials from
its Office of Planning, Management Inspection Division, and Office
of Strategic Trade and (2) our examination of the several versions
of the plan.

Created in 1789, the U. S. Customs Service is one of the federal
government's oldest agencies. Customs is responsible for
collecting revenue from imports and enforcing customs and other U.
S. laws and regulations. Customs collects revenues of about $22
billion annually while processing an estimated 15 million import
entries and 450 million people who enter the country. A major goal
of Customs is to prevent the smuggling of drugs into the country
by creating an effective drug interdiction, intelligence, and
investigation capability to disrupt and dismantle smuggling
organizations. Customs' workforce totals almost 20,000 employees
at its headquarters, 20 Customs Management Centers, 20 Special
Agent- in- Charge offices, and 301 ports of entry around the
country.

Our work on Customs' efforts to interdict drugs has focused on
four distinct areas: (1) internal controls over Customs' low- risk
cargo entry programs; (2) the missions, resources, and performance
measures for Customs' aviation program; (3) the development of a
specific technology for detecting drugs; and (4) Customs drug
intelligence capabilities.

In July 1998, at the request of Senator Dianne Feinstein, we
reported on Customs' drug- enforcement operations along the
Southwest border of the United States. 1 Our review focused on
low- risk, cargo entry programs in use at three ports Otay Mesa,
California; Laredo, Texas; and Nogales, Arizona. To balance the
facilitation of trade through ports with the interdiction of
illegal drugs being smuggled into the United States, Customs
initiated and encouraged its ports to use several programs to
identify and separate low- risk shipments from those with
apparently higher smuggling risk. One such program is the Line
Release Program, designed to expedite cargo shipments that Customs
determined to be

1 Customs Service Drug Interdiction: Internal Control Weaknesses
and Other Concerns With Low- Risk Cargo Entry Programs (GAO/GGD-
98-175, July 31, 1998). Drug Interdiction

Low- Risk Cargo Entry Programs

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 2

repetitive, high volume, and low risk for narcotics smuggling. The
Line Release Program was first implemented on the Northern border
in 1986 and was expanded to most posts along the Southwest border
by 1989. This program requires importers, brokers (companies who
process the paperwork required to import merchandise), and
manufacturers to apply for the program and to be screened by
Customs to ensure that they have no past history of narcotics
smuggling and that their prior shipments have been in compliance
with trade laws and Customs' commercial importing regulations. In
1996, Customs implemented the Land Border Carrier Initiative
Program, which required that the Line Release shipments across the
Southwest border be transported by Customs- approved carriers and
driven by Customs- approved drivers. After the Carrier Initiative
Program was implemented, the number of Southwest Border Line
Release shipments dropped significantly.

At each of the three ports we visited, we identified internal
control weaknesses in one or more of the processes used to screen
Line Release applicants for entry into the program. These
weaknesses included (1) an absence of specific criteria for
determining applicant eligibility at two of the three ports, (2)
incomplete documentation of the screening and review of applicants
at two of the three ports, and (3) lack of documentation of
supervisory review for aspects of the applicant approval process.
During our review, Customs representatives from northern and
southern landborder cargo ports approved draft Line Release volume
and compliance eligibility criteria for program applicants and
draft recertification standards for program participants.

The Three Tier Targeting Program a method of targeting high- risk
shipments for narcotics inspection was used at the three Southwest
border ports that we visited. According to officials at the three
ports, they lost confidence in the program's ability to
distinguish high- from low- risk shipment because of two
operational problems. First, there was little information
available in any database for researching foreign manufacturers.
Second, local officials doubted the reliability of the
designations. They cited examples of narcotics seizures from
shipments designated as low- risk and the lack of a significant
number of seizures from shipments designated as high- risk.
Customs suspended this program until more reliable information is
developed for classifying lowrisk importations.

One low- risk entry program the Automated Targeting System was
being pilot tested at Laredo. It was designed to enable port
officials to identify and direct inspectional attention to high-
risk shipments. That is, the

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 3

Automated Targeting System was designed to assess shipment entry
information for known smuggling indicators and thus enable
inspectors to target high- risk shipments more efficiently.
Customs is evaluating the Automated Targeting System for expansion
to other land- border cargo ports.

In September 1998, we reported on Customs' aviation program
missions, resources, and performance measures. 2 Since the
establishment of the Customs Aviation Program in 1969, its basic
mandate to use air assets to counter the drug smuggling threat has
not changed. Originally, the program had two principal missions:

 border interdiction of drugs being smuggled by plane into the
United States and

 law enforcement support to other Customs offices as well as other
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

In 1993, the administration instituted a new policy to control
drugs coming from South and Central America. Because Customs
aircraft were to be used to help carry out this policy, foreign
counterdrug operations became a third principal mission for the
aviation program. Since then, the program has devoted about 25
percent of its resources to the border interdiction mission, 25
percent to foreign counterdrug operations, and 50 percent to other
law enforcement support.

Customs Aviation Program funding decreased from about $195 million
in fiscal year 1992, to about $135 million in fiscal year 1997
that is, about 31 percent in constant or inflation- adjusted
dollars. While available funds decreased, operations and
maintenance costs per aircraft flight hour increased. Customs
Aviation Program officials said that this increase in costs was
one of the reasons they were flying fewer hours each year. From
fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1997, the total number of flight
hours for all missions decreased by over one- third, from about
45,000 hours to about 29,000 hours.

The size of Customs' fleet dropped in fiscal year 1994, when
Customs took 19 surveillance aircraft out of service because of
funding reductions. The fleet has remained at about 114 since
then. 3 The number of Customs 2 Customs Service: Aviation Program
Missions, Resources, and Performance Measures (GAO/ GGD- 98186,
Sept. 9, 1998). 3 Customs' fleet should increase because
additional aircraft were funded in the Fiscal Year 1999 Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P. L.
105- 277, 112 Stat 2681553, 2681- 583. Aviation Program

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 4

Aviation Program onboard personnel decreased, from a high of 956
in fiscal year 1992 to 745 by the end of fiscal year 1997. 4

Customs has been using traditional law enforcement measures to
evaluate the aviation program (e. g., number of seizures, weight
of drugs seized, number of arrests). These measures, however, are
used to track activity, not measure results or effectiveness.
Until 1997, Customs also used an air threat index as an indicator
of its effectiveness in detecting illegal air traffic. 5 However,
Customs has discontinued use of this indicator, as well as some
other performance measures, because Customs determined that they
were not good measures of results and effectiveness. Having
recognized that these measures were not providing adequate
insights into whether the program was producing desired results,
Customs said it is developing new performance measures in order to
better measure results. However, its budget submission for fiscal
year 2000 contained no new performance measures.

The pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) inspection system is
designed to directly and automatically detect and measure the
presence of specific materials (e. g., cocaine) by exposing their
constituent chemical elements to short bursts of subatomic
particles called neutrons. Customs and other federal agencies are
considering whether to continue to invest in the development and
fielding of this technology.

The Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee
on Treasury and General Government, Senate Committee on
Appropriations, asked us to provide information about (1) the
status of plans for field testing a PFNA system and (2) federal
agency and vendor views on the operational viability of such a
system. We issued the report responding to this request on April
13, 1999. 6

Customs, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and Ancore Corporation the inspection system
inventor recently began planning to field test PFNA. Because they
were in the early stage of planning, they did not expect the
actual field test to begin until mid to late 1999 at the earliest.
Generally speaking, agency and

4 Staffing for the Aviation program is expected to grow to 817 in
fiscal year 2000, according to Customs' latest budget
justification. 5 The air threat index used various indicators,
such as the number of stolen and/ or seized aircraft, to determine
the potential threat of air drug smuggling. 6 Terrorism and Drug
Trafficking: Testing Status And Views on Operational Viability of
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis Technology (GAO/GGD-99-54, Apr. 13,
1999). Pulsed Fast Neutron

Analysis Inspection System

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 5

vendor officials estimated that a field test covering Customs' and
DOD's requirements will cost at least $5 million and that the cost
could reach $8 million if FAA's requirements are included in the
joint test. Customs officials told us that they are working
closely with the applicable congressional committees and
subcommittees to decide whether Customs can help fund the field
test, particularly given the no- federal- cost language of Senate
Report 105- 251. 7 In general, a complete field test would include
(1) preparing a test site and constructing an appropriate
facility; (2) making any needed modifications to the only existing
PFNA system and its components; 8 (3) disassembling, shipping, and
reassembling the system at the test site; and (4) conducting an
operational test for about 4 months. According to agency and
Ancore officials, the test site candidates are two seaports in
California (Long Beach and Oakland) and two land ports in El Paso,
Texas.

Federal agency and vendor views on the operational viability of
PFNA vary. While Customs, DOD, and FAA officials acknowledge that
laboratory testing has proven the technical feasibility of PFNA,
they told us that the current Ancore inspection system would not
meet their operational requirements. Among their other concerns,
Customs, DOD, and FAA officials said that a PFNA system not only
is too expensive (about $10 million to acquire per system), but
also is too large for operational use in most ports of entry or
other sites. Accordingly, these agencies question the value of
further testing. Ancore disputes these arguments, believes it can
produce an operationally cost- effective system, and is proposing
that a PFNA system be tested at a port of entry. The Office of
National Drug Control Policy has characterized neutron
interrogation as an emerging or future technology that has shown
promise in laboratory testing and thus warrants field testing to
provide a more informed basis for deciding whether PFNA has
operational merit.

At the request of the Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs and Criminal Justice, House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, 9 in June 1998 we identified the
organizations that collect and/ or produce counterdrug
intelligence, the role of these organizations, the federal funding
they receive, and the number of personnel that support

7 Senate Report 105- 251 (July 1998) on the fiscal year 1999
Treasury and General Government Appropriations bill directs the
Commissioner of Customs to enter into negotiations with the
private sector to conduct a field test of the PFNA technology at
no cost to the federal government.

8 The existing (prototype) PFNA system is located at the vendor's
plant in Santa Clara, CA. 9 This is now the Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans' Affairs and International Relations
of the House Committee on Government Reform. Federal Counterdrug

Intelligence Coordination Efforts

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 6

this function. 10 We noted that more than 20 federal or federally
funded organizations, including Customs, spread across 5 cabinet-
level departments and 2 cabinet- level organizations, have a
principal role in collecting or producing counterdrug
intelligence. Together, these organizations collect domestic and
foreign counterdrug intelligence information using human,
electronic, photographic, and other technical means.

Unclassified information reported to us by counterdrug
intelligence organizations shows that over $295 million was spent
for counterdrug intelligence activities during fiscal year 1997
and that more than 1,400 federal personnel were engaged in these
activities. The Departments of Justice, the Treasury, and Defense
accounted for over 90 percent of the money spent and personnel
involved. Customs spent over $14 million in 1997 on counterdrug
intelligence, and it is estimated that 63 percent of its 309
intelligence research specialists' duties involved counterdrug
intelligence matters.

Among its many missions, Customs is the lead agency for
interdicting drugs being smuggled into the United States and its
territories by land, sea, or air. Customs' primary counterdrug
intelligence mission is to support its own drug enforcement
elements (i. e., inspectors and investigators) in their
interdiction and investigation efforts. Customs is responsible for
producing tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence
concerning drug- smuggling individuals, organizations,
transportation networks, and patterns and trends. In addition to
providing these products to its own drug enforcement elements,
Customs is to provide this information to other agencies with drug
enforcement or intelligence responsibilities. Customs is also
responsible for analyzing the intelligence community's reports and
integrating them with its own intelligence. Customs' in- house
collection capability is heavily weighted toward human
intelligence, which comes largely from inspectors and
investigators who obtain information during their normal
interdiction and investigation activities.

In 1998, we reported on selected aspects of the Customs Service's
process for determining its need for inspectional personnel such
as inspectors

10 Drug Control: An Overview of U. S. Counterdrug Intelligence
Activities (GAO/NSIAD-98-142, June 25, 1998). Resource Allocation

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 7

and canine enforcement officers for the commercial cargo or land
and sea passengers at all of its 301 ports. 11

Customs officials were not aware of any formal agencywide efforts
prior to 1995 to determine the need for additional cargo or
passenger inspectional personnel for its 301 ports. However, in
preparation for its fiscal year 1997 budget request and a new drug
enforcement operation called Hard Line, 12 Customs conducted a
formal needs assessment. The needs assessment considered (1) fully
staffing all inspectional booths and (2) balancing enforcement
efforts with the need to move complying cargo and passengers
quickly through the ports. Customs conducted two subsequent
assessments for fiscal years 1998 and 1999. These assessments
considered the number and location of drug seizures and the
perceived threat of drug smuggling, including the use of rail cars
to smuggle drugs. However, all these assessments were

 focused exclusively on the need for additional personnel to
implement Hard Line and similar initiatives,

 limited to land ports along the Southwest border and certain sea
and air ports considered to be at risk from drug smuggling,

 conducted each year using generally different assessment factors,
and

 conducted with varying degrees of involvement by Customs'
headquarters and field units.

We concluded that these limitations could prevent Customs from
accurately estimating the need for inspectional personnel and then
allocating them to ports. We further concluded that, for Customs
to implement the Results Act successfully, it had to determine its
needs for inspectional personnel for all of its operations and
ensure that available personnel are allocated where they are
needed most. 13

We recommended that Customs establish an inspectional personnel
needs assessment and allocation process, and Customs is now in the
process of responding to that April 1998 recommendation. Customs
has awarded a contract for the development of a resource
allocation model, and Customs

11 Customs Service: Process for Estimating and Allocating
Inspectional Personnel (GAO/GGD-98-107, Apr. 30, 1998); Customs
Service: Inspectional Personnel and Workloads (GAO/GGD-98-170,
Aug. 14, 1998); and Customs Service: Inspectional Personnel and
Workloads (GAO/T-GGD-98-195, Aug. 14, 1998).

12 Operation Hard Line was Customs' effort to address border
violence and drug smuggling through intensified inspections,
improved facilities, and advances in technology. 13 Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993, P. L. 103- 62.

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 8

officials told us that the model was delivered in March 1999 and
that they are in the early stages of deciding how to use the model
and implement a formal needs assessment system.

Under the Results Act, executive agencies are to develop strategic
plans in which they, among other things, define their missions,
establish resultsoriented goals, and identify strategies they plan
to use to achieve those goals. In addition, agencies are to submit
annual performance plans covering the program activities set out
in the agencies' budgets (a practice which began with plans for
fiscal year 1999); these plans are to describe the results the
agencies expect to achieve with the requested resources and
indicate the progress the agency expects to make during the year
in achieving its strategic goals.

The strategic plan developed by the Customs Service addressed the
six requirements of the Results Act. Concerning the elements
required, the mission statement was results oriented and covered
Customs' principal statutory mission ensuring that all goods and
persons entering and exiting the United States do so in compliance
with all U. S. laws and regulations. The plan's goals and
objectives covered Customs' major functions processing cargo and
passengers entering and cargo leaving the United States. The plan
discussed the strategies by which Customs hopes to achieve its
goals. The strategic plan discussed, in very general terms, how it
related to annual performance plans. The plan discussed some key
factors, external to Customs and beyond its control, that could
significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals, such as
the level of cooperation of other countries in reducing the supply
of narcotics. Customs' strategic plan also contained a listing of
program evaluations used to prepare the plan and provided a
schedule of evaluations to be conducted in each of the functional
areas.

In addition to the required elements, Customs' plan discussed the
management challenges it was facing in carrying out its core
functions, including information and technology, finance, and
human resources management. However, the plan did not adequately
recognize Customs' need to improve

 financial management and internal control systems,

 controls over seized assets,

 plans to alleviate Year 2000 problems, 14 and 14 Customs has
established effective Year 2000 program management controls,
including structures and processes for Year 2000 testing,
contingency planning, and Year 2000 status reporting. See Year
2000 Performance Measures

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 9

 plans to improve computer security. 15 We reported that these
weaknesses could affect the reliability of Customs' performance
data.

Further, our initial review of Customs' fiscal year 2000
performance plan showed that it is substantially unchanged in
format from the one presented for 1999. Although the plan is a
very useful document for decisionmakers, it still does not
recognize Customs' need to improve its internal control systems,
control over seized assets, or plans to improve computer security.

You asked us to comment on the performance measures proposed by
Customs, which are to assess whether Customs is achieving its
goals. Customs has included 26 performance measures in its fiscal
year 2000 performance plan. These measures range from general
information on the level of compliance of the trade community with
trade laws and Customs' regulations (which Customs has
traditionally used) to very complex measures, such as
transportation costs of drug smuggling organizations. Many of
these complex measures were still being developed by Customs when
the fiscal year 2000 performance plan was issued. In addition,
Customs did not include performance targets for 8 of the 26
measures in its fiscal year 2000 plan.

You asked us to discuss Customs' action plan, which is a document
comprised of action items to resolve management problems.
Commissioner Kelly originated the action plan; all assistant
commissioners and office directors were asked to submit a list of
actual or perceived management problems in Customs. The action
plan is organized around 31 categories ranging from integrity to
the Mod Act implementation, and the May 1999 version had 219 items
under the 31 categories. Since 16 of the items are listed under
more than one category, there are 203 discrete items. For each
action item, the plan currently includes the (1) date initiated,
(2) responsible office( s), and (3) status. If more than one
office is responsible for an action, one of the offices is
designated as the lead office. Twenty- one offices within Customs
are responsible for taking the lead on resolving the action items.
The number of items that the offices are

Computing Crisis: Customs Has Established Effective Year 2000
Program Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-37, Mar. 29, 1999).

15 See Customs Service: Comments on Strategic Plan and Resource
Allocation Process (GAO/ T- GGD- 9815, Oct. 16, 1997); and Results
Act: Observations on Treasury's Fiscal Year 1999 Annual
Performance Plan (GAO/GGD-98-149, June 30, 1998). Action Plan

Statement U. S. Customs Service: Enforcement Oversight Issues

Page 10

responsible for ranges from 1 to 37. The first action plan was
issued in February 1999 and has since been updated three times.

According to the plan, it is Customs' intention to implement all
action items included in the plan by 2000. Customs' Director for
Planning is to manage and monitor the plan on an ongoing basis. He
told us that items are usually added at the behest of the
Commissioner. The Management Inspection Division (part of the
Office of Internal Affairs) is responsible for verifying and
validating the items that have been reported as completed,
including determining whether the action taken was effective. The
action plan of May 7 the latest version available shows that 91 of
the 203 items had been completed; 110 were ongoing, pending, or
scheduled; and 2 had no description of their status.

Overall, use of this kind of management tool can be very helpful
in communicating problems and proposed solutions to executives,
managers, and the Customs Service workforce, as well as to other
groups interested in Customs such as this Committee and us.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions.

Page 11 GAO/T-GGD-99-99

Page 12 GAO/T-GGD-99-99

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